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Insights and More for Daf 11

2011-07-06T22:51:00.000-04:00

The Lots for the Goats

The halachah that that the lot (for the two goats) does not assign the goat to Azazel unless it is fit to be the one offered to Hashem can be explained in two ways. Either, that it is a law in the assigning of the lot - to be regarded as a proper lot - they both have to be fit for the chatas which will be offered to Hashem - if one is found to be a tereifah, it is a deficient lot; or perhaps there is an inherent law that the goat being sent to Azazel must be fit to be offered as the chatas for Hashem; a tereifah is therefore disqualified from being the goat sent to Azazel, and that is why it is not considered a lot.

Rav Elchanan Wasserman in Koveitz Heoros says that a practical difference between the two explanations is if it became a tereifah after the lot. According to the first explanation it is valid because at the time of the lot it was not a tereifah. According to the second understanding, it is still invalid because the goat being sent to Azazel cannot be a tereifah.

As they Intended

The Mishna teaches us that the zomemin witnesses are only punished if they attempted to have someone executed, but they were found to be zomemin before the defendant was executed (as long as it was after the verdict was handed down). However, if they were discredited through hazamah only after the defendant had been executed, they will not be punished. This is derived from the Scriptural verse: as they intended to do; but not as they actually accomplished.

The Kesef Mishnah explains this seemingly perplexing halachah in two manners:

1. When the zomemin witnesses actually carry out their plan and the accused is executed - such a sin is of such a magnitude that they cannot get punished in this world. The punishment for such a hideous sin can only take place in the next world- in Gehinnom.

2. Alternatively, he explains, if the accused was actually executed, we assume that he was indeed guilty and deserved to die. Hashem is present by every court case and it must be attributed to Divine Providence that the second set of witnesses did not arrive until after the defendant was executed.

DAILY MASHAL

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Most Drunkards

HaGaon Rabbi Yehonasan Eibeschitz zt”l was once asked by a gentile king why he doesn’t convert as gentiles constitute a majority as compared to the Jews. He replied that a majority is only used in case of a doubt but not when the situation is definite. Though this is true, there’s another simple answer. A hundred drunkards do not outweigh one chacham and who is like the wise of Israel who are pure of ulterior motives? (HaGaon E. Wasserman, Beiurei Agadaos ‘al Derech HaPeshat).

From Sacrifices

to Honoring One’s Father

The source of the halachah of the majority stems from sacrifices, which are offered without worrying about treifos. Maharal Tzintz writes that it is possible that we can thus explain the verse “And you will sanctify him for he offers the bread of your G-d” (Vayikra 21:8). You should sanctify the kohen and if you have a doubt if he is a kohen lest his declared father is not his true father (see Chulin 11b: “…and maybe he is not his father”), the answer is “for he offers the bread of your G-d” – learn from sacrifices that we should follow the majority and if so, he’s certainly his father and you should sanctify him (Melo Ha’Omer).

Who Distinguishes Between the Holy and the Mundane

Our sugya says that the two goats of Yom Kippur, the chatas and the goat for Azazel, must be equal. This teaches us that the holy and the mundane are likely to be equal, almost without any difference. How much must we concentrate to know what is holy and what is mundane! (Leket Amarim).

Chullin Starting!!! Join thousands!!!

2011-06-28T19:10:00.000-04:00

Tractate Chulin: Hakol Shochatin

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

With Hashem’s help we have finished Menachos and now we pass from the realm of kodshim to the realm of chullin - the mundane. Chullin is one of the longest tractates in the Talmud and its sugyos treat practical and most important subjects. It is one of the most varied tractates as it addresses a number of utterly different topics and therefore learners find much interest and satisfaction because of the many concepts they discover.

The tractate before us: First we shall learn the details of slaughtering, without which an animal is a neveilah. In the third chapter we shall learn about the signs of treifah and the signs of kashrus of land animals, fish and locusts. In the next chapter we shall complete different details of the topics learnt in the previous chapters and especially concerning the embryo of a slaughtered animal (ben peku’ah) and the impurity of a neveilah. Further on, the chapters are full of different subjects accompanying slaughtering and kashrus. In Chapter 5 we shall examine the details of the negative mitzvah not to slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day and in the next chapter we shall explore the mitzvah to cover up the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or fowl. In Chapter 7 we shall learn about the prohibition of gid hanasheh and Chapter 8 is devoted to the prohibition of meat and milk. In these chapters we shall also become aware of the great questions of mixtures. The halachos of a limb from a live animal and the impurity of a neveilah are detailed in Chapter 9 and in Chapter 10 and 11 we shall learn halachos concerning gifts to kohanim. The final chapter addresses the mitzvah of shiluach haken (chasing away a mother bird before taking its eggs).

After we finish chullin, we shall again learn about kodshim. chullin is like an island of matters of mundane meat among the tractates dealing with kodshim and some say that it is therefore called chullin or Shechitas chullin, as Rashi often calls it. Rambam (in the preface to his commentary on the Mishnah) explains that chullin was placed after Zevachim and Menachos because the Torah also treats the halachos of sacrifices and then addresses eating mundane meat: “Yet as much as you desire you shall slaughter and eat meat” (Devarim 12:15).

Who is fit to be a shochet?

In the first paragraph of the first chapter of Yoreh De’ah the Remo details who is fit to serve as a shochet: “He shouldn’t slaughter, though he is an expert and knows the halachos of shechitah, till he slaughters three times before a chacham expert in the halachos of shechitah, so that he knows that he is expert and will not faint (Tur in the name of Rambam). Therefore, we are accustomed that no one slaughters unless he received a kabalah (approval to slaughter) from a chacham. The chacham does not grant him a kabalah unless he knows that he knows the halachos of shechitah and is expert with his hands. Therefore we are accustomed to rely on anyone who comes to slaughter (that he surely received a kabalah)… and in some places they have the custom to be stricter, that the recipient takes a written kabalah as proof. Every shochet, though he has a kabalah, should review the halachos of shechitah from time to time, that he should be expert in them not to forget them (Rav Yaakov HaLevi in the name of the Maharash). The same applies to the halachos of examining the lungs and to the bodeik - the person who examines - their halachah and custom are equal in this entire matter. And the beis din should inspect the bodekim and shochetim to see that they should be expert and kosher (Mahariu, 50) for the hazard of any transgression concerning shechitah and bedikah, accessible to everyone, is immense.”

How often must he review of the halachos of shechitah: When the Remo said “from time to time”, he meant that a shochet should review the halachos every month! (Baer Heiteiv, S.K. 8). Beer HaGolah wrote in the Maharil’s name that during the first 30 days of his position a shochet should review the halachos of slaughtering and examination every day. After the first 30 days he should review them every 30 days and when he completes his first year, he should review them once in a while but if he doesn’t do so, his slaughtering is disqualified!

ShUB: shochet ubodek: It has always been known that a shochet must be an outstandingly G-d-fearing person and the title Shub, the initials of shochet ubodek is a source of pride to many, such that some adopted it as their family name. The need for an outstandingly G-d-fearing slaughterer is not mere stringency but concerns the basic halachos of slaughtering, as follows.

The three phases of shechitah: The process of rendering an animal fit to eat by shechitah consists of three phases: (1) examining the knife, (2) slaughtering, (3) examining the lungs.

Examining the knife: Rabeinu Yonah writes in his Sha’arei Teshuvah (sha’ar 3, os 96) that examining the knife demands extreme scrupulous care: “And regarding someone who is not conscientious, his heart will not understand to be meticulous about examining the knife for he must greatly concentrate all his attention on his examination. You will see that a person sometimes checks two or three times without detecting a slight fault and then he finds it, for he concentrated the last time.” Indeed, the task of examining the knife was given to the chacham or Rabbi and a shochet who didn’t show his knife to the Rabbi before slaughtering would be ostracized (chullin 18a)! Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 18:17) maintains that in later eras the custom arose to appoint special people for this task and the Rabbi relinquishes his honor to them as they are scrupulously careful. In fact, the author of Shulchan Aruch HaRav (18, Kuntres Acharon, S.K. 9) maintains that the Rabbanim only relinquished their honor for G-d-fearing people but others are not allowed to examine knives!

Slaughtering: One witness is believed regarding prohibitions (chullin 10b), as opposed to halachos of property and marriage, which require at least two witnesses. According to the Reem, one witness is still not believed to testify that an animal was properly slaughtered as, opposing his testimony there is a chazakah (previous knowledge) of prohibition to eat the (unslaughtered) animal, and one witness is not believed against a chazakah. Only a witness known to be faithful and kosher may testify (Mordechai, chullin, §579). There is therefore a need for a G-d-fearing shochet because otherwise, if he slaughtered an animal alone, he is not believed to testify that he slaughtered it properly. We emphasize that the Reem’s opinion was not accepted as halachah (see Pri Megadim in the preface and „Aroch HaShulchan, 4). But all the poskim repeatedly warn that we must eat from the shechitah of a G-d-fearing and scrupulous shochet, as Baer Heiteiv asserts (S.K. 29): “Not to give a kabalah to anyone who is frivolous but only to the G-d-fearing.”

Examining the lungs: An examination of the lungs is conducted to eliminate the possibility of a hole or another disorder of the lung, rendering the animal treifah. Though most animals are not treifah, one must examine the lungs because of the frequency of treifos (Shach, ibid) and Shulchan Aruch warns (Y.D. 39:1): “Anyone who breaches the fence - to eat without examination - should be bitten by a snake.”

Only the G-d-fearing may be lenient: Regarding two types of suspected treifah that could occur in a lung, Shulchan Aruch states (ibid, se’if 11 and 13) that in certain instances we may be lenient but he limits his statement: “We rely on this leniency only in case of an outstandingly G-d-fearing and kosher examiner.” We thus see that the need for an outstandingly G-d-fearing ShuB is essential, as otherwise one must not be lenient.

DAILY MASHAL

A Fast

The Chasam Sofer zt”l decreed a fast in his yeshivah before learning chullin according to Sefer Chasidim (261 and 1012; Mekor Chesed on Sefer Chasidim, 261, remark 6). Some believe that the reason is because of the danger that arises when a person demonstrates the matters of slaughtering and treifos on his own body (Sichas chullin in the preface, according to the Maharsha, Gitin, end of 57b).

What Is an Outstandingly G-d-fearing Person?

As explained in the article “Who Is Fit to Slaughter”, a shochet must be an outstandingly G-d-fearing person (yerei shamayim meirabim). People say in the name of the Belzer Rebbe that an outstandingly G-d-fearing person means that he must practice every stringency practiced by two people in his town as the least number of rabim (many) is two!

Last Daf in Menachos - learning about the sacrifices

2011-06-27T15:42:00.000-04:00

Anyone who learns about the chatas is as though he sacrificed it

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

With the conclusion of Menachos the Gemora teaches us: “Rabbi Yitzchak said, “…Anyone who learns about the chatas is as though he sacrificed it and anyone who learns about the asham is as though he sacrificed an asham.”

The Tur wrote (O.C. 1) that one had well say the parshah of the sacrifices every day and after saying the verses of the sacrifce one should say “May it be Your will” that saying the verses should be accepted as though the sacrifice were offered (see an expansion of this topic in the article “The parallel between saying korbanos and offering sacrifices” in Vol. 224).

Temporary atonement: Many sugyos indicate that even one who says the parshyos of the sacrifices devotedly does not become exempt from the obligation of his sacrifice and when the Temple will be built, he must offer them. Saying korbanos is temporary atonement, “as though he offered”, but he is surely not exempt from the Torah’s obligation (Responsa Har Tzvi, O.C. 1; Bnei Yisaschar, Maamar Rosh Chodesh, maamar 2, os 8; Responsa Torah Shleimah, 120; and see Kemotzei Shalal Rav, parshas Tzav).

Apropos, as we approach the end of Menachos, we mention two augmentive tidbits to explain Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha’s famous words when once, on Shabbos, he tilted a light unintentionally and wrote down “I, Yishmael ben Elisha, read and tilted a light on Shabbos; when the Temple will be built, I’ll bring a fat chatas” (Shabbos 12b). Why wasn’t he satisfied with reading the parashah of the chatas?

Saying korbanos lacks the advantage of the kohanim’s eating:. The author of Yeshu’os Ya’akov (O.C. 1) wrote in the name of the Rishonim that as the atonement of the chatas is also achieved by the kohanim’s eating – “kohanim eat and the owners are atoned” (Pesachim 59b) – hence by saying the verses of the chatas we do not achieve that same level accomplished by offering the sacrifice. This is also the reason, he adds, that Rabbi Yishmael undertook a fat chatas – to emphasize the inability to make up for the kohanim’s part by saying the verses.

By saying the verses we do not achieve the advantage of an embellished sacrifice: Rabbi Yitzchak Shvadron, the Maharsham’s son, solved this question in the following manner (in the preface to Responsa Maharsham, II, os 32). A few times we have already cited the halachah mentioned by Rambam (Hilchos Isurei Mizbeiach 1:1): “It is a positive mitzvah that all the sacrifices should be perfect and choice, as we are told: „It should be perfect for a good will‟. This is a positive mitzvah.” It is obvious that though saying the verses of the sacrifices is considered like offering them, it can never achieve the level of observing the mitzvah with embellishment such as offering a fat sacrifice. This is what Rabbi Yishmael meant when he said “I’ll bring a fat chatas.”

Still, saying the verses of the sacrifices has advantages over their being offered. The first is if a person has a doubt as to if he committed a transgression unintentionally, he is forbidden to bring a sacrifice because of the doubt but he may say the appropriate verses and that is considered his atonement (Responsa Har Tzvi, ibid; see ibid, that he proves so from the Tur).

Saying korbanos atones for intentional sins: The Bnei Yisachar of Dinov zt”l tells of the second advantage (in the preface to his Derech Pikudecha, preface 5, os 8; cf Rabeinu Yonah to Rif, Berachos 3a, s.v. kivan), that saying korbanos can atone for intentional sins! This is based on Chazal’s statement (Taanis 27a, etc.) that Avraham said, “Ribono shel ‘olam…when there’s no Temple what will be with them?” He told him, “I already arranged the order of korbanos. When they read them before Me, I attribute to them as though they offered them and forgive them all their sins (‘avonoseihem).” An ‘avon is an intentional sin. We thus see that learning the verses of the sacrifices can ease atonement for intentional sins (Kemotzei Shalal Rav, ibid).

Hadran Aloch Maseches Menachos. We shall review it and learn about the sacrifices to atone for us before Hashem.

DAILY MASHAL

Korbanos!

It is told about HaGaon Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (Halichos Shlomo, I, Ch. 6, remarks 20 and 24) that he took care to come ten minutes before the start of prayers to say birchos hashachar and korbanos patiently and pleasantly. He told to those who asked to at least be careful to say the parshah of the tamid and the ketores (incense). If he didn’t say them before prayers, it is fitting to say the parshah of the tamid after prayers but not the ketores as they already said it at the end of the prayer. He was unsatisfied that people were careless about saying korbanos and would urge his pupils to heed such and in cheider the pupils should be taught to say at least part of korbanos.

A Minchah:

Like a Body Without a Soul

At the start of Menachos (Vol. 228) we cited the following peninah: The pupils of HaGaon Rav Chayim of Volozhin zt”l write in the name of their mentor: Prayer resembles the tamid. “Prayer without concentration is like a body without a soul.” This means that prayer without concentration does not have the advantage of an animal sacrifice, which has a soul, but the advantage of a minchah, which is “a body without a soul” (Tosefes Ma’aseh Rav, 12; Keser Rosh, 22; Beiurei Rabeinu Chayim MiVolozhin, 163).

A reader sent us an interesting addition which he heard from HaGaon HaTzadik Rav Gedalyah Eiseman, mashgiach of Kol Torah Yeshivah. Chazal’s satement, that prayer without concentration is like a body without a soul, denegrates the value of such prayer while Rav Chayim’s statement apparently enlivens it as he treats such prayer as a minchah! However, a minchah was offered by a poor person who could not afford to offer an animal. From such a person, who is not able to pray with concentration, his prayer is accepted like a minchah. But someone who could have prayed with concentration should not expect his prayer to be regarded…

Join our "NEW" Kedushas Tefillin Project!!!!!

2011-04-15T12:20:00.000-04:00

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

The Glory of Tefillin

by: R’ Zev Busel

ליהודים היתה אורה ושמחה וששן ויקר - the Yidden experienced light and joy, delight and honor. The Gemora in Meseches Megillah tells us that that אורה זו תורה, and that שמחה זה יום טוב, ששון זו מילה, and ויקר אלו תפילין. Rashi explains that Haman decreed against the observance of the aforementioned mitzvos and now we are able to observe them.

The Sfas Emes pondered: If so, why didn't the passuk just say that ליהודים היתה תורה יום טוב ומילה ותפילין? The Sfas Emes answers that through the redemption, Klal Yisroel experienced a heightened realization that the true nature of light is Torah; the true nature of joy is Yom Tov; the true nature of delight is bris milah; and that the true nature of honor is tefillin.

Perhaps in regard to tefillin this concept can be explained as follows: Horav Yonasan Eibeschitz in יערות דבש דרוש ג' writes that the sudden rejuvenation of the mitzvah of tefillin subsequent to the miracles of Purim was because tefillin is symbolic of Hashem monitoring one’s thoughts and actions. Everything that transpires in our lives is not teva, natural, but rather the hashgachah protis, Divine providence of the Ribono Shel Olam. The shel rosh symbolizes that all our thoughts are observed by Hashem; the shel yad represents our actions. Therefore, after the great miracles of Purim, that even in the darkness of galus, where beforehand it was not so recognizable the glory of Hashem, the Jewish people merited to see the yad Hashem, and that created a renewed awareness for the mitzvah of tefillin.

With this we understand why true honor is reflected in tefillin. After the nes of Purim, witnessed by the nations, Klal Yisroel-- as the am hanivchar, the Chosen People, merited special hashgachah protis even in galus. This is the true kavod, as reflected by the mitzvah of tefillin as expressed in the Gemora: וראו כל עמי הארץ כי שם ה' נקרא עליך ויראו ממך - then all the peoples of the earth will see that the Name of Hashem is proclaimed over you, and they will revere you. When one realizes that the true nature of honor is tefillin, how much more so is it imperative to properly observe this unique mitzvah.

DAILY MASHAL

Tefillin In your Head

It is written: And all the peoples of the earth shall see that the name of Hashem is proclaimed over you, and they shall be in awe of you. It was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Eliezer the Great said: This refers to the tefillin of the head.

The Baal Hatanya notes that it does not say “the tefillin that are on his head,” but rather, “the tefillin in his head.” The tefillin will make an impression on others only if the wearer has internalized the message of the tefillin inside of him. If it is merely resting on his head, it will have no effect on others.

The Minchas Elozar continued and says that in order to reach that level, one must ensure that he has “his head” in the tefillin. One must make a strong effort not to lose focus while he is wearing his tefillin. If one works diligently to have his head in the tefillin, he will eventually reach the level where the tefillin will be in his head.

He used to say to a boy becoming bar mitzvah as he was putting his tefillin on for the very first time: Do not talk idle chatter with your tefillin on! If you guarantee me that that you will never talk idle chatter while wearing your tefillin, I will guarantee you that you will feel the “taste” of the tefillin.

HALACHOS OF TEFILLIN

by: Rabbi Boruch Hirschfeld Shlit”a

When one puts on tefillin he should have the following things in mind:

To fulfill the mitzvah of tefillin shel yad.
To fulfill the mitzvah of tefillin shel rosh.
To subdue my heart, mind and body for Hashem.
To remember the miracle of yetzias mitzrayim (shows Hashem’s power over heaven and earth).
To minimize the physical pleasures of this world.
To believe in the Oneness of Hashem written in the tefillin.
To fulfill everything else written in the tefillin (love Hashem, learn Torah, mezuzah, tefillah, mitzvos of Pesach and prohibitions regarding chametz, pidyon haben).

The ideal time for thinking these כוונות is while he puts on the tefillin. If he didn’t, he can think them right after putting them on the tefillin or any time while still wearing them.

Between the של יד and של ראש it is אסור to speak out, even to answer אמן or יהא שמיה רבא. He should just think to be יוצא with what the others are saying.

After finishing tightening and positioning the של ראש, one should say ברוך שם... ועד. One should be very careful not to say ברוך שם till the של ראש is fully positioned.

It is very praiseworthy to learn something while wearing tefillin, before they are taken off.

Join the Kedushas Tefillin Program!

Who is this program for?

Any boy who has a ratzon to wear his tefillin without talking.

How do I Join?

Contact our Gabbai, Eli Jaffa, @ 216-385-4869, or send us an email @ kedushastefillin@gmail.com.

What are the rules?

See below.

What do I get?

A tremendous reward for davening properly, and for being careful in the fulfillment of this mitzvah. For the “she’lo lishma” part, see below.

How do I keep track?

After you join, you will receive a monthly card.

When Can I start?

The program begins on the second day of Rosh Chodesh Iyar, May 5th

Hatzlachah!!

Kedushas Tefillin Rules

You should be davening with a minyan.
You should be wearing your tefillin from at least “Boruch she’amar” until after “Aleinu.”
There is no talking (including “mouthing”) with your tefillin on.
Even if you (mistakenly) talk, you will try not to continue (during that Shacharis).
The month begins on Rosh Chodesh (second day, when applicable).
You cannot miss-out more than four times during a month.
If you have a perfect month, or only miss once - you will receive the following: a set of old coins (which includes: 2 pennies from the 50’s; 2 from the 40’s; 2 from the 30’s), plus you will be entered into three raffles for sets of seforim.
If you miss twice or three times, you will still receive the set of old coins, and you will be entered into two raffles for sets of seforim.
When you have completed your third month, the set of coins will begin to include the following: Pennies from the 20’s; 10’s; 1900’s; 1890’s; 1880’s and even earlier; nickels from the turn of the century; foreign coins, plus more.
Any boy that hands in 12 cards (and did not win any of the monthly raffles) will receive a sefer.

If you would like your school or class to join this project, please contact

Rabbi Adler

@ kedushastefillin@gmail.com.

Daily Mashal - Zevachim 90

2011-02-08T22:51:00.002-05:00

This is the Law of an Olah

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

The Order of Serving Hashem

Our Gemora explains that a chatas should be sacrificed before an „olah but that the Torah put the verses of the „olah before those of the chatas because “for its reading, the Torah gave precedence to it”. Rashi (s.v. Lemikraah) comments: “that it should be read in the subject (of offerings) first” and Tosfos wonder (s.v. Lemikraah): “What kind of chidush is this?” HaGaon Rav Eliyahu Dessler zt”l writes that we can explain Rashi thus: In the order of sacrifices – i.e., in the practical phases of serving Hashem, the chatas – the rectification of sins – precedes the „olah – achieving high levels. But “for its reading” – i.e., to know and perceive high levels – “the Torah gave precedence to it” as even before the sinner finishes rectifying his sins, he should be familiar with all the levels. One cannot serve Hashem from a narrow viewpoint but one must be aware of all the stages of serving Hashem and the high levels that one must strive to achieve (Michtav MeEliyahu, III 174).

Miracle of the fire - Zevachim 89

2011-02-07T11:43:00.002-05:00

Our Mishna says that one must first burn the limbs of an ‘olah and then the parts of a chatas. At the inauguration of the altar in the Sanctuary, the Torah says that they put the ‘olah on the altar and, above it, the parts of the other sacrifices (Vayikra 9). But when the fire came out from before Hashem and “consumed on the altar”, the verse says that it consumed the “’olah and the fats.” In other words, first the fire burned the ‘olah and then the fats above the ‘olah! The Netziv writes that this was a miracle to observe the halachah that the limbs of an ‘olah are burnt before the parts of other sacrifices (Ha’amek Davar, Shemini).

Ramps in the Mishkan

2011-01-12T17:03:00.004-05:00

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Rav Yehudah said: Two small ramps branched off from the main ramp, by which one (on the west side) turned to the base and one (on the east side) to the ledge, and these were also separated from the altar by a hairsbreadth, because it is written: around.

HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V’Kailav, notes: This is referring to the altar in the Beis HaMikdash. It is logical to assume that there would also be one to the ledge in the Mishkan if the ledge in the Mishkan was for the Kohanim to walk upon. According to Rashi in Chumash there was no ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan, so there was no need for a small ramp to the ledge. There are commentators that maintain that there was a ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan (page 234), so according to them there was a need for a small ramp to the ledge.

Regarding if in the Mishkan there was a small ramp to the base, according to what Shitah Mekubetzes (letter 12) that the purpose of the small ramp to the base was because if the Kohen would have to go down the ramp and then go to the base, the blood might coagulate and become unfit for sprinkling, it would seem that there should also be one in the Mishkan. Even though it would seem that the ramp in the Mishkan was a little shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, it is not logical to say that since the ramp in the Mishkan was a few amos shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, there would be no concern that the blood would coagulate. According to what we have written, it seems that there was only one small ramp in the Mishkan,

Traveling with the Fire on the Altar

2011-01-09T18:03:00.001-05:00

The Gemora says that the fire that came down from the heavens during the time of Moshe did not depart from the copper Altar until the time of Shlomo. The fire that came down from the heavens during the time of Shlomo did not depart until Menashe and removed it.

Kollel Iyun HaDaf http://www.dafyomi.co.il/zevachim/insites/zv-dt-061.htm poses the following question: Rashi in his commentary on Chumash (Shemos 30:3) cites the Mechilta which contrasts the Mizbe’ach ha’Ketores to the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes. The verse says that the Mizbe’ach ha’Ketores had a solid top, while, says the Mechilta, the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes did not have such a top. The Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes was transported merely as a frame, and at each stop in the desert its hollow interior was filled with dirt. The Netziv (Shemos 27:2) therefore questions Rashi’s words from the Gemora here, which states that the fire descended and stayed on the Mizbe’ach. If the earth inside of the hollow of the Mizbe’ach was removed and the Mizbe’ach dismantled each time the Jewish people embarked on a new journey, then where was the fire?

HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V'Kailav, answers as follows: Firstly, according to the Malbim (Shemos 20, posuk 21) there is an argument in Mechilta whether the Mizbe’ach was carried with the dirt or not. The Malbim also brings another dispute if the fire was on the Mizbe’ach when they traveled or not. The Malbim explains that if the fire remained, then the Mizbe’ach was filled with dirt when they carried it. If it did not remain, then it was carried without dirt.

According to the Shitah Mekubetzes on our Daf (letter 6), in the time they traveled, the fire rested on the edge of the Mizbe’ach.

According to Raaviah (chelek sheini Maseches Chagigah siman 808), the fire rested on a clump of dirt carried with the Mizbe’ach.

According to Anaf Yosef on Tanchuma (Terumah 11) they put a tablet on the Mizbe’ach and it rested on it.

According to Tosafos HaSaleim (Shemos 38, 6-7, letter 1), even according to Rashi, the Mizbe’ach HaNechshes had a top.

The Kollel cites the following answers: The Netziv explains that the Gemora argues with the Mechilta and maintains that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes did have a top on which the fire rested even during the journeys. He finds support for this assertion in the Midrash Tanchuma. He explains that the way the Mizbe’ach was filled with earth was through the bottom of the Mizbe’ach, which had no floor. Upon their arrival at a new location, the Jewish people would make a mound of earth and place the Mizbe’ach over it, effectively filling the Mizbe’ach with earth. When they would leave, they would lift the Mizbe’ach, leaving the earth in its place.

This also seems to be the opinion of the Kereisi u’Pleisi (43:5). The Gemora in Chagigah (27a) derives through a kal va’chomer from the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav that the fire of Gehinom does not affect the transgressors among the Jewish people. Even though the gold covering the top of the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav was only the thickness of a dinar coin, it was not diminished at all throughout the years that it had a fire burning on it. Certainly, then, the transgressors among the Jewish people -- who are full of mitzvos like a pomegranate -- will not be affected by the fire of Gehinom (see Insights to Chagigah 27a).

Tosfos in Chagigah there (DH she’Ein) is bothered by a question, as the Kereisi u’Pleisi explains his words. Why does the Gemora learn this kal va’chomer from the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav, and not from the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes? The only thing offered on the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav was the incense offering, which was burned there once at the beginning of the day and once at the end of the day. There was much more activity on the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes, which had a fire on it at all times, and it too had a coating of gold that did not diminish!

Since the Kereisi u’Pleisi says that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes had a coating of gold on its top, it is clear that he maintains that the Mizbe’ach had a top, like its counterpart, the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav.

The Gemora here may be understood even according to Rashi’s assertion that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes had no top, based on the words of the Shitah Mekubetzes (#6). Rashi here (DH Lo Nistalkah) comments that while the Jewish people traveled in the desert, they used to turn a certain type of vessel over the fire on the Mizbe’ach to preserve the fire. This is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah in Toras Kohanim (Tzav 2:10; see Rash mi’Shantz), and not the opinion of Rebbi Shimon who says that the fire was removed from the Mizbe’ach. This is also the way Rashi explains in Bamidbar (4:13), where he says that the cover of the Mizbe’ach was not burned by the fire underneath it while traveling, due to the vessel which was placed over the fire. If there was no actual top to the Mizbe’ach, though (but rather its frame was filled to the top with earth), and the earth inside of it was removed when the people traveled, where could they place the vessel to contain the fire? The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that they placed the vessel “over the edge” of the Mizbe’ach. This means that the fire on the Mizbe’ach remained on top of the frame of the Mizbe’ach, covered by this vessel.

Eighty Replies to One Question

2010-12-27T18:19:00.000-05:00

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
and Many of our Subscribers

Our Gemora states: Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi said, I have heard that the owner causes piggul. In his opinion, not only a Kohen can disqualify a sacrifice with a thought of piggul (that it will be eaten not in its proper time or place) but the owner of a sacrifice can disqualify it in the same way.

A question that originated in the beis midrash of Rabbi Chayim Berlin zt”l, the Netziv’s son, was discussed in all centers of learning everywhere. In his Sedei Chemed, HaGaon Rav Chizkiyah Medini zt”l collected the replies to this question from outstanding talmidei chachamim in Teveria, Vilna, Germany, etc. The question even graced the world of Torah with the work Gevuros Shemonim which, according to its author HaGaon Rav Yosef Engel zt”l (author of Beis HaOtzar, Asvan D’oraisa, etc.), “discusses one question and answers it in 80 ways”. His pupils related that he had many more answers but he sufficed with publishing 80 of them to give his book its unique name.

The question: If the owner causes piggul, we cannot test a sotah (a woman suspected of adultery) in the Temple, as before she drinks the cursing water, the Kohen has to offer the minchah (Sotah 23a, s.v. Kol) that she must bring. The sotah, who surely wants to be saved from the curse, will cause the minchah to be piggul and without offering the minchah, the water does not test her (Sotah 20b)! Rav Berlin continues that this question is only according to Rambam, that piggul can be caused also by thought but according to Rashi, that piggul is caused only by speech, the sotah can be prevented from saying anything.

She can be taken out of the ‘Azarah: The fifth of the 80 answers is based on Tosfos (above, 29a, s.v. Lamakom), who assert that a thought of piggul disqualifies a sacrifice only in the ‘Azarah. If so, the sotah can be taken out of the ‘Azarah while the minchah is offered. To force her to say the opposite: In the 37th answer, Rav Engel advises that the woman be forced to say explicitly that the minchah will be eaten in its proper time and place. From then on, even if she thinks frantically that it should be piggul, she cannot disqualify anything (according to Pesachim 63a).

The Kohen dispels her thought: In the 18th answer we find an idea based on a fine proof from Rashi on our sugya (s.v. Shama’ti), that the owner causes piggul only if the Kohen remains silent. But if the Kohen announces his pure intentions, the owner cannot cause piggul.

Piggul applies only to shelamim and todos: Rav Zeev Yitzchak HaLevi Dünner of Germany offered the answer that the owner can cause piggul only concerning shelamim and todos, whose meat they eat, but not regarding an asham, chatas orminchah, of which they do not partake (and see ibid, answer 4).

It would appear that the concept of the owner causing piggul is not relevant to the sotah’s minchah. The Gemora (36a; see Rashi ad loc. s.v. Hachi Garsinan Lishna Acharina) says that piggul, which entails intending to eat or burn the korban at the wrong time, only applies if the one causing the piggul can actually do it at the wrong time. But if he himself cannot, intending that others will do it at the wrong time is meaningless. Accordingly, the halachah that the owner can cause piggul would only apply to shelamim and the like, where the owner will indeed be eating the meat, so it is up to him to intend to eat it at the wrong time. But when it comes to the minchah, the woman will not be burning the minchah, nor will she be eating it. All she can do is intend that the Kohen burn or eat it at the wrong time, and that is meaningless.

Let’s remember that the woman is not the sole owner, as the husband is the one "sponsoring" the korban for her, which has many halachic ramifications. Accordingly, it is quite likely that the husband is the one who would have the jurisdiction over the piggul, just as we see in Bava Kama Daf 13a-b that when one person sponsors a korban for another, the sponsor is entitled to the meat.

Rashi writes that the owner can render it piggul if the Kohen had no intent, implying that if the Kohen explicitly intended the proper thought, the owner’s thought would not count. This makes sense, considering that the source for the owner’s power to cause piggul is that he too is called a makriv, but as a makriv, he is definitely secondary to the Kohen. Accordingly, in the case of the sotah, the solution is to ensure that the Kohen specifically intends the right thought.

The most obvious answer seems to be that she cannot overpower the intention of the Kohen doing the avodah. You will note that Rashi says that the owner can cause piggul if he has piggul intention and the Kohen kept quiet. From here it seems that if the Kohen has an active intention the owner’s intention cannot take effect.

Perhaps, since it’s not b’yadah to eat it chutz l’zmano or to be makriv it chutz l’mkomo, she cannot make it piggul.

The Torah says that the husband shall bring her to the Kohen, and therefore it’s his korban not hers.

Perhaps because she would benefit personally from piggul, therefore she does not have believability.

Only an innocent woman will actually drink the waters, so as to prove her innocence. Accordingly, she wouldn’t cause it to become piggul.

The Torah says (Bamidbor 5,15) "Veheivi", which means that the husband brings the minchah, so what makes the wife the owner? And even if the waving (of the minchah) is done by the wife, so what? The Kohen had to do the waving with her as well so he is the owner as well?

In Sotah 19, the Chachamim say (and so is the halachah) that first she drinks and then they start with the minchah. There was no chance to cause piggul before drinking, and R’ Shimon says the minchah was first, but who says that he agrees with Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi?

It would seem to me that if she deliberately has machsheves piggul, she would not be believed to say so since ain odom maysim atzmo rasha. (I assume it is forbidden to deliberately invalidate a korban, and especially to prevent them from fulfilling dinei sotah). The only possible case is if the person says he accidentally had machsheves piggul.

Who said the woman is the owner of the korban. Perhaps it’s being brought for her, not by her, and she can’t cause the piggul.

If we’re concerned that she’ll try to get out of drinking she could do it in an easier way by admitting she was guilty. This would forbid her to her husband, but no death penalty.

Who said the wife is the owner of the minchah? Doesn’t the husband pay for it and have to "bring her"? Isn’t he the owner?

The first though that occurs to me is whether in fact the korban minchah prevents the sotah from drinking, or is it considered a separate and distinct aspect of the overall process, so that even if it invalidated it, she could still drink?

There is a halachah that if the accused sotah declares that she will not drink, then the korban minchah must be burned. Therefore, even according to the opinion of the Rambam, if she is completely silent, we need not be concerned with the possibility of her having a piggul thought, since she did not verbally refuse to drink. Obviously, she feels that she is innocent, and is willing to do ahead with the entire process - including both a proper hakravah of the korban and the drinking.

Rashi there says ‘if the Kohen is quiet while being mekabel…’ – this sounds like the only then does the owner capable of rendering it piggul. Therefore here where there is a concern we’ll just have the Kohen speak out the correct time and day… and therefore even the Rambam will agree that her intention cannot override or have any impact to the Kohen’s expression.

Do we see anywhere that we suspect someone to deliberately render something piggul – is it not kares?

If there is this concern then R’ Chaim Berlin should ask more – how can the Kohen continue to do the different avodah’s on an animal which is suspect to be piggul?

Saying Eizehu Mekoman before Prayer

For very many years it has been the custom to say the Mishna of our chapter, Eizehu mekoman, before shacharis. The Tur (O.C. 50) bases the custom on the halachah that every day one should learn Torah (Written), Mishna and Talmud (Kiddushin 30a). Therefore we say the parashah of the tamid and the verses dealing with the sacrifices for the portion of Torah, Eizehu mekoman for Mishna and Rabbi Yishmael’s braisa for the portion of Talmud. Our chapter was chosen from the 524 chapters of Mishna because the Gemora in Menachos 110a praises those who learn about sacrifices (see Perishah, ibid, S.K. 2 and 4).

Beis Yosef (ibid) cites another reason in the name of the Raah: “because there is no disagreement in the whole chapter and it is a clear Mishna handed down from Moshe from Mount Sinai”. In other words, this chapter does not contain even one difference of opinions and therefore we assume that it has been handed down from Moshe in its present form (Peninim Mishulchan HaGra, end of Shemos, and the Noda’ BiYeudah wrote likewise in Doresh LeTziyon, derush 11). Some also prove thus from the phrasing of the Mishna in this chapter, which evidences its antiquity, as we are told: “…and they are eaten within the curtains (kla’im)”. Curtains were not in the Temple but in the Sanctuary (mishkan). Therefore, the Tanaim did not formulate this Mishna but it originates from the generation of the desert (see Otzar HaTefilos, p. 81 in the remark, and Tiferes Yisrael on our chapter, os 22). ‘Ateres Zekeinim on Shulchan ‘Aruch (ibid) states that the words of this chapter amount to 344 and when we add 1 for reading, we arrive at the numerical equivalent for Moshe – a hint that this chapter was given to Moshe at Mount Sinai in its present phrasing.

Is it really true, many wondered, that there is no difference of opinions in the chapter? Our Gemora explains that the Mishna’s statement, that the pesach is eaten only till midnight, is only according to Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and not according to Rabbi Akiva (see Pri Megadim, ibid, in Eishel Avraham, and see Yeshu’as Ya’akov, S.K. 1). Indeed, the Ritva, the great pupil of the Raah, indicates (Avodah Zarah 19b) that Raah did not mean that this chapter was given to Moshe in its present form but “since the whole chapter is learnt with no difference of opinions mentioned at all, it should be learnt more than other chapters”.

HaGaon Rav Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, who expands on the topic (Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, IX, 5), cites the reason of Orchos Chayim (Dinei Meah Berachos, os 16), that this chapter includes the secret of all the sacrifices. Yesod Veshoresh Ha’Avodah says: “A person scrutinizing the writings of the Ari z”l will realize its great import, that every Mishna of this chapter is a rectification (tikun) in itself in the high worlds” (see Tzitz Eli’ezer, ibid).

To conclude, we should mention the statement of Rabbi Shneiur Zalman of Lyadi zt”l (Responsa HaGraz, 1:9), that as saying Eizehu mekoman before prayer was mainly instituted so that a person should learn something each day, a person “who can learn and understand does not have to say the parashah of the sacrifices each day but to say it sometimes suffices”.

DAILY MASHAL

How Could You Write a Book on Eizehu Mekoman?

A person who wrote a commentary on Eizehu mekoman came with his book to Rebbe Baruch of Mezhbuzh for an approbation. The Rebbe replied, “I wonder how you could write such a commentary. When I come to this chapter, I begin to imagine bringing sacrifices to the Temple and the service of the kohanim. My stomach turns over and I’m full of tribulations and suffering” (Ma’yanah shel Mishna).

What Is a Sacrifice?

Our Mishna says “What is the place of the sacrifices?” – i.e., all the sacrifices. Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra writes in his commentary on the Torah (Shemos 20:20): “I saw an apostate…who challenged the chachamim because they said „What is the place of the sacrifices (zevachim)‟. He said that in all the Torah he found zevichah referring only to shelamim, such as „‘olah uzevachim as an ‘olah is a thing for itself and the zevachim are shelamim, as in „…and they offered ‘olos and slaughtered zevachim shelamim” (Shemos 24:5) and thus we find everywhere. I showed him that he wasn’t speaking correctly as we are told: „…and you will slaughter (vezavachta) on it your ‘olos and shelamim.” He then admitted to his sin…that he had disputed men greater than all following generations”

Story on the Daf

2010-07-14T10:33:00.001-04:00

The Gemora states that the terms Mishkan and Mikdash are interchangeable. One must wonder if the terms are interchangeable, why Scripture would not just employ one term, either always using the term Mishkan or always using the term Mikdash. An answer to this puzzle can be found with a story that occurred many years ago.

Rabbi Stein, an executive director of a well-known Yeshiva, rand the doorbell one evening at the Miller’s home. Mr. Miller invited Rabbi Stein inside to partake of supper with Mr. Miller’s family. Rabbi Stein began apologizing for interrupting the family, when Mr. Miller said, “Please, I am certain you are here for an important reason. How can I be of help to you?”

Rabbi Stein explained that the yeshiva was in desperate need of funds, so Mr. Miller sent his son to bring his checkbook. After writing out a very generous check to the Yeshiva and handing it to Rabbi Stein, Rabbi Stein thanked Mr. Miller and rose to leave. “I would like to apologize again for coming at such an inconvenient time,” Rabbi Stein said. “The opposite is true,” declared Mr. Miller. “Let me share with you something.

Reb Yitzchak Hutner of Yeshivas Chaim Berlin calls me from time to time asking for financial assistance for his Yeshiva. When Rav Hutner once called me while I was eating supper, I told Rav Hutner the following: I am very organized in my method of giving tzedakah. I set aside ten percent of my income and I distribute the funds systematically. I would probably give the Rosh HaYeshiva a donation even without the Rosh HaYeshiva calling me, but I actually appreciate the call. I would never interrupt my supper to pay a utility bill, but I will interrupt my supper to give tzedakah, because I feel that this is something that is every important for my children to witness. Rabi Stein, I must thank you too for ringing my doorbell as we were about to commence our supper. You could not have arrived at a better time.”

This story teaches us that there is a Mikdash, a shul, a yeshiva, or any worthy Jewish organization, but there is also a Mishkan, from the generosity and beauty of performing the mitzvah of tzedakah, that allows the Divine Presence to reside in the homes of those who support the Torah.

Sent out of a Walled City

The Gemora mentions that there is a special sanctity regarding cities in Eretz Yisroel that were surrounded by a wall in the times of Yehoshua. Rashi writes some of these halachos: One who sells a house inside a walled city has one year to redeem the house, but if he chooses not to redeem the house, it becomes the property of the buyer permanently; sending a metzora outside the city; and that the open space (1,000 cubits) surrounding the city should be left uncultivated.

Why does a Metzora need to leave a city that is surrounded by a wall, but may otherwise remain in all other cities--as long as they are unwalled? The Be'er Yosef provides a fascinating p'shat based on the Chazal in Erachin (15b) which states that Hashem provided for the tongue two protections -- two walls: one of flesh--the lips, and one of bone--the teeth. A metzora breached his very own walls of protection by speaking lashon hora; he cannot therefore remain in a city protected by a wall!

Hakhel Note: An average city has only one wall--yet Hashem in his benevolence gives us a truly enhanced fortification--a dual safeguard! How can a person be so imprudent, so unwise, so as to take down not only one wall made for his own protection--but two! We will add one other point, as well. One of the most famous Metzora scenes in Tanach is that of Gechazi and his sons outside the city of Shomron (the Haftorah for Parshas Metzora)--perhaps a lesson to us that the sin of Lashon Hora is easily spread within or among a family(Miriam and Aharon speaking regarding Moshe Rabbeinu provides a similar lesson)--and this may be why it is easier to succeed at taking down the 'double wall'--it is an unfortunate and misguided team effort, and one family member encourages the next in what to the casual observer may otherwise be described as a self-defeating struggle. If one sees a weakness in his family--or in a particular family member (even if that family member is himself) -- he should bolster the fortifications--so that the security of the entire family is not breached--and the lips and tongue can take their noble places in protecting home, life and family!

Sent Goat and Yom Kippur

2010-07-08T18:26:00.001-04:00

The Gemora discusses who is the author of the Mishna, which says that the sent goat atones for all sins, apparently even without repentance. The Gemora concludes that Rebbi is the author, as Rebbi says that Yom Kippur atones for all sins, except for three very severe ones, even without repentance. The commentators note that Rebbi does not make any direct mention of the sent goat, but only of the day of Yom Kippur, which seems to be at odds with the Mishna. A number of answers are offered to this question:

1. The day atones partially, and the sent goat achieves full atonement (Tosfos 13a d'ovad)
2. The day atones, but the repentance requirement is waived only if the goat is sent (Ritva)
3. The sent goat atones, but its atonement is due to the power of Yom Kippur day (Tosfos, Rashba)
4. The day atones, but when there is a Bais Hamikdash, it depends on the sent goat being brought (Minchas Chinuch 364)

The Gemora had objected that if one did not repent, the goat cannot atone, as it is a sacrifice of the wicked, which is an abomination. The Ritva explains that Rebbi says that the goat is an exception, and the rule of a sacrifice of the wicked applies only to other sacrifices. The Rashba suggests that since the goat only completes the atonement of the day (following the first explanation above), it is not simply a sacrifice of the wicked, and therefore is effective.

The Gemora introduces a sifra which states that the day of Yom Kippur atones even if the sinner did not commemorate it. The Gemora says that this sifra implies that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance. The Ramban explains that if Yom Kippur needs repentance, it is like any other sacrifice, e.g., chatas, which is not effective if the sinner denies its effectiveness.

Rava says that Rebbi agrees that Yom Kippur does not atone for infractions of the day without repentance. Rava says this must be so, since otherwise there would be no case of one being punished for Yom Kippur prohibitions, since the day itself would atone for them. The Gemora objects, and provides two cases where the day would not atone for the transgression, even if repentance is not generally necessary:

1. The person died choking on food he ate, leaving no time after the transgression for atonement
2. The person ate at the end of the day, leaving no part of the day to atone
Tosfos (13a d'ovad) notes that the goat atones even for sins committed later on the day of Yom Kippur, since otherwise the Gemora should have suggested that the case is one who ate after the goat was sent. Some texts of the Gemora continue by citing a braisa, comparing the atonement of the goat and the day. The braisa states that the goat has the advantage of atoning right away, while the day atones only at the end. The day has the advantage of atoning without a sacrifice, while the goat atones only with a sacrifice. Rashi cites this text and rejects it, noting that it is incompatible with the answers provided by the Gemora, which both imply that any part of the day would atone, not just the end. The Ramban and Rabbeinu Chananel keep the text, and the Ramban explains that this is an alternate answer offered by the Gemora. According to this approach, only the end of the day atones, and therefore one would be liable for violating Yom Kippur if he died before the end of the day.

The Rashba offers two explanations of the advantage of Yom Kippur cited in the braisa:
1. The “sacrifice” refers to sending the goat off the azazel cliff. The braisa refers to this as a “sacrifice” since it is considered a sacrifice like standard ones, and follows its rules.
2. The “sacrifice” refers to the chatas goat whose blood was sprinkled inside the mishkan. The braisa is stating that the atonement of Yom Kippur is independent of this sacrifice, while the sent goat only atones if this sacrifice is also brought.
These two explanations seem to differ as to whether the sent goat is considered a standard sacrifice or not. The answer cited by the Ritva for how the goat atones without repentance seems to consider it a standard sacrifice, while the fact that the goat atones for sins committed later seems to indicate it is not.

The Rambam (Teshuva 1:2) rules that the sent goat atones on all lenient prohibitions (i.e., generic positive and negative commandments) even without repentance, but on all others only with repentance. The commentators attempt to explain the Rambam's source for this ruling, since the Gemora presents the opinions of the Sages, who require repentance, and Rebbi, who does not, with no indication of a middle position. The Lechem Mishne says that the Rambam rules like the Sages, but attempts to limit the extent of the dispute between Rebbi and the Sages. The braisa in which they differ on the explanation of the verse mandating karais is discussing only severe prohibitions, and only in that case do we find the Sages explicitly requiring repentance. The Rambam therefore says that the Sages agree with Rebbi that the sent goat atones for lenient transgressions without repentance. The Meshech Chochma (Vayikra 16:30) explains the Rambam based on the Gemora in Yoma (85b), which says that Rebbi holds that Yom Kippur atones for severe transgressions without repentance, but repentance does not atone for them without Yom Kippur. From here we see that Yom Kippur is more potent that repentance alone. Therefore, the Sages, who say that repentance alone atones for lenient prohibitions, surely say that Yom Kippur alone atones for these.

Sifra's authorship

The Gemora states that an anonymous sifra is Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore proves that Rabbi Yehuda requires repentance for the atonement of Yom Kippur. The Gemora then cites another sifra, which indicates that repentance is not required. Abaye answers that the first sifra is Rabbi Yehuda, while the second is Rebbi. The Ritva asks how Abaye can offer this answer if the Gemora stated that an anonymous sifra is Rabbi Yehuda. He offers two answers:
1. The two sifras are different opinions of Rabbi Yehuda's position. Thus, both follow Rabbi Yehuda, but differ on what Rabbi Yehuda holds on this point.
2. The rule of authorship is a general rule for most sifras, but has exceptions. Similarly, the Gemora identifies anonymous mishnas as Rabbi Meir, since most are, but there are many exceptions to this rule.

Gezeirah shavah and Rhymes

2010-07-04T18:13:00.001-04:00

Gezeirah Shavah
Rava praises Rebbe for his connection of olah v’yored with the prohibition on an impure person eating kodesh, by a gezeirah shavah – a common phrase, since behemah temai’ah – non kosher animal is used in both sections. Tosfos Harosh (7a Doleh) asks why this is so praiseworthy, as one can only use such the textual device of gezeirah shavah if he learned it from his teacher. Therefore, Rebbe must have learned this from his teacher, and showed no innovation. Tosfos Harosh answers that all that one learns from his teacher is the common phrase of the gezeirah shavah, but it is up to the student to know which phrases to use, and what to learn. It is Rebbi’s application of the gezeirah shavah which Rava praised.

Rhymes Purer Than Gold

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The Chasam Sofer revered his mentor – “the great eagle,” Rabbi Nasan Adler zt”l. We see his admiration in a poem he composed in his honor, whose beginning copies the style of our sugya, in which Rava praises Rebbe. The interesting rhymes are written in a style now unknown.
He draws water from deep wells
From him they built eternal ruins; he establishes the institutions of each generation.
His words raise those who falter and are sweeter than honey and mead.
The master’s mouth emits flashes of fire, desirable more than refined gold.
The great Kohen – we shall seek Torah, judgment and rulings from him.
He is the teacher who quenches the thirst of the parched, like flowing water-brooks.
The light of Israel, the strong hammer, cast solid as lustrous bronze,
Nasan the Kohen, a tzadik above chasidim and tzadikim.
He is the great eagle who hovers over his nestlings, his veteran students.
Wings of a dove coated in silver and its wings are like brilliant green-gold
And I am among the young, not from the seasoned,
But from the fragile kids (Responsa Chasam Sofer, Y.D. 167).

Shades of Leprosy and "the Bald One"

2010-07-04T18:12:00.001-04:00

Varying Degrees of White

The Gemora discusses Rabbi Akiva’s and the Sages’ positions on the four categories of whiteness of tzara’as. Rabbi Akiva lists them in order of whiteness, while the Sages list them as two categories, each with its own subcategory.

Rashi explains that Rabbi Akiva holds that the main categories are baheres (snow), and the duller se’ais (wool), but that se’ais has two subcategories, plaster and the duller egg membrane. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva says that the two main categories can combine with each other, since they are on equal footing, but the subcategories only combine with each other and with se’ais, their parent category, but not with baheres, which has no relation to them.

Tosfos (6a Af) disagrees, and says that Rabbi Akiva agrees to the general formulation of two categories, each with a subcategory, but just disagrees on the rules of combinations. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva agrees that the subcategory of baheres is plaster, and the subcategory of se’ais is egg membrane, but says that since plaster is two steps duller than its parent, it can only combine with se’ais.

The Raavad says that, according to the Sages, each subcategory can combine with its parent, and each category can combine with each other.

The Rambam (Tumas Tzara’as 1:1-3) says that all four levels of whiteness can combine with each other.

See the Kesef Mishneh (1:1) for a lengthy discussion of how the Rambam learned our Gemora, and his suggestion that the Rambam understands that the Gemora concludes that there is no dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages. He notes that the Gemora is not clear as to whether a source was provided for Rabbi Akiva’s position on the combination of the differing shades of white.

Rabbi Akiva’s Son

The Gemora cites a braisa which records a dialogue between Rabbi Akiva and his son, Yehoshua. Rashi says that this son is Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah. Since Rabbi Akiva was bald, his son was referred to as the son of Karchah – the bald one.

Tosfos (Bechoros 58a Chutz) disagrees, noting that the chronology would not place Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah early enough to be Rabbi Akiva’s son. Tosfos also says that Rabbi Akiva would not be constantly referred to as karchah – the bald one, as that is a derogatory term. Rather, Tosfos says Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah was a later Tanna, whose father was named Karchah.

Shame of Tzara'as

2010-07-04T18:10:00.000-04:00

Shame and Embarrassment

The examination of the nega’im detailed in our sugya requires much study. When a Kohen goes to see a suspect tsara’as, he is accompanied by many young kohanim who come to learn. It is obvious that the person afflicted does not enjoy great honor in such a situation. According to the Netziv, this is explicitly mentioned in the Torah: “This is the law…to teach about the day of becoming tamei and the day of becoming tahor” (Vayikra 14:54-57). In other words, a kohen calls his students to come with him to be taught. The Torah thereafter concludes: “…this is the law of tzara’as” – this is the penalty of a slanderer, who insulted others (Ha’amek Davar).

Three Sorts of Metzora’im

There are three types of tzara’as: s’eis, sapachas and baheres. HaGaon Rav Moshe Sternbuch explains that these names express the nature of those who slander:
1. S’eis (a raised mark): someone who slanders with the object of rising above another.
2. Sapachas (an “accompanying” mark): someone who slanders because he blindly follows those around him.
3. Baheres (a bright mark): someone who slanders with the object of “clarifying” the truth…
But all of them are “the plague of tsara’as (Ta’am Veda’as, Vayikra 13:2). (Hame’or)

Redeeming with a Check

2010-07-04T18:09:00.000-04:00

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rebbe says that a person can use anything to redeem his firstborn son from the Kohen, aside from documents. The Rabbis say: A person can use anything besides for slaves, documents, and land.

The Chasam Sofer in a teshuva (Y”D 134) discusses if redemption would be valid when the father pays the Kohen by check. Is a check regarded as money because it is accepted as cash all over or do we say that it is regarded as a document since there is no inherent value in the paper itself?

He concludes that a check can be regarded as money for some things, but as a document for others. If it is regarding a matter which is between people, then a check would be considered money, since it is commonly accepted. However, regarding redemption of a firstborn, which is between man and Hashem, a check would be regarded as a document and the redemption would not be valid. He explains: The father is actually redeeming his firstborn son from Hashem, but He gave over the monetary rights to the five selaim to the Kohen. Since it is the Torah that set the requirement for the money, the redemption will only be valid if the father gives to the Kohen something that is itself valued at five selaim.

The Chazon Ish (Y”D 72:10) disagrees and maintains that a check would be regarded as money and the redemption would be valid.

Poor Man

2010-07-04T18:07:00.000-04:00

The Bartenura asks, why did the Tanna use the example of the poor man and not merely state, “the person standing in the public domain?”

1. The Bartenura answers that the Tanna is teaching us that although the householder is giving the poor man charity, he has still violated the Shabbos, because this is what is known as a “mitzvah haba’ah b’aveirah, a positive commandment that was fulfilled by committing a sin.

2. The Tosfos Yom Tov, however, contends that this idea only holds true according to the opinion in the Gemora that one who erred in assuming that he is performing a mitzvah is liable. This would not be reconciled, however, with the opinion that posits that one who erred in assuming that he did a mitzvah is not liable. The Tosfos Yom Tov therefore writes that only regarding mitzvos that one is allowed to perform on Shabbos, such as bris milah, can one suggest that if he performs the mitzvah through the means of a sin, he is not liable. Concerning the mitzvah of tzedakah, however, one is not allowed to give tzedakah on Shabbos, and therefore he is certainly deemed punishable for giving charity to the poor person. [Rabbi Akiva Eiger, questions this, however, as we see that one is not allowed to fulfill the mitzvah of lulav on Shabbos, and yet there is an opinion that maintains that one who was involved in handling a lulav on Shabbos would not be liable a punishment.]

3. The Chemdas Shlomo writes that the only case where we say that one may be exempt from punishment is when he is obligated to perform some act for the mitzvah. In such a situation we can seek leniency for someone who was involved in performing the mitzvah even at a time when he was prohibited to do so. Regarding charity, though, one is not obligated to hand the poor man the article. The householder can leave the article for the poor man, without having to transfer the article from the private domain to the public domain. By transferring the article from one domain to another, the householder has incurred a sin that is liable a punishment.

4. Reb Aharon Leib Shteinman answers that we only say that one who erred in performing a mitzvah is not liable when the involvement in the mitzvah led the person to sin. In the case of the Mishna however, the mitzvah of giving charity did not distract the householder. Rather, the householder erred in not remembering that it was Shabbos or not being cognizant that this was a forbidden act of labor. In such circumstances one is not exempt from the punishment of having committed a sin.

Temple Mount

2010-07-04T18:06:00.000-04:00

Entering the Temple Mount

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

In our Mishna Rabbi Meir says, “All the goats serve to atone for the defilement of the Temple and its holy objects.” In other words, all the goats of the additional sacrifices (musafim) served to atone for prohibitions of defilement committed in the Temple by eating kodoshim (parts of sacrifices) while being defiled (tamei) or by entering the Temple when being tamei.

Does the sanctity of the site of the Temple depend on the Temple’s existence? A defiled person (tamei) who enters the site of the Temple transgresses a prohibition of the Torah and is punished with kareis. According to Rambam (Hilchos Beis HaBechirah, 6:16) and many Rishonim (Tosfos, Yevamos 82b, s.v. Yerushah; Rash on Shevi‟is 6:1; Semag, ‘asin 163; Yereiim Hashalem, 277; Ritva, Megillah 10b and Shevuos 2b; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvos 184, 362 and 363), the prohibition and the resulting kares are still valid after the Temple’s destruction as “the first sanctification sanctified the place in its time and for the future.” In other words, the site of the Temple was consecrated forever with an unconditional sanctity, independent of the existence of the Temple.

Raavad (ibid) disagrees and believes that once the Temple was destroyed and the gentiles conquered the Temple Mount, its sanctity was rescinded.

Some hold that even according to Raavad, it could be that only the punishment of kares was revoked whereas the Torah prohibition to enter remains (see Responsa Binyan Tziyon, 2, and Responsa Mishpat Kohen, 96). Even if not so, all agree that Chazal decreed that we mustn’t enter the site of the Temple after its destruction because of two reasons: (a) so that when the Temple will be rebuilt, everyone should remember that a tamei must not enter; (b) to preserve the respect for the Temple. Indeed, leading authorities testified that after the destruction of the Temple Jews were always careful to avoid entering the site as the prohibition to enter is also valid in our era from the Torah (d’oraisa) and those who enter are punished with kares (Rabeinu Ovadyah Bartenura in his letter from Eretz Israel of 5248; Maharam Chagiz in Parashas Mas’ei; and see Binyan Tziyon, that that is the ruling of all the poskim).

Rambam’s letter that caused a sensation: A letter sent by Rambam during his visit in Eretz Yisroel (printed in Sefer Chareidim, 65) aroused a great commotion when he wrote that on coming to Yerushalayim, he prayed in the “great and holy house.” Some interpreted this as meaning a synagogue built on the site of the Temple – a contradiction to his ruling that one mustn’t enter there in our era. Still, poskim reject the attempt to present the letter as proof that Rambam changed his ruling, and proved that he referred to a large synagogue called Midrash Shlomo, located near the Temple Mount, whose windows faced the whole area of the site of the Temple (see Responsa Minchas Yitzchak, V, 1, and Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, X, 1, and XI, 15, in the name of HaGaon Rav Y. Chai Zarihan).

Montefiore’s visit to the Temple Mount: 136 years ago, in 5627 (1867), Sir Moses Montefiore visited Eretz Israel, accompanied by his private secretary, Dr Levi. To the great surprise of the Yerushalayim community, the two entered the Temple Mount with a special permit issued by the Sultan in Istanbul, attained by the Pashah of Yerushalayim who had been well paid by Montefiore’s aides. The Jerusalemites were shocked and HaGaon Rav Yosef Moshe of Lissa, the son of the author of Nesivos HaMishpat and Chavos Da’as, even blew a shofar in the streets and excommunicated Montefiore. Being deeply religious, the latter rushed to the rabbis and scholars of Yerushalayim and apologized, claiming that he had acted sincerely, having been misled by a certain rabbi that Raavad’s opinion was accepted as halachah. He then accepted certain orders of teshuvah and the commotion subsided (Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, XI, 15:5).

May non-Jews enter the Temple Mount?

Now that we know that the Torah’s prohibition to enter the site of the Temple and the penalty of kares are valid in our era, we should examine the halachah pertaining to gentiles. The Mishna in Keilim 1:8 explains that non-Jews must not enter further than the cheil (the fence around the Temple) – i.e., the area of the Temple Mount (except for the cubits adjacent to the surrounding wall) – and Rambam (Hilchos Bias HaMikdash, 3:5) rules accordingly, that “at the cheil gentiles should be sent away.”

The halachos of defilement are only for Jews: The Torah does not apply halachos of defilement (tumah) to non-Jews (Nazir 61b; Rambam, Hilchos Tumas HaMeis, 1:13), just as animals do not become tamei. As a result, the Torah’s prohibition that temeiim must not enter the site of the Temple refers only to Jews. Nonetheless, Chazal decreed tumah on gentiles and the Mishna therefore explains that they must not penetrate the cheil.

May a non-Jew enter the Temple Mount? Some explain (Magid Meireishis in Kuntres Derech HaKodesh) that though non-Jews are allowed to enter the site of the Temple, we are commanded by Chazal to prevent their entry, as Rambam states: “gentiles should be sent away.”Still, the Maharit (cited in Derech HaKodesh by Rav C.A. Alfandari) indicates that Chazal also actually forbade them to enter the site of the Temple (Chazon Nachum on Keilim 1:6).

How the Greeks defiled the oil of the Temple: Every year on Chanukah we praise Hashem for the miracle of the single sealed jug of pure oil found remaining from all the other oil defiled by the Greeks. Apparently, since non-Jews are never tamei, we must understand how they managed to defile the oil.

Tosfos (Shabos 21b, s.v. Shehayah, and see Maharsha, ibid) indicate that the decree to apply tumah to gentiles could have been very early, even before the Mishnaic era, whereas the Re’eim (on the Semag at the beginning of Hilchos Chanukah) remarks that the Greeks defiled all the oil when they entered the Temple because of their garments which were tamei.

Buying water from a well on the Temple Mount: Sdei Chemed (Ma’areches Vav, Kelal 26, os 33) refers to the question of the Jerusalemites as to if they may buy water from Arabs who draw it from a well on the Temple Mount, as they suspected that their demand for water caused the Arabs to go there. He replied that as the water-drawers stay on the Mount all day anyway, there is no prohibition to buy the water. On the contrary, the demand for water causes them to leave the site of the Temple when they bring water to the Jews.

Inserting fingers in the Western Wall: Over three years ago we treated the topic of putting one’s fingers in the cracks of the Western Wall. In that article we cited the Aderes (Mishkenos L’Abir Ya’akov, II) who forbids such for fear of entering the site of the Temple while being tamei. On the other hand, some believe (Maharil Diskin, cited ibid, etc.) that the walls of the Temple Mount were never sanctified and that there is no prohibition (see sefer Meoros HaDaf HaYomi, Vol. II, p. 249).

Permission by the Avnei Nezer: Still, it is interesting to note that the Sochatchover Rebbe zt”l, author of Avnei Nezer (Responsa Avnei Nezer, Y.D., II, 450-51), writes that even if the walls were consecrated, there is no prohibition to put one’s fingers therein because of two halachos: (a) The prohibition to enter refers to the normal manner of entry whereas entry in an unusual fashion is allowed; (b) the prohibition to enter is only for the ways of access to the Temple. Putting a finger in a hole in a wall is not considered a normal manner of entry and is therefore allowed and even if we say that it is a form of entry, that place cannot be reached from inside the Temple and is not regarded as entering a sanctified place (see other reasons ibid).

Makkos 21 (insights all about shaving)

2010-06-25T09:11:00.002-04:00

You can see the most recent Daf at: http://daf-yomi.org/english_dafyomi/makkos_21.pdf

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Makkos 20 (plus important detailed poster)

2010-06-24T09:11:00.002-04:00

You can see the most recent Daf at: http://daf-yomi.org/english_dafyomi/makkos_20.pdf

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Makkos Daf 19

2010-06-23T18:08:00.000-04:00

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Atonement of an Olah

2010-06-21T07:58:00.000-04:00

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Rabbi Yosi HaGelili (Yoma 36) states that a korban olah is brought for the sin of not giving the poor people from your grain, which one is obligated to do. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that a korban olah is brought to atone for transgressing a positive commandment. Chazal say that an olah is a doron - a present to Hashem. The Seforim say that an olah shows a tremendous amount of love between the person and Hashem. The Ramban writes that when one brings a chatas or an asham, he should feel as if he is bringing himself as a sacrifice, for in truth, that is what he deserves. By an olah, it is as if he is giving himself to Hashem out of love.

How do we reconcile an olah being a present and a sign of love with the fact that Chazal say it is brought for transgressing certain sins?

The Aruch L'neir (Makkos 17b) explains the Ritva. The Gemora contrasts a chatas and asham that is coming for atonement and an olah is not. The Ritva asks from the Gemora in Yoma and Zevachim that it does provide forgiveness for some sins, and he answers that when one brings an olah as a donation, it atones for those sins.

Reb Chaim HaQoton elaborates: Rashi, quoting the Midrash, explains that an olah sacrifice is an atonement for one who violates a positive commandment or for one who violates a negative commandment and fails to perform the positive commandment that is supposed to rectify the negative commandment. Rashi explains, in a point further explained by Nachmanides and Rabbi Yaakov Ettlinger, that one is never obligated to bring a olah as an atonement, rather, if one does, he attains his atonement.

Tosfos write that after bringing an olah one’s atonement is “floating. Rabbi Meir Lublin explains that the Tosafists mean that an olah offering only atones for lenient sins, not for the more strict and severe sins.

Rabbi Shlomo Luria explains that the atonement is “floating” inasmuch as the atonement does not occur automatically when one offers an olah sacrifice, rather one must first perform teshuvah (repentance) and return to God before the offering of the sacrifice will complete its powers of atonement.

His words echo that of Rabbi Yaakov ben Asher who explains that the olah only serves as atonement for failing to perform a positive commandment or violating a negative commandment which is to be repaired by a positive commandment, if one repents from one’s sin.

Other Tosafists write that the olah offers an atonement for one who sinned and never knew of his sin. According to this explanation, obviously one cannot be obligate to being an olah for such a sin, because if he never knew about his sin, how can he be obliged to offer a sacrifice to atone for it? Rather, if one brought an olah offering, then it atones for sins unbeknown to him, but if he did not bring one, he is not required to do so. Another Midrash says that an olah is an atonement for one who thinks about sinning and thus has sinned with his intellect, not for one who violates a positive commandment.

Hasra'ah and Witnesses

2010-06-10T19:40:00.002-04:00

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The Purpose of Hasra’ah

By: Rabbi Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora cites various verses as the source for the requirement of hasra’ah (warning).

The Maharatz Chayus points out that there are two sources for hasra’ah. The first is a sevara, - this serves to make sure that the person is aware of the severity and consequences of his actions. Included in the hasra’ah is both the education of the halachah, and the awareness of the action that he is about to do. The second source is the verses that the Gemora quotes which serve as a gezeiras hakasuv, whether they apply or not, that no punishment can be carried out unless there is a warning.

The Maharatz Chayus deduces this from Tosfos who is bothered why the Gemora has to find a source for hasra’ah, to which they answer that it is needed for a non-chaver (someone who isn’t educated in the laws). It is obvious from logic that he requires hasra’ah, because otherwise, he would have no idea whether the action that he is doing is prohibited by the Torah, but, a chaver, who is well educated, knows very well what he is doing and understands the consequences. He shouldn’t require hasra’ah if not for the fact that the Torah would demand it as a gezeiras hakasuv. The verses are the rationale for requiring the details of hasra’ah, such as killing him within the time of an utterance (and perhaps having to accept the hasra’ah).

Based on this, he points out that Tosfos, who asks regarding the source for hasra’ah by an ir hanidachas (subverted town), is difficult. Who says that ir hanidachas has the gezeiras hakasuv requirement of hasra’ah that would involve the details? Perhaps it would only have the sevara aspect of hasra’ah to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate, so that no source is necessary. Clearly, Tosfos assumes that the type of hasra’ah necessary by ir hanidachas is the gezeiras hakasuv type - with all the details, and not just the determination that he was aware of the consequences of his actions.

The Rambam, however, doesn’t seem to follow this same approach. The Gemora 8b and 41a quote Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah, who says that a Torah scholar doesn’t require hasra’ah, since the sole purpose of hasra’ah is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate. This would imply that the Rabbis, who hold that even a Torah scholar requires hasra’ah, would hold that hasra’ah is a gezeiras hakasuv, and NOT just to distinguish between unintentional and deliberate. However, the Rambam (Sanhederin 12:2) writes: A torah scholar and an unlearned man require hasra’ah, for the sole purpose of hasra’ah is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate. This seems to be very strange. The Rambam cites the rationale of Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah, yet requires hasra’ah even for a chaver! Why?

The Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh explain that according to the Rambam, the Rabbis don’t disagree with Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah in principal; rather, they hold that because of his concern, we require hasra’ah even by a chaver who knows the law, since he may not be aware of the action he is about to do. The Rambam clearly learns that the concept of hasra’ah is only meant to make him aware of his actions, and educate him about the halachah, not just a gezeiras hakasuv. Nevertheless, the Rambam requires hasra’ah within the time of an utterance of the action, implying that this concept isn’t merely a gezeiras hakasuv, but an actual concern that he may have a very short term memory. It seems that the Rambam doesn’t buy into the two sources for hasra’ah approach; rather, he understands that the rationale for the sources of hasra’ah cited in the Gemora is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate - to educate and inform.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Eidim P’sulim

The Gemora learns that even if there are a hundred witnesses that witnessed an event, but included in those witnesses were relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses, then the all the witnesses may not testify. Rebbe clarifies that this is only true when the relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses also gave the warning, but if they merely witnessed an event along with others, they can’t nullify the testimony of the other witnesses. Rashi explains that by giving the warning, they show that they too want to be considered witnesses, therefore they negate the other witnesses’ testimony, since part of the witnesses are disqualified.

Who is considered disqualified for testimony?

1) Relatives - Relatives: There are many different scenarios; we will only touch on a few.

We learn that relatives cannot be considered witnesses from the verse: Fathers shall not die through their sons. The Chachamim derived from this verse that the father cannot die due to testimony from his son, and vice versa. Aside from a son there are other relatives that cannot testify; a) brothers, b) grandson, c) first cousins, d) second cousins. All these cases apply to females as well, meaning a sister cannot testify on a brother and vice versa etc. (Choshen Mishpat 33:2)

If one cannot testify regarding a woman (for example a sister), he is similarly prohibited from testifying for her husband, and conversely, if one cannot testify for a certain man, he also may not testify for his wife (ibid 33:3). However, he may testify for that spouse’s relative (ibid 33:5).

Mechutanim may testify for each other (ibid 33:6).

2) Oivrei Aveirah - One Who Committed a Sin: If one transgressed any prohibition that is punishable by either death or lashes, he is disqualified for testimony until he repents. It makes no difference if he sinned due to desire, or if he sinned as an act of rebellion (ibid 34:2).

If one transgressed a Rabbinic prohibition, he is disqualified only on a Rabbinic level (there are halachic differences between them).

3) Other P’sulei Eidus: A minor is disqualified for testimony, even if he is very bright. One leaves the status of a minor once he shows signs of physical maturity, usually when he turns thirteen years old.

One who is incoherent in a certain issue is also disqualified (ibid 35:8). If he is mentally deranged, he is also disqualified (ibid 35:10).

As they Intended

2010-06-10T14:47:00.001-04:00

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The Mishna teaches us that the zomemin witnesses are only punished if they attempted to have someone executed, but they were found to be zomemin before the defendant was executed (as long as it was after the verdict was handed down). However, if they were discredited through hazamah only after the defendant had been executed, they will not be punished. This is derived from the Scriptural verse: as they intended to do; but not as they actually accomplished.

The Kesef Mishnah explains this seemingly perplexing halachah in two manners:
1. When the zomemin witnesses actually carry out their plan and the accused is executed - such a sin is of such a magnitude that they cannot get punished in this world. The punishment for such a hideous sin can only take place in the next world- in Gehinnom.
2. Alternatively, he explains, if the accused was actually executed, we assume that he was indeed guilty and deserved to die. Hashem is present by every court case and it must be attributed to Divine Providence that the second set of witnesses did not arrive until after the defendant was executed.

Paying and Piercing

2010-06-08T19:37:00.000-04:00

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The Mishna stated: “We testify that this particular person owes his fellow two hundred zuz,” and they are found to be zomemin, they receive lashes and must pay, for the Scriptural verse that makes him liable for the lashes is not the same as that which makes him liable for compensation; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Chachamim say: Whoever is liable to pay does not receive lashes.

Based upon this, the Panim Yafos answers the following question: The Gemora in Kiddushin states: Why was an ear chosen (to be pierced - when a Jewish servant wishes to stay by his master even after the six years) more than other limbs of a person’s body? Hashem says that the ear that heard on Mount Sinai, “For to Me Bnei Yisroel are servants,” and not servants to servants, and he went anyway and chose a master for himself, his ear should be pierced. The question begs to be asked: If the piercing is because of his stealing, why don’t we pierce his ear immediately? Why do we wait until he wants to stay longer?

Our Gemora states that whoever is liable to pay does not receive lashes. If one is liable a punishment of lashes and money for one action, he does not receive lashes and pay, but rather, he pays and he does not incur the lashes.

Accordingly, we can say that the thief was deserving of getting his ear pierced immediately – except, since he is required to pay for that which he stole, and selling him as a servant is instead of his payment, he is therefore exempt from the piercing, for he cannot pay and receive “lashes.” However, after he served his six years, and he says, “I love my master, my wife and my children; I do not want to go free,” he is revealing to us that his serving as a servant was not a punishment for him. Retroactively, he reverts to the halachah that he should be punished for selling himself as a servant through piercing.

Lottery ticket from Maaser and Shemittas Kesafim

2010-06-07T16:20:00.001-04:00

Lottery Ticket

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Buying a lottery ticket for a charitable cause from ma’aser money

Many charitable institutions raise funds by promising prizes to be awarded in a lottery among the contributors. HaGaon Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Responsa Igros Moshe, O.C., IV, 76) was asked if a person could purchase such a ticket from his ma’aser money or if the ticket should be considered as having a monetary value to its holder and thus forbidden to be purchased from ma’aser.

Two types of tickets: Rav Feinstein remarks that we should divide this question into two parts – i.e., two types of lottery tickets. Some institutions issue a fixed amount of tickets, promising that at a certain date or when all of them are sold, the raffle will be held. In such a lottery even the first purchaser knows his chances of winning.

Nonetheless, there is another sort of ticket: Some institutions do not limit the amount of tickets and fix no final date for the raffle. It is obvious, then, that such tickets have no monetary value. A person who purchases such a ticket has no investment, as he has been promised nothing. It is not an investment but a form of charity and may be purchased from ma’aser.

What is the nature, though, of the first type of ticket? First of all, we must examine if we can define the value of something whose worth is unknown. In other words, is a lottery ticket regarded as an item of monetary value although the vast majority of purchasers win nothing?

Estimating the worth of an item whose value is unknown: Rav Feinstein proves from our sugya that we can regard such an article as having value. Our sugya explains that we can estimate the worth of a kesuvah of a woman who has not been divorced by examining the amount merchants would be willing to invest to purchase the rights to the kesuvah once it can be realized. The merchants examine the state of the couple’s health, their relationship and the like. They then estimate the wife’s chances to survive her husband or get divorced and earn her kesuvah. We thus see that we can regard an item whose worth is unknown as an article of monetary value. One should therefore not purchase a ticket of the first sort from ma’aser as the purchaser immediately gets the worth of his investment.

The winner of a lottery: Rav Feinstein adds that if a purchaser of the second type of ticket wins a prize, he should better return the cost of the ticket to his ma’aser money (see Derech Emunah on Matenos ‘Aniyim, Ch. 7, in Beiur Halachah, s.v. V’echad).

Reasons for Shemittas Kesafim

By: Rabbi Moshe Donnebaum

As strange as the mitzvah of relinquishing one's loans may seem, there are important lessons in regard to this commandment. The Sefer HaChinuch explains that the first useful benefit to be gained is the characteristic of generosity. There is none so generous as he who gives without hope of receiving anything in return. So too, relinquishing a loan with no benefit or gain in mind imbues a person with this noble character trait.

The second lesson mentioned in the Chinuch relates to the mitzvah of bitachon - trust in Hashem. Anyone who, upon command, relinquishes all outstanding debts, is continuously strengthening his level of trust in Hashem. The creditor displays trust that any losses incurred will be fully reimbursed to his allocated and pre-determined wealth. The knowledge of G-d as the source of all livelihood and provider of all one's needs is confirmed, and substantiated when releasing a debtor from his debts.

The Chinuch continues that the mitzvah of Shemittas kesafim is also a 'barrier' to keep away from robbery and any desire to own the possessions of one's neighbor, via a kal vachomer. If the Torah decrees that one should leave a loan in his neighbor's hand concerning money that is rightfully owed to him, then certainly he may not obtain his neighbor's belongings, in any way, without his neighbor's consent.

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Makkos, Forty and Zomemin

2010-06-06T15:28:00.001-04:00

Makkos and Forty

The Chidah writes that he heard from an elderly mekubal that it is advantageous to study Tractate Makkos, for it is the same numerical value as “hirhurim” – “thoughts,” and it will be an assistance to those who wish to rid themselves from any impure thoughts.

It is stated in the Medrash Tanchuma that one who transgresses a negative prohibition incurs forty lashes because a person is created in forty days, and he violated the Torah which was given to Moshe in forty days.

Warning not Necessary

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

We are now learning the sugya of eidim zomemim, false witnesses who testify that they saw an act performed by a certain person and are later contradicted by others who assert that the witnesses were with them elsewhere at the time of the supposed act and could not have seen it. The false witnesses are punished with the punishment they intended to mete on the person about whom they testified. At the beginning of Makkos we should cite the explanation of HaGaon Rav Shimon Shkop zt”l about this halachah.

False witnesses are punished without being warned: A Beis Din does not punish a person unless he was warned before his act that he is about to transgress a prohibition of the Torah and will be punished accordingly. Still, false witnesses are punished without such warning (Kesuvos 33a), as the Gemora (ibid) explains, since they wanted to punish someone whom they never warned. Rambam (Hilchos ‘Edus, 20:4) adds that even unwitting false witnesses (shogegim), who did not know about the prohibition of false testimony, are punished.

Two reasons for warning: There are two reasons why we can’t punish someone without warning him: (a) He should not be considered shogeg (Makkos, 6b), unaware that he is transgressing a Torah prohibition, and (b) He should know that by his act he decrees a punishment on himself (Sanhedrin 41a and Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin, 12:2; see ibid, that the transgressor must explicitly acknowledge his penalty). Apparently, the Gemora’s explanation, that we don’t have to warn false witnesses because they wanted to punish an unwarned person, means that we can punish the witnesses even though they didn’t know that they could be punished with death. Still, what is Rambam’s basis for saying that we don’t have to verify that the witnesses acted willfully (see Raavad, ibid)?

False witnesses are punished for their cruelty: Rav Shkop explains that Rambam assumes that false witnesses are not punished for transgressing but “because of their wickedness, acting against characteristic human decency. Even though they didn’t know of the prohibition by the Torah, since they knew that they were falsely incriminating a person…that is the main point of their evil…” (Chiddushei Rabbi Shim’on Yehudah HaKohen, Kesuvos, #39, and see Ketsos HaChoshen, 25, S.K. 8, and Sefer HaMafteiach as for other explanations for Rambam’s ruling).

Zomemin

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

In a situation where two groups of witnesses contradict one another about an event; it is classified as contradictory witnesses, where we have no reason to believe one any more than the other. Under these circumstances the Gemora in Bava Basra has a discussion about what to do - it is an uncertainty, so follow the chazakah. One thing, however, is clear, that we do not believe the latter group any more than the first. However, where the second group doesn't testify about the event, rather about the validity of the first two as being valid witnesses, such as testifying that they are thieves, the second group is completely believed to overthrow the testimony of the first group. This is not considered a novelty, since everything that the first group is saying is true, just that by believing the second group that the first are thieves, we automatically do not accept their testimony.

Rava (in the first version) holds that a zomeim is a novelty and therefore only becomes disqualified from the time of the hazamah, and not retroactively from the time of the testimony. Abaye would presumably agree with Rava that zomemin is a novelty, just that it is not logical for them to be disqualified from the time of the hazamah; therefore we disqualify them retroactively from the time of their testimony.

It seems that the concept of “novelty” by zomemin is that rather than considering it to be a case of contradictory witnesses, where the second group are merely disagreeing about the event, we consider it as if the second group are actually testifying about the character of the first group, invalidating them as witnesses. (See Tosfos who explains that the novelty of zomemin more than contradictory testimony is either that the second group is entirely believed, or that the first group is definitely disqualified, not just out of uncertainty. Assuming like Tosfos’ second approach that the novelty of zomemin is to view the testimony to be on the character of the witnesses, not on the event, in which case it is not a novelty to directly disqualify the first or to validate the second, rather it is a novelty in classification).

Why are zomemin somewhere in between? In essence, the second group is not making a character judgment; they are only contradicting the facts – “these two witnesses could not have possibly witnessed what they claim to have witnessed since they were with us elsewhere.” Had it not been for the novelty of the Torah that we believe the second group, we would view it as if they just contradicting the first group about the events, where we would have a legitimate doubt as to who to believe. We would interpret their intent as simply being that the event was not witnesses by these two witnesses because they were with us elsewhere. But the Torah teaches us that we are not to regard the hazamah as just undermining the plausibility of the event, rather they are giving a character testimony similar to claiming that the first group were thieves. Why?

It would seem that the reason is because when testifying about an event, it is sometimes possible to misinterpret the event, or not have a clear picture as to what actually happened, so we give each group the benefit of the doubt. But, by zomemin, the second group is claiming that it was clearly premeditated lying that is taking place, not an innocent mistake. People who would fabricate a story when they were in an entirely different location have a fatal character flaw just as thieves do, and therefore they are not admissible as witnesses in any court.

Eretz Yisroel - Highest Point

2010-05-10T18:42:00.000-04:00

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Eretz Yisroel and the Beis HaMikdash is Higher than all other Places

Does High and Low Apply to Spherical Objects?

In our sugya the Gemora cites a verse in Yirmyahu (23:7) “…Who brought Bnei Yisrael up from the land of Egypt” and a verse in Devarim (17:8) “…then you shall arise and go up unto the place which the Lord thy G-d shall choose” to demonstrate that Eretz Yisrael is higher than any other land, and that the Beis HaMikdash is the highest point in Eretz Yisrael. The wording of the Gemora seems to indicate that Eretz Yisrael is physically higher. In fact, the Yam Shel Shlomo (Kiddushin Chap. 4, 1) goes so far as to say that if someone standing in Eretz Yisrael says, “I vow to go up to Chutz La’aretz,” the vow is considered to be made in vain and is invalid. Leaving Yerushalayim or Eretz Yisrael is always referred to as “going down.”

Many commentators maintain that our Gemora should not be interpreted literally. The Chasam Sofer (Responsa, Part II, Y.D. §234) stresses this point, writing, “…in fact, those who are somewhat familiar with the world map can see otherwise…actually the world is round, and high and low do not apply to spherical objects; from any given point one sees the skies high overhead and low on the horizon, forming a dome. Someone who approaches from a point on the horizon appears as if he emerged from a deep pit, and high and low do not apply.”

Furthermore the Maharal of Prague (in his book on Talmudic Aggados and in Tiferes Yosef, Chagiga 3b, s.v. Eizehu) writes that the Gemora is referring to the spiritual loftiness of Eretz Yisrael, and not to its physical height.

It is interesting to note that the Chasam Sofer (ibid) writes that Eretz Yisrael is said to be “higher than all other lands” because Creation began from the even shesiya [foundation stone] located on Har HaBayis (see Rashi, Sanhedrin 26b, s.v. veshesiya). Thus all eyes are raised to Eretz Yisrael and Har HaBayis because mankind lifts its gaze to the spot where the ground beneath its feet was first created.

Marrying an Old Man

2010-04-29T17:31:00.000-04:00

by: Rabbi Yaakov Montrose
(printed in Halachic World)

Reb Muttel was not sure what to do. On the one hand, his daughter simply had no luck with shidduchim, and she was already thirty-nine. On the other hand, though the potential shidduch his daughter was now being offered was a person who was well known to be a tremendous Tzadik, and a kind and wealthy person, he thought that marrying off his daughter to someone thirty five years older than her might be transgressing the Gemora that says that one should not marry off his daughter to an older person. As any Torah abiding person would do when he was unclear about a certain Halachah, he went to ask his Rav to advise him as to whether or not the Shidduch was permitted.

The Gemora says that three types of people transgress the verse of “Lemaan Sefos Haravah Es HaTzemei’ah” - “In order to add the watered upon the thirsty.” One of them is someone who marries off his daughter to an old man. The Shulchan Aruch rules that this is also a prohibition against a young man marrying an old woman. The reason for the prohibition is that the younger partner will not be satisfied with the relationship, and will probably end up acting in a promiscuous fashion.

The Sefer Chasidim says that this a prohibition against being “married off” to an old man. If a woman wants to marry an old man - for example, if she wants to do so because she wants to be the wife of a Tzadik - she would be permitted to do so. This Sefer Chasidim is quoted by the Beis Shmuel and Chelkas Mechokek.

There seem to be at least two clear proofs to the Sefer Chasidim. We know that Rus married Boaz, who was extremely old at that time. Additionally, we find in Avos D’Rebbi Nasan (ch.16) that Rabbi Eliezer was already an old man when his young niece wanted to marry him. After he tried to discourage her and she still insisted, he agreed to marry her.

The Aruch HaShulchan qualifies the Sefer Chasidim. He explains that even if the girl readily agrees to the marriage, if Beis Din sees that the woman’s motives are to share (or take over) her husband’s wealth, it is not appropriate to perform such a wedding. Being that she is not really interested in the marriage, she will end up being unfaithful to her husband.

Conclusion: It is permitted for a woman to marry an old man if we see that the reason for her agreement to the marriage is worthy. One is not allowed to pressure his daughter into such a marriage against her will.

Gambling

2010-03-08T17:56:00.002-05:00

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Mishna lists gamblers among those who are unfit to judge, and as Rashi points out, unfit to testify, since they are regarded as re’shaim. There is a discussion in the Gemora as to why a gambler is unfit to testify or judge. Rami Bar Chamah holds that it is an issue of “asmachta,” which means that the money he wins is regarded as stolen. Rav Sheishes disagrees and attributes the disqualification to not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public. The Gemora points out that the difference between the two opinions would be a situation where he has another job aside from gambling. The issue of “asmachta” would apply regardless of whether he has another means of support, whereas the issue of furthering the general welfare of the public would only apply if he has no other means of support.

Tosfos points out that both opinions in the Gemora agree that the disqualification is only Rabbinic, because even the opinion who considers it theft due to “asmachta,” since he doesn’t realize the severity of the prohibition; he is not invalidated as a witness on a Biblical level. Regardless, we rule according to Rav Sheishes that the disqualification is attributed to him not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public which would surely be Rabbinic.

There is a dispute between the Rambam and Rashi as to the nature of the disqualification of not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public. The Rambam associates this with theft. Since the looser isn’t willingly forfeiting his money to the winner, it is considered “avak gezel.” The S”ma (C.M. 34:40) explains the position of the Rambam - since it is not technically theft, the Rabbis only considered it to be a problem if his main livelihood was coming from his gambling earnings. When the Gemora stipulates that he is only disqualified if he doesn’t have another means of earning a living, the Gemora really means to say that he doesn’t have another source of income. If he has another source of income, or is wealthy so that he doesn’t need the gambling earnings for support, he would be eligible to serve as a witness. However, if he had another income, but required the earnings from gambling to support himself, he would be disqualified. The Gr”a (C.M. 203:44) disagrees with the approach of the S”ma and explains that the Rambam actually rules like Rami bar Chamah that an “asmachta” is not binding, and therefore, he considers it to be theft. But, the Gr”a holds that even though it is stealing, the Sages only invalidated him when he has no other livelihood.

Rashi considers the issue of not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public to have nothing to do with theft. Rashi considers the issue to be an indication of a very low level of fear of Heaven. The S”ma explains that this only applies to someone who doesn’t work and doesn’t realize the difficulties involved in earning money and would be prone to testify falsely (because he associates money as “easy-come, easy-go,” and doesn’t take it seriously). But someone who works, even if he can’t support himself without the added income from gambling, wouldn’t be disqualified for testimony since he realizes the challenges of earning a living.

The Shulchan Aruch, who follows the Rambam, and considers the problem of gambling to be associated with theft, follows his own opinion (c.m. 370:3) where he writes that one who gambles with gentiles would not be in violation of theft (since only actual and direct theft is forbidden from a gentile, but not when he loses in gambling and agrees to give the money). Rashi would certainly not make this distinction and would hold that even one who gambles with gentiles would be disqualified to testify. Even according to the Rambam, the Shulchan Aruch frowns upon gambling and writes: However, it is forbidden to occupy oneself with matters of vain, for a person should only occupy his time with wisdom and matters that benefit the general welfare of the public.

Rules of the Game and the
Rules of Life

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Rabbi Nachum of Stepinesht, the son of Rabbi Yisrael of Ruzhin, once entered his beis midrash during Chanukah and saw some chasidim playing checkers. Seeing their Rebbe, they were taken aback, but Rabbi Nachum approached and asked them, “Do you know the rules of the game? Now listen carefully:
1) You give one piece to get back two.
2) You mustn’t avoid your move.
3) You mustn’t make two moves with one turn.
4) Go forward, but never backward.
5) When you get to the top, you can go anywhere (Rav S.Y. Zevin, Sipurei Chasidim al HaMo’adim, p. 267).

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Hatmanah

The Gemora rules that one may be matmin (insulate) a cold food or drink on Shabbos. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 257:6) clarifies that one may only do so when the insulation does not add heat (eino mosif hevel), and his whole purpose of doing so is to ensure that the item will not become too cold. If however it does add heat (mosif hevel), then it is forbidden to insulate it even prior to Shabbos.

In generations past, in order to keep the cooked food warm once it was taken off the fire, it was insulated. Although there isn’t any issur melachah with hatmanah per se, the Chachamim nevertheless forbade it so as not to violate the issur of bishul in the event that before the insulation he would find that the item cooled off and then he would return it to the fire. Therefore one may not do hatmanah on Shabbos even when the insulation is not mosif hevel (ibid 257:1).

The Chachamim additionally forbade insulating an item in a place where it’s mosif hevel even before Shabbos. The reason being since in the times of the Gemora the ideal place for mosif hevel was in the ash next to the fire, and he might come to stir the ash on Shabbos to heat up the insulated food, thereby violating a form of mavir (ibid).

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 4:74 - Hatmanah) explains that it is forbidden to insulate an item in a manner of mosif hevel even early Friday morning. [One cannot infer that Reb Moshe held that there isn’t any problem of hatmanah if it was insulated before Friday, since the question he was addressing was regarding Friday morning. On the contrary, it is pretty clear from his wording that it would be forbidden to do so no matter when it was insulated.]

Choosing Judges; Sitting with Judges and Table Manners

2010-03-07T17:04:00.001-05:00

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The Tur writes that any judge who knows that a different judge is a thief or otherwise evil should not sit in judgment with him. And this is how the pure-minded people of Yerushalim conducted themselves. They would not sit in judgment unless they knew who was sitting in judgment with them.

The Perishah asks that the Tur’s language is not precise, for it would seem from his words that the pure-minded people of Yerushalayim would not sit in judgment except with people whom they knew to be thieves or evil!? And behold, in truth, they would not sit with people about whom they were even uncertain about their character! The Rambam’s language, however, is more precise.

The Perishah explains the Tur as follows: There is a strict prohibition against sitting in judgment with someone who is known to be a thief or otherwise evil. This is not merely pious conduct, but rather, it is something which is forbidden to do. There is a level higher than that, and that is not to sit in judgment with people that you are unsure about. This is how the pure-minded people of Yerushalayim would conduct themselves. Even if they did not know for certain that the other person was evil, they still, as an act of righteousness, would not sit with them.

The Bach reaches a slightly different conclusion. He states that an ordinary person should not sit with others in judgment only if he knows that they are evil; however, if he does not know, there is no concern whatsoever. However, prominent people, such as the pure-minded people of Yerushalayim, they should not sit in judgment with others unless they are certain as to their character.

The Aruch Hashulchan writes l’halachah that since we can presume that all Jewish people have a fine character, there is no reason to assume that someone is a thief, and therefore, there is no prohibition against sitting in judgment with someone that you do not know. It is regarded as “hiddur” to be wary of such people.

The Shvus Yaakov holds that if one of the judges does not know the other two, he should not sit in judgment with them; however, if two of the judges know each other, but they do not know the character of the third, there is no prohibition against sitting in judgment with him, for the majority of the Beis Din is proper. This is the case that the pure-minded people of Yerushalayim were strict about; they were extra careful even if it was only one of the judges that they were uncertain about.

Each Litigant Chooses a Judge

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Our Mishna addresses one of the basic rules pertaining to a beis din: One litigant chooses a dayan, the other chooses another and both dayanim choose a third. The rule applies to financial or property cases and describes the method of composing the required beis din of three dayanim. Nonetheless, the rule is characterized by a serious lack of clarity. The Panim Meiros already protested several hundred years ago: “I have seen a scandal in our generation regarding this rule: Each litigant first explains his claims to the dayan he chooses and, moreover, promises him a certain amount if he acquits him…and justice becomes distorted and the light of the Torah is extinguished and the name of Heaven is profaned” (Responsa Panim Meiros, II, 159).

Those learning the beginning of Sanhedrin may wonder: We are told, after all, that three dayanim may judge a defendant against his will (Tosefos 5a, s.v. Dan), so how can the above rule be applied? Anyone may summon another to a beis din and the defendant, willingly or not, must accept the judgment of that beis din. This question caused the misunderstanding that a beis din of which two dayanim are chosen by the litigants lacks the authority of an ordinary beis din. Furthermore, each litigant tries to choose a dayan he has known well and before the hearing he sets forth his claims to convince him to agree with him even though the dayanim are forbidden to hear only one side.

The Rishonim (Chidushei HaRan, Hagahos Ashri) explain that a beis din may judge a defendant against his will only if he refuses to appear for a din Torah. If, however, he agrees to appear, each litigant chooses a dayan and the two dayanim then choose a third. Still, asserts the Rosh (#2), we should not think that the dayanim chosen by the litigants are meant to act in their favor. Rather, the possibility to choose dayanim is intended to perfect a true verdict as each dayan presents every possible claim to justify his litigant that would otherwise escape the attention of the beis din. Hearing all the claims, the beis din can then issue a true verdict. The Rosh adds that if a litigant insists on appointing an unsuitable dayan, the beis din ignores his request and forces him to be judged by themselves or by a beis din they appoint. In other words, the rule of litigants choosing dayanim is not meant to effect any kind of arbitration. A beis din chosen by litigants has full authority and its dayanim must be as qualified as any others.

Despite all the above, the Remo asserts (C.M. 3:1) that wherever there is a regular, established beis din, a defendant must not refuse to be judged by them or demand to choose his own dayan. The Acharonim explain that the Remo refers to towns whose residents have accepted the authority of certain dayanim as a permanent beis din with no conditions. This acceptance of authority excludes any permission to refuse to be judged by them (Tosfos Yom Tov on our Mishna; Aroch HaShulchan, ibid, 2). In our era HaGaon Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l referred to the city of New York (Responsa, C.M. 2:3) and ruled that the residents had not appointed permanent dayanim, “especially being that there are many rabbinical associations which have never convened to jointly appoint even one dayan; if a litigant wants to choose his own dayan, we must therefore obey his wish.”

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Table Manners

The Gemora mentions that the pure-minded people of Yerushalayim did not enter to eat a meal unless they knew who would be eating with them. Rashi explains that it was considered degrading for a Torah scholar to eat with an unlearned person.

The Be'er Heitiv (Orach Chaim 170 s.k.) cites Mateh Moshe who holds that this halachah applies even by a seudas mitzvah. The Biur Halachah cannot find a source for his ruling, and notes that we don't refrain from doing so. Furthermore, he maintains that even the Mateh Moshe would agree in an instance where there is a benefit for the participants when a talmid chacham enhances a seudah with his presence, then, he may do so. Also it is possible that the Mateh Moshe would concur that a talmid chacham may participate in a regular seudas mitzvah, if a) there are other talmidei chachamim there as well, or b) if he is sitting by himself (he deduces this from the above mentioned Rashi who states that it is g’nai for a talmid chacham to sit next to an am ha'aretz at a meal).

The reason for this halachah is because a talmid chacham eats in a more refined manner than the am ha'aretz. This is not simply a matter of finesse, rather, there are explicit halachos that are mentioned in the poskim (aside from the halachos that the Shulchan Aruch in siman 170 speaks about), on how to conduct oneself during a meal.

A small sampling:

1. Talking while eating is discouraged (Mechaber ibid 170:1).
2. The proper amount to eat at a time is less than a k'beitzah (ibid 170:7).
3. When drinking, the entire cupful should not be consumed in one gulp, rather it is proper to finish it in two swallows (ibid 170:8).
4. It is improper to take a bite out of the food and then leave it on the table (ibid 170:11).
5. One should not eat or drink while standing (Be'er Heitiv ibid citing Rokeiach).
6. It is proper for the host to show the guests where the restroom is (M'kor Chaim).
7. One should not lick his fingers during eating (Rokeiach).
8. It is impolite to wolf down the food, rather, eating should be done slowly (Ben Ish Chai).

Matchmaker, L'chaim and Bas-sheva

2010-03-07T17:01:00.001-05:00

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The Gemora discusses the process of matching a man and woman together for marriage, and states that for the first match, a heavenly voice proclaims who will marry whom, while for a second match, the process is as difficult as the splitting of Yam Suf. Rav says that the heavenly voice announces forty days before the forming of a fetus, “The daughter of So-and-so will marry So-and-so.” The Ran explains that this at the point of conception, since an embryo is halachically considered a fetus at forty days from conception.

The Maharsha (Sotah 2b) says that the voice comes out at the time of the husband’s conception, which is why the wife is referred to only as the daughter of someone, and not by name.

Tosfos (22a Arbaim) states that through prayer, one can modify the match that he gets, even in his first match.

The Chasam Sofer (7:34) writes in the name of the Arizal that the “first match” referred to is not necessarily a first marriage. When a soul is created and placed in the world, it has a matching half in someone of the opposite gender. This match is the first match. As the person grows up, they develop, sometimes positively, and sometimes negatively. When they marry, their “first match” may not still be appropriate for who they have become, necessitating a “second match,” based on their actions since birth, and this match is the more difficult one.

Lechaim?
The Gemora brought a braisa, in which Rebbe said that although a Kohen who does not know his rotation week should never drink wine, he is allowed to by dint of his problem. Rashi explains that Rebbe is not concerned with the imminent rebuilding of the Bais Hamikdash. Therefore, Rebbe is saying that destruction of the Bais Hamikdash, which led to the problem of not knowing the rotation, also is the solution which allows them to drink nowadays.

Tosfos Harosh says that Rebbe is saying that a decree that a Kohen can never drink wine is too onerous. Therefore, the problem of not knowing which rotation he is in, also leads to the untenable situation, which therefore allows them to drink wine.

The Rambam (Bias Mikdash 1:7) rules that a Kohen who does know which rotation he is in may not drink wine during his week, even nowadays. This seems to follow the Tosfos Harosh, who says that the license to drink is only for someone who would otherwise never drink.

The Raavad rules that all Kohanim may drink nowadays, which seems to follow Rashi, who says that the license to drink is due to the absence of a Bais Hamikdash, which applies to all Kohanim.

The Shulchan Aruch (OH 128:38) rules that a Kohen who drank a revi’is of wine may not bless Birchas Kohanim, since it is a form of service. The Gemora (Taanis 26b) states that we therefore do not say Birchas Kohanim at Minchah, since it is after a meal, at which the Kohen may have ingested a revi’is of wine. This concern also is the rationale behind the custom in some congregations to shift the Birkas Kohanim on Simchas Torah to Shacharis, lest the Kohanim drink a revi’is of wine after the reading of the Torah, before Musaf.

Bas Sheva or BasSheva?
By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

HaGaon Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin wondered if one should write the name Bas-Sheva in a get as one or two words and he asked his mentor, the Vilna Gaon. The gaon told him that “I have supported my foundations on 13 words” (from the selichos prayers). Rabbi Chaim then remembered our Gemora in which Rashi remarks that the above verse contains thirteen words (s.v. Kinechah). Counting the words, though, he found fourteen! The only solution, then, is that Bas-Sheva should be written and counted as one word (Kol Eliyahu in the name of Emunah Vehashgachah).

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Mentally Preparing for Shemoneh Esreh
The Gemora mentions in passing that according to one explanation, the verse of “Shivisi Hashem l’negdi samid” teaches us that when one davens, he should visualize that the Divine Presence is in front of him. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 98) writes an entire siman on the topic of realizing that one is talking to Hashem and how we should approach the mighty concept of tefillah.

First of all when davening, we must concentrate on the explanation of the words that our mouths are saying. Mishnah Berurah stresses that one must understand the simple meaning, and not delve into the esoteric depths of tefillah, and furthermore, all the mental preparations that are required, should be done before one starts Shemoneh Esreh, for during davening, one must solely focus on the simple translation.

One must expel all of his thoughts until his mind is clear, and he should meditate as to what amount of meticulous preparation he would put in when speaking before an earthly king, how much more so when speaking to Hashem. If a thought does enter his mind during davening, he should wait quietly until the thought goes away. The Mishnah Berurah cites an interesting She’lah who states that as a segulah not to be interrupted with other thoughts during tefillah, before davening. one should say the pasuk “Lev bara li Elokim v’ruach nachon chadash b’kirbi” three times, and each time he recites it he should pass his right hand over his forehead. If thoughts enter during davening, he should do as the above; just instead of reciting the verse out loud, he should think it in his mind.

The Rema adds that before davening one should ponder the greatness of Hashem and conversely the smallness of man.

One must daven as a poor person pleading for mercy, slowly enunciating each word. One must make sure not to daven in a way that it seems that he can’t wait to finish. Mishnah Berurah points out that one must be exceedingly careful in this regard, since there are poskim which hold that if one davened in such a manner he must daven again. Although we don’t rule in accord with these poskim, it shows the severity of not davening properly.

Superstition and Gazing at Women

2010-03-07T16:59:00.000-05:00

Ulla says: A dargash bed is a bed of good fortune.

The Rishonim ask: Shouldn’t such a bed be forbidden on account of the prohibition of nichush; One should not act upon the basis of omens or lucky times (Vayikra 19:26)?

The Radvaz answers that it is being used as a sign to strengthen one’s luck, but not to be superstitious about it. R’ Eliezer MiMitz disagrees with him and maintains that even that would be forbidden.

The Shitah Mikubetzes explains that this is a bed designated for the guardian angel of the house. It was done for the purpose of honoring the Holy One, blessed is He. This is similar in the manner that we prepare a chair for Eliyahu Hanavi by a bris milah.

The Ra”n in Sanhedrin explains that it is a bed which is constantly made and kept empty in order to demonstrate that the household has more than they need. Through this, one is recognizing that Hashem has blessed him with wealth and thanking Him for it.

The Rambam writes that dargash is a small bed that is placed before a larger bed; it is used as a stepping-stool in order to climb onto the higher bed.

The Rosh explains that the angel in charge of poverty resides in a dirty house and the angel in charge of riches and success resides in a clean house. The dargash is a bed which always remained clean in order to beckon the angel of wealth to reside in the house.

The Wisdom of Rabbi Yehonasan

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

And he may break through property to make a way for himself.

Rabbi Yehonasan Eibschitz was familiar with the royal family. Once the king was about to enter the city and to test Rabbi Yehonasan’s wisdom, asked him to guess the gate through which he would enter. Rabbi Yehonasan replied that he would put his answer in writing, to be opened only after the king’s entry to the city. The king thought of a trick and broke through the city wall, making a new gate and imagining that Rabbi Yehonasan could never foresee such a ploy. After his arrival, the reply was opened, showing the excerpt from the Mishna: “…the king may break through property to make a way for himself.”

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Gazing at Women

The Gemora records a dispute between the Chachamim and Rabbi Yehudah regarding where the women stand when attending a funeral. Chachamim are of the opinion that they may stand both in front and behind the coffin, while Rabbi Yehudah maintains that they may only stand in front.

Tosfos explains that since when attending a funeral it is a time of anguish, we are not concerned that the men will see the women and have illicit thoughts, therefore we allow the women to stand in front of the coffin while the men are behind them. However, Tosfos continues that there are those who have the custom to position the men in front of the coffin and the women behind it, for it is improper for the men to gaze at the women.

There are many things men are forbidden to do, so as to distance themselves from immorality. Obviously these laws do not apply to one’s wife. Due to the severity of these laws and the fact that it is unknown to many people, these halachos will be a bit explicit.

It is forbidden to:

1) Wink, snap the fingers or any other bodily movement that is considered flirting.

2) Joke around with a woman, or to act in a light-hearted manner.

3) Gaze at her beauty. This also applies to an unmarried girl.

4) Smell the perfume that a woman is wearing.

5) Gaze at the clothing of a woman that one knows, even if she is not wearing it at the time.

6) If one is walking down the street and a woman is walking in front of him, it is forbidden to continue to walk behind her; rather, he should quicken his pace and get in front of her. If this is not possible, then he should either go to the side or wait until she is sufficiently ahead of him. There is a dispute as to how much of a distance needs to be between them. Mahari and others hold that it is enough if a man is four amos behind a woman, while the Radvaz rules that one must distance himself until he can’t clearly see her walking and movements. This applies even where ladies go covered from head to toe.

7) Pass the house of a prostitute.

8) Gaze at any part of a woman’s body.

9) Listen to a woman singing.

Freezing Mikvah and Returning a Lost Article

2010-03-07T16:54:00.000-05:00

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The king or the Kohen Gadol may not be members of the Beis Din involved with the intercalation of the year The king cannot on account of the upkeep of his army (since they are paid annually, he might wish to make a leap year in order to save money). The Kohen Gadol cannot because of the cold the following year (since he might be against intercalation of this year, for if the year is extended, Yom Kippur, being a month later, will be colder, and it will cause him distress during his five immersions on that day).

Tosfos asks from a Gemora in Yoma (31b) which states that if the Kohen Gadol found it difficult to immerse in a cold mikvah, iron bars were heated prior to Yom Kippur and placed into the mikvah to warm it up!?

Tosfos learns that the Kohen Gadol would be cold from the floor of the Beis Hamikdash, since he performed the Temple service while barefoot.

The Margoliyos Hayam answers Tosfos’ question by saying that the Mishna is Yoma states that they would only do that if the Kohen Gadol was finicky or elderly; otherwise, it would not be done for him. Accordingly, a healthy Kohen Gadol would not want the year extended.

Alternatively, he answers based upon Reb Akiva Eiger, who asserts that this allowance was not permitted for his first immersion on Yom Kippur, since that did not take place in the sanctified part of the Temple; rather, it was done outside. The Rabbinic prohibition against throwing a heating element into the cold mikvah was only permitted in the Mikdash (based upon the dictum of “ein sh’vus ba’Mikdash). Accordingly, the Kohen Gadol would not want the year extended, for there was no way to avoid the cold water of the first immersion.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

When is One Exempt from Returning a Lost Item

The Mishna had stated: The Kohen Gadol may testify and others may testify about him

The Gemora asks from a braisa: And you will look away. This teaches that sometimes one looks away (from returning a lost article), and sometimes one cannot look away. What is the case? If a Kohen saw a lost object in the cemetery, or an elderly man saw an object that it was not honorable for him to carry, or if his work is more valuable that the lost object of his friend, this is why it says: And you will turn away from them. [Seemingly, it should not be respectful for a Kohen Gadol to testify on behalf of a common person!?]

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 263:1) clarifies that even a young Torah scholar, or a well respected person (Aruch Hashulchan), is exempt from returning a lost item which is below their dignity to deal with, for example a bale of hay.

Although they are usually exempt from returning a lost item that is beneath their dignity to deal with, they will be required to do so if they actually moved or picked up the item, since they started the mitzvah (ibid 263:2).

The Shach directs us to a halachah (in 261:2) where the Shulchan Aruch rules that if one found an animal grazing in someone else’s vineyard or field, then he is obligated to return it, because the animal is damaging that property. This is termed aveidas karka (in other words, the owner of the vineyard is being caused a loss, so the person seeing the animal grazing has an obligation to return it to his owner, so as not to cause a loss to the owner of the field).

At first glance it is difficult to see the apparent connection. Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains that the Shach is proving that since the Shulchan Aruch does not state that he should just simply move the animal to a ownerless field, that shows that once he moved the animal he is obligated to return to its owner. However, the Or Zerua cites Ritva who disagrees and maintains that it is enough if he merely moves it to an ownerless field.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid 263:3) rules that if the these people want to go beyond the call of duty and lower themselves to return the lost item, they may do so. The Rema disagrees, and quotes Rosh that the most such people are allowed to do is to pay the owner for the lost item.

Dayanim

2010-03-07T16:53:00.001-05:00

A dayan who says he doesn’t know is regarded as absent.

Our Mishna and Gemora explain that the decision of a beis din is determined according to the majority opinion of the dayanim. The initiator of the method of study practiced in yeshivos, HaGaon Rav Chaim Soloveichik of Brisk zt”l, offered a logical explanation as to why a majority opinion suffices to rule a decision. As stated in the first Mishna in Sanhedrin, financial or property cases are judged by a beis din of three and cases involving a death penalty require a beis din of 23. How, then, can a beis din rule a decision according to the majority opinion if the minority of dayanim objects? In such an instance, the beis din lacks the needed number of dayanim to judge the case! Moreover, we may ask an even more serious question: We have the rule that “the majority is not a determining factor in financial and property cases” so how could they ever be ruled according to a majority of dayanim? (Tosefos, Bava Kamma 27b, s.v. Ka mashma lan).

Rav Chaim then explains that the term majority has two definitions. Sometimes we follow the majority to decide a doubtful case. On the other hand, we sometimes have the definition of “the majority is like all.” A shochet, for example, must cut through certain parts in an animal for the shechitah to be kosher, but if he cuts through most of them, his shechitah is kosher as, in this case, “the majority is like all” and the minor part is also considered as “shechted.” Similarly, when the Torah says, “Decide according to the majority (of dayanim)” (Shemos 23:2), it means we should regard the minority as actually becoming part of the majority and arriving at the same decision and we then have an entire beis din – of three or 23 – with one ruling. (Chidushei HaGaon Rav Chayim al HaShas, p. 127 – see there that this applies to the verdict; the assumption that they reached a correct decision is based on the rule to follow the majority in a case of doubt.)

The concept of “the majority is like all” is constantly expressed in daily life. We must, for instance, choose myrtle branches (hadasim) with clusters of three leaves but if a hadas is mostly covered with such clusters it is kosher for the mitzvah as “the majority is like all.” By the same reasoning, sechach does not have to entirely prevent the penetration of sunlight in a sukkah: it suffices if the sechach creates more shade than sunlight. In his Kehilos Ya’akov (1:2), the Steipler Gaon, HaRav Yaakov Kanievski explains that this halachah stems from the aforesaid rule and, indeed, such a sukkah is regarded as entirely shaded by kosher sechah.

Why don’t the Jews follow the majority of the world?

We conclude with the reply of Rabbi Yehonasan Eibschitz zt”l to a priest who asked why the Jews don’t follow the majority of the world even though the Torah commands us to “decide according to the majority.” Rabbi Eibschitz explained that the command applies only in the case of a doubt. As to their faith, however, Jews have no doubts and in such matters have no reason to follow the majority.

A Rabbi Is Better Than a Doctor

A Torah scholar must not reside in a town lacking any of these ten things.

A poor Lithuanian town lacked both a rabbi and a physician and the community disagreed as to whether they should hire a rabbi or use their meager budget to employ a doctor. Rabbi Yaakov Kaminetzky zt”l heard the different opinions and ruled in favor of a rabbi since, as our sugya explains, a rabbi knows that one mustn’t live in a town without a doctor, whereas a doctor would not demand the presence of a rabbi… Indeed, Rabbi Kaminetzky obeyed this principle. Upon his appointment as the Rabbi of Tzitivan, he discovered that the town lacked a physician. He troubled to find a medical book in Russian and devoted a whole night to its study. Stories were later told about his medical expertise resulting from that night (Rabbi Yaakov, 130, 139).

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Adding More Dayanim to a Beis Din

After Beis Din listens to all the claims from the litigants, and any testimony from the witnesses, they send everyone out of the room and precede to deliberate the case. If they all agree as what the halachah should be, well and good, but if they don’t then they follow the majority opinion (Choshen Mishpat 18:1).

In instances where either; a) one dayan says chayav and another says zakkai, while the third abstains from stating an opinion because he doesn’t know, or b) even if both dayanim agree what the ruling should be, but the third does not know what to rule, then two more dayanim are added. Now that there are five dayanim they deliberate once again, and if there is a majority opinion either way, then that is what the ruling would be. If however the same scenario repeats itself that there is an equally divided opinion and the fifth does not know, then an additional two are added (ibid).

It is interesting to note that if there would be a similar case as example b above, where three dayanim rule one way while the fourth disagrees and the fifth abstains, or if four dayanim rule one way and the fifth abstains, then we follow the majority opinion. Even though earlier such an instance would cause us to add more dayanim, here it is different. The difference is because in order to follow the majority opinion of a Beis Din, there obviously needs to be a Beis Din in the first place, and that can only happen when there are at least three opinions. Therefore in the case of three alone, then more dayanim need to be added in order to follow the majority, while in the instance where more were already added, then there are already three that gave an opinion, so we may follow the majority (S’ma ibid).

Harp and the Northern Wind; Tikkun Chatzos

2010-03-07T16:49:00.001-05:00

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The Mishna had stated: A voluntary war (if they are not waging war against the seven nations that were occupying Eretz Yisroel) requires a Court of seventy-one.

Rabbi Avahu said: It is written: And before Elozar the Kohen he shall stand [and Elozar shall inquire for him by the judgment of the Urim before God; by His word shall they go out (to war) and by His word they shall come in from war, both he and all the children of Israel with him and all the congregation]. He refers to the king (Yehoshua); and all the children of Israel with him refers to the Kohen anointed for war; and all the congregation refers to the Sanhedrin.

The Gemora asks: But perhaps the verse is teaching us that it is the Sanhedrin (or king or the Kohen anointed for war) whom the Torah tells to inquire of the Urim ve’Tumim (but the Sanhedrin do not need to be consulted before going to war)!?

Rather, it may be derived from a verse cited by Rav Acha bar Bizna in the name of Rabbi Shimon Chasida: There was a harp hanging over David’s bed and when it reached midnight, the north wind would blow on the harp and it played by itself. At that point, David would get up and study Torah until the break of dawn. After the break of dawn, the Chachamim came to him and said: “Our master, the king! Your nation Israel requires sustenance.” David replied, “Go and sustain each other.” They said back to him, “A handful cannot satisfy a lion, nor can a pit be filled up with its own earth.” He said to them, “Then go out and stretch your hand against the enemy (for plunder).” They immediately took counsel with Achitofel (as to their battle strategy) and consulted the Sanhedrin (for permission and that they should pray for them) and questioned the Urim Ve’Tumim (if they would be successful or not).

Rav Yosef said: What is the verse that states this? It is written: And after Achitofel was Benayahu the son of Yehoyada and Evyasar; and the commander of the king’s army was Yoav. Achitofel is the adviser; Benayahu the son of Yehoyada refers to the Sanhedrin, and Evyasar refers to the Urim ve’Tumim.

The Gemora in Brochos (3b) asks: And did David actually know when midnight was? If Moshe didn’t know, is it possible that David knew? [Although it is possible that David had some type of clock, and we know that such things existed in those times as is evident by the Zohar in Lech Lecho, where he mentions a type of alarm clock, which functioned through water, nevertheless, the Zohar states that it was impossible to determine the precise moment of midnight through the use of those man-made items!?]

The Gemora answers: David knew when it was midnight, for he had a sign which notified him, as Rav Acha bar Bizna said in the name of Rabbi Shimon Chasida: There was a harp hanging over David’s bed and when it reached midnight, the north wind would blow on the harp and it played by itself. At that point, David would get up and study Torah until the break of dawn.

The Mefarshim ask: If so, why couldn’t Moshe make use of a harp as well?

The Satmar Rebbe answers based on the following Yonasan ben Uziel in Parshas Yisro: On the night that the Jewish people were about to leave Egypt, the clouds lifted them up and brought them to the place where the Beis Hamikdash would be built in order for them to offer the korban pesach.

The Gemora in Yevamos (72a) states that for all forty years that the Jewish people were in the Wilderness, the northern wind did not blow for them. One of the reasons cited was because the wind would cause the Clouds of Honor to scatter.

Accordingly, it can be explained that the night of Yetzias Mitzrayim, the northern wind could not blow, for if it would have, it would have scattered the Clouds of Honor, and they would not have been able to “fly” to Yerushalayim. It was for this reason that Moshe could not determine the precise time for midnight on that night through the usage of a harp, for the harp would begin to play when the northern wind blew on it, and that night, the northern wind did not blow at all.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Tikun Chatzos

The Gemora informs us of David Hamelech’s custom of waking at midnight and learning until dawn. Today this is known as Tikun Chatzos, for that time of night is a particularly auspicious time for learning and prayer, especially to lament the destruction of the Bais Hamikdash and to pray for its speedy rebuilding.

There is a dispute among the Poskim as to when exactly Chatzos is. Without going into a lengthy explanation of the various opinions, suffice to say that the Mor Uktzia, Shulchan Aruch Harav and the Mishnah Berurah all agree that Chatzos is always exactly at midnight, meaning the halfway point between tzeis hakochavim (when three stars are seen) and alos hashachar (dawn).

Although we see from this Gemora that David Hamelech learned after Chatzos, and this would imply that we should do so as well, in regard to Tikun Chatzos, there are Achronim that hold otherwise. While the Mishnah Berurah, Kaf Hachaim and others advocate that one should learn from Chatzos and on, the Arugas Habosem held that one should learn the first half of the night, rather than the second. Similarly the Chasam Sofer writes that most people that learn at night do so the first half of the night. The Seder Hayom explains why one should rather learn the first half of the night, for the simple reason that he might find it hard to get up in middle of the night to learn, and the night would pass without him learning.

Tikun Chatzos is a great mitzvah, but it cannot come at the expense of falling asleep during davening (Elya Rabbah). Similarly, a person who is by nature made of a weaker composition and needs his sleep, he need not arise for Tikun Chatzos.

Wild Animals and Hunting

2010-03-07T16:42:00.001-05:00

Wild Animals
The Gemora discusses the opinions in the Mishna regarding wild animals, citing three opinions:
1. The Sages say that all animals, wild or not, are killed only if they kill, and then only in a court of twenty-three.

2. Rabbi Eliezer says that wild animals should be killed by anyone, without waiting for a court.

3. Rabbi Akiva says that only a snake should be killed by anyone, without waiting for a court, but all other animals must be killed only by a court of twenty-three.

Rish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan differ on the terms of Rabbi Eliezer’s and Rabbi Akiva’s exceptions. Rish Lakish says these animals are only killed when they kill, while Rabbi Yochanan says that these animals are killed under any circumstances, since they are inherently dangerous.

Tosfos (15b v’Rabbi Yochanan) compares our Mishna to the Mishna in Bava Kamma (15b), which discusses which animals are presumed to be accustomed to damage, and therefore must pay full damages in all cases. The Mishna says that the Sages consider all wild animals to be accustomed to damage, while Rabbi Elozar says that they can be domesticated. However, all agree that a snake is considered accustomed to damaging. [Tosfos points out that Rabbi Elozar in the Mishna in Baba Kama is not identical to Rabbi Eliezer in our Mishna.] Tosfos asks how we can reconcile the Mishna in Bava Kamma, in which all agree that a snake cannot be domesticated and is assumed, a priori, to be dangerous, with Rish Lakish’s position in Sanhedrin, that all agree that a snake which has not killed may not be killed. Tosfos offers two answers:
1. In order to actually kill the snake, it must have proven its danger by killing someone. However, we assume any snake is potentially dangerous, and we therefore require the owner to guard the snake well, obligating him in full payment in the case of actual damage.

2. Rabbeinu Tam says that the Mishna in Sanhedrin refers to animals that were simply domesticated by training. All agree that a snake cannot be trained, and is still dangerous. However, the Mishna in Sanhedrin is referring to animals that have been restrained (e.g., by chains). Such protection is the subject of the dispute in the Mishna, and Rish Lakish’s limitation.

The Rambam (Sanhedrin 5:2) rules like Rabbi Akiva, according to Rish Lakish’s explanation.

The Rishonim point out that we rule like Rish Lakish since the Gemora brought a braisa which supports him.

The Ra’avad, however, challenges the Rambam’s ruling like Rabbi Akiva, since we generally rule like the Sages against Rabbi Akiva.

The Radvaz says that the Rambam accepted Rabbi Akiva’s special treatment of a snake, since the Mishna in Bava Kamma (15b) explicitly states that a snake is always considered in the habit of damaging.

The Rashash explains that although Tosfos distinguished between the Mishnayos, we still see in the Mishna in Bava Kamma that a snake is treated differently than other wild animals. From that case, we extrapolate to the case of our Mishna.

The Kesef Mishnah says that the Rambam ruled like the majority of opinions in each case. In the case of all wild animals except for a snake, both Rabbi Akiva and the Sages rule that a court of twenty-three is needed, while in the case of a snake, both Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer rule that anyone should kill it. [See the Rashash for a discussion of the status of the Sages in such an analysis.]

Hunting
The Noda beYehudah (Mahadura Tinyana Y”D 10) discusses whether someone may hunt for sport. He first analyzes the potential formal prohibitions, including tza’ar ba’alei chayim – causing pain to creatures, and bal tashchis – not wantonly destroying, and says that they are not applicable to such a case. However, he states that hunting for no gain (e.g., meat or hides, or for employment) is not a Torah value, with the only examples in the Torah of such behavior being Nimrod and Esav. He raises the possibility that one may hunt and kill wild animals, in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, who says that anyone should kill wild animals, due to their danger. He rejects this on two counts:
1. This does not fit with our ruling. We rule like Rish Lakish, who limits the Mishna to a case where the animal already killed. Even under those circumstance, we rule like Rabbi Akiva, and not like Rabbi Eliezer.

2. The Mishna is only discussing wild animals who are among people, and allows one to kill them to protect the people. However, wild animals that are in their natural habitat, not threatening people, are not considered a danger to be eliminated.

Finally, he prohibits such hunting, since the sport itself is inherently dangerous, as expressed by Esav, who told Yaakov that he is going to die young, due to his sport. Although the Torah allowed one to put oneself in danger for employment, the Torah did not allow this simply for sport.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Mamon Hamazik
The Gemora explains that the difference between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Akiva (which at first glance both Tannaim seem to be saying the same thing; a wolf, lion etc. that killed a person must be killed by a Beis Din of twenty three), is if a snake killed a person. According to Rabbi Akiva, it is not in the same category as the wolf, lion etc. while the Tanna Kamma is of the opinion that it is.

Rashi explains Rabbi Akiva according to the Mishna in Bava Kamma (15b), where there is a dispute between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Eliezer whether a wolf, lion etc. automatically have a status of a mu’ad (an animal which is established after three times that it damages) or not, but they both agree that a snake is always considered a mu’ad.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 389) explains the concept, possible scenarios, and their various halachic outcomes.

Any creature which is owned by a person that damages, the owner is liable to pay. This does not apply to a slave (Tur). Not all damages are paid in full, rather, only damages that can occur when the creature does an action that comes naturally to it. For example, an animal that caused damage by eating someone else’s hay, or if it stepped on items while walking, these types of cases would require the owner to pay in full, since the owner should have thought of that natural scenario and stopped his animal from damaging. In instances where the animal damaged in an unnatural way, for example, a cow that bit someone, then he only pays half of the damages.

Therefore if an animal damages three times in the same unnatural manner, then we say that this particular thing (for example biting) became natural to this animal, so the owner would have to pay for the damages in full. This is the logic behind tam and mu’ad.

However, there are six creatures (wolf, lion etc. and snake) which the Chachamim determined are naturally inclined to cause damage, even if they are domesticated, so it will make no difference as to what specific action caused the damage, for any action it does, it will have the status of a mu’ad, and therefore the owner is liable to pay in full.

However, the Rema disagrees and is of the opinion that only a snake has an automatic status as a creature that will damage through any action, but the other five are only a mu’ad for specific actions that are natural to them, for example, a lion to be doires and a wolf to be toref, but not vice versa.

Keep away from a Lie, Empty Vessel

2010-03-07T16:41:00.002-05:00

Keep Far from a Lie
By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The Gemora related: Rabbi Zeira used to hide himself to avoid ordination, because Rabbi Elozar had said: A person should remain obscure, for then he will live. But later, having heard yet another saying of Rabbi Elozar that one does not attain a position of greatness unless all his sins are forgiven, he himself made every effort to obtain it. When they ordained him, the people sang before him, “no eyeliner, no rouge, no braids, and yet, she radiates grace.”

A Torah scholar pleaded with Rabbi Aryeh Leib Shapira, the Rabbi of Kovno, to give him a certificate of rabbinical ordination. At first he refused but eventually gave in to the young man’s pleading and started to write the certificate. He then used the customary wording but left a long space before signing his name. “What are you wondering about?” he asked the other dayanim, “After all, the Torah says, Keep far from a lie” (Emunas HaTechiyah).

The Empty Vessel
The Gemora related: When the Rabbis ordained Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Assi, they sang as follows: Only men as these, only men as these, ordain for us, but do not ordain for us any of the “sarmitin” (rags; people who cannot provide proper reasoning for their words) and “sarmisin” (people who distort the reasons of the Torah), or as some say, “machmisin” (people who hold back from saying the reasons of the Torah) or “miturmisin” (empty-headed people).

A simple person came to the Chida for a letter of recommendation that would help him in begging from door to door. The Chida took pen in hand and described him with outstanding titles of honor, adding that had he lived in the days of the prophet Elisha, the miraculous oil would not have stopped flowing! The beggar showed the letter on his rounds and had much success. In a certain town, though, the local rabbi noticed that the mendicant did not seem to be such an outstanding scholar. Rereading the letter of recommendation, he came upon the above statement and, pondering the matter, realized the point: Elisha commanded Ovadiah’s wife to borrow empty utensils and pour the oil in them, promising that there would be enough to fill them all. When there were no more vessels, “the oil stopped” (Melachim II, 4:6) but were this person there, it wouldn’t have stopped as there would have been one more empty vessel. The Chida wanted to imply to the more discerning that they mustn’t rely on his recommendation for matters not pertaining to charity (Shivchei HaRav Chida).

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Kichul, Pirkus and Serak
The Gemora mentions that when they ordained Rav Zeira, they lauded his greatness, and they expressed themselves with the same words that was used in the time of the Gemora to praise a bride, “without kichul, without serak, without pirchus, and yet she is still full of chein”, meaning that without adding any embellishments to Rav Zeira, he was still a great scholar. Rashi defines; kichul - makeup for the eyes, serak - makeup for the face, pirchus - braiding the hair. Tosfos points out that Rashi in Kesuvos (4b) learned that pirchus is really serak.

Understanding the exact meaning is not just academic, for there are halachic differences.

1) The above mentioned Gemora in Kesuvos discusses that a woman, when either she or her husband is in mourning, may not do kichul and pirchus. For a married woman this only applies during shivah (the seven days of mourning), but after that, she may do so in order that she should not be misganeh al baalah (repulsive in the eyes of her husband) (Yoreh De'ah 381:6).

2) A bride that is in mourning may do kichul and pirchus for up to thirty days after her wedding, even during shivah (ibid).

3) A girl that has reached marriageable age, and she is in mourning, may too do kichul and pirchus (ibid).

titles for Talmudic Sages and Lo Adu Rosh

2010-03-07T16:39:00.000-05:00

How the Talmudic Sages were Given their Titles

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Rav Acha the son of Rava said to Rav Ashi: Does one have to literally put his hand on someone’s head when giving him rabbinic ordination?

He answered: We lean on him in name only, calling him a Rabbi, and giving him permission to judge cases involving fines.

Gadol meraban shemo – “greater than raban is his name” is an expression used by many to praise an exalted Torah personality. The description first appears in a responsum from the Babylonian Ge’onim – Rav Sherira Gaon, the Rosh Yeshivah of Ge’on Yaakov, and his son Rav Hai Gaon, called the Av beis din of Yeshivas Ge’on Yaakov. They were asked to explain the titles used for the sages of the Talmud, such as Raban, Rabbi, Rav, Mar and the like, in contrast to the lack of titles when mentioning others such as Hillel, Shammai or Shimon ben Shetach. Their long and detailed responsum appears in He’Aruch, in the article on Abaye, (see also introduction of Rambam to Peirush HaMishnayos ch 7) and cites the rule that “greater than rav is rabbi, greater than rabbi is raban and greater than raban is his name alone.”The very first sages were known only by their names and therefore no titles were ever used to describe Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, the prophets, the kings, the members of the Kenesses HaGedolah or the sages up to the middle of the era of the Tannaim before the destruction of the Second Temple. The title Raban became to be used for the Nesi’im in the generation of Raban Gamliel HaZaken while other sages in Eretz Yisroel were known as Rabbi. The Sefer HaYuchasin states that the title Rabbi was used to distinguish genuine sages from Sadducean imposters and since then various titles have been employed to describe our sages. On the other hand, the sages not called by their real names – such as Abaye, whose true name was Nachmeini – were left without a title (see ibid as to the meaning of the name Abaye and why he was not called by his real name). The only one of our forefathers with an added title is Moshe Rabbeinu and even then his title always appears after his name, as it is not meant to honor him but to honor us, that we had the merit that he was our rav (see Otzar HaGeonim).

The difference between rav and rabbi: Rav Sherira Gaon and Rav Hai Gaon explain that the sages of Eretz Yisroel were called rabbi whereas those of Babylonia were titled rav. Indeed, the Gemora calls Rav Zeira by that title while he was in Babylonia, but refers to him as Rabbi Zeira after his arrival in Eretz Yisroel and the Gemora in Kesuvos 43b discusses whether a certain halachah was stated by Rav Zeira, while still in Babylonia, or by Rabbi Zeira in Eretz Yisroel (according to Rashi, ibid, but Tosefos in Menachos 40b, s.v. Rabbi Zeira, disagree). Rashi (ibid) explains that the difference in titles stems from the fact that there was no traditional semichah – rabbinical ordination – in Babylonia (see Sefer HaShtaros by Rabbi Yehudah El-Barceloni, one of the first Rishonim and author of Sefer Ha’Itim).

Real semichah was eventually discontinued for certain reasons and was replaced by a symbolic semichah “so that students should adhere to the sages’ attributes and gradually advance along the levels of wisdom and its uses” (Rabbi Y. El-Barceloni, ibid). The Sefer HaShtaros (“Book of Documents”) therefore includes a “document of semichah” to authorize students to be called rav, rabbi or chacham.

An unlearned person called by a rabbinical title: The use of titles has spread since that period such that people who are not talmidei chachamim are sometimes called by the above appellations. The matter may even have halachic implications, as in the instance of a bill of divorce (get). The author of Get Pashut (129, s.k. 31, s.v. Harav) asserts that because of the proliferation of titles we must not disqualify a get in which the husband is called rav even if he lacks any Torah knowledge.

HaGaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger zt”l states that if he could, he would completely do away with titles in our era. Those who give a title to anyone, he complains, are guilty of minor flattery and those so titled might be tempted to assume false pride or dislike those giving them such titles if they think they deserve better (Preface to Responsa Rabbi Akiva Eiger).

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Lo Adu Rosh

The Gemora continues to discuss the laws of making a leap year. The Gemora records a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yosi. Rashi explains the opinion of Rabbi Yosi, and an important part of the calculation, is lo adu rosh, meaning that the first day of Rosh Hashanah cannot fall out on a Sunday, Wednesday or Friday.

In the times of the Bais Hamikdash they established the length of the month based on testimony from witnesses that saw the new moon. But that all changed when Hillel made a calendar whose specific rules would allow the smooth running of the Jewish year. Each year has a set amount of months, whose length is either a 29 or 30 day month.

Every couple of years, there is a need to add an additional month in order to enable the holidays to fall in the same season each year (the seasons follow the solar year, and the Jewish calendar follows the lunar year). There is a set timeline as to which year will be a leap year. [This is known as “gu-ach adzat” – every third, sixth, eighth, eleventh, fourteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth year of the nineteen year cycle is deemed a leap year.]

According to the calendar's calculation, there are specific days which will never fall out on a given Yom Tov.

Rosh Hashana - Sunday, Wednesday and Friday.
Yom Kippur - Sunday, Tuesday and Friday.
Hoshana Rabbah - Tuesday, Thursday and Shabbos.
Chanukah - Tuesday. Incidentally, this is the reason for the custom to distribute “Chanuka Gelt” on the 5th day of Chanuka, since it can never fall out on a Shabbos (Steipler).
Ta’anis Esther - Sunday, Tuesday and Friday.
Purim - Monday, Wednesday and Shabbos.
Pesach - Monday, Wednesday and Friday.
Shavuos - Tuesday, Thursday and Shabbos.
Shiva Asar B’tamuz - Monday, Wednesday and Friday.
Tisha B’av - Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

Another calculation that manifests itself through the calendar is the correlation between two important days. Meaning the day of the week in which A falls out will always be the same day as B (i.e. the upcoming B).

The first day of Pesach - Tisha B’av.
The second day of Pesach - Shavuos.
The third day of Pesach - Rosh Hashanah.
The fourth day of Pesach - Simchas Torah.
The fifth day of Pesach - Yom Kippur.
The sixth day of Pesach - Purim (of that year)
Purim - Lag B’omer

Mevarchin Hachodesh

2010-02-22T17:39:00.001-05:00

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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In the sefer Yereim (259) it is written: That which Jews all over the world have the custom to announce the new month on Shabbos before Rosh Chodesh (birchas ha’chodesh), this is not the sanctification of the new month, for we do not have the Rosh Beis Din amongst us and he is an integral and essential part of this mitzvah. The Rishonim established this custom merely as a way of notifying the people when Rosh Chodesh will be.

The Magen Avraham (O:C, 417) writes that it is, nevertheless, the custom to stand by birchas ha’chodesh - specifically when we are saying that “Rosh Chodesh will be on Such-and-such a day,” similar to when Beis Din sanctified the new month, which was done while standing.

Reb Akiva Eiger (ibid) asks: Where is it found that the sanctifying of the month was done standing? On the contrary! It would seem from the beginning of the third perek of Rosh Hashanah that it was done while sitting!?

Reb Moshe Feinstein zt”l (O:C I; 142) answers this question based upon a Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (24a) which states that first the Rosh Beis Din would say, “Mekudash” – “It is sanctified,” and then the entire congregation would say in unison, “Mekudash, mekudash.” And certainly, the entire congregation, who were there at the Beis Din, were not all sitting; they were standing! We find like this by the mitzvah of chalitzah as well, where the Gemora in Yevamos (106a) states that there is a mitzvah for all the people standing there to say “chalutz hana’al.”

Reb Moshe understands that the Rosh Beis Din’s saying “Mekudash” was the p’sak din – the witnesses were fully cross-examined and the Beis Din came to a conclusion with respect of the new month. The Rosh Beis Din announced this ruling. Then, there was a mitzvah on the congregation to sanctify the new month. This, they accomplished, by saying, “Mekudash, mekudash.” He derives this from a Scriptural verse, and it can be inferred from the language of the Rambam, as well.

That which we recite birchas ha’chodesh is based upon the congregation’s saying of “Mekudash, mekudash.” It is not on account of the Rosh Beis Din’s announcement of the judgment, for this was already done by Hillel’s Beis Din (when he arranged the calendar for the future). This is why the custom is to stand. The inference of the Gemora in Rosh Hashanah that they were sitting is only in reference to the Beis Din, not to the people standing there. It also stands to reason that the “Mekudash, mekudash” should be said standing, for this was the mitzvah of sanctifying the new month, and mitzvos (as a general rule) are performed while standing.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Palginan Dibura

The Gemora teaches us that if Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon cohabited with his wife, and with Reuven there is another witness, we can consider them two witnesses and Shimon gets killed. The Gemora explains that it would work only because of palginan dibura (we split his words). Rashi explains that we accept his testimony in regard to Shimon but not in regard to his wife, since she is related to him and he is not a valid witness.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:26) has several cases where palginan dibura applies:

1) A loveh (borrower) may testify that the malveh (lender) lent money to him with interest, and although he cannot testify on himself, we enact palginan dibura and we split his sentence. Instead of hearing the entire testimony that the malveh lent money to him with interest, we only listen to part of it; i.e., the malveh lent with interest (S’ma). Therefore, if there would be another witness, Beis Din will disqualify the malveh from being believed when giving testimony in the future (an oveir aveira is disqualify as a witness).

2) Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon sodomized him, we invoke palginan dibura, and if there would be another witness testifying, Beis Din will disqualify him.

3) Similarly, if Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon cohabited with his wife, and there is another witness, Beis Din will disqualify Shimon (the Shulchan Aruch doesn’t state that he gets put to death, because the Shulchan Aruch is talking to our generation, where there isn’t any court-imposed death penalty).

The Rashba distinguishes between the case where he says, “Shimon cohabited with my wife,” and where he said, “I cohabited with Shimon’s wife.” In the latter case, we don’t say palginan dibura.

4) Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon sodomized Reuven’s animal, if there will be another witness, Beis Din will disqualify Shimon. The S’ma points out that this case is different than the above cases, since there is no such concept that Reuven is related to his animal, and therefore, in the times of the Sanhedrin, we would kill the animal as well.

Not in all cases do we say palginan dibura. The Mordechai (Yevamos) and Tosfos in Kesuvos (18b) rule that cases which are not common, or if you have to add a reason to his sentence, then we don’t say palginan dibura.

Blackmailing Father

2010-02-22T17:37:00.001-05:00

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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And Rav Yosef said: If a man says, “So-and-so committed sodomy with me against my will,” he himself with another witness can combine to testify against the perpetrator. If, however, he said, “So-and-so committed sodomy with me with my consent,” he is a wicked man and the Torah states: Do not use a sinner as a witness.

Rava said: Every man is considered a relative to himself, and he cannot incriminate himself (as a sinner).

The following question was raised to the poskim years ago: A man testified in Beis Din that he married off his minor daughter, but he refused to state the identity of this man. His intention was to put pressure on his wife for her to accept a divorce without receiving any alimony payments and to have equal visitation rights for the children. Do we accept his testimony and consider the girl as a married woman?

Rav Eliyahu Pesach Ramnik, Rosh Yeshiva of Ohavei torah in Far Rockaway applied the principle of ‘a person is not believed to establish himself as an evil person’ as the basis for his ruling. He explained: The father, who is testifying that he married off his minor daughter, is establishing himself as a wicked person for several different reasons. Firstly, if in truth, he has married her off in order to extort money from his wife, using a mechanism of the Torah in this manner causes a tremendous desecration of Hashem’s Name, and if the wife does not concede to his demands, the child will remain an agunah her entire life. This will result in an even bigger chilul Hashem. Secondly, he is transgressing the prohibition of paining another fellow Jew. The pain and the embarrassment that he is causing his wife and daughter to endure is indescribable. Thirdly, the Gemora in Sanhedrin (76a) states that one who marries his daughter to an elderly man transgresses a Biblical prohibition of causing his daughter to sin, since she will not be satisfied in that marriage; certainly in this case, the father will be violating this prohibition, for the daughter does not even know the identity of her true husband. Based on these above reasons, it emerges that by accepting the father’s testimony, he would be rendered a rasha, and therefore, his testimony should not be accepted and his daughter would not be regarded as a married woman.

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, in his sefer Chashukei Chemed questions the above conclusion. He cites several Acharonim who rule that when a man has already been established as a rasha regarding other matters, his testimony can still be valid (provided that he is not disqualified from offering testimony) even though it also renders him a rasha. The Chacham Tzvi (responsa 3) rules that if someone has violated a light transgression in our presence, he would still be believed that he has violated an even stricter prohibition. This is because his testimony is not rendering him a rasha; he already has established himself a rasha. It is for this reason that we will be compelled to accept the father’s testimony that he married off his daughter, for this man has already been established as a rasha. He is desecrating the name of Hashem by using the Torah’s mechanisms for evil purposes and by causing pain and grief to his wife and to his daughter.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Eidim P’sulim

The Gemora learns that even if there are a hundred witnesses that witnessed an event, but included in those witnesses were relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses, then the all the witnesses may not testify. Rebbe clarifies that this is only true when the relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses also gave the warning, but if they merely witnessed an event along with others, they can’t nullify the testimony of the other witnesses. Rashi explains that by giving the warning, they show that they too want to be considered witnesses, therefore they negate the other witnesses’ testimony, since part of the witnesses are disqualified.

Who is considered disqualified for testimony?

1) Relatives - Relatives: There are many different scenarios; we will only touch on a few.

We learn that relatives cannot be considered witnesses from the verse: Fathers shall not die through their sons. The Chachamim derived from this verse that the father cannot die due to testimony from his son, and vice versa. Aside from a son there are other relatives that cannot testify; a) brothers, b) grandson, c) first cousins, d) second cousins. All these cases apply to females as well, meaning a sister cannot testify on a brother and vice versa etc. (Choshen Mishpat 33:2)

If one cannot testify regarding a woman (for example a sister), he is similarly prohibited from testifying for her husband, and conversely, if one cannot testify for a certain man, he also may not testify for his wife (ibid 33:3). However, he may testify for that spouse’s relative (ibid 33:5).

Mechutanim may testify for each other (ibid 33:6).

2) Oivrei Aveirah - One Who Committed a Sin: If one transgressed any prohibition that is punishable by either death or lashes, he is disqualified for testimony until he repents. It makes no difference if he sinned due to desire, or if he sinned as an act of rebellion (ibid 34:2).

If one transgressed a Rabbinic prohibition, he is disqualified only on a Rabbinic level (there are halachic differences between them).

3) Other P’sulei Eidus: A minor is disqualified for testimony, even if he is very bright. One leaves the status of a minor once he shows signs of physical maturity, usually when he turns thirteen years old.

One who is incoherent in a certain issue is also disqualified (ibid 35:8). If he is mentally deranged, he is also disqualified (ibid 35:10).

Motzi Sheim Ra

2010-02-22T17:34:00.001-05:00

The Gemora discusses what the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir about the number of judges for a case of motzi sheim ra is actually about. Ulla and Rava explain that the dispute is not an inherent dispute of how many judges are needed for this case, but rather depends on an external concern that the Sages have. Ulla says the Sages are concerned with la’az – a rumor, while Rava says that the Sages are concerned with the honor of the originally convened court.

Rashi explains that according to both of these explanations, the issue brought before the court is the husband’s demand to void the wife’s kesuvah, since she was not a virgin at the time of marriage. Rashi explains that the husband is believed to void the kesuvah, as the Gemora in Kesuvos (10a) states, since the Sages, who instituted kesuvah, assumed that a man would not lie about this, since he stands to lose the money spent on his wedding meal.

Ulla is explaining that the Sages are concerned that when this case is brought to court, although the husband is not claiming infidelity, witnesses to infidelity may indeed hear of the case and come forward, transforming this to a capital case. We therefore begin with a court of twenty-three, to account for that possibility.

Rava says the case is where the husband did claim infidelity, but wasn’t able to produce witnesses to prove it. When the court then dispersed, the husband requested that the remaining judges void the kesuvah. The Sages are concerned that adjudicating that with the partial court that remains would be disrespectful the original judges, and therefore they must reconvene.

The Gemora cites a braisa, which states that if t’va’o mamon – he claimed from him money, only three judges are needed, but if t’vao nefashos – he claimed from him a capital crime, twenty-three are needed. According to Rava, the first clause is a case where there was no claim of capital infidelity, and therefore there is no issue of the judges’ honor, leaving a monetary case for three judges. However, according to Ulla, even if the case began as monetary, we should be concerned about witnesses arriving later.

Rava answers that the braisa is a case where the husband produced witnesses that testified to her infidelity, but these were fully refuted by the father’s witnesses, who put the original witnesses in a different place at the time of their testimony. The husband is now liable 100 sela to the father for his false claim. The braisa is stating that to adjudicate the father’s monetary claim, only three witnesses are necessary. According to Rashi, the Gemora is introducing the aspect of the father claiming his monetary damages only at this point in the Gemora. All earlier discussions of monetary judgment were purely of the husband’s claim to void the kesuvah.

Tosfos (8a Motzi) cites Rabbeinu Tam, who disagrees with Rashi’s reading of the Gemora’s first two answers. Rabbeinu Tam challenges Rashi’s reading based on the following points:
1. Motzi sheim ra is listed in the Mishna along with fines paid by a rapist and a seducer, indicating that it similarly is a case of a fine. The husband’s voiding the kesuvah does not fit this pattern, as it is purely a monetary case.
2. Generally, motzi sheim ra is used to refer to the money paid by the husband when his claim is found to be false.
3. The three judges required in the Mishna are experts. However, cases of voiding a kesuvah are routinely judged by non expert judges, outside of Eretz Yisroel, indicating that the Mishna is not discussing such a case.
4. Rashi’s reading translates the la’az of Ulla as the witnesses hearing about the case and coming forward. Generally, la’az has a connotation of being a false rumor, not simply news spreading.
5. In Rava’s explanation, the husband says to the remaining judges, “At least judge the monetary aspect.” According to Rashi, all the husband wants to do is not have to pay the kesuvah, not collect any money. As long as the wife is not claiming it, he has no urgency to adjudicate the matter.
6. The Gemora’s explanation of the braisa according to Rava’s opinion is that the first clause is referring to a husband who is only adjudicating the kesuvah. The braisa says tva’o mamon – if he claimed from him money. According to Rashi, it should say he claimed from her (the wife), and in fact, the husband is not claiming anything, but simply refusing to pay.
7. Finally, when Rava explains the braisa according to Ulla’s opinion, he explains that the second clause of the braisa is stating that at the outset of a husband’s claim – at which point, it may lead to a capital case – twenty-three judges are needed. The simple reading of the Gemora, however, is that it is a different circumstance of the same case as the first clause, not a new case.
8. Rabbeinu Peretz points out that Rabbi Meir, one the opinions discussed, holds that a husband is obligated from the Torah to pay a kesuvah. The Gemora is Kesuvos that states that husband is believed to void his wife’s kesuvah is based on the assumption that the obligation of kesuvah is purely Rabbinic. Therefore, Rabbi Meir may not even agree that a husband may void the kesuvah, so he cannot be disputing how many judges are needed to deal with such a claim.

Instead, Rabbeinu Tam says that the whole discussion of Motzi sheim ra is of the 100 sela the husband must pay when his claim is disproven. Ulla says the case is when the husband brought witnesses, who were contradicted by the father’s witnesses.

Rabbeinu Tam says that although the witnesses were not refuted (by being placed at a different place at the time of testimony), but simply contradicted in the details of their testimony, the husband still must pay, since his claim was dismissed by the court. (See Tosfos 8b v’haivi for further discussion of this position).

If the father’s witnesses refuted the husbands’ by putting them in a different place at the time of their testimony, we assume no further witnesses will come forward. However, since they only contradicted them, other witnesses may still come. The Sages are concerned that if the twenty-three judges are disbanded, and then a new court of twenty-three will be necessary if new witnesses come, it will lead to la’az - false rumors that the first court was incompetent and replace with the new court. We therefore leave the first court in place. Rabbi Meir is not concerned about such rumors.

Rava says that the case is where the father produced witnesses to refute the husband’s witnesses. Since the husband’s witnesses were trying to kill the wife, they are liable to the same punishment as aidim zomemim – conspiring witnesses. However, the case of the Mishna is where the court of twenty-three dispersed, due to some external event (fear of the government, or another urgent matter they needed to attend to). At that point, the father requested that the remaining judges adjudicate his monetary claim. Rabbi Meir allows this, but the Sages say that this will disrespect the original twenty-three, and they must therefore be reconvened.

Rabbeinu Tam’s reading of the Gemora addresses all of his issues with Rashi’s:
1-3: As it usually does, motzi sheim ra in the Mishna refers to the money paid by the husband to the father, which is a fine. It is therefore listed with rape and seduction, and requires three expert judges.
4: The la’az is the false rumor people may spread about the original court.
5: The request to “At least judge the monetary aspect” is made by the father, who is trying to collect money from the husband.
6: The father is claiming from him (the husband) the money of the fine of motzi sheim ra.
7: The braisa’s first clause is where the father’s witnesses refuted the husband’s before the verdict, and the husband’s false witnesses are therefore not punished by death. However, the second clause is a similar case, but instead of the witnesses being refuted, they are contradicted, leaving the possibility that new witnesses will come, and establish infidelity.
8: Since we are not discussing the kesuvah, whether it is Rabbinic or from the Torah is irrelevant.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Birchas Zimun

The Gemora mentions that zimun needs at least three people. The Gemora in Brachos (47a) derives the concept of zimun from the verses of “gadlu lashem iti”... and “ki shem Hashem ekra havu godel leilokeinu,” and from there, we also learn that a minimum of three is required (since the singular is speaking to the plural and together they equal three).

The person that received the honor of bentching starts off by saying “rabbosai nivarech” (some have the minhag to say it in yiddish “rabbosai mir velen bentchin”), and everyone else responds with “y’hi sheim Hashem mivorach mei’atah v’ad olam.” This originated with the Zohar. (Magen Avraham).

Immediately after that, he continues with “nivarech she’achalnu m’shelo” and the rest answer “baruch she’achalnu m’shelo uv’tuvo chayinu.” After that, he too repeats “baruch she’achalnu m’shelo uv’tuvo chayinu” (Orach Chaim 192:1). There is a machlokes Achronim if the other people bentching should answer amen, the Mishna Berurah writes that the minhag is not to answer.

If there are ten or more people that are bentching together then we add Elokeinu (nivarech Elokeinu, baruch Elokeinu). If he forgot to say Elokeinu and the others didn’t yet respond, then he may say it again properly; once they answered, however, he does not repeat it (ibid).

Sanhedrin 7

2010-02-22T17:30:00.001-05:00

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The First Question

A person’s judgment starts only with asking him about his learning Torah.

Our sugya cites Rav Hamnuna that a person’s final judgment in the beis din of the World to Come starts with asking him about his learning Torah. However, Tosfos (s.v. Ela) compare this statement to the Gemora in Shabbos (31a), which asserts that a person is first asked if he did business faithfully and only then asked if he set aside fixed times for Torah study.

The Gerer Rebbe, author of Imrei Emes zt”l, answers this question in the spirit of our sages’ interpretation of the verse “And you shall love Hashem” – “that you should cause His name to be loved: One should learn the Torah, serve Torah scholars, do business faithfully and speak softly with people. What do people say about him? “Happy is his father who taught him Torah! Happy is his teacher who taught him Torah! How pitiful are those people who have not learnt Torah. That person who has learnt Torah – see how he exhibits such fine behavior.” But he who learns Torah and serves Torah scholars but fails to do business faithfully or speak nicely with people – what do people say about him? “How pitiful is that person who has learnt Torah!” (Yoma 86a). Hence, even though a person is first judged about the Torah he has learnt, he must first be examined if his Torah caused a sanctification of the Name by practicing business faithfully (Imrei Emes, Likutim).

The Thieves Who Were Not Caught

If the beis din takes his garment as payment for his debt, he should sing a song and go on his way.

Our Gemora says that if a beis din takes a person’s garment in payment for some debt that they ruled he was to remunerate, he should be glad.

The Chafetz Chayim zt”l offered the following parable to explain this statement. A group of experienced bandits enlisted some new members and, so as to easily identify each other, agreed that all the members should wear the same clothing. Once, after a hard night’s work, they went to an inn where they ate and drank to inebriation. After the meal some of them refused to pay and the innkeeper let them go only if they gave him their identifying garments as a pledge. A few days later the police found out about the bandits’ “uniform” and arrested them all, with the exception of those who had left their clothing at the inn. “Aha!” they laughed, “The innkeeper did us a big favor when he forced us to give him our clothing.”

A person should know, says the Chafetz Chayim, that any stolen garment or other purloined article in his possession is a reason for the loss of the rest of his wherewithal. If, then, a beis din takes that garment and gives it to the person to whom he owes a debt, they have done him a big favor as they have saved the rest of his possessions (Ahavas Chesed, II, Ch. 1).

The Talking Tree

If the matter is as clear to you as your sister’s being forbidden to you, pronounce it, but if not, do not pronounce it.

Our Gemora emphasizes a dayan’s duty to seriously consider the ruling he intends to announce and stresses that his decision must be completely clear to him.

Once, the Brisker rav, Rabbi Chayim Soloveichik zt”l, wanted to impress upon his son, who became the next Brisker rav, how clear everything must be to the person who says it. One’s pronouncements, he said, must be the firm and utterly unyielding truth, and he presented the following parable: Imagine you are passing by a tree and that someone there tells you that the tree spoke a few minutes ago. You would immediately conclude that he was unbalanced and even if ten people tell you the same, you would judge them insane. But if a thousand people say the same, you would start to think they were apparently mistaken and if 100,000 insist on it, you must consider that a tree could talk. This means, then, that it was never clear to you that trees can’t speak!

A Fair Trial

This is a warning to the beis din to refrain from hearing one litigant without the presence of the other.

Rabbi A.L. HaLevi Horvitz, author of Rashei Besamim, was required to judge the validity of a beis din that had heard one litigant without the presence of the other and he cited the example of Tzelofchad’s daughters: “And they stood before Moshe and before Elozar the Kohen and before the heads of the tribes and the whole congregation” (Bemidbar 27:2). Why must we know that they stood before the whole congregation? The Torah wants to emphasize that the potential litigants, the tribe of Menasheh, were also present, for if not so, Moshe would not have listened to Tzelofchad’s daughters (Kemotzei Shalal Rav, Parashas Pinchas).

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Being a Dayan

The Gemora discusses the responsibilities of a dayan (judge). The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 10:1) exhorts a dayan to be patient when judging what the halachah is, and not to answer flippantly. A dayan should make 100 percent sure in his mind that this is indeed the halachah before paskening, and a dayan that doesn’t do so is labeled a shoteh, rasha and a haughty person.

Similarly if a dayan compares the question that he is asked to another case, and doesn’t ask a Torah scholar who is greater than him for his opinion, he too is categorized as a rasha that is a haughty person.

The Torah does not look favorably on a Torah scholar who is not on the level of being a dayan, and yet judges cases. Nor does it appreciate a scholar of high caliber who abstains from becoming a dayan. However, if he abstains due to the fact that there is another dayan in town, then he is to be commended.

A dayan should always try to make a compromise rather than to judge the case, even if he is one hundred percent sure of the halachah.

A dayan has an obligation to treat each case brought before him, even if it involves a negligible amount of money, with his full attention and seriousness.

Sanhedrin 5

2010-02-22T17:25:00.002-05:00

Mother's Name

The Seder Hadoros (erech: Rav Shmuel bar Marsa) writes that he is uncertain if the name Marsa is the name of a man or the name of a woman.

In the Teshuvos Hageonim it is written: You asked regarding Yoav ben Tzeruyah – why was he called by the name of his mother? And what was his father’s name? His father’s name is known, for it is written (Divrei Hayamim I: 4, 14): and Serayah begot Yoav, the leader of Gei Harashim. And since his mother (Tzeruyah) was the sister of King David, he was called after her name.

This also explains why Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi was called after his mother’s name, for she was the daughter of Rabbi Chiya, as we learned in Yevamos (65b).

Rabbah bar Chanah as well can be explained in this manner, for Chanah was the sister of Rabbi Chiya.

Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marsa is also explained in this manner, for Marsa was the sister of Rabbi Chiya, as it was taught in Sanhedrin (5a) that Aivu (Rav’s father), Chanah (Rabbah’s father), Shila, Marsa and Rabbi Chiya were all the children of Abba bar Acha Karsela of Kafri.

In other Teshuvos Hageonim, it is stated like that as well that Marsa was the mother of Shmuel and the sister of Rabbi Chiya.

Rabbeinu Gershom in Bava Basra
(52a) writes that Marsa is a woman’s name.

The Rashbam learns that Marsa is the name of a scholar, the brother of Rabbi Chiya.

Seder Hadoros cites a Zohar that Pazi was the father of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, not his mother.

“The scepter will not be removed from Yehudah” (Bereishis 49:10).

The Continuation of Jewish Sovereignty in Exile

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Our Gemora explains that the leaders of the Jewish exile in Babylonia, descended from the tribe of Yehudah, derived their might from Yaakov’s blessing: The scepter will not be removed from Yehudah.

Rambam adds that “the leaders of the Babylonian exile take the place of our kings and should rule the Jews everywhere and judge them, whether willingly obeyed or not, as we have been told: The scepter will not be removed from Yehudah; these are the leaders of the Babylonian exile (Hilchos Sanhedrin, 4:13).

The description of Yehudah as a “law-giver” later in the same verse is expressed by the fact that the Nesiim of Eretz Yisroel were descended from Yehudah.

Yaakov’s prophecy served as a weapon for anti-Semitic Christians for many centuries as they tried to point out “inexactitudes” in the Torah and public debates with the Christians featured the repeated question that, after all, the Torah promises eternal sovereignty to Yehudah’s descendants. “Where is Yehudah’s sovereignty and kingdom?”

Addressing this question, Ramban (on Bereishis 49:10) quotes the verse in Devarim 28:36: Hashem will lead you and your king, whom you will appoint over you, to a people unknown by you and your fathers. The Torah itself, he asserts, does not exclude the possibility that Yehudah’s sovereignty will be interrupted. “The scepter will not be removed from Yehudah” therefore means that as long as there is a Jewish kingdom, kings must be appointed only from Yehudah’s descendants, but there is no promise for a continuous monarchy. Indeed, those who ignored this commandment and crowned kings not descended from Yehudah were harshly punished. “And this,” writes Ramban, “was the punishment of the Hasmoneans, who reigned in the era of the Second Temple. They were exceedingly pious and if not for them, the Torah and mitzvos would have been forgotten by the Jews but still they were severely punished…because they reigned without being descended from Yehudah and David and removed the scepter completely. And their punishment was measure for measure, as Hashem set up their slaves over them and they eradicated them.”

The Rashba also addresses this question: “I have seen fit to record in a book my argument with one of their learned men in those matters” (Responsa Rashba, IV, 187). In his opinion, though, the verse promises that Yehudah will reign eternally, we should regard the interruptions of our exile or the reign of kings not descended from Yehudah as merely temporary as, after all, the verse concludes: “till Shiloh (the Mashiach) comes and he will gather the peoples.” In other words, Mashiach, descended from Yehudah, will finally arrive and restore the monarchy to the tribe of Yehudah.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Ruling in the Presence of one’s Teacher

A disciple should not issue a halachic ruling in the presence of his teacher. This is one of the many halachos that pertain to a talmid (disciple) in regard to his Rebbi muvhak (a teacher that taught him a majority of his Torah knowledge), due to the fact that he is obligated to revere him. A talmid that does issue a halachic ruling in the presence of his teacher is liable to death.

Tosfos points out that a talmid may not rule within three parsaos of his teacher, even if his teacher gave him permission to do so. A talmid that is out of the range of three parsaos may only rule in an unofficial manner, but to establish himself as a judge, he will not be permitted until his teacher gave him permission to do so, or when his teacher dies. (Yoreh De’ah 242:4)

Rif and Rambam explain that if the talmid is a talmid chaver - a student that did not learn most of his Torah knowledge from this teacher (Rambam’s definition), then he may rule even within three parsaos. Rama cites an opinion that even a talmid chaver cannot rule in the immediate vicinity of his teacher (ibid).

What exactly constitutes that a talmid has ruled?

1) Only if an actual issue came up, but if he was merely asked his opinion on a hypothetical case then he is permitted to reply (ibid 242:7).

2) Only when asked a question that is a novel halachah to the person who asked the question, but if it’s a common halachah that everyone knows about (i.e. he knows that such a concept exists, but he doesn’t know the ruling in his case), then the talmid may answer (ibid 242:8).

A talmid may rule even in front of his teacher that something is forbidden in order to stop a person from committing a transgression, since we do not give respect to a teacher when a desecration of Hashem’s Name is at stake (ibid 242:11).

A talmid that did not yet reach the level of Torah that enables him to rule and does so, is called a host of harsh names, among them shoteh and rasha (ibid 242:13).

A judge that drank wine may not issue rulings, unless the question is something that is explicitly written in the Torah, for example that blood may not be eaten (ibid). Once he is certain that the wine has left him then he may rule once again (Shach). Similarly if he is distressed, he may not rule (Bach).

Order of the Parshiyos

2010-02-17T00:54:00.000-05:00

Letotafos (tefillin placed on the head) occurs three times in the Torah, twice without a “vav” and once without a “vav,” - four in all. This teaches us that four compartments are to be inserted in the (head) tefillin. This is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva, however, maintains that there is no need for that explanation, for the word totafos itself implies four, since it is composed of the word tot which means two in Caspi, and fos which means two in Afriki.

In both the shel rosh (head tefillin) and shel yad (arm tefillin), there are the same four passages written in them; the only difference between them is that in the shel rosh each bayis (compartment) contains one passage, while in the shel yad all four passages are written in the same bayis on one piece of parchment. (Orach Chaim 32:2). Furthermore, these four passages must be written in order as it appears in the Torah which is Kadesh, V’hayah ki yi’vi’achah, She’ma, V’hayah im shamo’a, and if they aren’t, the tefillin are invalid. (ibid 32:1).

There is a well known disagreement between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam as to what is the correct order of the passages: Rashi holds that it is Kadesh, V’hayah ki yi’vi’achah, She’ma, V’hayah im shamo’a, starting from left to right. Rabbeinu Tam maintains that V’hayah im shamo’a goes before She’ma. The Shulchan Aruch rules in accordance with Rashi (ibid. 34:1). The Mishnah Berurah points out that Rabbeinu Tam is not arguing on the order that it must be written, rather, only on the order that it needs to be placed in the compartments.

The Bach quotes the S’mag and Mordechai, who reported that a pair of tefillin were found in the grave of Yechezkel Hanavi, and the passages appeared in the order of Rashi. Some do not consider this as proof that the ancient tefillin were in fact made according to the opinion of Rashi, since it might have been buried precisely because it was out of order. The Bach rejects this answer, since they could have simply switched it back to the proper order, as we learned that it is only the placing out of order in the compartments that invalidates the tefillin.

"Eim" or "Av"

2010-02-17T00:51:00.000-05:00

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Rebbe, Rabbi Yehudah ben Roeitz, Beis Shammai, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Akiva all hold that the way a word is pronounced is determinant in Biblical exposition (yeish eim lamikra).

The Rif was questioned as to why the Gemora uses the word eim, which means mother, and not av, which means father. A similar question would be that the Gemora refers to one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics as a binyan av and not a binyan eim.

The Rif initially responded that he never heard anyone shed light on this matter, but then he proceeded to offer a possible explanation. When the purpose of a principle is to teach a concept in a different area, the Gemora uses the term av, whereas if the discussion at hand is regarding relying on a principle, the Gemora uses the word eim.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha explains the words of the Rif. The mother is the akeres habayis, the mainstay of the house as it is said every honorable princess dwelling within. For this reason we say yeish eim lemikra or yeish eim lemasores, as the mother is the central figure in the house and it is the mother who everyone is dependant upon. The father, on the other hand, is not usually found in the house, as he leaves the house to seek a livelihood. The principle of a binyan av, however, is that we are building from one location to another, and this is analogous to a father who influences others. (See Rabbeinu Bachye to Devarim 33:8 for further discussion on the differences between the father and mother.)

IS IT NATURAL FOR AN OX TO GORE?

2010-02-15T16:48:00.001-05:00

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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The Gemora cited a dispute regarding the half damages that one is required to pay if his ox gores for the first time.

The Gemora in Bava Kamma (15s) explains: Concerning the payment of half damages (which are paid when a tame ox gores another animal; if the ox did not gore three times, it is regarded as an abnormal act and the animal was not intending to inflict damage; this is called a tam), Rav Papa says: This is regarded as a compensation payment. Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua says: The half damages are considered a fine.

The Gemora explains: Rav Papa says that the half damages are regarded as a compensation payment, for an ordinary ox is not considered guarded in respect to these types of ‘abnormal’ damages and the owner should really be liable to pay completely for its damages. The Torah had compassion on him since his ox was not yet warned (three times) and ruled that he is only required to pay for half the damage (hence the half damages that he does pay is considered compensation). Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua says that the half damages are considered a fine, for an ordinary ox is considered guarded in respect to these types of ‘abnormal’ damages and the owner should really be exempt completely from paying for its damages. The Torah penalized him and ruled that he is required to pay half in order that he will watch his ox better in the future (hence the half damages are considered a fine).

Reb Dovid Pervarsky writes that this is not a factual dispute if ordinary oxen are accustomed to gore or not. Rather, the argument can be explained as follows: Rav Papa maintains that it is inherent in the nature of an ox to gore. Sometimes it will not gore because it does not feel the desire to gore at that time. When the animal does gore, it is not considered an abnormality at all. Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua holds that it is not natural for an ox to gore at all; when it does gore, it is regarded as an abnormality.

Reb Dovid is not comfortable with this explanation of the argument, for the Gemora’s language is that an ordinary ox is not considered guarded; if the animal is not goring (for whatever reason), it should be considered “guarded”!?

He therefore concludes that this is the explanation: Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua holds that it is not natural for an ox to gore at all; if it does gore, it cannot be labeled as a “damager,” since the ox was considered guarded. Rav Papa, however, maintains that it is in the nature of an ox to gore, and when it gores, it can be labeled a “damager.” This is what obligates the owner to watch his animal even though it is not accustomed to goring.

Monetary Cases are Judged by a Beis Din of Three

2010-02-15T16:41:00.001-05:00

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By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Should a get be delivered only before a beis din?

This week the Daf HaYomi learners have concluded Bava Basra and started tractate Sanhedrin and we take this opportunity to address an important topic connected with the beginning of Sanhedrin and the end of Bava Basra.

One of the striking subjects we most perceive as needing a beis din is divorce but, to our surprise, not all halachic authorities accept this assumption. The first posek to devote a broad discussion to this basic question was the Chief Rabbi of Prague, HaGaon Rav Yechezkel Landau, famed as the author of Responsa Noda’ BiYehudah (2nd edition, E.H. 114). The gaon was asked to judge the validity of a bill of divorce (get) arranged by a certain rabbi who had enlisted his son-in-law and another person to form a beis din. As the rabbi and his son-in-law were relatives, the group of three cannot be defined as a beis din and the question remains if the get is valid though not having been delivered in the presence of a beis din. The poskim point out that the Talmud never indicates that a divorce should be enacted only in a beis din but the Or Zarua’ (cited in Terumas HaDeshen, I, 248) states that a beis din is required, and later halachic authorities began to search the Talmud for proof for either opinion.

Bava Basra (174b) quotes Abayei’s question to Rava – “Indeed, does everyone divorce in a beis din?” – giving us to understand that there is no need for a beis din. Still, Rabeinu Gershom’s commentary, printed alongside the Gemora, offers a different text – “Indeed, does everyone divorce in a reputable beis din? One can divorce in an ordinary beis din” – and according to this version, every get must be delivered in a beis din. On the other hand, the Gemora in Bava Basra 176a rules that a get without the signatures of witnesses is valid as long as the wife received it in the presence of witnesses. Apparently, though, asserts the Noda’ BiYehudah, if a get must be delivered in a beis din, why does the Gemora omit that important detail? We must assume, then, that there is no need for a beis din.

The Noda’ BiYehudah proves, however, that a beis din is required from Rashi’s commentary at the beginning of Sanhedrin. Our Mishna lists the procedures that become valid only if performed before a beis din, such as financial or property decisions, chalitzah or mi’un (the refusal of a girl under bas mitzvah age to stay with her husband). Rashi explains the need for a beis din in the case of mi’un as “everything that the chachamim instituted (i.e., all regulations derabanan) they instituted in a form approximating that required by the Torah.” In other words, the regulation derabanan, that a girl under bas mitzvah age married off by her brother may object to the marriage and leave her husband, is performed without a get, but as mi’un resembles divorce, it must be performed before a beis din. The Noda’ BiYehudah therefore deducts that a get must surely be delivered in the presence of a beis din (see Responsa Beis HaLevi, end of Part I; Maharam Schiff, Rashash and Hagahos Rav Y.A. Chaver at the end of the Shas; and Hagahos Chasam Sofer on Noda BiYehudah, at the end of the book, who explains that Rashi intended to compare mi’un only to chalitzah, which requires a beis din).

However, some poskim try to prove the opposite from our Mishna. The Mishna, after all, lists all the procedures requiring a beis din without including divorce. Still, the Noda’ BiYehudah rejects this proof as the need for a beis din in divorce cases is based on the financial and property aspects of divorce and our Mishna states explicitly that “financial cases are judged by a beis din of three.” Referring to the specific question of the rabbi and his son-in-law, he ruled that the divorce should be performed again before a valid beis din because of the various halachic authorities requiring a beis din. Most Acharonim, however, believe that a couple is considered divorced even if the procedure was not enacted before a beis din (see a lengthy discussion of the topic in Pischei Teshuvah, 154; Seder HaGet, S.K. 8; and Sedei Chemed, Ma’areches Get, 1).

The Original City Limits of Yerushalayim

No additions should be made to Yerushalayim or the courtyards of the Temple unless approved by a beis din of seventy-one.

As we all know, Eretz Yisroel has a special sanctity and the observation of many commandments depends on one’s being there. Yerushalayim was even more sanctified for certain mitzvos decreed by the Torah to be performed in the vicinity of the Temple, such as eating ma’aser sheni, and our Mishna explains that only a beis din of seventy-one – the Great Sanhedrin – can annex and sanctify more territory to the original area of Yerushalayim. The Mishna in Shevuos (14a) adds that the Sanhedrin also requires the consent of the king, a prophet and the Urim VeTumim on the breastplate of the Kohen Gadol. According to our known historical sources, the area of the original city of Yerushalayim was enlarged only once and in the opinion of certain researchers, including HaGaon Rav Yechiel Michel Tikotchinski zt”l, this was accomplished during the reign of King Chizkiyahu (‘Ir HaKodesh VeHaMikdash, II, Ch. 5).

The Tosefta to Sanhedrin (3:4) cites Aba Shaul, that “there were two pools in Yerushalayim: the lower and the upper; the lower pool was sanctified with all these requisites but the upper pool was sanctified only with the arrival of the exiles (in Ezra’s era) without a king and without the Urim VeTumim.” (A “pool” obviously means the environs around the pool). Many researchers, Jewish and non-Jewish, have pondered the location of the Lower Pool both from the halachic and -lehavdil- the historical/archaeological viewpoints. As for the halachah, it is vital to know the boundaries of sanctified Yerushalayim as even today there are several halachos that apply only within its limits, such as the following:

i) Ma’aser sheni must not be redeemed – i.e., exchanged for money or other produce – in sanctified Yerushalayim.
ii) Human bones are not to be moved through sanctified Yerushalayim (Rambam, Hilchos Beis HaBechirah, 7:14, based on Avos deRabbi Nasan, Ch. 38).
iii) It is forbidden to bury the dead in Yerushalayim (Rambam, ibid, based on Avos deRabbi Nasan, ibid). Some poskim hold that this halachah still applies (‘Ir HaKodesh VeHaMikdash, III, Ch. 13 – in disagreement with Pe’as HaShulchan, 23 – see his discussion of the graves of the Sambuski family on the southeastern slope of Mount Zion).
iv) Bodies of the deceased must not stay in Yerushalayim overnight (Bava Kama 82b) – a halachah in practice today (Pe’as HaShulchan, Ch. 3, S.K. 23; ‘Ir HaKodesh VeHaMikdash, III, Ch. 14 – in disagreement with the Responsa Radbaz, II, 633).

We have no solid information on the original boundaries of Yerushalayim. Most of the present wall was built by the Turks and researchers rely on archaeological digs revealing older walls. The age of those walls is determined according to the artifacts found near them or by the approximate antiquity of their stones. It is only natural, then, that many opinions have been expressed but in our limited framework we shall focus on that of Rav Tikotchinski in his ‘Ir HaKodesh VeHaMikdash.

The “Old City” is not that old: All researchers agree that the area originally sanctified and walled by King David and King Shlomo (Melachim I, 9:15; Divrei HaYamim I, 11) is not contiguous with the area now called the “Old City.” The latter includes the Temple Mount and territory to the north whereas King David’s city was built to the south. A large area south of the present wall, therefore, bears the original sanctity of Yerushalayim. Between 5654-57 researchers discovered a wall far from the present one, judged to have been built in the era of the First Temple. If this estimate is correct, the pools of Shiloach and El Khamrah and the streets called Maalot Ir David, Wadi Khilwah, Malkitzedek and Ma’aleh HaShalom are within the borders of sanctified Yerushalayim. Another wall was found 16 meters east of the Old City and some therefore believe that the city’s original sanctity extends that far to the east.

Where, though, is the Lower Pool annexed to Yerushalayim by King Chizkiyahu? Rav Tikotchinski maintains that it is somewhere north of the Temple but south of the present northern wall and, in his opinion, all of the Old City bears the original sanctity of Yerushalayim. Others, however, disagree because of the presence of a few graves in the Old City from the Second Temple era discovered after Rav Tikotchinski’s demise. As it is forbidden to bury the dead in Yerushalayim, the entire Old City cannot be included in the originally sanctified area though there is the possibility that the graves were dug in opposition to the halachah (see Entziklopedia Talmudis, Vol. 25, Appendix to the article on Yerushalayim, column 707, footnotes 32 and 106). All this pertains to the sanctity of Yerushalayim as decreed by the Torah but according to the Maharit (II, Y.D. 37), we should extend its sanctity by rabbinical decree to include the Upper Pool, added to Yerushalayim without the Urim VeTumim. In his opinion, then, the sanctity of Yerushalayim stretches out to the Third Wall, near the Mandelbaum Gate west of the Old City, to the valley known as Jurat-il-Anab.

The Mi’un of Sulka, the Sister-in-law of Rabbi Yaakov Polak

Chalitzah and mi’un are performed in a beis din of three.

Our sages instituted a regulation whereby a girl whose father had died could be wed in certain circumstances, though still under bas mitzvah age (see Tur Shulchan ‘Aruch, E.H. 155). Such a girl may refuse to stay with her husband as long as she has not attained bas mitzvah age. Her marriage becomes void with no need for a get and our Mishna asserts that she must declare her mi’un (“refusal”) before a beis din of three. Mi’un occupies many sugyos throughout the Talmud and a chapter of 22 paragraphs in Shulchan ‘Aruch (E.H. 155).

In our era the custom to marry off young girls has ceased except in Yemen, where it persisted to save them from certain decrees. One the other hand, till 500 years ago poskim discussed questions involving such marriages and, first and foremost, mi’un. Six hundred years ago there was a posek in Germany called Rabbi Menachem of Miersburg, author of Me’il Tzedek and sometimes known as Rabbi Menachem HaMeili for his masterwork. Accoding to HaGaon Rav Shlomo Luria (Yam shel Shlomo, Yevamos, ch. 13, #17), “he instituted several regulations to protect the Torah and was a great expert and his regulations and decrees were accepted throughout Ashkenaz (Germany and the neighboring lands).” One of his decrees did away with mi’un and required any wife to leave her husband only with a get in order to prevent people from saying that couples could part without a get, eventually leading to some disregard for the mitzvah. In addition, there was the suspicion that a girl would declare mi’un in the presence of unlearned persons who would not ascertain that she was still a minor, not requiring a get.

Five hundred and ten years ago, in 5252, an orphaned girl by the name of Sulka was married off by her mother and brother to a Torah scholar, Rabbi David Tzenner. After a while, and still being under bas mitzvah age, she expressed the wish to leave him and since her husband refused to divorce her with a get, her relatives instructed her in the procedure of mi’un and she performed that requirement. Her sister’s husband was Rabbi Yaakov Polak, the founder of the pilpul method of Talmudic study, one of the leading Torah scholars of that generation and a rosh yeshivah in Prague, where he taught thousands of students. He agreed to the mi’un and allowed Sulka to remarry without a get.

Many leading halachic authorities vehemently objected to Rabbi Polak’s decision, including one of his teachers – HaGaon Rav Y. Margalios, author of Seder HaGet – and MaharY Mintz (Responsa, §13) who insisted that the procedure of mi’un should be discarded according to the regulation of Rabbi Menachem of Miersburg. They forbade Sulka to remarry without a get and even imposed excommunication (niduy) on anyone opposing their decision. Still, Rabbi Polak ignored their ruling, proved that the regulation against mi’un had not been accepted and that mi’un had been in practice since the era of Rabbi Menachem of Miersburg and married off Sulka without requiring her to receive a get. Rabbi Polak left Prague as a result of the stormy altercation and settled in Krakow, where he stayed for 35 years and established a large yeshivah which contributed greatly to turning Poland into the most important center for Torah study in Europe for hundreds of years.

How was the halachah eventually decided regarding mi’un? Maharshal (Yam shel Shlomo, ibid) offers a short description of the above event, which occurred in the previous generation, and relates that according to his knowledge, Sulka’s second marriage failed due to the annoyance of the leading Torah authorities. He holds that mi’un must no longer be performed and if enacted, the girl must not remarry without a get unless instructed otherwise by a beis din and even so, such a beis din should be thereafter discredited.

There is no “custom” regarding a rare occurrence: On the other hand, the Remo was a student of the disciples of Rabbi Polak and devotes a brief discussion to mi’un at the end of the relevant chapter in Shulchan ‘Aruch (E.H. 155). In his opinion, mi’un may be practiced even now, “as performed by Rabbi Yaakov Polak z”l in his era.” Rabbi Shneiur Zalman of Liadi, author of Tanya, explains the Remo’s reason in the responsa at the end of his Shulchan ‘Aruch (§22, based on Rambam). We cannot, he asserts, speak of an established custom regarding instances which occur only rarely, especially where an attempted regulation commands us to refrain from performing a previously accepted procedure (see ibid). We cannot claim, then, that there was a “custom” to refrain from mi’un (see Pischei Teshuvah and ‘Aroch HaShulchan, ibid). The ‘Aroch HaShulchan has doubts about the Remo’s ruling and concludes “when I was young I heard that in the previous generation there had been a mi’un and that the leading Torah authorities objected vigorously but I don‟t know how the matter ended; in our era we have never heard of any mi’un at all.”

Who Pays for the Clock?

2010-02-04T18:28:00.002-05:00

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The Forgers’ Scheme

A person who wants to show a specimen of his signature to a Beis Din should not sign at the bottom of a blank page. A few years ago the Torah community in Yerushalayim was outraged when a claim was presented to a Beis Din against a respected Torah scholar. The claimant produced a promissory note for a huge amount signed by the supposed debtor and the latter certified his signature but denied borrowing the money. The dayanim appointed a special investigative team who revealed that the claimant belonged to a group of swindlers who had managed to misuse the defendant’s signature. They had discovered that he was accustomed to sign his name in the middle of the front page of every book in his large library and all they had to do was just borrow one of his books, remove the blank page and compose a promissory note above the signature.

Indeed, in our sugya Abaye recommends that anyone required to demonstrate his signature should do so at the top of a page to prevent anyone from adding a fraudulent text above it. Commenting on our sugya, the Ritva clarifies that Abaye’s warning stems from an understanding of people and foreseeing their spontaneous reaction at unexpected times. Abaye’s suspicion, after all, is actually unfounded as a person may claim he has paid a debt, even if a signed promissory note is produced against him, and he is believed unless the note is signed by witnesses. The Ritva explains, though, that Abaye foresaw a typical person’s behavior: By the nature of things, when someone is faced with a false document, his spontaneous reaction is to deny there having been any loan and subsequently he is not believed to assert that he paid the debt. The best thing to do, then, is to prevent any untoward use of one’s signature (Bava Basra 6a, Kesubos 88a, and see Shulchan „Aruch, C.M. 69:2, and the Shach, ibid, S.K. 10).

A claim based on a promissory note with no indicated amount: HaGaon Rav Mordechai Yafeh, author of the Levushim, cites an unusual event in his Levush Ir Shushan (section 48). About 420 years ago a person claimed to a Beis Din that another owed him a certain sum and, as proof, presented a blank promissory note signed by the supposed debtor, with no indicated amount. “The debtor,” he asserted, “gave me this note because he trusted me to fill in the amount he owes me.” The claimant added that were he a liar, he could have written in any sum he wanted and therefore the Beis Din should believe his demand. Still, the “Levush” immediately rejected the claim as “even a fool” would never give another a signed blank promissory note and we must assume that the defendant had lost the note, which was later found by the claimant. Concluding with a sharp warning, he declares that anyone giving another such a blank note is “merely a witless person willing to believe anyone, or insane and defined as a shotah, whose actions have no validity.”

Claiming money with a blank check: Nonetheless, the situation is different today and the above topic is relevant as people do give others signed checks with no specified amount, such as when paying a sum to be determined according to the future rate of exchange of some foreign currency. The practice is most common when borrowing from a free loan fund if the loan is repaid in installments and linked to a foreign currency. Moreover, most Gemachim lending medical apparatus or other equipment require a blank signed check. Indeed, what is the halachic validity of a monetary claim based on a signed check lacking any indicated amount?

Halachic authorities assert that if people are accustomed to give others such “open” checks, the holder of the check is believed to demand any amount. This regulation is also supported by Paragraph 19a of the national ordinance for promissory notes, which states that if a note lacks an essential detail, the holder may fill in the detail as he wishes. It follows, then, that the holder is believed to present a claim against the signer of a check missing a specified amount (see Mishpatecha LeYa‟akov, I, 22:6).

Who should Pay
for a Clock for the Teacher?

Our Mishna states the regulation that the person benefiting from a document must defray the costs of its being written. A borrower pays the expenses of drawing up a promissory note as he benefits from the loan and a purchaser defrays the costs of a bill of sale or deed, which is delivered to him as proof of his purchase and protects his rights. The author of Meshech Chochmah (at the end of Parashas Behar) supports this halachah with a passage from Yirmiyahu (32:10), recounting that the prophet bought a field from his cousin Chanamel ben Shalum, attesting “And I wrote the document and signed” even though the seller is generally assumed to write the bill of sale. The verse indicates, then, that Yirmiyahu paid the scribe, as stated in our Mishna.

An obligation to contribute to charity used as bail: The scope of the above halachah is seen from a question asked of the Rosh by his son Rabbi Yechiel. A certain Beis Din suspected that Shimon would not appear for a Din Torah scheduled for a particular time and commanded him to submit a guarantee. Shimon’s friend then signed a document before the Beis Din that if Shimon failed to appear as demanded, he would donate 1,000 coins to charity. The question arose, though, as to who should pay the costs of writing the document: Shimon, his litigant, or the guarantor. At first, the Rosh ruled that Shimon’s litigant must pay as the guarantee is to his benefit. He later discovered, though, that there was no other litigant but that “Shimon had sinned and the community wanted to imprison him till his punishment will be decided.” The Rosh then changed his decision and ruled that Shimon, as the one benefiting from the guarantee, must pay the price of the writing (Responsa of the Rosh, Kelal 13:2-3).

About 500 years ago an argument arose between a teacher and a certain pupil’s parent. The teacher was hired to instruct the child for a few hours each day and needed a clock in the room to know when the session ended (pocket watches had not yet been invented). The father claimed that the teacher must pay for the clock but the teacher insisted that the father bear the expense. Rabbi Yisrael Isserlin, author of Terumas HaDeshen, ruled that the father should buy the clock, but his student, Rabbi Yisrael bar Rav Chayim of Bruna, questioned the decision: Apparently, just as one who hires a tailor to sew a garment need not buy him a needle, and just as one who hires a scribe need not provide him with a pen as all artisans are hired with their tools, the teacher should pay for the clock required for his work.

The difference between teachers and tailors: Rav Yisrael of Bruna clarified his mentor’s ruling by explaining the difference between a teache r’s clock and a tailo r’s needle. A tailor without a needle is no tailor and a penless scribe is no scribe, as they cannot practice their trades without such tools. A teacher needs no clock for his work, as he only requires the ability to speak and explain. A clock is merely meant to tell him when to finish his task. We cannot force him to pay for it as he can claim that he can estimate the elapse of time without it. If the father refuses to believe him, says Rav Yisrael of Bruna, “Buy a clock and I’ll teach by it.”

The Collection of Legal Costs

In civil courts the losing party is charged for legal expenses, generally including the court costs and the winning party’s lawye r’s fees, etc. How does the Torah view such costs and how does a Beis Din act according to halachah?

Our sugya explains that the secretaries of a Beis Din would record the litigants’ claims, as Rashbam comments, “so that they would not change their claims” (s.v. Shitrei ta’anta) and our Mishna rules that the expenses involved in writing the records must be shared equally by both litigants. The Ribash deducts from there (Responsa, 222) that the general costs of a Beis Din should also be equally shared by the litigants rather than be borne exclusively by the losing party. Both the claimant and defendant need the services of the Beis Din and should divide the expenses entailed by their case.

An uncooperative defendant pays the extra costs he causes: Still, the Ribash emphasizes that if the defendant is uncooperative and causes the claimant to suffer needless expenses, such as the issuance of a “notice of refusal” (kesav seiruv), he is regarded as guilty of causing damage by negligence and must defray such expenses. Moreover, if the Beis Din discovers that a claim is baseless and only intended to hassle the defendant, the latter is exempt from all court costs and they are then borne exclusively by the claimant (Yeshuos Yisrael by the Gaon of Kutna, C.M. 14, in Ein Mishpat, s.k.14). Nonetheless, we have yet to clarify if in such cases a defendant may also demand the claimant to defray his own costs, such as payment to a rabbinical court advocate (to’en rabani) or the like. Halachic authorities indicate that the claimant should not be so charged as such expenses are not unavoidable and a defendant may represent himself. Hiring a to’en rabani is optional and the costs involved are not considered damage caused by the claimant.

A practical implication of the above discussion is that if a Beis Din allows a person to present a claim at a civil court and he wins his case, resulting in the defendant’s obligation to pay for the claimant’s lawyer, then the claimant must return to Beis Din to ask whether he may collect that sum from the defendant.

The Tree That Wasn’t

HaGaon Rav Aharon Kotler zt”l, Rosh Yeshivah of Lakewood, was known to be extremely heedful to guard the truth. Once he was shown an advertisement with a sketch of the Yeshivah including the surrounding trees. He counted the trees, though, and found that three had been drawn instead of the actual two and not wanting to lend a hand to the misrepresentation, banned the picture. “It’s a falsification,” he said, “and the Torah is a Torah of truth and any method to maintain it must rely on the strict truth.”

Minimum Number of Coins of Different Denominations

2010-02-04T18:25:00.000-05:00

brought to you by:
Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
daf@shemayisrael.co.il

The braisa teaches that when a shtar mentions that a person borrowed “gold dinarin” but it does not mention the number of dinarin, the creditor may claim only two gold dinarin, since the minimum possible amount to which the plural “dinarin” refers is two -- “mi’ut rabim shenayim.” The braisa earlier (165b) teaches the same with regard to a shtar that says “silver dinarin.” Similarly, the Mishna (165b) states that when a shtar mentions that a person borrowed “zuzim,” “sela’im,” or “darkonos,” and the number of those coins was erased, the creditor may claim only two, which is the minimum possible amount of the plural word used in the shtar.

Why does the Mishna and braisa need to repeat itself with regard to these different types of coins? The Mishna and braisa need only teach this in one case, and then we would know that whenever there is an unspecified amount of “coins” (in the plural) -- regardless of what type of coin -- the creditor may collect only two!?

The Penei Shlomo answers that the Mishna (and braisa) is teaching a novelty in each case. Since the subject of the shtar is coins, which are divisible entities, we might have thought that even though the word used is plural, it refers not to two coins but to one and a half coins. The Mishna is teaching that the creditor is entitled to more than one and a half coins -- he is entitled to take two full coins of the specified denomination, because if it is true that the borrower only borrowed one and a half coins (such as a sela and half a sela), then the value of the half-coin would have been expressed in terms of a smaller denomination (a sela and two dinarin).

The Penei Shlomo adds that this is also why the Mishna and braisa use the phrase, “It is not less than two...,” instead of saying, “He may only collect two.” “It is not less than two” excludes a “lesser” amount, and implies that we might have thought that the creditor is only allowed to collect an amount which is less than two (such as one and a half). “He may only collect two” excludes a “greater” amount, and implies that we might have thought that the creditor should collect more than two. Since the Mishna is teaching that he “may” collect more than just one and a half, it says, “It is not less than two.”

The Mishna and braisa, therefore, needed to teach this novelty with regard to each denomination of coins, since we would not have been able to learn one from the other. People might write “one and a half zuzim” without expressing the fractional zuz in terms of a smaller denomination. Therefore, the Mishna must teach us in each case that the plural word is not less than two.

The Tiferes Yisroel explains that each case in the Mishna is necessary for the following reasons. In the case of “Kesef zuzim which are...,” where the number of zuzim was erased, we might have thought that the creditor is entitled to collect four zuzim, since the words “Kesef zuzim which are...” imply that the author of the shtar is defining an equal value for “Kesef zuzim.” The lowest number of zuzim which are equivalent to a different coin is four, and the shtar originally said, “Kesef zuzim which are one sela.” Therefore, the Mishna needs to teach us that the creditor may only collect two zuzim, because perhaps the author of the shtar was giving a number of zuzim, and not an equivalent value in another denomination.

In the case of “Kesef sela’im which are...,” where the number of sela’im was erased, we might have thought that the author of the shtar was referring to two “inferior” sela’im (as mentioned earlier in the Mishna), which are equal to seven zuzim (or 6 2/3 zuzim), and not 8 zuzim, and the shtar originally read, “Kesef sela’im which are seven zuzim.” Therefore, the Mishna teaches that the creditor may collect two standard sela’im and not inferior ones.

In the case of “Kesef darkonos which are...,” where the number of darkonos was erased, we might have thought that certainly the author of the shtar was referring to inferior darkonos, for the following reason. A darkon is a large, valuable gold coin, and people do not usually pay back debts with such coins. Accordingly, we might have thought that the author of the shtar meant inferior gold darkonos, and that is why he was writing the actual value of the darkonos, which was “less” than the value of two standard darkonos. Therefore, the Mishna needs to teach us that the creditor is indeed entitled to collect two normal darkonos and not inferior ones.

Most People are Guilty of some sort of Thievery

2010-02-03T04:02:00.003-05:00

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Dear Customer, Please Note: This Book is not Proofread at all

Rav Yehudah asserts in the name of Rav that most people are guilty of some sort of thievery and, as Rashbam explains (s.v. Rov begezel), this means that most people transacting business allow themselves to deny others their due profit. In other words, fraud, false pretenses and financial conniving are considered gezel.

In his Sefas Tamim (Ch. 3), Rabeinu Yisrael Meir HaKohen zt”l, the Chafetz Chaim, proves that even one who causes his fellow a loss is considered a thief. True to his word, he was renowned for his extreme avoidance of anything resembling falsification or thievery, as evident from his behavior concerning the books he authored.

The Chafetz Chaim was in Warsaw when he first had his Mishnah Berurah printed and every day he would come to the printer to check that no smudged or otherwise defective pages were being sent out for sale. He left his learning for several months for this purpose and afterwards relied on his son to undertake the task. When he discovered that despite his great care, one of his books had been sold with a few defective pages, he hurried a sharp letter to his son, saying “What have you done to me, my son? All my life I’ve taken care to avoid anything resembling thievery but I never thought that I would err in outright robbery and because of you this has happened!” The Chafetz Chaim immediately ordered the printer to reprint those pages found defective and publicize in the press that anyone who had bought a defective edition should inform him of such in order to receive the corrected pages by post (Michtevei HeChafetz Chaim, p. 30).

The Chafetz Chaim knew no rest till he hired special proofreaders to examine each page of his printed books and, if approved, to mark the front page of each book as “proofread” (HeChafetz Chaim Ufo‟olav, I, Ch. 32). Some of these books are still extant.

The problem of printing errors also concerned other halachic authorities. For example, the students of the Tsadik HaGaon Rav Eliahu Lopian zt”l, led by the famed Yerushalmi Magid Rabbi Shalom Schwadron zt”l, published the popular Lev Eliahu with a warning on the front page: “Dear purchaser: This book is not proofread and I assume no responsibility – The Publisher.” We have no knowledge of the severity of the printing error discovered by the Chafetz Chaim but HaGaon Rav Yaakov Kanievski zt”l, the Steipler, states in a letter that the sale of a book containing minor errors that still allow readers to understand the text is not considered gezel. After all, anyone buying a book knows that the task of printing is complicated and hardly ever free of mistakes. In his opinion, a book with no pages missing may be sold even with some defects and therefore, when he found that the last letters on a page were omitted in an entire edition of his Kehilos Yaakov, he continued to sell that edition as the defect did not prevent understanding the text (Karyana D’igarta, I, p. 351). Of course, this principle applies only to publishers of new books but one is not permitted to sell defective sidurim, as finely proofread sidurim are available on the market and they are expected to be free of errors.

All the above is just a fraction of the material pertaining to this broad topic. The Gemora in Brachos (6a) explains that one who fails to respond to a greeting is called a robber, indicating that depriving a person even of his due word is defined as gezel (Sefer “Mamon Kasher”).

Once, Rabbi Elazar Shulevitz zt”l, Rosh Yeshivah of Lomzha, was standing praying Shemoneh Esreh at the entrance to a synagogue and Rabbi Yisrael Salanter, standing near him, approached him and whispered, “Robber! The synagogue is packed full and you’re robbing the congregation of air!” Rabbi Shulevitz immediately interrupted his prayer to move away (Lev Eliahu, Bereishis). Similarly, though in an opposite circumstance, the Vilna Gaon zt”l would take care to shut the door to the bathhouse immediately after entering lest he rob the bathers of the warm air inside (Tosefes Maaseh Rav, S.K. 29). According to the Chafetz Chaim, even someone who participates in a wedding or sheva berachos meal without enhancing the joy of the chassan, about whom the Gemora in Berachos (ibid) states that he transgresses “five voices”, might be guilty of robbery (Michtevei HeChafetz Chaim, p. 46).

Why the Labor Cost More

A simple tailor became close to Rebbe Noach of Lechovitz and the Rebbe persuaded him to refrain from the custom then common among tailors to demand clients to bring them extra cloth in order to benefit from the quantity remaining after their work. “This custom is outright thievery,” explained the Rebbe, “You may charge more for your labor but you mustn’t practice that foul custom.”

“And what should I tell my customers,” questioned the tailor, “if they ask me why I charge more yet need less cloth?”

“Tell them,” replied the Rebbe, “that you learnt to cut in a new way that doesn’t need a lot of cloth but that learning the method cost a great deal.”

The tailor obeyed the Rebbe’s instructions but after a while his customers remarked that he had already covered the expenses of learning the new method and asked why he continued to charge more.

“The new method,” he answered, “is a whole system to be learnt again every day and every week” (Hizaharu Bemamon Chavreichem, p. 366).

The Old Man Fell Asleep on His Coat

On the night following the demise of HaGaon Rav Elchanan Wasserman’s wife, his son Rabbi Naftali sat down and wept incessantly while several yeshivah students slept in an adjacent room. Rav Wasserman approached his son and told him, “You shouldn’t cry so loudly now. The boys might wake up and you would rob them of their sleep” (Or Elchanan, I, p. 13).

A similar story is told of Rabbi Avraham of Purisov. Despite his known tendency to conceal his behavior, he once learnt all night in the beis midrash, later explaining that an old man had fallen asleep on the edge of his coat. “I couldn’t, after all, stand up for fear of waking him!” (Chasidim Mesaperim, I).

Mentioning the Praise of Others

2010-02-01T13:59:00.000-05:00

Another time Rabbi Shimon was sitting in Rebbe’s presence when he finished a section of the Book of Psalms (one of the five books that Tehillim is divided into). Rebbe said, “How neat is this writing!” Rabbi Shimon replied, “I did not write it; Yehudah Chayata wrote it.” Rebbe rebuked him by saying, “Stay away from this lashon hara.”

The Gemora asks: In the first case (by the tied document), one can understand Rebbe’s rebuke, since there was lashon hara involved; what lashon hara, however, was there in this case?

The Gemora answers: It is based upon the teaching of Rav Dimi, for Rav Dimi, the brother of Rav Safra, taught a braisa: A man should never speak in praise of his friend, because by mentioning his praise, he will come to mention his faults as well.

The Gemora in Gittin (67a) relates that Issi ben Yehudah used to specify the praiseworthy merits of the various Sages.

The Chidah challenges this from our Gemora, which rules that one should never speak in praise of his friend, because by mentioning his praise, he will come to mention his faults as well!?

He initially answers that Issi ben Yehudah specified their merits after their death; it would then be permitted, for there was no concern that he would talk about their faults after their deaths.

He retracts from this answer, for it is evident from the Avod d’Rabbi Nassan that Issi ben Yehudah spoke about their praises even during their lifetime!

It would seem that the Chidah’s question can be answered according to the words of the Rashbam here. He writes that a person should never speak excessively in praise of his friend, because by mentioning his praise, he will come to mention his faults as well. Apparently, it is only prohibited if one offers excessive praise; this will lead to the listener or the speaker interjecting that the person does possess some faults as well. Issi ben Yehudah, however, was not exaggerating at all when specifying the merits of those Sages.

The Maharsha challenges this explanation, for it does not seem from our Gemora that Rabbi Shimon was excessively praising Yehudah Chayata; he was merely stating that it was he who wrote that book of Tehillim, and that it was a neat handwriting.

The Rambam is of the opinion that this prohibition applies only in public, for there are bound to be enemies of the subject of the praise in the crowd, and they will almost certainly begin to talk disparagingly about him. In private, however, this prohibition would not apply.

No Person is Saved from these Transgressions

2010-02-01T13:56:00.000-05:00

brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof

The Gemora states: Rav Amram said in the name of Rav that there are three transgressions from which no person is saved every day. They are: thoughts of sin, examining one’s prayers (Rashbam – feeling overconfident that his tefillah will be answered positively; Tosfos – lack of concentration during tefillah), and lashon hara. The Gemora explains that lashon hara refers to avak lashon hara (close to being lashon hara).

What does the Gemora mean that “no man is saved” from these transgressions? Certainly there are great Tzadikim and Talmidei Chachamim who -- even if not entirely free of sin (see Koheles 7:20) -- do not transgress all of these transgressions every single day! How can the Gemora say that “no person” is saved from these three transgressions every day?

In addition, if no one is saved from these three transgressions, then why are they transgressions? Hashem certainly would not give commandments that are impossible to keep.

The Iyun Yaakov explains that the Gemora means to say that because the temptation for these three transgressions is so great, no person is saved from these three transgressions without putting forth much effort. Someone who puts forth the effort to protect himself from these transgressions, though, will succeed and will not succumb.

The Toras Chaim, however, does not seem to agree with this explanation. He asks why the Gemora says that “no person is saved” from these three transgressions, instead of saying simply that “there are three transgressions which a person transgresses every day.” He answers that the Gemora is teaching that even one who attempts to avoid these transgressions will not be saved from transgressing them inadvertently, since the frequency of the challenge of these transgressions is so great.

How, though, does the Toras Chaim explain that there are Tzadikim who are able to avoid these transgressions?

The Maharsha explains that when the Gemora says that “no person is saved” from these three transgressions, it is referring to an ordinary person, but not to Tzadikim, who indeed are saved from these transgressions. He explains that while only a Jew, and not a gentile, is called “Adam” (Yevamos 61a), there is still a much higher level that a person can reach. The verse in Zecharyah (3:7) says that when a person follows the ways of Hashem, then “I will give you strides among these [Mal’achim] standing here.” Similarly, the Gemora in Chagigah (15b) explains that the verse, “The lips of the Kohen shall safeguard knowledge, and they shall seek Torah from his mount, because he is an agent (Mal'ach) of Hashem...” (Malachi 2:7), is teaching that when a Torah teacher is similar to an angel, then one should seek to learn Torah from him. This teaches that a person should strive to reach a level of absolute submission to Hashem, like the level of the angels.

When the Gemora here says that “no person (Adam) is saved” from these three transgressions, it is referring to a person who has not yet reached this level of perfection in his Avodas Hashem. The Maharsha explains that the word “Adam” is an acronym for the words, “Efer” (ashes, dust), “Dam” (blood), and “Marah” (bile), as the Gemora in Sotah (5a) says. An ordinary person, whose physical composition dominates his actions, is not able to prevent himself from transgressing these three transgressions. The fact that he is comprised of “Efer” negates his ability to activate his spiritual strengths in order to pray properly, and thus he sins with the transgression of iyun tefillah. The heat of the “Dam” within him causes him to lust for immoral pleasure, and thus he is not saved from thoughts of sin. His element of “Marah,” bile, creates in him the bitterness that causes him to have bad Middos and leads him to speaking lashon hara.

A person who conquers the lusts created by his physical composition overcomes the pull of those elements and rises above the status of “Adam” (“Efer, Dam, Marah”) and becomes comparable to an angel. Such a person certainly is able to avoid transgressing these transgressions.