Daf Yomi DafYomi Daf-Yomi: 2006-09-24

Friday, September 29, 2006

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 28 - To be as great as Moshe Rabbeinu

The Gemara states that Hillel had many great students, thirty of whom were worthy that the Divine Presence should rest on them like it did on Moshe our teacher. The Rashbam in Bava Basra 134a writes that the reason they did not have the Divine Presence rest on them was due to the sins of the generation. We find in a few instances in the Gemara that one Amora referred to another Amora by the name Moshe, which implies that that Amora was comparable to Moshe in his generation. The Rambam writes (Hilchos Teshuvah 5:2) that anyone amongst the Jewish People has the potential to be as righteous as Moshe Rabbeinu. This is a sobering thought. Even in our generation, which is considered by many to be the lowest generation ever, one can strive to be as great as Moshe Rabbeinu. The Aruch writes that the Gemara in Sanhedrin states that animals do not have the concept of marriage. Nonetheless, the Torah accorded the animals in the times of Noach who did not cohabitate with other species the status of being married. Rabbi Yaakov Galinsky Shlita said that this teaches us that someone in our generation who does not become influenced by the outside world could be as great as Rabbi Akiva Eiger in his generation. Let us take this lesson to heart during the High Holidays, as we each strive to become the best that we possibly can, and our efforts should lead us to inspire all those around us.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 27- Lekavod Shabbos

The Gemara states that Rabbi Yitzchak said that one is obligated to visit his teacher during the festival. This is derived from the verse that states why are you going to him today? It is neither a New Moon nor a Shabbos! This verse was said regarding the woman from Shuneim, who Elisha had blessed with a child and then the child became ill and died. When the woman told her husband that she was returning to Elisha to inform him of the child’s demise, her husband, unaware of what had occurred, inquired why she was going to Elisha. The Gemara states that the verse implies that on the New Moon and on Shabbos one is obligated to visit his teacher. It would seem that the reason for this obligation is because the Zohar states that a Torah scholar is in the category of Shabbos. If one wishes to truly experience the Shabbos, he should visit his teacher on the Shabbos. The Arizal writes that the essential obligation of one visiting his teacher is on Shabbos, because that is when a person has a neshama yeseira, an extra soul, for the whole Shabbos.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 28 - Heoros by Reb Dave (just trying)

28a – it is interesting that the Gemara elaborates at length to describe the greatness of Rav Yochanan, while it gives relatively short shrift to Ravb Yonason, who was greater. That idea is reflected in the notion that great men and greatness do not need advertisements for themselves. Greatness speaks for itself

28a – The Gemara states that Yonasan Ben Uziel was the greatest disciple of Hillel, and this is evident from the fact that when Yonasan sat and studied Torah, a bird that flew over him was immediately burned. The commentators explain this to mean that the moment a foreign idea entered Yonasan’s mind, he immediately vanquished the thought. Thus, a bird is an allegory for a thought or a communication. There are many instances throughout Scripture and the Talmud where we find that a bird is a metaphor for this idea. In the Book of Koheles (10:20) we find the expression for a bird of the skies may carry the sound, and some winged creature may betray the matter. We find further in the Gemara Brachos 3a the expression of a dove whimpering like a heavenly voice. The Gemara in Gittin 45a records an incident of a man who was familiar with the speech of birds. The Gemara in Sota 31a states that we can derive testimony from a flying bird. A related idea to this can also be found in Chullin 124b.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 27 - Arovos Less than a Nickel

The Minchas Chinuch (325) quotes Rashi that whenever a mitzva mandates לכם - it has to be yours, if one owns less than a שוה פרוטה, it is also lacking לכם. He asks that according to that, how will people fulfill the mitzva of ערבה on Sukkos when each stem is valued as less than a שוה פרוטה? (Tell that to our Esrog dealers!!!!) It is answered that Rashi did not intend to say that something can't be yours if you own in it less than a שוה פרוטה. Rashi holds that to be considered a partner with others, you must possess at least a פרוטה. This is evident from a Ritva in Avoda Zara and in Sefer Tal Torah.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 27 - Going to the Rebbe on Yom Tov

A question is asked as to why it is not brought down in Shulchan Aruch the halacha of visiting one's Rebbe on a Yom Tov? The Noda Beyahuda answers that this was only in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh when there was a mitzva of aliyah l'regel, however after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh, the mitzva of going to your Rebbealso became batel. He explains that the Sages did not want that the honor of the student (Talmid chochom) should be greater than that of the Rav (Shechina).

A question that is asked on the Noda Beyehuda is from our Gemora and other Gemora's where we see that they went to the Reish Gilusa on Yom Tov and Rashi states it was to fulfill the mitzva of going to a Rebbe on Yom Tov. There was no Beis Hamikdosh then and still they went?

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - No more night

The Gemara states that the sleep of Dovid HaMelech was as long as a horse, and a horse’s nap is sixty respirations. The Zohar states that Dovid did not wish to sleep more than sixty respirations, because sleep is one sixtieth of death, and Dovid did not wish to taste death. Rabbi Yonasan Eibschutz writes in Ya’aros Devash that the Medrash states that when the angels observed Adam HaRishon, they wished to declare on him kadosh, the Holy One i.e. that he was g-dly and thus eternal. For this reason HaShem cast a slumber on Adam, to demonstrate to the angels that Adam was mortal and would eventually die. Nonetheless, had Adam not sinned by eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad, he would have lived forever. For this reason, writes Reb Yonasan, in the future there will only be day and no night, because the purpose of night in this world is for sleep, and in the future the righteous will not experience death,. Since sleep is one sixtieth of death, in the future there will be no need for night.

Thursday, September 28, 2006

Dozing with Tefillin

The Gemara cites an opinion that one is permitted to casually sleep while he is wearing his Tefillin. The Rosh asks on this from the Halacha that one is not allowed to divert his attention away from his Tefillin? He answers by quoting a Rabbeinu Yona that states it is considered diverting attention only when one acts with frivolity and lightheadedness. However, standing with trepidation in front of Hashem or being preoccupied with other things is not deemed to be hesech hada’as. The Shagas Aryeh states that this is not the opinion of the Rambam because he rules that one who is under duress is exempt from donning Tefillin because when one is wearing Tefillin he cannot divert his attention away from the Tefillin. He is not acting with frivolity and nevertheless the Rambam rules that this is considered hesech hada’as.Reb Itzele Peterberger in Pri Yitzchok offers the following answer based on ruling of the Magen Avrohom 308:11. According to the opinion that Shabbos is not the time for Tefillin if one dons Tefillin on Shabbos, he does not have to. The explanation for this is that the obligation is only to avoid diverting his attention away from the Tefillin only at the time the person is fulfilling the mitzvah of Tefillin. However, on Shabbos where he is not fulfilling any mitzvah there is no obligation to because there is no prohibition of hesech hada’as.The Gemara in Eruvin 95 state that if one does not have intention to fulfill the mitzvah of Tefillin he does not fulfill the mitzvah of wearing Tefillin according to the opinion that mitzvos require intention. When a person is sleeping and he is obviously not have any intention in fulfilling the mitzvah at this time he will not be fulfilling any mitzvah even according to the opinion that mitzvos do not require attention. Since he is not fulfilling any mitzvah at the time, there will be no prohibition of hesech hada’as.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - Highlights

1. A bridegroom and all the members of his party are exempt from the mitzvah of Tefillah and Tefillin, but they are obligated in reciting Shema. It is said in the name of Rabbi Shila that the bridegroom is exempt from reciting Shema but the members of the bridegroom’s party are obligated in reciting Shema. (25b4-26a1)
2. Scribes of Torah scrolls, Tefillin and mezuzos, along with the merchants and merchants’ merchants, including those who sell tzitzis, are exempt from reciting Shema, from Tefillah and from Tefillin and all other mitzvos. This ruling is based on the principle that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from performing other mitzvos. (26a1)
3. One who is traveling on the road is exempt from the mitzvah of Sukkah at the time that he is traveling. One is who traveling for the purpose of a mitzvah is exempt even when he is not traveling because he is constantly preoccupied with the fulfillment of the mitzvah. (26a1)
4. The Gemara rules that a sick person is exempt from the mitzvah of Sukkah even if his life is not endangered. The reason for this ruling is because one who is under duress is exempt from dwelling in a Sukkah as the mitzvah of Sukkah is to dwell in a Sukkah in the same manner as one would dwell in his house. (26a3)
5. One is allowed to eat a snack outside of the Sukkah but he is not allowed to nap outside of the Sukkah. The reason why he cannot even nap outside of the Sukkah is because we are concerned that he will fall into a deep sleep. (26a3-26a4)
6. The Gemara discusses the time frame of napping and this is relevant to halachos regarding Tefillin where there are opinions that one can nap even while wearing his Tefillin.(26a4-26a5-26b1)The Mishna states that if one eats food that is less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so. (26b2-26b3)

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - Quoted from the Mishna

The Mishna states that if one eats food that measures less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so. The Gemara in Yoma 79 cites this Mishna and concludes the citation by stating that the reason that the rabbis ate in the Sukkah was not because the Halacha is like that. Rather, it was because the rabbis wanted to be strict on themselves. The Oneg Yom Tov writes that from the text of the Gemara it would seem that the conclusion is part of the Mishna when in fact, it is an addition of the Gemara. The Oneg Yom Tov writes that this is a rule throughout the Talmud that when a Gemara qualifies a statement of the Mishna, the Mishna can be quoted with the addition of the Gemara as if the addition of the Gemara is part of the Mishna. It is noteworthy that Tosfos in Yoma expresses the same idea as mentioned by the Oneg Yom Tov. Reb Yeshaya Pik in his glosses to the Gemara in Yoma notes that it would seem from the words of Tosfos that Tosfos did not have the same version of the Gemara that we have. Our text explicitly states the words vetoni aloh, and a Baraisa taught concerning this Mishnah. According to our version of the Gemara, there would be no proof to the concept expressed by Tosfos and the Oneg Yom Tov.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - Frummies

The Mishna states that if one eats food that measures less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so. Mahretz Chayus raises a difficulty with this Gemara from the ruling of the Rema in Orach Chaim 639 who rules that one who is exempt from Sukkah and nevertheless sits in the Sukkah is referred to as a hedyot, a commoner. It seems from the words of the Rema that acting in a stricter manner is not viewed favorably. The Mahretz Chayus answers that the reason one should not be overly strict with regard to himself is so he should not appear haughty. Thus, every situation must be judged individually. Regarding the case of the Gemara where one eats a snack inside the Sukkah, people will say that he is eating a little now but he intends to eat more at a later time and for that reason he is sitting in the Sukkah. Regarding one who sits in the Sukkah while it is raining, however, there is no room to justify his actions and therefore doing so is frowned upon.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 26 - Heoros by David

26a – the Gemara says “the guarantor himself needs a guarantor”. This phrase is repeated in Gittin 28b, and there Rav Reuven Margolios notes that the Rambam attributes this phrase to be an Arabic expression, and did note that the Gemara itself says the same thing.

26a – “he placed his head between his knees”. This was a common position which the early kabbalists used for meditation. See the many books by R’ Aryeh Kaplan z’l on the subject. My own speculation is that it is reminiscent of the fetal position, the same position a baby is in when he learns the entire Torah through an angel, as recorded in Niddah.

26a – Rashi q.v. “holchei derachim”. etc. I think this Rashi implies that there is no problem with working on Cholo shel moed. However, Reb Tzvi Berkowitz shlita does not believe one can draw this inference from this Rashi, and directed my attention to Rashi in Chagigah 18a, which holds explicitly to the contrary.

26a – Rashi q.v. “portzah” – its worthwhile to note that the common word “hedyot” is simply a transliteration of the Greek word “idiot”. It’s original connation simply meant “commoner”, and it’s meaning has since changed. ( Similar to the way word “vulgar” and the Yiddish word “prost” now mean much worse than simply “common”, which was their original meaning).

Wednesday, September 27, 2006

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Eating Neveila while Performing a Mitzva

Tosfos maintains that one who is busy with the mitzva of returning someone's lost object is exempt from giving tzedaka to a poor person. Busy is defined as being involved and preoccupied with the lost object, such as feeding an animal.

Maharatz Chayus is bothered with a strong question on tosfos. He states that besides for there being a positive commandment of sustaining the poor, there is a lo saaseh of closing one's hand by not giving the poor person. This is why beis din can compel someone to give tzedaka for there is a lav as well. if so, he asks, there cannot be an exemption of giving tzedaka to an oni when he is involved with a lost object for the principle of osek b'mitzva only applies by a positive commandment and not by a neative one?

Would someone who is busy performing a mitzva be permitted to eat neveila?

He leaves this question unresolved.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Travelling to Learn by David

Rashi gives as an example of “osek bemitzvah”, one who is going to study Torah. Now why can’t he study where he is? How is traveling to learn considered involvement with a mitzvah? Is it not, at best, hechser mitzvah, preperatropy to the mitzvah, but not actually the mitzvah itself?

The answer is, “no”. Shulcah aruch in Yoreh Deah 240:25 says that a son has no obligation to respect his fathers wishes to remain behind, if the son feels he will be able to learn better in a particular place, or with a particular teacher. This is true even if the student is not 100% sure. (Pischei teshivah, loc cit). “One cannot always learn from simply anyone” – Eruvin 47b.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Wedding Thoughts by David

What is the factor that weighs on a man’s mind on his wedding night? It cannot simply be his inexperience with conjugal relations, b/c then why would there be no concerns before a man marrying a widow? (Unless we assume that the gemara itself assumes that only a widower or divorcee, ie, an experienced person, would marry a widow). Rather, the factor that weighs on the mind, according to the gemara, is the removal of the hymen. See Berachos 16 a, and the Bertinora.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Osek B'mitzva by Reb Jay

Shluchei mitzva are patur from sitting in the sukka, because of
oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva. Rashi writes that this refers
to going to learn Torah, or to see his Rebbi, or pidyon shevuyim.
Tosfos notes that he is patur from the sukka only in a case
where if he would sit in the sukka, he would be dealyed or
unable to perform these other mitzvos, otherwise, there is no
patur of oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva. The Ran writes that
while a person is being Oisek bmitzva, he is patur from other
mitzvos, even if it is possible to fulfill both of them. This is the
reason, writes the Ran, that a groom is patur from krias Shema,
as although he could find the time to say it, since he is tarud in a
mitzva, the Torah does not obligate him to do another mitzva. A
nafka mina between Tosfos and the Ran would be
...Read more

a person on
the way to do pidyon shevuyim who finds a lost object, and the
owner of the object will be at the destination of the person going
to do pidyon shevuyim. Tosfos would say that since doing the
mitzva of hashavas aveida doess not delay the mitzva of pidyon
shevuyim, he is obligated in the mitzva, while the Ran would
say that since he is involved in the mitzva of pidyon shevuyim,
the Torah is not mechayev him whatsoever in the mitzva of
pidyon shevuyim (today, in any case, we have lost the ability to
be so focused on one mitzva, and even the Ran would agree that
he is obligated in the mitzva). Rav Akiva Eiger asks how can the
Gemara learn the limud of oseik b'mitzva patur min hamitzva
from a groom and from Korban Pesach (that those who were
oisek with the coffin of Yoseph were patur from the Korban
Pesach), both those cases involve a shev v'al tasay, while the
case of sukka involves a lo sa'asay of eating outside the sukka?
Rav Akiva Eiger answers that there is no lo sa'asay of eating
outside the sukka, only an asay to eat in the sukka, and if a
person eats outside the sukka, he is mevatel an asay which is a
shev v'al tasay, so there is no problem. Another answer could
be, that while Korban Pesach is a mitzvos asay, it is an asay
sheyeish bo kares (the only other asay that has a chiyuv of kares
for not performing the mitzva is Bris Milah), which gives it a
similarity to a lo sa'asay, and is thus a good rayah.
Rav Moshe Shternbuch asks why is a person required to stop
davening to answer, or in some cases merely stop davening and
listen to (depending on where he is up to)kedusha, he is Oisek
bmitzva and is therefore patur from other mitzvos? He answers
that a person is patur from a mitzva only when he is being oisek
in a different mitzva, but if it is part of the same mitzva--in this
case tefila--he is chayov.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - A Sukkah in Mourning

Rav Acha rules that a mourner is obligated in the mitzva of sukkah. The Gemora explains why this is a novel ruling for we might thought he would be exempt from the mitzva based on the ruling that one who is suffering is exempt from the mitzva of sukkah and a mourner is in anguish, the Gemora teaches us that he's nevertheless obligated.

The Rosh explains this Gemora by stating that a mourner wants to be in solitude and he would rather be in his house enabling him to think about the recent loss and this is causing him grief, the Gemora teaches that the exemption of sitting in a sukkah due to suffering is only when it comes by itself, however here he is bringing this anguish upon himself and it is incumbent on him to appease his mind, thereby obligating himself in the mitzva of sukkah.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Pe'er-Tefillin shel Rosh only?

Rav Dovid Goldberg quotes Rabbeinu Avraham min HaHar who writes that pe’er of Tefillin is because it is said vrau kol amei haaretz ki sheim HaShem nikra olecho veyaru mimeka, and the Gemara in Brachos states these are Tefillin shel Rosh. Rav Goldberg wonders then why an aveil is exempt from Tefillin shel yad which does not seem to be included in pe'er. Rav Goldberg suggests that the passuk that states veyaru mimeka refers to Tefillin shel Rosh because they are visible, whereas the Tefillin shel yad are not visible. Rav Goldberg concludes that in reality, even Tefillin shel yad are referred to as pe’er. The Meshech Chochmah at the end of Parashas Bo writes that we say in Vehu Rachum on Monday and Thursday ad masai uzcho bashvi vsiferatecho beyad tzar. Oz is Tefillin shel yad, and tiferes is Tefillin shel Rosh. The Meshech Chochmah seems to imply that tiferes-pe’er only refers to the Tefillin shel Rosh. Yet, the Meshech Chochmah himself in parshas Beshalach writes that both oz and pe’er refer to Tefillin. Perhaps when oz and tiferes are written together, one can distinguish between the Tefillin shel yad and the Tefillin shel Rosh. Rashi in Ta’anis 16a and other Rishonim in Mode Katan, Kesubos and Bava Basra seem to imply that pe’er refers only to Tefillin shel Rosh. I also wonder if there is a distinction between tiferes and pe’er, which seem to be the same shoresh, yet imply different connotations. The Mishna Berurah in Hilchos Tisha B’Av quotes the Medrash that states that the passuk that states hishlich mishamayim tiferes Yisroel refers to Tefillin, and that is why we do not wear Tefillin on Tisha B’Av morning.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Yedias HaTorah and Yegias HaTorah

Rav Soloveitchek writes that when the Mishna mentions shluchei mitzvah, Rashi explains that these are people who are going to study Torah, and this refers to the aspect of yegias HaTorah, toiling in Torah. There is another aspect of Torah which is yedias HaTorah, knowing Torah. Rav Soloveitchek writes that the Rambam divides the two aspects of Torah in Hilchos Talmud Torah. I wonder how it is possible for one to fulfill the mitzvah of yedias HaTorah without yegias HaTorah. It seem that Rav Soloveitchek is saying that one can fulfill the mitzvah of yedias HaTorah by studying Torah and one can also fulfill the mitzvah of yegias HaTorah by being yageia in Torah. It is also not clear why according to Rav Soloveitchek one who is going to be yageia in Torah is called a shliach mitzvah as opposed to one who is going to be yodeia Torah.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Oseik bemitzvah derabanan exempting mitvah medoraisa

Rav Elchonen in Kovetiz Shiurim 2:32 and the Sdei Chemed (maareches oseik page 436) discuss whether the principle of one being exempt from one mitzvah when engaged in another mitzvah applies when the mitzvah one is engaged in is derabannan and the other mitzvah awaiting him is deoraisa. The Sdei Chemed quotes the Rashba who writes that from our Gemara it is evident that one who is engaged in a mitzvah derabannan is exempt from a mitzvah deoraisa. The Mitzpei Aisan on Daf 10b wonders why one who is going to receive his teacher, which is only a mitzvah derabannan, should be exempt from dwelling in a Sukkah, which is a mitzvah deoraisa. The Mitzpei Aisan quotes a Ran in Shabbos who writes that a mitzvah derabannan does not override a mitzvah deoraisa even by saying sheiv vaal taaseh. Rather, a mitzvah deoraisa will override a mitzvah derabannan with sheiv vaal taaseh. Reb Dovid Goldberg here quotes the Bikkurei Yaakov who writes that receiving one’s teacher on Yom Tov is a mitzvah deoraisa of es HaShem Elokecha tira, which comes to include talmidei Chachamim.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 25 - Hosting guests overrides receiving the Shechinah

The Gemara discusses the halacha of oseik bimitzvah patur min hamitzvah, one who is engaged in the performance of one mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah. The question is raised with regard to Avraham Avinu who was receiving the Shechinah after he had been circumcised. When the angels came to visit him, Avraham left the Shechinah and went to attend to the guests. Why did Avraham not employ the principle of one who is engaged in one mitzvah, i.e. receiving the Shechinah, is exempt from performing another mitzvah, i.e. hosting the guests? I heard from Rav Chaim Uri Freund Shlita that Rav Noach Weinberg asked this questions and Rav Noach suggested that when Avraham was engaged in receiving the Shechinah, he then became aware of the necessity of performing the mitzvah of greeting guests. It is noteworthy that the Gemara in Shabbos states that from Avraham Avinu we derive the principle that receiving guests is greater than receiving the Shechinah. The Gemara should have challenged this principle based on the idea that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from other mitzvos. The mitzvah of receiving the Shechinah appears to be the mitzvah of uledavka bo, one is obligated to cleave to HaShem. According to the Netziv in Heemek Davar, Avraham was engaged in loving HaShem and receiving the Shechinah, and he was performing the mitzvah of loving HaShem. The Netziv writes that when one is engaged in the mitzvah of loving HaShem, he is obligated to interrupt his thoughts and perform another mitzvah, because the mitzvah of loving HaShem has no time frame. This, the Netziv writes, is the meaning of the Gemara in Shabbos that states that hosting guests is greater than receiving the Shechinah. This means that the action of hosting guests overrides the mitzvah of loving HaShem which has no time frame. (See there further). Receiving guests can be a number of mitzvos, such as gemilus chasadim (Netziv) or even vehalachta bedrachav, one should emulate HaShem. Just as HaShem is compassionate, also you must be compassionate.

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 24 - Missile Attack

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein in his sefer on Sukkah relates a question that came to him during the recent war in Israel with Hezbollah. A man purchased some items on credit from a store before Shabbos. Shabbbos morning, a barrage of missiles rained down on the city and this particular store was demolished, there was nothing salvagable left. The man wanted to know if he was still obligated to pay his debt. He claimed that if he would not have bought those items, they would have been destroyed anyways. The Rav ruled that he is obligated to pay for the debt was incurred before the missile attack.

Rav Zilberstain wondered as to what the halacha would be if the missiles were already launched when the fellow made his purchase.

[The connection to the daf is the Gemora states that there is a concern for the barrel bursting before Shabbos is over thereby preventing the person from separating terumah and maaser after Shabbos.]

Monday, September 25, 2006

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 24 - Huff n' Puff and Blow those Walls Down

The Gemara states that the walls of a Sukkah have to be able to withstand a usual wind. The Rambam in his commentary to the Mishnayos writes that the walls of the Sukkah must be strong enough that the wind will not blow them down. It would seem from the words of the Rambam that it is sufficient if the walls do not fall down, even if they sway in the wind. From Rabbi Yosef Kapach’s edition of the Rambam, however, it appears that the Rambam maintains that the walls cannot sway at all. The Ritva writes explicitly that the walls cannot sway. Sefer Emek Bracha understands the Rambam in Mishneh Torah to be in accordance with the opinion of the Ritva. There is a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai that states that the walls must be sturdy enough that they do not sway in the wind. This would also be the explanation of the Magen Avraham’s ruling that if the Sukkah was enclosed and the walls were such that if the Sukkah was located outside, the walls would fall, the Sukkah is invalid. The reason for this is because there is a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai that states that the walls must be strong and if the walls are not sturdy enough, the Sukkah is deemed to be lacking walls and the Sukkah is thus invalid. Based on this reasoning, we can resolve a question that is posed by some of the Acharonim. The Acharonim wonder what the Halacha would be if a Sukkah has sturdy walls but it cannot withstand an unusual wind. When an unusual wind blows and the walls sway in the wind, is the Sukkah still deemed to be valid while the walls are blowing? We can suggest that the Sukkah would be valid because the requirement of a Sukkah wall is that the wall can withstand a usual wind and a Sukkah with sturdy walls can certainly withstand a usual wind. Although the Sukkah sways in the wind, we are not concerned and the Sukkah is deemed to be valid.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 24 - Canvas

When one uses a canvas Sukkah, there is a concern that the walls will flap in the wind and this will invalidate the walls. The Poskim suggest that one can tie ropes or reeds from one side of the Sukkah to the other. The ropes or reeds must be within three tefachim of each other, thus applying the principle of lavud, and this would obviate the need for the canvas walls. The Chazon Ish rules that the walls cannot sway more than three tefachim. One must wonder if this means that the walls cannot sway three tefachim in each direction or does it mean that the walls cannot sway three tefachim entirely.
I did notice an interesting discussion here and it continues here and concludes here.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 24 - Highlights

1. The Gemara concludes that Rabbi Meir maintains that we are concerned for the possibility of death and for this reason one cannot use an animal as the wall of a Sukkah. Rabbi Meir is not concerned, however, that a barrel will burst, and for this reason one can drink the wine in a barrel on Shabbos. He can then rely on the fact that he will separate terumah and Maaser from the wine after Shabbos. If there was a concern that the barrel might break, we would not permit such a leniency because he may never be able to separate the terumah and Maaser. (24a1)
2. Rabbi Yehudah does not allow one to drink from the wine and rely on the fact that he will separate terumah and Maaser after Shabbos because Rabbi Yehudah does not hold of the principle of breira, retroactive clarification. In this case the principle of breira would dictate that the wine that he will separate in the future for terumah and Maaser is already deemed to have been separated now. (24a1)
3. The Gemara cites two other reasons why an animal cannot be used as the wall of a Sukkah. One reason is because Rabbi Meir maintains that a wall that stands only because of breath is not deemed to be a wall. Alternatively, it is only deemed to be a wall if it is made by man. (24a3)
4. There are several halachos that the Gemara mentions regarding a bill of divorce. Rabbi Yose HaGlili maintains that a bill of divorce cannot be written on an animal. There is a halacha that states that a man can only divorce his wife with a bill of divorce but he cannot divorce her with money. A man cannot divorce his wife by stipulating a condition that will be in effect for her entire life because a conditional divorce of this nature is not deemed to be a separation between a man and his wife. (24b1-24b2)
5. The Mishna rules that if one constructs his Sukkah between trees and the trees are serving as the walls of the Sukkah, the Sukkah is valid. The Gemara states that the walls of the Sukkah must be able to withstand a usual wind. One must ensure that the trees do not sway to and fro because walls that sway are invalid. (24b2)

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 23 - Highlights

1. The Mishna rules that if one constructs a Sukkah on top of a wagon or a boat, it is valid and one is permitted to enter the wagon or boat on Yom Tov. If one constructs a Sukkah on top of a tree or a camel, it is valid and one is prohibited to enter it on Yom Tov. (22b2)
2. The Gemara cites a dispute regarding a Sukkah on a boat. Rabban Gamliel invalidates such a Sukkah and Rabbi Akiva validates it. The Gemara relates an incident where Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva were on a boat and Rabbi Akiva constructed a Sukkah. The next day, a gust of wind blew the Sukkah off the boat. Rabbi Gamliel then said to Rabbi Akiva, “Akiva, where is your Sukkah now?” (23a1)
3. Abaye explains that if the Sukkah would not be able to withstand a usual wind on dry land, the Sukkah is invalid according to all opinions. If the Sukkah could withstand an unusual wind, it is certainly valid. The dispute is regarding a case where the Sukkah can withstand a usual wind blowing on dry land but the Sukkah would not be able to withstand a usual wind on the sea. (23a1)
4. The Gemara cites a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah whether a Sukkah constructed on top of an animal is valid or not. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a Sukkah must be fit to be used for all seven days and since this Sukkah cannot be used on Shabbos or Yom Tov because of the Rabbinic injunction against riding on an animal, this Sukkah is invalid. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the Sukkah is valid because the Sukkah is Biblically fit for all seven days and the fact that it is not rabbinically fit does not invalidate the Sukkah. (23a1-23a2)
5. There is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah if one is allowed to use an animal as a wall for a Sukkah. Rabbi Meir maintains that such a Sukkah is invalid, whereas Rabbi Yehudah maintains that such a Sukkah is valid. Rabbi Meir enumerates many instances where the use of anything that is alive is invalid for use. (23a2)
6. There is a dispute regarding the reason Rabbi Meir invalidates a Sukkah where the animal is used as a wall. Abaye maintains that we are concerned that the animal will die and the Sukkah will be without one of its required walls. Rabbi Zeira maintains that we are concerned that the animal may run away, thus leaving the Sukkah without one of its required walls. (23a2-23a3)
7. Abaye understands that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the possibility of death. The Gemara questions this thesis from a Mishna in Gittin that states that if a daughter of a non-Kohen was married to a Kohen, we do not have to be concerned that her husband might die when he has traveled abroad and the woman is permitted to eat terumah. Abaye maintains that the Mishna in Gittin is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, and this would seem to contradict Abaye’s position in our Gemara. The Gemara answers that we reverse the statement of Abaye regarding the Mishna in Gittin and Abaye really answered that the Mishna in Gittin is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah who maintains that we are not concerned with the possibility of death. (23b1-23b2-24a1)

Litveshe Kasha / Chasidishe Vort

Ben Azai maintains that "mehalech K'omed" one who carries an object four amos in a public domain does not violate the Biblical prohibition of carrying for every step he takes. The moment he places his foot down it is considered as stopping and therefore, he is not walking four amos continuously. The only way for him to transgress this prohibition is to jump four amos at one time.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks that according to Ben Azai, there should not be any injunction against blowing the shofer on Shabbos because the sages were concerned of one carrying the shofer four amos in a public domain and according to Ben Azai this would not be a violation of Shabbos. It is not logical to assume that one might take the shofer and jump four amos?

Reb Leibel Eiger answered that in the person's excitement to for the mitzva of shofar, how can he not jump!

Practically Speaking

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank in Mikroei Kodesh (32) writes that Reb Akiva Schlesinger maintained that even nowadays there is an obligation to blow shofar in Yerushalayim when Rosh Hashana occurs on Shabbos. There are those who maintain that Rabbi Schlesinger actually practiced in accordance with his opinion and when Rosh Hashanah occurred on Shabbos, Rabbi Schlesinger blew shofar. Rav Frank wonders if there is any reason for one to hear shofar blasts nowadays if he knows of someone who was blowing shofar when Rosh Hashanah occurs on Shabbos. The first question that needs to be addressed is if Rabbi Schlesinger’s opinion is halachically valid. Even if the halacha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Schlesinger, perhaps one fulfills a biblical obligation of hearing the shofar blasts even if the one blowing shofar is violating a rabbinical prohibition. Rav Frank initially compares this issue with our Gemara. If one does not fulfill his obligation of dwelling in a Sukkah when sitting in a Sukkah that is on top of an animal, this would be proof that one cannot fulfill his biblical obligation if there is a rabbinical prohibition involved.

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 23 - Shofar on Shabbos

The Gemara cites a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah whether a Sukkah constructed on top of an animal is valid or not. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a Sukkah must be fit to be used for all seven days and since this Sukkah cannot be used on Shabbos or Yom Tov because of the Rabbinic injunction against riding on an animal, this Sukkah is invalid. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that the Sukkah is valid because the Sukkah is Biblically fit for all seven days and the fact that it is not rabbinically fit does not invalidate the Sukkah. This issue of something that is biblically fit but is rabbinically unfit has halachic ramifications in other areas as well, such as regarding one who performs a mitzvah in a manner that was rabbinically prohibited if we can still say that he fulfilled his biblical obligation. This issue was previously discussed on Daf 3 here regarding sitting in a sukkah that has the table situated outside of the sukkah regarding sitting in a Sukkah where the table is placed outside the Sukkah. The question will arise regarding Rosh Hashanah that occurs on Shabbos where there is a Rabbinic injunction against blowing the shofar as one may come to carry the shofar four amos in a public domain to learn from an expert. What would be the halacha if one were to violate the rabbinical prohibition and blow shofar on Shabbos? Would one be rewarded for performing a mitzvah because he has fulfilled the biblical obligation or perhaps one does not even fulfill a biblical obligation when he is rabbinically prohibited form blowing shofar on Shabbos? This question would not present a problem according to the opinion of the Yerushalmi that maintains that one is biblically prohibited from blowing shofar on Shabbos. Rabbi Akiva Eiger rules that in such a situation one has fulfilled his biblical obligation of blowing shofar. Tosfos in Rosh Hashanah writes that blowing the shofar on Shabbos is rabbinically prohibited because it is considered a chachmah, an art, and not an act of labor. Rabbi Ezriel Cziment writes in a pamphlet called Zmanei Sasson that it is evident that even according to Tosfos, the Chachamim did not invalidate the shofar blasts, because then Rabbi Akiva Eiger would not have ruled that one fulfills his biblical obligation of blowing shofar. It is clear that if the only rabbinical injunction against blowing shofar on Shabbos was because of the concern that one may come to carry four amos in a public domain, the shofar blasts would not be invalidated. The novelty here is that even if the rabbinical injunction would invalidate the shofar blasts, this would be different than a Sukkah that the Chachamim invalidate when the table is outside.

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