Saturday, October 13, 2007

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 42 - Highlights


A na'arah who was seduced, her embarrassment, depreciation and her fine goes to her father; and the pain, for the one who was violated.

If she stood in judgment before her father died, then they are the father's. If the father died, then they are the brothers. If she did not manage to stand in judgment before the father died, then they are her own. If she stood in judgment before she became of age, then they are the father's. If the father died, then they are the brothers. If she did not manage to stand in judgment before she became of age, then they are her own. Rabbi Shimon says: If she did not manage to collect the payments before the father died, then they belong to her.

Her earnings and what she finds, even though she did not collect them, and the father died, they then belong to the brothers. (41b – 42a)

The Novelty of the Mishna

What is the Mishna teaching us? Didn’t we already learn in a previous Mishna that one who seduces pays three types of payments and one who violates pays four. One who seduces pays for embarrassment, the blemish, and the Torah mandated fine for seducing. One who violates also pays for the pain he inflicted.

The Gemora answers that our Mishna added that the payment goes to her father. The Gemora asks that this is also obvious, as these payments are given for seduction. If they would be given to her, then no payments would be necessary for seduction, as she did so willingly!

The Gemora answers that the novel teaching of the Mishna is (indeed not regarding the types of payments, but rather) the argument of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbanan in a case where the father died before the case finished in Beis Din (see 41b). (42a)

Denying Violation/Seduction in an Oath

The Mishna discussed a case where a father claimed from someone that he violated or seduced his daughter, and the person rejected his claim. The father said that he should swear that he did not do so, and the person indeed swore. Later, however, he admitted that he indeed was the perpetrator. The Tana Kama states that he is obligated (to pay the amount for doing this sin discussed above, plus pay an extra fifth and bring a “korban asham gezeilos”). Rabbi Shimon says that he is exempt, as a person does not pay a fine when admitting to having to pay a fine (only when witnesses prove that he is obligated). They (Tanna Kama and others) retorted to Rabbi Shimon that although it is true that a person does not pay a fine based on his own admittance, here the person denied having to pay for embarrassment and the blemish as well (which are not fines). [He is therefore obligated to add an extra fifth and bring a korban, as would a regular person who swears that he does not owe money that he indeed owes.]

Abaye inquired from Rabbah: A person claims that someone violated/seduced his daughter, and he took him to a different Beis Din which indeed found that the perpetrator must pay. The accused denies everything, and swore to this effect. The accused then admitted that he lied. What would be the law in this case according to Rabbi Shimon? As he had indeed stood trial and was obligated to pay money to the father, is this considered denying money in an oath for which one must bring a korban? Or do we say that even though the verdict that he owed money was already handed down, it is a matter of a fine (for which one does not bring a korban according to Rabbi Shimon if he denies owing the money under oath)?

Rabbah replied that this is already considered (denying owing) money, and Rabbi Shimon would agree that he is obligated to bring a korban.

Abaye asked Rabbah a question on his conclusion (from a Braisa). Rabbi Shimon stated that one might think that if someone accuses his friend of the violation/seduction of his daughter and he denies it, or accuses that his friend’s ox killed his slave and he denies it, or his slave accuses him of knocking out his tooth or blinding him (for which he would go free) and he denies it, that if he swears it is not true and then admits he lied he would be obligated (to also pay a fifth and bring a korban). The passuk therefore states “and he denies to his friend regarding a object he was watching, or money he had invested/loaned, or stole, or did not pay him his wages, or he found a lost object and denied it and swore falsely (see Rashi Vayikra 5:21).” Just as the examples listed in the passuk are all unique in that they involve payments obligated, so too this only applies regarding payments obligated. This excludes fines, for which this law is inapplicable. Abaye therefore asked, this must be (also) talking about a case that had already went to trial (and yet Rabbi Shimon says that denying owing such money will never result in a korban).

Rabbah answered: no, the Braisa is talking about a case where it did not yet go to trial. Abaye asked: being that the first part of the Braisa is discussing where the case went to trial, it makes sense that the second part of the Braisa (the statement of Rabbi Shimon) is also discussing a case that went to trial. The first part of the Braisa states that we only know that if someone pays this penalty on regular monetary obligations. How do we know that this also applies to (laws where one is obligated to) owing double the amount, four or five times the amount, violation, seduction or giving a newly married woman a bad name? This is derived from the passuk “and he has violated a violation,” which teaches us to include all of these types of monetary obligations.

What is the case (in this first part of the Braisa)? If the case did not yet go to trial, why would one be obligated to pay double? It is therefore clearly talking about denying money that he had already been obligated to pay by Beis Din. Being that the first part of the Braisa is talking about a case that had already went to trial, the second part must also be talking about a case that went to trial!

Rabbah said that I can theoretically answer you by saying that the first part of the Braisa is talking about cases that already went to trial, and the second part is talking about cases that did not yet go to trial. The entire Braisa is according to Rabbi Shimon (who is discussing post-trial cases in the first part, and pre-trial cases in the second part). However, I will not give you a difficult answer, for you could reply that (if this is so) the Braisa should have stated in the beginning “Rabbi Shimon says” or at the end “these are the words of Rabbi Shimon (the normal style of a Braisa with one author).

Rabbah continued that in fact, the entire Braisa is discussing cases that are post-trial. The first part of the Braisa is authored by the Rabbanan, while the second is authored by Rabbi Shimon. I will admit that regarding a korban for lying in such an oath Rabbi Shimon says one is exempt (even post-trial), based on the word “and he denied” (as stated in the second part of the Braisa). When I said that it was considered money, I meant that this is true regarding inheritance for his children (that if the father dies after the verdict regarding violation/seduction, his sons inherit the money owed as opposed to the daughter). [See Rashba regarding how Rabbah could have meant this when Abaye directly asked him about a korban, not about other laws such as inheritance.]

Abaye continued to ask Rabbah a question from another Braisa. Rabbi Shimon states: if she did not collect the money until the father dies, she keeps the money. If you say that Rabbi Shimon holds that the money is inherited by his sons, why does Rabbi Shimon say that it goes to the daughter? It should go to the sons!

Rava stated: this question was difficult to Rabbah and Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and it was not answered until Rav Yosef became the Rosh Yeshiva (after Rabbah died) and answered the question. He answered from the passuk “and the person who slept with the girl will give the father of the girl fifty silver coins.” This implies that it only becomes the father’s money when it is given. When Rabbah said that this is deemed money he gives over in inheritance to his sons, he only meant that this is true regarding other fines, not violation/seduction. [The Rashba explains that Rabbah always held this way, but could not answer Abaye’s question of what was his source that there is a difference between the fine of violation/seduction versus other fines that are inherited to sons before they are collected. The source of the teaching had been lost, until Rav Yosef rediscovered it when he became Rosh Yeshiva.]

The Gemora asks, regarding the killing of a slave (by one’s ox) it says “he must give thirty shekalim to his master.” Here, too, say that this means it only becomes the masters when he actually receives the money!

The Gemora answers that the word “he should give” is different than the word “and he will give.” [Rashi explains that “he should give” is a command for the future.]

The Gemora asks, why did Rabbi Shimon in the Braisa derive that violation/seduction is exempt from a korban because of the word “and he will deny?” This should be derived from the word “and he will give” (as this word shows that violation/seduction is unlike all of the things mentioned in the passuk, as they are already considered his money).

Rava answers: the pasuk “and he will deny” is needed in a case where there was already a trial, after which the girl became a bogeres (older than twelve and a half) and then died. In such a case when the father inherits the fine, he inherits it from his daughter. [Rashi explains that in a case where the daughter receives the fine, Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is considered her money before it is collected. Accordingly, this case is similar to other monetary cases in that the money is considered her right away.]

The Gemora asks: if this is so, how could Rabbi Shimon say (in the Braisa) that these are exceptions as they are fines? We see that there are some cases within these categories that are like regular monetary obligations! Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answered: he meant that these are exceptions as they are primarily fines. (42a – 42b)