WHERE DOES THE SECOND PROHIBITION GO? - Yevamos 33 - Daf Yomi

The Shach (Y”D 238) rules that one who takes an oath that he will not eat neveilah (an animal that was not slaughtered properly), and subsequently got sick in a manner that he was permitted to eat neveilah; he is allowed to eat it, and he is not required to have his vow annulled.

The Peri Megadim in his introduction to Hilchos Pesach asks on this ruling. He states: That which we say that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition merely means that the he will not be liable for violating both prohibitions; however, he is violating two prohibitions and he will be buried together with the completely wicked.

Accordingly, he asks on the ruling of the Shach: While it’s true that the prohibition stemming from his personal oath not to eat neveilah will not take effect because he is already prohibited from eating neveilah from the Torah, nevertheless, the oath is valid and is existent; he will not be liable for transgressing the oath. However, when he is dangerously ill and he is permitted to eat neveilah, the oath would subsequently take effect and he must have it annulled.

The Avnei Miluim (teshuva 12) does not agree with the way the Peri Megadim understands the Shach. He states: The ruling of the Shach is not based on the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing prohibition, but rather, it is because of the principle mentioned specifically regarding an oath. One oath cannot take effect on another one and every person took an oath at Mount Sinai that he will not eat neveilah; this is why his personal oath is not valid and does not require annulment.

He explains the distinction between the two principles: One cannot be liable for a second prohibition when a previously existing prohibition is in effect, but there are obviously both prohibitions present. Regarding an oath, one does not have the capabilities to take an oath prohibiting himself on something that he already is sworn to uphold anyway; the second oath has no legitimacy whatsoever.

Rav Shach in Hilchos Shavuos (5:16) asks on the premise of these Acharonim. If the second prohibition is present, why isn’t one liable for violating it? If a second prohibition cannot take effect on an existing one only means that we do not administer punishment for the second prohibition, why should there be an exception for an extensive or an inclusive prohibition? He therefore learns that the second prohibition does not take effect at all. The Gemora, which states that one who violates such a prohibition will be buried with the completely wicked does not mean to say that he has indeed violated two transgressions; rather, it means that he is regarded as completely wicked since he is committing an action which involves two prohibitions even though in fact, he has only violated one.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 33 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a dispute regarding a non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service and the other for desecrating the Shabbos. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing labor on Shabbos. Permission was granted to perform labor in the Beis HaMikdosh only for Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing labor on Shabbos. Permission was completely granted to perform labor in the Beis HaMikdosh (and it was not specific to the Kohanim). A non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos has violated only one transgression; for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service, but not for violating the Shabbos. (32b)

The Gemora cites a similar dispute between Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara: A blemished Kohen performed the Temple service (we are referring to a communal offering whose time is fixed, which is permitted to be brought by Kohanim in a state of tumah) while he was in a state of tumah. Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for performing the Temple service with a blemish and the other for performing the Temple service while he is tamei. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for performing the Temple service with a blemish.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah. Permission was granted to perform the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah (for a communal offering) only for unblemished Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah. Permission was completely granted to perform the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah (and it was not specific to unblemished Kohanim). A blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei has violated only one transgression; for performing the Temple service with a blemish, but not for performing the service while he was tamei. (32b)

The Gemora cites a third dispute between Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara: A non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah (a Kohen pierces the back of the bird’s neck with his fingernail – this is valid only by a sacrificial offering, otherwise, it would be deemed a neveilah and could not be eaten). Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food and the other for eating neveilah. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from eating neveilah. Permission was granted in the Beis Hamikdosh (for a bird offering) only for Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from eating neveilah. Permission was completely granted in the Beis Hamikdosh (and it was not specific to Kohanim). A non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah has violated only one transgression; for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food, but not for eating neveilah. (32b)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to an inclusive prohibition (more objects become forbidden to the same people) taking effect on an existing prohibition, and according to Rabbi Yosi (who maintains that one prohibition can take effect on an existing one). Rabbi Chiya holds that Rabbi Yosi maintains that the inclusive prohibition does take effect and therefore he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara holds that it does not take effect and he has violated only one prohibition. (33a)

The Gemora asks: What are the inclusive prohibitions in each of three cases cited above?

The Gemora answers: The first case is where a non-Kohen performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. The non-Kohen is permitted to perform labor, but is prohibited from perform the Temple service. When Shabbos arrives, we can say that since he is now prohibited from engaging in any labor, he also is prohibited from performing the Temple service on account of Shabbos. (This is an inclusive prohibition since more objects become forbidden.)

The second case is where a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei. The blemished Kohen is permitted to eat portions of the sacrificial offerings, but he is prohibited from performing the Temple service. When he becomes tamei, we can say that since he is now prohibited from eating portions of the sacrificial offerings, he is also prohibited from performing the Temple service on account of tumah. (This is an inclusive prohibition since more objects become forbidden.)

The Gemora asks that the third case cannot be explained to be referring to an inclusive prohibition taking effect on an existing prohibition since both prohibitions take effect simultaneously. As soon as the melikah is performed, the meat of the bird offering becomes forbidden to a non-Kohen and it becomes a neveilah at the same time. (33a)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to simultaneous prohibitions, and according to Rabbi Yosi (who maintains that he would be liable for two prohibitions). Rabbi Chiya holds that Rabbi Yosi maintains that the inclusive prohibition does take effect and therefore he has violated two transgressions. (Rabbi Yosi must be referring to the following case: Two brothers designated one agent to go and betroth two sisters. The sisters also appointed an agent to accept the betrothals for them. The agent of the brothers gave the two betrothals to the agent of the sisters simultaneously. The prohibition of his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife occurred simultaneously.) Bar Kappara holds that it does not take effect and he has violated only one prohibition. (33a)

The Gemora asks: What are the simultaneous prohibitions in each of three cases cited above?

The Gemora answers: The first case is where a non-Kohen performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. This is referring to a case when he grew the two pubic hairs that render him an adult on Shabbos. The prohibition against a non-Kohen performing the Temple service and the prohibition against engaging in labor on Shabbos occur simultaneously.

The second case is where a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei. This is referring to a case when he grew the two pubic hairs that render him an adult after he had a blemish and became tamei. These two prohibitions occur simultaneously. Alternatively, we can say that his finger got cut off with a knife that was tamei. (The third case, we explained previously.) (33a)

The Gemora asks on this explanation: According to Rabbi Chiya, we can understand Rebbe’s two statements; the statement that he has violated two transgressions is following Rabbi Yosi’s opinion and the statement that he has violated only one transgression is following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, according to Bar Kappara, was Rabbi Chiya lying when he stated in the name of Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions? (33a)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to simultaneous prohibitions, and according to Rabbi Shimon (Rabbi Chiya maintains that by simultaneous prohibitions, he would be liable for two prohibitions, and not by an inclusive prohibition, and Bar Kappara holds that he will never be liable for two transgressions).

The Gemora asks on this explanation: According to Bar Kappara, we can understand Rebbe’s two statements; the statement that he has violated only one transgression is following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and the statement that he has violated two transgressions is following Rabbi Yosi’s opinion. However, according to Rabbi Chiya, was Bar Kappara lying when he stated in the name of Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Chiya could say that Bar Kappara was mistaken when he quoted Rebbe as ruling that one is liable for only one transgression in all three cases. Although it is true that Rabbi Shimon would hold that in cases of an inclusive prohibition, he is liable for only one; but in cases involving simultaneous prohibitions, Rabbi Shimon would concede that they both take effect. Rebbe did not issue a ruling to bar Kappara regarding the third case where a non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah. This case can only be referring to simultaneous prohibitions and not an inclusive prohibition. Bar Kappara erroneously (according to Rabbi Chiya) grouped this case together with the other two and stated that Rebbe maintains according to Rabbi Shimon that one is liable for only one transgression even when the prohibitions occur simultaneously. Rabbi Chiya disagrees and holds that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yosi by simultaneous prohibitions that one would be liable for two transgressions. (33b)

The Gemora cites a braisa which refutes the opinion of Bar Kappara. It is evident from the braisa that Rabbi Shimon only disagrees with Rabbi Yosi by an inclusive prohibition, but agrees that one will be liable for two transgressions when the prohibitions occur simultaneously. (33b)

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