tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30932360.post116451442005162980..comments2023-10-31T08:48:55.890-04:00Comments on Daf Yomi DafYomi Daf-Yomi: Daf Yomi - Beitza 30 - When the Reason doesn't Apply (Untzumdritimel)Avromihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13593992238707872967noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30932360.post-1164649254442676762006-11-27T12:40:00.000-05:002006-11-27T12:40:00.000-05:00In general, the rule is that once enacted a rabbin...In general, the rule is that once enacted a rabbinic edict does not disappear even if the driving reason behind the edict is no longer applicable, as long as a remote possibility still exists. When a remote possibility does not exist, then the edict is removed, such as mashkim megulim nowadays, according top most poskim. Tosfos might hold that the edict against clapping is similar to mashkim megulim, the other Rishonim hold that a remote possibility for fixing musical instruments still exists and it is not similar to maskim megulim.<BR/><BR/> Another possible explanation to tosfos is, that this edict was never totally accepted even when it was enacted, as the gemara says in Beitza 30 that it was never adhered to and we did not object. Although that alone did not make the edict disappear, the combination of it becoming only a remote possibility plus the fact that it was never fully accepted, leads Tosfos to rule that it no longer applies today. The other Rishonim do not agree to this combination.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30932360.post-1164636023514209402006-11-27T09:00:00.000-05:002006-11-27T09:00:00.000-05:00Rabbi Neustadt’s response was that once something ...Rabbi Neustadt’s response was that once something is established, it cannot be taken away, but wasn’t that the whole discussion? Shouldn’t the fact that clapping was forbidden X thousand years ago and then permitted (X – 1) thousand years ago be evidence that a d’rabbanan protecting from a situation that no longer occurs CAN in fact be taken away? Kal V’chomer a minhag. The question at hand is whether or not the principle of “once something is established, it cannot be removed” is ITSELF in effect always, under certain circumstances, or never. The fact that rabbis generally hold that way today seems to be countered by evidence from the Gemara. So why can this principle itself not be altered? It appears that Rabbis today are using the principle itself to maintain the principle. In other words, “while back then, a d’rabbanan that protected from something that no longer occurs could be removed, today we hold that once a principle is established it remains established”. Why does it remain established? Because once the minhag developed to not take away irrelevant minhagim, it cannot be changed. This is circular logic at best, and so needs to be understood.<BR/><BR/> <BR/><BR/>A while back I was going to do a Purim skit with a frum couple from the year 2050. One of the bits was going to be a lady putting flour, water, yeast, etc… into a machine, hitting a button, and 1 minute later pulling out a perfectly done challah. Then, the woman would take her finger and poke a whole through the side. When someone asked her about it, she would say “my grandmother used to make challahs with her bread machine, and they always had holes at the side when they came out. I follow the family minhag”. Not very funny, which is why I didn’t do it, but it goes to the point that sometimes rather unusual and poorly grounded minhagim can develop. Why can these things not “un-develop”?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30932360.post-1164583534177366622006-11-26T18:25:00.000-05:002006-11-26T18:25:00.000-05:00Your questions are debated by the poskim, and all ...Your questions are debated by the poskim, and all rejected, the main reason being that once it became assur we can’t be matir even if the situation changed. IN addition, they were worried about Kitniyos that are ground into flour, and then baked into similar to bread items, which might confuse the am haaretz to use any flour.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30932360.post-1164520542495833282006-11-26T00:55:00.000-05:002006-11-26T00:55:00.000-05:00Why is kitniyos not a prohibition whose reason is ...Why is kitniyos not a prohibition whose reason is common knowledge and no longer applies? It is a minhag that developed, which should, I would think, make it even easier to break when the reason does not apply to a d’rabbanan anymore.<BR/><BR/> <BR/><BR/>Am I correct in assuming that a commercial business that produces rice almost certainly has a large area (probably someone in China) that does nothing but nice? There probably isn’t wheat or anything else even close by. Similarly, these companies are probably so huge that each type of bean, etc… is grown in large fields that do nothing but that type of bean.<BR/><BR/> <BR/><BR/>I’ve never understood the whole thing in the first place, since even “back then”, a tiny piece of wheat making its way into the rice fields would be bitul b’shishim as long as everything is harvested and prepared before Pesach, right?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com