Lottery ticket from Maaser and Shemittas Kesafim

Lottery Ticket

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Buying a lottery ticket for a charitable cause from ma’aser money

Many charitable institutions raise funds by promising prizes to be awarded in a lottery among the contributors. HaGaon Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Responsa Igros Moshe, O.C., IV, 76) was asked if a person could purchase such a ticket from his ma’aser money or if the ticket should be considered as having a monetary value to its holder and thus forbidden to be purchased from ma’aser.

Two types of tickets: Rav Feinstein remarks that we should divide this question into two parts – i.e., two types of lottery tickets. Some institutions issue a fixed amount of tickets, promising that at a certain date or when all of them are sold, the raffle will be held. In such a lottery even the first purchaser knows his chances of winning.

Nonetheless, there is another sort of ticket: Some institutions do not limit the amount of tickets and fix no final date for the raffle. It is obvious, then, that such tickets have no monetary value. A person who purchases such a ticket has no investment, as he has been promised nothing. It is not an investment but a form of charity and may be purchased from ma’aser.

What is the nature, though, of the first type of ticket? First of all, we must examine if we can define the value of something whose worth is unknown. In other words, is a lottery ticket regarded as an item of monetary value although the vast majority of purchasers win nothing?

Estimating the worth of an item whose value is unknown: Rav Feinstein proves from our sugya that we can regard such an article as having value. Our sugya explains that we can estimate the worth of a kesuvah of a woman who has not been divorced by examining the amount merchants would be willing to invest to purchase the rights to the kesuvah once it can be realized. The merchants examine the state of the couple’s health, their relationship and the like. They then estimate the wife’s chances to survive her husband or get divorced and earn her kesuvah. We thus see that we can regard an item whose worth is unknown as an article of monetary value. One should therefore not purchase a ticket of the first sort from ma’aser as the purchaser immediately gets the worth of his investment.

The winner of a lottery: Rav Feinstein adds that if a purchaser of the second type of ticket wins a prize, he should better return the cost of the ticket to his ma’aser money (see Derech Emunah on Matenos ‘Aniyim, Ch. 7, in Beiur Halachah, s.v. V’echad).




Reasons for Shemittas Kesafim

By: Rabbi Moshe Donnebaum

As strange as the mitzvah of relinquishing one's loans may seem, there are important lessons in regard to this commandment. The Sefer HaChinuch explains that the first useful benefit to be gained is the characteristic of generosity. There is none so generous as he who gives without hope of receiving anything in return. So too, relinquishing a loan with no benefit or gain in mind imbues a person with this noble character trait.

The second lesson mentioned in the Chinuch relates to the mitzvah of bitachon - trust in Hashem. Anyone who, upon command, relinquishes all outstanding debts, is continuously strengthening his level of trust in Hashem. The creditor displays trust that any losses incurred will be fully reimbursed to his allocated and pre-determined wealth. The knowledge of G-d as the source of all livelihood and provider of all one's needs is confirmed, and substantiated when releasing a debtor from his debts.

The Chinuch continues that the mitzvah of Shemittas kesafim is also a 'barrier' to keep away from robbery and any desire to own the possessions of one's neighbor, via a kal vachomer. If the Torah decrees that one should leave a loan in his neighbor's hand concerning money that is rightfully owed to him, then certainly he may not obtain his neighbor's belongings, in any way, without his neighbor's consent.

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Gambling

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Mishna lists gamblers among those who are unfit to judge, and as Rashi points out, unfit to testify, since they are regarded as re’shaim. There is a discussion in the Gemora as to why a gambler is unfit to testify or judge. Rami Bar Chamah holds that it is an issue of “asmachta,” which means that the money he wins is regarded as stolen. Rav Sheishes disagrees and attributes the disqualification to not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public. The Gemora points out that the difference between the two opinions would be a situation where he has another job aside from gambling. The issue of “asmachta” would apply regardless of whether he has another means of support, whereas the issue of furthering the general welfare of the public would only apply if he has no other means of support.

Tosfos points out that both opinions in the Gemora agree that the disqualification is only Rabbinic, because even the opinion who considers it theft due to “asmachta,” since he doesn’t realize the severity of the prohibition; he is not invalidated as a witness on a Biblical level. Regardless, we rule according to Rav Sheishes that the disqualification is attributed to him not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public which would surely be Rabbinic.

There is a dispute between the Rambam and Rashi as to the nature of the disqualification of not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public. The Rambam associates this with theft. Since the looser isn’t willingly forfeiting his money to the winner, it is considered “avak gezel.” The S”ma (C.M. 34:40) explains the position of the Rambam - since it is not technically theft, the Rabbis only considered it to be a problem if his main livelihood was coming from his gambling earnings. When the Gemora stipulates that he is only disqualified if he doesn’t have another means of earning a living, the Gemora really means to say that he doesn’t have another source of income. If he has another source of income, or is wealthy so that he doesn’t need the gambling earnings for support, he would be eligible to serve as a witness. However, if he had another income, but required the earnings from gambling to support himself, he would be disqualified. The Gr”a (C.M. 203:44) disagrees with the approach of the S”ma and explains that the Rambam actually rules like Rami bar Chamah that an “asmachta” is not binding, and therefore, he considers it to be theft. But, the Gr”a holds that even though it is stealing, the Sages only invalidated him when he has no other livelihood.

Rashi considers the issue of not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public to have nothing to do with theft. Rashi considers the issue to be an indication of a very low level of fear of Heaven. The S”ma explains that this only applies to someone who doesn’t work and doesn’t realize the difficulties involved in earning money and would be prone to testify falsely (because he associates money as “easy-come, easy-go,” and doesn’t take it seriously). But someone who works, even if he can’t support himself without the added income from gambling, wouldn’t be disqualified for testimony since he realizes the challenges of earning a living.

The Shulchan Aruch, who follows the Rambam, and considers the problem of gambling to be associated with theft, follows his own opinion (c.m. 370:3) where he writes that one who gambles with gentiles would not be in violation of theft (since only actual and direct theft is forbidden from a gentile, but not when he loses in gambling and agrees to give the money). Rashi would certainly not make this distinction and would hold that even one who gambles with gentiles would be disqualified to testify. Even according to the Rambam, the Shulchan Aruch frowns upon gambling and writes: However, it is forbidden to occupy oneself with matters of vain, for a person should only occupy his time with wisdom and matters that benefit the general welfare of the public.

Rules of the Game and the
Rules of Life

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Rabbi Nachum of Stepinesht, the son of Rabbi Yisrael of Ruzhin, once entered his beis midrash during Chanukah and saw some chasidim playing checkers. Seeing their Rebbe, they were taken aback, but Rabbi Nachum approached and asked them, “Do you know the rules of the game? Now listen carefully:
1) You give one piece to get back two.
2) You mustn’t avoid your move.
3) You mustn’t make two moves with one turn.
4) Go forward, but never backward.
5) When you get to the top, you can go anywhere (Rav S.Y. Zevin, Sipurei Chasidim al HaMo’adim, p. 267).

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Hatmanah


The Gemora rules that one may be matmin (insulate) a cold food or drink on Shabbos. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 257:6) clarifies that one may only do so when the insulation does not add heat (eino mosif hevel), and his whole purpose of doing so is to ensure that the item will not become too cold. If however it does add heat (mosif hevel), then it is forbidden to insulate it even prior to Shabbos.

In generations past, in order to keep the cooked food warm once it was taken off the fire, it was insulated. Although there isn’t any issur melachah with hatmanah per se, the Chachamim nevertheless forbade it so as not to violate the issur of bishul in the event that before the insulation he would find that the item cooled off and then he would return it to the fire. Therefore one may not do hatmanah on Shabbos even when the insulation is not mosif hevel (ibid 257:1).

The Chachamim additionally forbade insulating an item in a place where it’s mosif hevel even before Shabbos. The reason being since in the times of the Gemora the ideal place for mosif hevel was in the ash next to the fire, and he might come to stir the ash on Shabbos to heat up the insulated food, thereby violating a form of mavir (ibid).

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 4:74 - Hatmanah) explains that it is forbidden to insulate an item in a manner of mosif hevel even early Friday morning. [One cannot infer that Reb Moshe held that there isn’t any problem of hatmanah if it was insulated before Friday, since the question he was addressing was regarding Friday morning. On the contrary, it is pretty clear from his wording that it would be forbidden to do so no matter when it was insulated.]

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Mevarchin Hachodesh

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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In the sefer Yereim (259) it is written: That which Jews all over the world have the custom to announce the new month on Shabbos before Rosh Chodesh (birchas ha’chodesh), this is not the sanctification of the new month, for we do not have the Rosh Beis Din amongst us and he is an integral and essential part of this mitzvah. The Rishonim established this custom merely as a way of notifying the people when Rosh Chodesh will be.

The Magen Avraham (O:C, 417) writes that it is, nevertheless, the custom to stand by birchas ha’chodesh - specifically when we are saying that “Rosh Chodesh will be on Such-and-such a day,” similar to when Beis Din sanctified the new month, which was done while standing.

Reb Akiva Eiger (ibid) asks: Where is it found that the sanctifying of the month was done standing? On the contrary! It would seem from the beginning of the third perek of Rosh Hashanah that it was done while sitting!?

Reb Moshe Feinstein zt”l (O:C I; 142) answers this question based upon a Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (24a) which states that first the Rosh Beis Din would say, “Mekudash” – “It is sanctified,” and then the entire congregation would say in unison, “Mekudash, mekudash.” And certainly, the entire congregation, who were there at the Beis Din, were not all sitting; they were standing! We find like this by the mitzvah of chalitzah as well, where the Gemora in Yevamos (106a) states that there is a mitzvah for all the people standing there to say “chalutz hana’al.”

Reb Moshe understands that the Rosh Beis Din’s saying “Mekudash” was the p’sak din – the witnesses were fully cross-examined and the Beis Din came to a conclusion with respect of the new month. The Rosh Beis Din announced this ruling. Then, there was a mitzvah on the congregation to sanctify the new month. This, they accomplished, by saying, “Mekudash, mekudash.” He derives this from a Scriptural verse, and it can be inferred from the language of the Rambam, as well.

That which we recite birchas ha’chodesh is based upon the congregation’s saying of “Mekudash, mekudash.” It is not on account of the Rosh Beis Din’s announcement of the judgment, for this was already done by Hillel’s Beis Din (when he arranged the calendar for the future). This is why the custom is to stand. The inference of the Gemora in Rosh Hashanah that they were sitting is only in reference to the Beis Din, not to the people standing there. It also stands to reason that the “Mekudash, mekudash” should be said standing, for this was the mitzvah of sanctifying the new month, and mitzvos (as a general rule) are performed while standing.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Palginan Dibura

The Gemora teaches us that if Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon cohabited with his wife, and with Reuven there is another witness, we can consider them two witnesses and Shimon gets killed. The Gemora explains that it would work only because of palginan dibura (we split his words). Rashi explains that we accept his testimony in regard to Shimon but not in regard to his wife, since she is related to him and he is not a valid witness.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:26) has several cases where palginan dibura applies:

1) A loveh (borrower) may testify that the malveh (lender) lent money to him with interest, and although he cannot testify on himself, we enact palginan dibura and we split his sentence. Instead of hearing the entire testimony that the malveh lent money to him with interest, we only listen to part of it; i.e., the malveh lent with interest (S’ma). Therefore, if there would be another witness, Beis Din will disqualify the malveh from being believed when giving testimony in the future (an oveir aveira is disqualify as a witness).

2) Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon sodomized him, we invoke palginan dibura, and if there would be another witness testifying, Beis Din will disqualify him.

3) Similarly, if Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon cohabited with his wife, and there is another witness, Beis Din will disqualify Shimon (the Shulchan Aruch doesn’t state that he gets put to death, because the Shulchan Aruch is talking to our generation, where there isn’t any court-imposed death penalty).

The Rashba distinguishes between the case where he says, “Shimon cohabited with my wife,” and where he said, “I cohabited with Shimon’s wife.” In the latter case, we don’t say palginan dibura.

4) Reuven testifies in Beis Din that Shimon sodomized Reuven’s animal, if there will be another witness, Beis Din will disqualify Shimon. The S’ma points out that this case is different than the above cases, since there is no such concept that Reuven is related to his animal, and therefore, in the times of the Sanhedrin, we would kill the animal as well.

Not in all cases do we say palginan dibura. The Mordechai (Yevamos) and Tosfos in Kesuvos (18b) rule that cases which are not common, or if you have to add a reason to his sentence, then we don’t say palginan dibura.

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What Furnishings are Included in the Sale of Property?

By: Meoros HaDaf Hayomi

Approaching retirement, Reuven sold his shop and, in the purchaser’s presence, began to clear out his personal effects. The new owner was astounded, though, when Reuven ordered the movers to dismantle a partition forming a wall in the middle of the shop and bring it for storage in his home. The partition, he claimed, served no current purpose but was installed long ago only to reduce the shop’s area and thus avoid paying a high municipal tax. The new owner retorted that the partition was just like any other wall, surely included in the sale. Rav Moshe Feinstein justified Reuven (Igros Moshe, I, 53) as Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 214:11) rules, in accordance with our sugya, that decorative window frames are excluded from the sale of a home, shop, etc., because they are not one of the items that give a house its name. Likewise the partition, which had been installed for extraneous reasons, was superfluous for the shop and excluded from the sale.

What is Sold with a House?

Commenting on our sugya, the Rishonim indicate that anything not affixed to a dwelling is excluded from its sale, unless otherwise specified, and anything affixed thereto and needed for normative habitation, e.g. doors or windows, are included.

Keys Now and Then

Keys are virtually the only items now defined differently than in Talmudic times. The Mishnah (65a) states that keys were excluded from the sale of property. They were not attached to a house or the like and came in just a few models, fitting the simpler locks of the era. Slightly altered, a key could fit other locks and therefore could not be defined as unique to any house. A modern key fits only a certain lock and must be included in the sale. HaGaon Rav Yaakov Bloy (Pischei Choshen, VII, 14, S.K. 64) adds that as purchasers of property now take care to prevent strangers from having keys, former owners must relinquish all keys to a new resident.

Lighting Fixtures

Lighting fixtures sold with a home, office or the like must be in working condition, being essential for habitation. However, a seller may remove chandeliers present at the sale and replace them with cheaper fixtures, as they are merely decorative.

Wall safes may likewise be removed, being non-essential.

Air-conditioners

These fixtures present a serious problem. About 30 years ago, all halachic authorities would agree that air-conditioners were luxuries not assumed to be included with homes. Thirty years from now, all will apparently define them as essential items for normal habitation. Today, then, we are in a dubious interim that requires asking a Rav for a decision according to local conditions.

Inventorying the Property

In conclusion, we cite Rav Y. Bloy (ibid), that sellers and buyers would act wisely to list the articles included in the sale in writing. Rambam, albeit, asserts that local custom determines practice (Hilchos Mechirah, 26) and halachic rulings are meant to solve problems where there is no obvious custom. Still, there may always be some item open to debate.

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The Law of the Kingdom

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The Poskim deal with when do we say the law of the land is binding. Rav Moshe Feinstien was asked about a bankruptcy case. One of the creditors had taken the money he was owed. This was against the law, for the company was protected under bankruptcy laws. On the other hand, according, to Torah law, he was entitled to the money.

Rav Moshe brings two opinions found in the Rema. The first opinion is that we only say the law is binding when the king has direct benefit like paying taxes, otherwise, we go according to our laws. The second opinion is that we always say the law is binding. Rav Moshe qualifies this opinion. This means that the king has a right to make laws so that commerce runs orderly. If there are no uniform rules for commerce and debt collection, the country would fall apart. The laws of the land would not be binding, however, in laws of damages or laws governing marriage and divorce. In these areas, one must follow Torah laws. Since we hold like the second opinion, Rav Moshe ruled that the debt could not be collected and had to be returned.

Obeying a Jewish King
in Eretz Yisroel

It is evident from the Gemora that the law of the kingdom has the full force of halachah behind it. The Ritva writes that we do not find anyone that disagrees with this principle.

The Rashbam explains the rationale for this halachah: All citizens of a country voluntarily accept upon themselves to obey the king’s decrees and laws. All of their laws are therefore binding. Accordingly, one who possesses his fellow’s property based upon that particular country’s law, does not violate a prohibition of stealing at all.

The Rashba explains it differently: Since the entire land belongs to the king, he is entitled to chase anyone away from his land if he wishes, and he has the right to tax everyone for the privilege of residing in his land.

A difference between these two opinions may be if this halachah would apply in Eretz Yisroel with a Jewish king. According to the Rashba, it might not apply in Eretz Yisroel, for every Jew has an inalienable right to live there, and no king would have the jurisdiction to banish anyone from the Land.

The Ra”n in Nedarim (28a) rules that this principle applies only in the lands of the exile. The reason for this, he explains, is that in these countries, the land is the property of the kingdom, and one is therefore obligated to abide by the laws and ordinances of the country in which he resides. But, in Eretz Yisroel, which belongs to the entire Jewish nation, there is no obligation to comply with the laws of a Jewish king. The Rambam and Shulchan Aruch both rule that this principle does apply to a Jewish king in Eretz Yisroel.

The Law of the Kingdom is the Law

Shmuel states: The law of the government is the law (even according to our law).

The Gemora in Shabbos (88a) teaches that when Bnei Yisroel stood at Mount Sinai and heard the word of Hashem, He held the mountain over our heads. Hashem declared, “If you’ll accept the Torah, all will be well. If not, this will be your burial place!” Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: This can now be used as an excuse for Klal Yisroel when they do not perform the mitzvos. For when they are summoned for judgment, they can claim that they were coerced into accepting the Torah; it was not done willingly.

The Perashas Derachim asks from our Gemora which states that the law of the kingdom is the law. If so, this should certainly apply by The Holy One blessed is He, Who is the King of all Kings. How could Klal Yisroel use the coercion as an excuse? The law of the kingdom is the law, and they took an oath obligating themselves to perform His mitzvos!

He answers that Rabbeinu Tam holds that the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law is only applicable if the king decrees on all his subjects. However, if the decree is issued only on part of his kingdom, this principle does not apply. Since Hashem is the King over all the nations of the world and He only forced Bnei Yisroel to accept His mitzvos, this principle would not apply and hence, a claim of coercion can be effective.

It emerges that regarding the seven mitzvos that were given to all Bnei Noach, the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law would apply, and a claim of coercion would not be valid.

According to this, the Ketzos HaChoshen explains the argument between Pharaoh and the midwives. Pharaoh asked them, “Why didn’t you listen to my commandment? The law of the kingdom is the law and since I the king decreed that all the Jewish children should be killed, you are obligated to listen to me!” They responded to him, “Your decree is not a universal one; it was only issued regarding the Jewish children and not to any others. Accordingly, the principle does not apply and we are not obligated to adhere to the laws of the kingdom. Thereupon, Pharaoh immediately decreed that all children born must be thrown into the sea.

Reb Shlomo Kluger uses this principle to explain Adam HaRishon’s response to Hashem. He answered, “The woman that you gave to me gave me from the tree and I ate.” What kind of answer was this? Adam HaRishon was saying that since his was wife was here as well and she was not commanded not to eat from the tree. Therefore, the law of the kingdom does not apply and that is why he ate.

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Retaining its Beauty

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The Mishna says that if the city is first, the tree should be cut down and he will not be reimbursed.

The Gemora asks: Why does the owner of the pit have to reimburse the owner of a tree for the cutting down of his tree, while in our Mishna the owner of the tree is not reimbursed?

Rav Kahana says: This is because a pot belonging to partners is neither hot nor cold. [Rashi explains that it is difficult to collect money from people in the city for the tree, as everyone will say that money should first be collected from others. In the interim, if the tree is allowed to stand, it will affect the beauty of Eretz Yisroel. We therefore rule that the tree must be cut down immediately without payment.]

The Gemora asks: What is the question? Perhaps there is simply a difference between damaging the public and damaging an individual!?

Rather, the Gemora answers: Rav Kahana’s statement was said regarding the second part of the Mishna. The Mishna states: If the tree was first, he must cut it down, but he is reimbursed. One would think he could claim, “First give me the money and then I will cut it down!” [The Mishna implies that he first must cut it down, and only then is he reimbursed.] Rav Kahana says: This is because a pot belonging to partners is neither hot nor cold.

Reb Moshe Feinstein asks: According to the Rishonim who hold that this halachah only applies in Eretz Yisroel, what is the Gemora asking that he should tell them, “First give me the money and then I will cut it down”? It is also incumbent upon him to beautify Eretz Yisroel! Just as they are obligated to give him money for this, he should be obligated to lose money on this account!? Why should he be entitled to cut it down only with the stipulation that he should be reimbursed for it?

Now if the halachah would apply in all lands because it is painful for people to see the ruining of their town, we could understand that he would have a right to claim that the town’s look does not bother him at all. However, the beauty of Eretz Yisroel is not dependent on his personal preference – if so, why should he be allowed to make such a stipulation?

He answers that although they all are obligated to preserve Eretz Yisroel’s beauty, he is not compelled to lose money for this.

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Se'udas Havra'ah

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Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Our Gemora recounts that Yaakov Avinu prepared the stew, with which he bought his brother’s firstborn rights, for Yitzchak to comfort him after Avraham’s demise.

The commentaries (see Rashi, Bereshis 25:30) explain that he brought the lentils as a se’udas havra’ah (recuperation meal) given to a mourner coming from burying his relative and the poskim learnt important halachos about this meal from our Gemora.

The Gemora in Moed Katan (27b) decides that a mourner must eat the “bread” of others at this first meal, not his own, and Shulchan ‘Aruch rules accordingly (Y.D. 378:1).

Does “bread” mean any food or is the term restricted to actual bread alone? Chochmas Shlomo and ‘Aroch HaShulchan (Y.D. 378) hold that a mourner may eat his own food aside from bread but Shevet Yehudah (378) and the Chida (Yafeh LaLev, VIII, 378) assert that he must eat nothing of his own and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch maintains that he must not even drink his own coffee.

Why is a mourner forbidden to eat his own food at the se’udas havra’ah?

According to Divrei Soferim (25:23), the above difference of opinions depends on the reason for the Talmudic regulation that a mourner must not eat his own food for his first meal. The Rosh, cited in Beis Yosef (Y.D., ibid), holds that a mourner is so despondent that he neglects to care for himself. Chazal therefore decreed that he must not prepare his first meal, causing others to bring him food and comfort him (Responsa Igros Moshe, Y.D. II, 168).

Shevet Yehudah, though, maintains that Chazal wanted to prevent a mourner from eating a full meal and neglect his mourning and therefore limited him to eating what others bring, assuming their contributions would not be excessive. Hence, Shevet Yehudah forbade a mourner to eat anything of his own, avoiding any possibility of his eating a full meal.

The Acharonim (Divrei Soferim, ibid, 27) emphasize the Tur, who quotes our sugya that the meal is intended to “comfort the mourner” – i.e., to hearten him but not to prevent his overeating.

The Rosh (Moed Katan, Ch. 3, §84) adds that a husband must not serve his wife a se’udas havra’ah for two reasons. Being that he must support her as her husband, she acquires the food he serves her and it is not regarded as another’s. Moreover, they always eat together and the food would not appear as if brought by others.

May a son supported by his father bring him a se’udas havra’ah from his own (the son’s) food? According to the first reason he may do so as the food does not belong to his father. Worrying about appearances (maris ‘ayin), though, the son must not, as anyone who knows that his father supports him and sees him serving is sure the food is his fathers.

The Acharonim prove, once again from our sugya, that the first reason of the Rosh forbidding a husband to serve se’udas havra’ah is halachically valid: Yaakov was supported by Yitzchak yet he brought him the stew which, as mentioned, was a se’udas havra’ah (Ruach Chayim by HaGaon Rav Chayim Falaji, 378).

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The Famous Taz

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Estate Money and Interest

The Gemora allowed an administrator of an estate to invest the orphan’s money in an investment with favorable terms for them, although this is generally Rabbinically prohibited.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 160:18), based on the Rambam and Rosh, applies this license to all Rabbinically prohibited interest, and extends this to money of charity, money donated to Torah scholars, and money donated for use in a synagogue.

What did the Torah Permit?

The Gemora quotes a statement of Rav Huna that prohibits charging interest from a non Jew. The Gemora debates why this is prohibited, and how to reconcile this statement with the verse and Mishna that seem to permit such a loan.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) asks why the Gemora was concerned with reconciling this Rabbinic law with the verse and Mishna, and answers that the Gemora assumed that the Sages would not prohibit something the Torah permitted.

The Taz states in numerous places that although the Sages have leeway to enact their own new prohibitions, they may not prohibit something explicitly permitted by the Torah.

The Taz in YD 117:1 applies this to the Rabbinic prohibition on commerce in forbidden foods. Since the Torah explicitly allows one to sell neveilah meat to a non Jew, the Rabbinic prohibition had to allow for such commerce when one chanced upon the forbidden food, so as to not fully prohibit an act the Torah explicitly allows.

The Taz in OC 588:5 discusses a question raised by earlier poskim. We find the Sages prohibited the performance of numerous mitzvos on Shabbos (e.g., Shofar, Lulav), due to a concern of one accidentally carrying to perform the mitzvah. Why did the Sages not apply this to bris milah, prohibiting a bris milah which falls on a Shabbos.

The Taz says that since the Torah explicitly said that one must perform a bris milah on the eighth day, even if it is a Shabbos, the Sages could not prohibit it.

The Chavos Yair 142 challenges this Taz from our Gemora, among others. Our Gemora is an instance where the Sages prohibited an action explicitly permitted by the Torah – i.e., charging a non Jew interest on a loan. Therefore, the Chavos Yair rejects the Taz’s thesis.

Later poskim dispute the Chavos Yair’s disproof. The Shla, quoted by the Chasam Sofer (YD 106), says that the Sages did not prohibit charging a non Jew interest, since that is indeed explicitly permitted by the Torah. Instead, the Sages prohibited a Jew from lending to a non Jew at all, and only thereby precluded the Jew from receiving interest from him.

The Chasam Sofer (YD 106, 109) says that Tosfos themselves (70b Tashich, 64b v’Lo) seem to support the Taz, and actually explain the Gemora based on his principle. According to Tosfos, when the Gemora challenged Rav Nachman from the verse, the Gemora was stating that since the Torah explicitly allowed a Jew to charge a non Jew interest, the Sages cannot prohibit it. The Chasam Sofer says that the reason the Sages were allowed to do so is due to the exclusions built in to their prohibitions (for livelihood, or for a Torah scholar). Just as the Sages allowed commerce in forbidden food when the Jew chanced upon it in order to avoid explicitly prohibiting an act allowed by the Torah, so too, the Sages allowed charging a non Jew interest in some cases, to avoid explicitly such a prohibition.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 1:134) says that the Gemora’s answer that we read the verse only as tashich – explicitly allowing a Jew only to pay interest, means that the Torah never did explicitly allow a Jew to charge interest, giving the Sages the leeway to prohibit it. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger YD 117 on the Taz for more details.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) says that nowadays we lend money to non Jews with interest. Tosfos advances three reasons for this behavior:
1. The economic situation and lack of other professions available to Jews makes the interest necessary for the creditor’s basic needs, in which case it is permitted.
2. Ravina’s answer understood that the prohibition was to limit our interactions with non Jews. Since we are forced into such interactions due to economic circumstances, there is no added interaction that will be prevented by refraining from charging interest.
3. The second version of Rav Huna’s statement does not prohibit interest from a non Jew at all, but only prioritized an interest free loan to a Jew above it.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 159:1) rules that charging interest from a non Jew is prohibited by the Sages, unless the creditor needs the interest for his basic needs, or is a Torah scholar. However, the Shulchan Aruch says that it is permitted nowadays, based on the first two reasons of Tosfos (see Shach 2).

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Mumar l'hachis and l'teavon

Desecrating Shabbos

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s students asked of him (Bava Kamma 79) : Why is the Torah stricter on a thief than on a robber. He replied: The robber puts the honor of the servant (man) on the same level as the honor of his owner (Hashem),whereas the thief does not put the honor of the servant on the same level as the honor of the master (for by stealing covertly, he is displaying a fear of man, but not Hashem). He made, as it were, the eye of the one Below (Hashem) as if it would not be seeing, and the ear of the one Below as if it would not be hearing, as it says: Woe to them who hide in depths to conceal their counsel from Hashem, and their deeds are in the dark, and they say, “Who sees us, and who knows of us?” And it is written: And they say, “Hashem will not see, neither will the God of Jacob give heed.” And it is written: For they say, “Hashem has forsaken the earth and Hashem does not see.”

Many years ago (14 Teves 5761), I had a question based on the halachah found in Hilchos Shechita (siman 2) - One who violates Shabbos in public is considered a mumar for the entire torah tantamount to one who worships avoda zara, and his shechitah is invalid just as the shechitah of an idolater. But, one who violates Shabbos in private, although he is not trusted, so long as there are mashgichim who determine that he shechted properly, his shechitah is valid. Based on the Gemora’s logic by ganav and gazlan, we should consider one who desecrates Shabbos in private to be worse than one who desecrates Shabbos in public!?

R' Moshe (Igros O.C. 1:33) raises this question and based on it, he is mechadesh an important yesod. It is not clear why one who desecrates Shabbos in public is so severe, but R' Moshe suggests that one who violates Shabbos in public is not just a mumar l’teavon (a heretic out of desire), but the fact that he is doing it in public indicates that he is a mumar l’hachis (a heretic out of spite). Although the concept of the Gemora is true, that one who steals in private and hides from Hashem is worse, that is when both the act in private and the act in public are for the sake of fulfilling his. However, when one violates Shabbos in public, he enters a new realm of being a “mechalel Shabbos l’hachis,” which is certainly worse than merely being motivated by desires. Even if deep down, he is only doing it to satisfy his desires, we do not regard his inner thoughts, and the act is an act of l’hachis.

Based on this, he suggests that this only applies at a time when people understand the severity of Shabbos, so that when one violates Shabbos publicly, it is an indication that he has a complete disregard for the Shabbos, but nowadays, where people no longer take Shabbos seriously, and their desires would bring them to desecrate Shabbos in public just as fast as it would bring them to desecrate Shabbos in private, even one who desecrates Shabbos in public will not have the status of an idolater (and therefore his shechitah is valid and he can be counted for a minyan).

I had an alternate approach to answer this question. Stealing is an aveira between two fellow men that every society recognizes as wrong and destructive. It is part of human nature to consider theft to be bad, and is inherent in human nature to try and hide these actions from others. When one hides these actions from people because he is worried that people will think less of him, or may catch him to punish him, he is outwardly displaying a fear for people that exceeds his fear of Hashem. Since it is part of human nature to hide acts of theft, we assume his intention is to hide it from other people. However, Shabbos is between man and God, and therefore the violation of Shabbos is not considered bad by human nature. When one hides his desecration of Shabbos from others, we assume that it is not because he is afraid of people, because people don't view desecrating Shabbos as inherently bad. So why would he hide his actions from people? We assume his attempt to hide his desecration of Shabbos is out of respect for Hashem, rather than trying to hide from Hashem. But when he is desecrating Shabbos in public, we consider it to be a lack of respect, violating Shabbos in the open showing no regard for it at all.

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How Kosher?

The poskim discuss different cases of people who transgress, and how we relate to them, in light of Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel (Rashbag)’s opinion. One situation discussed in recent times is a hotel that wishes to be certified as kosher, but with limitations. The hotel owners agree that all the food prepared in the hotel will be kosher (including only kosher meat, and no cooking of meat and milk together). However, they explicitly do not want to restrict their guests from eating milk right after meat, or even mixing (not cooking) meat and milk together. These actions are Rabbinically forbidden, but not as severe as the other potential transgressions being avoided by the certification. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer Y"D 4:7 and 6:3:3) rules that the rabbinate may - and should - certify the hotel, and says that Rashbag’s statement does not apply to this case. The Rambam rules like Rashbag, but says it’s good to be like the tznuim, making it a positive trait to be concerned with people’s religious welfare. Further, the Rambam may rule like Rashbag only in the case of robbery, which is more severe. Further yet, in the case of the trespassers, they may avoid the land altogether if they know that it may involve other prohibitions. In this case, without the certification, no one will avoid prohibitions, but, on the contrary, violate other ones. Finally, there are many customers who will not eat milk and meat together, and therefore the certification will make the difference for them between forbidden and permitted food. These people (including unwitting tourists) know no better, and therefore are considered anusim (forced), and we are concerned with their welfare.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Y"D 1:52) also discusses a similar case of an establishment that agrees to only prepare kosher food (with certification), but not restrict the uses of the food by its patrons. Rav Moshe rules that the restaurant should be certified, since a certification does not have to relate to and concern external matters, even in the use of the certified food. Rav Moshe adds that this is especially true, since some of the patrons may be totally ignorant, and have the status of tinok shenishba. This would remove the rule of haliteyhu entirely, even according to Rashbag.

The Tzitz Eliezer (11:55 and 12: page 224) strenuously disputes these rulings, and states that only bad results can come from such a certification. The public at large will take the rabbinate certification much more lightly, and even the certification will be hard to enforce. The Tzitz Eliezer states that Rashbag’s statement definitely applies here, as we want to have no hand in enabling transgressions, and have no interest in ameliorating any of the transgressions involved. In his response to Rav Ovadia Yosef’s letter to him, the Tzitz Eliezer says that it seems that he and Rav Ovadia Yosef approach this halachic area differently.

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Spending Money for a Mitzvah

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Tosfos (Bava Kamma 9b) writes that it is evident from our Gemora that a person is not obligated to give up all of his possessions in order to fulfill a mitzvah, and even for a mitzvah that will pass in time, such as an esrog. It is further evident from the conclusion of the Gemora that one is not even obligated to give up a third of his possessions in order to fulfill a mitzvah. And furthermore, it is said regarding charity: One who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his money, for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself.

All Mitzvos

The Rosh writes that this halacha applies by all mitzvos; one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on any specific mitzva, such as esrog or lulav. The Rambam and Rema seem to rule accordingly.

Why not Spend?

The Rishonim ask: Why would someone be exempt from performing a mitzvah just because it costs more than a fifth of his wealth? The Ra’avad answers that this is similar to halacha that one should make his Shabbos like an ordinary weekday, and not be forced to be supported from charity. This is because poverty is regarded as death, and one is not obligated to give up his life for an ordinary mitzvah.

The Biur Halachah writes (in his explanation of an opinion from the Beis Yosef) that not all mitzvos are compared to charity, for charity is a mitzvah that will not pass in time, and even if the poor people are before him, they can be supported by another person. That is why one would not be obligated to spend more than a tenth of his possessions. However, with respect to a mitzvah that will pass in time, it is possible that there would be an obligation to spend more than a tenth.

Reb Yaakov Emden asks: Why isn’t there an obligation to spend more for a positive commandment? Did we not learn regarding one who does not want to fulfill a positive commandment – we beat him until his soul departs him? Do we treat his money stricter than his life?

The Maharitz Chayus answers that we only beat him until his soul departs him when he is rebelling against the fulfillment of mitzvos; otherwise, we do not beat him, and he would not be required to spend all his money for it.

Lo Sa’aseh is Different

The Ra’avad adds that this halacha applies only to a positive commandment; however, one would be required to spend his entire wealth in order not to transgress a negative precept.

Must he Spend a Fifth?

The Gemora (Kesuvos 50a) states that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth to fulfill a mitzvah; is one halachically required to spend up to that amount, or is it only regarded as a mitzvah?

The Beis Yosef (Y”D; 249) writes that it is considered a mitzvah in the preferable manner if one spends up to a fifth of his wealth in order to perform a mitzvah. The Beis Yosef adds that although one can imply from the Gemora that it is not even a mitzvah to spend that amount because the Gemora states: One who spends liberally should not give more than a fifth of his wealth; however, even less than that would be regarded as spending liberally, and there would be no mitzvah whatsoever to spend that amount. Nevertheless, there is a Yerushalmi in Pe’ah that seems to indicate that there is a mitzvah to spend up to one-fifth of his wealth for a mitzvah.

In the sefer Ahavas Chesed, the Chafetz Chaim cites a Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos, who writes that there is a halachic obligation to spend up to one-fifth of one’s wealth for charity. He asks form our Gemora, which would seem to indicate that there is no such obligation. He answers that our Gemora is discussing a case where the poor people are not present and someone is searching to find them in order to give them charity. In such a situation, there is not even a mitzvah to give up to one-fifth. However, the Yerushalmi and the Rambam are speaking about a case where the poor person is in front of you; then, there would be a halachic obligation to give up to one-fifth.

Spending More than a Fifth

What if one wants to spend more than a fifth? Is he allowed to? It is evident from the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos that it is regarded as virtuous (midas chassidus) for one to spend more than a fifth. However, it can be inferred from the Rambam in halachos that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on a mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim reconciles the two rulings of the Rambam in the same manner as before. If the poor person is present, it would be regarded as midas chassidus to spend more than a fifth, and that is what the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos is discussing. However, when the poor people are not present and one is chasing after them, he should not spend more than a fifth.

The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth if it is to support the studying of Torah. The Ahavas Chesed explains the reasoning for this. One who supports another fellow to learn Torah is creating a partnership with him; the supporter receives a reward together with the one who is learning the Torah. One is permitted to purchase this reward for himself even if it will cost him more than a fifth.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe (Y”D, 4:37) rules that this is correct only if the supporter specifically negotiates with the one studying Torah to create a partnership of Yissochar and Zevulun. However, if the provider is just donating money to support Torah, he is not permitted to give more than a fifth.

The Ibn Ezra in Mishlei (4:7) writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth in order to study Torah himself. The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos (Yoma 12a) also rules like that. However, the Netziv in the Shiltos states that this is a matter of dispute between two Amoraim. The Gemora in Eruvin cites the verse that Torah is not in the Heavens. Rav Avdimi says: If it would be in the heavens, one would be obligated to go there and learn. It is evident that one would be forced to spend more than a fifth of his wealth to study Torah, for otherwise, he could claim that it costs too much to travel to the Heaven. However, Rava disagrees regarding the interpretation of that verse, and according to him, one would not be allowed to spend more than a fifth in order to study Torah.

The Rema (Y”D, 249:1) seems to hold that one can give away more than one-fifth of his wealth to charity right before he dies. It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah that even then, he should not.

It is written in Ahavas Chesed that one who is a free-spender in regards to himself and his family, i.e., he splurges on expensive clothing, builds for himself a fancy mansion and generally leads a luxurious lifestyle; it is permitted for him to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth.

Some say that if one finds himself in dire straits, he is permitted to spend more than a fifth with the intention that it should be on account of this deed that he will merit a salvation. It is brought in the name of the Bnei Yissoschar that one who requires atonement on a specific sin is also permitted to give away more than a fifth.

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Showering after Mikvah

Rashi (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16a) explains that the Chachamim enacted a decree of mayim sheuvim (drawn water) because people would err and say that immersing in a Mikvah and in mayim sheuvim would render one pure. Rava (Shabbos 14a) asked Abaye, why does it make a difference if people said this? The end result was that the people had immersed themselves in a Mikvah?

Reb Moshe Feinstein writes in Iggros Moshe that perhaps Abaye’s reasoning was that by pouring on themselves mayim sheuvim, they transgressed the prohibition of baal tosif (adding on to a mitzvah) by thinking that pouring mayim sheuvim was obligatory. Rava, however, maintained that for this suspicion there was no reason to render the person tamei. Some wrote that Abaye held that if one would immerse in a Mikvah or in mayim sheuvim, others would consider him tamei, and they would end up burning Terumah and Kodshim in an errant manner.

Some Rishonim write that similar to matters of purity, the Chachamim also enacted a decree that a woman who was a niddah is not allowed to shower after immersing in a Mikvah. If she showered after immersing in a Mikvah, her immersion would be invalid and she would be forbidden to her husband. Most Rishonim, however, maintain that this is not the law, because this decree was only enacted regarding matters of purity.

The Shach writes that the reason that is offered in the Gemora that people will err in thinking that pouring mayim sheuvim is what purifies the person, also applies to a woman immersing in a Mikvah, irrespective of the woman erring in her thinking. Others write that from the words of the Rambam, it appears that the decree was enacted because people erred and thought that merely immersing in a Mikvah did not render them pure, and they also were required to pour on themselves mayim sheuvim. This reasoning only applies with regard to mayim sheuvim of Taharos, because only when one immersed for Taharos was one required to have the correct intentions. A niddah who immersed in a Mikvah, however, does not require the correct intention, and there was no reason to enact a decree for a niddah.

Rav Shmuel Vozner in Shevet HaLevi writes that even though the Rama rules that after immersing in a Mikvah a woman should not shower, once she arrives at her home she is permitted to shower.

Rav Ovadyah Yosef in Sheilos U’Teshuvos Yabia Omer, however, rules that a woman can shower immediately after immersing in a Mikvah.

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Teaching Torah to Girls

Rabbi Eliezer said (Daf Yomi: Sotah 21b): If someone teaches his daughter Torah, he is teaching her lewdness.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi which notes that Ben Azzai does not follow the exposition of Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. For it is written regarding the mitzvah of Hakhel that men, women and children should assemble. The men come to learn, the women come to listen and the children come so that those who brought the children can earn reward. According to Ben Azzai, the reason why the women come is to learn, just like the men. However, according to Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah, who holds that one should not teach his daughter Torah, the women are not coming to learn; but rather, they are listening to the words of Torah in order for them to know how to fulfill the mitzvos that they are commanded to perform.

The Rambam rules that a woman who studies Torah receives reward, but not in the same capacity as a man. However, the Chachamim commanded a father not to teach Torah to his daughter, for women, in general, are not capable of understanding the intricacies and the fine details of the Torah, and it will lead them to incorrect halachic conclusions. This admonition is only applicable to the Oral Law; however with respect of the Written Law, one should not teach it to her, but if he does, it is not regarded as if he taught her lewdness.

The Maharatz Chiyos asks: According to the Rambam, Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah could also expound the verse by Hakhel to be saying that the women are coming to learn Torah, for there, the king was teaching the Written Law, and there is no prohibition whatsoever to teach that to her!?

He writes that after careful scrutiny of the Rambam’s language, it is clear that there is a prohibition to teach one’s daughter the Written Law; however, it is not with the same degree as the prohibition regarding the Oral law.

The Tur (Y”D 246:6) seemed to have a different version of the Rambam, for he writes that the Rambam holds that the concept of lewdness only applies by the Written Law, but with respect of the Oral Law, there is no lewdness; however, one should not teach it to her, but if he does, it is not regarded as if he taught her lewdness.

The Beis Yosef writes that it must be a printer’s mistake in the Tur, for the Rambam says the exact opposite.

The Rama rules that the laws pertaining to a woman, she is obligated to learn. The Bach writes that it is for this reason that a woman recites a birchas HaTorah in the morning.

The Aruch Hashulchan comments that it was never the custom for women to learn from a sefer. They were taught orally all the halachos that were relevant to them.

The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos writes that these halachos only applied in earlier times when the children lived in the same place as their parents and the tradition was strong. Then, it was forbidden to teach the women Torah, and the women followed the examples of the previous generations. However, in today’s times, when children live far away from their parents and the tradition has been weakened, and especially because the woman are studying the language and writings of the secular world, it is an important obligation to teach the girls Chumash, Prophets, the Writings, Pirkei Avos and the ethical teachings of our sages in order to strengthen their faith. For if not, they are liable to stray from the correct path of Hashem. The Steipler Gaon writes that in today’s times, it is more dangerous not to teach them Torah than to teach them. He even rules that one is allowed to teach Mishna to girls. However, Reb Moshe Feinstein (Y”D III, 87) rules that Mishna is part of the Oral Law, and the original prohibition is still intact, and therefore, girls should not be taught Mishna in school.

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The Consumption of Non-Kosher Food Causing “Timtum”

The Gemora states (Daf Yomi: Sotah 12b): And his sister said to Pharaoh’s daughter, “Shall I go and call for you a wet-nurse from the Hebrew women?” The Gemora asks: Why was it necessary to summon a Hebrew woman? The Gemora answers: This teaches us that they handed Moshe to all the Egyptian women, but he would not nurse from them. He said: “Shall a mouth that is destined to speak with the Shechinah nurse from something which is not kosher?”

The question is asked: Why does the Gemora state this reason with respect to Moshe, when the halacha clearly rules that all Jews must refrain from having an idolater nurse their child, if a Jewish nurse is available (Rama Y”D 81:7)?
Maharatz Chayos suggests that this halacha only applied after the Giving of the Torah, for then many of the foods consumed by non-Jewish women are forbidden to Jews. Since this reason was not applicable to Moshe in Egypt, it was necessary to provide a different explanation for his refusal to be nursed by an Egyptian woman.

Shulchan Aruch rules that a Jewish baby is permitted to have a non-Jewish wet nurse; however it is not preferable because the non-kosher food will harm the baby spiritually. The Rama adds that a Jewish woman who must eat non-kosher food for health reasons should not nurse her baby because the non-kosher food will be detrimental for the child.

The Gra cites our Gemora that Moshe refused to nurse from an Egyptian woman because he was destined for prophecy, so it would be improper for him to consume non-kosher food. It would seem that the non-kosher food would have affected his soul, and disqualify him to be the Prophet that he became.

Reb Micha Berger gleans from here that non-kosher food is intrinsically harmful for a person’s soul even if it is permissible to eat.

He cites a Ran in his Drashos (11) that states this explicitly. In his discussion as to why halacha is decided by the Chachamim and not by the Prophets, he asks the following question: If a sage errs and permits a forbidden food, it is like a doctor who makes a mistake and gives a patient poison instead of medicine. In both cases, the person is harmed. Accordingly, wouldn’t it be preferable for the Prophets to decide halachic matters, and then, there would be no mistakes?

He answers that prophecy is not always available. He then adds that even though eating non-kosher food is harmful, the mitzvah of listening to our sages may offset the harmful effects. It is however evident from the Ran that the consumption of non-kosher food is objectively poison, and detrimental to one’s soul even if it is done permissibly.

The Abarbanel (Devarim 17:4) disagrees with the Ran. He maintains that it is impossible for harm to befall a person if he is following the Chachamim. If the food is permitted, it cannot be harmful. Reb Micha explains that it would seem from the Abarbanel that he maintains that the consumption of non-kosher food is not intrinsically harmful; rather, it is harmful only because it is prohibited. If for some reason, there is no prohibition, then it is not harmful.

Reb Moshe (O”C 2:88) quotes the Chasam Sofer where he was discussing a handicapped girl in the following situation: If she would remain at home, she would not develop properly and remain ignorant her entire life. However, if the parents would send her to a special school, they claimed that she would then reach the potential of a teenager. However, the school was in a non-Jewish area, and there was no possibility of providing kosher food. The Chasam Sofer ruled that it is permitted to send her there, but he recommended against sending her, for the following reason: If they send her to that school, she will become intelligent enough to be obligated in mitzvos. The non-kosher food that she will consume will affect her heart, and she will probably violate Torah and mitzvos. It is therefore preferable for her to remain in her present situation. (He concludes: Her present situation is more preferable than being “b’timtum” before the Holy One, Blessed is He for one moment.)

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Once a Nazir; Always a Nazir

It is written: And afterwards, the nazir may drink wine. The Gemora cites several opinions as to when precisely is he permitted to drink wine and become tamei to the dead. According to one opinion, he only has to wait until after one of the korbanos have been brought, and according to another opinion, he is required to wait until all the korbanos have been brought.

The question is asked: Why does the Torah say that the nazir is permitted to drink wine? He is no longer a nazir!

Reb Moshe Feinstein answers that the inspiration that a nazir attains from abstaining from some of the worldly pleasures remains with him his entire life. Although the halachos of nezirus no longer apply to him, he is nevertheless in an elevated state, similar to the sanctity he had imposed upon himself during the term of his nezirus.

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Oath to Study a Certain Tractate

The Gemora (Nedarim 8a) states that when one makes a vow to learn a specific tractate, it is binding even in regard to a korban, and it is not regarded as a vow to fulfill a mitzvah. The reason is that since the Torah does not explicitly indicate an obligation to learn any more than just kerias shema in the morning and evening, the vow is completely binding on anything beyond what is explicitly stated in the Torah.

The Reshash asks that since one is not obligated to learn that specific tractate, the vow should be binding to learn that specific tractate? Actually, the Ritva uses this approach to understand what the Gemora is saying. Since one can fulfill their obligation with some other type of learning i.e. kerias shema, or any other tractate, therefore, when he makes a vow on a specific tractate, it is fully binding.

Tosfos writes that even if one makes a vow not to learn something specific, the vow is binding. Reb Avi Lebowitz cites Reb Moshe (Dibros Moshe heora #43), who explains that Tosfos cannot be understood to be saying that one is not obligated to learn all sections of Torah, because both the obligation of knowing Torah and the obligation of constantly learning Torah actually requires a person to learn all sections of Torah every day. While it may be impossible to do so, there is still technically an obligation on every single aspect of Torah. Therefore, Tosfos can only be explained like the Ran that the obligation to learn every section of Torah is not stated explicitly. Based on this, the Rosh and Ramban would hold that a vow not to learn even a specific or obscure section of Torah on any particular day would not be binding at all.

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Spending More than a Fifth

Rabbi Ila said: It was decreed in Usha that one who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his wealth (for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself).

A braisa is cited to support this ruling: One who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his money, for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself. There was an incident with a fellow who wished to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth and his friend did not allow him to. Who was this friend? Rabbi Yesheivav. Others say: Rabbi Yesheivav wished to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth and his friend did not allow him to. Who was this friend? Rabbi Akiva.

The Rosh writes that this halacha applies by all mitzvos; one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on any specific mitzva, such as esrog or lulav. The Rambam and Rema seem to rule accordingly.

The Rishonim ask: Why would someone be exempt from performing a mitzvah just because it costs more than a fifth of his wealth? The Ra’avad answers that this is similar to halacha that one should make his Shabbos like an ordinary weekday, and not be forced to be supported from charity. This is because poverty is regarded as death, and one is not obligated to give up his life for an ordinary mitzvah.

The Ra’avad adds that this halacha applies only to a positive commandment; however, one would be required to spend his entire wealth in order not to transgress a negative precept.

The Gemora stated that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth to fulfill a mitzvah; is one halachically required to spend up to that amount, or is it only regarded as a mitzvah?

The Beis Yosef (Y”D; 249) writes that it is considered a mitzvah in the preferable manner if one spends up to a fifth of his wealth in order to perform a mitzvah. The Beis Yosef adds that although one can imply from the Gemora that it is not even a mitzvah to spend that amount because the Gemora states: One who spends liberally should not give more than a fifth of his wealth; however, even less than that would be regarded as spending liberally, and there would be no mitzvah whatsoever to spend that amount. Nevertheless, there is a Yerushalmi in Pe’ah that seems to indicate that there is a mitzvah to spend up to one-fifth of his wealth for a mitzvah.

In the sefer Ahavas Chesed, the Chafetz Chaim cites a Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos, who writes that there is a halachic obligation to spend up to one-fifth of one’s wealth for charity. He asks form our Gemora, which would seem to indicate that there is no such obligation. He answers that our Gemora is discussing a case where the poor people are not present and someone is searching to find them in order to give them charity. In such a situation, there is not even a mitzvah to give up to one-fifth. However, the Yerushalmi and the Rambam are speaking about a case where the poor person is in front of you; then, there would be a halachic obligation to give up to one-fifth.

WHEN CAN ONE SPEND
MORE THAN A FIFTH ?

What if one wants to spend more than a fifth? Is he allowed to? It is evident from the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos that it is regarded as virtuous (midas chassidus) for one to spend more than a fifth. However, it can be inferred from the Rambam in halachos that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on a mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim reconciles the two rulings of the Rambam in the same manner as before. If the poor person is present, it would be regarded as midas chassidus to spend more than a fifth, and that is what the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos is discussing. However, when the poor people are not present and one is chasing after them, he should not spend more than a fifth.

The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth if it is to support the studying of Torah. The Ahavas Chesed explains the reasoning for this. One who supports another fellow to learn Torah is creating a partnership with him; the supporter receives a reward together with the one who is learning the Torah. One is permitted to purchase this reward for himself even if it will cost him more than a fifth.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe (Y”D, 4:37) rules that this is correct only if the supporter specifically negotiates with the one studying Torah to create a partnership of Yissochar and Zevulun. However, if the provider is just donating money to support Torah, he is not permitted to give more than a fifth.

The Ibn Ezra in Mishlei (4:7) writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth in order to study Torah himself. The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos (Yoma 12a) also rules like that. However, the Netziv in the Shiltos states that this is a matter of dispute between two Amoraim. The Gemora in Eruvin cites the verse that Torah is not in the Heavens. Rav Avdimi says: If it would be in the heavens, one would be obligated to go there and learn. It is evident that one would be forced to spend more than a fifth of his wealth to study Torah, for otherwise, he could claim that it costs too much to travel to the Heaven. However, Rava disagrees regarding the interpretation of that verse, and according to him, one would not be allowed to spend more than a fifth in order to study Torah.

The Rema (Y”D, 249:1) seems to hold that one can give away more than one-fifth of his wealth to charity right before he dies. It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah that even then, he should not.

It is written in Ahavas Chesed that one who is a free-spender in regards to himself and his family, i.e., he splurges on expensive clothing, builds for himself a fancy mansion and generally leads a luxurious lifestyle; it is permitted for him to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth.

Some say that if one finds himself in dire straits, he is permitted to spend more than a fifth with the intention that it should be on account of this deed that he will merit a salvation. It is brought in the name of the Bnei Yissoschar that one who requires atonement on a specific sin is also permitted to give away more than a fifth.

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Supporting your Children (scroll to the bottom to see Reb Moshe's opinion)

The Mishna (Kesuvos 49a) states: A father is not obligated to provide food for his daughter. This teaching Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah taught in front of the sages in Kerem Be’Yavneh: The sons should inherit and the daughters should be supported. Just as sons only inherit after their father dies, so too daughters should only be supported after their father dies.

The Gemora comments: This implies that he is not obligated in supporting his daughters, while he is obligated to support his sons. Additionally, it implies that there is no obligation to support one’s daughter but there is a mitzva to do so.

The Gemora asks: Who is the author of our Mishna? It does not seem to be Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, or Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah, as we shall see from the following Beraisa.

The Beraisa states that it is a mitzva to support girls, and certainly sons who learn Torah. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that it is a mitzva to support sons, and certainly daughters, as it is degrading for the girls. Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says that it is an obligation to support girls after the father dies, but both (girls and boys) do not have to be supported during the father’s lifetime.

Who is the author of our Mishna? It is difficult to say that it follows Rabbi Meir's opinion, as he says it is only a mitzva (not obligation) to support boys. It is difficult to say it follows Rabbi Yehuda's opinion, as he says that boys are also a mitzva. It is difficult to say it follows Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka's opinion, as he says it is only a mitzva to support boys after the father dies.

The Gemora answers that the author could be any of these three Tanaim. Our Mishna could be Rabbi Meir, and it would read as follows: A father is not obligated to support his daughter and similarly his son, but there is a mitzva to support one’s daughter and certainly his son. Why did it only say “daughter” in the Mishna? This teaches us that it is even a mitzva to support a daughter (though she does not learn Torah), but it is not obligatory.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it could also be Rabbi Yehuda. The Mishna would read as follows: A father is not obligated to support a daughter and certainly a son, but it is a mitzva to support a son and certainly a daughter. Why does the Mishna only discuss a son? This teaches us that there is no obligation to support one's children, even regarding a daughter.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it could also be Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka. The Mishna would read as follows: A father is not obligated to support a daughter or a son, and it is not even a mitzva to do so. The Mishna only used the term “obligation” (not to imply it is a mitzva, but rather) because there is an obligation to support daughters after their father dies.

Rabbi Ila said in the name of Reish Lakish in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Chanina: In Usha they decreed that a person must support his sons and daughters when they are minors.

The Gemora inquires: Does the halachah follow this decree or not? We can answer this from Rav Yehuda, who would tell people who came before him with this question, “The alligator has children, and throws them on the people of the city?!” [This implies that he would tell people they should do so, but not enforce it.] Rav Chisda would tell people who came before him: “Turn over a grinder in public stand on top of it and say: “a raven feeds its kin, and this person does not want to do so!”

The Gemora asks, does a raven indeed feed its kin? Doesn’t the passuk say “He feeds the sons of the raven who call out to Him?” This is not difficult, for the passuk is talking about the white ravens babies, while Rav Chisda meant the older black raven children (see Rashi).

When people would come before Rava, he would say: “Are you happy that your children should be supported from charity?” All of this is only referring to a case where the person is not wealthy. If he is wealthy, we force him to support his children. This is as in the case where Rava forced Rav Nasan bar Ami (regarding giving proper amounts of charity), and took from him four hundred zuz (type of coin) for charity.

Tosfos comments: If one has children less than six years old, he has an obligation to feed them, and it is enforceable. It would seem that this is a Rabbinical obligation.

Reb Moshe Feinstein in his sefer Dibros Moshe on Gittin (fourth perek; heora 83)writes the following novel halacha: If one has only one son and only one daughter, he is halachically required to support them. His reasoning is as follows: There is a mitzva of procreation. We hold according to Rabbi Yochanan, who states that if one has children and they die, he has not fulfilled his mitzva of procreation. Accordingly, if one does not sustain his children and they consequently die, he will be lacking his mitzva of peru u'revu. It is therefore incumbent upon him to be concerned about the welfare of these children; not necessarily for their sake, but for his mitzva.

He adds: When the Mishna says that one is not obligated to sustain his children, that is only if he has more than one son and one daughter. He concludes that he is bewildered why none of the poskim rule accordingly.

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Must a Prospective Bride Inform the Groom regarding her Absence of Blood?

The following question was posed to Reb Moshe Feinstein: There was a girl who was over twenty years old who had pubic hairs; however, she did not commence menstruating yet. Some doctors told her that when she gets married and cohabits with her husband, she will begin her cycle and she will have the ability to bear children. Is it permitted for her father to arrange a match for her without informing the groom of the situation? Is there a concern that this will be regarded as a mistaken kiddushin or not?

Reb Moshe (E”H, III, 27) addresses the question and cites proof from our Gemora (Kesuvos 10b).

There was a man who came before Rabban Gamliel the Elder and said, “Rebbi, I have had marital relations but did not find any blood.” His wife said, “Rebbi, I am from the Durkati family who does not have either menstrual blood nor virgin blood.” Rabban Gamliel investigated regarding her relatives, and found that she was correct. He said “go and take your purchase (wife, as she indeed was a virgin), praised are you who have merited (a wife) from the house of Durkati.” What does Durkati mean? A cut-off (from these bloods) generation.

Rabbi Chanina said that Rabban Gamliel comforted this man with illogical comfort. This is because Rabbi Chiya taught that just as yeast is good for dough, so is blood is good for a woman (as it causes her to become pregnant quicker).” The Braisa also says in the name of Rabbi Meir that any women who has much blood, has many children.

It is said that Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Aba stated (that the phraseology of go and take your purchase in the case immediately above means) “acquire your purchase,” he said to him. Rabbi Yossi bar Avin says “you are obligated in your purchase,” he said to him. The opinion that he meant “you are obligated in your purchase” is understandable according to the words of Rabbi Chanina (that this wasn’t great as his wife couldn’t have so many children, nor get pregnant quickly). However, according to the opinion that says “acquire,” what kind of meritorious acquisition is this (that he should use a term referring to both acquiring and implying that it is a great merit to do so)? The Gemora answers, that the husband will never have a doubt whether or not his wife is a Nidah.

We see that even according To Rabbi Yosi bar Avin who holds that the absence of blood can prevent a woman from bearing children, nevertheless, the kiddushin is valid, and not regarded as a mistake even though it is detrimental to him.

It is evident that the possibility exists that a woman without blood can give birth, although she will not bear many children. Since she is fit to have children, and many men are not particular to have many children and they are also not particular if she becomes pregnant immediately or not, it is not regarded as a mistaken kiddushin.

In our case, where there are doctors that say that her menstrual cycle will return and she will have the ability to bear many children, the father is not obligated to reveal her blemish to the groom’s family. Reb Moshe adds: The father and the bride should resolve that if four years goes by and she doesn’t become pregnant and she does not begin to menstruate, she should accept her bill of divorce without a hassle and without and monetary claims on the husband.

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DEFINING A SHOTAH - Yevamos 113 - Daf Yomi

Generally the understanding of a "shoteh" in the entire Torah as one who is exempt from mitzvos is classified by the Gemora in Chagiga 3b as someone who may have a high IQ but does crazy things.

Reb Moshe (Even Haezer 1:120) has an elaborate and controversial teshuva explaining that if he does one of the crazy acts mentioned, we assume he is a shoteh until proven otherwise, but if we can prove otherwise, then he is no longer considered a shoteh (but he points out that the Rambam implies that we consider him a shoteh even if he is crazy in only one thing and nothing else, he is still exempt from mitzvos- but R' Moshe then issues a novel ruling that regarding giving a get, so long as he understands the issues, it is valid).

A man who has shoteh status cannot divorce his wife since he needs to be mentally competent, but a woman can be divorced against her will and therefore the Gemora says she can receive a get Biblically. However, the Torah requires that in order to receive a 'get', she must: 1. Be able to watch her get, which means to distinguish between the get and something else (Gittin 64b). 2. She must have enough understanding about the concept of divorce that she does not return to her husband’s house. The Gemora concludes that even one who is a shoteh for everything else, can have enough da'as to distinguish between a get and something else, and realize that she must not return. But, since people will take advantage of her and act immorally with her, Chazal do not allow him to divorce her.

Tosafos and Rashi argue about a girl who is unable to distinguish between her get and something else, and will also continue to return after the divorce, whether the father can receive the get for her. Tosafos seems to understand that the father preventing her from returning qualifies, implying that it is a practical consideration that she must be someone who will not return, rather than being an issue of da'as. Rashi seems to understand that the father preventing her from returning isn't sufficient since it is a da'as requirement and she is still missing the da'as. It is interesting to note that according to Tosafos, a woman who is sometimes a shoteh and sometimes healthy, can receive a get at a time where she has enough intellect not to return, even though she is likely to once again become a shoteh and return to her husbands house (v'dok).

Reb Moshe (Y.D. 4:29 and Even Haezer 1:164) makes a very important distinction between a shoteh and someone with a very low IQ, implying that many mentally retarded people do not halachically qualify as a shoteh. I think his approach is very meduyak in the Gemora and Rashi on the bottom of 113a that a low level intellect which thinks clearly and straight (rather than 'krum' qualifies as sufficient da'as). (Reb Avi Lebovitz; Hearos al HaDaf

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