Wednesday, March 05, 2008

Is the Fetus a "Swallowed Item"?

The following halacha is derived from our Gemora (Nedarim 75b): If a person swallows a tahor ring and subsequently enters a room containing a corpse, the ring does not contract tumah. This is based on a Gemora in Chulin (71b), which states that a “swallowed item” does not contract tumah.

The Minchas Chinuch (263:3) asks the following question: How can Rabbi Akiva in Chulin (72a) rule that a fetus inside of its mother’s womb can Biblically contract tumah? Shouldn’t the fetus be regarded as a “swallowed item,” and therefore, be shielded by the mother’s body from becoming tamei?

He answers that the fetus is considered like a thigh of its mother and therefore is rendered tamei just like any other one of the mother’s limbs.

The Magen Avraham (O”C 343:2) cites the Rokeach as saying the following: Concerning a pregnant wife of a Kohen, she is permitted to enter into a room that contains a corpse (even though the baby might be a male and cannot become tamei). The rationale is based upon a “double doubt.” Perhaps she will miscarry, and even if she will not, perhaps the child will be a female, not a male!

The Magen Avraham asks: Why is this logic necessary? It should be permitted because the fetus can be regarded as a “swallowed item,” and hence, cannot become tamei?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (2:41) answers: A Kohen is forbidden from entering into a room that contains tumah (regardless of becoming tamei). A “swallowed item,” although it does not become tamei, it is nevertheless, considered as if it is inside the room. Therefore, the principle of a “swallowed item” will not permit her to enter the room.

According to the Minchas Chinuch, we can answer that the fetus is not regarded as a “swallowed item,” and therefore will not be a reason to permit her to enter.

Read more!

Monday, March 03, 2008

Ben Azzai

(Nedarim 74b) When Ben Azzai heard Rabbi Akiva’s argument, he exclaimed in this exact language: It is a pity to you, Ban Azzai, that you did not serve Rabbi Akiva!

The Yad Malachei asks: It is evident from this Gemora that Ben Azzai did not study under Rabbi akiva. However, the Gemora Brochos (62a) states that Rabbi Yehudah told Ben Azzai: For how long will you be brazen towards Rabbi Akiva, your master? It could be answered that Ben Azzai went to study under Rabbi Akiva, and that is what the Gemora in Brochos is referring to.

However, the Gemora Brochos mentions that Ben Azzai said to Rabbi Akiva: For how long will you be brazen towards your master, that you followed Rabbi Yehoshua into the lavatory? If Rabbi Akiva was his master, how could he speak in such a degrading manner towards him? Even a teacher to a student wouldn’t talk like that; certainly a student to his teacher!

Therefore, he writes that it must be that Ben Azzai was a talmid chaver (a peer) of Rabbi Akiva. They were both disciples of Rabbi Eliezer the Great.

The Gemora in Bava Basra (158a) refers to Ben Azzai as the “Talmid chaver” of Rabbi Akiva. Ben Azzai was considered somewhat of a disciple of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbeinu Gershom comments: Since Ben Azzai was a “bochur,” he was unable to comprehend halachic logic as well as Rabbi Akiva.

What is the connection between being a “bochur,” and not comprehending to the fullest extent?

I once heard from my Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Chaim Schmelczer zt”l that Rabbeinu Gershom means that Ben Azzai was a bachelor, and one who is not married does not have the same level of contentment as one who is married. Torah study requires one to be at ease; one must have a menuchas hanefesh in order to comprehend the depths of the Torah. This is what Ben Azzai was lacking.

Read more!

Deaf-mute Revoking

Rami bar Cham inquires (Nedarim 73a): Can a deaf man revoke the nedarim of his wife?

The Ra”n explains that the Gemora is referring to a deaf person who can talk, but cannot hear.

The Rosh adds: We cannot be referring to a deaf-mute, for he can only make a Rabbinical kiddushin through hinting or signing. He will not be able to revoke her nedarim, which are Biblically valid! Furthermore, he would have the halacha of a shoteh, and the halachos of revoking will not be applicable for him.

Reb Yaakov Emden explains the Rosh to mean as follows: The kiddushin of a deaf-mute is only a Rabbinical one. He performs a kiddushin by demonstrating that he wishes to marry her. It is, therefore, impossible for him to revoke his wife’s nedarim, for that is a Biblical halacha, which would only be applicable to a marriage on a Biblical level.

The Acharonim challenge this explanation from a Gemora in Niddah (46b), which states that one who married a minor, who has no father, and the kiddushin is only a Rabbinical one, may nevertheless revoke her nedarim. This is because every woman who makes a neder intends that it will be subject to her husband’s will. This applies by a Rabbinical marriage as well, since she is his wife.

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky (and others) explain the Rosh to mean that since he cannot talk, he is incapable of revoking his wife’s vows. For one needs to speak in order ot revoke a vow; hinting and signing will not be sufficient.

The Nidrei Zerizin is perplexed by this answer: Where does it say that one needs a complete expression in order to revoke a vow? Furthermore, he can revoke it through writing. For there are many opinions that maintain that writing is considered like speaking in regards to making an oath; certainly it should suffice for revoking a vow!

Read more!

Sunday, March 02, 2008

Pre-existing Conditions

The Gemora (Nedarim 72a) stated that the Mishna is referring to a nesuah, and the reason that the husband cannot revoke her vow is because the halacha is that a husband cannot revoke his nesuah’s prior vows.

The Ra”n explains that it can be referring to a nesuah either in the marriage preceding the divorce or the one that followed it. If she was an arusah by the first marriage and a nesuah at the end, he would not be able to revoke her nedarim, for the husband cannot revoke pre-existing nedarim. If she was a nesuah by the first marriage and an arusah at the end, he cannot revoke her nedarim, for once she is a nesuah, the father loses his rights over her, and the arus is not able to revoke her vows without the conjunction of her father.

The Reshash notes that it would seem from this Ra”n that a husband after nisuin can indeed revoke the nedarim that his wife made while she was an arusah. For otherwise, the Mishna did not have to mention that he divorced her and then remarried her. He cites the Rambam’s opinion that the husband may not revoke the nedarim that his wife made while she was an arusah.

There are those that explain the argument as follows: Does the husband have authority over his wife’s nedarim, while she is an arusah? If you say that the husband has no authority then; it is only in conjunction with her father that he may revoke her nedarim, we can explain the Rambam’s opinion. Once they perform nisuin, the husband acquires the authority to revoke her nedarim, but he can only use this authority on nedarim that his wife makes from now on. However, if you will say that the husband does have authority to revoke her vows even during the erusin, except that this authority is limited in the fact that he may only revoke her nedarim in conjunction with her father, we can understand the Ra”n’s opinion. The husband may revoke the nedarim that his wife made during erusin, for this is not regarded as a pre-existing neder, since he had the authority to revoke this neder even beforehand.

Read more!

Thursday, February 28, 2008

A Quiet Confirmation

Rava inquires (Nedarim 69a): Is there such a thing as an annulment for a confirmation, or not?

The Ra”n explains: If the father or the husband confirmed the neder and asked on that same day that the confirmation should be annulled, can it be annulled (similar to a neder)? It is obvious that it cannot be annulled on the following day, for it has no less effect than remaining quiet.

It is evident from the Ra”n here and he says so explicitly in Kesuvos that there is certainly no annulment if he had remained quiet.

The Reshash asks: What is the distinction? If he can annul a spoken-out confirmation, why can’t he annul a confirmation that came about because he remained quiet (which is regarded automatically as a confirmation)?

The Steipler Gaon answers: An annulment is only possible on an action performed by a person; however, remaining quiet, although that is deemed a confirmation, is not an action that can be annulled.

Read more!

Monday, February 25, 2008

Father Revoking by Himself - Nedarim Daf 67

The Rambam holds that a father has the right to revoke all types of his daughter’s nedarim. The husband, however, can only revoke a neder of personal affliction, and only those that affect their marital relationship. The Ra”n nd the Rosh disagree and hold that the father may only revoke her nedarim that are of personal affliction, and only those matters that are between him and her.

The Keren Orah poses the following question: The halacha is that the father and the husban revoke the nedarim of a betrothed na’arah. According to the Rambam, who maintains that the father can revoke all types of nedarim, what is the halacha if his daughter is a betrothed na’arah and she pronounces such a vow? Do we say that the father has a right to revoke this neder by himself? Or, perhaps, the halacha is that the father may only revoke nedarim in partnership with her husband, and since her husband cannot revoke such a neder, the father cannot revoke it either?

Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach wonders further: This inquiry can be posed according to the Ra”n and the Rosh as well. If the girl makes a neder that is a “matter that is between her father and her,” but it does not affect the husband. For example, she said that she will not assist her father. Do we say that the father can revoke this neder by himself, or do we say that he can only revoke nedarim together with her husband, and since her husband cannot revoke this neder, the father cannot revoke it either?

The Meiri writes that the Rambam would concede that the father does not have the ability to revoke the neder of his betrothed daughter by himself. His rights to revoke his daughter’s neder are only in partnership with her husband, and if the husband cannot revoke the neder, since it is not a neder that affects him, the father cannot revoke it either.

Read more!

Spit in his Eye

The Yerushalmi in Sotah relates the following: Rav Meir was accustomed to deliver a Torah lecture every Friday night. A certain woman was always in attendance. One time, Rabbi Meir said a lengthy drasha and by the time she arrived home, the Shabbos candles had already burnt out. Her husband was angry with her and told her, “I do not want to see you again until you spit into the eye of the person who was giving the lecture that you attended.”

The Medrash records that the woman sat outside of her house for several weeks. All the women saw her and asked her what was going on. She explained the story. The women went to Rabbi Meir and related the situation to him in hope that he would have a solution. (The Yerushalmi states that Rabbi Meir realized through Divine spirit what the situation was even before the women came to him.)

Rabbi Meir pretended to be suffering from pain in the eyes, and announced: “If there is any woman skilled in whispering charms for the eyes (a type of "medicine" which was believed to be effective in those days) , let her come and whisper.” When this particular woman came to him, he asked her: “Are you skilled in whispering charms for the eyes?” She said that she didn’t. Rabbi Meir told her, “Do not worry. I will tell you what to do. Just spit into this eye seven times and all will be well.” After she did as she was instructed, Rabbi Meir told her to go to her husband and say that you only requested of me to spit in his eye once; I did so seven times.

His students asked him: “Master! Should Torah be degraded in such a manner?” Rabbi Meir replied: “Should my honor be treated in a higher regard than the honor of the Omnipresent? If, in order to make peace between a husband and a wife, the Torah commanded: Let My Name, which was written in sanctity, be erased in the destructive waters, how much more so I, where I can forego my honor in order to bring about peace between a man and his wife.

Read more!

Friday, February 22, 2008

Four People are Considered as Dead

The braisa (Nedarim 64b) states: Four people are as if they are dead. These are a poor person, a leper, a blind person, and someone who does not have children. A poor person is as if he is dead, as derived from the passuk above, ““Because all of those (who have sought to kill you) have died.” A leper is considered like he is dead, as the passuk states, “let her not be as if she is dead.” A blind person is considered dead, as the passuk states, “In the darkness he placed me like the dead of the world.” Someone who does not have sons is considered dead, as the passuk states, ““give me children, and if not I am dead.”

Reb Chaim Shmulevitz explains that the common denominator among these four is that they do not feel someone else’s pain and that they cannot provide benefit for others.

A poor person is considered as dead not because he is lacking himself, but rather, it is because he cannot give to others.

A blind person cannot see others and therefore, he is unable to perceive their pain or suffering. He cannot join in his tribulation.

A metzora is banished from the camp and therefore, he is unable to offer assistance to others.

One who does not have children to nurture is lacking the ability to provide benefit to those that are dear and close to him. It is a natural instinct for a person to desire to give whatever he has to his children.

Only a life where one can share with others is worth living.

Read more!

Delaying by a Neder

The Mishna (Nedarim 63a) had stated: If one made a neder against tasting wine for the year, and the year was proclaimed to be a leap year, he is forbidden for the year and its extension.

The Ra”n explains: The Mishna is teaching us that even if one made the neder from the beginning of the year, since he said “this year,” we do not say that he meant “one year,” but rather, he is prohibited for an extra month, which is thirteen months. However, if he said “one year” without any specification, the extra month is not included, even though the year was a leap year. For behold, if he did not abide by his prohibition this year, he makes it up the next year, which is a regular year. And although, it is forbidden for him to do that, because there is a prohibition against delaying, since if he would delay, he could make it up in another year, his neder is not connected to this year, which is a leap year. Therefore, even if he fulfills it this year, the extra month is not included.

The Rashba holds that even if he says, “one year from today,” the extra month is not included.

It is evident from the Ra”n that he holds of the following novelty: One can violate the transgression against delaying, even by a prohibatory neder.

The Rambam and Ramban, both maintain that this prohibition is only applicable by a neder for hekdesh, when one is obligating himself to do something.

The Machaneh Efraim adds that this transgression can apply by all nedarim to fulfill a mitzvah.

Reb Shimon Shkop states that the Ra”n’s words are perplexing. The prohibition against delaying is applicable when the person has an obligation to do soemthing. A neder is a prohibition on an object. If the object is forbidden, it is forbidden, but if it is not, how can there be a prohibition against delaying?

Reb Dovod Pervarsky explains: A neder also begins with an obligation resting on the person. He is obligated to fulfill his neder. If the forbidden object is in existence, the neder takes effect upon that object. However, if it is not in existence at that time, the person has a responsibility to render it forbidden when it comes into this world. If he fails to do so immediately, he is violating the transgression against delaying.

Read more!

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

An Abbreviated Cycle

The Gemora (Nedarim 61a) presents a dispute regarding the counting of Yovel. The Chachamim hold that Yovel is the fiftieth year in the cycle and the following year is the first year of the next cycle. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the fiftieth year is reckoned for both cycles. It is the fiftieth year of the previous cycle and the first year of the forthcoming cycle.

The Turei Even poses an interesting question according to the viewpoint of Rabbi Yehuda. In the first Shemitah cycle after a Yovel, there will only be five field working years between Yovel and Shemitah since during Yovel one is not permitted to work his field.

In a normal Shemitah cycle, each of the six years has a designated tithing that one is required to separate from his field. One is obligated to take maaser sheini (he would bring one tenth of his produce to Yerushalayim to be eaten there) on the first, second, fourth and fifth years. He would separate maaser oni (given to the poor) on the third and sixth years. The Turei Even wonders what the arrangement would be according to Rabbi Yehuda in the first cycle following a Yovel, where there is only five years.

The Netziv and the Sfas Emes state that in the third year, one would separate maaser oni and regarding the remaining years, he would take maaser sheini. This is because the Torah states that maaser oni should be separated every three years; however the Torah does not prescribe set years for maaser sheini. A year that does not have a requirement for maaser oni, automatically has an obligation for maaser sheini.

Read more!

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Term Expired and Fasting for "One Day"

Annulment after the Term of the Neder Expired

The Mishna (Nedarim 60a) states: If a person says: “Konam” (he forbids himself with a vow) that he will not taste any wine today, he is only forbidden from doing so until it gets dark.

Rabbi Yirmiyah says: When it gets dark, he must ask a scholar (to permit his vow). The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Yosef answers: It is a decree, lest he confuse this case with a vow that he will abstain “for one day” (which the Mishna stated means that he is forbidden for twenty-four hours, not just until dark).

The Acharonim ask: Why can’t he have the neder annulled before the night? Why must he wait for the night?

The Chasam Sofer answers: If he would have the neder annulled before the night, it would retroactively annul his neder. It would emerge that he had abstained for nothing. However, if he waits until the night to annul the neder, he has fulfilled his neder, since the term of his neder was for that day. It was only a stringency based upon a decree that he should have it annulled at night.

It is evident from the Chasam Sofer that he maintains that a neder cannot be annulled after its term has been completed. The Tosfos Ri”d holds that a neder can be annulled by a sage even after its term has expired.

Fasting Nowadays

The Ra”n asks on our custom of accepting to fast for one day, and immediately by nightfall, he is permitted to eat without petitioning a sage first. According to our Gemora, shouldn’t he be required to have the neder annulled because of Rav Yosef’s decree of “one day”?

The Ra”n answers: Everyone knows that the Chachamim instituted that the time for a fast is from morning until night. It is not similar to other nedarim, which do not have a set time. There, therefore, is no reason for a decree, for everyone understands that the halachos of nedarim and the halachos of fasting are distinct from each other.

The Rashba answers: The Gemora’s decree is only applicable in a case where he made a neder, saying, “Today, I will not drink wine,” which is similar to the case where he said, “I will not drink wine for one day.” There, we rule that he must have the neder annulled at nightfall, since it is similar to the case where he made the neder for “one day,” where he was permitted in the beginning of the day. However, regarding a fast, where one is forbidden to eat from the beginning of the day until its conclusion, there is no reason for any decree. One would easily think that the reason why we are lenient and allow him to eat at nightfall is because we were stringent upon him at the beginning of the day. When he makes the neder in middle of the day, and he was permitted up until then, we decree that he is required to petition a sage for annulment of his neder at nightfall.

The Rashba offers another answer: There is no place for Rav Yosef’s decree by a neder to fast, for even if one would make a neder to fast for “one day,” he will not be required to fast for twenty-four hours like by a different neder. Therefore, on a regular fast, he may begin to eat immediately upon nightfall.

The Yados Nedarim answers: This decree was never issued by a neder for a mitzvah. One who vows to fast is regarded as a mitzvah, as the Gemora refers to him as a kodosh.

Read more!

Monday, February 18, 2008

Pigs in the Future

(Nedarim 59a) The Rishonim disagree regarding a food item that the Gemora is uncertain if it is forbidden or not and it remains unresolved. The inquiry will remain in that state until Eliyahu Hanavi clarifies it for us. The Ohr Zarua maintains that this is regarded as “something which can become permitted,” since there is a possibility that Eliyahu will say that it is permitted. The Rashba (Beitzah 4a) disagrees and he explains: If Eliyahu will decide that the food is forbidden, it will emerge that this item will never be permitted. If he will rule that it is permitted, it actually was never forbidden. Either way, he argues, it cannot be labeled as “something which can become permitted.” The Bach cites a Mordechai that it is not considered “something which can become permitted,” for by the time Eliyahu will permit it, the food will be already ruined.

The Chasam Sofer cites the following question from the Rav in Frankfurt: Chazal write that a pig is called a “chazir,” for in the future, Hashem will reverse the prohibition of the pig and it will be permitted. If so, according to those Rishonim, pig should be regarded as “something which can become permitted”?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon that which was written in the Toldos Yitzchak: The Torah forbids animals that do not have split hooves, or those that do not chew their cud because those animals are naturally conceited; they trample with their feet and they have a poison inside of them, which is extremely dangerous for a Jew to eat. The animals that do not digest their food easily and they are compelled to chew their cud; those animals are permitted to eat.

If so, explains the Chasam Sofer, there will be no change in halacha regarding the pig. It was forbidden and will remain forbidden. Rather, Hashem will change the nature of the pig and it will begin to chew its cud. That is why it will be permitted then. Accordingly, the only pigs that will be permitted then, are those that will be born after this change occurs; however, the pigs that were in existence prior to that will remain forbidden. This is why a pig is not classified as “something which can become permitted.”

Read more!

Women and Shemitah

The Chinuch states that there is a positive commandment which forbids plowing on Shemitah. It is written [Shmos 34:21]: From plowing and harvesting you shall desist.

The Minchas Chinuch (112) asks that if so, women should be exempt from this mitzvah, and they should be permitted to plow on shemitah because it is a positive commandment that has a time element to it and the principle is that women are exempt from any positive mitzvah which is governed by time?

He answers that women are obligated in this mitzvah because that rule is applicable only regarding a positive mitzvah that is incumbent on the body of the person and not a mitzvah like shemitah, which is a mitzvah that is dependent on the land (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz). This can be better understood based upon our Gemora which says that the shemitah prohibition is on account of the ground.

Proof to this distinction is cited from the Ritva in Kiddushin (29a). The Gemora rules, based on a Scriptural verse that women are not obligated to perform a circumcision on their sons. Tosfos asks: Why is a verse necessary; circumcision is a positive mitzvah which is governed by time since the mitzvah can only be performed by day, and women are exempt? The Ritva answers: Any mitzvah which is not related to the person themselves; this principle does not apply. The mitzvah of milah is to perform the circumcision on the son and therefore women would be obligated if not for the special verse teaching us otherwise.

Read more!

Something that will become Permitted

Rabbi Shimon said Nedarim 58a): That Mishna is only referring to the halacha of bi’ur i.e. removing (the produce of Shemitah may be kept as long as that produce is still available in the fields for the animals; afterwards, it may no longer remain in the house).

The Ra”n explains: Since it was possible to eat it before that time, it is regarded as something that can become permitted.

The Sha’ar Hamelech and the Noda B’Yehudah ask: According to this logic, why is it only not nullified if it becomes intermingled with its type? The halacha should be that it should not become nullified even if it becomes mixed up in something that is not its type? For the Ra”n above (52a) explained at great length in the name of the Ri”f that something which is permitted presently to be consumed will not be nullified, even with a mixture of things that aren’t its type?

The Sha’ar Hamelech answers: The Ra”n only said that rule in respect of things that will be permitted forever, such as meat, which will always be permitted to be eaten with other meat or foods that are not from milk. However, here, the Shemitah produce will become forbidden forever, i.e. after the “time of removal.” It is therefore compared to something that will become permitted, where it will not become nullified only in a mixture of things that aren’t its type.

Read more!

Superstition

Ula says (Nedarim 56a): A dargash bed is a bed of good fortune.

The Rishonim ask: Shouldn’t such a bed be forbidden on account of the prohibition of nichush; One should not act upon the basis of omens or lucky times (Vayikra 19:26)?

The Radvaz answers that it is being used as a sign to strengthen one’s luck, but not to be superstitious about it. R’ Eliezer MiMitz disagrees with him and maintains that even that would be forbidden.

The Shitah Mikubetzes explains that this is a bed designated for the guardian angel of the house. It was done for the purpose of honoring the Holy One, blessed is He. This is similar in the manner that we prepare a chair for Eliyahu Hanavi by a bris milah.

The Ra”n in Sanhedrin explains that it is a bed which is constantly made and kept empty in order to demonstrate that the household has more than they need. Through this, one is recognizing that Hashem has blessed him with wealth and thanking Him for it.

The Rambam writes that dargash is a small bed that is placed before a larger bed; it is used as a stepping-stool in order to climb onto the higher bed.

The Rosh explains that the angel in charge of poverty resides in a dirty house and the angel in charge of riches and success resides in a clean house. The dargash is a bed which always remained clean in order to beckon the angel of wealth to reside in the house.

Read more!

Thursday, February 14, 2008

Those that Study and those that Support Torah

Rav Yosef said to him (Nedarim 55a), “Do not sit down until have explained the following verse [Bamidbar 21: 18 – 19]: And from the wilderness to Mattanah; and from Mattanah to Nachaliel; and from Nachaliel to Bamos?” Rava replied, “When one makes himself as the wilderness, which is open to everyone (willing to teach them Torah), the Torah is given to him as a gift, as it says: And from the wilderness to Mattanah (a gift). And once it is given to him as a gift, Hashem makes it his inheritance, as it says: and from Mattanah to Nachaliel (inheritance from Hashem). And after Hashem gives it to him as an inheritance, he ascends to greatness, as it says: and from Nachaliel to Bamos (to heights). And if he becomes haughty, Hashem will lower him down, as it says: And from Bamos to the valley. And furthermore, Hashem sinks him into the ground, as it says: overlooking the surface of the wilderness. However, if he repents, Hashem will raise him up once again, as it says: every valley shall be raised.

The verse prior to these verses states: A well dug by princes, carved out by nobles of the people, through the lawgiver with their staffs, and from the desert to Mattanah. The Vilna Gaon says that this verse must be explained according to our Gemora as well.

He explains: The well is referring to the wellsprings of Torah. The princes are those that delving into the depths of Torah. The nobles are those people who are engaged in business activities and support those who are studying Torah. The verse concludes that both those that study Torah and those that support others who are studying have a portion in Torah.

The Chozeh mi’Lublin adds: Since the verse concludes with the words: and from the Desert to Mattanah, and we derived from there one is obligated to make himself similar to the wilderness; opened to teach Torah to all, this must be true for the supporters as well. One who is supporting Torah must view his support as if the Torah scholar is receiving it from the wilderness, and not directly from him. He should not expect a return on his investment in this world; the reward for supporting Torah is given out in the World to Come; the same time that those who study Torah receive their reward.

Read more!

Meat and Fowl

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said (Nedarim 54b): If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from meat, he is permitted in fowl. It is evident that he maintains that fowl is not included in meat.

The Chasam Sofer asks: How can he hold that fowl is not included in “meat,” when it is seemingly clear from the Torah that it is? The Jews in the Desert complained that they desired meat and the Ribbono shel Olom sent fowl to them. Evidently, fowl is a type of meat!

He answers that the Gemora explains that fowl is not included in “meat” because it is not healthy to eat fowl on a day of blood letting. Since in the Desert, the northern wind did not blow, and that is the reason why there was no circumcision then (the wind is needed to heal the child). Accordingly, there was no blood letting in the desert, as well. It emerges that there would be no distinction between fowl and meat in the Desert and fowl would be included in “meat.”

Read more!

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Following the Majority

The Beraisa states (Nedarim 52a): If someone makes a vow not to have oil in Eretz Yisroel, he is permitted to have sesame oil and not olive oil. In Babylon, he may not have sesame oil but he can have olive oil. In a place where both are used, he is forbidden to have both.

The Gemora asks: This is obvious! The Gemora answers: The case is where most people use one kind of oil. One might think that the vow is considered like the usage of most people. This is why the Beraisa tells us that he is forbidden to both oils, because a doubt regarding a prohibition is judged stringently.

The Ra”n explains what we would have thought: Even though there is a minority that makes use of the other kind, there is a possibility that his intention might have been even from those.

The Lechem Mishna asks: Why don’t we follow the majority? Why, in all matters of prohibition, we issue a ruling based upon the majority?

He explains: If it would be a certainty that the vower was referring to the oil used by most people, we would definitely rule that that the vow takes effect only upon that type of oil. However, here he used a language which may include both types of oil, therefore, there is an assumption that he is excluding himself from the majority. We therefore rule stringently and forbid him on both types of oil, since his language can include both.

The Netziv answers that we only follow the majority in cases where the minority is in conflict with the majority. However, here, the minority is not in contradiction with the majority, since he may have intended for both. We therefore rule stringently and forbid him on both types of oil.

Read more!

Winter Vinegar; Date Honey; Milk and Whey

The Mishna states (52a): If a person makes a vow that he will not partake of dates, he can still eat date honey. If he makes a vow not to partake of winter grapes, he may partake of the vinegar made from those grapes. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah says: Whenever a product is called a name that reflects upon its source and a person vows not to partake from that source, he is forbidden to have the product as well. The Chachamim permit this.

The Ra”n asks: Who is this first Tanna? It is neither Rabbi Yosi nor the Chachamim! For we learned above, in the dispute regarding milk and whey, that whenever they called it “whey of milk,” it was forbidden according to everyone! If so, the date honey and the vinegar should be forbidden!

The Rashba answers: The cases are not similar. For in the case of the whey of milk, its form has not been changed. Even initially, when it was mixed with the milk, it was in that very same form. But here it has changed physically.

Furthermore, in the case of whey, the reason it is called “whey of milk,” is because it still has the law of milk. It is not to distinguish it from some other kind of whey, for there is no other kind. But here, when it is called “date honey” or “winter-grape vinegar,” it is not that they still have those laws; rather, it is to distinguish them between other types of honey and vinegar.

Read more!

Monday, February 11, 2008

Something that can become Permitted - Davar she'yeish lo Matirin

(Nedarim 52a) If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from wine, he is permitted in cooked food which has in it the taste of wine. However, if he said, “Konam this wine that I will not taste,” and it fell into a cooked dish, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture, it is forbidden.

This would imply that if there is not enough to give flavor, it would be permitted. The Ra”n quotes his teachers who ask the following: Something which is forbidden on account of a neder is “something that can become permitted” (davar she’yeish lo matirin), and we have established that anything that can become permitted is not nullified even in a thousand!?

They answer that when we say that it is not nullified even in a thousand, that refers to something that has been mixed with its own kind. But here, when it says, “and it became mixed,” it is referring to something else that is not the same kind, like the case of eggs that were cooked with it. Anything that is mixed with something else that is not its kind is permitted, provided that it does not give flavor, even if it is “something that can become permitted.” The Ra”n cites proof to this from a Mishna in Chalah and a Yerushalmi in our perek.

They, therefore, objected to the statement of the Ri”f in Meseches Chulin concerning bread that was baked in an oven with roasted meat. The Gemora states that it is forbidden to eat it with a dairy sauce even though it has been established that we are not halachically concerned with vapors. The reason it is forbidden is because the bread is “something that can be permitted,” since one may eat it together with meat. For that reason, it is not nullified, even in a thousand. It is evident from the Ri”f that he maintains that “something that can be permitted” is not nullified even in something that is not its kind.

The Ra”n, however, agrees to the Ri”f. When the Mishna here says that “something can become permitted” becomes nullified in something that is not its own kind, that is referring to something that is forbidden now, but will become permitted in the future, like nedarim. For the Ra”n has the following question: Since according to the Chachamim, all forbidden things become nullified in their own kind just as in a different kind, why did the Chachamim make a distinction in the case of “something that can become permitted,” between its own kind and a different kind?

The reason is as follows: The Chachamim and Rabbi Yehudah disagree whether or not something can be nullified in its own kind. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a forbidden item is not nullified in its own kind, because anything that is similar to another thing does not weaken and nullify it; rather, it preserves it and strengthens it.

The Chachamim disagree and hold that a forbidden item and something which is permitted are not similar to each other, even if they are the same kind. This is because one is forbidden and one is permitted. For it is not fitting to follow the similarity of their substance, but rather the difference in their being forbidden and permitted.

It is for this reason that the Chachamim learned concerning “something that can be permitted” for the sake of being strict towards the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. For since the forbidden item is not completely different from the permitted one, because the forbidden one will eventually become permitted, we say that it is not nullified in its own kind. It will only become nullified when mixed with a different kind, for the difference that exists between one kind and another will make up for the equality that is added here because it is “something that can be permitted.” It is the difference between kinds that is the cause of nullification, and equality interferes with nullification.

Read more!