Friday, May 25, 2007

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 22 - A CONVERT WHO CONVERTS

The Gemora states: A convert who converts is regarded as a newborn baby (and thus has no pre-existing family relationships).

Why does it say “a convert who converts,” wouldn’t it be more correct by saying “a gentile who converts”? He is not a convert until he actually converts.

Margaliyos HaShas quotes from a sefer: At the time that the entire Jewish Nation was standing by Har Sinai to receive the Torah, the souls of all the future proselytes were there, as well. Some converted immediately and others took a long time, but they were all there.

This is the explanation: A convert, one whose soul was present by Har Sinai when the Jewish people received the Torah, and is now converting, is regarded as a newborn baby.

[Interesting readings relevant to converts:

http://rchaimqoton.blogspot.com/2006/06/understanding-proselytes.html


http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2006/09/convert-in-mourning.html

What brocha does a ger recite in the morning?

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 22 - Highlights

A braisa of Rabbi Chiya was taught: The third generation of his son (his son's son's daughter), and of his daughter (his daughter's son's daughter), and of the son of his wife (his wife’s son’s son’s daughter), or of the daughter of his wife (his wife’s daughter’s son’s daughter) are all forbidden as secondary arayos; the fourth generation through his father-in-law (his father-in-law's mother's mother) or his mother-in-law (his mother-in-law's mother's mother) are forbidden as secondary arayos. (22a)

The Gemora inquires if the six secondary arayos listed in Rabbi Chiya’s braisa have a termination of their prohibitions or not? (Does the prohibition stop by them or does it continue on to their descendants or ancestors in the descending or ascending line?)

The Gemora does not resolve this inquiry. (22a)

Rav Nachman said to Rava: The Rabbis decreed that a ger (a proselyte) may not marry his gentile mother (Biblically, this is permitted because a ger is regarded as a newborn baby and thus has no pre-existing family relationships) because otherwise, people might say that he is coming from a strict sanctity (a gentile is Biblically prohibited from marrying his mother) to a weaker sanctity; however, there is no reason to decree secondary arayos on a ger. (22a)

Rav Nachman said: Since the subject of proselytes has come up, let us say something else pertaining to them: Maternal brothers (who have converted) may not testify in a Beis Din (it is a certainty that they came from the same gentile woman, the Rabbis decreed that they should not testify together), however, if they did, their testimony is valid (because converts are regarded as newborn babies without pre-existing family relationships). Paternal brothers (who have converted) may testify in a Beis Din (due to excessive male promiscuity, their brotherly relationship is not recognized).

Ameimar said: Maternal brothers (who have converted) may testify in a Beis Din.

The Gemora asks: Why is there a distinction between testimony and arayos?

The Gemora answers: Marriage pertains to everyone; testimony is only relevant to Beis Din, and they are aware that one who converts is regarded as a newborn baby (and thus has no pre-existing family relationships). (22a)

The Mishna states: If one has any kind of brother, he (the brother) binds the wife of his brother to yibum; and he is his brother in every respect. These rules are always applicable except for one who has a brother from a Canaanite maidservant or from a non-Jewess.

If one has any kind of son, he (the son) exempts his father's wife from yibum; and he is liable if for striking or cursing his father; and he is his son in every respect. These rules are always applicable except for one who has a brother from a Canaanite maidservant or from a non-Jewess. (22a)

The Gemora asks: What does the Mishna mean when it stated “If one has any kind of brother”?

Rav Yehudah answered: The Mishna is coming to include a mamzer (an illegitimate child).

The Gemora asks: This is simple; since the Mishna states that he is his brother in every respect, he obviously binds the wife of his brother to yibum?

The Gemora answers: We might have thought that we should derive through a gezeirah shovah (one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics - it links two similar words from dissimilar verses in the Torah) from the sons of Yaakov that just like there, the brothers were legitimate, so too, in regards to yibum, the brothers must be legitimate. The Mishna teaches us that this is not the case.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps it is so (the mitzvah of yibum only applies to legitimate brothers)?

The Gemora answers: Since a mamzer would exempt the wife of his father from being taken for yibum, a brother, who is a mamzer will also bind the wife of his brother for yibum. (22a – 22b)

The Gemora asks: What does the Mishna mean when it stated “and he is his brother in every respect”?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is teaching us that a mamzer can inherit his brother and one (a kohen) is permitted to become tamei for him. (22b)

The Gemora asks: What does the Mishna mean when it stated “If one has any kind of son”?

Rav Yehudah answered: The Mishna is coming to include a mamzer.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason that a mamzer is regarded as a son to exempt his father's wife from yibum?

The Gemora answers: It is written [Devarim 25:5]: And he has no son. The word ‘ein’ could be said ‘ayen,’ examine him. This means to search if the deceased brother has any type of son, including a mamzer; this would exempt the father's wife from yibum. (22b)

The Mishna had stated: And he is liable if for striking or cursing his father. The Gemora had explained that this is referring to a mamzer.

The Gemora asks: Doesn’t the prohibition against cursing one’s father only apply if the father conducts himself like the rest of the Jewish Nation; this father cohabitated with an ervah, the prohibition should not apply?

The Gemora answers: We are speaking of a case where the father repented.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t we learn in a Mishna in Chagigah (9a): Rabbi Shimon ben Menasye said: A crooked thing cannot be straightened is referring to one who engaged in relations with a woman whom cohabitation is forbidden and produced a mamzer (an illegitimate child born from a union prohibited under penalty of death or kares) through her.

The Gemora answers: Although the effect of his sin is always revealed and remembered, he nevertheless did repent and can be regarded as one who conducts himself in the ways of the Jewish people. (22b)

The Gemora inquires: What is the law regarding the wife of his mother’s maternal brother?

The Gemora answers: When Rav Yehudah bar Shila came to Bavel, he reported the following rule from Eretz Yisroel: Whenever a female is a Biblical ervah, the Rabbis decreed regarding the wife of a male in the same degree of relationship (as the female) as a secondary ervah.

Rava interrupts: Can this be a general rule; there are many examples that indicate otherwise? One’s mother-in-law is a Biblical ervah and yet the wife of his father-in-law is permitted?

The Gemora states that Rav Yehudah bar Shila’s rule is coming to include the case of the wife of his mother’s maternal brother. Since the Torah prohibits the mother’s maternal sister, the Rabbis decreed regarding the parallel male relation, which is the wife of the mother’s brother.

The Gemora asks: What is the difference between the cases? (Why is the wife of his mother’s maternal brother prohibited based on the parallel by the male and the wife of his father-in-law is permitted even though the parallel case i.e., his mother-in-law is forbidden to him?)

The Gemora answers: The wife of his mother’s maternal brother became his relative through one act of betrothal and the Rabbis therefore ruled stringently; the wife of his father-in-law is permitted because that relationship came about only through two acts of betrothal (his own marriage and his father-in-law’s new marriage). (22b)

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Daf YomiI - Yevamos 21 - FENCES AND SAFEGUARDS

Rabbis Safeguard Against Assimilation, As It Leads To Intermarriage
by Rabbi Frand

http://wap.torah.org/learning/ravfrand/5764/achareimos.html

Fences of Holiness

by Rabbi Zev Leff

http://www.shemayisrael.co.il/parsha/leff/archives/ach_kdsh.htm

A Fence Around the Torah – The Key to Yiras Shomayim

by Rabbi Zvi Sobolofsky

http://www.torahweb.org/torah/2006/parsha/rsob_acharei.html

Our Dual Relationship with the Secular World
by Rabbi Hershel Schachter

http://www.torahweb.org/torah/2005/parsha/rsch_vayishlach.html

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Tuesday, May 22, 2007

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 20 - A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT OVERRIDING TWO PROHIBITIONS

Reb Moshe Rozmerin in Dvar Moshe states that the Rambam maintains that one who rounds the corners of his head has violated two prohibitions; one for cutting his payos (corners), and another for following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

Our Gemora states that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head.

According to the Rambam, it is actually overriding two prohibitions.

Tosfos above (3b) discussed this issue and did not cite our Gemora as a proof. Other Rishonim maintain that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions.

A question is brought in the name of the Lubliner Gaon: The Gemora (20b) states regarding a widow falling to yibum to a Kohen Gadol that it is a situation where the positive commandment of yibum can possibly override the prohibition of a Kohen Gadol marrying a widow. He asks: There are two prohibitions for a Kohen Gadol to marry a widow; one is lo yikach (he shall not take her), and the other is lo yechallel (he shall not desecrate the kehuna). How can the positive commandment of yibum override two prohibitions?

Reb Chaim Ozer in Achiezer (Even Ezer, 4) answers: The Rishonim concede when the two prohibitions are dependent on each other, that the positive commandment can override both prohibitions. The basis for the prohibition of desecrating the kehuna is because it is an illicit relationship; once the mitzvah of yibum overrides the prohibition of lo yikach, it becomes a permitted relationship and there will be no prohibition of lo yechallel.

[It would seem to me that this is dependent on how we understand that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions. We can explain that each prohibition strengthens one another and the positive commandment cannot override any of them; or perhaps the positive commandment does override one of the prohibitions, but it does not have the capabilities to override the second one. Reb Chaim Ozer would be in accordance with the latter explanation.]

According to the Achiezer, we can answer the Dvar Moshe’s question. The positive commandment for the metzora to cut his hair overrides the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head, and consequently, there will be no prohibition of following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 20 - Highlights

The Mishna states: They stated a general rule concerning the yevamah: Whoever is prohibited to the yavam because of an ervah is exempt from chalitzah and yibum. If her prohibition is because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, she would require chalitzah but she is not taken for yibum.

Her sister who is her fellow yevamah would require chalitzah or yibum. (The case is as follows: Two brothers (Reuven and Shimon) married two sisters Rochel and Leah), and the two husbands died childless. The sisters fall for yibum to a third brother Levi, and one of the sisters is prohibited to Levi because she is an ervah (a former daughter-in-law). The ervah’s sister requires chalitzah or is married by yibum. Normally, if two sisters fall before the yavam for yibum, both are prohibited from marrying him as his yevamah, since each is the sister of a zekukah, and she has the status of his wife's sister. In this case, however, in which one of the women is prohibited to the yavam by a prohibition of ervah, and therefore there is no zikah between her and the yavam, he is permitted to marry her sister by yibum, because she is not the sister of a zekukah.)

The Mishna explains the term “mitzvah prohibition”: Secondary arayos, who are Rabbinically forbidden. A “sanctity prohibition” is a widow to the Kohen Gadol, a divorcee and a chalutzah to a common kohen, a mamzeres or a Nesinite woman to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a Nesinite or to a mamzer. (20a)

The Gemora discusses if the Mishna is including The halacha of Rav Assi or not. Rav Assi rules: The co-wife of an aylonis (an adult woman who did not develop any signs of female puberty and is incapable of bearing children) is forbidden to be taken in yibum. It is written regarding yibum [Devarim 25:6]: It shall be the firstborn – if she can bear. This excludes an aylonis since she cannot bear children. (20a)

The Gemora asks: Why is a Rabbinical ervah referred to as a prohibition because of mitzvah.

The Gemora answers: It is because there is a Biblical mitzvah to heed the words of the Rabbis.

The Gemora states: The reason for the term “sanctity prohibition” is because it is written regarding the kohanim [Vayikra 21:6]: They shall be sanctified unto their God. (20a)

We learned in a braisa: Rabbi Yehudah switched the terminologies. A “mitzvah prohibition” is referring to a widow to the Kohen Gadol and a divorcee and a chalutzah to a common kohen. These are referred to as mitzvos prohibitions because it is written regarding the kohanim [Vayikra 27:34]: These are the mitzvos.

Rabbi Yehudah continues: A “sanctity prohibition” is referring to the secondary arayos. Abaye explains why they are so called: it is because one who upholds the instructions of the Sages is considered “sanctified.”

Rava offers another explanation: There is a concept that one should sanctify himself by refraining from doing things that actually are permitted. (20a)

The Mishna had stated: If a widow falls for yibum to a kohen gadol, she requires chalitzah, but may not be taken in yibum.

The Gemora asks: It is merely a negative prohibition against marrying a widow; why don’t we say that the positive commandment of yibum should override this prohibition and we should permit the kohen gadol to perform a yibum?

Rav Gidel answered in the name of Rav: There is a Scriptural verse that teaches us that although one cannot perform a yibum on a woman prohibited to the yavam on account of a negative commandment, a chalitzah is required. Another Scriptural verse teaches us that a woman who is subject to the penalty of kares is exempt from chalitzah and yibum.

The Gemora explains: When faced with a choice of how to expound the verses (which women should be subject to chalitzah and which should not be), it is reasonable that the women who are subject to the kares penalty are not obligated in chalitzah because these are women that kiddushin cannot be effected with them; women that are only subject to a negative prohibition, kiddushin can be effected with them; thus, they require a chalitzah. (20a – 20b)

Rava challenges Rav’s explanation and proves from a braisa that women who are prohibited to the yavam because of a negative commandment are Biblically subject to yibum (unlike Rav who said that there is a Scriptural verse excluding them).

Rava attempts to explain that a kohen gadol cannot perform a yibum with his brother’s widow because of a Rabbinic decree. The Rabbis decreed that if we allow the yevamah who only had erusin with the brother to be taken in yibum, this might lead to a different kohen gadol performing a yibum with a yevamah who had nisuin (the marriage was consummated). This would be Biblically forbidden because there is a positive commandment (besides the negative prohibition for a kohen gadol not to marry a widow) that a kohen gadol must marry a virgin. The positive commandment of yibum cannot override a negative prohibition and a positive commandment.

The Gemora proves that this explanation cannot be correct.

Rava offers another explanation: A kohen gadol cannot perform a yibum with his brother’s widow because only the first act of cohabitation is permitted (that is the mitzvah of yibum), but not the second act. We are concerned that the kohen gadol might cohabitate with her a second time, which would be forbidden. (20b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 19 - Highlights

According to Rabbi Oshaya, Rabbi Shimon disagrees in both cases and allows Levi, the new brother to perform a yibum with Reuven’s widow.

The first case (the Mishna in the beginning of the chapter):

There are two brothers, Reuven and Shimon; Reuven dies childless and then a third brother, Levi is born to them. The second brother, Shimon performs a yibum with Reuven’s wife, Penina, and then, he too, dies childless. Shimon had another wife, Chana, as well. They both (Penina and Chana) fall to yibum to Levi. Penina is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the wife of Levi’s brother (Reuven) who was not in his world (Reuven and Levi were not alive together). Chana is also exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the co-wife of an ervah.

Rabbi Shimon would permit Reuven’s wife, Penina to Levi even though Levi was born before Shimon took her in yibum.

The second case (our Mishna):

There were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon. Reuven died childless and Shimon performed a yibum on Reuven’s widow, Penina. A third brother, Levi was born and subsequently Shimon died childless. Shimon’s two widows fall for yibum to Levi. Penina is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the wife of Levi’s brother who was not in his world (Reuven and Levi were not alive at the same time.) Chana, Shimon’s original wife, is exempt as well because she is the co-wife of an ervah.

Rabbi Shimon disagrees and maintains that Levi may perform yibum or chalitzah with any one that he desires.

The Gemora asks: It is understandable why in the Rabbi Shimon disagrees in the latter case because when Levi was born, he found Penina (Reuven’s widow) in a permitted state (since she was married to Shimon at that time); however, what is his reasoning in the former case; when Levi was born, Penina was forbidden to him on account of her being the wife of his brother that was not in his world?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Shimon maintains that there is a zikah-attachment between every yavam and yevamah and this attachment is regarded like his complete wife. (Therefore, when Reuven dies and his widow, Penina falls for yibum to Shimon, it is as if she is Shimon’s full-fledged wife. When Levi was subsequently born, she did not fall for yibum to Levi, thus prohibiting her to Levi on account of her being the wife of his brother that was not in his world; rather, she is Shimon’s ‘wife’ and when Shimon dies, she is falling for yibum to Levi on account of being Shimon’s wife, not Reuven’s.)

Rav Yosef asks: We have learned regarding a case where there was a zikah and a ma’amar that Rabbi Shimon is uncertain if the zikah-attachment will result in the yevamah being considered a full-fledged wife or not; can there be any question that zikah alone (without a ma’amar) can certainly not result in the yevamah being considered a full-fledged wife?

In which case was Rabbi Shimon uncertain? The Gemora cites the Mishna (31b): There were three brothers who were married to three unrelated women, and one of them, Reuven died. The second brother, Shimon married the yevamah by ma'amar (Biblically, the yavam cohabits with the yevamah, thus acquiring her. The Rabbis established ma’amar, the betrothal of a yevamah as a prelude to yibum.), and he died. Reuven’s original wife falls for yibum to the third remaining brother, Levi. Levi must perform chalitzah, but he cannot perform a yibum. This is derived from a Scriptural verse which states that a yevamah can be taken in yibum only if there was a zikah (an attachment on the account of yibum) from one brother; not when there is a zikah from two brothers. (The yevamah is doubly subject to yibum, on account of her Biblical marriage with Reuven and her Rabbinical marriage with Shimon.)

Rabbi Shimon disagrees and maintains that Levi can perform a yibum with whichever one he wishes and he must perform a chalitzah with the other one. Rabbi Shimon holds that ma’amar is considered a complete marriage or is it entirely ineffective. If ma’amar accomplishes that she is now considered Shimon’s wife, Levi can perform yibum with whichever woman he wishes because they are both Shimon’s wives, and not Reuven’s. It is for this reason that he cannot perform yibum with both women. If ma’amar is entirely ineffective, Reuven’s widow is falling for yibum only on the account of Reuven and she can still be taken in yibum. In any event, it is evident that Rabbi Shimon is uncertain if a zikah-attachment and ma’amar will result in the tevamah being regarded as a full-fledged wife.

Abaye answers that there is a distinction between the Mishna’s case where there is only one surviving brother and the other cases where there are two remaining brothers. Rabbi Shimon maintains that when there is only one yavam, the zikah-attachment is regarded as a complete marriage; however, when there are two brothers, he does not say this; only ma’amar can accomplish this.

The Gemora objects to this distinction: The Gemora cites a braisa which indicates that Rabbi Shimon maintains that if the new brother was born before the widow is taken for yibum, she is forbidden to the new brother in any future yibum situation even if there was only one brother. (18b -19a)

Rav Oshaya asks on Rabbi Oshaya (two different people) from a Mishna (28b): Three were three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi. If two of them (Reuven and Shimon) are married to two sisters, or to a woman and her daughter, or to a woman and her daughter's daughter, or to a woman and her son's daughter (and both Reuven and Shimon die childless), these two women require chalitzah, but they may not be taken in yibum (since each one of these women is an ervah from the other zekukah). Rabbi Shimon exempts even from chalitzah.

The Gemora asks: If Rabbi Shimon maintains that there is a zikah-attachment between every yavam and yevamah and this attachment is regarded like his complete wife, why can’t the third brother Levi perform a yibum or chalitzah with Reuven’s wife and Shimon’s wife should be exempt from yibum and chalitzah? (Since Reuven died first, there should be a zikah-attachment from Reuven’s widow to Levi, tantamount to a complete marriage, which should preclude any zikah from Shimon’s widow to Levi on account that she is an ervah to Levi.)

Rav Amram answers: This is actually what Rabbi Shimon meant to say; he exempts the widow who fell to yibum second. (He may perform a yibum or chalitzah with the first widow.)

The Gemora asks: This cannot be the correct interpretation, for we learned in a braisa that Rabbi Shimon exempts both widows from yibum and chalitzah?

Rava answers: When Rabbi Shimon said that both widows are exempt, he meant that the second one from this pair and the second one from that pair is exempt from yibum and chalitzah. (Rava’s interpretation of the case is as follows: Reuven was married to two women, Sora and Rochel. Shimon was also married to two women, Rivka and Leah. Rivka was Sora’s daughter and Leah was Rochel’s sister. Reuven died first. Levi can perform yibum or chalitzah with any one of Reuven’s widows. Shimon’s widows are exempt from yibum and chalitzah. The reasoning is as follows: When Reuven dies childless; one of his wives is considered a full-fledged wife to Levi on account of the zikah-attachment. Whichever one this turns out to be has a relative who is married to Shimon, either a daughter or a sister. It emerges that when Shimon also dies childless, one of his wives is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is a relative of Levi’s zikah-wife and the other one is exempt because she is a co-wife of an ervah.)

The Gemora states that Rava’s interpretation is flawed: Firstly, the Mishna states that the cases independently of one another. One case is with two sisters and another case is referring to a woman and her daughter; Rava explained that they are all one case.

Secondly, the Mishna lists four cases; two sisters, a woman and her daughter, a woman and her daughter's daughter, or a woman and her son's daughter. According to Rava that each brother had four wives, the Mishna should have stated that Rabbi Shimon exempts all four from yibum and chalitzah?

Furthermore, it was taught explicitly in a braisa that Rabbi Shimon exempts the widow from each brother from chalitzah and yibum.

Rav Ashi answers: The Mishna is dealing with a case that both brothers died precisely at the same moment; each widow will be exempt from yibum and chalitzah because each one of them is an ervah from the zikah-wife. If Reuven would have died first, Levi would be permitted to perform yibum with his widow and Shimon’s widow would be released without yibum or chalitzah. (19a)

The Gemora cites a dissenting opinion: Rav Pappa disagrees with Rabbi Oshaya in his interpretation of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion. Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Shimon maintains that Levi can perform a yibum with Shimon’s widow only when Shimon performed a yibum with Reuven’s widow and then Levi was born. If however, Levi was born and then Shimon performed a yibum with Reuven’s widow, she will always remain forbidden to Levi.

The Gemora quotes a braisa that supports Rav Pappa’s understanding of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion and refutes Rabbi Oshaya’s explanation. (19a – 19b)

The Gemora cites a braisa: Reuven and Shimon were contemporary brothers and Reuven died childless. Shimon planned to perform a ma'amar to his yevamah, but before he managed to perform a ma’amar to her, a third brother, Levi was born and subsequently Shimon died childless. The first (Reuven’s wife) is exempt from yibum and chalitzah on account that she is the wife of his brother who was not in his world, whereas the second (Shimon’s wife) can be taken for yibum or chalitzah.

The Gemora asks: What is the meaning of “he planned to perform a ma’amar,” and what is the meaning of “but before he managed to perform a ma’amar to her”? Why should it make a difference if he wanted to perform ma’amar?

The Gemora answers: We are referring to a case where he wanted to perform a ma’amar with her consent, but at the end, he performed it against her will.

This does not follow Rebbe’s opinion, for Rebbe holds that a forced ma’amar is valid, and the Chachamim disagree.

The Gemora explains this dispute: Rebbe compares ma’amar to yibum. Just like, one may perform a yibum without the consent of the yevamah, so too, a ma’amar without her consent is valid. The Chachamim compare ma’amar to a regular betrothal between a man and a woman. Just like a betrothal is only effective if the woman agrees, so too, ma’amar will only be valid with the consent of the yevamah. (19b)

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Monday, May 21, 2007

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 18 - MA’AMAR AND KIDDUSHIN

Why is the betrothal of a yavam called ma’amar and not kiddushin like the marriage of any woman?

The Beis Aharon of Karlin answered this question at a siyum on Maseches Yevamos.

Firstly, we must explain why marrying a woman is referred to as a kiddushin. It is derived from the word ‘hekdesh,’ a consecration. The concept of consecrating an object is that something that was permitted to the entire world now becomes forbidden. This is true by kiddushin, as well. A woman is permitted to everyone until a man performs a kiddushin with her; she now becomes forbidden to the entire world.

A yevamah is different. She was married to a man and prohibited to marry anyone else. When her husband died childless, she is a yevamah awaiting either a yibum or chalitzah. She is still forbidden to marry anyone else. When the yavam betroths her, this cannot be referred to as a kiddushin because she was forbidden to everyone beforehand.

Why is the betrothal called ma’amar? The essence of yibum is to perpetuate the name of the deceased. Yibum is actually a resurrection for the deceased brother. Ma’amar is the word of Hashem that brings the dead back to life as it is written: mechaye meisim b’ma’amoro, He resurrects the dead with His words. This explains why the betrothal of a yevamah is called ma’amar.

It is well known that Shabbos is a sampling of the World to Come. This is why we say in the zemiros of Shabbos: tehorim yiroshua vikadshua b’ma’amar kol asher asah vayechal Elokim bayom hashivii.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 18 - Highlights

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: If a woman awaiting the decision of the yavam died, the yavam is permitted to marry her mother. This obviously indicates that Rav maintains that no zikah (an attachment on the account of yibum, which would create halachos similar to marriage) exists between the yevamah and the yavam.

The Gemora asks: Let him then say, the halachah is in accordance with the view of the one who doesn’t hold of zikah?

The Gemora answers: If he would have said so, it might have been suggested that this applied only to the case where there are at least two surviving brothers, but that in the case of one brother, a zikah does exist.

The Gemora asks: Then let him say, the halachah is in accordance with the view of the one who doesn’t hold of zikah even in the case of one brother?

The Gemora answers: If he would have said so, it might have been assumed that there is no zikah even where the yevamah is alive (and he would be permitted to marry her mother then); Rav Huna taught us that only after the yevamah dies is he permitted to marry her mother, and not when she is still alive, because it is forbidden to abolish the commandment of yibum (marrying her mother would exempt the yevamah from yibum and chalitzah). (17b)

Rav Yehudah disagrees with Rav Huna: Rav Yehudah maintains that if a woman awaiting the decision of the yavam died, the yavam is still forbidden to marry her mother.

The Gemora asks: Let him then say, the halachah is in accordance with the view of the one who holds of zikah?

The Gemora answers: If he would have said so, it might have been suggested that this applied only to the case where there is but one brother, however when there are at least two surviving brothers, perhaps there is no zikah.

The Gemora asks: One could not possibly think that the dispute is only in a case where there is one brother because they explicitly argue in a case when there are two remaining brothers.

The Gemora answers: If he would have said so (the halachah is in accordance with the view of the one who holds of zikah), it might have been assumed that there is only a zikah when the yevamah is alive (and he would be prohibited to marry her mother then), but that after her death, the zikah is broken; Rav Yehudah taught us that the zikah is not automatically dissolved. (17b – 18a)

Abaye asks on Rav Yehudah from the following braisa: Reuven and Shimon were contemporary brothers and Reuven died childless. Shimon planned to perform a ma'amar to his yevamah, but before he managed to perform a ma’amar to her, a third brother, Levi was born and subsequently Shimon died childless. The first (Reuven’s wife) is exempt from yibum and chalitzah on account that she is the wife of his brother who was not in his world, whereas the second (Shimon’s wife) can be taken for yibum or chalitzah. Now, if you would say that a zikah does exist, Shimon’s wife should be regarded as a co-wife of the first wife, who is forbidden because she is the wife of his brother who was not in his world (and it should be forbidden for Levi to perform a yibum with her)?

The Gemora answers that this braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that there is no zikah. (18a)

The Gemora asks: Does Rabbi Meir actually hold that there is no zikah; we have learned in a Mishna otherwise? The Mishna states: There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. (The only reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) Now, if Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that no zikah exists, each yevamah is coming from two different houses, and one brother could marry the one while the other could marry the other?

The Gemora answers: Actually Rabbi Meir maintains that no zikah exists, but nevertheless, it would be forbidden to perform yibum with each of the widows. This is because a yibum with one can annul the precept of yibum with the other; if one of the brothers performs yibum with one sister and the other brother dies, there would be no possibility of yibum or chalitzah with her (since she is the yavam’s wife’s sister) and this would have negated the mitzvah of yibum with her.

The Gemora asks: If there is no zikah, we should not be concerned with the possibility of negating the mitzvah of yibum either? The Gemora proves this to be the case from Rabban Gamliel.

The Gemora answers that Rabbi Meir is concerned even when it is merely a possibility that the mitzvah of yibum will be negated and Rabban Gamliel is not concerned even when the mitzvah of yibum will certainly be negated. (18a)

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Rav Yehudah’s ruling follows his teacher Shmuel, for we have learned in a Mishna (41a): A woman was awaiting the decision of the yavam, and his brother (who is also a yavam) betrothed the yevamah’s sister; it was said in the name of Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira that we should tell him (the one who married the sister) to wait (from consummating the marriage) until his brother performs a yibum or chalitzah with the yevamah. (This ruling is based on the concept of zikah; the brother is forbidden to consummate the marriage with the sister of the yevamah because she is prohibited to him on account of her being the sister of his zekukah.) And Shmuel said: The halacha is like Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira. (18a – 18b)

The Mishna states: There were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon. Reuven died childless and Shimon performed a yibum on Reuven’s widow, Penina. A third brother, Levi was born and subsequently Shimon died childless. Shimon’s two widows fall for yibum to Levi. Penina is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the wife of Levi’s brother who was not in his world (Reuven and Levi were not alive at the same time.) Chana, Shimon’s original wife, is exempt as well because she is the co-wife of an ervah. If Shimon performed a ma’amar with Penina and then died childless, Levi can perform chalitzah, but not yibum.



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Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Mishna’s fist ruling. He maintains that Levi may perform yibum or chalitzah with any one that he desires. (This is because Reuven’s widow, Penina became Shimon’s wife before Levi was born; Penina never fell for yibum to Levi as the wife of his brother who was not in this world.) (18b)

Rabbi Oshaya states: Rabbi Shimon would disagree even in the case in the beginning of the chapter.



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There are two brothers, Reuven and Shimon; Reuven dies childless and then a third brother, Levi is born to them. The second brother, Shimon performs a yibum with Reuven’s wife, Penina, and then, he too, dies childless. Shimon had another wife, Chana, as well. They both (Penina and Chana) fall to yibum to Levi. Penina is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the wife of Levi’s brother (Reuven) who was not in his world (Reuven and Levi were not alive together). Chana is also exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the co-wife of an ervah.

Rabbi Shimon would permit Reuven’s wife, Penina to Levi even though Levi was born before Shimon took her in yibum. (18b)

The Gemora asks: If Rabbi Shimon disagrees in both cases, what would be a case of the wife of a brother that was not in his world, according to Rabbi Shimon?

The Gemora presents two cases: If there was only one brother and he died childless; afterwards another brother was born. The new brother may not perform a yibum on the wife of his brother that was not in his world. Another case is when there were two brothers and one of them died childless. The third brother, Levi was born and the second brother did not perform a yibum and did not die. The widow of the first brother will be forbidden to Levi even according to Rabbi Shimon. (18b)

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Sunday, May 20, 2007

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 17 - THE BRILLIANT WISDOM OF KING SOLOMON

Baruch Cohen (Jewish Law) quotes the famous Chazal regarding Shlomo Hamelech, and explains it with a brilliant and original answer from Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld from Kollel Iyun HaDaf. This is worthy of reading from beginning to end.
The Book of Kings [Melachim 1 3:12] states that Israel's great King Solomon was twelve years old when God promised him that he would be granted great wisdom. He turned out to be the wisest man ever to live. As an illustration of the fulfillment of this blessing of wisdom, the Book of Kings reports the following account of a case that was brought before King Solomon's court in Jerusalem.
Two women came to King Solomon and stood before him. One woman (#1) said: "My Lord, this woman and I dwell in the same house, and I gave birth to a child while with her in the house. On the third day after I gave birth, she also gave birth. We live together; there is no outsider with us in the house; only the two of us were there. The son of this woman died during the night because she lay upon him. She arose during the night and took my son from my side while I was asleep, and lay him in her bosom, and her dead son she laid in my bosom. when I got up in the morning to nurse my son, behold, he was dead! But when I observed him (later on) in the morning, I realized that he was not my son to whom I had given birth!"
The other woman (#2) replied: "It is not so! My son is the live one and your son is the dead one!"
The first woman (#1) responded: "It is not so! Your son is the dead one and my son is the living one!"
They argued before King Solomon.
King Solomon said: "this woman (#2) claims 'My son is the live one and your son is the dead one, 'and this woman (#1) claims 'Your son is the dead one and my son is the living one!"'
King Solomon said, "Bring me a sword!" So they brought a sword before the King. The King said, "Cut the living child in two, and give half to one and half to the other"
The woman (#2) turned to the King, because her compassion was aroused for her son, and said: "Please my Lord, give her the living child and do not kill it!"
But the other woman (#1) said: "Neither mine nor yours shall he be. Cut!"
The King spoke up and said: "Give her (#2) the living child, and do not kill it, for she is his mother!" All of Israel heard the judgment that the King had judged. They had great awe for the King, for they saw that the wisdom of God was within him to do justice. [I Melachim 3:16 - 27]. The woman was rightfully awarded custody of her son.
It should be noted, that King Solomon's was the first major recorded and published decision in the history of legal jurisprudence, and I believe that with the help of the commentaries, one can begin to appreciate the magnificent depth of his wisdom.
OBSERVATIONS
Some say that King Solomon truly knew who was the real mother as soon as he saw the two women. This was the nature of the special divine wisdom that God gave him. As King Solomon was able to understand the speech of the animals and the birds, so he could see the truth in someone's face. His knowledge was of Divine origin. It was infallible.
According to the Abarbanel and Metzudas David, King Solomon studied the countenance of each woman as they presented their claims and counter-claims, and by means of his penetrating and heavenly wisdom, understood which of the two women was telling the truth.
Still, to prove this to the people, he had to demonstrate it in a way that everyone would acknowledge. Perhaps that is why he pretended not to know who said what, and repeated their arguments in reverse order, by repeating Woman #2's argument first, and Woman #1's argument second.
He even pretended to apply the well-known law of dividing disputed property. If two people come to court holding on to the ends of a piece of clothing, and each claims it to be his, the court divides it and gives each one half. King Solomon seemed to pretend to be ignorant of the many complicated details of this law, and to think that it applied to babies as well, which would have been ridiculously simpleminded. No judge would ever make such a foolish mistake. Yet, he succeeded in convincing the two women that he was serious.
Nonetheless, he was careful not to let the trick go too far. He specifically commanded his servants to bring the sword to him, not to give it to one of the guards. They too, were no doubt fooled and he did not want them to divide the baby before he had a chance to stop them. In fact, the King's ministers said "Woe to you Oh Land, whose king is but a boy!" They thought "what has God done to us to give us such a king? How long will we have to suffer with such foolish judgments?" But afterwards, when they saw the women's reactions they knew that he had recently received Divine inspiration and rejoiced saying "Happy are you, oh Land, whose king is a free man!" - i.e., one who studies Torah (Koheles - Ecclesiastes 10:16-17).
King Solomon's trick succeeded. The imposter revealed herself by her heartless cruelty. After all, no mother would have let her own child be killed just to spite another woman.
But how could King Solomon have been sure the other woman would not also have mercy on the child? Wouldn't most people break down in such a situation and relinquish their claims? What sort of person would want to be responsible for the death of an innocent child, even if it were not her own?
Perhaps this was an aspect of the depth of King Solomon's insight - he knew that no normal mother lies on her own child and crushes him in her sleep. Babies always sleep with their mothers and fathers, yet this never happens, for perhaps God implants within a human being an innate sensitivity that prevents her from doing such a thing. A woman who lies on her child must be lacking basic human feeling, and such a person would certainly have no mercy on the child of another. According to the Abarbanel, perhaps such a woman developed a blood lust and possessed a cruel desire to see another life snuffed out.
And what of the compassionate one? Was it not possible that she was acting cunningly to impress the King with a false sense of motherly commiseration?
WHO HAD THE BETTER ARGUMENT?
Notwithstanding the outcome, many believe that Woman #1 still made a convincing and persuasive argument. She made it clear that there were no witnesses because they lived alone. Perhaps she suspected that Solomon would be able to tell how old the baby was and identify the mother. According to the Radak and the Metsudas David, her argument was bolstered by the claim that no one else knew the identities of the babies, nor had one been sick, that the neighbors might remember whose baby it was. When she first got up, it was still dark. She could not recognize the baby, so she did not suspect that it was not hers. All she knew was that it was dead. But when it got light, she saw it and realized what had happened. She asserted that her baby boy was born three days earlier, and therefore there was some reliable distinction available.
Woman #2 had only a brief presentation and did not claim to have any proof. She simply said that the child was hers. All she did was state her case.
Based on the first round of oral arguments, it would appear that Woman #1 had the better claim, and that she was the real mother.
It is noteworthy, that the women did not bring the corpse of the dead child for further identification. Perhaps the child was buried already, or its features were already changed making recognition difficult.
SUBTLE TRUTHS BEGIN TO UNRAVEL
Yet, as the women's dispute continued, their respective positions seemed to change ever so slightly. There was something disturbing and disingenuous about the way in which Woman #1 continued arguing her case, in that she subsequently seemed less concerned with having a live child and focused more on the other having the dead one. The fact that she mentioned the dead child first, in itself, was an indication of this ("It is not so! Your son is the dead one and my son is the living one!").
Woman #2, by contrast, always spoke of her own son first ("No. my son is the living one and your son is the dead one"). It seemed as if her heart was with her son. She spoke out of love and was apparently heartbroken at the thought of potentially losing her child.
According to the Devorim Rabah, King Solomon then repeated the arguments of both women, verbatim, without adding anything, making sure that he properly understood the arguments of both sides, listening carefully, and if there was anything that he misunderstood, the women had an opportunity to correct him.
ODD DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STORY
King Solomon's wisdom surely gave him the insight to foresee that the real mother (#2) would recoil in terror when she heard of his intention to kill the infant, nevertheless, could his wisdom have possibly predicted the liar (#1)'s response - to comply with this grotesque compromise?
Second, the woman who was lying (#1) was initially interested in taking the living child for herself, otherwise she never would have asserted such a bold and aggressive claim.
As soon as the real mother offered to let the liar keep the child in order to spare its life, the liar should have accepted the real mother offer's and kept the child. She could have played up her victory by saying: "Aha! She admits that the baby was truly mine all along! She is a kidnapper but not a murderer. The baby is mine." Instead, she did something totally unpredictable. She refused saying "Neither mine nor yours shall he be. Cut."
I have always wondered what made her suddenly lose interest in having the child for herself?
A brilliant and original answer to these questions is offered by Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld of Har Nof Jerusalem, of the Shmayisroel Torah Network (www.shemayisroel.co.il), who cited two 13th century commentators: Rav Yehoshua Ibn Shu'ib in his Drasha for Parshas Mishpatim, and Rav Menachem HaMeiri in his commentary to Yevamos 17a; and another 14th century commentator, the author of Shemen Rokeach and Sha'arHachazokas. They believe that in order to understand the real story behind King Solomon's decision, an understanding of the laws of Yibbum is necessary.
THE LAWS OF YIBBUM
The Torah describes the practice of Yibbum in the Parsha of Ki Setzei (Devarim 25:5,7,9):
"If there are brothers, and one of them dies without children, the wife of the deceased man may not marry out to another man. Her brother-in-law (her deceased husband's brother) must marry her and thus perform Yibbum on her ... If the man does not want to marry her, she shall approach the elders and declare 'My brother-in-law refuses to establish his brother's name in Israel; he does not consent to perform Yibbum on me'
... Then she shall approach him in the presence of the elders and remove his shoe from his foot, and spit in front of him and proclaim "Such should be done to a man who would not build up his brother's house!"
Yibbum is a Halachic rite which must be performed when a man who has a living brother dies childless. If this uncommon situation occurs, the widow must not remarry unless one of two actions are taken - either she must marry the brother of the deceased or she must be released from the obligation of marrying her brother-in-law by having him perform the Chalitzah ("removing" of the shoe) ceremony.
It is obviously uncomfortable for a woman to be trapped in this situation, wherein she would be subject to the will of another man. Her brother-in-law may not be locatable, compliant or appealing.
There are several fundamental laws concerning the childless nature of the deceased and the age of the bother that control whether Yibbum applies:
LAWS CONCERNING THE CHILDLESS NATURE OF THE DECEASED
1. Rule #1: The man must die childless. According to the Talmud Yevamos 87b, Dying childless includes instances where a man once had children, but these children were already dead at the time of his own death.
2. Rule #2: Grandchildren: According to the Talmud Yevamos 70a, if the deceased man has no living children but he does have living grandchildren, he is not considered to be childless, and therefore, there is no Yibbum obligation.
3. Rule #3: Offspring: According to Talmud Yevamos 11 lb and Shabbos 136a, if the deceased left behind any offspring at all, there is no Yibbum - even if the offspring is only one day old. Even if the offspring is still a viable fetus at the time of the husband's death, its mother is exempted from being bound to the living brother. If the fetus is a stillborn or is aborted, or dies, or is killed before it lived for thirty days, it is not considered to have ever been a viable offspring, and Yibbum would be required.
LAWS CONCERNING THE AGE OF THE DECEASED'S BROTHER
4. Rule #4: Brother-In-Law: According to the Talmud Yevamos 17b, the widow is obligated to marry her deceased husband's brother. If the deceased husband does not leave a living brother, his wife is free to marry whoever she pleases.
5. Rule #5: Minor: According to the Talmud Yevamos 1 05b, if the brother of the deceased is a minor, the widow is still bound to him, and does not have the option of freeing herself through Chalitzah since a minor lacks capacity to perform the ceremony. Instead she must wait until the brother reaches the age of majority (Bar Mitzvah 13) in order for him to render Chalitzah at that time. Only then may she remarry. According to the Talmud Niddah 45a if she wants to marry him, she must wait until he reaches 9 years of age.
APPLICATION & CONCLUSION
We now return to King Solomon's judgment.
The Midrash (Koheles Rabah 10:16) tells us that the reason both of these women were so desperate to have the living child declared theirs was that they were both potential Yevamos (widows subject to Yibbum). Neither of the two had any other offspring. Whoever would be judged to be the childless woman would not only lose the infant, but would also be trapped in the unpleasant status of Yevamah, being dependent upon her brother-in-law's good will.
The Midrash (Yalknt Shimoni 2:175) asserts that the husbands of the two women were father and son, making the two women, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law to each other.
According to the Meiri in his commentary to Yevamos 17a, the two Midrashim may be complementing each other - thanks to our 5-rule Yibbum analysis.
The two women - mother-in-law and daughter-in-law - had just lost their husbands, and needed a live child to exempt them from the status of a Yevamah. Both women gave birth to babies. However, these two babies were still less than 30 days old at the time that one of them died. The mother of the dead child would therefore be subject to the laws of Yibbum (Rule #3). This was the lying mother's motivation for taking the other woman's child.
If it were the mother-in-law's child who had died, she would have no incentive to kidnap her daughter-in-law's child. Even though her son (the deceased husband of her daughter-in-law) had passed away before her own husband had, and therefore he would not exempt her from Yibbum (Rule #1), nevertheless, she would be exempt from Yibbum for another reason. The living child was her son's child, and a grandchild exempts one from Yibbum (Rule #2).
Only the daughter-in-law had the motive to lie and try to claim that the child was hers. If it was her baby who had died within 30 days of its birth, leaving her childless, she would have been bound to her husband's brother as a Yevamah (Rule #4) - and that brother would have been -none other than the living baby (who was in fact her mother-in-law's child - i.e., her deceased husband's bother)! Since her brother-in-law was a newborn, the daughter-in-law would have had to wait 13 years before this baby would be able to perform Chalitzah on her and free her to remarry (Rule #5).
King Solomon realized all of this and suspected that since the only one with a strong motive to lie was the daughter-in-law, the child must really belong to the mother-in-law.
Perhaps this also explains why King Solomon ordered that the child be cut in half.
If the remaining child were to be killed, this too would free the daughter-in-law from her Yevamah status - since the living baby was her only brother-in-law (Rule #3). From the daughter-in-law's perspective, in fact, killing the child would result in a better solution for her. By just kidnaping the child she might have convinced the earthly court that she was not a Yevamah. However, she herself would know that the child was not really hers and that she really was not permitted to remarry, until Chalitzah was performed. By having the baby killed, though, she would truthfully be released from the bonds of Yibbum.
This is the reason the daughter-in-law suddenly lost interest in keeping the child when she saw that King Solomon was ready to cut the child in half. This would serve her interests even more if she took the child for herself. Therefore she insisted: "Cut!"
Young King Solomon guessed that this would be the woman's reaction. By tricking her into making a seemingly ludicrous statement, he revealed her true motives and that she was lying.
This is why, "All of Israel heard the judgment that the King had judged. They had great awe for the King, for they saw that the wisdom of God was within him to do justice."

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 17 - Highlights

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav Assi: If at the present time an idolater betroths a Jewish girl, we suspect that the kiddushin (betrothal) since it may be that he is from the Ten Tribes (Sancheriv exiled them prior to the destruction of the first Beis Hamikdosh. Rav Assi maintains that a child born from a Jewish man and a gentile woman is a Jewish mamzer.).

The Gemora asks: Why don’t we apply the rule that anything that separates is assumed to have been separated from the majority; and the majority of idolaters are not descendants from the Ten Tribes?

The Gemora answers: Rav Assi's statement is referring to places where the Ten Tribes have settled, and any doubt which is related to something “in its place” is regarded as having a probability of fifty-fifty. In the place where the Ten Tribes settled, we don’t apply the principle of majority. (16b)

The Gemora identifies the regions where the Ten Tribes settled. (16b – 17a)

Rav Yehudah said: When I said the statement before Shmuel (if at the present time an idolater betroths a Jewish girl, we suspect that the kiddushin (betrothal) since it may be that he is from the Ten Tribes), he told me: Your son who comes from a Jewish woman is called your son (he is considered Jewish), however, your son who comes from an idolatrous woman is not called your son, but rather he is called her son. (Accordingly, he is disagreeing with Rav Assi. He maintains that there is no reason to be concerned for an idolater’s betrothal being valid since the children born from a marriage between a Jewish man and a gentile woman are gentiles.)

The Gemora asks: Weren’t there Jewish women in the Ten Tribes, as well? If a gentile man married the Jewish woman, their children would be Jewish; there should be a concern for an idolater’s betrothal to a Jewish woman since his mother might have been Jewish, in which case he would be a Jew and his kiddushin would be valid.

The Gemora answers: There is a tradition that the Jewish women of that generation could not bear children (their wombs were torn due to the anguish of the journey into exile). (17a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
CHAMESH ESREI NASHIM

The Mishna asks: What is the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world (this brother and the yavam were not alive at the same time)? There are two brothers, Reuven and Shimon; Reuven dies childless and then a third brother, Levi is born to them. The second brother, Shimon performs a yibum with Reuven’s wife, Sora, and then, he too, dies childless. Shimon had another wife, Chana, as well. They both (Sora and Chana) fall to yibum to Levi. Sora is exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the wife of Levi’s brother (Reuven) who was not in his world (Reuven and Levi were not alive together). Chana is also exempt from yibum and chalitzah because she is the co-wife of an ervah.

If Shimon had performed a ma’amar (Biblically, the yavam cohabits with the yevamah, thus acquiring her. The Rabbis established ma’amar, the betrothal of a yevamah as a prelude to yibum.) with Sora instead of yibum and then he dies childless, Chana would require chalitzah, but not yibum. (17a)

Rav Nachman states: There are two versions in the Mishna. One refers to Sora as “the first one,” and one refers to her as “the second one.” Both versions are not mistaken, for she can understandable be called the “first” or the “second.” She can be called the “first” because she was the first to fall for yibum. She can be called the “second” because she was the second one married to Shimon.

The Gemora asks: Wouldn’t the halacha be the same if Shimon first performed a yibum with Sora and then married Chana (and then Sora was married first, not second)?

The Gemora answers: Rather, the “second” is referring to the fact that it is her second time falling for yibum (once on account of being Reuven’s wife and once because of Shimon). (17a – 17b)

The Gemora inquires as to the source for the exemption of the wife of a brother who was not in this world. Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: It is written [Devarim 25:5]: When brothers dwell together. We derive from here that in order to be permitted to perform yibum, the brothers must be alive together.

The word together in the verse teaches us that yibum is only applicable to paternal brothers, who are together in regards to inheritance, not maternal brothers.

Rabbah derives this halacha from a gezeira shavah (one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics – it links two similar words from dissimilar verses in the Torah). (17b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 16 - RABBI DOSA AND THE SAGES

The Gemora states that in the times of Rabbi Dosa ben Hurkenas, the co-wife of a daughter was permitted to the yavam. This is a clear proof that Beis Shamai practiced according to their own opinion.

The Gemora cites the entire incident: In the times of Rabbi Dosa ben Hurkenas, the co-wife of a daughter was permitted to the yavam.

This ruling was extremely troubling to the Sages, because Rabbi Dosa was a great Torah scholar and his eyes had stopped seeing, so that he was unable to come to the Beis Medrash to study. A discussion took place as to who should go and notify him that they disagree with him. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them, “I will go.” They asked, “And who will go after him?” Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah agreed to go. They asked, “And who will go after him?” Rabbi Akiva agreed to go.

They went and stood at the entrance of his house. His maid entered and told him, “Master, the Sages of Israel have come to visit you.” He said to her, “Let them enter,” and they entered. He took hold of Rabbi Yehoshua and sat him upon a golden couch. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him, “Master, tell your other disciple to sit down.” Rabbi Dosa asked Rabbi Yehoshua, “Who is he?” Rabbi Yehoshua answered, “He is Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah.” Rabbi Dosa exclaimed, “Does our friend Azaryah have a son?” He applied to him the following Scriptural text [Tehillim 37:25]: I have been young and now I am old; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his children begging for bread. He took hold of him also and sat him upon a golden couch. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him, “Master, tell your other disciple to sit down.” Rabbi Dosa asked Rabbi Yehoshua, “Who is he?” Rabbi Yehoshua answered, “He is Akiva ben Yosef.” Rabbi Dosa exclaimed, “Are you the Akiva ben Yosef whose name is known from one end of the world to the other! Sit down, my son, sit down. May there be many men like you in Israel.”

Thereupon, they began to pester him with all sorts of halachic questions on until they reached that of the co-wife of a daughter. They asked him, “What is the halachah regarding the co-wife of a daughter?” He answered them, “This is a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel.” They asked him, “In accordance with whose ruling is the halachah?” He replied, “The halachah is in accordance with the ruling of Beis Hillel.” They said to him, “But, it was reported in your name that the halachah is in accordance with the ruling of Beis Shamai?” He asked them: “Did you hear it in the name of Dosa or the son of Hurkenas?” They replied, “By the life of our Master, we only heard the son of Hurkenas.” He said to them, “I have a younger brother who is very stubborn and his name is Yonasan and he is a disciple of Shamai. Be careful that he does not crush you regarding halachic matters, because he has three hundred answers to prove that the co-wife of a daughter is permitted. But I call the heavens and the earth to witness that upon this mortar sat the prophet Chaggai and issued three rulings: A co-wife of a daughter is forbidden; tithes could be taken from grain in the lands of Ammon and Moav during the shemitah year; and that converts may be accepted from the Karduyites and the Tarmodites (they were not suspected of being mamzeirim).

The braisa continues: When they came, they entered through one doorway; but when they left, they left through three different doorways. Yonasan met Rabbi Akiva. He questioned him and silenced him. He asked him, “Are you the Akiva whose name is known from one end of the world to the other? You are fortunate indeed to have merited such a name, but you have not yet reached the level of an oxherd.” Rabbi Akiva replied (with humility), “I have not even reached the level of shepherds.”

*** Why were the Sages troubled because Rabbi Dosa was a great Torah scholar; since the correct ruling was that the co-wife of the daughter is forbidden, he would certainly admit? (Arvei Nachal)

*** Why did Rabbi Dosa take hold of Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and seat them on the golden couch, but he did not do that to Rabbi Akiva; he merely instructed him to sit down? (Ben Yehoyadah)

*** Why is an oxherd regarded as a higher level that a shepherd? (Igrah D’Kallah)

*** How can a shepherd be considered degrading; weren’t all our Patriarchs, Moshe and King David all shepherds? (Chasam Sofer)

(Kaftor Vaferech)

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