Monday, October 15, 2007

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 44 - Highlights

Two Deeds on the same Field

Rav Nachman had stated: If two deeds were issued in respect to one field and one is dated after the other, the latter cancels the former.

Rav Papa said: Rav Nachman would admit that if he added a palm tree in the second deed, he wrote it for the addition (the deed is not thereby impaired, and it is, therefore, within the right of the holder of the deeds to collect properties sold after the second date by using the second deed and thus recover the original as well as the addition, or he may collect from the first date the original alone without the addition).

The Gemora elaborates: It is obvious that the reason why both deeds are valid where the first transferred the field through a sale and the second deed gave the field as a gift, is because the action of the owner was intended to improve the recipients rights, as a safeguard against the law of the bordering property owner (in virtue of which the next adjoining neighbor can insist on exercising the right of first purchase, for the other purchaser can find fields to buy elsewhere; this right (derived from the verse: You shall do that which is right and good) applies to a sale but not to a gift). And certainly it is obvious where the first was for a gift and the second for a sale, for it may then be presumed that the latter was written in that manner for the law of the creditors rights (only a buyer may claim compensation from the original owner if a creditor of that owner had seized the field that he bought; a recipient of a gift has no such right; by the writing of the second deed, the owner has conferred upon the recipient the additional rights of a buyer). What, however, is the reason why the second deed cancels the first where both deeds were for a sale or both for a gift?

Rafram replied: It may be presumed that the recipient has admitted to the other that the first deed is invalid (and he nevertheless, willingly accepted the second deed, knowing that it will restrict him to the later date).

Rav Acha said: It may be presumed that the recipient has surrendered his lien from the first deed.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between them?

The Gemora answers: The disqualification of the witnesses (according to Rafram, the witnesses must be regarded as legally unfit for further evidence since they put their signatures to an invalid document; according to Rav Acha, who does not question the authenticity of the deed, the character of the witnesses is not in any way affected), payment of compensation for the fruits eaten by the recipient (between the first and the second date; according to Rafram, the recipient must pay such compensation since the first deed is presumed to be invalid, but according to Rav Acha, no such compensation is paid since the recipient is the actual owner of the field) and the land tax (the original owner must pay the property tax according to Rafram and the recipient pays it according to Rav Acha) are the differences between them. (44a)

From When May She Collect?
The Gemora returns to its original inquiry: What is the decision in respect of the kesuvah (as to the collection of the kesuvah, from which date may she collect the properties sold by her husband between the date of the betrothal and that on which the kesuvah was written; do we say she may collect the property from the purchasers because the husband becomes Rabbinically liable for the kesuvah at the time of erusin or do we say that she may only collect properties sold by the husband after the kesuvah was actually written)?

Come and hear what Rav Yehudah stated in the name of Shmuel who said it from Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon: The hundred or the two hundred zuz (the regular obligation of the kesuvah), she may collect the properties sold from the date of the betrothal (since the lien took effect from then) and the additional amount of the kesuvah (which varies according to their specific arrangement) she may collect from the properties sold after the nisuin. The Chachamim, however, ruled: Both amounts may be collected only from the date of the nisuin (having accepted the written hesuvah that bore the later date on which her nisuin took place, the woman is assumed to have waived her rights to the original lien, which she had acquired earlier on betrothal, in favor of her new advantages as well as any disadvantages that were conferred by the written document).

The Gemora rules: The halacha is that both amounts may be collected only from the date of the nisuin. (44a)
(Introduction: The Torah writes, concerning the slanderer, who after marrying a virgin na’arah, accuses her of committing adultery between the erusin and nisuin. If the witnesses that he brought to Beis Din were proven to be false, he receives lashes and he must pay a fine of one hundred sela. If the witnesses are confirmed, they shall lead the maiden out to the door of her father's house, and the people of her city shall stone her with stones that she die; because she committed a shameful act in Israel.)

The Mishna states: A female convert whose daughter was converted with her, and she committed adultery after erusin, she is liable to strangulation. She is not subject to the laws of “the entrance of the house of her father” (an ordinary na’arah is stoned at this location; it is not necessary by a convert), nor one hundred sela (if the witnesses were found to be false, she will not receive the fine from her husband). If she was not conceived in sanctity, but was born in sanctity, then she is subject to the law of stoning. She is not subject to the laws of “the entrance of the house of her father,” nor one hundred sela. If she was conceived and born in sanctity, then she is as the daughter of an Israelite in every respect.

If an ordinary na’arah has a father, but does not have the entrance of the house of her father (her father does not own a house), or if she has the entrance of the house of her father, but does not have a father, she is subject to the law of stoning. “The entrance of her father's house” was stated only as a mitzvah, but not as a requirement. (44a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural sources for the Mishna’s halachos. (44b)
Orphan Girl
Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina says: One who slanders an orphan girl is exempt from paying the fine. This is derived from the fact that the Torah writes [Devarim 22:19]: And give (the fine) to the father of the girl. This girl is excluded because she has no father.

The Gemora asks from the laws of a seducer where the Torah writes “her father,” and nevertheless, an orphan girl is not excluded from the receiving of the fine!?

The Gemora answers: An orphan would be excluded from the laws of the seducer if she was seduced while she was an orphan; however, if she had a father while she was seduced and afterwards she was orphaned, she will be entitled to receive the fine. (44b)

Slandering a Minor
Rish Lakish says: One who slanders a minor is exempt from paying the fine because it is written na’arah in the Torah.

Rav Acha bar Abba asks: If the Torah would not have written na’arah, would we have said that a minor is included? But, how can that be? The Torah writes that if the matter was true, the girl would be taken out and stoned! This cannot be referring to a minor, for a minor is not subject to punishment!?

The Gemora explains what Rish Lakish meant: Here, the word na’arah is written in full (with the letter hey at the end). We can infer from here that whenever the Torah writes na’ara without the hey, it is referring to a minor. (44b)