Showing posts with label inheritance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label inheritance. Show all posts

Friday, January 29, 2010

Inheritance - Bava Basra 134

What did the Father Intend?

The Gemora tells the story of Yonasan ben Uziel, who received the property of a man who did not wish to have his children receive it. The Gemora explains that Shammai felt that this gift was similar to the gift of Bais Choron, which was conditional on the recipient fulfilling the intent of the giver.

The Rashbam learns that the intent in this case was for the man’s children not to receive the property. Shammai therefore protested when Yonasan ben Uziel gave some of the property to them.

Tosfos (133b Ba) learns that the intent was for the children to receive the property, and the gift was for the man to avoid giving them the property directly, since he had sworn that they may not receive benefit from him. Shammai therefore felt this was the same as the case of Bais Choron, and further thought that Yonasan ben Uziel gave all the property to the children. Just as in the case of Bais Choron, the Sages ruled that a gift given only to circumvent an oath, and not allowing the recipient to consecrate it, is invalid, so Shammai felt that the gift was invalid. Yonasan ben Uziel explained that the father gave him the property as a full gift, and he actually did first sell and consecrate part of it.

The Ritva says that he specifically first sold and consecrated part of it, to ensure that the father meant it as a full gift, as indicated by his not protesting. The gift was thus an unconditional gift, so Yonasan could also give part of it back to the children, and avoid transgressing the oath.

My Brother?

The Mishna says that if one (e.g., Levi) claims that someone (e.g., Yehudah) is his brother, the doubtful brother only splits with the brother who made the claim, but not with the others.

The Rashbam explains that vis a vis Levi, we view the estates as split among all the brothers, including Yehudah, reducing Levi’s share appropriately. For example, if there are two other brothers (e.g., Reuven and Shimon), none of whom are first born, the estate will be split in the following manner: Reuven and Shimon claim there are three brothers, so they each get 1/3, which takes up 2/3 of the estate.

Levi and Yehudah claim there are four brothers. Levi therefore only collects ¼. At this point, 11/12 of the estate are taken. The last 1/12 is given to Yehudah. Although he claims he should be getting ¼, the other 2/12 would come from Reuven and Shimon, who do not accept his claim of being a brother. Levi can therefore tell Yehudah to discuss the remainder of his share with Reuven and Shimon.

Rabbeinu Gershom, however, says that Levi, by claiming that Yehudah is a brother, must split his whole share equally with Yehudah. Therefore, Reuven and Shimon each get 1/3, while Levi and Yehudah each get 1/6. If Yehudah proves to Reuven and Shimon that he is a brother, he will succeed in collecting 1/12 from each. In that case, he must give half of what he collects to Levi, who gave of his share to Yehudah, to compensate for Reuven and Shimon not agreeing to accept Yehudah as a brother.

A Son, for Inheritance

The Gemora says that it is obvious that a man can identify his son regarding inheritance, and therefore the Mishna is teaching us about yibum. The Rashbam says that although we learned from a verse that a man may identify one of his sons as a bechor, indicating that this is not an obvious concept, that is true when we knew the son to be his son, but not a bechor. In that case, the Torah tells us that the man has full power to identify a bechor, even regarding property which he otherwise would not be able to give to the son. However, in the Mishna, where we do not even know this person to be his son, the man has no special reliability. Therefore, all the Mishna is stating is that the man has the power to identify his son, only regarding property which he could otherwise give to him – i.e., present property, or future property that he will have until he is too frail to give it, according to Rabbi Meir, who allows for a gift of future property. That statement is indeed obvious, so the Mishna must be teaching us about yibum.

The Rashba and Ritva, however, understand the earlier verse that allows a man to identify his bechor, to allow a man to identify anyone as his son, even if we have no prior knowledge of a relationship. Therefore, the Mishna is empowering a man to identify someone as his son regarding inheritance, with no qualifications. When the Gemora says that this is obvious, the Gemora means it is obvious because we already know this from the verse cited earlier.

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Thursday, December 31, 2009

Inheritor or Guardian?

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The Gemora rules: It is obvious that if he designated all of his property to his adult son, we assume that he only appointed him to be a guardian (for he would not want to take away his other children’s inheritance).

The Rishonim ask: How can our Gemora say that the father’s stipulation is not effective when the Gemora above (130a) explicitly rules that the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan Ben Berokah?

The Rash”bam (ibid) says that the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan Ben Berokah only when the father uses the expression “as an inheritance”; however, our Gemora is referring to a case where he used “as a gift” expression, and in such a case, the Gemora here rules that his real intention is to make him a guardian.

The Ram”ban answers that the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan Ben Berokah only when the father stated his stipulation, however, our Gemora is referring to a case where he wrote it down.

The Ro”sh quotes Rabbeinu Chananel who says that before, the Gemora was referring to a case where he wanted to increase the portion to one son and decrease the portion of another; he did not give his entire estate to one person. Here, we are dealing with a case where he gave one of them his entire estate. In such a case, we may assume that he meant for that person to be a guardian on the estate on behalf of the others.

The Rash”ba explains that the Gemora before was discussing a specific case where he clearly said that he wants that particular person to inherit him and he does not want him to be a guardian.

The Baal Hameor understands our Gemora to be referring to a case where the sons are minors, or they are overseas. In such a case, we assume that the designated son will be appointed as a guardian.

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Wednesday, December 30, 2009

Bequeathing to One Son

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Rava said: Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah’s reason is based upon the following verse: It shall be on the day that he bequeaths to his sons. This indicates that the Torah gave authority to a father to bequeath to whom he desires to inherit his estate.

It is brought in the Sifri that the father has such a right even on prospective property, i.e. those that he does not currently own, but they will become his. He can say that he wants property that is not actually in existence yet to be inherited by whomever he desires. Reb Akiva Eiger, however, cites the R”if, who holds that the father cannot give away property that is not yet in existence.

There is another dispute regarding this halachah: The Nesivos quotes a Rit”va, who holds that the father may retract from this stipulation up to the moment he dies. The Ketzos Hachoshen disagrees.

The Mikdash David explains these two arguments with the following chakirah: When the father bequeaths his property to one of the sons, is he establishing that this particular son is his sole inheritor, or are all the children inheritors; the father is merely designating this property that it should belong to this particular son?

If the father is establishing that this particular son is his sole inheritor, this stipulation will be effective even on property that is not yet in existence, for once this son has been established as the inheritor, he will inherit whatever potentially should have belonged to the father. If, however, he is merely designating this property to belong to one of his sons, he can only do that on property which currently belongs to him.The same can be said regarding retraction: If the father is establishing that this particular son is his sole inheritor, he cannot retract from that (he may, however, in the future, add other inheritors, for he is not taking away the inheritor status from this son). If, however, he is merely designating this property to belong to one of his sons, he may retract up until the moment that they actually take possession of the property.

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Thursday, January 22, 2009

Like "his Arrows"

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Rabbi Yochanan said: One is liable on the damage caused by his fire on account of it being “his arrows” (it is as if he shot out an arrow which caused damage).

The Nimukei Yosef explains that this is why one is permitted to light candles Friday afternoon even though they will be burning on Shabbos; since the candles were lit from before Shabbos, which is when he shot the arrow.

The Minchas Chinuch explains further: According to Rabbi Yochanan, he is liable for the moment that he set the fire ablaze. Just as one who shoots an arrow is liable for the shooting of the arrow even though the damage which occurs afterwards is now unavoidable; so too it is with respect to one who lights a fire. Accordingly, a halachah would emerge as follows: If one lit a fire and before it had a chance to do damage he died, the inheritors would be obligated to pay (from the properties of the deceased), since the reason for liability was already completed while the lighter was still alive. This is only true if “his arrows” did not cease (when there was a fence preventing the fire from spreading, and the fence fell down after he died). However, if “his arrows” ceased before he died, they will be exempt from liability. As long as the heirs did not know about the fire, they would not be liable, for if they did know about it, and they could have prevented the fire from damaging, they will be liable, for it is their property that is damaging.

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Friday, August 22, 2008

Can a Tereifah Have Children?

The Gemora cites a braisa (Daf Yomi: Gittin 43a) : If an ox kills one who is a half-slave, half-free man, the (ox) owner gives half the fine (if the ox is a habitual gorer, the owner must pay thirty shekels as a penalty) to his master and half the kofer payment (the value of the victim as determined by what price he would have fetched at the slave market; this serves as an atonement for the owner of the ox) to the slave’s heirs. The Gemora points out that if the kiddushin of a half-slave, half-free man is invalid, how does he have inheritors?

Rav Adda bar Ahavah answers: The case is where he was gored and made a tereifah (deathly ill, where he was going to eventually die from his wounds). The “inheritors” referred to here actually means to the slave himself.

Rava retorted that there are two reasons to refute this answer. One is that the braisa says the money is given to his inheritors (not himself). Additionally, the payment is kofer, and Rish Lakish says that kofer is only paid after an actual death (not when someone is made deathly ill)!

The Peri Chadash asks: Why couldn’t the Gemora use the following case? He was gored and rendered a tereifah. The ox owner is required to pay the penalty after he dies. Before he died, however, the master emancipated him, he married and begot children. Afterwards, he died, and the ox owner should now be obligated to pay to his heirs!?

He proves from this that it must be that a tereifah is not capable of having children.

The Chazon Ish asks that even if we will assume that a tereifah cannot have children, there is another possibility. He was gored and injured so badly that he was dangerously close to death (yet he was not ruled to be a tereifah). The ox owner is required to pay the penalty after he dies. Before he died, however, the master emancipated him, he married and begot children. Afterwards, he died due to the injury, and the ox owner should now be obligated to pay to his heirs!?

He answers that a slave has no lineage, and therefore any children born from him while he was a slave are not regarded as his children. After he is emancipated, and now his children are considered his children, that is only for all matters that are applicable after his death. However, with respect to the obligation of the kofer payment, that is a payment that is owed to the victim’s heirs. If, at the time he was gored, he did not have any inheritors, the owner will not be obligated to pay to the heirs that came about at a later date.

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Sunday, December 16, 2007

Inheritance Based Upon the Testimony of only One Witness

The Gemora (Kesuvos 107a) cites the following case: If one witness said that the husband had died; since she is also allowed to remarry with one witness, she can be supported on the basis of this witness. However, his sons and daughters cannot split the estate based on the testimony of a single witness. They therefore do not have right to receive support from the estate.

Tosfos comments: That the Gemora in Bava Metzia (38b) states that when we hear that he has died, we can send down relatives to his estate; that is only to eat the produce, but he is not permitted to sell the property. So too, over here; we allow them to be sustained from the produce, but they are not allowed to sell the estate in order to be supported.

The Tashbatz writes that one witness is believed to allow the relatives to inherit the estate since it is something that will become public knowledge, and we are not concerned that he will lie. That which the Gemora says that we do not allow an inheritance based upon the testimony of one witness; that is only when the witness testifies that he heard about the death from another witness. Nevertheless, even this testimony will be valid to permit the wife to remarry.

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Friday, December 14, 2007

Blood Libel

The Gemora (Kesuvos 102b) relates an incident where they placed the orphan young son with his relatives. The very first evening, the relatives killed him (in order to take the inheritance; it is this very concern that causes us to say that the girl should reside with her mother and not with her relatives because she also receives a tenth of her father’s property).

The Meiri and the Hagahos Yavetz state this incident actually transpired on Erev Pesach. It is interesting that the Gemora uses a strange abbreviation for this. Rabbi Yosef Dov Karr and later I found this in the Mesifta Gemora explain that blood libels were common at the time of the Gemora and it would be a grave desecration of Hashem’s name if it would be known that Jews killed a young boy Erev Pesach as the idolaters would start persecutions of the Jews, and accuse the Jews of using the blood for the baking of matzah. The blood libels were marked by constant and unrelenting Christian persecution so it was understandable why an abbreviation was used. It is next to impossible to explain the accusations that were hurled at the Jews during this time. Jews were persecuted not only for being "Christ-killers" but as "baby-killers." The libels were not logical and occurred when a Jewish or Christian baby was killed. This is why the printers wrote this word in this manner.

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Friday, November 30, 2007

Inheritors Reciting Shehechiyonu when they Pay their Father’s Debts

It is ruled in Shulchan Aruch (223:2) that one whose father dies should recite the blessing of dayan ha’emes, the truthful Judge. If there was an inheritance, he should also recite the blessing of shehechiyonu.

The question arises: What would be the halacha if there is an inheritance, but all of the money will be used to pay off the father’s debts? Will the children still recite a shehechiyonu or not?

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 90b) states: We also see that one kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah (a dinar of the estate) can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah (which does not have that value as there is not two dinar in the estate). How is this apparent from the Mishna? Being that the Mishna does not say that the second collection can only occur “if there is an extra dinar (corresponding to this kesuvah).”

Rashi explains: The Mishna taught us that if one set of inheritors is collecting the kesuvah of their mother because her husband died before their mother, this payment is regarded as an inheritance for all of the father’s inheritors, and will therefore be considered as the surplus for the validity of the kesuvah for the male children. Since all inheritors have a mitzvah to repay their father’s debts, they are inheriting it and then paying off the other inheritors. Rashi uses the following expression: There is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein states that accordingly, the children will recite the shehechiyonu blessing even though they are left with nothing because there is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts.

However, he concludes that there actually is no proof from Rashi for this halachic ruling. Rashi is only explaining the reason why the Gemora considers it an inheritance, and that is because of the logic that there is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts. However, in respect to the shehechiyonu blessing, that is a blessing that is only recited when one is rejoicing. Although, one whose father dies and leaves him with an inheritance is not rejoicing at all; he would much rather that his father would not have died altogether (as the Mishna Berura ibid explains), nevertheless, there is a positive result from the inheritance; that is a sufficient enough of a reason to recite the blessing (although it is mixed with pain and anguish). In this case, however, there is no positive advantage to the inheritors with this inheritance at all and therefore, they would not recite the shehechiyonu blessing.

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Causing the Loss to Who?

Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav (Kesuvos 89b): According to you, who maintains that if the woman produces her get, she would collect the primary amount for her kesuvah (even without producing her kesuvah), with what evidence, may a woman, widowed from nisuin, offer in order to collect her kesuvah? The answer is obvious: She brings witnesses that her husband died! However, the question may be raised, let us be concerned that she was previously divorced, and later, she will produce the get and collect the primary amount of her kesuvah with it (since Rav is of the opinion that we do not write a receipt for the inheritors)?

Rav answers: She may collect her kesuvah only if we know that she was living with her husband until he died (and there was no divorce).

They asked: But perhaps, he divorced her right before he died?

Rav replied: If that was the case, he has caused the loss upon himself.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (319) asks: Why would the inheritors be obligated to give her the kesuvah in this case; the father is not causing the loss to himself; he is causing a loss to his heirs, who will now be responsible to pay her for the kesuvah?

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Wednesday, October 24, 2007

Transferring Inheritance Away From Yishmael

Shmuel said to Rav Yehudah (Kesuvos 53a): “Smart one! Do not be present when an inheritance is being transferred (away from the rightful heir) even when it is from a bad son to a good son, because one never knows what offspring will come forth from him (the bad son) and certainly when the transfer is from a son to a daughter (even though the transfer is valid, it should not be condoned).”

It is written in Parshas Chaye Sarah [24:10]: And the servant took ten camels of his master's camels, and he went, and all the best of his master was in his hand. Rashi comments that Avraham wrote a gift deed to Yitzchak for everything he owned, so that they would hasten to send him their daughter.

The Daas Zkeinim asks: The Gemora in Eruvin states that Avraham fulfilled the entire Torah including the Rabbinical obligations, such as eruv tavshilin. How could Avraham transgress this prohibition of transferring the inheritance away from the rightful heir; Yishmael and the sons of Keturah should have been the inheritors?

The Mizrachi answers: Avraham was permitted to do this because he was told by Hashem [Breishis, 21:12]: For in Yitzchak will be called your offspring.

The Maharal in Gur Aryeh answers: It was permitted because Sarah had told Avraham [ibid, v. 10]: For the son of this handmaid shall not inherit with my son, with Yitzchak. Sdei Chemed explains: Would Avraham heed Sarah’s words and violate a Rabbinical prohibition? Rather, the explanation is as follows: Since Hashem agreed with Sarah and He told Avraham [ibid, v. 12]: Whatever Sarah tells you, hearken to her voice, Avraham was given permission to transfer all his possessions to Yitzchak.

The Yefeh Toar answers that there is no transgression whatsoever when a father gives his possessions away during his lifetime; the prohibition is only when he transfers his property immediately prior to his death.

Maharsha (Sanhedrin 91a) answers: Yishmael and the children of Keturah were not fit to inherit Avraham. This is because Yishmael was the son of a slavewoman and Keturah was a pilegesh, and not an ordinary wife.

Rav Elyashiv challenges this explanation: Yishmael is referred to in the Torah as Avraham’s son; how can the Maharsha say that he was not an actual son?

The Oholei Yitzchak answers the original question: Our Gemora explains the rationale for this prohibition. One should not transfer an inheritance away from the rightful heir even when it is from a bad son to a good son, because one never knows what offspring will come forth from him (the bad son). Avraham knew through ruach hakodesh that no good offspring will ever come out from Yishmael, and therefore, there is no prohibition to give all his possessions to Yitzchak.

Similarly, the Chasam Sofer explains the verse in this week’s parsha. It is written [ibid, 21:11]: But the matter greatly displeased Abraham, concerning his son. Rashi explains literally: Avraham was displeased because Sarah told him to send Yishmael away. The Chasam Sofer explains: Avraham didn’t want to send him away because he was concerned on the account of this prohibition. How could he chase Yishmael away and give all his possessions to Yitzchak if Yishmael is the rightful heir, and perhaps, Yishmael will have some good offspring. Sarah saw through ruach hakodesh that there will be no good offspring coming from Yishmael, and Hashem told Avraham to listen to the words of Sarah.

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Sunday, May 27, 2007

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 24 - FOOD FOR THOUGHT

*** Will succeed in the name of his deceased brother teaches us that the brother who performs the yibum inherits the entire property of the deceased brother.

The Zohar (Mishpatim) states: The yavam becomes the father of the deceased brother. Reb Nosson Lubart in Sheiris Nosson says that this is the reason why the yavam receives the entire property of his brother and the other brothers do not get anything. One who dies and a father and brothers survive him; the father receives the entire estate and not the brothers.

*** The Gemora stated: It does not mean that the son born from the yavam and yevamah should be called the same name as the deceased brother; if the deceased brother’s name was Yosef or Yochanan, that is what you should call the son.

Reb Tzadok Hakohen explains according to the secrets of Torah why it is these two names that are mentioned here and in the Gemora Gittin (34b). It seems that the Ben Yehoyadah had a different version in the Gemora, as he asks why the Gemora mentions Yosef and Yaakov, and not Reuven and Shimon like it usually does.

*** The Gemora cites a braisa: No converts will be accepted in the days of Mashiach (it will be assumed that they have ulterior motives). Similarly, no converts were accepted in the days of Dovid, nor in the days of Shlomo.

The Maharil states: Similarly, repentance will not be accepted in the days of Mashiach (it will be assumed that one has ulterior motives). A person should hurry to repent because we are anxiously awaiting the imminent arrival of Mashiach, and if someone doesn’t repent and Mashiach will arrive, he will remain with his sins.

(Margoliyos HaShas)

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