Gambling

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Mishna lists gamblers among those who are unfit to judge, and as Rashi points out, unfit to testify, since they are regarded as re’shaim. There is a discussion in the Gemora as to why a gambler is unfit to testify or judge. Rami Bar Chamah holds that it is an issue of “asmachta,” which means that the money he wins is regarded as stolen. Rav Sheishes disagrees and attributes the disqualification to not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public. The Gemora points out that the difference between the two opinions would be a situation where he has another job aside from gambling. The issue of “asmachta” would apply regardless of whether he has another means of support, whereas the issue of furthering the general welfare of the public would only apply if he has no other means of support.

Tosfos points out that both opinions in the Gemora agree that the disqualification is only Rabbinic, because even the opinion who considers it theft due to “asmachta,” since he doesn’t realize the severity of the prohibition; he is not invalidated as a witness on a Biblical level. Regardless, we rule according to Rav Sheishes that the disqualification is attributed to him not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public which would surely be Rabbinic.

There is a dispute between the Rambam and Rashi as to the nature of the disqualification of not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public. The Rambam associates this with theft. Since the looser isn’t willingly forfeiting his money to the winner, it is considered “avak gezel.” The S”ma (C.M. 34:40) explains the position of the Rambam - since it is not technically theft, the Rabbis only considered it to be a problem if his main livelihood was coming from his gambling earnings. When the Gemora stipulates that he is only disqualified if he doesn’t have another means of earning a living, the Gemora really means to say that he doesn’t have another source of income. If he has another source of income, or is wealthy so that he doesn’t need the gambling earnings for support, he would be eligible to serve as a witness. However, if he had another income, but required the earnings from gambling to support himself, he would be disqualified. The Gr”a (C.M. 203:44) disagrees with the approach of the S”ma and explains that the Rambam actually rules like Rami bar Chamah that an “asmachta” is not binding, and therefore, he considers it to be theft. But, the Gr”a holds that even though it is stealing, the Sages only invalidated him when he has no other livelihood.

Rashi considers the issue of not being involved in furthering the general welfare of the public to have nothing to do with theft. Rashi considers the issue to be an indication of a very low level of fear of Heaven. The S”ma explains that this only applies to someone who doesn’t work and doesn’t realize the difficulties involved in earning money and would be prone to testify falsely (because he associates money as “easy-come, easy-go,” and doesn’t take it seriously). But someone who works, even if he can’t support himself without the added income from gambling, wouldn’t be disqualified for testimony since he realizes the challenges of earning a living.

The Shulchan Aruch, who follows the Rambam, and considers the problem of gambling to be associated with theft, follows his own opinion (c.m. 370:3) where he writes that one who gambles with gentiles would not be in violation of theft (since only actual and direct theft is forbidden from a gentile, but not when he loses in gambling and agrees to give the money). Rashi would certainly not make this distinction and would hold that even one who gambles with gentiles would be disqualified to testify. Even according to the Rambam, the Shulchan Aruch frowns upon gambling and writes: However, it is forbidden to occupy oneself with matters of vain, for a person should only occupy his time with wisdom and matters that benefit the general welfare of the public.

Rules of the Game and the
Rules of Life

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Rabbi Nachum of Stepinesht, the son of Rabbi Yisrael of Ruzhin, once entered his beis midrash during Chanukah and saw some chasidim playing checkers. Seeing their Rebbe, they were taken aback, but Rabbi Nachum approached and asked them, “Do you know the rules of the game? Now listen carefully:
1) You give one piece to get back two.
2) You mustn’t avoid your move.
3) You mustn’t make two moves with one turn.
4) Go forward, but never backward.
5) When you get to the top, you can go anywhere (Rav S.Y. Zevin, Sipurei Chasidim al HaMo’adim, p. 267).

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Hatmanah


The Gemora rules that one may be matmin (insulate) a cold food or drink on Shabbos. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 257:6) clarifies that one may only do so when the insulation does not add heat (eino mosif hevel), and his whole purpose of doing so is to ensure that the item will not become too cold. If however it does add heat (mosif hevel), then it is forbidden to insulate it even prior to Shabbos.

In generations past, in order to keep the cooked food warm once it was taken off the fire, it was insulated. Although there isn’t any issur melachah with hatmanah per se, the Chachamim nevertheless forbade it so as not to violate the issur of bishul in the event that before the insulation he would find that the item cooled off and then he would return it to the fire. Therefore one may not do hatmanah on Shabbos even when the insulation is not mosif hevel (ibid 257:1).

The Chachamim additionally forbade insulating an item in a place where it’s mosif hevel even before Shabbos. The reason being since in the times of the Gemora the ideal place for mosif hevel was in the ash next to the fire, and he might come to stir the ash on Shabbos to heat up the insulated food, thereby violating a form of mavir (ibid).

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 4:74 - Hatmanah) explains that it is forbidden to insulate an item in a manner of mosif hevel even early Friday morning. [One cannot infer that Reb Moshe held that there isn’t any problem of hatmanah if it was insulated before Friday, since the question he was addressing was regarding Friday morning. On the contrary, it is pretty clear from his wording that it would be forbidden to do so no matter when it was insulated.]

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Bava Basra 145

Why the Kiddushin Money is Irretrievable

The Gemora cites a dispute whether kiddushin money is irretrievable or not (does a man, when giving money to betroth a woman, resolve in his mind that he is prepared to forfeit the money if this will not result in a nisuin). Rabbi Nassan holds that the kiddushin money is not irretrievable (and it must be returned), and Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi holds that the kiddushin money is irretrievable (and it does not need to be returned).

What is the explanation of the Tanna that holds that the kiddushin money is irretrievable?

The Ritva writes that the man gives the money to the woman on the condition that it should be returned to him if she would die before the nisuin. He adds that this stipulation is only with respect to the kiddushin money more than the value of a perutah, for if the entire kiddushin money was included in this condition (and everything must be returned), it would emerge that they were retroactively never married, and why would it be necessary to give a get (in a case where she retracted prior to the nisuin)! If she would commit adultery, why would she be put to death? It would be a case of a hasra’as safek -- “an uncertain warning,” for if the kiddushin does not result in a nisuin, it would emerge that the man never gave her any money, there was never any kiddushin!

The Rashba disagrees and proves from a Gemora later that all the kiddushin money is returned. And although all the money is returned, the kiddushin is nevertheless valid through the benefit that she received by being able to use the money until she would be required to return it.

HALACHOS FROM THE DAF

What should I Learn?

By: Reb Avraham Klein

The Gemora discusses different types of Torah scholars. There are those that excel in Mishna, some in Aggadah, others in Pilpul, some in Halachah, while there are yet others whose field of expertise is Gemora. They are all part of Torah, and each contributes its part to Torah learning. Although there is a mitzvah of Yedias Hatorah (to know as much Torah as possible), there are halachos in what is imperative to learn.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah Siman 246 Seif 1) writes that every single Jew is obligated to learn Torah; it makes no difference if he’s rich or poor, healthy or ill, young or old, even if he’s preoccupied with earning a living and taking care of his family, everyone is obligated to set aside time to learn - by day and by night. If it is absolutely impossible for him to learn, either due to the fact that he has no idea how to learn anything, or he is simply extremely busy without even a moment to learn, then he should pay others to learn.

There is an opinion in halachah (ibid Seif 4) that when one is starting to learn Torah (i.e. in his younger years) he should split his learning time into thirds: the first third he should study Tanach, the second - Mishna, and the third - Gemora, and when he gets older, he should just learn Gemora while routinely reviewing Tanach and Mishna. However the Rema rules that Talmud Bavli is considered a mixture of all three, and therefore, if one focused all his energies in Gemora, he has fulfilled his obligation to study Tanach and Mishna as well. The Rema continues that “all one needs to learn is Tanach, Mishna, Gemora and the Halachos that are derived from them, and through this, he will acquire this world and the next.”

The Shach and Taz quote Drishah that notes that there are baalei batim (laymen - people who work and have less time to study Torah) who learn Gemora without halachah. He rules that they must also learn halachah. He bases his ruling from the famous Gemora which states: Whoever learns two halachos a day is guaranteed a portion in the World to Come. Rashi explains that to halachah means halachah lima’aseh (practical rulings; there are instances when the Gemora uses the word halachah, and it translates as Gemora). So although the Rema says that it is sufficient to learn Gemora, that is only for those who learn most of the day, but baalei batim that learn considerably less, must also learn halachah.

In regard to Kabbalah and other esoteric studies, the Shach rules that one should not start learning them before he is 40, since it requires a high level of holiness and purity. Pischei Tshuvah argues and cites Chavos Yair who recommends that one should altogether distance himself from learning these areas of Torah.

Mishna Berurah (Siman 290 Seif Katan 3) writes that it is written in the Zohar that a person should come up with a novel interpretation in Torah on Shabbos, and for those that can’t, they should learn an area of Torah that they never learned before.

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Bundle Up

The Gemora states that catching a cold or heat related illness is considered a negligent illness. The Gemora teaches us that “everything is in the hands of heaven except for heat and cold.”

Tosfos explain that all mishaps and occurrences that happen (in contrast to misfortunes that we actively bring to ourselves, for example jumping into a raging ocean) in our life, is not a random act attributed to queer and meaningless fate. Rather, everything that occurs in our lives, whether big or small, is directly caused by G-d. There is one exception to this Law of Occurrences - illnesses that are caused by heat or cold. This is exclusively in man's department.

There is an interesting difference between the two. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim Siman 276 Seif 5) rules that in cold places, it is permitted to tell a non-Jew on Shabbos to make a fire (or in today’s vernacular - turn on the heater) for the little children (because for them, it’s cold, even in weather where the adults are comfortable). Once there is a fire, everyone is allowed to benefit from it. However, the Taz and others add that one may not sit close to the fire out of concern that one might momentarily forget and make the fire larger. In a place where it’s extremely cold, one may tell a non-Jew to light a fire (even for adults). The reason for this is, as the Shulchan Aruch puts it, “Everyone is considered ill in regard to the cold.” The ill here refers to the category of “an ill person that is not in danger,” and therefore, we are not allowed to make a fire, but a non-Jew can, because a non-Jew may be specifically asked to perform forbidden labor when there is an ill person, without the hints that usually must accompany an “Amirah Li’akum” (telling a non-Jew to do a melachah on Shabbos).

Similarly, in a case where the air conditioner is on, and it is very cold, one may ask a non-Jew to turn it off. However, if it is very hot, there is no such concept of “Everyone is considered ill in regard to heat.” Although some (Minchas Yitzchak and others) permit to ask a non-Jew to turn on an air conditioner for different reasons, Reb Moishe Feinstein forbade it (Igros Moshe Yoreh De'ah Chelek 3 Shaila 47 Ois 2).

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Public; Tzadikim's Vision; Paternity - Bava Basra 142

HOW MANY JEWS ARE NEEDED TO MAKE SOMETHING PUBLIC?

Shmuel once said to Rav Chana Bagdasaah (from Baghdath, or an Aggada expert), “Go out and bring me ten people (so that the ruling should be publicized) in order for me to say to you before them that one who gives something to a fetus, the fetus has acquired it.”

It would seem form this Gemora that if something should be publicized, ten people are required.

This is also evident from the Gemora Sanhedrin (74b) which states that a person who is in public must be martyred even for a minor precept rather than violate it. Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The minimum for publicity is ten. This is derived from the verse [Vayikra 22:32]: And you shall not profane My holy name; but I will be holy among the children of Israel.

It is written [Bamidbar 16:21]: Separate yourselves from among this congregation, that I may consume them in a moment. An analogy is drawn from the use of congregation (edah) in two passages; one, just quoted, and the second, [ibid 14:27]: How long shall I bear with this evil congregation. ‘Congregation’ there refers to the Spies sent out by Moshe. As Yehoshua and Calev had dissociated themselves from their evil report, ten were left, all Israelites. Thus we see, that ten Israelites creates a quorum.

This applies to desecrating the Shabbos in public as well. The Peri Megadim (Sifsei Daas Y”D 2:17) states in the name of the Rashba: If there are ten men present when one violates the Shabbos, one is regarded as a desecrator of Shabbos in public.

This would seemingly be inconsistent with a Gemora in Bava Basra (39b) which states according to one opinion: A protest must be lodged in the presence of three people because this way, we are certain that the protest will become known.

The Gemora in Gittin (33a) also states that three people make a matter public. The Gemora rules that if a husband wishes to nullify a get, he must do so in front of three people. This is to ensure that the matter becomes known, and his wife will not mistakenly get married.

The Sdei Chemed (V p. 260) answers: Three people are sufficient when we wish to make something public knowledge; once three people know about the matter, we are certain that the public will become aware of this. However, when something must be performed in public, it is only regarded as being public, if ten Jews are present at the moment it occurred.

Refuting a Denial of Paternity

by: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

In the previous sugyos (127b) we learned that a father is believed to declare one of his sons as his firstborn even if another had been assumed as such and that the newly declared firstborn gets a double portion of his father’s estate. The halachah was ruled according to Rabbi Yehudah, that a father is believed even in opposition to chazakah – the long-assumed status of another son. Moreover, a father is believed to declare a certain son as his firstborn even if the older brother must perforce be understood to be another’s son born to his married wife, and therefore passul (Tosfos, ibid, s.v. Kach; Tosfos also offer another explanation for a father’s credibility to discredit a son). The Gemora learns this halachah from the verse “…for the firstborn…he shall recognize” (Devarim 21:17) – i.e., he may recognize him even in the presence of others.

Many Rishonim hold that a person is also believed to recognize someone who was not even known to be his son, as his firstborn, or, in modern terms, declare his first paternity. The Rishonim explain that the Torah lends a father such credence as no one else can reliably offer such testimony.

Ramban maintains that every Jewish father has a positive mitzvah to let people know that a certain one of his sons is his firstborn who is to inherit a double portion. If this fact is known already, the father fulfils the mitzvah by remaining silent (Ramban on Sefer HaMitzvos, negative mitzvah 10).

Lack of space prevents us from elaborating the many details, rules and differences of opinion concerning a father’s recognition of his firstborn. A sad event, though, occurred in Europe about 180 years ago when a person with a pregnant wife claimed that the baby wasn’t his as his having been far from home precluded his paternity. The couple eventually divorced and 20 years later the son asked the local beis din to examine the circumstances of his birth. Witnesses then came forward who discredited the husband’s claim that he had been away at the time of the son’s conception and the only remaining support for the father’s claim was if a father has the right to “recognize” who is his son.

The question was referred to HaGaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger zt”l who thoroughly investigated the issue. He mentions (Responsa Rabbi Akiva Eiger, I, 128) several opinions of Rishonim to support the view that in such a case the father is not believed. Among others, he cites the Tosfos Rid on Bava Basra 128b, that a father is not believed if the mother contradicts him, and the Ba’al Halachos Gedolos that he is believed to declare a young man his firstborn even if his wife’s older son is perforce understood to be another’s son and pasul, but he is not believed to directly declare that someone is not his son (see ibid another opinion attributed to the Riaz).

The main chiddush of Rabbi Eiger’s long reply stems from our sugya, which explains that a firstborn born after his father’s demise is not entitled to a double portion of the estate as the father could never recognize him. If so, contends Rabbi Akiva Eiger, a father can’t “recognize” (i.e. declare) his firstborn before his birth either, as then, too, he can’t see him. In our case, the father denied his paternity before the birth, but, according to the Gemora, he can’t do so! The father’s authority to recognize his firstborn is valid only when he sees him (see ibid with proof from the Rosh).

How Far is the Perception of Tzadikim!

Concluding his reply, Rabbi Eiger departed from his usual style and quoted his son-in-law, the Chasam Sofer zt”l, whom he asked for his opinion. The Chasam Sofer then expanded on the topic and discussed a subject which had not yet been raised: What would the decision be if the witnesses contradicting the husband’s testimony were related to each other and therefore disqualified? His father-in-law subsequently wrote: “I’ve now seen how far is the perception of tzadikim as he extraordinarily dealt with an issue without being asked. When Rav Pila (the local Rabbi) investigated the matter, however, he discovered that the witnesses were indeed related and we thus see that Hashem’s spirit spoke through him.”

HALACHOS FROM THE DAF

A Deceased Convert’s Property

By: Reb Avraham Klein

The Gemora mentions a case involving a deceased ger’s (convert) property that was acquired. Although a ger is a bona fide Jew in every aspect, when it comes to inheritance, there is often a major difference between him and the rest of Klal Yisroel - namely, Jewish relatives. Every Jew has some living relative if you go far enough up or down his family tree. A ger, however, has a status of a newborn in terms of relation; therefore, unless he married and had children, his property would have nowhere to go, and therefore anyone that is machzik (a legal acquirement though kinyan chazakah) this ger’s property, now becomes the owner.

The Gemora discusses a case in which a ger died and someone was machzik the ger’s property, and then he heard that the deceased ger has a son, or he heard that the ger’s wife is expecting - either case would obviously negate this person’s kinyan, for the property belongs to the relatives of the ger. And then he heard that the son died, or he heard that the ger’s wife had a miscarriage - now there isn’t any living relatives. So if the person is machzik it again (or anyone else for that matter) then he would acquire the ger’s property.

There is a major dispute as to the reading of the Gemora. Rashbam learns that when he heard that the son died, that is when he actually died, meaning, that when he heard that there was a son, that report was true.

Rambam (Hil. Zchiah Perek 2 Hal. 18) learns that when he heard that the son died, that means that the report that the son was alive, was false. For in actuality, the son had died before this person was ever machzik. The Maggid Mishnah proves that the Rambam’s way of learning this Gemora is correct, and brings up serious questions on how one can learn this Gemora the way the Rashbam does. The Mishnah Lamelech argues with the Maggid Mishnah and explains the Rashbam in a novel approach.

The halachah would depend on how one learns this Gemora. Without going into a lengthy rationale (see the Maggid Mishnah and Mishnah Lamelech above), if one would understand the Gemora like the Rashbam, the halachah would be that the first person that was machzik would in fact be the owner. According to the Rambam the halachah would be that the second person that was machzik is the owner.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat Siman 275 Sief 30) rules in accordance with the Rambam, and the halachah is that the second person is the owner and not the first.

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Shabbos Chanukah and Selling a Beis Kur

By: Meoros Hadaf Hayomi

An ancient, anonymous song for Shabbos Chanukah, Ichlu Mashmanim, appears in siddurim and is chanted in some communities. The whole composition sings the praises of food, meals, meat dishes, wine and miscellaneous culinary delights to be consumed on that Shabbos and the line ending each stanza goes: “A beis kur sell or lease; rent a beis kur for Shabbos Chanukah!”

In his Responsa (137), Mahari of Bruna, a pupil of the Terumas HaDeshen, remarks that no Torah scholar could have written the song as a Chanukah meal is not defined as a se’udas mitzvah. Others even stress that only foolhardy people could have composed it, as evident from its contents (Orchos Chayim, 670:8). On the other hand, some rebbes, such as Rebbe Pinchas of Koritz zt”l, sang it on Shabbos Chanukah and a few scholars attribute it to Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra as the initial letters of its lines form Avraham. Those favoring the song were somehow able to lend its contents a spiritual connotation and some surmise that beis kur is used as a pun: In Old French a yard for raising and fattening poultry was called a bas court (“low courtyard” – the final s was then, as in certain dialects today, pronounced). The message, then, is “Sell your beis kur” – your field – and rent a bas court for Shabbos Chanukah.

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Space for the Holy Ark

The Gemora states that neither the body of the keruvim, nor the ark itself took up any space in the inner sanctum.

The Maharsha says that this miracle was done to indicate that Hashem has no physical aspect, and therefore the ark and keruvim which were designated as the ultimate resting place of Hashem's presence did not use up any physical space.

The Ben Yehoyada says that the ark took up no space to hint that any expenditures that one makes for Torah do not come off his general budget set by Hashem for a year (as per Beitza 16a). The keruvim, which symbolize the Jewish nation, took up no space to hint that all sustenance provided to the Jewish nation is done miraculously by Hashem, and is not part of the general account made for the world's sustenance. He quotes his son, Yaakov, as explaining that this miracle was done to teach us that when one is involved in Torah (symbolized by the ark) and mitzvos (symbolized by the keruvim), he should do so without any earthly intentions, just as these items were not related to the physical space where they were situated.
Shabbos in the Daf
The Gemora states that the Aron, the Holy Ark, did not take up any room in space in the Mishkan and in the Bais HaMikdash. This was truly a miracle. Similarly, we can suggest that Shabbos, despite the prohibition from refraining to work, does not take up any space either.

The Zohar states that one’s sustenance is blessed from Shabbos. Although one refrains from work on Shabbos and it would seem that this would be detrimental to ones livelihood, one should not be concerned, because by observing Shabbos, his efforts during the week will be blessed.

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Normal Way of Carrying

Abaye sat and related the above halachah. Rav Ada bar Masnah asked him from the following braisa: [There is a halachah of kim leih bid’rabbah minei -whenever someone is deserving of two punishments, he receives the one which is more severe.] If one steals a purse on Shabbos, he is obligated to pay for the purse as well, as he had already stolen before he had been liable to be stoned (for desecrating Shabbos). If he was dragging the purse little by little out of the original owner’s domain, he is exempt from paying for the purse, as the act of desecrating Shabbos and the act of stealing happened at the same time. Now, a purse is something that is normal to be lifted, and nevertheless, it is acquired through meshichah!?

Abaye answered: It is referring to a purse that is tied by a string.

Rav Ada (thinking that Abaye meant that it was small) asked him back: I also understood it to be referring to a small purse (and that is why I asked my question that it should not be acquired through meshichah; rather, through hagba’ah)!?

Abaye responded: It is referring to a purse that needs a string attached to it (due to its large size, it can only be dragged; not lifted).

Tosfos asks: How could the Gemora think that the braisa is referring to a small purse which can be lifted? If so, he should not be liable for violating the Shabbos, since it is not the normal way of carrying something!?

Tosfos answers that although with respect to acquisitions, the item can only be acquired through lifting, for this is its normal mode of transport; nevertheless, with respect to Shabbos, it is regarded as normal.

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Assets Discovered Posthumously

By: Meoros HaDaf Hayomi

Orphans are assumed to know nothing about their parents’ business and the Torah therefore empowers dayanim to represent them in case of claims, argue for them and demand claimants to take an oath or produce solid proof. Almost every Rishon expressed an opinion as to the claims a beis din may present on an orphan’s behalf. Ramban and other Rishonim hold that they may assert any claim (see Responsa Maharit, 112; Shach in C.M. §69 S.K. 26, and §297) but Tosfos on our sugya (70a, s.v. Veleima) and other Rishonim believe a beis din is limited to only reasonable claims. If, for example, someone produces a document proving he deposited funds with the deceased, the beis din may not claim they were subject to force majeure (oness), exempting the orphans, as oness such as an armed robbery is uncommon and would usually have become known. (Shulchan ‘Aruch cites both opinions in C.M. 108:4; see Shach, ibid, S.K. 8, who rules according to Ramban). Still, all agree that a beis din must not counter with utterly unreasonable claims that, if submitted by the father, would be rejected. Halachic authorities were consequently required to decide which claims should be considered realistic and acceptable.

Taxation in German Communities

Poskim subsequently discussed the autonomous taxation methods practiced in German Jewish communities. Each member of the community had to submit a periodic declaration of assets to enable proportional collection of internal revenue tax to cover expenses such as maintenance of public services (synagogues, medical care, mikvaos, etc.); wages of rabbis, shochatim, lobbyists and the like; and incidental costs. Declarations had to detail promissory notes, deposits, cash, silver, gold, wine and grain, all to be assessed for taxation (Minhagei Vormaiza, II, p. 134). A relevant incident occurred in Nikolsburg, Moravia, now in the Czech Republic but then ruled by Germans.

Fisk’s Tax Declaration

About 350 years ago Yaakov Fisk was one of the richest men in Nikolsburg and, like his companions, periodically declared his assets and paid his taxes. After his demise, his heirs found the inheritance to be worth 300% more than his last assessment and the gabaim of the community demanded arrears. Some dayanim, though, countered on the heirs’ behalf that Fisk could have become richer just before his death, after the last taxation, and they could hence not be forced to pay arrears for previous years (Responsa Tzemach Tzedek HaKadmon, 24).

We don’t all have the Luck of Yosef Mokir Shabos

A similar case is judged in Responsa Chavos Yair (57-58) and ruled that claims of sudden enrichment are unrealistic as most people become wealthy gradually, over a long period: “Should we assume he opened a fish and found a precious stone like Yosef Mokir Shabos or got rich by a stroke of luck?” A beis din, then, cannot make such claims and the heirs must pay the demanded arrears.

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The Quantification of Shabbos Prohibitions: Practical Applications

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By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Cooking is a labor (melachah) forbidden on Shabbos, occurring when liquid or solid foods or other substances improved by heating, like pigments, are even parboiled. Utensils containing hot liquids are defined in three categories: A primary utensil (keli rishon) holds a boiling liquid and continues to be primary even off the fire or electric plate as long as an average adult’s hand recoils from its contents. Liquid poured directly from there cooks the external layer of any solid, uncooked food and a small amount of any cold liquid, even water (Shulchan ‘Aruch, O.C. 318:10; see Mishnah Berurah, ibid, S.K. 82). A container having received liquid from a keli rishon is called a second utensil (keli sheni) and likewise cooks in many circumstances as long as one’s hand recoils from its contents. A container receiving liquid from a keli sheni is a third utensil (keli shelishi) and virtually never cooks.

Making a glass of tea on Shabbos: A person wanting to make a hot drink on Shabbos might rinse a cup, inadvertently neglect to dry it or shake it out thoroughly and pour boiling water into it from a keli rishon. Most halachic authorities forbid this as the boiling water cooks the small amount of cold water in the cup (see Responsa Igros Moshe, O.C., I, 93; Responsa Minchas Yitzchak, IX, 30). They raise the question as to whether cooking a few drops of water is actually prohibited by the Torah – d’oraisa – or by rabbinical decree (derabanan). As we shall see, the topic is linked to Rashbam’s interpretation of a certain example cited in our sugya.

Rabbi Yochanan holds that “half a prohibited quantity is forbidden by the Torah” (Yoma 74a). Forbidden substances or acts are quantified according to measures received by Moshe Rabbeinu at Sinai. The minimal amount of food prohibited on Yom Kippur, for example, is equivalent to the volume of a large date. A person eating less is not punishable but, according to Rabbi Yochanan, is still forbidden to do so by the Torah. [“Half a quantity” does not mean only a half but rather, less than the halachically prohibited amount; we shall therefore hereon use the term “subquantity.”] Many Rishonim maintain that this rule also applies to Shabbos (Rashi, Shabbos 74a, s.v. Vechi mutar; Ritva and Hagahos Ashri, ibid; see Mishneh LeMelech, Hilchos Shabbos, 18:1). For instance, according to Rambam, the quantity of water forbidden to heat on Shabbos is enough to wash a baby’s pinky (Hilchos Shabbos, 9:1). Following the above opinion, someone boiling less is not punishable in any earthly beis din, but is still prohibited from doing so by the Torah. Some halachic authorities, though, cite Rashbam’s reasoning that this principle does not pertain to Shabbos.

The amount of food forbidden to carry on Shabbos from a reshus hayachid (literally, a “private domain” but actually any area, even ownerless, bound by certain enclosures) to a reshus harabim (a public domain having a certain breadth and other conditions) is equivalent to the volume of a dried fig. Our sugya mentions a person who carries out a subquantity of food and, according to Rashbam (s.v. Bemaseches Shabbos), he is innocent of any transgression as the Torah calls Shabbos labor meleches machsheves: “skilled” or “important” work. Shabbos labor is quantified by its importance, a condition that defines melachah, and a subquantity is therefore not melachah at all. By comparison, eating a subquantity on Yom Kippur is still eating and a partial transgression of the “affliction” demanded by the Torah (Vayikra 17:29). [This meaning is just one definition of meleches machashaves; see also Rashi in Chagigah 10b.] A subquantity of any prohibition, though, is outlawed at least derabanan (see Shabbos, ibid) and we must therefore assume that Rashbam would rabbinically forbid pouring from a keli rishon on a subquantity of cold water, such as in our example (see Responsa Divrei Yatziv, O.C. 156; Responsa Shevet HaLevi, VII, 136).

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The Designation of Money and the Timeliness of a Mitzvah

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The Gemora cited a braisa: The Purim collections must be used for Purim only, and we are not required to be so precise in the matter (how much is needed for Purim, and how much the poor of the city needs). The poor may not even buy straps for their shoes, unless it was stipulated in the presence of the townspeople that such shall be granted; these are the words of Rabbi Yaakov, who said it in the name of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient in the matter (and allows the poor person to use the charity funds for other uses besides the Purim feast).

The Chavos Yair quotes a Sefer Chasidim, who derives from this Gemora that if one sends his fellow a gift of food to be eaten on Shabbos, it is forbidden for the recipient to eat it during the weekdays. If he has leftover, he should let the rest of household partake in it, but only on Shabbos. If the donor explicitly stipulated that he should be the only one to eat from it, he may not give it to others.

It would seem from our Gemora that this is not merely an act of piousness; but rather, it is halachically mandated. We can extrapolate further that if one gives money or wine to his fellow and he tells him that is should be used for Kiddush, he must use it for Kiddush, and nothing else. It would be forbidden to buy fish for Shabbos with this money, for Kiddush is a Biblical mitzvah, and eating fish on Shabbos is merely a Rabbinic one.

However, according to the prevailing custom that money is given to Torah scholars, and they are told to use it for Shabbos and Yom Tov, that is only out of respect, but they are not actually being particular as to what it should be used for; in such cases, they could use the money for whatever they desire.

Reb Yosef Engel cites the following Yerushalmi: If one vows to bring a flour-offering on Yom Tov, he should not bring it on a weekday. This is why the seforim write that a transgression committed on Shabbos is more severe than one committed on a weekday, for the holiness of the day plays a role. So too it may be said regarding the performance of a mitzvah; There will be a greater reward for a mitzvah performed on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

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Thirty-one Hour Shabbos

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There is an obligation to add on to the Shabbos at its onset and upon its conclusion.

The Rosh writes that we do not know the exact amount that one is required to add.

The Arizal writes that the total amount of Shabbos, including the additions at its onset and upon its conclusion, should be thirty-one hours.

It is unclear where this amount comes from. Some say that a hint to this can be found in the fact that the Rambam counts the mitzvah of Shabbos as the thirty-first mitzvah in the Torah.

The Bnei Yissochar suggests the following possible reason for this. Shabbos is referred to in the Torah as a day of holiness. We find that a fifth is added to holy articles. An ordinary Shabbos day would consist of twenty-four hours. If we would add a fifth, we would have thirty hours.

Our Gemora teaches the following: Rav Pappa notes that by the fact that the braisa ruled that a kor constitutes an excessive burden for a boat, and that three kors are regarded as an excessive burden for a large ship, it can be derived that an average boat carries a load of thirty kors (for the Mishna taught us that 1/30th more than a usual load will be regarded as an excessive load).

Accordingly, we can say that we desired to add on to the Shabbos an addition that would not be regarded as an excessive burden. If the regular Shabbos day is thirty hours, one additional hour is added, for more than 1/30th would be regarded as excessive. It is because of this that the total amount of hours of Shabbos observance, according to the Arizal, is thirty-one!

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The Designation of Money and the Timeliness of a Mitzvah

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The Gemora cited a braisa: The Purim collections must be distributed for Purim (and nothing else). The local collections belong to that town only, and we are not required to be so precise in the matter (how much is needed for Purim, and how much the poor of the city needs), but calves are purchased in abundance, slaughtered and eaten, and the surplus goes to the charity fund. Rabbi Eliezer said: The Purim collections must be used for Purim only, and the poor may not even buy straps for their shoes, unless it was stipulated in the presence of the townspeople that such shall be granted; these are the words of Rabbi Yaakov, who said it in the name of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient in the matter (and allows the poor person to use the charity funds for other uses besides the Purim feast). [We may derive from here that Rabbi Meir holds that we cannot deviate from the owner’s intent.]

The Gemora notes that this braisa does not prove that (whoever deviates from the owner’s stipulation is regarded as a thief), for perhaps there too, the reason is that the donors gave the charity only that it should be used for Purim, and not for any other purpose? [Regarding charity funds, there is a significant difference between the two purposes, whereas the two routes discussed in our case are not significantly different than each other, for one is not more dangerous in any way than the other.]

The Chavos Yair quotes a Sefer Chasidim, who derives from this Gemora that if one sends his fellow a gift of food to be eaten on Shabbos, it is forbidden for the recipient to eat it during the weekdays. If he has leftover, he should let the rest of household partake in it, but only on Shabbos. If the donor explicitly stipulated that he should be the only one to eat from it, he may not give it to others.

It would seem from our Gemora that this is not merely an act of piousness; but rather, it is halachically mandated. We can extrapolate further that if one gives money or wine to his fellow and he tells him that is should be used for Kiddush, he must use it for Kiddush, and nothing else. It would be forbidden to buy fish for Shabbos with this money, for Kiddush is a Biblical mitzvah, and eating fish on Shabbos is merely a Rabbinic one.

However, according to the prevailing custom that money is given to Torah scholars, and they are told to use it for Shabbos and Yom Tov, that is only out of respect, but they are not actually being particular as to what it should be used for; in such cases, they could use the money for whatever they desire.

Reb Yosef Engel cites the following Yerushalmi: If one vows to bring a flour-offering on Yom Tov, he should not bring it on a weekday. This is why the seforim write that a transgression committed on Shabbos is more severe than one committed on a weekday, for the holiness of the day plays a role. So too it may be said regarding the performance of a mitzvah; There will be a greater reward for a mitzvah performed on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

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The Famous Taz

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Estate Money and Interest

The Gemora allowed an administrator of an estate to invest the orphan’s money in an investment with favorable terms for them, although this is generally Rabbinically prohibited.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 160:18), based on the Rambam and Rosh, applies this license to all Rabbinically prohibited interest, and extends this to money of charity, money donated to Torah scholars, and money donated for use in a synagogue.

What did the Torah Permit?

The Gemora quotes a statement of Rav Huna that prohibits charging interest from a non Jew. The Gemora debates why this is prohibited, and how to reconcile this statement with the verse and Mishna that seem to permit such a loan.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) asks why the Gemora was concerned with reconciling this Rabbinic law with the verse and Mishna, and answers that the Gemora assumed that the Sages would not prohibit something the Torah permitted.

The Taz states in numerous places that although the Sages have leeway to enact their own new prohibitions, they may not prohibit something explicitly permitted by the Torah.

The Taz in YD 117:1 applies this to the Rabbinic prohibition on commerce in forbidden foods. Since the Torah explicitly allows one to sell neveilah meat to a non Jew, the Rabbinic prohibition had to allow for such commerce when one chanced upon the forbidden food, so as to not fully prohibit an act the Torah explicitly allows.

The Taz in OC 588:5 discusses a question raised by earlier poskim. We find the Sages prohibited the performance of numerous mitzvos on Shabbos (e.g., Shofar, Lulav), due to a concern of one accidentally carrying to perform the mitzvah. Why did the Sages not apply this to bris milah, prohibiting a bris milah which falls on a Shabbos.

The Taz says that since the Torah explicitly said that one must perform a bris milah on the eighth day, even if it is a Shabbos, the Sages could not prohibit it.

The Chavos Yair 142 challenges this Taz from our Gemora, among others. Our Gemora is an instance where the Sages prohibited an action explicitly permitted by the Torah – i.e., charging a non Jew interest on a loan. Therefore, the Chavos Yair rejects the Taz’s thesis.

Later poskim dispute the Chavos Yair’s disproof. The Shla, quoted by the Chasam Sofer (YD 106), says that the Sages did not prohibit charging a non Jew interest, since that is indeed explicitly permitted by the Torah. Instead, the Sages prohibited a Jew from lending to a non Jew at all, and only thereby precluded the Jew from receiving interest from him.

The Chasam Sofer (YD 106, 109) says that Tosfos themselves (70b Tashich, 64b v’Lo) seem to support the Taz, and actually explain the Gemora based on his principle. According to Tosfos, when the Gemora challenged Rav Nachman from the verse, the Gemora was stating that since the Torah explicitly allowed a Jew to charge a non Jew interest, the Sages cannot prohibit it. The Chasam Sofer says that the reason the Sages were allowed to do so is due to the exclusions built in to their prohibitions (for livelihood, or for a Torah scholar). Just as the Sages allowed commerce in forbidden food when the Jew chanced upon it in order to avoid explicitly prohibiting an act allowed by the Torah, so too, the Sages allowed charging a non Jew interest in some cases, to avoid explicitly such a prohibition.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 1:134) says that the Gemora’s answer that we read the verse only as tashich – explicitly allowing a Jew only to pay interest, means that the Torah never did explicitly allow a Jew to charge interest, giving the Sages the leeway to prohibit it. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger YD 117 on the Taz for more details.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) says that nowadays we lend money to non Jews with interest. Tosfos advances three reasons for this behavior:
1. The economic situation and lack of other professions available to Jews makes the interest necessary for the creditor’s basic needs, in which case it is permitted.
2. Ravina’s answer understood that the prohibition was to limit our interactions with non Jews. Since we are forced into such interactions due to economic circumstances, there is no added interaction that will be prevented by refraining from charging interest.
3. The second version of Rav Huna’s statement does not prohibit interest from a non Jew at all, but only prioritized an interest free loan to a Jew above it.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 159:1) rules that charging interest from a non Jew is prohibited by the Sages, unless the creditor needs the interest for his basic needs, or is a Torah scholar. However, the Shulchan Aruch says that it is permitted nowadays, based on the first two reasons of Tosfos (see Shach 2).

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Mumar l'hachis and l'teavon

Desecrating Shabbos

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s students asked of him (Bava Kamma 79) : Why is the Torah stricter on a thief than on a robber. He replied: The robber puts the honor of the servant (man) on the same level as the honor of his owner (Hashem),whereas the thief does not put the honor of the servant on the same level as the honor of the master (for by stealing covertly, he is displaying a fear of man, but not Hashem). He made, as it were, the eye of the one Below (Hashem) as if it would not be seeing, and the ear of the one Below as if it would not be hearing, as it says: Woe to them who hide in depths to conceal their counsel from Hashem, and their deeds are in the dark, and they say, “Who sees us, and who knows of us?” And it is written: And they say, “Hashem will not see, neither will the God of Jacob give heed.” And it is written: For they say, “Hashem has forsaken the earth and Hashem does not see.”

Many years ago (14 Teves 5761), I had a question based on the halachah found in Hilchos Shechita (siman 2) - One who violates Shabbos in public is considered a mumar for the entire torah tantamount to one who worships avoda zara, and his shechitah is invalid just as the shechitah of an idolater. But, one who violates Shabbos in private, although he is not trusted, so long as there are mashgichim who determine that he shechted properly, his shechitah is valid. Based on the Gemora’s logic by ganav and gazlan, we should consider one who desecrates Shabbos in private to be worse than one who desecrates Shabbos in public!?

R' Moshe (Igros O.C. 1:33) raises this question and based on it, he is mechadesh an important yesod. It is not clear why one who desecrates Shabbos in public is so severe, but R' Moshe suggests that one who violates Shabbos in public is not just a mumar l’teavon (a heretic out of desire), but the fact that he is doing it in public indicates that he is a mumar l’hachis (a heretic out of spite). Although the concept of the Gemora is true, that one who steals in private and hides from Hashem is worse, that is when both the act in private and the act in public are for the sake of fulfilling his. However, when one violates Shabbos in public, he enters a new realm of being a “mechalel Shabbos l’hachis,” which is certainly worse than merely being motivated by desires. Even if deep down, he is only doing it to satisfy his desires, we do not regard his inner thoughts, and the act is an act of l’hachis.

Based on this, he suggests that this only applies at a time when people understand the severity of Shabbos, so that when one violates Shabbos publicly, it is an indication that he has a complete disregard for the Shabbos, but nowadays, where people no longer take Shabbos seriously, and their desires would bring them to desecrate Shabbos in public just as fast as it would bring them to desecrate Shabbos in private, even one who desecrates Shabbos in public will not have the status of an idolater (and therefore his shechitah is valid and he can be counted for a minyan).

I had an alternate approach to answer this question. Stealing is an aveira between two fellow men that every society recognizes as wrong and destructive. It is part of human nature to consider theft to be bad, and is inherent in human nature to try and hide these actions from others. When one hides these actions from people because he is worried that people will think less of him, or may catch him to punish him, he is outwardly displaying a fear for people that exceeds his fear of Hashem. Since it is part of human nature to hide acts of theft, we assume his intention is to hide it from other people. However, Shabbos is between man and God, and therefore the violation of Shabbos is not considered bad by human nature. When one hides his desecration of Shabbos from others, we assume that it is not because he is afraid of people, because people don't view desecrating Shabbos as inherently bad. So why would he hide his actions from people? We assume his attempt to hide his desecration of Shabbos is out of respect for Hashem, rather than trying to hide from Hashem. But when he is desecrating Shabbos in public, we consider it to be a lack of respect, violating Shabbos in the open showing no regard for it at all.

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Tov in the Luchos

By: Rabbi Avi Lebovitz

Rabbi Chanina ben Agil asked Rabbi Chiya bar Abba: Why do the first Commandments not have the word “good” in it, and the second Commandments do have the word “good” in it?

He replied: Before asking me why it says “good,” ask me if it says “good,” as I don’t know whether it says this or not. Go ask Rabbi Tanchum bar Chanilai, who used to learn from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who was an expert in Aggadic teachings.

When he went to Rabbi Tanchum, Rabbi Tanchum said: I did not hear anything from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi about this matter. However, Shmuel bar Nachum, the uncle of Rabbi Acha bar Rabbi Chanina, and some say the maternal grandfather of Rabbi Acha bar Rabbi Chanina, said: Being that the first ones were going to be broken (by Moshe, they did not contain the word “good”).

The Gemora asks: Why is this a reason that they should not contain the word “good”?

Rav Ashi said: Heaven forbid, this would mean that goodness would stop for the Jewish people.

Rashi explains that the Gemora is making reference to the term “tov” in the mitzvah of honoring one’s father and mother.

The Maharatz Chayus is bothered by the very difficult question: How is it that the Tannaim were not familiar with the text of the Ten Commandments, until it was confirmed by Rabbi Tanchum? Although Tosfos in Bava Basra writes that there were some who were not fluent in the Scriptural verses, it seems strange to say that they didn't know the Aseres Hadibros!?

The Maharatz Chayus suggests that the discussion was whether the Aseres Hadibros that are recorded in Parshas Yisro was the text on the first set of luchos, and the Aseres Hadibros in V’eshchanan are the second set of luchos. Rabbi Tanchum had a tradition that it was in fact the case, to which the Gemora finally explains that it now makes sense that the luchos which were to be broken didn't contain the term “tov.”

The Torah Temima (Devorim 5:16) offers another approach. The Gemora is making reference to a Medrash where Hashem says to Moshe that He is going to give a second set of luchos, to which Moshe reacts with joy by saying “Tov li toras pichah me’alfei zahav v’chasef” – Torah is more precious to me that thousands of gold and silver.

Why did he only express this happiness by the second luchos, and not the first? On that the Gemora explains that since they would be broken, it would be inappropriate to say that about the first set of luchos.

However, based on the conventional understanding of the Gemora, it certainly seems to indicate that the Aseres Hadibros of Yisro were the first luchos, and V’eschanan the second. Based on this, we can make another observation. In the second luchos, by Shabbos and honoring one’s father and mother, it says “like Hashem your God commanded you,” which Rashi interprets as a reference back to Marah where the water was bitter. Why is this reference specifically in the second luchos and not the first?

The Chasam Sofer in Parshas Beshalach explains that Hashem taught us in Marah that he is our personal doctor – “ki ani Hashem rof’echah.” Unlike a physician who just heals the sick, Hashem is our "family doctor" who is just as interested in providing us with preventive medicine as He is with remedies for illness. In the second luchos, Hashem wanted to remind Klal Yisroel that committing transgressions (such as the golden calf) forces Him to bring upon us illnesses, and then He demonstrates to us that He has the power to heal. He much prefers avoiding illness in the first place by our commitment to His Torah.

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Actions or Results

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Rabbi Yochanan (Tannis 29a) said as follows: Were I living in those days, I would have ordained the fast for the tenth of Av; for on that day the greater part of the Beis Hamikdosh was burned. The Chachamim maintained that the day when the calamity began should be observed as a fast-day.

The Kotzker Rebbe asked from that famous Nimukei Yosef in Bava Kamma. Rabbi Yochanan said: One is liable on the damage caused by his fire on account of it being “his arrows” (it is as if he shot out an arrow which caused damage). The Nimukei Yosef explains that this is why one is permitted to light candles Friday afternoon even though they will be burning on Shabbos; since the candles were lit from before Shabbos, which is when he shot the arrow. According to this, why is Rabbi Yochanan stating here that he would have declared the fast on the tenth of Av if the fire started on the ninth?

The answer is that regarding Shabbos and damages, we are concerned with the action; when it occurred and how it happened. Regarding the Beis Hamikdosh being destroyed; we are not concerned with the action, rather with the result and it was burned on the tenth of Av. This is why Rabbi Yochanan said that if he were living in those days, he would have ordained the tenth of Av as the fast day.

The Avnei Neizer answers that the fire of the Beis Hamikdosh was a Heaven-sent fire and that is constantly being lit - that is why Rabbi Yochanan thought the fast should be on the tenth - we don’t look at the beginning.

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An Av and its Toladah

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The Gemora (Bava Kamma 2a) notes: We see regarding Shabbos that there are thirty-nine main categories of melachos (that are forbidden to perform according to Torah law) on Shabbos. This implies that there are sub-categories as well. Regarding Shabbos, we say that the sub-categories are like the main categories. Whether one transgresses a main category or sub-category unwittingly, he must bring a korban chatas. Whether one transgresses a main category or sub-category willfully, he is liable to be stoned. What difference, then, does it make that one is called a main category and one is called a sub-category? The difference is that if one performs two main category prohibitions or two sub-category prohibitions, he is liable twice. However, if he performs a main category prohibition and its sub-category prohibition at the same time, he is only liable for transgressing Shabbos once (and would only bring one korban chatas).

Rashi explains that when one performs an av (main category) together with its toladah (sub-category), he is liable for the av, and not for the toladah. For example, if one planted a tree (av) and watered a plant (a toladah of zore’a), he is liable for the av, and not for the toladah.

The commentators ask: What practical difference does it make if he is liable for the av or the toladah? The bottom line is that he is required to bring one korban chatas!?

Reb Tzvi Pesach Frank suggests the following: The Gemora in Shabbos (71b) rules that if one eats two olive-sized pieces of cheilev (forbidden fats) in one state of unawareness, and he is apprised of the first and he brings a korban. If subsequently, he becomes aware of the second, he is now required to bring another chatas for that one (for the bringing of one korban cannot exempt one from bringing a korban for a violation that he did not know about at the time). Accordingly, if one would perform an av and its toladah together, and he would be apprised of the av, but not the toladah, he would bring a korban for the av. If afterwards he is made aware of the toladah, he would be liable to bring a korban for it, for according to Rashi, one is not liable for a toladah when it is done together with its av.

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Honoring Shabbos Yourself

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 41a) asks: If he can betroth through an agent, he can certainly betroth himself!?

Rav Yosef answers: It is a mitzvah for him to do so rather than his agent (as by all mitzvos it is preferable for one to perform them oneself than send an agent). This is like Rav Safra who would personally singe the head of the animal and Rav who would personally salt the fish (before Shabbos in order to honor Shabbos themselves).

The Shaar Hatziyon (250:9) asks: Why did these Amoraim prepare the food for Shabbos themselves? The halachah is that one is not permitted to be interrupt his Torah studying in order to perform a mitzvah that is possible to be performed by others! These Amoraim should have instructed others to prepare the Shabbos food on their behalf!?

He answers that this is only true by a mitzvah that does not have to be performed by the person himself. However, the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos must be performed by the person himself, and therefore, they prepared the food themselves, for it is a greater mitzvah when it is done by the person himself.

The sefer Shulchan Shlomo explains that the Shaar Hatziyon does not mean that honoring Shabbos is a mitzvah similar to tefillin and sukkah, for if so, it cannot be given over to an agent at all (one cannot ask someone else to sit in a sukkah on his behalf). Rather, it is a mitzvah that is incumbent upon him, and therefore he himself must be involved with the mitzvah.

Alternatively, the Shaar Hatziyon answers that because of the severity of Shabbos, they prepared the food themselves even though it could have been accomplished through another.

The sefer Lev Yam asks that if the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos is different than any other mitzvah, and one should perform it himself even if someone else can do it, how does our Gemora bring a proof from these Amoraim that it is a greater mitzvah when he personally performs it more than when he does so through an agent? Perhaps the reason they prepared the food themselves is because of the uniqueness associated with the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos, but it will not prove anything with respect to other mitzvos!?

He cites a Shulchan Aruch Harav that answers this question.

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Taste of the Manna

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 31a) states that one can separate both terumah gedolah and terumas ma’aser with a thought and one does not need to physically or orally designate the terumah.

Tosfos writes that on Shabbos, it is still forbidden to mentally separate terumah, for through that, he renders the produce usable (it is regarded as “fixing” on Shabbos).

Based upon this, the Pnei Dovid answers the following contradiction: It is written [Shmos 16:23] regarding the manna: Tomorrow is a rest day, a holy Shabbos to God. Bake whatever you wish to bake, and cook whatever you wish to cook. Rashi comments: Whatever you wish to bake in an oven, bake everything today for two days, and whatever amount of it you need to cook in water, cook today. Yet, it is written [Bamidbar 11:8]: The people walked about and gathered it. Then they ground it in a mill or crushed it in a mortar, cooked it in a pot and made it into cakes. And there Rashi comments: The manna did not actually enter the mill, the pot, or the mortar, but its taste changed to that of ground, crushed, or cooked food. And this is actually how the Gemora in Yoma (75a) explains it as well! It wasn’t actually baked, but rather, if they wanted it to taste as if it was baked, then it would! Seemingly, Rashi is contradicting himself!?

He answers that there is a distinction between the weekdays and Shabbos. During the weekdays, they could mentally decide on how the manna should taste, and so it happened. However, on Shabbos, this would be forbidden, for it would be regarded as “fixing” the food! They therefore had to bake it from beforehand if they wanted it to taste baked on Shabbos.

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Two Lugin

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 25b) cites a braisa: If someone buys wine from amongst the Cutheans (converts to Judaism after an outbreak of wild animals in Eretz Yisroel and their conversion was debated as to its validity; they observed some commandments, but not others), he should say the following: “The two lugin (a measurement) that I will eventually separate (from the one hundred lugin in total) are terumah (tithe for the kohen), ten are ma’aser rishon (tithe for the Levite), nine are for ma’aser sheini (to be eaten in Yerushalyim),” and after redeeming the ma’aser sheini (with coins), he can drink right away. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Shimon forbid this leniency.

Rashi explains the braisa to be referring to a case where he does not have a vessel to separate the tithes required to allow him to drink the wine in an orderly fashion.

Some explain it that he did not have any tahor vessels.

Rashi in Sukkah (23b) explains that the fellow purchased the wine bein hashemashos (close to sunset) on Friday and he did not have time to separate the ma’aser before Shabbos. Since it is forbidden to separate ma’aser on Shabbos, he did not have what to drink.

Tosfos challenges Rashi’s explanation, for if that would be the case, he would not even be allowed to orally declare it to be ma’aser, for it is forbidden to fix his produce on Shabbos!?

The Kaftor va’Ferach answers that Rashi holds that the manner prescribed in the Gemora is permitted, for he is not actually fixing it on Shabbos. He is separating the ma’aser after Shabbos and retroactively the produce is remedied on Shabbos. It emerges that he did nothing on Shabbos.

Tosfos explains that the remedy discussed in the Gemora is only when it is still bein hashemashos. At that time, there was a Rabbinic decree not to separate ma’aser, but one, at that time, is permitted to orally declare it to be ma’aser.

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