Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Highlights

1. Rabbi Yose rules that if the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos and one forgot and carried the lulav into a public domain, he is not liable a chatas offering because he was preoccupied with performing a mitzvah. Abaye qualifies this ruling to be referring to a case where one has not yet fulfilled the mitzvah, but once he has fulfilled the mitzvah, he will be liable a chatas for carrying. The Gemara questions this because it would see that he automatically fulfills the mitzvah when he picks up the lulav. Abaye answers that Rabbi Yose refers to a case where he turned the lulav upside down and one only fulfills the mitzvah when holding the lulav straight up in the manner that it grows. Rava answers that Rabbi Yose refers to a case where one took the lulav out in an undignified manner on a plate, in which case he does not fulfill the mitzvah. (41b4-42a1)
2. Rabbi Yose rules that if a Kohen found a bird olah amongst other bird chatas offerings and the Kohen assumed that that this bird was a bird chatas and he ate it, he is not liable a meilah offering, despite the fact the halacha is that a bird olah is entirely burned on the mizbeiach and a bird chatas is eaten entirely by the Kohanim. The rationale for this ruling is that Rabbi Yose maintains that one who is preoccupied with a mitzvah is not liable if he errs. (42a1-42a2)
3. The Mishna rules that the lulav can be returned to water on Shabbos so that it should not wilt. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that on Yom Tov one is even permitted to add water and on Chol HaMoed one would be permitted to change the water. (42a2-42a3)
4. A father is obligated to begin training his child who is a minor in the mitzvah of lulav if the child knows how to wave the lulav. The Gemara enumerates other mitzvos and the age for when a father is required to train his son to perform those mitzvos. (42a3-42a4-42b1)
5. The Mishna records the various mitzvos that are performed on Sukkos and on which days they are performed. The mitzvah of lulav and the mitzvah of aravah can be performed either six days or seven days. If the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the mitzvah of lulav would be performed but one would not perform the mitzvah of lulav on Shabbos when the first day of Sukkos occurs on any other day of the week. If the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the mitzvah of aravah would be performed but the mitzvah of aravah would not be performed when the seventh day of Sukkos occurs on any other day of the week. The obligation of reciting Hallel and the obligation to eat meat from the shelamim offering when the Bais HaMikdash stood applies for all eight days of Sukkos. The mitzvah to sit in the Sukkah and the mitzvah of the water libation on the mizbeiach apply to the seven days of Sukkos. The mitzvah to play musical instruments at the Simchas Bais Hashoeva, the Celebration of the Place of the Water Drawing, was performed either five or six days of Sukkos. The reason for this ruling is because it is forbidden to play music on Shabbos or Yom Tov. (42b2)
6. When the first day of Sukkos occurred on Shabbos, the people would bring their lulavim to the Beis HaMikdash on Friday and every person would stipulate that if someone else were to receive his lulav, it should belong to that person as a gift. When this procedure became dangerous because everyone would fight in their enthusiasm to receive their lulavim, it was instituted that each person should take the lulav in his house rather than in the Bais HaMikdash. (42b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42- Lekavod Shabbos and Shemini Atzeres

The Gemara states that when the first day of Sukkos occurred on Shabbos, the lulav was taken for seven days in the Bais HaMikdash. The reason for this is because taking the lulav on the first day of Sukkos is of biblical origin and the Chachamim did not enact a decree to that would prohibit one from taking the lulav on Shabbos. It is noteworthy that the Gemara earlier states that one extends the lulav outward and inward to ward off harmful winds, and one raises them up and lowers them down to ward off damaging dews. Although on Shabbos all evil influences depart from our midst, in the time of the Bais HaMikdash there was a requirement to take the lulav on Shabbos. The Sfas Emes suggest that nowadays we do not take the lulav on Shabbos because Shabbos is a day of rest and the Jewish People only are required to battle with the evil forces during the week. The Shem Mishmuel suggests that the reason that they were required to take the lulav on Shabbos in the Bais HaMikdash was because the lulav represents daas, knowledge, and Shabbos itself is daas, and an excess of daas could be detrimental. Nonetheless, in the Bais HaMikdash there were many actions involved with the sacrifices, so there was no concern regarding the taking of the lulav.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Teaching Torah to a child

The Gemara states that when a child knows how to talk, his father teaches him Torah and the recitation of Shema. The Gemara states that Torah means that the father should teach him the verse that states Torah tzivah lanu Moshe morashah Kehillas Yaakov, the Torah that Moshe commanded us is the heritage of the Congregation of Yaakov. There is an allusion to this teaching in the context of the verses themselves. Prior to this verse it is said af choveiv amim kol kedoshav beyadecho veheim tuko leraglecho yisa midabrosecho, indeed, You loved the tribes greatly, all its holy ones were in Your hands; for they planted themselves at Your feet, bearing the yoke of Your utterances. Rashi explains that the word midabrosecho, Your utterances, is derived from the word dibbur, speech. Thus, the verse can be interpreted as follows: midabrosecho, when the child begins to speak, teach him the verse of Torah tzivah lanu Moshe morashah Kehillas Yaakov.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Wrong Place Esrog

Rabbi Yosi rules that if one forgets and carries the lulav to a public domain on Shabbos, he is not liable since he was preoccupied with a mitzva. Abaye qualifies this to be referring to a case where he had not fulfilled the mitzva yet. The Gemora asks that he seemingly would automatically fulfill the mitzva when he picks up the lulav. Abaye answers that he turned it around and therefore did not discharge his obligation.

Rashi explains that he turned the esrog over with the pittum down. Rabbeinu Chananel learns that he took the lulav in his left hand and the esrog in his right hand.

The Ritva asks that even if he placed the lulav in the wrong hand, he nonetheless fulfills the mitzva? Chasam Sofer answers that by switching hands he is indicating that he does not intend to fulfill the mitzva now.

This can be the source for the two options brought down in halacha regarding the reciting of the brocha on the lulav. In Shulchan Aruch, it states that one should hold the esrog upside down during the brocha in order that the brocha will be prior to the performance of the mitzva. The Gra rules that one should have intention that he does not want to fulfill the mitzva at this moment and this will be sufficient even if the esrog is being held correctly.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Shakin'

The Acharonim cite several proofs that the mitzvah of waving the lulav is an integral part of the mitzvah of lulav. One proof is from our Gemara that states that a father is obligated to train his child who is a minor in the mitzvah of lulav when the child knows how to wave the lulav. The proof is from the fact that the Gemara did not state that the obligation begins when the minor knows how to hold the lulav. Rather, the Gemara states that the obligation begins only when the child knows how to wave the lulav.Further proof to this thesis is from the Gemara that we learned earlier that states that a lulav must be four tefachim in height to allow one to wave the lulav. The commentators discuss which waving the Gemara refers to. Is it the waving one performs when reciting the blessing on the lulav or is it the waving that is performed when reciting Hallel?

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Highlights

1. There is a dispute in the Gemara if the sanctity of Shemittah produce can be deconsecrated onto money by exchanging the money for the produce. All agrees that when the produce is sold, the sanctity rests on the money. The dispute is when the owner attempts to exchange the produce for money. Rav Ashi qualifies this dispute as referring only to the deconsecrating of the money that was exchanged with Shemittah produce. All agree, however, that the Shemittah produce itself cannot be deconsecrated with an ordinary exchange as one can do with hekdesh. Rather, the Shemittah produce must be purchased. (41a1)
2. The Mishna states that originally, the mitzvah of lulav was for seven days in the Bais HaMikdash and for one day outside the Bais HaMikdash. After the destruction of the second Bais HaMikdash, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai instituted that the lulav should be taken for all seven days of Sukkos as a commemoration to the Bais HaMikdash. (41a2)
3. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai also instituted that one is not permitted to eat from the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. In the times of the Bais HaMikdash, the new grain could only be eaten after the omer offering was brought on the sixteenth of Nissan. Subsequent to the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash, one was biblically permitted to eat the new grain on the sixteenth of Nissan in the morning. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai was concerned, however, that the Bais HaMikdash may be built the following year on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan and there would not be enough time to prepare the omer offering. People might then say that the new grain will be permitted in the morning just as it was the previous year. This assumption would be erroneous, because the previous year there was no Bais HaMikdash, thus there was no possibility of offering the omer, and for that reason the new grain was permitted in the morning. During the present year, however, there is a Bais HaMikdash, and one must wait for the offering of the omer or one must wait until the end of the day. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai therefore instituted that one was prohibited from eating the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. (41a2-41a3-41a4)
4. The Mishna states that when the first day of Sukkos occurs on Shabbos, the people would bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Friday and the next day, which was Shabbos, they would come early to the synagogue and each person would recognize his lulav and take it. The reason each person was required to take his own lulav is because there is a Halacha that one must fulfill his obligation on the first day of Sukkos with his own lulav, so one was not permitted to take a lulav that belonged to someone else. (41b1)
5. The Gemara relates an incident where Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav with him, which he had purchased for a thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel first fulfilled his own obligation with the lulav and he then gave the lulav to the other rabbis so that they could discharge their obligation. The Gemara states that since it was recorded that Rabbi Akiva returned the lulav to Rabban Gamliel, we can deduce a law that a present given on condition that it be returned is considered a present. Thus, the rabbis were able to fulfill their obligation with the lulav that belonged to someone else, despite the fact that the incident occurred on the first day of Sukkos when one is require to own the lulav. From the fact that the Baraisa mentioned that Rabban Gamliel purchased the lulav for a thousand zuz, it is evident how the sages of those times cherished the mitzvos. (41b2-41b3)
6. The Gemara states that one should not hold Tefillin or a Sefer Torah in his hand while he is praying Shemone Esrei. The reason for this ruling is because he will be concerned about protecting the Tefillin or Sefer Torah and he will not be able to concentrate on his prayers. Ameimar would hold his lulav while praying, and this was also the custom of the people of Jerusalem. The reason that they were permitted to hold the lulav while they prayed is because taking the lulav is a mitzvah and since they cherished the mitzvah, they were not preoccupied by its weight and by the necessity to guard the lulav from falling from their hands. (41b3-41b4)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Building the Gates

Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai instituted that one is not permitted to eat from the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. In the times of the Bais HaMikdash, the new grain could only be eaten after the omer offering was brought on the sixteenth of Nissan. Subsequent to the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash, one was biblically permitted to eat the new grain on the sixteenth of Nissan in the morning. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai was concerned, however, that the Bais HaMikdash may be built the following year on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan and there would not be enough time to prepare the omer offering. People might then say that the new grain will be permitted in the morning just as it was the previous year. This assumption would be erroneous, because the previous year there was no Bais HaMikdash, thus there was no possibility of offering the omer, and for that reason the new grain was permitted in the morning. During the present year, however, there is a Bais HaMikdash and one must wait for the offering of the omer or one must wait until the end of the day. Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai therefore instituted that one was prohibited from eating the new grain the entire day of the sixteenth of Nissan. Rashi wonders how the Bais HaMikdash could be built on the night of the sixteenth of Nissan, as the Gemara in Shevuos 15b states that the Bais HaMikdash cannot be built at night. Rashi answers that it is only regarding a Bais HaMikdash built by humans that there is a restriction of building it at night. The third Bais HaMikdash, however, will descend from Heaven miraculously, thus there are no restrictions regarding the building of the third Bais HaMikdash. The Maharil Diskin is troubled by this answer, as the Jewish People have an obligation to build the Bais HaMikdash, so why would HaShem prevent us from performing this mitzvah? The Maharil Diskin answers based on a Medrash in Eicha that states that when the Bais HaMikdash was destroyed, the gates of the Bais HaMikdash sank into the ground and in the future, the Jewish People will excavate the gates and affix them to the Bais HaMikdash. The Gemara in Bava Basra rules that one who secures the gates in an ownerless field is deemed to be the one who acquires the field. Thus, we will fulfill the mitzvah of building the Bais HaMikdash when we secure the gates of the Bais HaMikdash. This can also be the explanation of the words that we recite in the Shemone Esrei of Mussaf on the festivals, show us its rebuilding and gladden us in its perfection. The word for perfection is tikkuno, which can allude to the securing of the Bais HaMikdash gates.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Yekum Purkan

The Gemora states that a person should not daven shmoneh esrei and hold a sefer Torah or tefillin in his hand at the same time. This is because he will be concerned about protecting the torah and tefillin and will detract from his concentration for davening. This is in contrast to the custom in Yerushalayim where they would daven shmoneh esrei and hold the lulav in their hands at the same time. The Gemora explains that holding the lulav will not detract from his concentration since holding the lulav is a mitzva and therefore it is dear to him and not a burden to hold it.

The Mishna Berura 96:2 rules that the chazan can hold the sefer Torah as he is reciting yekum purkan on Shabbos since his intention at the time is to daven for the people learning Torah and not to guard the Torah. This is akin to holding the lulav during shmoneh esrei.

Rav Elyashiv comments that it’s apparent the prominence the tefillah of yekum purkan has if the Mishna Berura is comparing it to shmoneh esrei.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Love perverts accepted conduct

The Gemara records that Mar the son of Ameimar said that his father would pray with the lulav, i.e. Ameimar cherished the mitzvah of lulav so much that he would hold the lulav while praying. The term that the Gemara uses is tzaluyei ka metzalei bei. Regarding the verse that states lo sateh mishpat, you shall not pervert judgment, the Targum renders the translation lo satzlei din. This usage of the word tzalei refers to bending and twisting justice. Perhaps we can interpret the statement of the Gemara here homiletically to mean that normally one should not hold an object while praying because his preoccupation with the object will detract from concentrating on his prayers. Ameimar, however, cherished the mitzvah of lulav so much that he personified the statement of the Medrash that Ahavah mekalkeles es hashurah, the love for Hashem and his mitzvos perverts what is normally accepted behavior, and thus Ameimar held the lulav even while he was praying.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Un...tzum...drite...mol!! Sold!!!

The Gemora relates a story that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav which he had purchased for over a thousand zuz. It is evident from this Gemora how precious mitzvos were to them that Rabban Gamliel spent a thousand zuz on his lulav.

The Aruch Lener asks on the language of the Gemora. Why does it say "How precious mitzvos were to them" when in fact, Rabban Gamliel was the only one who purchased the lulav for that enormous sum?

He answers that from the fact that Rabban Gamliel paid a thousand zuz for the lulav, it is evident that there were other potential buyers that were interested and a bidding war erupted, especially since it is well documented that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva were rich people.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Preferential Treatment

The Gemora relates a story that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav which he had purchased for over a thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel initially fulfilled his mitzva with the lulav and then gave it to the other Tanaim to enable them to discharge their obligation. The Gemora states that from the extra wording in the story we can derive that a present given with the stipulation to be returned is considered a present and they can fulfill the mitzva even on the first day when the lulav must be yours. It is also evident from this Gemora how dear mitzvos were to them that Rabban Gamliel spent a thousand zuz on his lulav.

The Chasam Sofer asks on the order of the Tanaim. Why did Rabbi Yehoshua who was a Levi receive the lulav before Rabbi Eliezer who was a kohen? He answers that it must be because Rabbi Yehoshua was exceptional in Torah learning and an elder, therefore they honored him first. If so, continues the Chasam Sofer, why wasn't Rabbi Akiva the first? He answers that the merit of being a Talmid Chocham can propel him one level and that is why Rabbi Yehoshua who was a levi and an exceptional Talmid chocham can have preferential treatment over Rabbi Eliezer who was a kohen; however Rabbi Akiva, who was a yisroel cannot skip over two levels and therefore Rabbi Eliezer was before him.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 -Highlights

1. The Gemara states that if one gathered various leaves for kindling, they do not posses the sanctity of Shemittah. This is derived from the verse that states the Sabbatical produce of the land shall be for you to eat. The words for you have to be akin to the words to eat. This allows only uses whose benefit is equivalent to consuming the item. This excludes wood where the benefit of baking only comes after the wood has been transformed to coals, so the wood will not have the sanctity of Shemittah. Regarding a lulav, however, whose primary use is as a broom, its benefit is equivalent to its consumption, i.e. becoming worn from use, so a lulav will have the sanctity of Shemittah. (40a2)
2. There is a dispute whether firewood has the sanctity of Shemittah. One opinion maintains that firewood has sanctity of shemittah. (40a2-40a3)
3. Rabbi Yose maintains that one is allowed to use Shemittah produce for washing clothing but one cannot use Shemittah produce for medicinal purposes. (40a2-40a3-40b1)
4. There is a dispute in the Gemara whether the sanctity of Shemittah produce can be deconsecrated onto money, and this would be accomplished by exchanging the money for the produce. All agree that when the Shemittah produce is sold, the sanctity carries over to the money. The dispute is only regarding a case where the owner seeks to exchange the produce for money. (40b1-40b2)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40- The dust of their feet

The Gemara discusses the harsh punishment that one incurs when he treats the laws of Shemittah lightly. The Gemara uses the term avak shel sheviis, the dust of Shemittah, to refer to the less stringent laws of Shemittah. We find elsewhere that the Gemara uses the term avak Lashon hara to describe slander that is rabbinically prohibited, and the term avak ribbis in describing rabbinically prohibited interest on a loan. Why does the Gemara use the word avak, dust, in these instances? It is noteworthy that when Yaakov struggled with the angel of Esav, it is said vayeiavek ish imo, and a man wrestled with him. The Gemara in Chullin 91a states that the angel of Esav appeared to Yaakov like a Torah scholar. Perhaps the meaning of the Gemara is that the angel of Esav attempted to convince Yaakov that although one must follow the mitzvos that are stated explicitly in the Torah, one can be more lenient regarding the rabbinical prohibitions. This is alluded to in the word vayeiavek, which is derived from the word avak, dust. For this reason the Gemara refers to certain rabbinical prohibitions with the term avak, to allude to the idea that it is the evil inclination, a.k.a. the angel of Esav, who is attempting to convince the person that he can be lenient regarding rabbinical prohibitions. We must adhere to the dictum recorded in Pirkei Avos 1:4, where it is said vehevay misabak bafar ragleihem, literally translated as sit in the dust of their feet, and homiletically interpreted that one should adhere to even the less stringent rabbinical prohibitions.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 - Reverse Situation

The Gemora explains that wood which is projected to be used for kindling a fire does not have the sanctity of shemitah. This is derived from a possuk which states that only something which its pleasure and destruction from the world are simultaneous have shemitah sanctity; however firewood where the pleasure comes only after the wood transforms into coals does not have kedushas shemitah. A lulav is not projected to be used for kindling, rather as a broom for sweeping a house and therefore will have limitations due to shemitah.

The Chachamim were not concerned about purchasing the lulav since the lulav blossomed in the sixth year, it is not bound by the shemitah limitations. The esrog, even though it grew in the sixth year, is regarded as a shemitah fruit because it was plucked off the tree in the seventh year.

The Commentators ask as to what the halacha would be in a reverse situation from the Gemora. In the eighth year of the shemitah cycle, it should be forbidden to purchase the lulav because it grew in the seventh year and the esrog should be permitted to purchase since it was cut from the tree in the eighth year? (According to some, this case is a more frequent one than the Gemora’s.) The Kapos Temorim states that the halacha would be the same in reverse and it is inferred from the Mishna’s case.

Dayan Weiss in Minchas Yitzchok states (I believe) that the solution of the Gemora would not apply in this case. One can purchase a lulav and have the cost of the esrog absorbed in the lulav since in those days the lulav was more expensive than the esrog; however the reverse does not work. One cannot absorb the cost of the more expensive item i.e. the lulav into the cost of the inexpensive esrog.

There are those that state in the Rambam that a lulav does not have the sanctity of shemitah at all. This would seemingly be inconsistent with our Gemora, however it would explain why the situation is not addressed.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 40 - Meticulous about Shemitah

The Gemara states that if one is not meticulous even regarding the lenient laws of Shemittah, i.e. one sells Shemittah produce, he will be forced to sell all of his possessions and eventually he will be forced to sell himself as a slave. Rashi at the end of Parshas Behar quotes the full text of the Baraisa that is mentioned in Arachin 30b and Kiddushin 20a. The Ramban in the beginning of Parshas Behar writes that one should be careful to adhere to the laws of Shemittah just as one would be meticulous in observing the laws of Shabbos, as Shemittah is the secret of Creation. When one treats the laws of Shemittah lightly, he will be the catalyst that causes the Jewish People to be exiled for he is demonstrating that he does not affirm the belief that HaShem created the world and he also denies the concept of the World to Come.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Highlights

1. Rava rules that when responding to the recital of Kaddish, one should not pause between the words yehei shmei rabbah and the word mevarach because this will give the appearance that the word mevarach is disconnected and does not have its own meaning. Rav Safra disagreed with Rava and Rav Safra maintains that even if one were to pause in his response, the meaning of his response would still be the same, i.e. may His great Name be blessed. (39a1)
2. The recital of the blessing upon the completion of Hallel depends on the particular custom of that area, whereas there is an obligation upon everyone to recite a blessing before reciting Hallel. (39a1)
3. The Gemara rules that one should always recite a blessing before performing a mitzvah. (39a1)
4. One is not allowed to purchase a fruit that grew in the Shemittah year. The Mishna therefore rules that if one is purchasing a lulav and esrog from his friend during the Shemittah year, he must purchase the lulav and receive the esrog for free. (39a2)
5. The Gemara explains that it is preferable to receive the esrog for free. If the seller does not agree, however, then the cost of the esrog should be incorporated into the cost of the lulav. (39a2)
6. The reason one cannot purchase an esrog of the Shemittah year outright is because one is not permitted to conduct business with the fruits of the Shemittah year or with the money that was exchanged for the fruits. During the Shemittah year one is required to consume the fruits and the money that was exchanged for the fruits. When an ignorant Jew sells the esrog, we are concerned that he will save the money for after Shemittah. One should thus not purchase the esrog from the ignorant Jew because he would be causing the seller to stumble and transgress the prohibition of saving the money for after Shemittah. (39a2)
7. One is permitted to purchase fruits of the Shemittah year as long as the price of the food does not exceed the cost of three meals. This is only permitted for fruits that were not guarded during the Shemittah year. Fruits that were protected during the Shemittah year cannot be purchased at all. (39a3-39b1)
8. The Chachamim were not concerned about one purchasing a lulav during the Shemittah year because a lulav that one purchases during the Shemittah year grew during the sixth year, and subsequently the lulav is not confined to the Shemittah year restrictions. Regarding the esrog, however, even if it grew in the sixth year, it is deemed to be a Shemittah fruit because it was plucked from the tree in the seventh year. (39b2)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Blessings prevent anger

The Gemara states that one must recite the blessing for a mitzvah prior to performing the mitzvah. This is referred to as over laasiyasan. There are a number of instances in the Torah where the word over is used and the Medrash and Gemara interpret the word to denote anger. An example of this is regarding the laws of inheritance, where it is said, vhaavartem es nachalaso lebito, and you shall cause his inheritance to pass over to his daughter. The Gemara derives from the usage of the word vhaavartem that HaShem is angered by one who does not leave over a male child to inherit his estate. The same interpretation can be applied here. One must recite a blessing over laasiyasan, i.e. to prevent anger. We learned earlier on 38a that the remnants of a mitzvah can prevent punishment from occurring. It would follow then that although we rule that blessings do not prevent the fulfillment of the mitzvah, one should certainly be meticulous in reciting a blessing prior to performing a mitzvah, as the recital of the blessing will afford him protection and ward off any harmful agents.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Story Regarding Brochos

The Sefer Bais Shearim records an incident regarding a person who walked into Shul while the Congregation was reciting Hallel. The man took out his lulav and joined them in the recital of Hallel. After he finished reciting Hallel, he realized that he had forgotten to recite the blessing on the lulav. The Bais Shearim ruled that he could no longer recite the blessing because he had forfeited the essential aspect of the mitzvah, which is to take the lulav bundle and wave it during the recital of Hallel, and the blessing on the mitzvah can only be recited prior to or during the performance of the mitzvah and not afterwards. The Bikkurei Yaakov, however, disagreed, and he maintained that since it is our custom to recite Hoshanos while still holding the lulav, it was deemed as if he was still in the midst of performing the mitzvah, thus allowing him to recite the blessing.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Mitzva Remnants

Tosfos rules that one who took the lulav and did not recite the blessing can still do so as long as he has not yet waved the lulav. Although one can fulfill the mitzvah of lulav without waving it, the mitzvah is not deemed to be complete until he waves the lulav. This follows the principle that one can recite a blessing for a mitzvah as long as he has not completed the mitzvah. Thus, one can recite the blessing of netilas yadayim after washing his hands because the mitzvah is not deemed to be complete until one dries his hands. The Pri Megadim writes that if one commenced lighting the Chanukah lights without reciting a blessing, he can still recite the blessing as long as he has not kindled all of the lights that are required for that particular night. Regarding Chanukah lights we also apply the rationale that although one essentially discharges his obligation by kindling one light, the subsequent lights are also deemed to be a part of the mitzvah. Thus, one who has not completed lighting all the lights for that particular night is deemed to be engaged in the mitzvah and he can still recite the blessing.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Recital of Blessings

The Gemora rules that all brochos should be recited before one performs the mitzva. The Tashbatz comments that it is evident from the language of the Gemora that the brocha should be recited immediately prior to the performance of the mitzva and not some time beforehand. This is apparent from the fact that the Gemora used the word ‘over l’assiyoson’ and not ‘kodem l’assiyoson.’

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 39 - Yehei Shmei Rabbah

Rava rules that one should not pause when answering by kaddish between yehei shmei rabbah and mevarech since the mevarech will be disconnected and have no meaning by itself. Rav Safra disagreed with him and maintains that even with a pause the meaning is still the same – The great name of Hashem should be blessed.

The Rama 56 rules that one should not pause in between those words. The Magen Avrohom asks that this is against the conclusion of our Gemora. He answers that in actuality it depends on the meaning of yehei shmei rabbah mevarech. According to the Machzor Vitri, the meaning is that Hashem’s name should become great, by becoming complete. In the future, Hashem’s throne will be complete and that is what we are praying for. According to this one should not pause between yehei shmei and rabbah.

The Magen Avrohom concludes that the explanation in the Rama could be that one should not pause for longer than one breath and this would be consistent with our Gemora.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Highlights

1. The Mishna rules that if one arrived home from traveling and he did yet not fulfill the mitzvah of lulav, he has the entire day to fulfill the mitzvah. The Mishna rules further that if one commenced his meal without having yet fulfilled the mitzvah, he should interrupt his meal and perform the mitzvah. The Gemara explains that this refers to a case where there is not enough time left in the day to perform the mitzvah and therefore he must interrupt his meal to perform the mitzvah. (38a1)
2. The Gemara speculates that there might be a distinction between a Biblical mitzvah and one that is only Rabbinic in nature. One would be obligated to interrupt his meal to perform a Biblical mitzvah like the mitzvah of lulav. One would not be obligated, however, to interrupt a rabbinical mitzvah such as prayer. The Gemara concludes that one is only required to interrupt his meal if there is not enough time left to perform the mitzvah. If there is enough time, however, he can continue eating even if he has before him a Biblical mitzvah to perform. (38a2)
3. The Gemara further suggests that the Mishna can be referring to the mitzvah of lulav which is a rabbinical obligation on the intermediate days of Sukkos. A proof to this idea is because the Mishna states that he was traveling on the road and arrived at his house, and this clearly cannot be discussing a case that he returned from traveling on the first day of the festival, as one is forbidden to travel on the festival. Rather, the Mishnah refers to a case where he returned from traveling on the intermediate days of Sukkos. (38a2)
4. If one does not know how to recite Hallel by himself, it is preferable to have a male adult recite Hallel for him and he should respond after him the refrain of Hallelukah after the completion of every phrase. If a Canaanite slave, a minor or a woman read Hallel, he must repeat each word after the one reading Hallel. (38a3)
5. The Gemara discusses many halachos which are derived from the manner in which Hallel was recited in the times of Rava. (38a4-38b1-38b2)
6. The Gemara states that originally when Hallel was recited and one did not know how to recite it himself, someone else would recite each phrase and the person who was not familiar with the recital of Hallel would respond with the refrain of Hallelukah. (38b1)
7. The Gemara speculates if one would fulfill the mitzvah if he would listen to the Hallel being recited and he would not respond. The Gemara concludes that one who listens to the Hallel is deemed as having recited Hallel himself and for this reason, even if he does not respond with the refrain of Hallelukah, he has fulfilled his obligation. (38b2)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Befriending the Satan

The Gemora relates that when Rav Acha bar Yaakov would shake the lulav in all the directions, he would say to the Satan, “Look and see that you cannot stop us from performing the mitzvos.” The Gemora concludes that this is not a proper thing to say for it will only stir up the energy of the Satan to entice us to sin even more.

The Aruch Lener comments that Rav Acha himself was not concerned about this for he befriended the Satan and he was secure. The Gemora in bava Basra quotes Levi as saying that the Satan and Penina did their actions for the sake of Hashem. Rav Acha cited this in a drasha and the Satan came and kissed him.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Shomea Keoneh

The Gemora states that originally when Hallel was recited and one did not know how to recite it himself, someone else would recite each possuk and the person who couldn’t say the Hallel would answer Hallelu-kah.

The Gemora speculates as to what the halacha would be if one would listen to the Hallel being recited and he would not respond, would he still fulfill the mitzva? The Gemora concludes that he would.

The Reshash asks from an explicit Mishna in Rosh Hashana that rules in an instance that someone is walking in back of a Shul and hears the Megillah being read, if he has intention to fulfill the mitzva, he fulfills the mitzva. It is evident that one does not have to recite anything and nonetheless he fulfills the mitzva. This is based on the principle that one who hears is as if he has recited. Why is our Gemora pondering this issue?

The Darkei Moshe 167 quotes the Ohr Zorua who rules that when one hears another reciting a brocha and he wants to be yotzei with that brocha, he must answer Amen to the brocha. The Darkei Moshe concludes that there is no basis for this ruling in Gemora or Shulchan Aruch. What is the explanation for the opinion of the Ohr Zorua?

Rav Elyashiv explains that since the Sages instituted that the listener to a brocha should respond with answering Amen, if he doesn’t, it is as if he is not listening to the brocha and he cannot join that person’s brocha.

Perhaps this is the issue in our Gemora. If one doesn’t respond by answering Hallelu-kah, he cannot join the one who is reciting the Hallel and therefore he cannot be regarded as reciting the Hallel himself.

The conclusion of the Gemora is that one who listens to the hallel is as if he himself is reciting it and therefore even if he doesn’t respond with Hallelu-kah, he is fulfilling his obligation. This also explains why the halacha is not in accordance with the Ohr Zorua. Even if one doesn’t answer Amen, by listening to the brocha, it is as if he is reciting it himself.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Remnants of a mitzvah keep one from falling

The Gemara states that shiyarei mitzvah, the remnants of a mitzvah performance, can prevent punishment form occurring. Proof to this is from the waving of the sacrifices, which was not an essential part of the sacrifice, yet the waving would ward off harmful winds and dews. What is the significance in performing the remnants of a mitzvah? Regarding the leftover matzah and maror that the Jewish People brought out with them from Egypt, the Sfas Emes explains that although the essence of the mitzvah performance is reckoned with in heaven, the remnants can protect one in this world. Furthermore, one who performs even the remnants of the mitzvah will be strengthened when he has a period of falling in his spiritual quests. This is the meaning of the Medrash that states that one must remember the Exodus from Egypt even by night, as night symbolizes a time of struggle and failure. One who performs the remnants of the mitzvah will be protected even in the dark nights when one is more prone to falling and struggling. Thus, one should always ensure that he performs a mitzvah whole-heartedly and with joy, so he will always have the protection of the mitzvah.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 38 - Chol Hamoed

The Mishna ruled that if someone came home from the road and did not fulfill the mitzvah of lulav yet, he has the entire day left to fulfill the mitzvah. The Mishna continues that if he started eating without fulfilling the mitzvah, he should interrupt his meal and perform the mitzvah. The Gemora explains that this is referring to an instance where there is no more time in the day and that is why he should interrupt his meal to perform the mitzvah.

The Gemora speculates that there might be a distinction between a Biblical mitzvah and one that is only Rabbinic. One would be obligated to interrupt his meal to perform a Biblical mitzvah, such as lulav; however a rabbinical mitzvah, like Tefillah, he would not be obligated to interrupt. The Gemora concludes that one interrupts his meal only if there is no time left to perform the mitzvah, however if there is time, he can continue eating even by a Biblical mitzvah.

Our Mishna can be referring to the Rabbinic mitzvah of lulav on the intermediary days of Sukkos. Proof for this is cited by the fact that the Mishna states that he was coming from the road and that is obviously not referring to Yom Tov Rishon, rather the second days of Yom Tov.

The Ritva states that from here is a proof that Chol Hamoed is referred to as Yom Tov since it is forbidden to do work. He cites other examples to this as well. The reason we do not say in Shemoneh Esrei “Es Yom Tov mikro kodesh hazeh,” is because some work is permitted and it would be degrading to a regular Yom Tov.

There is a debate amongst the poskim (see Magen Avrohom 490:1 and Kaf Hachaim 490:14) if the harachaman in Bircas Hamazon which is reserved for Yom Tov is recited on Chol Hamoed.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha states that through this, it can help explain the opinion which maintains that one should not wear tefillin on Chol Hamoed. The Gemora Eruvin 96a rules that we do not don tefillin on Shabbos and Yom Tov since they are referred to as a ‘sign’ and tefillin is a ‘sign.’ Chol Hamoed is also a Yom Tov and therefore tefillin are not worn.

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Esrog with a Gartel from Bar-Kochva

Was Bar-kochva a Chasid?

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Highlights

1. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one can only use the four species for the s’chach of the Sukkah. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the s’chach can be from anything, provided that the s’chach grows from the ground and is not susceptible to tumah. (36b3)
2. There is a dispute in the Gemara regarding the permissibility of holding the lulav with a material that interposes between ones hands and the lulav. The Gemara cites one opinion that maintains that the lulav must be held with ones hands and one cannot hold the lulav through any other means. (37b1)
3. The Gemara rules that one is prohibited from smelling and deriving pleasure from the fragrance of the hadassim that are used for the mitzvah. One is permitted, however, to smell the esrog. The Gemara states that the distinction between the esrog and the hadassim is that normally a hadas is used for smelling so prior to Sukkos one sets aside the hadassim for the mitzvah and thus it is set aside from smelling, whereas the esrog is normally used for eating and one sets it aside for the purpose of the mitzvah. Thus, one sets aside the esrog from eating but one does not set aside the esrog from the benefit of smelling. (37b1)
4. The Mishna rules that we shake the lulav when reciting the words hodu laHashem and when reciting the words ona Hashem. There is a dispute between Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel if one shakes the lulav when reciting the words ana HaShem hatzlicha na. (37b2)
5. The Gemara states that the significance of shaking the lulav and esrog is that one shakes them outward and inward to demonstrate that Hashem owns all four directions of the world. One shakes them upwards and downwards to signify that the heavens and the earth belong to Hashem. (37b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - To Shake or not to Shake -That is the Question

The Mishna rules that we shake the lulav by ‘hodu’ and ‘ona Hashem.’ There is a debate between Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel if we shake by ‘hatzlicha no.’ The Gemora explains the significance of the shaking of the lulav and esrog. We bring it in front of us and behind to indicate that Hashem resides in all four directions. We shake it up and down to signify that the heavens and the earth belong to Hashem.

Does anyone have an explanation as to why Bais Hillel maintains that we shake the lulav by ‘hoshia no’ and not ‘hatzlicha no’?

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Hoshanos Clip for $3.75

The Gemora rules that the lulav should be held in the right hand and the esrog in the left. It was the custom and still is that during hallel and hoshanos, we hold all of the four species in our right hand. The Taz 651:14 states that this is not a concern and one fulfills his mitzvah in this manner. It is assumed that this was the always the method of holding the lulav and esrog.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Foresight and Prophecy

The Mishnah states that Rabbi Akiva said, “Tzofeh hayisi beRabban Gamliel,” I was watching Rabban Gamliel. Why does the Mishnah use the word tzofeh and not the conventional word for sight, roeh? The word tzofeh is often associated with prophecy, as it is said in Yeshaya (52:8) kol tzofayich nasu kol, the voice of your lookouts, i.e. prophets, they raised their voice. Perhaps Rabbi Akiva was alluding to the idea that although the Bais HaMikdash would be destroyed and salvation would appear distant, he saw in a form of prophecy that the words of the prophets who predicted the Ultimate Redemption would be fulfilled. This idea is consonant with the Gemara in Makkos that records an incident where Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues passed by the site of the Bais HaMikdash. The rabbis cried and Rabbi Akiva laughed. Rabbi Akiva explained his enigmatic actions by quoting Scripture that foretells of the ultimate rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Bais HaMikdash.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - More Hadas Aroma

The Gemara rules that one is prohibited from smelling and deriving pleasure from the fragrance of the hadassim that are used for the mitzvah. The Acharonim challenge this ruling from the Gemara that states that sound, sight and aroma are deemed inconsequential and one who inhales a fragrance from an item in the Bais HaMikdash will not have violated the prohibition of meilah. Why, then, is there a concern if one were to smell the hadas? HaRav Elyashiv Shlita explains that the above-mentioned principle only applies when one smells, sees or hears something incidentally and one was not intending for the smell, sight or sound. One who inhales the hadas for its aroma, however, is acting deliberately and this is forbidden. Harav Elyashiv cites a proof to this from the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah which discusses if one can fulfill his obligation of shofar with a shofar that one is forbidden to derive benefit from. The issue in the Gemara there is if the benefit that one derives while performing a mitzvah is deemed a prohibited benefit or not. Although sound is normally deemed inconsequential, regarding shofar it is obvious that he intends for the sound and this intention is thus taken into consideration.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 37 - Hadas Sniffing

The Gemora rules regarding the hadasim which are being used for the mitzvah, it is forbidden to smell it and derive pleasure from its fragrance; however one is permitted to smell the esrog. The Gemora explains the distinction between them and states that the anticipated use of a hadas is for its smell and therefore it is set aside from before Yom Tov for the mitzvah and not for smelling, however an esrog’s predictable use is for eating and therefore it is forbidden to eat and not for smelling.

Rashi adds that it is forbidden to derive any benefit from the hadas all seven days akin to the halacha that we learned previously regarding the wood of the sukkah. The Kapos Temorim asks that the words of Rashi are superfluous since the Gemora explicitly states the reason for the prohibition is because of ‘haktzoah,’ something which is set aside before Yom Tov and not because of deriving pleasure?

The Pri Megadim answers that Gemora is teaching us that even if the hadas would become disqualified from use on Yom Tov and hence would not have the prohibition of deriving pleasure from it similar to the halachos of the wood of the sukkah that fell during yom Tov, it would still be forbidden to smell it because of the halachos of ‘haktzoah.’

This can explain the opinion of the Mordechai who rules in the second Perek of Pesachim regarding something that is forbidden to have pleasure from, one would be permitted to smell it if it is something that is not intended for smelling. He cites our Gemora as a proof to this for only the hadas has the prohibition and not the esrog. The Shach questions this proof from the fact that ur Gemora is not discussing pleasure but rather what it was set aside for from before Yom Tov. According to the Pri Megadim, the Gemora is involving itself in both issues and therefore the Mordechai has a proof.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36 - Highlights

1. The Gemara rules that if there is a hole that goes through the entire esrog, the esrog will be invalid even if the hole is miniscule. If the hole does not go through the entire esrog, then the esrog is only invalid if the hole is the size of an issar coin. (36a1)
2. The Gemara lists other criteria that could invalidate an esrog. If the esrog is bloated, spoiled, steeped in vinegar or mustard, it is invalid. If one grew the esrog in its formative stage inside a form that has a different shape than an esrog and the fruit subsequently grew into the shape of the form, the fruit is invalid for use of the mitzvah. (36a2)
3. Rabbi Chanina would dip his esrog into a sauce, eat part of it and then he would fulfill the mitzvah with the partially eaten esrog. The Gemara states that the reason this was permitted was because a hole in an esrog is only invalid on the first day of Sukkos whereas Rabi Chanina fulfilled his obligation with a partially eaten esrog on the second day of Sukkos or afterwards. (36b1)
4. The Mishna cites a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Meir if the lulav should be tied to the other species with the leaves of the lulav or if the lulav can be tied with any material.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36 - Biblical Injunction

Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the maximum measurement of an esrog is the size at which one can hold two esrogim in one hand. Rabbi Yose maintains that an esrog is valid even if one needs two hands to hold one esrog. Rav Yosef Engel lists approximately twenty instances throughout Shas where we find that the Torah states that something is not allowed and the prohibition is due to a concern that one will violate a different transgression. One example that he cites is the Ran in Pesachim who suggests that perhaps the reason the Torah prohibited one to see chametz on Pesach is because the Torah was concerned that a person will eat the chametz, as chametz is something that a person usually does not stay away from. Another example that Rav Yosef Engel cites is a Medrash in Parshas Naso that states that the Torah prohibited a nazir from drinking vinegar wine because the Torah was concerned that the nazir may come to drink regular wine. In the Sefer Ma’adanei Chaim, Rav Chaim Cohen wonders how Rav Yosef Engel, with all his erudition and scholarship in Shas and Poskim, did not cite our Gemara as one of the examples. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that an esrog cannot be too large as there is a concern that he may have mistakenly placed the lulav bundle in his left hand and the esrog in his right hand, and when he attempts to reverse them, he may drop the esrog. Rashi (based on the explanation of the Sfas Emes) and the Ritva explain that if one drops the esrog, it may cause the esrog to become deficient and the person may not realize it, and he will unknowingly not have fulfilled the mitzvah of taking the four species. Although the measurements for the four species are derived from a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai which is a Biblical requirement, it is nonetheless apparent that the rationale for the maximum measurement of an esrog is due to a concern that perhaps one may drop the esrog. The Sfas Emes maintains that based on this Gemara, we must say that Rabbi Yehduah’s requirement regarding the size of an esrog is only rabbinical in nature.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 36- Gold and humility

The Mishnah states that the people of Jerusalem would bind their lulav bundles with gold strings. The Chachamim said to Rabbi Meir that they would first bind the lulav with material of the same specie in order to fulfill the mitzvah properly and then they added the gold strings as decoration. It is interesting that the word that the Mishnah uses for these gold strings is gimoniyos, which Rashi explains is derived from the word ki’agmon, which means bent. Perhaps the Mishnah is teaching us that the people of Jerusalem would glorify the mitzvah of lulav with gold fibers, which usually can be interpreted to be a display of arrogance. Nonetheless, the people of Jerusalem acted for the sake of Heaven, and their actions were done “bent over,” i.e. in a humble fashion.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Highlights

1. An esrog is a fruit whose fruit and bark have the same taste. Rebbi maintains that an esrog tree is unique in that it has small ones and large ones growing at the same time. Rabbi Abahu maintains that this can be derived from the word hadar, which can be read as haddar, which refers to a fruit that can dwell on the tree from one year to the next. (35a1-35a2)
2. There is a dispute in the Gemara as to why an esrog from an orlah tree is invalid. One opinion maintains that it is invalid because it cannot be eaten. Another opinion maintains that it is invalid because it has no value as it is forbidden to derive pleasure from it. (35a2)
3. The Gemara offers several reasons as to why one should not use an esrog of terumah for the mitzvah outright. One of the reasons offered is because the esrog will become susceptible to tumah when it becomes wet. Another reason offered is because handling the esrog will eventually cause the outer peel to become ruined and one is forbidden to ruin fruit that is terumah. (35b1)
4. There is a discussion in the Gemara regarding chazazis, boils, on an esrog. There is a distinction between a spot that is in one location and if there are spots in two or three locations. (35b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Magnifying Glass

Rashi and the Ran write that the reason that small spots at the top of the esrog invalidate the esrog whereas spots on other parts do not invalidate the esrog is because the top of the esrog is the area which is clearly visible to the eye. The Magen Avrohom in Orach Chaim 648:16 quotes the Mabit who writes that a discoloration at the top of the esrog will only invalidate the esrog if it is visible to all. If the discoloration is so small that one can see it only by gazing intently and others cannot even see it, the esrog will still be deemed as hadar. The Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha writes that this ruling is the source for those who maintain that a black spot or discoloration which can only be viewed with a magnifying glass will not invalidate an esrog. It is noteworthy that there are those who use the magnifying glass to validate a spot that others expressed concerned about.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35 - Esrog Joining the Lulav

The Gemora offers several reasons as to why l’chatchila one should not use an esrog of terumah for the mitzvah. One of the reasons given is because it will make it susceptible to become tamei. Rashi explains this based on a Mishna later which states that the wife takes the lulav from the husband and can return it to water on Shabbos. This would be done in order that it shouldn’t become dry. Subsequently when the water will touch the esrog, it will now be susceptible to become tamei. Tosfos states that the water might drip onto the esrog.

Rav Elyashiv understands this to be an argument between Rashi and Tosfos. Rashi holds that the esrog will certainly become wet and Tosfos maintains that it is a possibility that might occur but it is not a certainty.

This argument can be based on an argument in Shulchan Aruch 651:11 if one is required to have the esrog touch the lulav during the shaking of the lulav. Rashi maintains that in order to fulfill the obligation of shaking the lulav, the esrog must be touching the lulav and therefore it is a certainty that the esrog will become wet. Tosfos would hold that it is not required to do so and thereby it is only a possibility that the esrog will become wet.

See before where we discussed the reason behind the joining of the esrog to the lulav.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 35- Lekavod Shabbos

The Gemara states that an esrog is described in the Torah as a pri eitz hadar, the fruit of the hadar tree, and the word hadar can be interpreted to mean haddar, that dwells. Thus, the esrog is a fruit that dwells on its tree from one year to the next year. It is noteworthy that the Rishonim write that the word esrog is derived from the Aramaic word merogeg, which means desire. Similarly, we find that the Zohar states that regarding Shabbos it is said the Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbos, to make the Shabbos an eternal covenant for their generations. The Zohar states that the word ledorosam can be interpreted to read lederosam, for their dwelling places. Furthermore, it is said thus the heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array, and the Targum Yerushalmi interprets the word vayechulu, were finished, as vechamad, and He desired. Thus, the esrog and the Shabbos both share the same characteristics in that they are desired items and that they both have a permanent dwelling.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - Chatzotzros Growing

The Gemora states that there are three words that their names changes since the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh. One of the words is chatzotzros (trumpets) to shofar and vice versa. The Gemora proceeds to state that the relevance of this is regarding the shofar of Rosh Hashana. Rashi explains that a shofar is bent and chatzotzros are straight and not obtained from a ram.

It would appear from Rashi that although the chatzotzros are not from a ram, they are indeed derived from a different animal. This is very problematic because the torah explicitly states that the chatzotzros are made from solid silver.

Tosfos in Avoda Zora 47 asks this precise question on a Gemora there that speculates as to what the halacha would be with the horns of animal to be used a schatzotzros in an instance where someone would bow down to an animal as avoda zora. Tosfos asks that chatzotzros were made out of silver and not obtained from an animal? He answers that although the chatzotzros that the kohanim used were made from silver, there were also chatzotzros that the leviim used as musical instruments and these were indeed obtained from an animal.

The Kapos Temorim asks that it seems from Rashi that the chatzotzros are disqualified to be used for Rosh Hashana because it is straight and not from a ram. This, he asks, is not the halacha. Using a ram’s horn is only a preference and if the shofar is not bent, it is still valid? Actually, the Rambam does rule that one may only use a ram’s horn for a shofar.

The Aruch Lener answers that the explanation in Rashi is that it is unfit to be used for Rosh Hashana because it is metal.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - Aravos

Abba Shaul learns from the words in the possuk ‘arvei nachal’ that there are two separate mitzvos of arovos, one together with the lulav and one for the Mikdash. Rashi explains that the second one was used to circle the mizbeach. It would appear from Rashi that they circled the mizbeach with the arovos. In actuality, there is an argument later on daf 43 if they circled the mizbeach with the arovos or with the lulav.

The Kapos Temorim mentions this as a question on Rashi because l’halacha we hold that they circled the mizbeach with the lulav and not with the arovos? He answers that when Rashi states the words ‘to circle the mizbeach,’ he actually is referring to the lulav and the arovos would be leaned against the mizbeach as the Gemora in daf 45 explains this opinion.

It seems a bit odd that the Kapos Temorim is compelled to force this explanation into Rashi when the simple explanation would be to say that Rashi is going according to the opinion that maintains that the aravos were used to circle the mizbeach and not the lulav?

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Connectivity Issues

We are currently undergoing connectivity problems - we hope to be able to post soon. At that time, there will be posts on daf 34, 35, 36 and 37. Please stay tuned. Thanks and a gutten Moed to you.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - A perfect game

The Gemara derives from the word ulekachtem, and you shall take, that the four species are essential to each other, i.e. that one must have all four species available when he is prepared to fulfill the mitzvah. It is noteworthy that the Gemara derives this ruling from the word ulekachtem. The sefarim write that the festival of Sukkos is corresponding to Yaakov, regarding whom it is said and Yaakov journeyed to Sukkos. The Medrash states that on Rosh Hashanah the Jews and the gentiles enter into judgment, and it is not discernable who the victor is until the Jews exit from judgment waving the lulav on Sukkos. It is said regarding the Yom Kippur service, the he-­goat will bear upon itself all their iniquities, and the Medrash states that the word for their iniquities is avonosam, which is an acrostic for the words avonos tam, the sins of Yaakov, who is referred to as tam, the perfect one. Thus, Yaakov is victorious on Yom Kippur when the he-goat, symbolizing Esav, carries away Yaakov’s sins, and this victory is reflected in the Jewish People waving the lulav on Sukkos. The statement of the Gemara here is thus complemented by the statement of the Medrashim that the sins of the tam are removed and Yaakov is then able to perform a lekicha tama, a perfect taking of the lulav.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34 - Hadasim, Aravos, and Bar Kochba Coins

Whereas the Lulav of the First Revolt includes many twigs of willow and myrtle, the Lulav of the Second Revolt has just one twig of each. Was there a reason for this or was it just a whim of the engraver?

See here for a fascinating explanation.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34- To tie the esrog or not

The Gemara derives from the word ulekachtem, and you shall take, that the four species are essential to each other, i.e. that one must have all four species available when he is prepared to fulfill the mitzvah. Nonetheless, one is not required to tie the esrog together with the other species, because the verse states the fruit of a hadar tree, (vekapos) the branches of date palms, and it does not state (kapos) and the branches. This teaches us that one is not required to tie the esrog together with the other three species. The Shulchan Aruch in Orach Chaim 651:11 rules that one must hold the esrog next to the lulav while waving the species and one must waive them all together. The Bikkurei Yaakov quotes the Taz who rules that if one ties the lulav together with the esrog, it is invalid because it is said regarding the lulav kapos and not vekapos. The Bikkurei Yaakov questions the words of the Taz, because our Gemara merely states that from the fact that the Torah did not write vekapos we derive that is not required to tie the esrog even according to the opinion that maintains that one is required to bundle the species. We maintain, however, that one is not biblically required to bundle the species at all, so why should bundling the esrog with the other species be forbidden? The Bikkurei Yaakov offers other proofs to his thesis and concludes that if one bundles the esrog with the other species, he has fulfilled the mitzvah.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 34- Highlights

1. The words brook willows refer to aravos that grow by a brook whereas a tzaftzafah grows in the mountains. (34a1)
2. Hashem desired that the Jewish People should be like an aravah that is taken from many waters but they made themselves to be like a tzaftzafah that grows in the mountains. (34a1)
3. An aravah has a red stem, a straight leaf, and its leaves are smooth, whereas a tzaftzafah has a white stem, rounded leaves and the edges of its leaves are serrated like a sickle. (34a2)
4. Rav Chisda maintained that three things had a change in name from when the Bais HaMikdash was destroyed, and they are the aravah, the shofar and the pesorsa, which is a table. The change in name of aravah and chilfa has relevance regarding the willows that are used together with the lulav. The practical difference between a shofar and chatzotzarta is regarding the shofar of Rosh Hashanah. The practical difference between pesorsa and pesora is regarding one who wishes to sell a table. Abaye maintains that a part of the stomach called the bei casei is now called huvlila and what was called huvlila is now called bei casei. The practical difference in this name change is regarding a needle that was discovered in the thick wall of the beis hakosos, the reticulum of an animal. Rava bar Yosef maintains that the place that was called Babylonia is now called Bursif and the place that was called Bursif is now called Babylonia, and the practical difference regarding these names is related to a bill of divorce. (34a2-34a3-34b1)
5. There is a dispute regarding the requirement of quantities for the taking of the four species. Rabbi Yishmael maintains that one must take three hadassim, two aravos, one lulav, and one esrog. The hadassim are valid even if two of the hadassim are clipped and there is only one hadas that is not clipped. Rabbi Tarfon, however, maintains that even if all three hadassim are clipped, they are valid. Rabbi Akiva maintains that one is only required to take one hadas and one aravah, similar to the requirement of taking one lulav and one esrog. (34b1)
6. We derive that the four species must all be taken together for one to fulfill the mitzvah, because it is said ulekachtem, and you shall take, which teaches us that it should be a lekicha tama, a complete taking. (34b2)
7. Shmuel maintained that the Halacha follows Rabbi Tarfon who rules that a clipped hadas is valid. Shmuel told the hadassim merchants that they should not raise the prices for hadassim and if they do, he would rule publicly like Rabbi Tarfon that clipped hadassim are valid. The Gemara attempts to prove from Shmuel’s threat that he ruled like Rabbi Tarfon, because otherwise Shmuel could have threatened the merchants with a ruling like Rabi Akiva, who maintains that one only requires a single hadas. The Gemara rejects this proof because although the ruling of Rabbi Akiva appears to be more lenient than that of Rabbi Tarfon, in truth the ruling of Rabbi Akiva is more stringent. The reason for this is because it is easier to find three clipped hadassim than to find one whole hadas. (34b2-34b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Berries Growing in the Air

In the Sefer Nishmas Adam, he speculates as to what the halacha would be if any of the four species would be grown in a planter without a hole. Would we be able to use them for the mitzva? Some ask on him from our Gemora which states that if a berry grows on the hadas after it is cut from the ground, the hadas is valid even though the berry grew when the hadas was not connected to the ground. This should be analagous to growing a hadas in a planter.

The distinction seems to be obvious and Rabbi Solovetchik in his sefer says like this that here the hadas grew in the ground. The berry which grows afterwards will have the same halacha as the hadas from which it grew. The Nishmas Adam was discussing a case where the hadas did not grow from the ground at all and perhaps it is not a valid type of hadas.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Chovah Vs. Mitzva

The Tur 651 writes that even though we hold that the lulav is not required to be tied to the hadasim and arovos, nevertheless it is a mitzva to do so because it would appear nicer. He cites Rashi that there is an obligation to do so because of the possuk zeh keli v'anvehu. The Beis Yosef comments that our Rashi does not say that there is an obligation, rather it is a mitzva to do so and the explanation can be like the Tur that it is because of beauty.

It would seem from the way the Beis Yosef is discussing the Tur that that the Tur is making a distinction between the word 'chovah' and 'mitzva.' Chovah is more of an obligation and mitzva in this context would connote a nice thing to do.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Highlights

1. The Mishnah rules that if the top of a hadas was cut off, it is invalid. Ulla learned that if a bud grows at the top of the hadas, it is valid. Rabbi Yirmiyah queried regarding a case where the top of the hadas was cut off prior to the festival and a bud grew on the hadas on the festival. The query was, do we say that once a mitzvah was rejected, i.e. the hadas was unfit from the onset of the festival, the hadas will remain rejected permanently, or do we say that that it is only a temporary rejection. This query is based on the principle of dichui, rejection, regarding sacrifices, i.e. an animal was slaughtered for an offering and subsequently one could not offer the animal for whatever reason. Since the animal was rejected as an offering, it can no longer be offered, so the question here is whether this principle will also apply to a mitzvah. The Gemara does not resolve the question. (33a1-33a2)
2. The Mishnah ruled that if there are more berries than leaves on a hadas, the hadas is invalid. Rav Chisda initially qualified this ruling to be referring to a case where the berries are in one place. If, however, the berries are spread out on the hadas in two or three places, it will be valid. Rava challenged Rav Chisda, and the Gemara revised Rav Chisda’s statement, stating that Rav Chisda learned that black berries will invalidate the hadas but if the berries are green and are the same color as the leaves, the hadas will be valid. Rav Pappa ruled that red berries are similar to black berries and red berries will thus also invalidate the hadas. (33a4-33b1)
3. The Mishnah ruled that if there are more berries than leaves on a hadas, the hadas is invalid. One is permitted to validate the hadas by removing the berries but one cannot remove the berries on the festival. There is a dispute between Tanaaim if the hadas will be valid if one removes the berries from a hadas on the festival. The Gemara offers several approaches to explain this dispute. (33b2-33b3)
4. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that one is permitted to remove the berries on the festival. The Gemara qualifies this ruling to be referring to a case where he plucked the berries with the intention of eating them. Rabbi Eliezer permits this because he rules in accordance with the opinion of his father Rabbi Shimon who maintains that one is permitted to perform a permitted act although he may unintentionally perform a forbidden act in the process. An example of this is when one drags a chair across the dirt on Shabbos where he may make a furrow in the ground. His intention is to move the chair and not to cerate the furrow, so even though he is aware that he may cerate a furrow, Rabbi Shimon maintains that this is permitted. The Gemara questions this because even Rabbi Shimon agrees that if the prohibition will inevitably occur, it is forbidden to perform the permitted act. The Gemara answers that we are referring to a case where the person has another hadas and when he plucks the berries from this hadas, he does not care whether the hadas is valid. Thus, we do not deem the plucking of the berries to be a repair and he has not committed a prohibited act at all. (33b2-33b3)
5. The Mishna rules that a stolen or dry aravah is invalid. An aravah used for idolatry is also invalid. If the top of the aravah was cut off, its leaves were torn or if it is a tzaftzafah, a willow with rounded leaves, it is invalid. If the aravah was withered, some of its leaves fell off, or if the aravah grew from a field and not near a stream, the aravah will be valid. (33b3-33b4)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33- Humble in a group

The Gemara states that Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one is required to bundle the lulav with the other species, and he derives this ruling from a gezeirah shavah of taking, taking, from the case of the bundle of eizov, hyssop, that the Jews took prior to departing from Egypt. That verse estates and you shall take a bundle of eizov. We can interpret the verse homiletically to mean that if one desires to be a part of the bundle, i.e. the group, he should humble himself like the hyssop, which is a low branch.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Letters on the Side of a Book on Shabbos

The Mishna ruled that if there are more berries than leaves on the hadas, it is invalid. One can remove the berries before the festival but one is forbidden to remove the berries on the festival. The reason for this ruling is because removing the berries is deemed to be repairing the hadas, and one is prohibited from repairing a utensil on the festival. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it would be permitted to remove the berries on the festival. The Gemara qualifies this ruling to be referring to a case where he plucked the berries with the intention of eating them. Rabbi Eliezer permits this because he rules in accordance with the opinion of his father Rabbi Shimon who maintains that one is permitted to perform a permitted act although he may unintentionally perform a forbidden act in the process. An example of this is when one drags a chair across the dirt on Shabbos where he may make a furrow in the ground. His intention is to move the chair and not to cerate the furrow, so even though he is aware that he may cerate a furrow, Rabbi Shimon maintains that this is permitted. The Gemara questions this because even Rabbi Shimon agrees that if the prohibition will inevitably occur, it is forbidden to perform the permitted act. The Gemara answers that we are referring to a case where the person has another hadas and when he plucks the berries from this hadas, he does not care whether the hadas is valid. Thus, we do not deem the plucking of the berries to be a repair and he has not committed a prohibited act at all.Tosfos explains that the answer of the Gemara is predicated on the principle of melacha sheaina tzricha legufa, an act that was not performed for a defined purpose. Normally we say that it is rabbinically prohibited to perform an act where one does not desire the forbidden outcome. However, when there is a mitzvah involved, one is permitted to perform the act outright. [Tosfos seems to maintain that the person plucking the berries has intention for the mitzvah.] Teshuvos Imrei Yosher rules based on the words of Tosfos that one would be permitted to study on Shabbos from a sefer that has letters and words on the side of the pages. This would be permitted even though when he turns the pages he is in effect forming or erasing words. The reason for this ruling is because when one is preoccupied with a mitzvah, the Chachamim were not concerned with the prohibited act that will result if the result is unintended and undesired. The Mishna Berura rules that one can even read from a book with letters on the side even if he is not engaged in Torah study. The reason for this ruling is because one is not deemed to be writing or erasing as the pages of the book are meant to be turned. This would be analogous to opening and closing a door which would not be deemed building or destruction because a door is meant to be opened and closed.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Appeasement

If the top of a hadas leaf is cut off, it is disqualified. Ula learned that if a fruit grows in its place, it is kosher. Rabbi Yirmiah posed a shaila as to what would be the halacha if the top was cut off from before Yom Tov and the fruit grew on Yom Tov. Is there a concept that once the hadas was disqualified on Yom Tov, it cannot be revived and become kosher because once it is pushed away from the mitzva it remains in that state or do we say that now it is valid? There is the principle of dichuy by korbanos where once a korban is deemed to be invalid, it cannot become qualified to be used as a korban later. Do we compare mitzvos to korbanos? This question remains unresolved.

The Pnei Yehoshua writes that this p'sul can only be Rabbinic in nature for we have a principle throughout Shas that we cannot learn from kodshim to chulin.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B'halacha speculates that perhaps this concept will only apply by mitzvos whose purpose is appeasement and to bring about ritzuy, similar to korbanos, however other mitzvos, it would not apply. This is why Rabbi Yirmiah contemplates that dichuy should apply by the mitzva of the arbah minim which is similar to korbanos that it comprises a concept of appeasement.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 32 - Requirement for Shofar and Lulav to be a Tefach

The Gemora states that the spine of the lulav must be one tefach higher than where the hadassim end. The Gemora Niddah lists five things where the measurement is a tefach. Included in the listing is the third wall of a sukkah, the size of a shofar and the tefach of the lulav. Seemingly, the measurement for the lulav and shofar would be required Biblically just as the third wall of a sukkah must be at least a tefach and that was learned from a halacha l'Moshe misinai.

It is interesting to note that the L'vush 650 writes that the measurements of the height of the lulav, hadassim and arovos are all biblical in nature as they are halacha l'Moshe misinai, however the requirement for the shofar to be at least a tefach is only Rabbinic in nature.

Reb Meir Arik in Tal Torah asks on the L'vush as to where is the source to distinguish between the shofar and the lulav? From the Gemora in Niddah, it would seem that they are both Biblically required?

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 32 - Himnik

Rav Papa states that the Mishna which rules that a lulav which is cracked is disqualified is referring to a case where it split and the two leaves are going in opposite directions. This is called a 'himnek' and Rashi explains that it is similar to a scribe's quill. The Rambam rules that it is invalid if the two parts of the leaf are dstanced from each other to such a degree that they appear like two separate leaves. The Reoh states that the leaf is opened a lot.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B'halacha states that the bochurim from Yeshiva who ask him about lulavim, showing him that there is a split on the top and they inquire if the lulav is disqualified because of being a himnik. He rules since it can only be seen after gazing at the top of the lulav for a long time and the leaves are only separated a fraction from each other, this is not what the Gemora had in mind and therefore it is a valid lulav.

There is no picture in that sefer, however the poskim do not rule like him and the defining factor seems to be if the leaves are heading in two opposite directions. Make sure you bring your lulav to a Rav for an individual ruling.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 31 - 36 Esrog Video!!!

Please see here for a demonstration as to how to look for an esrog. Most of you may have picked one out already, but it's a great video on the subject and the points will stay with you for next year iy"H. Once again, we thank Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld and his entire staff for doing such a gevaldeke job at disseminating Torah.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 31 - Highlights

1. There is a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Chachamim regarding a stolen Sukkah and regarding one who constructs his Sukkah in a public domain. The dispute is predicated on a dispute as to whether one can fulfill the mitzvah of Sukkah in a Sukkah that is not his. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of Sukkah in a Sukkah that is not his and for this reason a stolen Sukkah is invalid. (31a1)
2. The Gemara relates a story that a certain elderly woman went to Rav Nachman and claimed that the Reish Galusa and all the Chachamim were sitting in a stolen Sukkah. Her claim was that the servants of the Reish Galusa stole wood from her and used it to build their Sukkah. Rav Nachman, however, did not pay attention to her claim. The woman persisted with her claim and she said that a woman whose father had three hundred and eighteen servants is screaming before you and you refuse to listen to her. Rav Nachman told his students that the woman did not have a valid claim as once the Sukkah is constructed with stolen wood, the wood does not to be returned. This is based on a rabbinic decree referred to as takanas hashavim, the decree for the returnees, and therefore the Sukkah is deemed to be valid. This decree was enacted so that thieves would be inspired to repent their ways. If a thief was compelled to demolish his structure to return the stolen property, he would not seek to repent. (31a2)
3. There is a dispute in the Gemara if a lulav is required to be hadar, beautiful in its halachic requirements, similar to an esrog, or perhaps a lulav does not have this requirement. (31a)
4. One is not allowed to add a fifth specie to the four species and one is prohibited from taking less than four species. One cannot substitute any of the four species from those that are listed in the Torah, and this is true even if one the species are not available. (31a3-31b1)
5. One cannot use a lulav that is from an asheirah tree from the times of Moshe. The reason for this ruling is because an asheirah must be burned and the asheirah is deemed to have been burned already and subsequently the lulav from the asheirah tree does not have the requisite measurements for a lulav to be considered valid. (31b2-31b3)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 31 - An Old Woman Raving and Avrohom's 318 Servants

The Gemora relates a story that a certain old woman went to Rav Nachman and claimed that the Reish Gilusa and all the chachamim are sitting in a stolen sukkah. Her claim was that the servants of the Reish Galusa stole wood from her and used it for the s'chach on their sukkah. Rav Nachman paid no attention to her claim. She persisted and said that a woman whose father had 318 servants and you refuse to listen to her. Rav Nachman responded that there is no valid claim here for once the sukkah is constructed with stolen wood, the wood does not to be returned based on a Rabbibic decree and therefore the sukkah is deemed to be valid. This decree was issued in order to inspire the thiefs to repent. If they would be compelled to deconstruct their building to return the stolen property, they would not repent.

Rashi explains that the woman was referring to Avrohom Avinu and his 318 servants. The commentators offer various explanations as to what was the meaning in this woman's words and the analogy to Avrohom's servants.

The Chasam Sofer cites the Gemora in Chulin 89a which states how harsh stealing is and proves this from the servants of Avrohom who stole from Sdom and Avrohom could not return that which they stole. The old woman thought that the Rabbinic decree of not returning stolen objects which are used in the construction of a building would only apply when there are many stolen objects and it would be very cumbersome to deconstruct the building to return those beams, however when the stolen wood is few in number and only being used for s'chach, perhaps the decree does not apply and the sukkah should be disqualified. Rav Nachman finally responded and ruled that the decree applies in all cases. Whenever wood is stolen and subsequently used in a building, whether it's a lot of wood or few and whether it's a mansion or a sukkah, the thief acquires the wood and owes money instead.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 31 - Stolen S'chach

If one steals wood and uses it for s'chach, it is valid. One of the reasons for this is because the thief dos not have to return the wood, rather the value of the wood. thisis because there was an injunction issued on anyone who steals something and uses it as part of his house or building that he acquires it and he only owes the original owner the value of the stolen object. The sages were concerned that otherwise (if he would have to return that particular beam) the robbers would not repent and return that which they stole.

A question is asked on our Gemora. Biblically, one does not acquire the stolen object - it is only a Rabbinic decree that the wood does now belong to the theif. If so, how can the robber fulfill his Biblical obligation with something that is not Biblically his?

The Shar Hamelech equates this case with a Gemora in Bava Basra 47b that states if one forces someone to sell something, the sale is considered final and deemed valid. Over here where one is obligated to listen to the Sages, it is as if the thief purchased the wood from the owner and now owes him money for it. It is a completely valid sale even Biblically and hence he will fulfill the obligation of sukkah with that s'chach.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 30 - Highlights

1. One cannot use a stolen lulav even on the second day of Sukkos because it is a mitzvah that is brought about through the violation of a negative prohibition and is thus invalid. There would be no distinction whether the owner despaired of recovering the lulav or not, because even if the owner despaired of recovering the lulav, the mitzvah is invalid because it was brought about through the violation of a prohibition. (29b4-30a1)
2. Rabbi Yitzchok maintains that just like one could fulfill his obligation with a borrowed lulav on the second day, he can also fulfill the mitzvah with a stolen lulav. (30a2)
3. Rav Huna told the merchants who purchased hadassim, myrtle branches, from gentiles that they should ensure that the gentiles cut the branches and give the branches to the merchants. Rav Huna did this because he was concerned that the gentiles had stolen the land from a Jew and land cannot be deemed stolen. This means that even if the original owner of the land despairs of recovering the property, the thief is not considered to be the owner and the original owner retains ownership of the land. Rav Huna intended that the gentiles should cut the branches and give the branches to the merchants so the abandonment of the owner regarding the produce would occur while the branches were in the hands of the gentiles, and there would be a change of ownership when the merchants received the branches. This procedure would thus allow the merchants to acquire the branches in accordance with the principles regarding acquisition of stolen objects. (30a2-30b1)
4. There is a principle that allows a thief to acquire stolen property if there is a physical change in the stolen object. The Gemara asks that since according to one opinion, one is required to tie the lulav together with the other two species, the tying should constitute a physical change and thus the merchants should be permitted to acquire the hadassim in this manner. The Gemara answers that Rav Huna follows the opinion that maintains that the lulav does not have to be tied with the other species and therefore no physical change occurs to the hadassim. Alternatively, even if Rav Huna requires the lulav to be tied with the other species, this tying is not deemed to be a change because the change can be reversed and the rule is that a change that can be reversed and the object will revert to its original form is not deemed to be a change. (30b1-30b2)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 30 - Mitzvah performance with more intention

The Gemara discusses the concept of a mitzvah that is brought about through one who violates a prohibition. The Rishonim explain that this principle only applies when the mitzvah cannot be performed unless one violates the prohibition. This principle teaches us a profound lesson regarding mitzvah performance. Very often we catch ourselves performing mitzvos by rote and we attempt to understand how this could have happened. The Gemara informs us that a mitzvah should be a conscientious effort, not just a mere performance of a daily ritual. If one can invalidate a mitzvah by performing it through a transgression, certainly one can enhance a mitzvah by performing it with the proper intention. We have been taught that HaShem rewards one for performing a positive action five hundred times more than for performing a negative action. If we would just improve our mitzvah performance even slightly, we would already be the beneficiaries of a great reward.

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Lekavod Yom HaKadosh G'mar Chasima Tova

The Day of Yom Kippur is upon us, and it is worth examining the essence of the day, so we can enter into this Holy Day in the proper frame of mind. Yom Kippur literally means the Day of Atonement. We will be receiving atonement for our sins that we have committed throughout the year. Yet, one must wonder what would happen if he did not receive atonement. The Gemara tells us that as long as one repents, Yom Kippur will serve as atonement for his sins. Apparently, it is not merely a day of atonement. It is a day of atonement predicated on repentance. Furthermore, there are many Jews who on the surface do not appear to repent, yet they live out the following year in peace. How is this possible? In the preamble to Kol Nidrei that we recite on Yom Kippur eve, we recite a very enigmatic declaration. The words we recite are: with the knowledge of the congregation, and with the knowledge of the Omnipresent, we are permitted to pray with the transgressors. This permit begs for an explanation. The Gemara teaches us that the ketores was comprised of eleven spices, and one of them was called the chelbanah, galbanum. This particular spice had a very foul odor, yet was included in the spices of the ketores, which was the most cherished of all services that were performed in the Bais HaMikdash. The Gemara teaches us that from here we derive the ruling that we include the wanton sinners of Israel in our fast days. Why is the ketores the object of this teaching? When Yaakov came before his father Yitzchak to receive the blessings, it is said and he smelled the fragrance of his clothing, and he blessed him. The Gemara states that the word for clothing, begadav, can be interpreted homiletically to mean bogdodv, his rebellious ones. The Gemara states that even the wanton sinners of Israel emit a wonderful fragrance. Thus, at the onset of Jewish history, the wicked were already incorporated into the blessings of the righteous. When one begins to understand the theme of Yom Kippur, it will become very clear why even the wicked of Israel are granted atonement. We can adopt the approach that our preamble refers to the wicked that do not even come to synagogue to pray on Yom Kippur, but then we will be left wondering how they earn atonement. It would be more plausible to assume that even amongst the worshipers on Yom Kippur there are those who may have not yet repented from their sins, and it is regarding those Jews who we address the declaration that we are permitted to pray with the wanton sinners. The Gemara tells us that even a Jew who sinned is still considered a Jew. If every Jew is always considered a Jew, then every Jew can gain atonement on Yom Kippur. This is accomplished by every Jew in the synagogue accepting upon himself responsibility for every Jew. Even those who emit a foul odor, and even those who rebel against HaShem, are still incorporated into the Yom Kippur service. A wanton sinner can receive the blessing of the righteous, as long as he is connected to the greater body of Israel. Let us enter into this Yom Kippur with the knowledge that we are functioning as the Kohen Gadol in the Bais HaMikdash, who sought atonement for the sins of all of Israel. When we bear this weighty responsibility in mind, we will surely be focused on the holiness of the day, and HaShem will once again declare the word salachti, I forgive. HaShem should grant us all a G’mar Chasima Tova.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 30 - Sukkah in a Public Domain

The Magen Avraham in Orach Chaim 637:3 discusses whether it is permitted for one to construct a Sukkah in a public domain without permission. The Magen Avraham writes that such a Sukkah may be deemed a stolen Sukkah and will be invalid. One cannot say that the local population forgo their rights to the land because the entire populace, including gentiles, have a share in the land. The Magen Avraham quotes Rashi on Daf 30 who implies that the only concern of a stolen Sukkah is regarding stealing from a Jew but not when stealing from a gentile. Although one is normally forbidden to steal from a gentile, if one steals from a gentile it is not considered a mitzvah that was brought about through a transgression. The Magen Avraham also quotes the Yerayim who posits the exact opposite approach. The Yerayim maintains that even according to the opinion that maintains that stealing from a gentile is permitted, the stolen object does not belong to the Jew. The Magen Avraham concludes his ruling based on the opinions of the Rashba and the Bais Yosef that one cannot construct a Sukkah in a public domain and if one went and constructed the Sukkah anyway, the Sukkah is invalid and one who recites a blessing in such a Sukkah is reciting the Name of Hashem in vain.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 29 - Highlights

1. One should not bring large serving pots into the Sukkah unless the pots will be used during the meal. The Mishna Berura writes that according to some opinions these pots should not be brought into the Sukkah even during the meal. One can, however, bring small pots into the Sukkah. One should remove plates and pans from the Sukkah after the meal has ended so as not to belittle the sanctity of the Sukkah. One can, however, leave drinking cups inside the Sukkah. (29a1)
2. One may leave a lamp inside the Sukkah, unless the Sukkah is so small that there will be a concern that that the walls of the Sukkah will catch fire from the heat of the lamp. (29a1)
3. One who is sitting in the Sukkah can leave the Sukkah if it begins to rain, provided that the rain is coming down hard enough to spoil his food. The Rema rules that the amount of rain that is required to allow one to exit his Sukkah is the same amount of rain that would cause a person to exit his house if he had a leak in his roof. (29a1)
4. If one was eating or sleeping in the Sukkah and it began to rain and he exited the Sukkah, he does not need to return to the Sukkah even if the rain ceased. The reason for this ruling is because it is considered distress for one to have to return to the Sukkah. One who insists on eating in the Sukkah while it is raining is deemed to be a hedyot, a commoner, and he does not earn reward for the mitzvah. (29a1-29a2)
5. The Mishna rules that all four species, i.e. lulav, esrog, hadas, and aravah are invalid if they are stolen, regardless of whether the owner had despaired from having the item retuned to him. (29b3)
6. If the spine or the majority of a Lulav’s leaves became dried out, the lulav is invalid. A lulav is deemed to be dry when instead of being a natural green, it turned white. (29b3)

Thank you to Rabbi Jay Spero for providing us with the highlights http://jbuff.com/daf_yomi_halacha.htm

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 29 - Alive and praising HaShem

The Mishnah states that a dry lulav is invalid, and the Gemara explains that the reason why it is invalid is because the Torah requires that the four species be hadar, beautiful, and a dry lulav is not beautiful. The Yerushalmi states that the reason why a dry lulav is invalid is because it is said (Tehillim 115:17) the dead cannot praise HaShem. What is the connection between the four species and praising HaShem? It is said (Ibid 96:12-13) the field and everything in it will exult; then all the trees of the forest will sing with joy. Before HaShem, for He will have arrived, He will have arrived to judge the earth. The Medrash states that these verses allude to the idea that after the judgment of Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur, one takes the trees of the forest, i.e. the lulav. It is said that the trees of the forest will sing with joy, and this alludes to the idea that the lulav is used to praise HaShem. Additionally, Rabbeinu Bachye (Vayikra 23:40) writes that the four species are fresh and alive, and the Torah and its recipients are alive, and we take the four species that have life and we praise HaShem, Who is referred to as the Living G-d.

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Daf Yomi -Sukkah 28 - Highlights

1. One should not sleep in a study hall. (28a1)
2. One should be careful not to speak unnecessary words in a study hall. (28a1)
3. One should not speak or even entertain thoughts of Torah in an unclean place i.e. near a garbage dump or near refuse. (28a1)
4. One should commence the Pesach Seder as soon as possible so that the children will remain awake and interested. One must even exit the study hall early on Ever Pesach so that he can commence the Seder on time. (28a1)
5. The Mishna cites a dispute between Bais Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding the minimum dimensions that are required for the Sukkah to be valid. Bais Shammai maintains that the Sukkah must be large enough to accommodate ones head, most of his body and his table. Bais Hillel maintains that it is sufficient even if the Sukkah cannot accommodate the table. Bais Hillel and Bais Shammai also disagree regarding a large Sukkah that is adjacent to a house and the table is inside the house. Bais Shammai maintains that one does not fulfill his mitzvah in this manner as we are concerned that he will be drawn after his table that is in the house and Bais Hillel disagrees. (28a3)
6. Women, slaves and children are exempt from the mitzva of Sukkah. (28a3)
7. Throughout the seven days of Sukkos, one makes his house a temporary dwelling place and his Sukkah a permanent dwelling place. The Aruch HaShulchan writes that one who wishes to speak with his friend onSukkos should do so inside the Sukkah. (28b2)
8. One should endeavor to study Torah in the Sukkah unless it is more conducive to his studies to learn in the house. (28b3)

Thank you to Rabbi Jay Spero for providing us with the highlights http://jbuff.com/daf_yomi_halacha.htm

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 29 - Four Species and Hashem's Name

Rashi writes that a dry lulav is invalid because the mitzvah must be mehuderes, performed with a beautiful object, as it is said this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him, and we learn from this verse that one should beautify himself before HaShem when fulfilling a mitzvah. Tosfos questions the words of Rashi from the Gemara earlier on Daf 11b that states that the mitzvah of glorifying a mitzvah is only a Halacha l’chatchila, preferable, but the mitzvah is not invalidated if one uses an object that is not beautiful for a mitzvah. The Gemara there states that it is preferable to tie the lulav with the hadassim and the aravos. If one does not tie the lulav with the other species, however, he has still fulfilled the mitzvah. Rav Aharon Yosef Weingarten in the Sefer HaYovel L’Chasam Sofer suggests an answer to resolve the question of Tosfos on Rashi. The Gemara in Gittin Daf 20 states that if one wrote the name of Hashem in a Sefer Torah without the proper sanctity, it is invalid. The Gemara explains that the reason for this is because of the verse that states this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him. The Bais Yosef in Orach Chaim 651 rules that one must join the esrog with the lulav in order to fulfill the mitzvah. The Bais Yosef cites the Rikanti who claimed that this secret was revealed to him in a dream. On the first night of Sukkos, a Chasid by the name of Rabbi Yitzchak appeared to the Rikanti and the Rikanti noticed that Rabbi Yitzchak was writing the Name of Hashem, but Rabbi Yitzchak wrote the letter hey separate from the first three letters. The Rikanti told him that this was incorrect and Rabbi Yitzchak responded that this is what is being done in the community of the Rikanti. The Rikanti protested and wrote the name of Hashem correctly. The Rikanti did not comprehend the meaning of the dream until the following morning when he observed the people in his community holding the esrog distant from the lulav. The Rikanti recalled the Medrash in Parashas Emor that states that the four species allude to the Name of HaShem. Just like the Name of HaShem must be written with all the letters adjacent to each other, the four species must also all be held together. This, then, could be the possible explanation for the opinion of Rashi. A dry lulav will be invalid ex post facto because it is lacking in the mitzvah of this is my G-d and I shall beautify Him, as the mitzvah of lulav is akin to writing the Name of HaShem. This approach is also found in the Sefer Shaarei Orah from Rav Meir Bergman.

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