The Famous Taz

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Estate Money and Interest

The Gemora allowed an administrator of an estate to invest the orphan’s money in an investment with favorable terms for them, although this is generally Rabbinically prohibited.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 160:18), based on the Rambam and Rosh, applies this license to all Rabbinically prohibited interest, and extends this to money of charity, money donated to Torah scholars, and money donated for use in a synagogue.

What did the Torah Permit?

The Gemora quotes a statement of Rav Huna that prohibits charging interest from a non Jew. The Gemora debates why this is prohibited, and how to reconcile this statement with the verse and Mishna that seem to permit such a loan.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) asks why the Gemora was concerned with reconciling this Rabbinic law with the verse and Mishna, and answers that the Gemora assumed that the Sages would not prohibit something the Torah permitted.

The Taz states in numerous places that although the Sages have leeway to enact their own new prohibitions, they may not prohibit something explicitly permitted by the Torah.

The Taz in YD 117:1 applies this to the Rabbinic prohibition on commerce in forbidden foods. Since the Torah explicitly allows one to sell neveilah meat to a non Jew, the Rabbinic prohibition had to allow for such commerce when one chanced upon the forbidden food, so as to not fully prohibit an act the Torah explicitly allows.

The Taz in OC 588:5 discusses a question raised by earlier poskim. We find the Sages prohibited the performance of numerous mitzvos on Shabbos (e.g., Shofar, Lulav), due to a concern of one accidentally carrying to perform the mitzvah. Why did the Sages not apply this to bris milah, prohibiting a bris milah which falls on a Shabbos.

The Taz says that since the Torah explicitly said that one must perform a bris milah on the eighth day, even if it is a Shabbos, the Sages could not prohibit it.

The Chavos Yair 142 challenges this Taz from our Gemora, among others. Our Gemora is an instance where the Sages prohibited an action explicitly permitted by the Torah – i.e., charging a non Jew interest on a loan. Therefore, the Chavos Yair rejects the Taz’s thesis.

Later poskim dispute the Chavos Yair’s disproof. The Shla, quoted by the Chasam Sofer (YD 106), says that the Sages did not prohibit charging a non Jew interest, since that is indeed explicitly permitted by the Torah. Instead, the Sages prohibited a Jew from lending to a non Jew at all, and only thereby precluded the Jew from receiving interest from him.

The Chasam Sofer (YD 106, 109) says that Tosfos themselves (70b Tashich, 64b v’Lo) seem to support the Taz, and actually explain the Gemora based on his principle. According to Tosfos, when the Gemora challenged Rav Nachman from the verse, the Gemora was stating that since the Torah explicitly allowed a Jew to charge a non Jew interest, the Sages cannot prohibit it. The Chasam Sofer says that the reason the Sages were allowed to do so is due to the exclusions built in to their prohibitions (for livelihood, or for a Torah scholar). Just as the Sages allowed commerce in forbidden food when the Jew chanced upon it in order to avoid explicitly prohibiting an act allowed by the Torah, so too, the Sages allowed charging a non Jew interest in some cases, to avoid explicitly such a prohibition.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 1:134) says that the Gemora’s answer that we read the verse only as tashich – explicitly allowing a Jew only to pay interest, means that the Torah never did explicitly allow a Jew to charge interest, giving the Sages the leeway to prohibit it. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger YD 117 on the Taz for more details.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) says that nowadays we lend money to non Jews with interest. Tosfos advances three reasons for this behavior:
1. The economic situation and lack of other professions available to Jews makes the interest necessary for the creditor’s basic needs, in which case it is permitted.
2. Ravina’s answer understood that the prohibition was to limit our interactions with non Jews. Since we are forced into such interactions due to economic circumstances, there is no added interaction that will be prevented by refraining from charging interest.
3. The second version of Rav Huna’s statement does not prohibit interest from a non Jew at all, but only prioritized an interest free loan to a Jew above it.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 159:1) rules that charging interest from a non Jew is prohibited by the Sages, unless the creditor needs the interest for his basic needs, or is a Torah scholar. However, the Shulchan Aruch says that it is permitted nowadays, based on the first two reasons of Tosfos (see Shach 2).

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Insights on Bava Kamma - 76

Too late to redeem?

Tosfos (76a shechitah) asks why we consider the slaughtering of a sacrifice outside of the Temple to be unusable. Rabbi Shimon holds that an animal with a blemish can be redeemed as long as it is moving, even after slaughtering. Once the animal is slaughtered, the slit throat is a definite blemish, and should be grounds for redemption.

Tosfos answers that only blemishes that were present before an animal died are grounds for redemption, but that redemption can occur as long as the animal is still moving.

Tahi bah

The Rishonim discuss the exact meaning of this word, used to describe Rabbi Elozar’s objection to the cases offered by Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish.

Rashi explains that the word is a borrowed term from wine inspection. The Gemora in Bava Basra refers to someone who smelled wine, and uses the same verb tahi . Similarly, Rashi explains that Rabbi Elozar was inspecting the statements, and delving into them, to understand them better.

The Shitah Mekubetzes, on the other hand, quotes an opinion that explains this word as a form of the more common matma - he was amazed.

Sacrificial slaughtering

Rashi states that Rabbi Elozar was challenging both Rish Lakish, who offered the case of a sacrifice with a blemish, as well as Ravin, who offered the case of a sacrifice that was successfully brought (including splashing of the blood), but not for the sake of its owner. Rashi understands Rabbi Elozar’s objection to apply even to Ravin, because even in a case where the sacrifice turned out to be valid and edible, the fact remains that as of the time of the slaughtering, it was not yet edible, since the splashing was not done.

Tosfos (76b v’halo zrika) states that Rabbi Elozar was challenging Rish Lakish, but only Rav Dimi’s version of Rabbi Yochanan’s answer – the case of the sacrifice whose blood was spilled before being splashed. Tosfos explains that their understanding of the Gemora in Chulin 80b is that the need for splashing blood can invalidate a slaughtering only if it was not ultimately done. Splashing of blood which was ultimately done will definitely make the slaughtering an edible one, retroactively.

Rashi, on the other hand, has a different text in the Gemora in Chulin, and therefore holds that even slaughtering a sacrifice which was successfully completed, including splashing the blood, does not render the slaughtering re’uyah since at the time of slaughtering, the animal was not edible.

See Pnei Yehoshua for a discussion of whether Rashi holds that Rabbi Elozar was also challenging Rav Dimi.

Just as if...

The Gemora stated that Rabbi Shimon holds a general rule of kol ha’omed - anything destined for a specific action is considered as if the action were already done. Tosfos (76b v’halo zrika) narrows the scope of Rabbi Shimon’s rule to cases where the subsequent action is mandated – a mitzvah. In that case, since the action not just may be performed, but is supposed to be performed, we can act as if it’s already done.

The halachah rules like the Chachamim. The Aruch Hashulchan infers from this topic a number of halachic conclusions. One of them is in the halachos of a shofar. The Gemora states that a shofar that is cracked is unfit. There is debate in the Rishonim on what extent of a crack invalidates a shofar, both for vertical and horizontal cracks. The Rosh (R”H 3:6) cites an opinion that any sized vertical crack (i.e., along the pathway of the air flow), no matter how small, invalidates the shofar, since the more it is blown, the larger the crack will become. The Aruch Hashulchan (O”H 586:15) states that this opinion does not invalidate it from the Torah, since we rule like the Chachamim. Rabbi Shimon can hold that a shofar that will become fully cracked is considered currently cracked, as part of his general opinion of kol ha’omed. The Chachamim, however, do not agree with this rule, and therefore would not consider the shofar already cracked. Since we do not rule like Rabbi Shimon, the invalidation must be on a Rabbinic level, lest we use a fully cracked shofar. [According to Tosfos’s limitation of Rabbi Shimon, it is debatable if Rabbi Shimon would apply kol ha’omed to a cracked shofar. There is no mitzvah of cracking the shofar, per se, but there is a mitzvah to blow in it, which would crack it further.]

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Decree when the reason no longer applies

Tosfos (Daf Yomi: Gittin 18a) asks: One of the reasons mentioned for the decree that the date should be recorded on a get is because perhaps the husband will want to save his niece from capital punishment if she committed adultery. Nowadays, Tosfos asks, when we do not execute anyone, why is there still a necessity to write the date in the get?

The Avnei Neizer (E”H: 188) cites a challenge to Tosfos’ question: Although the reason may not be applicable, the sages’ decree should still apply unless a greater Beis Din comes and nullifies it!

He answers that Tosfos understood that the initial decree was only established in a time and a place where they administered capital punishment. Accordingly, if nowadays, it is universal that we do not execute anyone, we are not nullifying the decree; rather, the enactment was never instituted for such cases. This is why it is not necessary for another Beis Din to annul the initial decree.

This would be comparable to that which Tosfos in Beitzah (6a) states: Tosfos writes that a matter that was only prohibited because of a specific concern will be permitted when the concern no longer exists. This principle justifies why we do not have to be concerned for water that was exposed at night and one is allowed to drink from it because in modern times snakes are not frequent in our homes.

The Gemora (Beitzah 30a) cites a Mishna that states that one is not allowed to clap or dance on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Rashi explains that the reason that one is prohibited from performing any of these actions is because they can lead to one fixing musical instruments. Tosfos states that this prohibition only applied in those days when they were experts in fashioning musical instruments. Presently, however, the decree does not apply, because we do not know how to fashion these instruments.

The Rema (O.C. 339:3) rules in accordance with Tosfos. Teshuvos HaRema (125) writes that there was an incident where a marriage occurred on Friday night and the people were not concerned that the groom would write the kesuvah, marriage contract on Shabbos. The reason for this permit was because it is not common in our times for the groom to write his own kesuvah.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l poses an interesting question. The halacha is that presently we do not have a legally qualified reshus harabim and for this reason one would be permitted to walk in a public thoroughfare on Shabbos while wearing various ornaments. According to this ruling, then, why are we still forbidden to blow shofar, shake a lulav and read the Megillah. Regarding these mitzvos there is a concern that one may come to carry the shofar, lulav or Megillah in the reshus harabim. Yet, the halachah is that our public thoroughfares are not deemed to be a legal reshus harabim, so we should no longer have these concerns.

Reb Shlomo Zalman also questions the opinion of the Raavad who maintains that muktzah is forbidden on account of a rabbinical decree that one should not come to carry into a reshus harabim. Why should this decree still apply when there is no longer a legally qualified reshus harabim?

Rav Shlomo Zalman explains that Tosfos is only referring to musical instruments. In previous times, everyone was capable of playing and repairing musical instruments. For this reason there was a decree prohibiting clapping and dancing. In our times, however, only a minority of people is capable of fixing musical instruments and because it is uncommon for people to fix musical instruments, there is no necessity for the decree against clapping and dancing.

Rabbah (Beitzah 5a) maintained that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai rescinded the prohibition against accepting witnesses after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, and subsequently an egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah was permitted to be eaten on the second day. Rav Yosef challenged Rabbah’s ruling because if the Chachamim assembled to render a ruling, they would need to reassemble to revoke their ruling. Rav Yosef added that one could not say that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai convened with his colleagues to permit one to eat the egg, because their decision was only to accept the testimony after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, but they never took a vote on permitting the egg to be eaten.

Tosfos HaRosh in Avodah Zara (2a) rules that one is permitted to conduct business with gentiles during their holiday season as initially this was prohibited because gentiles in the past worshipped idols and now that gentiles do not worship idols, the decree is irrelevant.

Tosfos in Brachos (53b) writes that people are not scrupulous regarding mayim acharonim, washing the hands at the end of a meal, because we no longer have melach sedomis, salt from Sodom. Tosfos notes that although the practice of washing mayim achronmim was instituted by an assembly of a Bais Din, this institution was not unanimously accepted and thus this institution is not categorized as a ruling that is irrevocable unless a Bais Din reassembles and rescinds the ruling.

Reb Shlomo Kluger in Elef Lecho Shlomo (116) rules that one is permitted to learn by candlelight on Shabbos and we are not concerned that he may come to move the wick which will cause the fire to burn brighter, thus violating a biblical prohibition, because one does not need to move the wick of our present-day candles.

Teshuvos HaRosh (klal 2:8) rules that one is permitted to tie strings of linen on a four-cornered garment that is made from linen to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis and we are not concerned that one might tie strings of wool to the garment. The reason for this ruling is because all know that techeiles, a blue-dyed wool used for tzitzis, is not prevalent, thus there is no permit to tie strings of wool to a linen garment.

Teshuvos HaRosh writes that if is common knowledge why a decree was instituted and the rationale no longer applies, then the decree is considered irrelevant. Teshuvos HaRosh draws a contrast of this supposition to the case in our Gemora regarding the egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah, because some people are not aware whey the egg was initially prohibited, nor do they understand why the reason to prohibit no longer applies.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halachah rules that if necessary, one is permitted to take medicine on Shabbos. Taking medicine on Shabbos was initially forbidden as there was a concern that one would violate the prohibition of grinding. Now that medicine is prepared by the manufacturer and most people are not even aware of the process involved in manufacturing the medicine, there is no longer a concern that one who wishes to take medicine will violate the Shabbos prohibition of grinding herbs or spices.

[END]

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Postponing Yom Kippur

The Gemora asks: Yom Kippur that falls out on a Monday should be postponed until Tuesday because of the concern that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the feast that will be held on the day prior to Yom Kippur?

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: It would emerge that Rosh Hashanah would be on A Sunday, and we have a principle that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on Sunday, Wednesday or Friday?

He answers: The reason that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on a Tuesday is because then, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos; that is also a preventive measure. The decree based on the concern of slaughtering a young bird takes precedence over the decree of taking the aravos on Shabbos. The reason is: Here, there are no other options; by Hoshanah Rabbah, there is an option, namely, not to take the aravos on Shabbos, just like the shofar is not blown and the lulav is not taken on Shabbos.

The Chasam Sofer answers: While it’s true that if Yom Kippur is postponed until Tuesday, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos, it is nevertheless preferable to uphold the decree of not slaughtering a young bird on Shabbos and sounding the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, even though we will forfeit the mitzvah of taking the aravos on Hoshanah Rabbah. Two is better than one.

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NATURE IS SUBJUGATED TO THE TORAH AND ITS CHACHAMIM - Yevamos 42 - Daf Yomi

Meoros HaDaf Yomi Vol. 296 brings the Gemara in Niddah which states something astounding. The nine months of pregnancy become shorter or longer according to how the Sanhedrin determines the calendar! The Gemara says that the shofar blown at the start of the month to announce the new month as determined by the beis din causes a new calculation concerning everything connected with calculating various dates.

The Rashba writes (Toras HaBayis, bayis 7, sha’ar 3,amud 9): “Certainly the shofar is the cause, because everything that beis din below does, the beis din on High agrees, as we are told: ‘(the appointed times) that you (beis din) shall call them’.” Hashem gave power to the beis din below and gave them authority and responsibility to decide the length of months and declare leap years by adding a month.

The Rashba says that if beis din declares a leap year, they delay Pesach by a month: on the days that originally would have been Pesach it is allowed to eat chametz, and they fixed a new Pesach.

The Rashba continues that the beis din above behaves according to the rulings of the beis din below. Even nature changes according to their decisions. We have gathered a few interesting examples to demonstrate this wonderful connection between people and the Heavenly beis din, by means of the Torah.

An infant suckles: A nursing mother is forbidden to re-wed till her infant becomes two years old (Yevamos 42a; Shulchan ‘Aruch, E.H. 13:11) lest she become pregnant and cut off the source of her infant’s sustenance while her husband, who is not the infant’s father, won’t see to alternative food. In a leap year, the author of Terumas HaDeshen writes (Responsa, 216), she must wait 25 months, as the Gemara explains that the suckling period is two years and in the leap year the suckling period is prolonged according to the year! (We should point out that the Remo ruled the halachah only “to worry as a first preference” while others disagree; see Pischei Teshuvah, ibid, S.K. 16, and Responsa Chasam Sofer, E.H. 137).

Treifah: A treifah animal (whose body is defective such that it cannot live longer than 12 months) doesn’t live longer than 12 months but some say that in a leap year it can live 13 months! (Shach, Y.D. 57, S.K. 18, and see Pri Chadash, ibid).

An animal’s life depends on the chacham’s ruling: The Chazon Ish zt”l writes (O.C. 39, os 15) wonderful things about the power of Torah: “But deciding the measure of an individual treifah was given to the chacham and what appears to him, is the root of the halachah said to Moshe at Mount Sinai… and it’s possible that its life depends on the chacham’s ruling, if the ruling was made during its life.” Worms live long: Certain fruits have worms in them only while they’re still attached to the tree. These fruits must be examined during 12 months after picking as the worm lives for six months and its body disintegrates after six more months and then there is no prohibition to eat it (Shulchan ‘Aruch, Y.D. 84:8, and ‘Aroch HaShulchan, ibid, se’if 66). However, in a leap year the worms live longer and the fruit should be examined for 13 months! (See Pri Megadim, ibid, and Gilyon Maharsha, ibid).

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 8 - BLOWING EXTRA

The Shaagas Aryeh (103) rules: It is permitted for one to blow shofar for no apparent reason on Rosh Hashanah.

The Meishiv Davar (1:36) disagrees and states that there is a Rabbinic decree against blowing a shofar on Yom Tov; the positive commandment of blowing the shofar overrides the Rabbinic injunction. Once a person has fulfilled the mitzva, there is no reason to blow anymore and it would be prohibited for him to sound the shofar.

However, he proves from our Gemora, that as long as has not had a lapse in concentration regarding the mitzva and he still intends to perform the mitzva, he may do so.

Our Gemora states: One who designated ten animals for his shalmei chagigah, he is permitted to offer them all as korbanos and they override the prohibition against bringing vow offerings on Yom Tov. The Yerushalmi states that it is allowed even if he originally designated one animal and afterwards decided to bring another one; as long as his intention is for the shalmei chagigah, it is permitted.

Therefore, he concludes, that one may blow the shofar on Rosh Hashanah as many times as he wants, provided that his intention is for the fulfillment of the mitzva.

It is said over that the Maharil Diskin used to listen to thousands of shofar blasts on Rosh Hashanah; for he wanted to be certain that he had fulfilled the mitzva properly. He was extremely particular that the shofar blast should be of one continuous tone.

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Daf Yomi - Taanis 14 - SHOFAR OR TRUMPETS ON A FAST DAY

The Mishna had stated that they would cry out during the last seven fasts. The Gemora presents a dispute as to the meaning of “cry out.” Rav Yehuda maintains that they would cry out by sounding the shofar and it was said in the name of Rav that they would cry out by reciting aneinu. It is evident from this Gemora that shofaros were used on a fast day.

The Rishonim ask that from the Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (27a), it would seem that they blew chatzotzros (trumpets) on a fast day. The braisa there states that outside of the Beis Hamikdosh, whenever there is an obligation for shofar (Rosh Hashanah), there are no trumpets and whenever there is an obligation for trumpets, a shofar is not blown. Rashi learns that the day we are referring to is a fast day.

The Ramban (in Milchamos R”H) disagrees with Rashi in Rosh Hashanah and explains that the Gemora in Rosh Hashanah is not referring to a fast day; rather it is referring to a time of war as the passuk there explicitly states. The obligation of sounding the trumpets is only by matters that are relevant to the entire Klal Yisroel. In the Beis Hamikdosh, where a large representation of Klal Yisroel was present, there also was a mitzva to sound the chatzotzros. Even though, other sufferings are derived from that passuk, nevertheless the obligation for trumpets is exclusive to a war. Therefore, only the shofar is blown on a fast day, and not the chatzotzros.

The Raavad answers that there are actually two distinct times that we blow on a fast day. The Gemora in Rosh Hashanah is referring to the blowing during the Shemoneh Esrei and the obligation was to sound the trumpets then. There were additional blowings after the Shemoneh Esrei when they recited additional supplications and prayers; this is what our Gemora is referring to when it states that they sounded the shofaros.

The Ritva answers that when our Gemora uses the term “shofar,” it actually means the chatzotzros. This is based on the Gemora Shabbos which states that what was once called a chatzotzarta is now referred to as a shofar, and what was called shofar is now referred to as chatztortzta.

The Meiri writes that that perhaps our Gemora is referring to the times after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh and nowadays only a shofar is blown and not chatzotzros.

The Mitzapeh Eisan answers that our Gemora is referring to a fast on account of a drought and since we daven and recite the blessing of shofaros, a shofar is used. The Gemora in Rosh Hashanah is referring to fast days for other sufferings and there the chatzotzros are sounded.

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Daf Yomi - Taanis 14 - REASON FOR NOT BLOWING TRUMPETS NOWADAYS

The Rambam in Hilchos Taanis (1:40 writes that there is a Rabbinical obligation to fast when Klal Yisroel is in distress and on the fast day, we call out in prayer and sound the trumpets. .

The Magen Avraham (576) wonders why the trumpets are not blown today.

The Nesiv Chaim answers that since the mitzva is derived from the passuk which states “And when the battle will enter your land,” it emerges that the obligation is only in Eretz Yisroel and not in any other lands.

The Mishna Berura cites this answer and adds from the Pri Megadim that the mitzva in Eretz Yisroel is limited to the times that the Beis Hamikdosh is in existence and Eretz Yisroel is in Klal Yisroel’s control but now, it is not called “our land.” The Ramban in one answer seems to say that the mitzva of sounding the trumpets is only in Eretz Yisroel.

The Minchas Chinuch (331:3) questions this explanation because generally a mitzva which rests on the head of a person (and not the ground) does not get excluded from the fact that the passuk states “your land.”

The Netziv cites a proof against the Nesiv Chaim from the incident where Pinchas was waging war against Midyan and he sounded the chatzotzros even though he wasn’t in Eretz Yisroel.

The Netziv answers that the mitzva is limited to the times that the Aron (Holy Ark) is with us and traveling along with Klal Yisroel during the war.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 34 - TWO REASONS TO SOUND THE SHOFAR ON ROSH HASHANAH

The Gemora cites two sources demonstrating that a teruah must have a tekiah preceding it and a tekiah should follow the teruah. One source is through a hekesh comparing the sounds that are blown on Yovel to the sounds that should be blown on Rosh Hashanah. The alternative source is derived from a gezeira shavah from the sounds of the trumpets blown in the desert.

Pnei Yehoshua states that there would be a difference in the tekios based on where it is learned out from. Rav Avahu instituted that one should blow a tekiah, three shevarim, teruah and tekiah. This cycle is done three times. The Gemora explains that Rav Avahu was uncertain that perhaps a teruah should be a moaning and a sobbing sound and therefore he blew a teruah and a shevarim together. The Gemora asked that perhaps the teruah should precede the shevarim. The answer given is that normally, when a tragedy occurs and a person is driven to cry, he will first moan and then he will sob.

The Bach asks on Rav Avahu that he is seemingly against the Mishna which explicitly stated that a teruah is either a sob or a moan but not both.

Pnei Yehoshua explains that actually the entire idea of a teruah on Rosh Hashanah referring to a cry needs further explanation. There is no calamity transpiring on Rosh Hashanah for there to be a reason to sob and to moan. This is why the Tannaim did not entertain the possibility that a teruah should be sobbing and moaning together.

Rav Avahu, however, was concerned for the braisa that derived the blowing on Rosh Hashanah from the sounding of the trumpets in the desert. They blew in the desert when a calamity was developing or during a war. This is why Rav Avahu stated that a teruah can be referring to a sob and then a moan.

Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld cites a Chasam Sofer that in actuality, there are two reasons to sound the shofar on Rosh Hashanah. Besides the obligation to blow on account of the mitzva, there is a requirement to blow because the enemy is besieging us. The Evil Inclination that is within us is the greatest adversary one can have. This is why the shofar was blown in the Beis Hamikdosh even on Shabbos. The Sages negated the obligation to blow on Shabbos but that was only the obligation due to the mitzva. It is still compulsory to blow on account of the battle is within us.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 33 - Understanding the Sounds of the Shofar

A BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE TEKIOS by Rabbi Doniel Neustadt

One of the most important mitzvos of Rosh Hashanah(1) is the Biblical command to blow the shofar. Although the significance of this mitzvah has been expounded at length - Rav Saadiah Gaon enumerates ten different reasons for blowing shofar(2) - still many people are unfamiliar with the basic procedures involved: how many blasts are sounded, how long or short must they be, etc. While the tokea and the makri (the individual who instructs the tokea which blast to sound) must be thoroughly versed in these intricate laws(3) - since it is they who determine if a particular blast was invalid and must be repeated - still it is important for the entire congregation to have some degree of familiarity with the general laws governing this mitzvah.

THE BASIC MITZVAH

The Biblical command is to blow three sets of blasts on Rosh Hashanah. A set of blasts means one teruah sound preceded and followed by a tekiah sound. Thus, the sum total of blasts which one is required to hear on Rosh Hashanah is nine - six tekiah sounds and three teruah sounds.
The tekiah sound was always well defined and agreed upon by all authorities - a long, straight (without a break or pause) blast. The teruah sound, however, was not well defined and the Rabbis were unsure of how, exactly, it was supposed to sound(4). The Talmud(5) describes three possibilities:
Three short, straight blasts - what we commonly refer to as shevarim; Nine(6) very short, staccato blasts - what we commonly refer to as teruah; A combination of both of the above sounds - a shevarim- teruah compound.
To satisfy all of the above opinions, the Rabbis established that the three sets of tekios be blown in three different ways, alternating the teruah sound in each set. Thus we blow tekiah shevarim-teruah tekiah (TaSHRaT) three times; tekiah shevarim tekiah (TaRaT) three times; tekiah teruah tekiah (TaSHaT) three times. All together that adds up to thirty different blasts - eighteen tekios, three shevarim-teruahs, three shevarim and three teruahs. This is the minimum number of blasts that every adult male(7) is required to hear on Rosh Hashanah. These are called tekios d'myushav, since the congregation is permitted to sit while they are being blown. In practice, however, it is universally accepted to stand during these tekios(8).
[A person who is in dire circumstances (a patient in the hospital, for example) and is unable to hear (or blow) thirty blasts, should try to hear (or blow) 10 sounds, one TaSHRaT, one TaRaT and one TaSHaT(9). No blessing, however, is recited over these blasts.]
In addition to these Biblically required blasts, we blow sixty more. Thirty more are blown during Musaf, ten each after the malchiyos, zichronos and shofaros divisions of Shemoneh Esrei. Every adult male is Rabbinically obligated to blow or hear these blasts in their designated places in the Musaf service. They are called tekios d'meumad, since one is required to stand while they are being blown(10).
In addition, it is customary to blow forty more blasts for a sum total of one hundred blasts. While this custom is based on several early sources(11) and has been almost universally adopted, there are various practices regarding when, exactly, they are blown. Generally, these blasts are blown towards the end of and after the Musaf service, and one must refrain from speaking(12) until after all one hundred sounds have been blown.

HOW LONG SHOULD EACH BLAST BE?

The length of a tekiah, both before and after the teruah, must be at least as long as the teruah which it accompanies(13). Thus, since it takes about 2-3 seconds to blow a shevarim or a teruah, the tekiah before and after must be at least 2-3 seconds long. Since it takes longer than that to blow the combination shevarim-teruah sound, the tekiah which precedes and follows these sounds must be longer as well. Most congregations allot about 4-5 seconds for each of these tekios. The makri is responsible to keep time.
[It is important to remember that each tekiah must be heard in its entirety no matter how long it takes. If, for example, a tekiah is blown for 7 seconds, which is much longer than required, the entire 7 seconds' worth must be heard by the congregation. Care must be taken not to begin reciting the yehi ratzon until after the blast is concluded(14).]
A teruah is at least nine short blasts (beeps), although in practice, many more beeps are sounded when the teruah is blown. No breath may taken between the short beeps; they must be blown consecutively.
Each shever should be about three teruah-beeps long. B'dieved the shever is valid even if it is only two beeps long, provided that all three shevarim are of that length(15). No breath may be taken between each shever; they must be blown consecutively(16).

SHEVARIM TERUAH - HOW IS IT BLOWN?

There are two basic views of how to blow the shevarim-terurah combination. Some opinions hold that no breath may be taken between them and even b'dieved, a breath between them invalidates the blast. Others hold that a breath may be taken as long as it takes no longer than the split second that it takes to draw a breath. The custom in most congregations is to do it both ways; the tekios before Musaf are blown with no breath being taken between the shevarim-teruah, while the tekios during and after Musaf are blown with a break for drawing a breath between the shevarim-teruah(17).

MISTAKES WHILE BLOWING

There are basically two types of mistakes that the tokea can make while blowing shofar. The most common is that the tokea tries but fails to produce the proper sound. The general rule is that the tokea ignores the failed try, takes a breath, and tries again(18).
The other type of mistake is that the tokea blows the blast properly, but loses track and blows the wrong blast, e.g., instead of shevarim he thinks that a tekiah is in order, or instead of teruah he thinks that a shevarim is due and he blows the shevarim. In that case, it is not sufficient to merely ignore the wrong blast; rather the tokea must repeat the tekiah which precedes the shevarim(19).
When a tekiah needs to be repeated, it is proper that the makri notify the congregation of that (by banging on the bimah, etc.), so that the listeners do not lose track of which blasts are being blown.

ADDITIONAL HIDDURIM

As there are different views and/or stringencies pertaining to various aspects of tekias shofar, one who wishes to be extremely particular in this mitzvah may blow (or hear) additional blasts after the davening is over in order to satisfy all opinions. These include the following hiddurim: There are several ways of blowing the shevarim sound; while some blow short, straight blasts, others make a slight undulation (tu-u-tu). Some opinions maintain that l'chatchillah, each shever should be no longer than the length of two beeps(20).
Some opinions hold that when the shevarim-teruha sound is blown, there may not be any break at all between them (even if no breath is taken); the shever must lead directly into the teruah(21). Some authorities insist that the tekiah sound be straight and clear from beginning to the end, with no fluctuation of pitch throughout the entire blast(22). (Courtesy of Rabbi Doniel Neustadt)

FOOTNOTES

1. This year, the shofar is blown only on the second day of Rosh Hashanah as the first day is Shabbos.
2. The most fundamental reason to perform this mitzvah, however, is simply that Hashem commanded us to do so.
3. Mateh Efrayim 585:2.
4. While the basic definition of a teruah is a "crying" sound, it was unclear if that resembled short "wailing" sounds or longer "groaning" sounds.
5. Rosh Hashanah 33b.
6. There are Rishonim who hold that a teruah is three short beeps. B'dieved, we may rely on that view to fulfill our obligation (Mishnah Berurah 590:12).
7. The obligation of women regarding tekias shofar was discussed in The Weekly Halachah Discussion, pg. 532-534.
8. Mishnah Berurah 585:2. A weak or elderly person may lean on a shtender or a table during these sets of tekios (Sha'ar ha-Tziyun 585:2).
9. Based on Mishnah Berurah 586:22 and 620:7. See also Mateh Efrayim 586:7 and Ktzeh ha-Mateh 590:1. See, however, Mateh Efrayim 593:3 who seems to rule in this case that three TaSHRaTs should be blown.
10. Mishnah Berurah 592:2. B'dieved, one fulfills his obligation if he sat during these tekios; ibid.
11. See Mishnah Berurah 592:4.
12. Asher Yatzar, though, may be recited; Minchas Yitzchak 3:44; 4:47.
13. This is based on the minimum length of time required for the teruah, not on the actual time it took to blow a particular teruah.
14. Mishnah Berurah 587:16; haTekios k'Halachah u'Behidur 1 quoting several sources.
15. Shulchan Aruch Harav 590:7.
16. O.C. 590:4.
17. Mishnah Berurah 590:20 and Sha'ar ha-Tziyun 18. The makri, too, should take a breath between the announcement of shevarim-teruah, so that the tokea will follow his lead (Elef ha-Magen 22).
18. Based on Mishnah Berurah 290:34, Aruch ha-Shulchan 290:20 and Da'as Torah 590:8.
19. Another example is when the tokea mistakenly blows [or begins to blow] two sets of shevarim or teruos in a row. The original tekiah must be repeated.
20. See O.C. 590:3.
21. Avnei Nezer 443; Chazon Ish O.C. 136:1. This is difficult to perform properly.
22. Harav Y.L. Diskin, based on the view of the Ramban and Ritva, see Moadim u'Zmanim 1:5. Chazon Ish, however, was not particular about this; Orchos Rabbeinu 2:183.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 33 - Women Performing Voluntary Mitzvos

Kollel Iyun Hadaf

PERFORMING A MITZVAH FROM WHICH ONE IS EXEMPT

QUESTIONS: The Gemara cites an opinion that women may not blow the Shofar on Rosh Hashanah that coincides with Shabbos, even though children are permitted to blow the Shofar. The Gemara says that this is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah who says in a Beraisa that "Ein Benos Yisrael Somchos" -- women may not perform Semichah on a Korban. RASHI (DH Ha Nashim) explains that the reason women are not permitted to blow the Shofar on Shabbos is because the act constitutes a transgression of Bal Tosif, adding to the Mitzvos, since women are exempt from the Mitzvah of Shofar.
Rashi's explanation is difficult to understand.
(a) Why does the performance of a Mitzvah which one is not obligated to perform constitute Bal Tosif? Bal Tosif applies only when one is obligated to perform a Mitzvah and he adds some detail to its performance which the Torah does not mandate. If the Mitzvah of Shofar does not apply to women at all, why does their act of blowing the Shofar constitute Bal Tosif? (MAHARSHA)
(b) If Bal Tosif is the reason why women may not blow the Shofar on Rosh Hashanah that coincides with Shabbos, then women should be prohibited from blowing the Shofar on any day on which Rosh Hashanah occurs, even on a weekday. The Gemara, however, refers specifically to blowing the Shofar on Rosh Hashanah that coincides with Shabbos. If women are prohibited from blowing the Shofar on Shabbos but not on weekdays, then the reason for the prohibition must not be because of Bal Tosif. Rather, the reason must be related to the prohibition against blowing the Shofar on Shabbos when it is not blown for the Mitzvah of Shofar (see 29b). Similarly, it is prohibited for women to perform Semichah on a Korban because -- with no obligation to perform Semichah -- their act of leaning on a sanctified animal constitutes Avodah b'Kodshim, an unauthorized use of a sanctified animal. The reason is not because of Bal Tosif. (TOSFOS, Eruvin 96a; TUREI EVEN)

ANSWERS:
(a) It is clear from the words of RASHI in Eruvin (96a) that he does not mean literally that a woman who performs a Mitzvah from which she is exempt transgresses the prohibition of Bal Tosif. Rashi there says that "it appears like Bal Tosif." That is, the Rabanan decreed that a woman may not perform an act of a Mitzvah from which she is exempt because it appears as though she is adding a Mitzvah to the Torah. Rashi does not mean that one who performs a Mitzvah from which he is exempt transgresses the prohibition of Bal Tosif. (See Insights to Eruvin 96:1.)
(b) Perhaps Rashi infers from the Gemara in Eruvin that the reason why women may not blow the Shofar on Shabbos is not due to the prohibition against blowing a Shofar on Shabbos. The Gemara in Eruvin (96a) says that according to the opinion that women may not blow the Shofar on Shabbos and may not perform Semichah, women also may not perform the Mitzvah of Aliyah l'Regel (visiting the Beis ha'Mikdash during the festival). Why may a woman not perform the Mitzvah of Aliyah l'Regel? TOSFOS in Eruvin explains that the Gemara means that a woman may not perform Aliyah l'Regel in order to offer a Korban Re'iyah; since she is exempt from the obligation to offer a Korban Re'iyah, the animal she would bring into the Azarah would be considered an animal of Chulin (non-sanctified), and one may not bring such an animal into the Azarah.
Rashi may understand that the Gemara there means simply that a woman may not perform a Mitzvah which she is not obligated to do, such as Aliyah l'Regel, because of the Rabanan's decree which prohibits doing an act which has the appearance of Bal Tosif.
When the Gemara here says that women may not do Semichah, it does not limit this prohibition to the opinion which maintains that Semichah must be done with all of one's strength ("b'Kol Kocho"; see Chagigah 16b). Rashi may understand that even according to the opinion that Semichah does not need to be done with all of one's strength, women may not do Semichah. Consequently, the reason they are prohibited from doing Semichah cannot be because of Avodah b'Kodshim, since Semichah done without all of one's strength does not constitute a use of the animal (as one does not actually use the animal to support himself). It must be that the prohibition is due to another reason -- a decree of the Rabanan against performing an act that looks like Bal Tosif. (M. Kornfeld) (Courtesy of Kollel Iyun Hadaf)

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 23 - Shofar on Shabbos

The Gemara cites a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah whether a Sukkah constructed on top of an animal is valid or not. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a Sukkah must be fit to be used for all seven days and since this Sukkah cannot be used on Shabbos or Yom Tov because of the Rabbinic injunction against riding on an animal, this Sukkah is invalid. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the Sukkah is valid because the Sukkah is Biblically fit for all seven days and the fact that it is not rabbinically fit does not invalidate the Sukkah. This issue of something that is biblically fit but is rabbinically unfit has halachic ramifications in other areas as well, such as regarding one who performs a mitzvah in a manner that was rabbinically prohibited if we can still say that he fulfilled his biblical obligation. This issue was previously discussed on Daf 3 here regarding sitting in a sukkah that has the table situated outside of the sukkah regarding sitting in a Sukkah where the table is placed outside the Sukkah. The question will arise regarding Rosh Hashanah that occurs on Shabbos where there is a Rabbinic injunction against blowing the shofar as one may come to carry the shofar four amos in a public domain to learn from an expert. What would be the halacha if one were to violate the rabbinical prohibition and blow shofar on Shabbos? Would one be rewarded for performing a mitzvah because he has fulfilled the biblical obligation or perhaps one does not even fulfill a biblical obligation when he is rabbinically prohibited form blowing shofar on Shabbos? This question would not present a problem according to the opinion of the Yerushalmi that maintains that one is biblically prohibited from blowing shofar on Shabbos. Rabbi Akiva Eiger rules that in such a situation one has fulfilled his biblical obligation of blowing shofar. Tosfos in Rosh Hashanah writes that blowing the shofar on Shabbos is rabbinically prohibited because it is considered a chachmah, an art, and not an act of labor. Rabbi Ezriel Cziment writes in a pamphlet called Zmanei Sasson that it is evident that even according to Tosfos, the Chachamim did not invalidate the shofar blasts, because then Rabbi Akiva Eiger would not have ruled that one fulfills his biblical obligation of blowing shofar. It is clear that if the only rabbinical injunction against blowing shofar on Shabbos was because of the concern that one may come to carry four amos in a public domain, the shofar blasts would not be invalidated. The novelty here is that even if the rabbinical injunction would invalidate the shofar blasts, this would be different than a Sukkah that the Chachamim invalidate when the table is outside.

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