Friday, August 10, 2007

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 100 - Highlights


The Gemora cites a braisa: There are ten classes of people that we do not give a share of terumah at the granary. They are the following: The deaf-mute, the imbecile, the minor, the tumtum (undetermined sex), the hermaphrodite, the slave, the woman (a Kohen’s wife), the uncircumcised (a Kohen, whose brothers died as a result of their circumcision, and who, owing to the fatal effect of such an operation on members of his family, is himself exempt from circumcision), the tamei, and one who married a woman who is unsuitable for him. And regarding all of these, however, terumah may be sent to their houses, with the exception of the one who is tamei and one who married a woman who is unsuitable for him. Now, one can well understand the prohibition in respect of the deaf-mute, the imbecile and the minor, since they lack intelligence (and it would be a mark of disrespect were the sacred terumah to be entrusted to the care of persons who are mentally defective, or undeveloped, or in any other way below the normal standard of intellectual or physical fitness), and in respect of the tumtum and the hermaphrodite also, they are regarded as creatures unto themselves (and it would be disrespectful for the sacred terumah to be given to these people). We do not give terumah to the slave a Kohen, as we are scared that people might eventually think that he himself is a Kohen (when he is not even a full-fledged Jew). A Kohen who has not had a circumcision, or one who is tamei, may also not collect terumah, as it is inappropriate that terumah should be collected by people who are considered defiled. A Kohen who marries a woman forbidden to Kohanim is fined that he cannot even have terumah sent to him. (99b – 100a)


The Gemora asks: Why can’t the wife of a Kohen collect terumah? Rav Papa and Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua argue about this law. One says: The reason is because the woman might get divorced, and will subsequently be unable to eat terumah. People might not realize that this happened, and will still give her terumah. The Rabanan therefore decreed as a preventive measure that she should not collect terumah. The other one says: The reason is to avoid possible situations of yichud (prohibition against a man being alone with a woman) between her and people giving out terumah at their granaries.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between these two reasons?

The Gemora offers two differences: One is in a case where the granary is close to the city where she lives, but people are not frequently in the area of the granary. If the reason is because she might get divorced, it doesn’t seem applicable, as local people always know if someone in their town was divorced. If the reason is because of yichud, it is obviously still applicable. A second difference would be in the opposite case, where the granary is far from the town, but always has many people in its vicinity. While a divorce from a different town might not become known there, there is clearly no problem of yichud. (100a)


All of the people listed in the previous braisa, who cannot collect terumah, may nonetheless have it delivered to their homes, besides a Kohen who is tamei and a Kohen who marries a woman who is forbidden to Kohanim. The Gemora notes that while a tamei cannot have terumah sent to him, a Kohen who was not circumcised (whose brothers died as a result of their circumcision, and who, owing to the fatal effect of such an operation on members of his family, is himself exempt from circumcision) may have terumah sent to him. The reason must be because he simply was forced not to circumcise himself, as it would be too dangerous. He therefore is allowed to have terumah sent to him. The Gemora therefore asks: Why should a Kohen who is tamei be any different? He was also a victim of forced circumstances, where he had to become tamei! Even so, the Gemora answers, the Kohen who was not circumcised due to his brothers deaths is a greater ones (forced circumstance), and is the reason why he can have terumah sent to his house (see Rashi 99b DH “Mishagrin” who states that he himself is not allowed to eat Terumah, only the people of his household).


The braisa states that we do not give a servant and woman terumah at the granaries. However, where they do give women and servants at the granaries, the woman receives first and is sent immediately on her way.

The Gemora asks: What does this mean? The braisa first states in a definite fashion that we do not give them terumah at the granaries, and then it states that they do receive?

The Gemora explains that the second statement was not talking about terumah, but rather ma’aser ani (tithe that is given to the poor), which was given out at houses in the city, not at granaries. The braisa was stating that women should be given ma’aser ani first, as it is degrading for them to wait to collect ma’aser ani, which is essentially charity.

On a similar note, Rava states: Originally, when two cases would come before him to judge, one involving a female plaintiff and one involving a male plaintiff, he would judge the case of the male first. His reasoning was that the male is more important, as he is obligated in more mitzvos than a woman. However, once he heard the law above regarding ma’aser ani, he realized that he should judge the case of the woman first, as it is embarrassing for a woman to wait for the judges to judge her case. (100a)


The Mishna had stated regarding the child of a Kohenes who became intermingled with her slavewoman's child: If they grew up, and they freed one another, they must marry wives eligible for the Kehuna.

The Gemora asks: Is this optional? If they do not free each other, they can’t get married, as they would not be able to find a marriage partner suitable for them. They can’t marry a slavewoman, or a free woman.

Rava explains that the Mishna means that they are forced to free each other. (100a)


After listing the various applicable stringencies that a person who might be a Kohen or a freed slave have to abide by, the Mishna states that this person receives the stringencies of Kohanim and Yisraelim (regular Jews).

The Gemora asks: What law is the Mishna alluding to that was not already mentioned?

The Gemora answers: It is referring to a korban minchah (flour offering) which would be voluntarily brought by such a person. His minchah would have kemitzah (a Kohen takes three fingers full of the minchah offering and offers it on the altar) done to it, like the minchah of a Yisrael, and it is not eaten at all, like the minchah of a Kohen.

How would his minchah be offered? After having kemitzah done to it, the kemitzah would be offered, separate from the rest of the minchah (which would also be offered).

The Gemora asks: Isn’t there a law that if the appropriate part of a korban has been offered, the rest of it (that is not supposed to be burned) is explicitly forbidden to be burned on the altar? Accordingly, if this person is really a freed servant whose minchah is supposed to be partially eaten, how can we burn that portion on the altar?

Rav Yehudah, son of Rebbi Shimon Ben Pazi answers that it can nonetheless be offered like a wood offering without transgressing this prohibition, in accordance with the opinion of Rebbi Elozar whom explicitly states that this is permissible in a braisa.

The Gemora asks, although we see our Mishna’s statement fits the opinion of Rabbi Elozar, can it fit the opinion of the Rabanan who argue on him?

The Gemora says it can, in light of the position of Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon regarding the way a Kohen brings a minchas chotei (flour offering for a Kohen who sins). n of Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon understands that the minchas chotei of a Kohen must undergo kemitzah, while the rest of it is simply placed on the beis hadeshen (where the ashes of the altar were placed). Although the Rabanan argue on n of Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon regarding a minchas chotei, that is because they understand that a regular minchas chotei of a Kohen must be completely offered on the altar, without having some of it placed in a place usually reserved for ashes. However, they would agree that in a strange case such as that of our mixed up servant/Kohen, where there is no regular solution, as we are unsure what type of korban he is supposed to bring, one should place the leftovers on the beis hadeshen. (100a)


A woman is required to wait three months between marriages (to different people) in order to ensure that any child she will have after her second marriage will clearly belong to the second parent. If a woman did not wait three months, and has a child, a mere seven months after marrying her second husband, the identity of the child’s father is unclear. Accordingly, if this child grows up and dies without having had children from his marriage, his possible brothers from both of his possible fathers may only perform chalitzah and not yibum, as it is unclear if this yevamah is theirs. Similarly, he may only perform chalitzah to the widow of his possible brothers.

The Mishna continues: If he had possible half-brothers from both of his possible fathers, he can do both chalitzah and yibum to their widow. [Rashi explains that the Mishna is talking about a case where he is the only possible brother from that father. He can therefore perform yibum or chalitzah, because if he really is a half-brother, the yibum or chalitzah is valid. If he is not, he is either marrying someone who is not his relative, or doing chalitzah to someone who didn’t need it in the first place.] If his widow falls to yibum, she can have chalitzah done by the half-brother of one possible father, and a half-brother from the second possible father can then perform yibum (or chalitzah).

If one of the husbands was a Kohen and the other husband was a Yisroel, the son may only marry a woman who is fit for Kehunah. He may not render himself tamei through corpse tumah, but if he did render himself tamei, he does not incur lashes (for perhaps he is a Yisroel, and not a Kohen). He is prohibited to eat terumah; and if he ate inadvertently, he does not repay the principal and the chomesh (the extra fifth to the Kohen as a penalty; this is because the burden of proof rests on the one attempting to exact payment from him, and he must bring a proof that the one who ate is not a Kohen). He does not share a portion at the granary (since he is forbidden to eat terumah), and he sells his own terumah (since he is not obligated to give it to a Kohen because the burden of proof will be on the Kohen), and the proceeds are his. He does not share in the consecrated foods of the Beis Hamikdosh, and we do not give him kodoshim items (such as bechor) and we may not take his kodoshim away from him. He is exempt from the requirement of giving the foreleg, the jaws, and the stomach to the Kohen (when a Jew slaughters a non-sacrificial animal, he is required to give these animal parts to the Kohen), and his firstborn shall graze until it becomes blemished (when it becomes disqualified for the altar, and may be eaten by its owner; the reason why an Israelite owner may not eat of the flesh of his firstborn, even after it has contracted a blemish, is not because of its sanctity but because its consumption by a non-Kohen is regarded as stealing from the Kohanim; no such consideration arises in a case where the owner can claim that he himself is a Kohen). All the stringencies of Kohanim and the stringencies of Israelites are applied to him.

If both possible husbands were Kohanim, the son acts as an onein (person who cannot involve himself in mitzvos before his close relative is buried) if they die, and they act as an Onein if he dies (regarding Kohanim there are other pertinent laws of being an Onein, such as not being allowed to eat from korbanos during the period that one is an Onein). He cannot become tamei to them, and they cannot become tamei to him (if one of them dies, as they might be transgressing the prohibition against a Kohen becoming tamei to a non-relative). He does not inherit either family (as each family can claim that he is not their relative), but both families inherit his possessions. He is exempt from death if he strikes or curses either of his possible fathers. He can serve as a Kohen in the Beis Hamikdosh during the shift of each father’s household, but cannot demand a share in the division of korban meat, as the household can claim that he does not really deserve a share because he might belong to a different household. (100a – 100b)


The Gemora points out that the Mishna carefully stated that if his widow falls to yibum, she must first have chalitzah done by the half-brother of one possible father, and only then can yibum be performed by a half-brother from the second possible father. The first possible father’s offspring cannot first perform yibum, as they would possibly encounter someone else’s yevamah (forbidden to others by a negative prohibition).


Shmuel states that if one Kohen from a group of ten Kohanim had relations with a woman who gave birth to a child, the child is considered a Shtuki. What does Shmuel mean that this child is a “Shtuki?” If he means that he is quieted from claiming inheritance from any of these ten Kohanim when they die, that is obvious! He has no claim, as no one knows who his father really is! It must be that Shmuel means that he is quieted from proclaiming himself to have the laws of a Kohen.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this? The verse states regarding Pinchas’ gift of Kehunah, “and it will be for him and his children after him.” This implies that for someone to be a Kohen, his father must be clearly identifiable, something not present in this case.

Rav Papa asked that we find a similar verse by Avraham Avinu, “to be for you for a G-d and for your children after you.” If Shmuel understands that the words “after him” in the verse above teaches us that paternal lineage of a Kohen must be identifiable or someone cannot be deemed a Kohen, would he say that this verse regarding all Jews means that someone’s father must be identifiable or his son is not Jewish? According to Shmuel, what does this verse regarding Avraham Avinu teach us? It must be, the Gemora answers that this verse indeed tells us that one should make sure not to marry a non-Jew or slavewoman, in order that his children should not follow her status of being not Jewish.

The Gemora asks that this seems difficult from a braisa that discusses a case similar to that of our Mishna. If a woman did not wait three months before having yibum, and has a child a mere seven months after marrying her second husband, the identity of the child’s father is unclear. If both potential fathers were Kohanim, the braisa states that the child is fit to be proclaimed the Kohen Gadol (high priest of the Beis Hamikdosh). This seems to be in direct contradiction to Shmuel, who would seemingly say that he does not even have the status of a Kohen!

The Gemora answers that Shmuel’s law was only a Rabbinical law, and did not derive the law from the verse that he quoted. The verse was only used as an asmachta (a hinted support to his law). Additionally, even Shmuel only stated that such a Rabbinical law was decreed when the relationship that bore the child was an illicit relationship, not when a marriage was merely consummated before the appropriate time (as in the case of the braisa).

The Gemora asks: Does the decree apply even in a case of an illicit relationship? Our Mishna discussed someone who didn’t wait three months before marrying her second husband, and then gave birth to a child. What does our Mishna mean when it says that she didn’t wait three months “after he husband?” If it refers to “after her first husband died,” the end of the Mishna that states that if both possible fathers are Kohanim, he acts as an onein if they die, and they act as an onein if he dies seems to be unclear. It is understandable that he could become an onein from both possible fathers, as his mother married her second husband and the first possible father may cause him to become an onein if his bones are collected when the son is alive (giving him the status of an onein on that day, see Rashi). However, the second statement “they become an onein to him,” seems nonsensical, as the case is where the first father is already dead! It must be, therefore, that the case is not where the first husband died, but rather divorced his wife. When the Mishna states “After her husband,” it must mean after she received a get (divorce) from her husband.

The Gemora states that the rest of the Mishna still seems difficult. The Mishna further states that if both possible parents were Kohanim, “he cannot become tamei to them, and they cannot become tamei to him.” It is understandable that they must be stringent and cannot become tamei to him, as he might not be the son of one of them (and the non-parent would become tamei to a regular person). However, why can’t he become tamei to them? It is understandable that he cannot become tamei to the second possible father (as he might be the son of the first father, and thereby become tamei to a non-relative). However, he should definitely be allowed to become tamei to his first possible father. If he is his son, he clearly is allowed to become tamei to his father. If he is not, this means that he is the product of a Kohen and divorcee, which means he has the status of a chalal (product of a forbidden Kohen marriage) who in any event does not have the status of a Kohen and can become tamei to dead people! Why, then, would the Mishna say he cannot become tamei to his first possible father? It must be that she did not wait “after her husband” in our Mishna means that she had an illicit relationship with two different men within three months of each other. When the Mishna stated “Achar Ba’alah” – “after her husband,” it really meant “Achar Bo’alah” – “after her first illicit relationship.” Despite the fact that this child was the product of an illicit relationship, the Mishna concludes that he may serve as a Kohen. This clearly proves that Shmuel, who stated that the child of an illicit Kohen relationship that does not have a clear father does not have the status of a Kohen, was incorrect.
Rav Shmaya answered the position of Shmuel. He explained that the Mishna may mean “after her husband,” and be talking about a first marriage which ended in mi’un (when a child is married off by her mother or brothers when she is a minor, and can refuse the marriage). [Being that the first marriage did not end in divorce, the second Kohen who marries her does not produce a chalal, which is why he cannot become tamei to either possible parent.] However, the Gemora asks, this does not seem plausible, as a minor does not normally give birth. This is apparent from the braisa that Rav Bibi cited in front of Rav Nachman: Three types of women are permitted to insert a wad into their bodies prior to engaging in marital relations in order to prevent conception. They are: A minor, a pregnant woman and a nursing woman. A minor is permitted because otherwise, she may become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman is permitted because otherwise, she might become pregnant again, and the second fetus will crush the first one. A nursing woman is permitted because otherwise, she might be compelled to wean her child, resulting in his death. The braisa continues: What age minor are we referring to? We are concerned when the minor is between eleven and twelve years old. If she is younger or older than that, she is not permitted to cohabit in that manner; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim disagree with the entire ruling and state that these women should cohabit in the regular manner and Heaven will have compassion on them (becoming pregnant in these situations is highly unusual and therefore we prohibit them from utilizing and type of contraceptive measures) as it is written [Tehillim 116:6]: Hashem protects the fools. This braisa shows that a minor does not normally have a child, as she would normally either not become pregnant or die due to the pregnancy.

The Gemora suggests a different answer for Shmuel. The case is when the first Kohen marriage was not actually a marriage, as the kiddushin was later rendered mistaken and therefore invalid. [Being that both father’s claims to fatherhood were during “marriages,” even though the first marriage was later found to be invalid the Rabbanan did not decree that the product of such Kohen fathers is not a Kohen (although they would have made this decree if the fathers had illicit relationships).]

The fact that a mistaken kiddushin does not fully make relations between the supposed bride and groom into an illicit relationship is like the position of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel. Rav Yehuda quoted Shmuel as saying in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that when the verse states (regarding a married woman who consents to having an affair) “and she was not held,” it is saying that she is therefore forbidden to her husband. This implies that if she was violated, she is permitted to her (Yisrael) husband. Rebbi Yishmael derives from the word “and she” that there is a case where a different woman was not held, and is still permitted to her husband. What is this case? It must be where her kiddushin was mistaken, such as in a case of mi’un, where even if she has a child sitting on her shoulder she can perform mi’un and leave the marriage. [Although we are not talking about a case of Miun, Rebbi Yishmael is clearly stating that if a girl who eventually did Miun had an affair before doing Miun, she retroactively did not become forbidden to her husband (due to the affair) once she does Miun. This is because Miun retroactively causes her marriage to have never taken place, and the law that a husband is forbidden to his wife who consents to have an affair is only relevant if she had the affair when they were actually married. The Gemora therefore applies Rebbi Yishmael’s law and logic to an adult woman who had an affair during a marriage that was later found out to have never existed in the first place, as the kiddushin was invalid. Anything that happened during that marriage is not actually classified as an illicit relationship. This allows Shmuel to state that our Mishna is talking about a case that is not an illicit relationship.] (100b)