Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 38 - Highlights

What do we Learn from the Extra Passuk?

Rava asked (on Rami bar Chama’s teaching) that this is already known from the teaching of the house of Chizkiya. The house of Chizkiya taught that that the passuk discusses a person who kills another person and a person who hits an animal. There is no difference if the person hit the animal (and damaged or killed it) did so on purpose or accidentally, with intent to hit or without intent to hit, whether his blow was upwards or downwards. In all cases he is obligated to pay. Similarly (regarding a person killing a person where the Torah says the penalty is death and not payment) there is no difference if the person hit a person (and damaged him) on purpose or accidentally, with intent to hit or without intent to hit, whether his blow was upwards or downwards. In all cases he does not pay. [This teaches that there is no difference whether the blow was upwards or downwards, making the teaching of Rami bar Chama redundant.]

Rami bar Chami therefore revised his statement, and said there is a different reason why we need these two pesukim (mentioned on 37b). One might think that if a person kills another person with a blow that blinds his eye and also kills him, only in such a case do we say that he is exempt from paying monetary damages for the blinding as well. However, in a case where he blinded him and immediately killed him with a different blow, one might think that he is obligated to pay for the blinding as well. [The extra passuk teaches us that this is not the case.]

Rava asked that this is already known from a different teaching of the house of Chizkiya. The house of Chizkiya taught “an eye for an eye,” but not a soul and eye for an eye (meaning that whenever one kills he does not pay for causing injury whether it was from the killing blow or not).

Rav Ashi therefore gave a different reason. One might think that because the Torah taught novel rules when it instituted monetary penalties (as opposed to regular payments or obligations that are always in direct relation to what was damaged) that even if one will be killed he still must pay a fine that was incurred at the same time. The extra passuk (either “kol cheirem” or lo sikchu kofer”) therefore teaches us that the same rule (“kim ley”) that applies to payments applies to fines.

What do we learn from the extra passuk according to Rabah, who indeed holds that being that monetary penalties are novel teaching we do not apply the rule that if he will be killed he does not pay? He must hold like the Tana Kama of Rabbi Chananya ben Akavya (who says that the extra passuk teaches that someone who pledges the value of a person who is being taken to be killed by Beis Din does not have to give any money).
Mishna
A girl was betrothed and divorced (and then seduced). Rabbi Yosi Haglili says that she does not receive a fine. Rabbi Akiva says that she does, and she receives it (instead of her father).
The Reasoning for their Argument
What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosi Haglili? The Torah states, “that she was not betrothed.” This clearly implies that if she was betrothed, she does not receive the fine. What does Rabbi Akiva do with this passuk? He understands “that she was not betrothed” refers to the fact that if she was betrothed, her father does not receive the fine. However, if she was betrothed she received the fine for herself.

The Gemora asks, this would imply that we should understand that when the Torah states the word “na’arah” and it specifically excludes a “bogeres” – “girl over twelve and a half,” it means that if the girl was a bogeres she should receive the fine for herself (and no one suggests that this is the case)! Similarly, when the Torah states that the girl was a “besulah” – “virgin” and not a “beulah,” Rabbi Akiva’s line of reasoning would imply that in such a case she herself should receive the fine! We know that the passuk in these matters is saying that in the case of the Torah the fine applies, and when it does not one is totally exempt! Here, too, the fact that she is “betrothed” should decide whether the person pays or is totally exempt!

Rabbi Akiva can answer that “that she was not betrothed” is needed, as stated in (his opinion in) the following Beraisa. The Beraisa states that “that she was not betrothed” excludes a girl who was betrothed and divorced, that she does not receive a fine. Rabbi Akiva says that she does receive a fine and her father keeps it. This is something that can be derived logically, as we can compare the fact that her father has the rights to her kiddushin money (when she is a na’arah) and any fine if she is seduced. Just as her father receives her kiddushin money if she was betrothed and then divorced (and then became betrothed a second time), so too he receives money from her fine in such a situation.

(Rabbi Akiva continues.) Why, then, does the passuk state “that she was not betrothed?” It is an extra passuk that is supposed to be compared to and used to derive from it a gezeirah shavah. It says here (regarding violation) “that she was not betrothed” and it says (regarding seduction) “that she was not betrothed.” Just as regarding violation the Torah mandates a fine of fifty coins, so too regarding seduction (where the amount is not specified) the amount is fifty coins. Additionally, just as the coins regarding seduction are clearly shekalim, so too the coins regarding violation are shekalim.

The Gemora asks: Why does Rabbi Akiva understand that “that she was not betrothed” is to be used for a gezeirah shavah, whereas “besulah” must be totally excluding a “beulah?” Why don’t we say that “besulah” should be used for a gezeirah shaveh and “that she was not betrothed” should be used to exclude a fine for a girl who was betrothed and divorced (as per the opinion of Rabbi Yosi Haglili)?

The Gemora answers that it makes sense that “that she was not betrothed” should be used for a gezeirah shavah, as she is still deemed to fit the description of a “na’arah besulah.” On the contrary, the Gemora asks, use “besulah” for a gezeirah shavah as she is described as “that she was not betrothed.”

The Gemora answers that the former choice makes sense, as the body of a besulah has clearly changed whereas the body of the one who was betrothed and divorced didn’t change (and the damage done to her is therefore more severe and deserving of a fine).

How does Rabbi Yosi Haglili know this logic (that the amount of coins regarding seduction is fifty and the denomination of coins regarding violation is shekalim)? He derives this from the passuk that states “he will give coins like the money given in exchange for virginity.” This teaches us that the amount regarding seduction should be like that given in exchange for virginity (said regarding violation which is fifty), and the exchange for virginity should be like this (the fine should be paid in shekalim).
Two Opinions According to Rabbi Akiva
The Gemora asks, Rabbi Akiva contradicts himself (as in the Beraisa he stated the fine goes to the father, whereas in our Mishna he said the fine goes to the girl herself)! The Gemora answers that the Beraisa and Mishna must be authored by two separate Tanaim who argue regarding the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

It is good that according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva discussed in our Mishna that when the passuk is used for a gezeirah shavah, it is not totally uprooted from its simple explanation. However, according to his opinion as stated in the Beraisa, is it possible that the fact that a passuk is open to be used for a gezeirah shavah a reason that it should go against the simple meaning of the passuk (as being betrothed is not a factor)?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers that the passuk should be read as if it is saying that she is not currently betrothed. The Gemora asks: If she was currently betrothed she would be stoned! [Therefore, how could this be the meaning of a passuk which merely discusses a fine?]

The Gemora answers that this comes to teach us that one might think that because the fine paid is a novel teaching of the Torah, even though he is killed (if he seduced her while she was betrothed) he still must pay the fine. The passuk “that she was not betrothed” therefore comes to teach that if she was betrothed he would not pay the fine.

The Gemora asks, according to Rabah who says that as a fine is a novel teaching of the Torah even though one is killed he still pays a fine, what does the passuk teach us? It must be that he is of the opinion of Rabbi Akiva as stated in the Mishna.

The Beraisa asks: Who receives the fine? [Some say] her father. Some say she receives the fine. Why does (this opinion state that) she receive the fine (doesn’t the Torah state that the father receives the fine)?

Rav Chisda answers that the Beraisa is discussing the case where she was betrothed and divorced. The argument in this Beraisa is the same argument between the opinion of Rabbi Akiva as stated in the Mishna, and that of Rabbi Akiva stated in the Beraisa (above).

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