Fly like a Bird

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The Gemora cites a braisa: If a husband says (this is your get), “On condition that you go up into the sky,” “that you go to the depths of the earth,” “that you swallow a reed of four cubits,” “that you bring me a reed one hundred cubits long,” “that you walk over the Great Ocean with your feet,” if the condition is fulfilled, the get is valid; if not, the get is invalid. Rabbi Yehudah ben Teima says: Something such as this is a get. He said the following rule: Any condition that cannot eventually be fulfilled and the husband stipulates at the outset, he is just doing that to pain his wife, and the get is therefore valid.

There is another case brought down in the Tosefta: If the husband said, “On condition that you fly in the air.”

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei HaShas asks: Isn’t this something that is possible? Don’t we find such an occurrence by Alexander the Great? And in today’s age (of Reb Yosef Engel), people fly in the air using air balloons!?

He answers that the language “fly” connotes “by himself,” similar to a bird, and floating in the air using exterior devices is not what he had in mind. A condition must be fulfilled according to the language of the stipulator!

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Is a Coin a Utensil?

It was stated: Rav and Levi have the following dispute. One of them holds that a coin can be used to effect an acquisition of chalifin (the buyer gives the seller something as a token exchange to settle the transaction), and the other one says that a coin cannot be used to effect an acquisition of chalifin.

Rav Pappa explains: A coin cannot be used as chalifin for the seller focuses on the figure which is stamped on the coin, and that figure may eventually become outdated (by the government; it is therefore not regarded as “whole,” and it is different from a “shoe,” which is the torah’s model of a utensil used for chalifin).

Rashi writes that both opinions hold that one does not need to use a utensil in order to effect an acquisition of chalifin (unlike Rav Nachman), for a coin is not a utensil, and nevertheless, they argue if it may be used. And even according to the Amora who holds that it cannot be uses, maintains that way for a different reason altogether.

The Rishonim ask: How can it be that Rav Nachman (who holds that chalifin can only be accomplished with a utensil) disagrees with his predecessors (Rav and Levi)?

Tosfos answers that a coin can be regarded as a utensil, for it may be used as a weight for a scale. Alternatively, it can be used for a necklace for one’s daughter.

The Ritva writes that Rav Nachman does not require an actual utensil; as long as it is something that lasts – similar to a shoe. This would exclude produce. A coin, however, would be included.

The Rashba writes that Rav Nachman is only excluding things that are not similar at all to a shoe.

Tosfos cites an opinion who holds that a coin is a utensil, for it is used for purchasing items.

The Hagaos Mordechai answers that anything which is man-made is regarded as a utensil. This would exclude produce. A coin, however, would be included.

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Shomer Rulings

Money Matters
The Gemora begins by stating that a custodian should keep deposited money on his body, and then later quotes Shmuel’s statement that money must be buried. The Rambam (She’eila u’Pikadon 4:6) explains that when the money is deposited with the custodian at home, he must bury it, while if the deposit was to transport the money somewhere, he must keep it on his body.

Shmuel states that a custodian must guard money entrusted to him by burying it, and anything short of that is negligence.

The Rosh quotes Ri Barceloni that says that Shmuel is only discussing a situation where burglary is common. However, if it is not common, a custodian need only guard the money as he guards his own. The Gemora implies this in its follow up discussion of different ways of storing the money, which the Gemora explicitly ties to the prevailing form of burglars at the time.

The Rambam (She’eila u’Pikadon) seems to imply that Shmuel’s statement is not subject to variation in different times and situations.

The Shulchan Aruch (HM 291:18) rules like the Rosh. See the Gra (HM 291:28) for a discussion of how this debate depends on differing texts in our Gemora.

The Sma (C”M 291:24) says that now that our houses are much more solid than in the Gemora’s time, and therefore a custodian may store the money in a locked house.

Shmuel is also implicitly stating that if the custodian did bury the money, and it was stolen, he is not liable.

The Rishonim debate what the rule for a paid custodian is. Unlike an unpaid custodian, a paid custodian is fundamentally liable for theft, but he is also not liable for unavoidable loss of the deposited item.

The Gemora states a number of times that a paid custodian is not liable for an item that is taken through armed robbery, since that is unavoidable. When a paid custodian buries money, but it is still stolen, he may be liable, since it is theft, but he may not be liable, since it seems like an unavoidable loss.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (HM 303:2) lists three positions of the Rishonim on this question:
1. Tosfos (BK 57a K’gon) and the Rosh (BM 3:21) say that a paid custodian is liable, even if he buried the money, since that is included in the liability for theft. Every theft is akin to an unavoidable loss, so a theft that is more unavoidable is still a theft. Only in the case of an armed robber, where the paid custodian was present and powerless to stop the theft is considered truly unavoidable.
2. The Ramban says that a paid custodian must keep the money in his presence. Therefore, theft of buried money is not considered unavoidable, and a paid custodian is liable. However, if something unavoidable occurred to the paid custodian, making it impossible to keep the money with him (e.g., a sudden severe sickness), he is not liable.
3. Tosfos (BM 42a Amar Shmuel) says that a custodian is not liable for unavoidable theft, which includes buried money, as well as an unavoidable event which prevented his guarding.

The Rambam (She’eila uPikadon 4:4) applies Shmuel’s statement to any item that has two things in common with money:
1. Valuable enough that burglars look for it
2. Not ruined by being underground
Therefore, blocks of precious metals and stones also must be buried when being guarded.
Diversification
Rav Yitzchak says that one should split his assets in three, with one third going to land. The Maharshsa offers two explanations for this:
1. Buried underground, as Shmuel requires of the custodian
2. Invested in real estate
Unobserved Blessings
The Gemora says that blessing only occurs to items that are not measured and observed.

The Meiri explains that the Gemora is referring to the blessing of successful returns on investments.

Rabbeinu Manoach says that the Gemora means that the blessing will be that the ultimate measure will be larger than the original estimate, in a miraculous fashion.

The Sfas Emes echoes this position, by explaining that Hashem does not make miracles that openly subvert nature, and therefore this blessing only occurs before the produce is measured.

The Ritva quotes the Ramban who says that one makes a brachah on this occurrence only when measuring produce for the purpose of separating tithes, since Hashem promised us a blessing for fulfilling this mitzvah. When otherwise measuring, one is not certain a blessing will occur, so he may not make a brachah.
Household Custodians
The Gemora states that a custodian may entrust his deposited item with members of his household.

The Rishonim debate what the rule is if the ones entrusted were negligent.

Rabbeinu Tam (42b kol) says that the custodian is ultimately liable for the negligence of members of his household, while the Ramban, Rashba (BM 36a) and Rambam (She’eila u’Pikadon 4:9) say that the member entrusted with the item is liable.
The Ox who couldn’t Eat
Rami bar Chama debates how to judge the case of an estate administrator who gave an ox without teeth to a herdsman, where it died. The Gemora explained that the orphans had already voided the sale, so the potential litigant is the seller.

Tosfos (42b Hacha) explains that Rami bar Chama is assuming that we rule like Rabbi Yosi (35b), who says that an owner of an item can directly deal with a custodian appointed by his custodian. Within Rabbi Yossi’s position, Rami bar Chama was unsure whether the seller can address the herdsman via his appointment by the orphans, or whether the orphans are removed from the transaction, since the sale was retroactively voided. Rami bar Chama’s conclusion is that the orphans are considered unpaid custodians, and the seller does have legal standing vis a vis the herdsman.

Rami bar Chama says that the herdsman must pay the seller the value of the ox, when sold for discounted meat.

Rashi explains that this is a compromise. Technically, the herdsman is not truly at fault and not liable, but he does compensate the herdsman minimally for his loss.

Rabbeinu Tam (42b Demai) says that this rule was a bona fide legal obligation. The herdsman should have notified the seller of the ox’s lack of teeth, and therefore is liable for its death. However, since an ox without teeth must be sold for meat, and may not even wait until the day of the market, it would have only been worth the price of discounted meat.

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Pain to the Deceased

It was stated (Bava Metzia 38b): If a man is taken captive, Rav said that we would not bring down a relative to his property, and Shmuel said that we would. Now, if it was heard (either by way of a rumor, or through one witness) that the captive was dead, all would agree that we would bring down a relative (for if the captive would return before the relative eats from the produce, he will receive his share like a sharecropper, and if the captive does not return, he inherits it all – either way, he will make sure to do a good job). They disagree where it was not heard that he had died. Rav said that we do not bring down a relative, for he might cause them the property to deteriorate (for he will not fertilize it, and he will constantly plant there – ultimately ruining the land). Shmuel said: We do bring down a relative, for since a master said that we evaluate for them just like a sharecropper, he will not allow the field to be ruined.

The Gemora asks from a braisa: From the implication of the verse (discussing those who oppress widows and orphans): “And I shall become incensed, and I shall kill you with the sword,” I know that their wives shall be widows and their children shall be orphans; why then does the Torah state: “And your wives shall be widows, and your children shall be orphans”? This teaches us that their wives will seek to remarry and we will not permit them (for Hashem is cursing them that they will be taken captive and we will not know if they died or not), and their children will desire to go down to their father’s property and we will not allow them. [This contradicts Shmuel, who rules that we do allow the relatives to go down to the captive’s field!?]

Rava answers: The braisa means that they are not permitted to go down and sell the property.

The Iyun Yaakov asks: What is the curse to the dead sinner if his wife will not be allowed to remarry? There is no pain at all! On the contrary, the Zohar writes that this would be regarded as an honor to the deceased!?

He answers that nevertheless, at the time that the woman desires to remarry, she will be embarrassed, and Chazal say that a man does not want his wife humiliated before a Beis Din!

The Ben Yehoyada writes that these men were killed by sword and buried immediately. There were no witnesses available to verify their identity. It will therefore be necessary to open their graves to see if there are any identifying marks to help us determine who they were. This is considered painful to the deceased, and this is the meaning of the curse.

He adds that these women, who will never be allowed to remarry, will eventually curse their own husbands for being the cause of their present predicament. This will be painful for the deceased!

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Freeing a Slave

by: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 74) says that when Rabban Gamliel blinded the eye of Tavi his slave, he was “very happy.” Rashi explains that he was happy because he really wanted to emancipate him, but was unable to do so since freeing a Canaanite slave is a violation of a prohibition, but since he blinded him, he would be free.

[The Ya’avetz raises a technical problem: Rabban Gamliel certainly didn’t blind him intentionally since that would be forbidden, rather it was done accidentally (a proof to this is that he didn’t do it until now), but the Gemora says on 26b that a slave would only go free if he “intended to destroy him.”]

It seems that Rashi would disagree with the Ran (Gittin 20b b’dafei ha’rif) who says that freeing a slave follows the same rules as “lo sei’chanem,” that it is only prohibited if done for the purpose of the slave, but not if done for the need of the master. Based on the Ra”n, it should have been permitted for Rabban Gamliel to free his slave since it brings joy to himself and is not for the benefit of the slave. Can we deduce from this Rashi that he disagrees with the Ra”n and maintains that it is forbidden to emancipate a slave even for the benefit of the master?

It seems that Rashi here is not necessarily against the Ra”n (meaning that even the Ran would hold that Rabban Gamliel wouldn’t be allowed to free his slave for the purpose of giving him joy). The joy that Rabban Gamliel had was not a selfish joy; rather it is because he loved Tavi so much that he wanted to set him free for his own sake. Even the Ra”n would agree that if the only benefit to the master is that he is happy to provide benefit to the slave, that would not qualify as a selfish benefit to permit the freeing of a slave.

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Everybody Knows - Kiddushin 45

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The Gemora had stated: Everyone knows that the sister of one’s chalutzah is only prohibited to that person according to Rabbinic law! Therefore, if the yavam, the one who performed chalitzah, gives kiddushin to her sister, the kiddushin would clearly be valid.

Rav Yehudah Assad in teshuvos Yehudah Yaaleh asks the following question: Why do we assume that everyone knows that the chalutzah’s sister is only a Rabbinical prohibition? Tosfos in Bava Metzia (15b) writes: Shmuel maintains that if someone sells a field during Yovel, the money is returned. Shmuel does not say that since everyone knows that a field cannot be sold during Yovel, the money was definitely given as a gift. This is because there is a dispute on this matter, as Rav holds that a field can be sold during Yovel. Something that is a topic of dispute is not well-known. If so, perhaps everyone does not know that a chalutzah’s sister is only a Rabbinical prohibition, for Rabbi Akiva, in fact, holds that she is Biblically forbidden!?

He answers that it is quite possible that Rabbi Akiva holds that the chalutzah’s sister is Biblically forbidden to the yavam only if she was a nesuah to her first husband. However, if she was only an arusah, like in our case, everyone agrees that she is only Rabbinically forbidden.

Reb Ezriel Hildesheimer answers that Tosfos’ logic applied to Shmuel himself, for although the halachah is according to Shmuel, Shmuel himself could not say that everyone knows that a field cannot be sold during Yovel, because he knew that Rav disagrees with this. However, here, everyone knows that the halachah follows Rebbe that the chalutzah’s sister is only Rabbinically forbidden.

In the gloss to the sefer Yehudah Yaaleh, another distinction between the two cases is pointed out. Firstly, by Yovel, we are concerned about one person; namely, the buyer. Perhaps he does not know that a field cannot be sold during Yovel. Here, we are worried about the onlookers. We can safely assume that many people will not make a mistake even though there is an argument on the matter.

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Transposing the Opinions - Kiddushin Daf 44

It was stated: If a minor accepted kiddushin without the knowledge of her father, Shmuel said: She requires a get and mi’un (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.). Karna asked: If she needs a get, why is mi’un necessary? And if mi’un is needed, why do we require a get?

Other Amoraim replied to him: Mar Ukva and his Beis Din are in Kafri (let’s ask him). They switched the opinions of Shmuel and Karna and sent it to Rav (they did this on purpose, for Rav was a close friend of Shmuel and they wished to see if Rav would agree to Karna’s ruling if it was said in the name of Shmuel). Rav said to them: Hashem! She requires a get and mi’un and Heaven forbid that the son of Abba bar Abba (Shmuel) should say such a thing!

The Reshash asks: How can it be that they would think that Rav would be influenced to rule according to Shmuel, for he was his friend? And besides, Rav and Shmuel argue throughout Shas!? He shows that Rashi elsewhere understands the word “switched” to mean “by mistake.”

Some say that Rashi did not write this, but rather, one of his students mistakenly inserted this explanation into his commentary.

The Reshash also asks: Why doesn’t the Gemora mention what Mar Ukva answered?

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Honoring Shabbos Yourself

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 41a) asks: If he can betroth through an agent, he can certainly betroth himself!?

Rav Yosef answers: It is a mitzvah for him to do so rather than his agent (as by all mitzvos it is preferable for one to perform them oneself than send an agent). This is like Rav Safra who would personally singe the head of the animal and Rav who would personally salt the fish (before Shabbos in order to honor Shabbos themselves).

The Shaar Hatziyon (250:9) asks: Why did these Amoraim prepare the food for Shabbos themselves? The halachah is that one is not permitted to be interrupt his Torah studying in order to perform a mitzvah that is possible to be performed by others! These Amoraim should have instructed others to prepare the Shabbos food on their behalf!?

He answers that this is only true by a mitzvah that does not have to be performed by the person himself. However, the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos must be performed by the person himself, and therefore, they prepared the food themselves, for it is a greater mitzvah when it is done by the person himself.

The sefer Shulchan Shlomo explains that the Shaar Hatziyon does not mean that honoring Shabbos is a mitzvah similar to tefillin and sukkah, for if so, it cannot be given over to an agent at all (one cannot ask someone else to sit in a sukkah on his behalf). Rather, it is a mitzvah that is incumbent upon him, and therefore he himself must be involved with the mitzvah.

Alternatively, the Shaar Hatziyon answers that because of the severity of Shabbos, they prepared the food themselves even though it could have been accomplished through another.

The sefer Lev Yam asks that if the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos is different than any other mitzvah, and one should perform it himself even if someone else can do it, how does our Gemora bring a proof from these Amoraim that it is a greater mitzvah when he personally performs it more than when he does so through an agent? Perhaps the reason they prepared the food themselves is because of the uniqueness associated with the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos, but it will not prove anything with respect to other mitzvos!?

He cites a Shulchan Aruch Harav that answers this question.

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Diamond Ring

The Gemora Daf Yomi Kiddushin 9aconcludes that silk (or things of unknown value that are clearly worth a perutah or more) do not require an evaluation before kiddushin.

Tosfos writes that this is only regarding items that their value is somewhat known and it is uncommon for people to make mistakes about it. However, items such as gems and pearls, where there are some that have very little value, people are apt to think that they are worth a lot, when in truth, they are worth very little; these require appraisal before they are used for kiddushin. This is why it has become the custom not to give diamond rings for kiddushin.

[Why has it become the custom to use a ring for kiddushin?]

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Mentioning Evil First

Rava stated: Let us see; where do we derive the rule for conditions? It is from the condition mentioned in the Torah regarding the Tribes of Reuven and Gad. Therefore, just as there, the positive feature (they will receive the land if they fulfill the condition) comes before the negative (if they do not fight together with the rest of Klal Yisroel, they will not receive that land), so too, it should be in all cases.

It is written [Bamidbar 16:29 - 30]: If these men die as all men die and the fate of all men will be visited upon them, then Hashem has not sent me. But if Hashem creates a creation, and the earth opens its mouth and swallows them and all that is theirs, and they descend alive into the grave, you will know that these men have provoked Hashem.

The Haflaah in Panim Yafos asks: Shouldn’t Moshe have stated the positive feature before the negative?

He answers: Our Gemora (Gittin 75) states that a man does not want to begin with a mention of evil for himself, and therefore he will say, “If I do not die” before stating, “If I will die.” So too, Moshe did not want to begin with mentioning evil even for these wicked people, and therefore, he worded the stipulation in a manner that the mention of this horrific type of death should be delayed for as long as possible.

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Healing an Idolater

(Gittin 70) For a skin disease (moist outside and dry inside), he should take seven plump wheat stalks and roast them over a new hoe and smear himself with the oil that exudes from them. Rav Shimi bar Ashi used this remedy for a certain idolater for “something else” (leprosy), and it cured him.

Tosfos asks from the Gemora in Avodah Zarah (26b) which states that it is forbidden to heal an idolater. The Gemora rules that one may not assist an idolater woman giving birth, even for payment, for she will raise the child to serve idols!?

Tosfos answers that Rav Shimi was permitted to heal the idolater, for this would help him perfect his medical skills, and thus enable him to heal other Jews.

Tosfos in Avodah Zarah adds that Rav Shimi was not an expert practitioner at all, and he was training when he cured the idolater.

Furthermore, in cases where the idolater knows that the Jew has the ability to cure him, it would be permitted to heal him, for otherwise, it would propagate hatred from them to us.

Alternatively, there may be a distinction between a child being born, who will serve idols, and one who already worships idols.

The Geresh Yerachim asks: How was Elisha permitted to heal Naaman from his leprosy?

He answers that Elisha knew that Naaman would not serve idols any longer, and therefore, it was permitted.

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Frontwards and Backwards

The Gemora (Gittin 69) states: For blood running out of one’s nose, one should bring a Kohen whose name is Levi, and he should write the name Levi backwards.

The Tiferes Yosef explains: It is well-known in the books of Kabbalah that the alef beis written forward connotes kindness, for this way, the inspiration comes in the regular manner; descending from Heaven to earth. The alef beis written backwards connotes judgment, similar to fire, which ascends from the earth.

It is written in the Zohar that a Kohen is a man of kindness, and a Levi is one of judgment. This is why the name Levi, written backwards, signifying judgment, should be written by a Kohen, for he represents kindness.

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Ancient Cures

The Maharsha (Gittin 69) asks: The Gemora in Brochos (10b) states that Chizkiyahu hid the book of remedies and the sages praised him for this. This book contained instructions on healing various diseases through the use of different herbs and plants. Rashi explains that the sages praised him for hiding the book, because people were relying upon these remedies and they were not praying to Hashem for healing. If so, why does the Gemora record all these remedies here?

The Maharsha answers: A doctor definitely has permission to heal the sick, and he therefore has the right to know the cure for all sicknesses. However, these should not be publicized to all people, for some people will not have faith in Hashem; rather, they will rely on these natural remedies. And just as it was permitted to write down the Oral Law, for otherwise, it would be forgotten; so too, it was permitted to write down these cures, for otherwise, they would all be forgotten.

The Geresh Yerachim answers: the book of remedies that Chizkiyahu hid contained cures that were accurate and functioned for any sick person. If that would have remained in existence, people would rely only on that, and not on Hashem. However, the remedies mentioned in our Gemora do not work for every person. There are many factors that would prevent a person from being cured, even if he followed the exact instructions. Therefore, even when these remedies would be applied, one would still need to pray to Hashem in order to be healed.

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Traits of the Sages

It was stated (Gittin 67) : Shmuel said in the name of Rebbe that the halachah is in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who said that verbal instructions cannot be passed on to an agent.

Rabbi Shimon the son of Rebbe said to Rebbe: Seeing that Rabbi Chanina of Ono and Rabbi Meir disagree with Rabbi Yosi, what was Rebbe’s reason for saying that the halachah follows Rabbi Yosi?

He replied: Be quiet, my son, be quiet; you have never seen Rabbi Yosi. Had you seen him, you would know that he always had reasons for his views. For we learned in a braisa: Issi ben Yehudah used to specify the praiseworthy merits of the various Sages. Rabbi Meir was a scholar and a scribe. Rabbi Yehudah was a scholar when he desired to be. Rabbi Tarfon resembled a heap of nuts. [When he was asked a question, he cited proofs from Scripture, Medrash, Mishnah, halachah and aggadah, like a heap of nuts toppling over one another.] Rabbi Yishmael resembled a well-stocked shop. [Whenever someone asked him something, he replied immediately, without keeping him waiting.] Rabbi Akiva was like a storehouse with compartments. [All his learning was organized by subject and each subject was taught separately.] Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri was like a basket of a spice peddler. [He could answer questions from any subject.] Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah was like an individual’s basket of spices. [The spice peddler has many varieties of spices.] The teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov were measured but pure. [He did not issue many rulings, but the halachah follows him.] Rabbi Yosi always had reasons for his views. Rabbi Shimon used to grind a lot and let out only a little. It was taught in a braisa that this meant that he used to forget little, and whatever he did forget was only bran (teachings that were not in accordance with halachah). And so too, Rabbi Shimon said to his disciples: My sons, learn my teachings, since my teachings are the cream of the cream of Rabbi Akiva’s.

*** The Peri Megadim asks: It is forbidden to speak the praises of a person, even in his presence!?

He answers: Rebbe spoke these praises to himself.

*** The Maharsha asks: Why is it considered a praise about Rabbi Yehudah that he was a scholar when he desired to be? Isn’t that derogatory?

The Aruch explains that Rabbi Yehudah was the first of the speakers. The Iyun Yaakov explains that he was humble, and although he had permission from the king to speak first, he did not want this honor, and he only used it when it was absolutely necessary.

*** The Kesef Mishnah in Hilchos Beis Habechirah (2:18) states that the halachah follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov only when he is mentioned in a Mishna, but not when he is mentioned in a braisa.

The Chacham Tzvi challenges this from the fact that Shimon ben Azai found this rule in the Megillas Setarim, which was written before Rebbe arranged the Mishnayos, so obviously, the rule is all encompassing, even the braisos!?

Tosfos Yom Hakippurim asks that the Kesef Mishnah contradicts himself, for he explains the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuvah (2:8) that the Rambam holds like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov because his teachings were measured but pure, and this halachah was mentioned in a braisa!?

He explains that whenever he is mentioned in a Mishna, the halachah follows him. However, when he is mentioned in a braisa, it depends upon the logic of his argument.

The Yad Malachei writes that in truth, the Kesef Mishnah holds that the Rambam always rules like Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, even when he is mentioned in a braisa. The Kesef Mishnah that was cited above was in fact a gloss from one of his students, and it erroneously got inserted into the text of the Kesef Mishnah.

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Demons

If someone was thrown into a pit and calls out that anyone who hears him should write a get to his wife (specifying his name and his city), those who hear this should indeed write and send the get to his wife (we assume that he omitted the instruction of giving the get due to the confusion of his situation).

The Gemora (Gittin 66) asks: Is it not possible that it was a demon (who are suspect of evil behavior, such as deceiving people) that issued that proclamation?

Rav Yehudah replied: The Mishna is referring to a case where they saw in him the form of a man.

The Mishnah Lamelech proves that that there were only two people heard the voice, for if there were three people there, a demon would not reveal itself to them. Now, if there are only two people, it must be that one of them is writing the get and signing on it. This will prove that the signature of a scribe together with one witness is sufficient! This would be problematic, for Amoraim below argue on this exact issue!?

Poras Yosef answers that the Mishna can be referring to a case where there were three people there, and the demon would nevertheless reveal itself, because they were far away from each other.

The Beis Aharon writes that in a place where demons are accustomed to be, such as inside pits, they will reveal themselves even in the presence of three people.

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Chalifin for a MInor - Gittin 65

Rava said: There are three categories of a minor: If he would be given a rock, he would discard it, but if given a walnut, he would accept it, he can make an acquisition on things, but he may not acquire for others.

Tosfos asks that it seems from a Gemora in Bava Basra that a minor does not have the ability to acquire anything!?

Tosfos answers: The Gemora there could be referring to a minor who has not yet reached this stage of understanding.

Alternatively, they answer that the Gemora there is referring only to a kinyan chalifin (acquiring something through an exchange with a kerchief or other object), where a minor has a more difficult time grasping the mechanics of the kinyan.

The Ra”n explains that the Rabbis instituted for a minor only those kinyanim where the object is raised or pulled by the minor; however, other types of kinyanim, where the concepts are difficult to grasp, are not effective for the minor.

The Rashb”a adds that since we rule that the object being used for the chalifin must be owned by the one making the acquisition, it emerges that the minor must convey the object to the seller. He does not have enough knowledge to accomplish that and therefore the kinyan is not effective.

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Rav Kahana and the Poor Man's Dates

The Gemora (Gittin 61) relates an incident: Rav Kahana was going to Hutzal and he saw a certain person who was throwing sticks at a palm tree so that the dates would fall to the ground. Rav Kahana picked up the dates and ate them. The person said to Rav Kahana, “You saw that I had picked some of the dates with my hand (and therefore it is actual theft for you to take them).”

Rav Kahana said to him: You must be from Rabbi Yoshiyah’s city (who often gave public discourses in the city; that is why you know these halachos). Rav Kahana applied the following verse to Rabbi Yoshiyah: And a righteous man is the foundation of the world.

Tosfos asks: Even if Rav Kahana did not know that the person picked the dates with his hand, he still should not have eaten them!? Why was he not concerned with our Mishna’s ruling that we do not take from the poor in the interest of peace?

Tosfos answers that the man was taking the branches off the tree and the dates were falling off themselves. Rav Kahana thought that the man had no interest in the dates.

The Ramban answers that Rav Kahana thought that he was an idolater and the Mishna did not rule that the produce of an idolater is protected because of harmony.

The Rashba answers that Rav Kahana himself was a poor person (or he was regarded as one since he was traveling). [This answers why he would have been permitted to take the dates that was seemingly reserved for the poor.]

The Meiri writes that the decree of promoting harmony was instituted primarily for a poor person who would be taking for himself and eating in his house; however, the enactment for the interest of peace would not affect a passerby, such as Rav Kahana, who would be eating on the road.

The Vilna Gaon says that this decree was instituted only with respect to olives, but not for dates.

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Freeing a Half-Slave

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 41a) had stated: Someone who is half-slave and half-free man (he was owned by two partners, and one of them emancipated him), he works for his master one day and for himself one day; these are the words of Beis Hillel. Beis Shamai, however, says: You have created a solution for the master (for he does not lose out through this division), but you have not solved anything for the slave. He may not marry a slavewoman, for he is half-free. He cannot marry a free woman for he is half-slave. If you will say that such a person should refrain from marrying, that cannot be, for the world was created for the purpose of propagation, as it is written: He did not create it to be desolate; He formed it to be inhabited. Rather, to benefit the public (this slave), we force his master to make him a free man, and the slave writes a document for his value. Beis Hillel later retracted and ruled in accordance with Beis Shamai.

The commentators ask: How can we force the master to free the slave? Isn’t there a prohibition against emancipating a slave?

The Kli Chemdah answers this question based upon the Avudraham, who says that a woman is exempt from mitzvos which have a time element to them, because she is pledged to her husband at these times. So too, it can be said with respect to a half-slave half-free man. Since he is partially a free man, he is obligated to observe all the mitzvos. Therefore, at the times where he is responsible to serve his master, he cannot do so completely, for he is obligated in mitzvos. Consequently, the master will anyway not be able to fulfill the mitzvah of working the slave forever; therefore, there is no prohibition against freeing him.

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Who is the "I"?

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Daf Yomi: Gittin 39a) : They asked before Rebbe: What is the law if someone says that he gives up hope of ever retrieving his slave? Rebbe replied: I say that such a slave can only be fixed (to marry) with a document.

Many times in Shas, it is found that Rebbe used this terminology, “I say etc.” What was his intention with these words?

Reb Yosef Engel in Beis Haotzar explains that it is known that Rebbe was a tremendously humble person. The Gemora in Sotah (49a) states that when Rebbe died, humility ceased. Perhaps what Rebbe was saying was that it appears to him that the halachah is like this-and-this, but not that it is most definitely so.

He also writes that it is clear from the seforim of the students of the Baal Shem Tov that lofty people are constantly thinking that their words and actions are not emanating from their own power and strength; rather, it is all coming from the Ribbono shel Olam. In kabbalah, the Shechinah is referred to as “Ani,” “I.” This is the explanation in the Gemora Sukkah (53a) when Hillel said, “If I am here, then everyone is here.” The “I” did not refer to himself, for Hillel, we also know was extremely humble. Rather, he was referring to the Shechinah. This, perhaps, is what Rebbe was saying when he said, “I say.” The Shechinah which is inside of me is saying that the halachah is like this.

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An Idolatrous Name

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel (Daf Yomi: Gittin 34b): The Jews from abroad sent to Rabban Gamliel the following inquiry: If a man comes here from Eretz Yisroel whose true name is Yosef, but who is known here as Yochanan, or whose name is Yochanan, but who is known here as Yosef, how can he divorce his wife? Rabban Gamliel thereupon stood up and decreed that they should write in the get, “This man So-and-so or by whatever names he is known,” “This woman So-and-so or by whatever names she is known,” in order to benefit the public.

They asked Rabbeinu Tam regarding a Jew who worships idols and he divorced his wife with a get which had only his Jewish name written on it, and not his idolatrous name. What is the status of such a get?

He answered: Heaven forbid to even mention an idolatrous name on a get which is written according to the law of Moshe and all of Israel!

The Ra”dach in his response explains that his idolatrous name is not regarded as his name at all, and if that would be the only name written on the get, it would be as if the get would be written without the name of the divorcing husband.

However, Reb Yosef Engel notes that from the language of Rabbeinu Tam, it would seem that there is a different explanation. It is on account of the sanctity of the get that his idolatrous name cannot be written.

And the Rad”vaz in his response writes like that as well. He says that any holy scroll, such as a Sefer Torah, Tefillin, or Mezuzah, where there lies an obligation that it should be written lishmah, and also a get has sanctity, for it is also has a requirement to be written lishmah.

He concludes that the matzah which is being baked to be eaten on Pesach night also possesses sanctity, for it is required to be baked lishmah.

It is possible that this could explain the custom of many righteous people to kiss the matzah before they eat it on the night of the seder.

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