Insights for Bava Kamma 83

By: Reb Yechezkel Khayyat

Dovecotes of Non Jews

The Gemora lists the dovecote of a non-Jew as not meriting a trap free zone around it. The Rishonim discuss the reason for this. The Meiri states that the Gemora was only referring to non Jews who are barbaric and have no religion at all. These people’s property is not afforded any protection, due to their barbaric behavior. All other dovecotes are protected, even if not owned by Jews. Rashi, on the other hand, understands the restriction of traps to be a special protection accorded to fellow Jews, as a kindness. This kindness is not extended to non-Jews.

Slave Value

The Mishna states that to estimate nezek, we evaluate the value of a slave with and without the damage. The Shitah quotes Rav Yehonasan who says that we do not estimate how much the victim feels he lost due to the permanent damage done to his body, since that would be so extreme as to be unfair to the damager. One would never put a reasonable price on his own physical body parts, and the resulting estimation would be exorbitant.

Rashi states that the slave market we are referring to is the market for an eved ivri – a Jewish slave. The Ketzos explains that a Jew cannot be estimated as a non Jewish slave, since he would never be one. The Rosh, however, says the market is for non Jewish slaves. Rashi’s opinion is difficult, as Jewish slaves are only sold for six years, and therefore the difference in value will not accurately reflect the damage done. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that even if we were to continually reevaluate the damages every six years (to reflect the ongoing loss), this would be unfair to the damager, since the ultimate sum will be much larger than the one time loss to a permanent non Jewish slave. The Maharshal suggests that Rashi agrees that the slave market used for estimation is that for non Jewish slaves, but that Rashi here is simply giving a rationale for applying such an estimation to a free man. Since a free man can sell himself as a slave, this indicates a monetary loss ascribable to the damage done to his body. See Ketzos 420:1 for more detail on Rashi’s opinion.

Ayin Tachas Ayin

The Gemora explains how we know this verse is not literal. The Rambam (Chovel umazik 1:6) states that even though the straight reading of the verse is at odds with the halachah, the halachah comes from Moshe Rabbeinu himself, and has been always accepted. The commentators discuss why the Torah used this phrase, if the real meaning is not literal. The Ibn Ezra states that the Torah is telling us that if the damager would not pay money, it would be fitting for him to lose his eye. The Seforno similarly states that in a pure legal sense, the appropriate punishment would be physical, but the Torah was kind to allow monetary punishment instead. See the Ibn Ezra (Shmos 21:24) for a discussion of logical proofs to the monetary punishment.

The Gr”a states that the verse itself hints to the monetary punishment. The word Ayin is three letters – ayin, yud, nun. If we take the letters after each of those letters, we have the letters pei, kaf, samech. Rearranging those letters spells kesef – money. The verse tells us that for the eye, the damager pays tachas ayin – the letters below (after) ayin.

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Spending Money for a Mitzvah

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Tosfos (Bava Kamma 9b) writes that it is evident from our Gemora that a person is not obligated to give up all of his possessions in order to fulfill a mitzvah, and even for a mitzvah that will pass in time, such as an esrog. It is further evident from the conclusion of the Gemora that one is not even obligated to give up a third of his possessions in order to fulfill a mitzvah. And furthermore, it is said regarding charity: One who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his money, for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself.

All Mitzvos

The Rosh writes that this halacha applies by all mitzvos; one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on any specific mitzva, such as esrog or lulav. The Rambam and Rema seem to rule accordingly.

Why not Spend?

The Rishonim ask: Why would someone be exempt from performing a mitzvah just because it costs more than a fifth of his wealth? The Ra’avad answers that this is similar to halacha that one should make his Shabbos like an ordinary weekday, and not be forced to be supported from charity. This is because poverty is regarded as death, and one is not obligated to give up his life for an ordinary mitzvah.

The Biur Halachah writes (in his explanation of an opinion from the Beis Yosef) that not all mitzvos are compared to charity, for charity is a mitzvah that will not pass in time, and even if the poor people are before him, they can be supported by another person. That is why one would not be obligated to spend more than a tenth of his possessions. However, with respect to a mitzvah that will pass in time, it is possible that there would be an obligation to spend more than a tenth.

Reb Yaakov Emden asks: Why isn’t there an obligation to spend more for a positive commandment? Did we not learn regarding one who does not want to fulfill a positive commandment – we beat him until his soul departs him? Do we treat his money stricter than his life?

The Maharitz Chayus answers that we only beat him until his soul departs him when he is rebelling against the fulfillment of mitzvos; otherwise, we do not beat him, and he would not be required to spend all his money for it.

Lo Sa’aseh is Different

The Ra’avad adds that this halacha applies only to a positive commandment; however, one would be required to spend his entire wealth in order not to transgress a negative precept.

Must he Spend a Fifth?

The Gemora (Kesuvos 50a) states that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth to fulfill a mitzvah; is one halachically required to spend up to that amount, or is it only regarded as a mitzvah?

The Beis Yosef (Y”D; 249) writes that it is considered a mitzvah in the preferable manner if one spends up to a fifth of his wealth in order to perform a mitzvah. The Beis Yosef adds that although one can imply from the Gemora that it is not even a mitzvah to spend that amount because the Gemora states: One who spends liberally should not give more than a fifth of his wealth; however, even less than that would be regarded as spending liberally, and there would be no mitzvah whatsoever to spend that amount. Nevertheless, there is a Yerushalmi in Pe’ah that seems to indicate that there is a mitzvah to spend up to one-fifth of his wealth for a mitzvah.

In the sefer Ahavas Chesed, the Chafetz Chaim cites a Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos, who writes that there is a halachic obligation to spend up to one-fifth of one’s wealth for charity. He asks form our Gemora, which would seem to indicate that there is no such obligation. He answers that our Gemora is discussing a case where the poor people are not present and someone is searching to find them in order to give them charity. In such a situation, there is not even a mitzvah to give up to one-fifth. However, the Yerushalmi and the Rambam are speaking about a case where the poor person is in front of you; then, there would be a halachic obligation to give up to one-fifth.

Spending More than a Fifth

What if one wants to spend more than a fifth? Is he allowed to? It is evident from the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos that it is regarded as virtuous (midas chassidus) for one to spend more than a fifth. However, it can be inferred from the Rambam in halachos that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on a mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim reconciles the two rulings of the Rambam in the same manner as before. If the poor person is present, it would be regarded as midas chassidus to spend more than a fifth, and that is what the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos is discussing. However, when the poor people are not present and one is chasing after them, he should not spend more than a fifth.

The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth if it is to support the studying of Torah. The Ahavas Chesed explains the reasoning for this. One who supports another fellow to learn Torah is creating a partnership with him; the supporter receives a reward together with the one who is learning the Torah. One is permitted to purchase this reward for himself even if it will cost him more than a fifth.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe (Y”D, 4:37) rules that this is correct only if the supporter specifically negotiates with the one studying Torah to create a partnership of Yissochar and Zevulun. However, if the provider is just donating money to support Torah, he is not permitted to give more than a fifth.

The Ibn Ezra in Mishlei (4:7) writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth in order to study Torah himself. The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos (Yoma 12a) also rules like that. However, the Netziv in the Shiltos states that this is a matter of dispute between two Amoraim. The Gemora in Eruvin cites the verse that Torah is not in the Heavens. Rav Avdimi says: If it would be in the heavens, one would be obligated to go there and learn. It is evident that one would be forced to spend more than a fifth of his wealth to study Torah, for otherwise, he could claim that it costs too much to travel to the Heaven. However, Rava disagrees regarding the interpretation of that verse, and according to him, one would not be allowed to spend more than a fifth in order to study Torah.

The Rema (Y”D, 249:1) seems to hold that one can give away more than one-fifth of his wealth to charity right before he dies. It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah that even then, he should not.

It is written in Ahavas Chesed that one who is a free-spender in regards to himself and his family, i.e., he splurges on expensive clothing, builds for himself a fancy mansion and generally leads a luxurious lifestyle; it is permitted for him to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth.

Some say that if one finds himself in dire straits, he is permitted to spend more than a fifth with the intention that it should be on account of this deed that he will merit a salvation. It is brought in the name of the Bnei Yissoschar that one who requires atonement on a specific sin is also permitted to give away more than a fifth.

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Reasons for the Exemption

The Mishna states: One, who builds a house, betroths a woman or plants a vineyard is exempt from going to battle.

There are various reasons to explain these exemptions: The Rashbam states: These people are similar to the ones who are faint of heart. They are concerned that they will not merit inaugurating their house, marrying their wife or redeeming their vineyard. They are scared that they will die during battle and are therefore exempt from going to war.

The Ibn Ezra explains: These people are preoccupied with their desire to inaugurate their house, marrying their wife or redeeming their vineyard, and will therefore not pay attention completely to the war. This will cause them to retreat during the heat of the battle and will constitute a danger to the remainder of the army.

The Mishna enumerates all the various people that may return from the battle. The Minchas Chinuch (§ 526) writes that it is not clear from the Gemora or the Rambam if these people have the option of remaining at the battlefield or not. He states that it is logical to assume that the faint of heart are required to go home, for otherwise, he will cause the hearts of the others to melt. He adds that according to Rashi, who writes that these people will definitely die during the war if they do not heed the words of the Kohen, they would not have the option of staying.

Seemingly, according to the reasons mentioned above, they would not be allowed to remain at the battlefield, for according to the Rashbam, they are similar to the faint of heart, and they are required to go home. And according to the Ibn Ezra, they would also be required to return home, for otherwise, they would constitute a danger to the other soldiers.

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Pauper Acting Rich

The braisa (Daf Yomi: Nazir 25b - 26a) states: Other people who are obligated to bring bird offerings by the Torah (because they cannot afford to buy animal offerings) who already designated the money to buy the birds (and then became rich), if they now want to bring a chatas or olah offering instead, they may do so.

The Mefaresh understands this Gemora to be referring to a rich woman who has given birth, where her chatas is a bird.

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

We can add that the Mishna in Negaim compliments this explanation. For the Mishna says that if a poor person who is a metzora brings the korban that a rich person is supposed to bring, he fulfills his obligation. The Chinuch (123) states by a korban olah v’yoreid - (certain sins which require a korban chatos, he either brings an animal, bird or flour offering depending on his status - this is called a fluctuating korban) if a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation. The Chinuch explains the reason: the Torah had compassion on the poor person, it is not proper for him to compel himself to bring a korban which he cannot afford. How can the Chinuch hold against the Mishna, which explicitly states that he does fulfill his obligation?

The Chasam Sofer answers based on the following Gemora in Shabbos: Hashem punishes each person according to what he can afford. A rich person who sins will lose his cow. A poor person, on the other hand, will lose his chicken or some eggs. Therefore, there is a distinction between the korban of a metzora or a woman who gave birth and the korban olah v’yoreid. A metzora is not required to bring a korban because he sinned, it is to purify him and allow him to eat kodoshim. If a poor metzora decides to bring the rich man’s korban, he will have discharged his obligation. Conversely, a sinner who does that will not have discharged his obligation, for here the Torah prescribed for him the korban which will give him atonement according to his status. The korban is in place of the punishment. It is not decided by the pauper what his punishment should be, and therefore when he brings the korban of a rich person, he does not fulfill his obligation.

The Sfas Emes (here and quoted in Moadim U’zmanim as a story which occurred by a Kenesiya Gedola) answers that there is a basic distinction. A metzora disregarding if he is rich or poor, is required to bring a chatas and an olah. The rich man brings animals and the pauper brings birds. If a poor person brings the korban of a rich person, he fulfills his obligation, for he brought the prescribed amount. A korban olah v’yoreid is different. A rich person brings an animal for a korban chatas and a poor person brings two birds, one for a chatas and one for an olah. If a poor person will force himself to bring the korban of a rich person, he will not fulfill his obligation because he cheated the Altar out of one korban - namely the olah.

There are two questions on this explanation (look in Shemuas Chaim and in Mitzvas Hamelech from Harav Ezriel Cziment). Firstly, the Chinuch says a different reason for his not fulfilling his obligation. He says because the Torah doesn’t want a poor person to overburden himself. He does not say the reason of the Sfas Emes that he missed a korban? Secondly, one must ask, why is it that a poor person is required to bring two korbanos and a rich person only brings one? The Ibn Ezra explains the reason for this: A chatas bird is completely eaten and an olah bird is completely burned on the Altar. These two birds together replace a regular korban which entails a human consumption and the Altar’s consumption. They are actually one korban. Therefore, one can say that a poor person is not missing a korban by bringing one animal instead of two birds?

It would seem, however, that this question can be answered. Even according to the Ibn Ezra, the two birds are not one korban. They are two korbanos complimenting one another. The rationale behind bringing the two korbanos could be because the Torah wants human consumption and the Altar’s consumption; nevertheless, it is still two korbanos and a poor person is missing one korban when he brings the korban of a rich person.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 20 - SOURCE FOR THE LAWS REGARDING MOURNING

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source establishing that the primary period of mourning is for seven days.

Tosfos asks: Why didn’t the Gemora cite the verse where Yosef mourned for his father Yaakov in Breishis [50:10]: And he made for his father a mourning of seven days?

Tosfos answers: That verse is referring to the period of mourning prior to the burial.

It is noteworthy that the Ibn Ezra on that verse comments that the mourning mentioned here is referring to the period after the burial. Rabbi Aharon Levine in his sefer Hadrash V’haeyun wonders why the Ibn Ezra explained the verse in that manner, when it is evident that our Gemora does not learn that way. The Rif (Brochos) does derive the laws of mourning from Yaakov.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi that answers differently: We cannot derive the laws of mourning from the death of Yaakov because that was prior to the giving of the Torah.

This seems a bit perplexing because there are many halachos (time for the Minchah prayer) that are derived from verses in the Torah even though the incidents transpired prior to the giving of the Torah?

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is written regarding the laws of mourning ‘Banim atem,’ You are My children. When did Klal Yisroel get the status of being children of Hashem? After receiving the Torah. It is for this reason that the laws of mourning must be derived from a verse which occurred after the Torah was given.

Rav Elyashiv answers: While it is true that we could have learned many of the laws of mourning from Yaakov and Yosef, there are some laws that we would be incapable of deriving from there. A mourner cannot study Torah, nor can he don tefillin on the first day and before the burial he cannot perform any mitzvos. If the source of the laws of mourning would be from Yaakov and Yosef, we would say that those laws were included in the mourning period for the mourners who did not have these obligations (the Patriarchs before the Torah was given); however we, who have an obligation to study Torah, don tefillin and perform mitzvos, cannot be subject to these prohibitions. It was for this reason that the Gemora found the source for the laws of mourning from a verse in Amus, after the Torah was given.

[Once again, my anonymous friend pointed me in the right direction.]

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 41 - A Pauper Bringing the Korban of a Rich Person

The Gemora quotes a Mishna in נגעים, if a poor person who is a מצורע brings the קרבן that a rich person is supposed to bring, he fulfills his obligation. The Chinuch (123) states by a קרבן עולה ויורד - (certain sins which require a korban chatos, he either brings an animal, bird or flour offering depending on his status - this is called a fluctuating korban) if an עני brings the קרבן of an עשיר, he does not fulfill his obligation. The Chinuch explains the reason: the Torah had compassion on the poor person, it is not proper for him to compel himself to bring a korban which he cannot afford. How can the Chinuch hold against the Mishna, which explicitly states that he does fulfill his obligation?

The Chasam Sofer answers based on a Gemora Shabbos that states that Hashem punishes each person according to what he can afford. A rich person who sins will lose his cow. A poor person, on the other hand, will lose his chicken or some eggs. Therefore, there is a distinction between the קרבן of a מצורע or יולדת (a woman who gave birth) and the קרבן עולה ויורד. A מצורע is not required to bring a קרבן because he sinned, it is to purify him and allow him to eat kodoshim. If a poor מצורע decides to bring the rich man's קרבן, he will be יוצא. Conversely, a sinner who does that will not be יוצא, for here the Torah prescribed for him the קרבן which will give him atonement according to his status. The קרבן is in place of the punishment. It is not decided by the עני what his punishment should be and therefore when he brings the קרבן of an עשיר, he does not fulfill his obligation.

The Sfas Emes (here and quoted in Moadim U'zmanim as a story which occured by a כנסיה גדולה) answers that there is a basic distinction. A מצורע disregarding if he is an עשיר or an עני is required to bring a חטאת and an עולה. The rich man brings animals and the pauper brings birds. If the עני brings the קרבן of an עשיר, he fulfills his obligation, for he brought the prescribed amount. A קרבן עולה ויורד is different. A rich person brings an animal for a קרבן חטאת and an עני brings two birds, one for a חטאת and one for an עולה. If an עני will force himself to bring the קרבן of an עשיר, he will not fulfill his obligation because he cheated the מזבח out of one קרבן - namely the עולה.

There are two questions on this explanation (look in שמועת חיים and in מצות המלך from Harav Ezriel Cziment). Firstly, the chinuch says a different reason for his not being יוצא. He says because the Torah doesn't want the עני to overburden himself. He does not say the reason of the Sfas Emes that he missed a קרבן? Secondly, one must ask, why is it that an עני is required to bring two קרבנות and an עשיר only brings one? The אבן עזרא explains the reason for this: A חטאת העוף is completely eaten and an עולת העוף is completely burned on the מזבח. These two birds together replace a regular קרבן which entails אכילת אדם and אכילת מזבח. They are actually one קרבן. Therefore, one can say that the עני is not missing a קרבן by bringing one animal instead of two birds?

It would seem, however, that this question can be answered. Even according to the אבן עזרא, the two birds are not one קרבן. They are two קרבנות complimenting one another. The rationale behind bringing the two קרבנות could be because the Torah wants אכילת אדם and אכילת מזבח, nevertheless, it is still two קרבנות and the עני is missing one קרבן when he brings the קרבן of an עשיר.

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