Friday, September 29, 2006
Posted by ben at 9/29/2006 11:35:00 AM
28a – The Gemara states that Yonasan Ben Uziel was the greatest disciple of Hillel, and this is evident from the fact that when Yonasan sat and studied Torah, a bird that flew over him was immediately burned. The commentators explain this to mean that the moment a foreign idea entered Yonasan’s mind, he immediately vanquished the thought. Thus, a bird is an allegory for a thought or a communication. There are many instances throughout Scripture and the Talmud where we find that a bird is a metaphor for this idea. In the Book of Koheles (10:20) we find the expression for a bird of the skies may carry the sound, and some winged creature may betray the matter. We find further in the Gemara Brachos 3a the expression of a dove whimpering like a heavenly voice. The Gemara in Gittin 45a records an incident of a man who was familiar with the speech of birds. The Gemara in Sota 31a states that we can derive testimony from a flying bird. A related idea to this can also be found in Chullin 124b.
Posted by Avromi at 9/29/2006 10:55:00 AM
The Minchas Chinuch (325) quotes Rashi that whenever a mitzva mandates לכם - it has to be yours, if one owns less than a שוה פרוטה, it is also lacking לכם. He asks that according to that, how will people fulfill the mitzva of ערבה on Sukkos when each stem is valued as less than a שוה פרוטה? (Tell that to our Esrog dealers!!!!) It is answered that Rashi did not intend to say that something can't be yours if you own in it less than a שוה פרוטה. Rashi holds that to be considered a partner with others, you must possess at least a פרוטה. This is evident from a Ritva in Avoda Zara and in Sefer Tal Torah.Read more!
Posted by Avromi at 9/29/2006 09:48:00 AM
A question is asked as to why it is not brought down in Shulchan Aruch the halacha of visiting one's Rebbe on a Yom Tov? The Noda Beyahuda answers that this was only in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh when there was a mitzva of aliyah l'regel, however after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh, the mitzva of going to your Rebbealso became batel. He explains that the Sages did not want that the honor of the student (Talmid chochom) should be greater than that of the Rav (Shechina).
A question that is asked on the Noda Beyehuda is from our Gemora and other Gemora's where we see that they went to the Reish Gilusa on Yom Tov and Rashi states it was to fulfill the mitzva of going to a Rebbe on Yom Tov. There was no Beis Hamikdosh then and still they went?
Posted by Avromi at 9/29/2006 09:41:00 AM
Posted by ben at 9/29/2006 02:56:00 AM
Thursday, September 28, 2006
Posted by Avromi at 9/28/2006 09:04:00 AM
2. Scribes of Torah scrolls, Tefillin and mezuzos, along with the merchants and merchants’ merchants, including those who sell tzitzis, are exempt from reciting Shema, from Tefillah and from Tefillin and all other mitzvos. This ruling is based on the principle that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from performing other mitzvos. (26a1)
3. One who is traveling on the road is exempt from the mitzvah of Sukkah at the time that he is traveling. One is who traveling for the purpose of a mitzvah is exempt even when he is not traveling because he is constantly preoccupied with the fulfillment of the mitzvah. (26a1)
4. The Gemara rules that a sick person is exempt from the mitzvah of Sukkah even if his life is not endangered. The reason for this ruling is because one who is under duress is exempt from dwelling in a Sukkah as the mitzvah of Sukkah is to dwell in a Sukkah in the same manner as one would dwell in his house. (26a3)
5. One is allowed to eat a snack outside of the Sukkah but he is not allowed to nap outside of the Sukkah. The reason why he cannot even nap outside of the Sukkah is because we are concerned that he will fall into a deep sleep. (26a3-26a4)
6. The Gemara discusses the time frame of napping and this is relevant to halachos regarding Tefillin where there are opinions that one can nap even while wearing his Tefillin.(26a4-26a5-26b1)The Mishna states that if one eats food that is less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so. (26b2-26b3)
Posted by Avromi at 9/28/2006 06:44:00 AM
Posted by Avromi at 9/28/2006 01:41:00 AM
Posted by Avromi at 9/28/2006 12:13:00 AM
26a – the Gemara says “the guarantor himself needs a guarantor”. This phrase is repeated in Gittin 28b, and there Rav Reuven Margolios notes that the Rambam attributes this phrase to be an Arabic expression, and did note that the Gemara itself says the same thing.
26a – “he placed his head between his knees”. This was a common position which the early kabbalists used for meditation. See the many books by R’ Aryeh Kaplan z’l on the subject. My own speculation is that it is reminiscent of the fetal position, the same position a baby is in when he learns the entire Torah through an angel, as recorded in Niddah.
26a – Rashi q.v. “holchei derachim”. etc. I think this Rashi implies that there is no problem with working on Cholo shel moed. However, Reb Tzvi Berkowitz shlita does not believe one can draw this inference from this Rashi, and directed my attention to Rashi in Chagigah 18a, which holds explicitly to the contrary.
26a – Rashi q.v. “portzah” – its worthwhile to note that the common word “hedyot” is simply a transliteration of the Greek word “idiot”. It’s original connation simply meant “commoner”, and it’s meaning has since changed. ( Similar to the way word “vulgar” and the Yiddish word “prost” now mean much worse than simply “common”, which was their original meaning).Read more!
Posted by Avromi at 9/28/2006 12:01:00 AM
Wednesday, September 27, 2006
Maharatz Chayus is bothered with a strong question on tosfos. He states that besides for there being a positive commandment of sustaining the poor, there is a lo saaseh of closing one's hand by not giving the poor person. This is why beis din can compel someone to give tzedaka for there is a lav as well. if so, he asks, there cannot be an exemption of giving tzedaka to an oni when he is involved with a lost object for the principle of osek b'mitzva only applies by a positive commandment and not by a neative one?
Would someone who is busy performing a mitzva be permitted to eat neveila?
He leaves this question unresolved.
The answer is, “no”. Shulcah aruch in Yoreh Deah 240:25 says that a son has no obligation to respect his fathers wishes to remain behind, if the son feels he will be able to learn better in a particular place, or with a particular teacher. This is true even if the student is not 100% sure. (Pischei teshivah, loc cit). “One cannot always learn from simply anyone” – Eruvin 47b.
Posted by Avromi at 9/27/2006 02:47:00 PM
Posted by Avromi at 9/27/2006 02:34:00 PM
oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva. Rashi writes that this refers
to going to learn Torah, or to see his Rebbi, or pidyon shevuyim.
Tosfos notes that he is patur from the sukka only in a case
where if he would sit in the sukka, he would be dealyed or
unable to perform these other mitzvos, otherwise, there is no
patur of oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva. The Ran writes that
while a person is being Oisek bmitzva, he is patur from other
mitzvos, even if it is possible to fulfill both of them. This is the
reason, writes the Ran, that a groom is patur from krias Shema,
as although he could find the time to say it, since he is tarud in a
mitzva, the Torah does not obligate him to do another mitzva. A
nafka mina between Tosfos and the Ran would be
a person on
the way to do pidyon shevuyim who finds a lost object, and the
owner of the object will be at the destination of the person going
to do pidyon shevuyim. Tosfos would say that since doing the
mitzva of hashavas aveida doess not delay the mitzva of pidyon
shevuyim, he is obligated in the mitzva, while the Ran would
say that since he is involved in the mitzva of pidyon shevuyim,
the Torah is not mechayev him whatsoever in the mitzva of
pidyon shevuyim (today, in any case, we have lost the ability to
be so focused on one mitzva, and even the Ran would agree that
he is obligated in the mitzva). Rav Akiva Eiger asks how can the
Gemara learn the limud of oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva
from a groom and from Korban Pesach (that those who were
oisek with the coffin of Yoseph were patur from the Korban
Pesach), both those cases involve a shev v'al tasay, while the
case of sukka involves a lo sa'asay of eating outside the sukka?
Rav Akiva Eiger answers that there is no lo sa'asay of eating
outside the sukka, only an asay to eat in the sukka, and if a
person eats outside the sukka, he is mevatel an asay which is a
shev v'al tasay, so there is no problem. Another answer could
be, that while Korban Pesach is a mitzvos asay, it is an asay
sheyeish bo kares (the only other asay that has a chiyuv of kares
for not performing the mitzva is Bris Milah), which gives it a
similarity to a lo sa'asay, and is thus a good rayah.
Rav Moshe Shternbuch asks why is a person required to stop
davening to answer, or in some cases merely stop davening and
listen to (depending on where he is up to)kedusha, he is Oisek
bmitzva and is therefore patur from other mitzvos? He answers
that a person is patur from a mitzva only when he is being oisek
in a different mitzva, but if it is part of the same mitzva--in this
case tefila--he is chayov.
Posted by Avromi at 9/27/2006 02:18:00 PM
Rav Acha rules that a mourner is obligated in the mitzva of sukkah. The Gemora explains why this is a novel ruling for we might thought he would be exempt from the mitzva based on the ruling that one who is suffering is exempt from the mitzva of sukkah and a mourner is in anguish, the Gemora teaches us that he's nevertheless obligated.
The Rosh explains this Gemora by stating that a mourner wants to be in solitude and he would rather be in his house enabling him to think about the recent loss and this is causing him grief, the Gemora teaches that the exemption of sitting in a sukkah due to suffering is only when it comes by itself, however here he is bringing this anguish upon himself and it is incumbent on him to appease his mind, thereby obligating himself in the mitzva of sukkah.
Posted by Avromi at 9/27/2006 06:05:00 AM
Posted by ben at 9/27/2006 02:14:00 AM
Posted by ben at 9/27/2006 01:17:00 AM
Posted by ben at 9/27/2006 01:07:00 AM
Posted by ben at 9/27/2006 12:05:00 AM
Tuesday, September 26, 2006
Rav Zilberstain wondered as to what the halacha would be if the missiles were already launched when the fellow made his purchase.
[The connection to the daf is the Gemora states that there is a concern for the barrel bursting before Shabbos is over thereby preventing the person from separating terumah and maaser after Shabbos.]
Posted by Avromi at 9/26/2006 05:23:00 PM
Monday, September 25, 2006
Posted by Avromi at 9/25/2006 09:39:00 PM
I did notice an interesting discussion here and it continues here and concludes here.
Posted by Avromi at 9/25/2006 09:31:00 PM
1. The Gemara concludes that Rabbi Meir maintains that we are concerned for the possibility of death and for this reason one cannot use an animal as the wall of a Sukkah. Rabbi Meir is not concerned, however, that a barrel will burst, and for this reason one can drink the wine in a barrel on Shabbos. He can then rely on the fact that he will separate terumah and Maaser from the wine after Shabbos. If there was a concern that the barrel might break, we would not permit such a leniency because he may never be able to separate the terumah and Maaser. (24a1)
2. Rabbi Yehudah does not allow one to drink from the wine and rely on the fact that he will separate terumah and Maaser after Shabbos because Rabbi Yehudah does not hold of the principle of breira, retroactive clarification. In this case the principle of breira would dictate that the wine that he will separate in the future for terumah and Maaser is already deemed to have been separated now. (24a1)
3. The Gemara cites two other reasons why an animal cannot be used as the wall of a Sukkah. One reason is because Rabbi Meir maintains that a wall that stands only because of breath is not deemed to be a wall. Alternatively, it is only deemed to be a wall if it is made by man. (24a3)
4. There are several halachos that the Gemara mentions regarding a bill of divorce. Rabbi Yose HaGlili maintains that a bill of divorce cannot be written on an animal. There is a halacha that states that a man can only divorce his wife with a bill of divorce but he cannot divorce her with money. A man cannot divorce his wife by stipulating a condition that will be in effect for her entire life because a conditional divorce of this nature is not deemed to be a separation between a man and his wife. (24b1-24b2)
5. The Mishna rules that if one constructs his Sukkah between trees and the trees are serving as the walls of the Sukkah, the Sukkah is valid. The Gemara states that the walls of the Sukkah must be able to withstand a usual wind. One must ensure that the trees do not sway to and fro because walls that sway are invalid. (24b2)
Posted by Avromi at 9/25/2006 08:55:00 PM
2. The Gemara cites a dispute regarding a Sukkah on a boat. Rabban Gamliel invalidates such a Sukkah and Rabbi Akiva validates it. The Gemara relates an incident where Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva were on a boat and Rabbi Akiva constructed a Sukkah. The next day, a gust of wind blew the Sukkah off the boat. Rabbi Gamliel then said to Rabbi Akiva, “Akiva, where is your Sukkah now?” (23a1)
3. Abaye explains that if the Sukkah would not be able to withstand a usual wind on dry land, the Sukkah is invalid according to all opinions. If the Sukkah could withstand an unusual wind, it is certainly valid. The dispute is regarding a case where the Sukkah can withstand a usual wind blowing on dry land but the Sukkah would not be able to withstand a usual wind on the sea. (23a1)
4. The Gemara cites a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah whether a Sukkah constructed on top of an animal is valid or not. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a Sukkah must be fit to be used for all seven days and since this Sukkah cannot be used on Shabbos or Yom Tov because of the Rabbinic injunction against riding on an animal, this Sukkah is invalid. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the Sukkah is valid because the Sukkah is Biblically fit for all seven days and the fact that it is not rabbinically fit does not invalidate the Sukkah. (23a1-23a2)
5. There is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah if one is allowed to use an animal as a wall for a Sukkah. Rabbi Meir maintains that such a Sukkah is invalid, whereas Rabbi Yehudah maintains that such a Sukkah is valid. Rabbi Meir enumerates many instances where the use of anything that is alive is invalid for use. (23a2)
6. There is a dispute regarding the reason Rabbi Meir invalidates a Sukkah where the animal is used as a wall. Abaye maintains that we are concerned that the animal will die and the Sukkah will be without one of its required walls. Rabbi Zeira maintains that we are concerned that the animal may run away, thus leaving the Sukkah without one of its required walls. (23a2-23a3)
7. Abaye understands that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the possibility of death. The Gemara questions this thesis from a Mishna in Gittin that states that if a daughter of a non-Kohen was married to a Kohen, we do not have to be concerned that her husband might die when he has traveled abroad and the woman is permitted to eat terumah. Abaye maintains that the Mishna in Gittin is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, and this would seem to contradict Abaye’s position in our Gemara. The Gemara answers that we reverse the statement of Abaye regarding the Mishna in Gittin and Abaye really answered that the Mishna in Gittin is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah who maintains that we are not concerned with the possibility of death. (23b1-23b2-24a1)
Posted by Avromi at 9/25/2006 02:16:00 PM
Reb Akiva Eiger asks that according to Ben Azai, there should not be any injunction against blowing the shofer on Shabbos because the sages were concerned of one carrying the shofer four amos in a public domain and according to Ben Azai this would not be a violation of Shabbos. It is not logical to assume that one might take the shofer and jump four amos?
Reb Leibel Eiger answered that in the person's excitement to for the mitzva of shofar, how can he not jump!
Posted by Avromi at 9/25/2006 10:28:00 AM
Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank in Mikroei Kodesh (32) writes that Reb Akiva Schlesinger maintained that even nowadays there is an obligation to blow shofar in Yerushalayim when Rosh Hashana occurs on Shabbos. There are those who maintain that Rabbi Schlesinger actually practiced in accordance with his opinion and when Rosh Hashanah occurred on Shabbos, Rabbi Schlesinger blew shofar. Rav Frank wonders if there is any reason for one to hear shofar blasts nowadays if he knows of someone who was blowing shofar when Rosh Hashanah occurs on Shabbos. The first question that needs to be addressed is if Rabbi Schlesinger’s opinion is halachically valid. Even if the halacha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Schlesinger, perhaps one fulfills a biblical obligation of hearing the shofar blasts even if the one blowing shofar is violating a rabbinical prohibition. Rav Frank initially compares this issue with our Gemara. If one does not fulfill his obligation of dwelling in a Sukkah when sitting in a Sukkah that is on top of an animal, this would be proof that one cannot fulfill his biblical obligation if there is a rabbinical prohibition involved.
Posted by Avromi at 9/25/2006 10:00:00 AM