The Designation of Money and the Timeliness of a Mitzvah

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The Gemora cited a braisa: The Purim collections must be distributed for Purim (and nothing else). The local collections belong to that town only, and we are not required to be so precise in the matter (how much is needed for Purim, and how much the poor of the city needs), but calves are purchased in abundance, slaughtered and eaten, and the surplus goes to the charity fund. Rabbi Eliezer said: The Purim collections must be used for Purim only, and the poor may not even buy straps for their shoes, unless it was stipulated in the presence of the townspeople that such shall be granted; these are the words of Rabbi Yaakov, who said it in the name of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient in the matter (and allows the poor person to use the charity funds for other uses besides the Purim feast). [We may derive from here that Rabbi Meir holds that we cannot deviate from the owner’s intent.]

The Gemora notes that this braisa does not prove that (whoever deviates from the owner’s stipulation is regarded as a thief), for perhaps there too, the reason is that the donors gave the charity only that it should be used for Purim, and not for any other purpose? [Regarding charity funds, there is a significant difference between the two purposes, whereas the two routes discussed in our case are not significantly different than each other, for one is not more dangerous in any way than the other.]

The Chavos Yair quotes a Sefer Chasidim, who derives from this Gemora that if one sends his fellow a gift of food to be eaten on Shabbos, it is forbidden for the recipient to eat it during the weekdays. If he has leftover, he should let the rest of household partake in it, but only on Shabbos. If the donor explicitly stipulated that he should be the only one to eat from it, he may not give it to others.

It would seem from our Gemora that this is not merely an act of piousness; but rather, it is halachically mandated. We can extrapolate further that if one gives money or wine to his fellow and he tells him that is should be used for Kiddush, he must use it for Kiddush, and nothing else. It would be forbidden to buy fish for Shabbos with this money, for Kiddush is a Biblical mitzvah, and eating fish on Shabbos is merely a Rabbinic one.

However, according to the prevailing custom that money is given to Torah scholars, and they are told to use it for Shabbos and Yom Tov, that is only out of respect, but they are not actually being particular as to what it should be used for; in such cases, they could use the money for whatever they desire.

Reb Yosef Engel cites the following Yerushalmi: If one vows to bring a flour-offering on Yom Tov, he should not bring it on a weekday. This is why the seforim write that a transgression committed on Shabbos is more severe than one committed on a weekday, for the holiness of the day plays a role. So too it may be said regarding the performance of a mitzvah; There will be a greater reward for a mitzvah performed on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

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Pigs in the Future

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Our Gemora states that ma’aser sheini produce is regarded as something that will otherwise become permitted (since it may be eaten in Yerushalayim, or it can be redeemed), and there is a principle that any item that will eventually become permitted is not nullified even when intermingled with a thousand items of its like.

The Rishonim disagree regarding a food item that the Gemora is uncertain if it is forbidden or not and it remains unresolved. The inquiry will remain in that state until Eliyahu Hanavi clarifies it for us. The Ohr Zarua maintains that this is regarded as “something which can become permitted,” since there is a possibility that Eliyahu will say that it is permitted. The Rashba disagrees and he explains: If Eliyahu will decide that the food is forbidden, it will emerge that this item will never be permitted. If he will rule that it is permitted, it actually was never forbidden. Either way, he argues, it cannot be labeled as “something which can become permitted.” The Bach cites a Mordechai that it is not considered “something which can become permitted,” for by the time Eliyahu will permit it, the food will be already ruined.

The Chasam Sofer cites the following question from the Rav in Frankfurt: Chazal write that a pig is called a “chazir,” for in the future, Hashem will reverse the prohibition of the pig and it will be permitted. If so, according to those Rishonim, pig should be regarded as “something which can become permitted”?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon that which was written in the Toldos Yitzchak: The Torah forbids animals that do not have split hooves, or those that do not chew their cud because those animals are naturally conceited; they trample with their feet and they have a poison inside of them, which is extremely dangerous for a Jew to eat. The animals that do not digest their food easily and they are compelled to chew their cud; those animals are permitted to eat.

If so, explains the Chasam Sofer, there will be no change in halacha regarding the pig. It was forbidden and will remain forbidden. Rather, Hashem will change the nature of the pig and it will begin to chew its cud. That is why it will be permitted then. Accordingly, the only pigs that will be permitted then, are those that will be born after this change occurs; however, the pigs that were in existence prior to that will remain forbidden. This is why a pig is not classified as “something which can become permitted.”

Something that can become Permitted
(Davar she’yeish lo Matirin)
The Mishna states: If one makes a neder prohibiting himself from wine, he is permitted in cooked food which has in it the taste of wine. However, if he said, “Konam this wine that I will not taste,” and it fell into a cooked dish, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture, it is forbidden.

This would imply that if there is not enough to give flavor, it would be permitted. The Ra”n quotes his teachers who ask the following: Something which is forbidden on account of a neder is “something that can become permitted” (davar she’yeish lo matirin), and we have established that anything that can become permitted is not nullified even in a thousand!?

They answer that when we say that it is not nullified even in a thousand, that refers to something that has been mixed with its own kind. But here, when it says, “and it became mixed,” it is referring to something else that is not the same kind, like the case of eggs that were cooked with it. Anything that is mixed with something else that is not its kind is permitted, provided that it does not give flavor, even if it is “something that can become permitted.” The Ra”n cites proof to this from a Mishna in Chalah and a Yerushalmi.

They, therefore, objected to the statement of the Ri”f in Meseches Chulin concerning bread that was baked in an oven with roasted meat. The Gemora states that it is forbidden to eat it with a dairy sauce even though it has been established that we are not halachically concerned with vapors. The reason it is forbidden is because the bread is “something that can be permitted,” since one may eat it together with meat. For that reason, it is not nullified, even in a thousand. It is evident from the Ri”f that he maintains that “something that can be permitted” is not nullified even in something that is not its kind.

The Ra”n, however, agrees to the Ri”f. When the Mishna here says that “something can become permitted” becomes nullified in something that is not its own kind, that is referring to something that is forbidden now, but will become permitted in the future, like nedarim. For the Ra”n has the following question: Since according to the Chachamim, all forbidden things become nullified in their own kind just as in a different kind, why did the Chachamim make a distinction in the case of “something that can become permitted,” between its own kind and a different kind? The reason is as follows: The Chachamim and Rabbi Yehudah disagree whether or not something can be nullified in its own kind. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a forbidden item is not nullified in its own kind, because anything that is similar to another thing does not weaken and nullify it; rather, it preserves it and strengthens it.

The Chachamim disagree and hold that a forbidden item and something which is permitted are not similar to each other, even if they are the same kind. This is because one is forbidden and one is permitted. For it is not fitting to follow the similarity of their substance, but rather the difference in their being forbidden and permitted. It is for this reason that the Chachamim learned concerning “something that can be permitted” for the sake of being strict towards the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. For since the forbidden item is not completely different from the permitted one, because the forbidden one will eventually become permitted, we say that it is not nullified in its own kind. It will only become nullified when mixed with a different kind, for the difference that exists between one kind and another will make up for the equality that is added here because it is “something that can be permitted.” It is the difference between kinds that is the cause of nullification, and equality interferes with nullification.

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Neder like a Bamah

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The Sefas Emes and Noam Elimelech teach us that the word neder, vow is related to the word dira, dwelling. What does an oath have to do with a dwelling?

Reb Chaim from Divrei Chaim cites the Shem m’Shmuel who questions the entire essence of nedarim: How is it that a person has the power through his verbal declaration to create prohibitions (in the case of nidrei bituei) and create a status of hekdesh (nidrei hekdesh)? This power goes so far that the Gemora is uncertain whether the object of a neder is subject to the laws of me’ilah for violating a neder!

He suggests the following: In essence no new kedushah is being created. The concept of neder is a recognition that beyond what meets the eye, there is a level of kedushah already inherent in the reality around us - the Shechinah already dwells immanently in the world.

Sefas Emes notes that the first person in the Torah to take a neder is Yaakov Avinu. While the other Avos revealed Hashem’s presence as similar to a mountain or a field, Chazal tell us that Yaakov revealed Hashem’s presence as the bayis, a dwelling. Chazal tell us that taking a neder is like building a bamah, an altar used outside the Mikdash. Hashem metaphorically “dwells” in the Bais haMikdash – to create a sanctified space for him - outside those confines is a task fraught with challenge.

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Husband's Knowledge

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b - 46a)had stated: Rabbi Meir says: If it is a vow which requires examination by a Chacham (and the husband cannot annul it by himself), he may not take her back, but for one which does not require examination by a Chacham (the husband can annul it himself), he may take her back (because in this case, the husband cannot advance the claim that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding). Rabbi Elozar said: They prohibited him to remarry in the case where the vow required examination by a Chacham to annul it only on account of the case where the vow did not require examination by a Chacham to annul it (since in the latter case, the husband might claim that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow; in the former case, however, no such claim can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law).

The Gemora asks: What is the core of their argument? Rabbi Meir maintains that a husband does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law and therefore forbids remarriage on account of the first reason mentioned above, since the first husband might claim that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Chacham, he would not have consented to give a divorce. Rabbi Elozar holds that no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law.

The Tosfos Rid explains the argument in the following manner. If the vow required a Chacham to permit it, he may not remarry her. This is because we are scared that he will say that if I merely knew that a Chacham could permit it, I would never have divorced her. He would have had her go before a Beis Din to have her vow permitted, despite the fact that this is embarrassing. However, if it is a vow that he could have nullified as her husband, there is no suspicion. This is because everyone knows that they can nullify certain vows that their wives make. The fact that he did not do so shows that he clearly wanted to divorce her; regardless of whether or not the vow was actually made. Rabbi Elozar holds that a husband does not always realize that he can nullify his wife’s vows. Therefore, they cannot remarry if he divorced her because of such a vow, as he will later claim that if he had known he could have done so, he would not have divorced her. Furthermore, Rabbi Elozar says that a vow that requires a Chacham or Beis Din is not really cause for them not to remarry. This is because he would not have taken his wife to a Chacham or beis din anyway, because it is denigrating. However, in this case as well they are forbidden to remarry because of the similarity to the case where a Chacham is not required.

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The Annonymous Man

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 32b) had stated: They (six people) were walking on a road, and there was one person coming towards them. One of them said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is So-and-so,” and a second one said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is not So-and-so.” The third one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is a nazir,” and the fourth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is not a nazir.” The fifth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that both of you (the first two) are nezirim.” The sixth person said, “I am hereby a nazir that all of you (the first five) are nezirim.”

Tosfos explains the rationale of each person: They (six people) were walking on a road, and there was one person coming towards them, who could not be identified from afar. One of them said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is So-and-so,” for he was convinced that he recognized the far away person to be Reuven.

The second one said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is not So-and-so,” for he was in fact certain that the person was not Reuven.

The third one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is a nazir,” for he figured that one of them was certainly correct.

The fourth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is not a nazir.” He is in essence saying the same as the third one, except it is the converse of his declaration.

The fifth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that both of you (the first two) are nezirim,” for he thinks that both of them should be a nazir since they both accepted upon themselves nezirus according to what they honestly thought to be the truth.

The sixth person said, “I am hereby a nazir that all of you (the first five) are nezirim,” for in his opinion, they should all be nezirim.

Retracting from Nezirus and Hekdesh

The Mishna had stated: Beis Hillel rules that none of them are nezirim except the one whose words were not fulfilled.

The Gemora asks: Why is he a nazir if his words were not fulfilled?

Rav Yehudah emends the Mishna to say that none of them are nezirim except the one whose words were fulfilled.

Abaye says: The case is where he added, “If it is not So-and-so, I am hereby a nazir.” (The novelty of this ruling is that he may retract from his original statement if his retraction was within the time of an utterance.) [Accordingly] What does Beis Hillel mean when they said, “His words did not come to fruition?” They meant that his first words did not come to fruition; only his second words.

The Tiferes Tziyon writes that this would be a distinction between the halachos of a nazir and the halachos regarding hekdesh. If one vows to become a nazir under a certain condition and immediately retracts, we accept his second declaration, for his intention is to become a nazir. However, regarding hekdesh, we would not allow one to retract from a vow declaring something to be hekdesh.

The Be’er Moshe disagrees and states that just like one may immediately retract from his nezirus vow, he may retract from a hekdesh declaration as well. He concludes that since the Rambam rules that one may not retract from hekdesh, even within the time of an utterance, it is apparent that he does not rule like our Gemora, and one may not retract from a nezirus vow either.

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Halfway Nezirus

It is evident from our Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 24a) that if a woman made a neder to become a nazir, and she did not designate the animals for her korbanos (that were to be brought upon conclusion of her nezirus), and then the husband revoked her neder, she is not obligated to bring those korbanos.

The Reshash notes: The Gemora in Nedarim 83a discusses the concept of a halfway nezirus and that there are no korbanos for a partial nezirus (since the Torah only required korbanos upon completing a nezirus). The Rosh and Ran explain the case as follows: If a woman became a nazir and counted fifteen days, and then her husband revoked it, she has not completed her nezirus and therefore is not obligated to bring korbanos.

It can be inferred that it is only in a case where she observed nezirus for fifteen days that she would be exempt from bringing the korbanos, since that is not regarded as a complete nezirus, however, if she would have declared to become a nazir for sixty days, and her husband revoked it after thirty days, perhaps she would be obligated to bring the korbanos, for she has completed a full, standard term of nezirus.

The Reshash concludes that this is not the halacha. Anytime that the woman does not complete her nezirus, she is not obligated to bring the nazir’s korbanos.

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Conditions

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 11a) states: If one says, “I am hereby a nazir on the condition that I will drink wine and become tamei to the dead,” he is a nazir and all the prohibitions apply to him.

The Gemora explains: Everyone agrees to this halacha, for he is stipulating “against that which the Torah states and such conditions are null and void.

Tosfos asks: Why was it necessary for the Gemara to state this reason? The Gemora could have said the following: There is a principle that anything which cannot be performed through an agent, cannot take effect with a condition either. Since nezirus cannot be accomplished through an agent, it should not take effect with any condition (even if the stipulation is not against that which is written in the Torah)!

Tosfos answers: Since others are able to bring the korbanos for him, nezirus is regarded as something that can be performed through an agent.

The Gerrer Rebbe (Pnei Menachem in the sefer Torascha Shasu’oy) uses this Tosfos to answer the following question: It is written [Breishis 28: 20 – 21]: And Yaakov uttered a vow, saying, “If God will be with me, and He will guard me on this way, upon which I am going, and He will give me bread to eat and a garment to wear; and if I return in peace to my father’s house, and the Lord will be my God. A neder cannot be fulfilled through an agent, so a conditional neder should not take effect!

According to our Tosfos, he suggests as follows: A neder with respect to hekdesh may be performed through an agent. One person can consecrate something for his fellow. Although Yaakov’s neder was not a neder regarding hekdesh; since nedarim in general could be performed through an agent, all nedarim may take effect even with a condition attached.

The Ramban answers Tosfos’ question by saying that the principle of “anything which cannot be performed through an agent, cannot take effect with a condition either” only applies by something that a person does with his fellow. However, when a person stipulates a condition with himself, the condition is valid and takes effect even though all of the guidelines effecting conditions are not met. Since by nazir, his condition is only relevant to himself, the condition takes effect even though nezirus cannot be performed through an agent.

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The Man and the Servant

In our Mishna (Nedarim 89a), when it says, “This is the rule” (once she enters into her own jurisdiction for even one moment, the husband cannot revoke her vows), it is coming to include a case where the father gave her over to the husband’s agents, or the father’s agents gave her over to the husband’s agents. From this point and on, the husband may not revoke any of his wife’s prior vows.

For once she was given over to them, her father no longer has any jurisdiction over her, because this handing over is regarded like nisuin. The husband may revoke nedarim that she makes from this time on, but with respect to her prior nedarim, he may not revoke them. He cannot revoke them in conjunction with her father either, because she has left her father’s jurisdiction, and he no longer has any rights over her.

Based upon this principle, the Pardes Yosef explains the following verse [Breishis 24:61]: And Rivkah and her maidens arose and rode on the camels, and they followed the man; and the servant took Rivkah and left. Why was Eliezer first referred to as “the man,” and afterwards, “the servant”?

We can answer as follows: As long as Rivkah was under the jurisdiction of her father, although Eliezer was the servant of Yitzchak, because Avraham gave over all his possessions to him, nevertheless, he was not the servant of Rivkah. Therefore, Eliezer (with respect to Rivkah) was called, “the man.” However, after Rivkah’s maidens, who were Lavan’s agents, handed her over to Eliezer, she entered into the jurisdiction of Yitzchak, for her father gave her over to the husband’s agent (Eliezer). Once she entered into her husband’s authority, Eliezer now became her servant, and therefore, the Torah refers to him as “the servant.”

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Deaf-mute Revoking

Rami bar Cham inquires (Nedarim 73a): Can a deaf man revoke the nedarim of his wife?

The Ra”n explains that the Gemora is referring to a deaf person who can talk, but cannot hear.

The Rosh adds: We cannot be referring to a deaf-mute, for he can only make a Rabbinical kiddushin through hinting or signing. He will not be able to revoke her nedarim, which are Biblically valid! Furthermore, he would have the halacha of a shoteh, and the halachos of revoking will not be applicable for him.

Reb Yaakov Emden explains the Rosh to mean as follows: The kiddushin of a deaf-mute is only a Rabbinical one. He performs a kiddushin by demonstrating that he wishes to marry her. It is, therefore, impossible for him to revoke his wife’s nedarim, for that is a Biblical halacha, which would only be applicable to a marriage on a Biblical level.

The Acharonim challenge this explanation from a Gemora in Niddah (46b), which states that one who married a minor, who has no father, and the kiddushin is only a Rabbinical one, may nevertheless revoke her nedarim. This is because every woman who makes a neder intends that it will be subject to her husband’s will. This applies by a Rabbinical marriage as well, since she is his wife.

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky (and others) explain the Rosh to mean that since he cannot talk, he is incapable of revoking his wife’s vows. For one needs to speak in order ot revoke a vow; hinting and signing will not be sufficient.

The Nidrei Zerizin is perplexed by this answer: Where does it say that one needs a complete expression in order to revoke a vow? Furthermore, he can revoke it through writing. For there are many opinions that maintain that writing is considered like speaking in regards to making an oath; certainly it should suffice for revoking a vow!

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Pre-existing Conditions

The Gemora (Nedarim 72a) stated that the Mishna is referring to a nesuah, and the reason that the husband cannot revoke her vow is because the halacha is that a husband cannot revoke his nesuah’s prior vows.

The Ra”n explains that it can be referring to a nesuah either in the marriage preceding the divorce or the one that followed it. If she was an arusah by the first marriage and a nesuah at the end, he would not be able to revoke her nedarim, for the husband cannot revoke pre-existing nedarim. If she was a nesuah by the first marriage and an arusah at the end, he cannot revoke her nedarim, for once she is a nesuah, the father loses his rights over her, and the arus is not able to revoke her vows without the conjunction of her father.

The Reshash notes that it would seem from this Ra”n that a husband after nisuin can indeed revoke the nedarim that his wife made while she was an arusah. For otherwise, the Mishna did not have to mention that he divorced her and then remarried her. He cites the Rambam’s opinion that the husband may not revoke the nedarim that his wife made while she was an arusah.

There are those that explain the argument as follows: Does the husband have authority over his wife’s nedarim, while she is an arusah? If you say that the husband has no authority then; it is only in conjunction with her father that he may revoke her nedarim, we can explain the Rambam’s opinion. Once they perform nisuin, the husband acquires the authority to revoke her nedarim, but he can only use this authority on nedarim that his wife makes from now on. However, if you will say that the husband does have authority to revoke her vows even during the erusin, except that this authority is limited in the fact that he may only revoke her nedarim in conjunction with her father, we can understand the Ra”n’s opinion. The husband may revoke the nedarim that his wife made during erusin, for this is not regarded as a pre-existing neder, since he had the authority to revoke this neder even beforehand.

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Father Revoking by Himself - Nedarim Daf 67

The Rambam holds that a father has the right to revoke all types of his daughter’s nedarim. The husband, however, can only revoke a neder of personal affliction, and only those that affect their marital relationship. The Ra”n nd the Rosh disagree and hold that the father may only revoke her nedarim that are of personal affliction, and only those matters that are between him and her.

The Keren Orah poses the following question: The halacha is that the father and the husban revoke the nedarim of a betrothed na’arah. According to the Rambam, who maintains that the father can revoke all types of nedarim, what is the halacha if his daughter is a betrothed na’arah and she pronounces such a vow? Do we say that the father has a right to revoke this neder by himself? Or, perhaps, the halacha is that the father may only revoke nedarim in partnership with her husband, and since her husband cannot revoke such a neder, the father cannot revoke it either?

Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach wonders further: This inquiry can be posed according to the Ra”n and the Rosh as well. If the girl makes a neder that is a “matter that is between her father and her,” but it does not affect the husband. For example, she said that she will not assist her father. Do we say that the father can revoke this neder by himself, or do we say that he can only revoke nedarim together with her husband, and since her husband cannot revoke this neder, the father cannot revoke it either?

The Meiri writes that the Rambam would concede that the father does not have the ability to revoke the neder of his betrothed daughter by himself. His rights to revoke his daughter’s neder are only in partnership with her husband, and if the husband cannot revoke the neder, since it is not a neder that affects him, the father cannot revoke it either.

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Delaying by a Neder

The Mishna (Nedarim 63a) had stated: If one made a neder against tasting wine for the year, and the year was proclaimed to be a leap year, he is forbidden for the year and its extension.

The Ra”n explains: The Mishna is teaching us that even if one made the neder from the beginning of the year, since he said “this year,” we do not say that he meant “one year,” but rather, he is prohibited for an extra month, which is thirteen months. However, if he said “one year” without any specification, the extra month is not included, even though the year was a leap year. For behold, if he did not abide by his prohibition this year, he makes it up the next year, which is a regular year. And although, it is forbidden for him to do that, because there is a prohibition against delaying, since if he would delay, he could make it up in another year, his neder is not connected to this year, which is a leap year. Therefore, even if he fulfills it this year, the extra month is not included.

The Rashba holds that even if he says, “one year from today,” the extra month is not included.

It is evident from the Ra”n that he holds of the following novelty: One can violate the transgression against delaying, even by a prohibatory neder.

The Rambam and Ramban, both maintain that this prohibition is only applicable by a neder for hekdesh, when one is obligating himself to do something.

The Machaneh Efraim adds that this transgression can apply by all nedarim to fulfill a mitzvah.

Reb Shimon Shkop states that the Ra”n’s words are perplexing. The prohibition against delaying is applicable when the person has an obligation to do soemthing. A neder is a prohibition on an object. If the object is forbidden, it is forbidden, but if it is not, how can there be a prohibition against delaying?

Reb Dovod Pervarsky explains: A neder also begins with an obligation resting on the person. He is obligated to fulfill his neder. If the forbidden object is in existence, the neder takes effect upon that object. However, if it is not in existence at that time, the person has a responsibility to render it forbidden when it comes into this world. If he fails to do so immediately, he is violating the transgression against delaying.

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Term Expired and Fasting for "One Day"

Annulment after the Term of the Neder Expired

The Mishna (Nedarim 60a) states: If a person says: “Konam” (he forbids himself with a vow) that he will not taste any wine today, he is only forbidden from doing so until it gets dark.

Rabbi Yirmiyah says: When it gets dark, he must ask a scholar (to permit his vow). The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Yosef answers: It is a decree, lest he confuse this case with a vow that he will abstain “for one day” (which the Mishna stated means that he is forbidden for twenty-four hours, not just until dark).

The Acharonim ask: Why can’t he have the neder annulled before the night? Why must he wait for the night?

The Chasam Sofer answers: If he would have the neder annulled before the night, it would retroactively annul his neder. It would emerge that he had abstained for nothing. However, if he waits until the night to annul the neder, he has fulfilled his neder, since the term of his neder was for that day. It was only a stringency based upon a decree that he should have it annulled at night.

It is evident from the Chasam Sofer that he maintains that a neder cannot be annulled after its term has been completed. The Tosfos Ri”d holds that a neder can be annulled by a sage even after its term has expired.

Fasting Nowadays

The Ra”n asks on our custom of accepting to fast for one day, and immediately by nightfall, he is permitted to eat without petitioning a sage first. According to our Gemora, shouldn’t he be required to have the neder annulled because of Rav Yosef’s decree of “one day”?

The Ra”n answers: Everyone knows that the Chachamim instituted that the time for a fast is from morning until night. It is not similar to other nedarim, which do not have a set time. There, therefore, is no reason for a decree, for everyone understands that the halachos of nedarim and the halachos of fasting are distinct from each other.

The Rashba answers: The Gemora’s decree is only applicable in a case where he made a neder, saying, “Today, I will not drink wine,” which is similar to the case where he said, “I will not drink wine for one day.” There, we rule that he must have the neder annulled at nightfall, since it is similar to the case where he made the neder for “one day,” where he was permitted in the beginning of the day. However, regarding a fast, where one is forbidden to eat from the beginning of the day until its conclusion, there is no reason for any decree. One would easily think that the reason why we are lenient and allow him to eat at nightfall is because we were stringent upon him at the beginning of the day. When he makes the neder in middle of the day, and he was permitted up until then, we decree that he is required to petition a sage for annulment of his neder at nightfall.

The Rashba offers another answer: There is no place for Rav Yosef’s decree by a neder to fast, for even if one would make a neder to fast for “one day,” he will not be required to fast for twenty-four hours like by a different neder. Therefore, on a regular fast, he may begin to eat immediately upon nightfall.

The Yados Nedarim answers: This decree was never issued by a neder for a mitzvah. One who vows to fast is regarded as a mitzvah, as the Gemora refers to him as a kodosh.

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Following the Majority

The Beraisa states (Nedarim 52a): If someone makes a vow not to have oil in Eretz Yisroel, he is permitted to have sesame oil and not olive oil. In Babylon, he may not have sesame oil but he can have olive oil. In a place where both are used, he is forbidden to have both.

The Gemora asks: This is obvious! The Gemora answers: The case is where most people use one kind of oil. One might think that the vow is considered like the usage of most people. This is why the Beraisa tells us that he is forbidden to both oils, because a doubt regarding a prohibition is judged stringently.

The Ra”n explains what we would have thought: Even though there is a minority that makes use of the other kind, there is a possibility that his intention might have been even from those.

The Lechem Mishna asks: Why don’t we follow the majority? Why, in all matters of prohibition, we issue a ruling based upon the majority?

He explains: If it would be a certainty that the vower was referring to the oil used by most people, we would definitely rule that that the vow takes effect only upon that type of oil. However, here he used a language which may include both types of oil, therefore, there is an assumption that he is excluding himself from the majority. We therefore rule stringently and forbid him on both types of oil, since his language can include both.

The Netziv answers that we only follow the majority in cases where the minority is in conflict with the majority. However, here, the minority is not in contradiction with the majority, since he may have intended for both. We therefore rule stringently and forbid him on both types of oil.

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Winter Vinegar; Date Honey; Milk and Whey

The Mishna states (52a): If a person makes a vow that he will not partake of dates, he can still eat date honey. If he makes a vow not to partake of winter grapes, he may partake of the vinegar made from those grapes. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah says: Whenever a product is called a name that reflects upon its source and a person vows not to partake from that source, he is forbidden to have the product as well. The Chachamim permit this.

The Ra”n asks: Who is this first Tanna? It is neither Rabbi Yosi nor the Chachamim! For we learned above, in the dispute regarding milk and whey, that whenever they called it “whey of milk,” it was forbidden according to everyone! If so, the date honey and the vinegar should be forbidden!

The Rashba answers: The cases are not similar. For in the case of the whey of milk, its form has not been changed. Even initially, when it was mixed with the milk, it was in that very same form. But here it has changed physically.

Furthermore, in the case of whey, the reason it is called “whey of milk,” is because it still has the law of milk. It is not to distinguish it from some other kind of whey, for there is no other kind. But here, when it is called “date honey” or “winter-grape vinegar,” it is not that they still have those laws; rather, it is to distinguish them between other types of honey and vinegar.

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The prohibition remaining even after the item leaves his possession

Avimi inquired (Nedarim Daf 47): If one said to his friend, “Konam, your entering this house,” and then he dies or sold it to someone else, what is the halacha? Does a person have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership or not?

The Nimukei Yosef cites a Ritva, who quotes the following Yerushalmi: A person will only have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership. However, he cannot initially prohibit the item only for the time after it leaves his possession.

The Haflaas Nedarim explains: The only reason that someone would have the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership is because it is similar to hekdesh. Since the item in question is presently in his possession, the neder takes effect and the prohibition remains on this object forever just like hekdesh. However, one does not have the ability to consecrate an item that is presently not in his possession, and therefore, a neder to prohibit something only for the time after it leaves his possession will not take effect.

The Korban Nesanel asks: Why couldn’t this inquiry be resolved from the Gemora above (42a-b) which concluded that if one says to his fellow, “These possessions should be forbidden to you”; if he vowed prior to shemitah, he may not enter his field and he may not eat from the fruits which are growing on the branches outside of his field even when shemitah arrives? This is because a person has the ability to prohibit something presently in his ownership, and the prohibition will remain even after it leaves his ownership! Shouldn’t the halacha be the same in our case where he sold the property to someone else?

He answers that shemitah is different. Since the vower has the right to acquire the fruits that are growing just like anyone else, it is regarded as if it is still in his possession, and that is why the fruits remain forbidden. (This is a tremendous chiddush that something can be considered yours because you have the right to acquire it.) However, the Gemora’s inquiry here is regarding a case where he sold the property. In this case, the item is not in his possession at all, and perhaps, the prohibition will not remain after it leaves his possession.

The Shitah Mikubetzes answers that Avimi did not know the conclusion of the Gemora above and that is why he made this inquiry.

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Proof Against the Rambam - Nedarim Daf 35

Rav Acha the son of Rav Avya said to Rav Ashi: If one said, “My loaf is forbidden to you,” and then he gave it to that fellow as a gift, who has committed me’ilah? The giver cannot be the one who committed me’ilah, for the loaf was never forbidden upon him. The recipient cannot be the one who committed me’ilah, for he can say, “I am only interested in acquiring permissible loaves; loaves that are forbidden to me, I do not want.”

The Ran writes that this is a refutation to the Rambam’s opinion, who holds that one who forbids another person benefit from himself and then feeds him will incur lashes because he has violated the transgression of “he shall not desecrate his word.”

The meaning of the Ra”n seems to be that if the Rambam is correct that if the vower provides the forbidden item to the other fellow, he has desecrated his word; then, the giver may be guilty of me’ilah as well! Why does our Gemora assume as an obvious point that the giver has not committed me’ilah?

The Machaneh Efraim (35) and the Lechem Mishna answer that although it might be prohibited for the vower to give the other fellow the forbidden item, but that does not mean that he has committed me’ilah. He has desecrated his word, but he is not guilty of me’ilah, for it was not regarded as hekdesh for him.

Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach explains that the Ran’s proof was from the language of the Gemora. The Gemora stated unequivocally that there can be no prohibition on the giver, for the loaf is not forbidden to him. It would seem from the Gemora that there is no prohibition on the giver at all! This is not correct according to the Rambam.

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Paying Up a Debt of his Fellow

The Gemora (Nedarim 33) rules regarding one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from his fellow; the fellow is prohibited to repay his debt (in a regular case).

Reb Elchonon Wasserman discusses the rationale behind this ruling. Is it prohibited because the one who pronounced the vow is directly benefiting from the money that is being used to repay his debt? Or, perhaps it is because the fellow is causing the lender to forgive the borrower for his debt (once he has the money from elsewhere), and it emerges that he is indirectly receiving pleasure from the fellow?

This question is actually dependent upon a different question: Can someone pay up the debt of his fellow and cause that the debt has been paid? Or, perhaps only the borrower can repay a debt; his friend may give money to the lender with the stipulation being that the lender will forgive the borrower from the debt which he owes?

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Distinction between Charity and Returning a Lost Object

The Gemora (Nedarim 33) states regarding one who is forbidden by a vow to derive benefit from his fellow; the fellow is permitted to return his lost property to him. This is permitted because his primary intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and he is not intending to provide pleasure to his friend.

This, explains the Shitah Mikubetzes, is in contrast to the mitzvah of giving charity, which would be forbidden. What is the difference between the two mitzvos? He explains: When charity is given to him, he is benefiting directly from the money; therefore, it is forbidden. When his lost object is returned, he is not deriving pleasure from the item; he is getting benefit from the fact that his fellow troubled himself to return the object to him. Regarding his fellow’s exertion, it may be said that his intention is to fulfill the mitzvah, and not to provide pleasure.

Others make the following distinction: Charity may be given to any poor person; it does not have to be given to this specific poor person. That is why it is prohibited to give this particular poor person charity. However, in order to fulfill the mitzvah of returning a lost object, it must be returned to the one who lost the item, and therefore, it would be permitted.

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The Law of the Kingdom is the Law

The Gemora in Shabbos 88a teaches that when Bnei Yisroel stood at Mount Sinai and heard the word of Hashem, He held the mountain over our heads. Hashem declared, “If you’ll accept the Torah, all will be well. If not, this will be your burial place!” Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: This can now be used as an excuse for Klal Yisroel when they do not perform the mitzvos. For when they are summoned for judgment, they can claim that they were coerced into accepting the Torah; it was not done willingly.

The Perashas Derachim asks from our Gemora (Nedarim 28a) which states that the law of the kingdom is the law and we do not allow a person to vow deceptively. If so, this should certainly apply by The Holy One blessed is He, Who is the King of all Kings. How could Klal Yisroel use the coercion as an excuse? The law of the kingdom is the law, and they took an oath obligating themselves to perform His mitzvos!

He answers that Rabbeinu Tam holds that the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law is only applicable if the king decrees on all his subjects. However, if the decree is issued only on part of his kingdom, this principle does not apply. Since Hashem is the King over all the nations of the world and He only forced Bnei Yisroel to accept His mitzvos, this principle would not apply and hence, a claim of coercion can be effective.

It emerges that regarding the seven mitzvos that were given to all Bnei Noach, the principle of the law of the kingdom is the law would apply, and a claim of coercion would not be valid.

According to this, we can explain the argument between Pharaoh and the midwives. Pharaoh asked them, “Why didn’t you listen to my commandment? The law of the kingdom is the law and since I the king decreed that all the Jewish children should be killed, you are obligated to listen to me!” They responded to him, “Your decree is not a universal one; it was only issued regarding the Jewish children and not to any others. Accordingly, the principle does not apply and we are not obligated to adhere to the laws of the kingdom. Thereupon, Pharaoh immediately decreed that all children born must be thrown into the sea.

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