Yahrtzeit; Paying a Father's Debt; Davar shelo ba L'olam

A Yahrtzeit

Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the founder of the Daf Hayomi passed away on the day that those who were studying the daf during that cycle were learning Kesuvos 91.

The Gemora states: The orphans have a mitzvah to pay the debt of their father.

Hundreds of Reb Meir Shapiro’s students, who viewed themselves as only children of their beloved Rebbe swore by his coffin that they would continue building the illustrious Yeshiva of their Rebbe spiritually and financially. It was in this manner that they felt that they were paying the debt of their father; continuing his legacy.

And so it was. For the next six years, until the Holocaust, his Yeshiva flourished; his spirit was present in the walls of the Yeshiva, and served as a tremendous influence to all of his disciples.

Mitzvah to Pay the Father’s Debt


By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

Tosfos explains that the concept of their being a mitzvah on inheritors to pay the debts of their fathers depends on a few variables:
a. whether the father left them property from which to collect.
b. whether a debt without a contract is collectible from the orphans.
c. whether the orphans inherited anything from their father.

1. If the father leaves over property on which there is a loan with a contract - the orphans have a mitzvah to pay and we force them in beis din to pay.

2. If the father doesn’t leave over property - the orphans have a mitzvah to pay, but we don’t force them to pay [Rashash points out that the Shulchan Aruch (107) rules like the Hagahos Ashri that if the father doesn’t leave over anything, they don’t even have a mitzvah to pay at all].

3. If the father leaves them property on which there is a verbal loan, it depends: One opinion holds that a verbal loan is collected from orphans, so we force them to pay. But according to Rav and Shmuel that a verbal loan isn’t collected from orphans, they have a mitzvah to pay but we don’t force.

Perhaps the concept of forcing the orphans to pay is under the rubric of forcing for positive mitzvos. This seems to be supported clearly by Tosfos who quotes this Gemora not only for the reason that one must repay their own debt, but to justify why we force orphans to pay their fathers debt (when it is a contractual debt and he leaves over property). The difficulty is: if we force for mitzvas aseh, why don’t we force in all situations where they have a mitzvah to pay, even when he doesn’t leave over property on which there is a lien?

Conveying Properties that are not in Existence

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Our sugya says that this principle applies to dinei mamonos [cases involving monetary matters]. As long as an article is nonexistent, it cannot be acquired (C.M. 209:4). However, under certain circumstances, when a kinyan [an act of acquisition] is made for something nonexistent, the seller must carry out the transaction.

Two Jews, one a Turkish chacham and businessman and the other captain of a cargo ship, went to the Maharit for a ruling. The Turkish chacham told the Maharit that he had recently signed a contract in which he had committed to sell four hundred skins to the captain. Now, after the chacham had reneged on his side of the deal, he argued that he had never been obligated to deliver the goods. He only intended to sell skins that were nonexistent at the time of sale and therefore the transaction is null and void since “nonexistent items cannot be sold.”

However, the Maharit ruled that the chacham could not use this excuse to sidestep his obligation. We can differentiate between selling a nonexistent article and obligating oneself concerning such an article. Although the sale of the nonexistent item is invalid, this is because there is nothing tangible for the sale to take effect upon. However, an obligation to sell such an article is binding because the obligation lies upon the person, who does exist. We regard his obligation as a monetary debt in the form of an object. The monetary debt is binding, for surely one can undertake to give money to someone else (see Ktzos HaChoshen 203:4).

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Support in Kollel; Kaddish; Yahrtzeit

Is Support Tzedakah?

The Gemora discusses the obligation for one to support his sons and/or daughters.

The Shulchan Aruch (E”H 71:1) rules that one is obligated to support his children, but only up to the age of six. Beyond that age, the Sages instituted that he support them, but the court has no power to force him to do so.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 253:3) rules that supporting one’s children is a form of tzedakah, based on the Gemora (Kesuvos 50a) that explains the verse extolling one who is oseh tzedakah b’chol ais – does tzedakah at all times, as referring to one who supports his young children.

The Shach (4) explains that this refers to children above the age of six, whom the father has no enforceable obligation to support.

The Poskim discuss whether one may therefore use money set aside as ma’aser for supporting his children.

The Taz (YD 249:1), echoing the Rama, says that ma’aser is meant exclusively for the poor, and supporting one’s children is like any other monetary obligation, which may not be fulfilled with ma’aser money.

The Shach (YD 249:3) disagrees, based on the Maharam miRutenburg, citing the Gemora in Kesuvos, which refers to supporting one’s older children as a form of tzedakah.

The Igros Moshe (YD 1:143) states that the obligation to support one’s wife includes an obligation to support her children, as long as they live with him. Such an obligation is like any other monetary obligation, which may not be fulfilled with ma’aser money. The Igros Moshe says that even the Shach only meant to include children who are of an age to earn their own living and live on their own, but would agree that one’s support for children living at home may not come from ma’aser money.

The Yechave Da’as (3:76) rules that one may take ma’aser money to support children above the age of six, and rejects the Igros Moshe’s assumption that support of one’s wife includes an obligation to support her children. Further, he rules that one may use ma’aser money for any form of support – including providing food, furnishing an apartment for a new couple, and supporting children learning Torah pre and post marriage. He recommends that one stipulate before earning money that he will use the ma’aser to provide such support, as some Poskim allow such a stipulation to allow use of ma’aser for other purposes. He adds that although the Rabbinate of Israel instituted a rule to force parents to support their children until the age of fifteen, this is simply giving more power to the institution of the Sages, but does not change the nature of such support from the status of tzedakah.

A Daughter First
is a Good Sign for Sons

by: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The Maharsha explains that a firstborn daughter prevents any discord that would arise between the sons if one of them were a firstborn, as now all of them inherit equal portions. If, however, a father leaves a firstborn son after him, he gets a double portion and his brothers become jealous. “A daughter first” is therefore a good sign that peace will reign among her brothers.

Others explain that a big sister will care for her brothers willingly and energetically, as she knows that “most sons are like their mother’s brothers.” In other words, when she is ready to marry, people will inquire after her brothers and she therefore has a good reason to help them grow up properly (Peninei Kedem).

Who Supports Whom?

Rabbi Eliezer Gordon eventually became the Rosh Yeshivah at Telz and one of the leading Torah figures of his generation, but after his marriage, he was supported by his father-in-law, who was a rabbi and a great scholar, but exceedingly poor. Still, despite his indigence, he contributed to his son-in-law’s welfare and, moreover, prevented him from responding to any of the many offers tempting him to serve as rabbi in various communities. Witnessing their sorry plight, his wife often tried to convince him to allow their renowned son-in-law to become an officiating rabbi, if only to keep him from resorting to their support. Nonetheless, he refused and once even rebuked her, saying, “Who knows who’s supporting whom?” Eventually, though, his wife prevailed upon him so unrelentingly that he had to agree that Rabbi Gordon should accept the next offer. Such an opportunity soon came and Rabbi Eliezer and his family packed their belongings and moved to another town. The same day the father-in-law suddenly collapsed and passed away. Those who attended the funeral and knew the family echoed his remark: “Who knows who’s supporting whom?”

Those who Learned Mishnayos for their own Departed Souls

Our Gemora highly praises anyone who leaves a son to inherit his estate. A previous Gemora, on 116a, applies the verse “…cry for the one who goes” (Yirmyahu 22:10) to a person who fails to leave a son after him. The Gemora in Sanhedrin explains that sons increase their fathers’ merits and the halachah accordingly stresses the importance of a son’s saying kaddish for his father (Remo in Shulchan ‘Aruch, Y.D. 376:4; Responsa Binyamin Ze’ev, 51).

A Father who Told his Son to Say Kaddish for 12 Months

To be careful for his father’s honor, a son stops saying kaddish for him 11 months after his demise; saying kaddish for the full year of mourning would suggest the father was a rasha, as only the evil stay in Gehinnom for 12 months (Remo, ibid).

Halachic authorities have discussed the question of a son, whose father commanded him to say kaddish for a full year.

HaGaon Rav Shlomo Kluger zt”l commanded his son to do so and the latter asked Rabbi Yitzchak Shmelkes of Lvov, author of Beis Yitzchak, as to how to behave, fearing that such an act would disgrace his father.

The Beis Yitzchak (II, 157) ruled that he should say kaddish for a full year to obey his father, as that would be the best way of honoring him (see ibid as to the halachah concerning the thirteenth month in a leap year).

Hiring a Person to Say Kaddish

If the deceased had no son, some relative should say the kaddish according to the following order of preference: the deceased’s sons’ sons, his daughters’ sons, his father, his brothers and other relatives. In the absence of any relative, a person should be hired to say kaddish for the elevation of his soul and according to the Kaf HaChayim (55:30), the person hired should say before any prayer that the kaddeishim he is about to say are for the elevation of the soul of So-and-so.


May a Daughter Say Kaddish?

Several halachic authorities ruled that if the deceased had no son, his daughter should say kaddish in a minyan at her home, and some even had the custom that if the daughter was very small, she would say kaddish in a synagogue. Still, almost all the Poskim hold that daughters must not say kaddish even at home, and if she wants to increase her father’s merits, she should answer amen after the sheliach tzibur (Penei Baruch: Aveilus BaHalachah, 34:20, in the name of Shevus Ya’akov, etc., and see S.K. 36).

Why Rav Auerbach Said Kaddish for Rabbi Shlomo Kluger’s Granddaughter

HaGaon Rav Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach zt”l used to say kaddish for his relatives who had no one else to say it, and also for a woman called Shasha Mindel bas Rav Chayim Yehudah on her yahrzeit, 24 Nisan.

Shasha Mindel was not his relative and no one paid him to honor her yahrzeit. She was the granddaughter of HaGaon Rav Shlomo Kluger, who lost her father as a girl and was brought up by her grandfather; she passed away many years before Rav Auerbach was born. She suffered much during her short life and had no children.

Rav Kluger dedicated his Nidrei Zeiruzin, on tractate Nedarim, to her memory and in his preface he describes her short life and appeals to any reader to “mention her soul on the anniversary of her demise… He who is not thus dishonored should say kaddish for her… and he who thinks he is thus dishonored should pay a worthy poor person a small amount to say kaddish for her and this will be a true kindness done for the deceased and for me and their reward from Heaven will be double.” As one who learnt Rav Kluger’s works, Rav Auerbach obeyed his request despite the long time since her demise (Halichos Shlomo, Ch. 18, note 78).




Nine Years and One Son-in-Law

Immigrants from Russia recount that Jews in the communist era used to maintain groups for learning mishnayos in the remaining synagogues. The special feature of these groups, however, was that the members learnt mishnayos for the merit of their own souls as in the bitter reality of the Soviet regime, they could not rely on their sons to remember them in any way. A member of one group learnt mishnayos for himself for nine years before he passed away. His daughter eventually emigrated to Eretz Yisroel and wed a Torah scholar, who began to learn mishnayos in his father-in-law’s memory. When? Exactly nine years after his father-in-law’s demise!

HALACHOS FROM THE DAF

Does a Father have to Support his Son in Kollel?

By: Reb Avraham Klein

The Gemora cites Rabbi Meir that says: It is a mitzvah for a person to support his daughters and certainly his sons that learn Torah. This Gemora appears in Maseches Kesubos (49a) as well, and there ,the Gemora infers that it is a mitzvah, but not a chovah (obligation).

At what age is Rabbi Meir referring to? What about the sons that don’t learn Torah?

There are three categories:

1) Children under six years old: Their father is obligated to support them, even if the children have money (one of the only ways that money would be theirs and not automatically belonging to their father is if it was from an inheritance), and even if their mother died. (Shulchan Aruch Even Ha’ezer Siman 71 Sief 1)

2) Children aged six to Bar/Bas Mitzva: Chazal instituted that their father should support them if they don’t have money, even if he himself is not wealthy. If he chooses not to, we scream at him and shame him. If this doesn’t work, then we take even more drastic measures: We publicly announce that this person is a callous cold-hearted man that refuses to support his own children. However, we can’t actually force him to support them. In a case where the father is wealthy and can easily afford to support his children and he doesn’t, then we forcibly take away money from him to support them (ibid).

3) Children that are over the age of Bar/Bas Mitzva (gadlus): The father is obligated to support them like any other poor person (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De’ah Siman 151 Sief 4).

The Bais Shmuel (in Even Ha’ezer ibid) explains that the father’s obligation to these children is equivalent to any other of his relatives. However, regarding the children under gadlus, the father has a greater obligation towards them than he has to other relatives.

A father that gives money to his children who he is not obligated to support, so that they can learn Torah, that money is considered tzedakah (and can be deducted from his ma’aser). Furthermore, he must support them before any other tzedakah. This is true for any relative that learns Torah, not just a son (ibid Sief 3).

There are many other halachos regarding tzedakah and ma’aser that was not mentioned here. One should always ask a competent Posek in this or any other area of halachha. There are many halachos about the order of tzedakah, how much to give, who should one not give to, etc.

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A Yahrtzeit

Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the founder of the Daf Hayomi passed away on the day that those who were studying the daf during that cycle were learning Kesuvos 91.

The Gemora states: The orphans have a mitzvah to pay the debt of their father.

Hundreds of Reb Meir Shapiro’s students, who viewed themselves as only children of their beloved Rebbe swore by his coffin that they would continue building the illustrious Yeshiva of their Rebbe spiritually and financially. It was in this manner that they felt that they were paying the debt of their father; continuing his legacy.

And so it was. For the next six years, until the Holocaust, his Yeshiva flourished; his spirit was present in the walls of the Yeshiva, and served as a tremendous influence to all of his disciples.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 21 - Food For Thought

*** There are eleven halachos (stringencies that apply by kodesh and not terumah) listed in the Mishna and yet Rabbi Ila said that there were only ten. It is evident that two of them are based upon the same reasoning; the first (one utensil inside the other) and the fifth (a garment with a knot) are both because of chatzitzah.)

If they are both on the account of chatzitzah, why did the Mishna separate them; shouldn’t they be listen one after the other?

(Turei Even, Merumei Sadeh)


*** The Mishna had stated: We may immerse utensils inside of other utensils in a mikvah for terumah, but not for kodesh.

Rabbi Ila answered: It is because the weight of the inside utensil prevents the water from circulating freely between the two utensils; if this would occur, the immersion would not be valid because the water must touch every part of the utensil. (This case would not constitute a Biblical chatzitzah (an interposition between the water and the utensil) because the water does find a way to pass through the utensils, but since it appears like a chatzitzah, the Chachamim were stringent regarding kodesh, but not in regards to terumah.)

In the sefer Masaas Binyomin (81), he rules that a woman who is physically unable to stand can be immersed in the mikvah while she is laying on a mat that is not susceptible to tumah.

The Sidrei Tahara (198: 47) asks from our Gemora: Shouldn’t her weight on the mat constitute a chatzitzah; the water will not be able to circulate freely between the woman and the mat?

I had a similar question on the Gemora above: If a wave that consisted of forty se’ah separated from the sea and fell on a person or utensils that were tamei, they become tahor. The Gemora explains that the Mishna is referring to a case where the person is sitting on the shore waiting for the wave to separate from the sea and fall on him or on the utensils. It is evident from our Gemora that even though the person did not directly immerse the utensils in the water; he was merely anticipating that the wave will detach itself from the sea and fall on the contaminated utensils, this is sufficient, provided that he has intention that the water should purify the utensils.

How does the water get in between the person or the utensils and the ground on the shore?


*** Dayan Weiss (4:35) has a teshuva regarding the validity of immersion while wearing a bathing suit.



*** Shoel Umeishiv (I:2:122) writes: “In the year 5615, I was learning Meseches Chagigah on the yahrtzeit of my mother because my father told me that the holy seforim say that it is beneficial to study Meseches Chagigah on a yahrtzeit.”

What is the source for this and what is the reasoning?

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 6 - Food for Thought

1. The Gemora states that Zevulun complained about their portion and Hashem answered them that they should be appeased because of the chilazon that is in their portion. Rashi in Devarim [33:19] says that it can be found in Yisachar and Zevulun's portion.
(Maharsha, Igros Moshe (Y"D 4:37:1)

2. The Gemora states regarding Teveria that it is referred to as Rakas because even the sinners amongst them are full of mitzvos like a pomegranate has seeds. Why is this unique to Teveria? It states this regarding all of Klal Yisroel in Sanhedrin 37a? What was unique about Teveria more than any other city in Eretz Yisroel?
(Turei Even, Pesach Einayim, Mitzapeh Eisan)

3.If a person has yahrtzeit in Adar,in which Adar does he conduct the yahrtzeit? (Maharil, Terumos Hadeshen, Shulchan Aruch 668, Chasam Sofer 163)

4. Rabbi Yitzchak said: If someone tells you, "I labored (studying Torah) but I did not succeed," don't believe him. If he tells you "I haven't labored, yet I did succeed," don't believe him. If, however, he tells you "I have labored and did succeed," you may believe him. What is the meaning of "believe him" or "don't believe him"?

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 12 - Yahrtzeit Candles on Yom Tov

The Mishnah cites a dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding transferring objects that are not food related from one domain to another on Yom Tov. Bais Shammai maintains that one cannot carry a child, a lulav, or a Sefer Torah into a public domain and Bais Hillel permits it. Rav Yitzchok bar Avdimi explains that Bais Hillel is of the opinion that since one can carry from one domain to another for the purpose of food related items, one is also permitted to carry items that are not food-related. Bais Shammai, however, does not agree with this concept. Rashi explains that according to Bais Hillel, it is even biblically permitted to carry items that have no purpose at all. The Chachamim, however, prohibited one from carrying stones or objects which serve no purpose on Yom Tov.

Tosfos disagrees with Rashi and Tosfos maintains that Bais Hillel only permits one to perform melachos that will either enhance ones enjoyment on Yom Tov or that will aid him in performing a mitzvah. According to Tosfos, it must be understood why Bais Hillel maintains that one who slaughters a donated olah on Yom Tov is not liable for the act of slaughtering. It would seem that there is no purpose in slaughtering a donated olah on Yom Tov because it is completely burned on the mizbeiach. Tosfos writes based on a Gemara later on Daf 20b that states that one cannot bear to see his own table full and the table of his master empty. If one is not able to offer a sacrifice to Hashem on Yom Tov, his own joy will be diminished.

The Teshuvos Ksav Sofer (65) rules that one is permitted to light a yahrtzeit candle on Yom Tov although the light does not serve a purpose for Yom Tov. If one would be prohibited from kindling this light, he would be grieved that he cannot honor his departed loved ones. This grief would significantly detract from his joy on Yom Tov and for this reason he is permitted to light the yahrtzeit candle.

The Biur Halacha (514:5) rules that it is preferable that one light the yahrtzeit candle prior to Yom Tov. If one was not able to light the candle prior to Yom Tov, he should light the candle in a room where he will be eating so that he will benefit from the light. The preferred approach is that one light a candle in the synagogue. The Biur Halacha concludes based on the Ksav Sofer that if one does not have available any of the aforementioned options, he is still be permitted to light the yahrtzeit candle because lighting a yahrtzeit candles has a semblance of a mitzvah as one is honoring his departed parent.

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