Invalidated Contracts and Gaps in Sechach

Last Line of the Contract

Rabbi Yochanan says that a contract must review its content in the last line, and Rav Amram explained that this is because we disregard anything in the last line before the signatures.

The Rishonim explain that we fulfill this by writing vkanina – and we (the witnesses) received authorization regarding everything stated above.

The Rosh rules that if a contract does not summarize its content at the end, it does not conform to the required format of a contract, and is invalid.

The Ramban rules that it is valid, but we disregard whatever is written in the last line.

The Shulchan Aruch (HM 44:1) rules like the Ramban.

The Rishonim state that our custom is to fill in the last line with the phrase “v’hakol sharir v’kayam” - and all of this is in force and validated.

The Rashbam says that this phrase is a form of validation, and gives the line above it full legal force.

Other Rishonim disagree and state that even with our contracts, the last line has no legal validity.

Rabbeinu Tam explains the form of a get, in which we write the following last 2 lines:
v’dain etc. – this should be a contract of divorce
k’das moshe v’yisrael – as instituted by Moshe and Yisrael
Rabbeinu Tam says that the first of these lines is an integral part of the get, and not just a review of the earlier text. The last line takes the place of the validation of sharir v’kayam, and gives the preceding line legal validity.

The Rosh says that nowadays we require a contract to end with sharir v’kayam, and any contract without it is invalid. We therefore give all the preceding lines full legal validity.

The Shulchan Aruch (HM 44:9) rules like the Rosh.

See Shach (10-12, 21) for a deeper discussion of the rationale and ruling regarding sharir v’kayam.

The Gemora explains that a contract with two blank lines is invalid, since we are concerned that one will put false information in one of the blank lines.

The Ramban explains that on a contract with more than one blank line, we are concerned that there may have been more than two blank lines, and the last lines are false.

The Ri Migash says that even if we see nothing that would indicate that (no content at the end to the advantage of the creditor), the contract is invalid, since he could have forged part of the contract.

The Rema says that this is a fine on the holder of the contract, since he made forgery accessible.

1 ½ lines

The Gemora discusses whether a contract with 1 ½ blank lines before the signatures is valid or not, and resolves that it is not.

Tosfos (162b iba’ya) debates what was the case that the Gemora was discussing. Tosfos says that if the contract finished in the middle of a line, and the remainder of that line, in addition to the next line, was left blank, such a contract is clearly invalid, since the holder of the contract can fill in the space after the text of the contract. The other option is a case where the contract ended at the end of a line, a blank line was left, and the witnesses started signing half way through the next line. Tosfos says that such a case should clearly be valid, since the only line that can be filled in is the one before the signatures, and we disregard that line. Tosfos concludes that the Gemora’s question was a width of 1 ½ lines, similar to the measure of one and two lines, discussed in the braisa.

Filling in with Relatives

The Gemora cites Chizkiyah’s statement that if one filled in blank space in a contract with witnesses that are relatives to the parties, the contract is still valid.

The Rishonim debate in what context Chizkiyah made his statement. Rabbeinu Chananel says that Chizkiyah is referring to a get kereyach – a bald contract, i.e., a closed contract (mekushar), which is missing witnesses. Such a contract must be signed by three witnesses on each of its enclosures. Chizkiyah is saying that if one used relatives for the extra signatures necessary, the contract is valid.

The Mishna in Gittin (81b) records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Nanas about this case and Chizkiyah is ruling like Rabbi Akiva, who only allows relatives to fill in the necessary signatures.

The Rashbam challenges this position, since Chizkiyah, an Amora, would not need to rule or discuss a case that was already discussed in a Mishna, nor would he need support from a braisa, since he is supported by Rabbi Akiva in a Mishna.

Rather, the Rashbam says that Chizkiyah is discussing the case of our Gemora, i.e., a contract that had too much blank space before the signatures, and is stating that if one filled in this space with related witnesses, the contract remains valid.

The Mishna in Makkos (5b) states that if a group of witnesses testify, and one is found to be invalid, the whole testimony is invalidated.

Tosfos (162b nimtza) cites different opinions regarding how to reconcile this Mishna with Chizkiyah’s statement, validating a contract in which relatives signed to fill in blank space.

The Rambam (Edus 5:6) rules that a contract with two valid witnesses is assumed valid, even if the remaining witnesses are not valid. If the witnesses are available, or if others were there, we investigate whether they signed together. If they signed together, the contract is invalid, but it is otherwise valid.

Rav Chaim Brisker explains that the Rambam considers witnesses on a contract to have two parts to their testimony – the witnessing, which takes place at signing, and the testimony, which occurs when the contract is brought to court. When a contract is brought to court, the Gemora says that witnesses signed in a contract are considered to be fully examined and accepted, and they therefore exist independently, and the invalid witnesses do not affect the valid ones’ testimony. However, if they signed together, they have joined together in their witnessing, and therefore fall under the ruling in Makkos, invalidating the contract they signed.

Invalid Schach and Gaps

Chizkiyah cites the rules for gaps in s’chach, and invalid s’chach, as a precedent for his ruling that invalid witnesses can be better than blank space in a contract.

Tosfos explains that the measures given for invalid s’chach (4 tefachim) and gaps (3 tefachim) are only in a case where these areas go from one end of the sukkah to the other, and thereby make the valid s’chach not be surrounded by three walls, or when there isn’t the minimum area of valid s’chach (7 x 7 tefachim). However, if the valid s’chach surrounds these areas, or if these areas are in a location where the valid s’chach has 3 walls around it, and there is at least 7 x7 tefachim of valid s’chach, they do not invalidate the sukkah, but only their location itself.

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Chazakah on a Sukkah

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora says that generally, if a person builds a hut which infringes on his friend’s property, there is a grace period of thirty days in which the owner graciously permits the hut owner to use the area and doesn’t have to protest. But, after that grace period has passed, if the owner doesn’t protest, the hut owner will have an established right to be able to claim that he purchased the rights of use. But, if the hut is built for a sukkah on Sukkos, then immediately after the seven days of s Sukkos passes, the lack of the owners protest enables the builder to claim that he purchased the right to leave it there permanently. [This is according to Rashi, but the Hagahos Ashri cites other opinions that it is seven days in addition to the thirty days.]

Tosfos points out that in truth, the builder doesn’t have a chazakah after seven days; he only has a chazakah after eight days since on the eighth day, which is Shemini Atzeres, it wasn’t possible to remove the sukkah.

The Ya’avetz asks: What compelled Tosfos to say that he will not have a chazakah until the eighth day is over. Perhaps we assume that the owner would have allowed him to use the space for the mitzvah, but as soon as the mitzvah ends, the owner is expected to protest. The fact that the owner fails to protest would not enable the builder to claim that he has acquired permanent rights to this area!?

It would seem that Tosfos holds that although the owner can protest the sukkah immediately after the seven days pass, even before the eighth day ends, he is not expected to do so. Why? It is because he is well aware that his protest is futile. The owner can claim that for the duration of Sukkos, he allowed the hut owner to fulfill his mitzvah. On the eighth day he also did not protest because he knew that his protest would be in vain, since the hut owner could not remove the sukkah until after Sukkos. Therefore, Tosfos holds that the owner has the right to protest through eight days.

From this we can learn that even after one has been machzik for enough time to create a chazakah, it is only effective if by the owner protesting he could have forced the hut owner to leave. But in a situation, where the owner could not have forced the hut owner to leave, such as when the chazakah concludes on a Shabbos or Yom Tov, the owner is not expected to protest and is given an extra day to voice his protest.

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Father (outside) and Mother (inside)

The braisa (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 18) states: A person can accept kiddushin for his daughter again (if she became widowed or divorced after betrothal), he can sell her again, and he can marry her off after selling her as a maidservant. However, he cannot sell her after marrying her off. Rabbi Shimon says: Just as he cannot do this, he cannot sell her as a maidservant after he already sold her once.

This is like the argument of the following Tannaim. The braisa says: “When he betrayed her.” Once he spread his cloak over her (in marriage), he cannot sell her; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says, “When he betrayed her,” teaches that once he betrayed her (sold her as a maidservant) he cannot sell her.

What is their argument? Rabbi Eliezer says: The way the word is written in the Torah is important. Rabbi Akiva says: The way it is read is important. Rabbi Shimon says: Both are important. [“Important” here refers to how we understand the intent of the Torah. If we focus on the word as it is read, it refers to clothing, while if we focus on the letters, it refers to being sold.]

This is similar to a debate in the Gemora in Sukkah which discusses if a sukkah requires two full walls and a third wall that is at least a tefach, or should there be three complete walls. This debate is based on whether one reads the word Sukkos in the Torah with the letter vav or without the letter vav. The Chachamim maintain that we say yeish eim lemasores, the transmitted written form has primacy, whereas Rabbi Shimon maintains that yeish eim lemikra, the pronounced form has primacy.

The Rif was questioned as to why the Gemora uses the word eim, which means mother, and not av, which means father. A similar question would be that the Gemora refers to one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics as a binyan av and not a binyan eim.

The Rif initially responded that he never heard anyone shed light on this matter, but then he proceeded to offer a possible explanation. When the purpose of a principle is to teach a concept in a different area, the Gemora uses the term av, whereas if the discussion at hand is regarding relying on a principle, the Gemora uses the word eim.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha explains the words of the Rif. The mother is the akeres habayis, the mainstay of the house as it is said every honorable princess dwelling within. For this reason we say yeish eim lemikra or yeish eim lemasores, as the mother is the central figure in the house and it is the mother who everyone is dependant upon. The father, on the other hand, is not usually found in the house, as he leaves the house to seek a livelihood. The principle of a binyan av, however, is that we are building from one location to another, and this is analogous to a father who influences others. (See Rabbeinu Bachye to Devarim 33:8 for further discussion on the differences between the father and mother.)

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Incidental Benefit

Abaye explains the Gemora (Nedarim 16b) as follows: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

Rava asks on Abaye’s language: Were mitzvos given to derive benefit from them? (He should still be able to sit in the sukkah?)

Rather, Rava explains: In the case of a vow, one says, “The sitting in the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah.”

The Reshash asks on Rava’s question: Although the mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving benefit from them, it still should be forbidden to sit in the sukkah in this situation? This is because he is enjoying the incidental pleasure of the shade!

He answers that if it is shade that the person desires, he could stay inside the house. The reason he chose to sit in a sukkah is solely because of the mitzvah. It is therefore not regarded as if he is befitting from the shade of the sukkah.

The Machaneh Efraim is not satisfied with this answer. He asks that the bottom line is that he is not dwelling in his house; he is inside the sukkah and enjoying its shade! Why should this be permitted?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers: We are only concerned with the physical pleasure when the benefit is purely incidental and not related to the mitzvah. However, the mitzvah of sukkah is different. The Torah commands us to dwell in the sukkah in the same manner that one would live in his house. The enjoyment of sitting in a sukkah is not regarded as an incidental benefit; this is the fulfillment of the mitzvah. And since mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving pleasure from them, the (direct) benefit that one receives as he is fulfilling the mitzvah is not regarded as a benefit, and is therefore permitted.

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Ran Elucidated - Daf 16

Distinction between a vow and an oath - The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for this: How do we know that one cannot swear to transgress a mitzvah? It is because it is written [Bamidbar 30:3]: If a man makes a vow to Hashem or makes an oath to prohibit himself, he shall not desecrate his word; according to whatever came out of his mouth, he shall do. We see from here that only “his word” (a discretionary matter) he should not desecrate. However, he may desecrate it when it involves the wishes of Heaven (where his oath contradicts a mitzvah).

The Gemora asks: Why is a vow any different? If it is because it says makes a vow to Hashem, which implies that he should not desecrate his word even when his vow involves the wishes of Heaven, why, by an oath, it is also written makes an oath to Hashem (since the words “to Hashem” is written between a vow and an oath)?

Abaye answers: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

The Ran explains: It is reasonable that the word “to Hashem” should be referring to a vow, but not an oath. It is logical to assume that a neder in this manner will take effect. This is because he is not vowing directly against the Torah’s commandment. The neder takes effect and he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the sukkah because we cannot force a person to eat something that is forbidden to him. However, by an oath, he is saying that he will not sit in the sukkah. This is a direct contradiction to the Torah’s commandment and he doesn’t have the power to free himself from the Torah’s commandment to sit in a sukkah.

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Beat him Until he Dies

The Gemora (Kesuvos 86a) cites a braisa: When does one receive forty lashes for violating a Biblical law? That is only in regard to a negative commandment; however, with respect to a positive commandment, for example – if we tell someone, “Make a sukkah” and he refuses, or we tell him, “Make a lulav,” and he refuses, we beat him until his soul departs.

The question is asked: Why is there permission to kill one who is not interested in fulfilling a positive commandment; the punishment for not fulfilling a positive commandment is not death?

Reb Tuvia Lisitzin, in his sefer Kerem Tuvia answers that permission is granted to beat him until his death because by not fulfilling a positive commandment (and especially, when people are attempting to persuade him, and he, nevertheless, refuses), this is tantamount to desecrating the name of Hashem.

This can also explain why Pinchas was allowed to kill the Midyanis woman. He was able to kill Zimri because the halacha is that one who cohabits with an idolater, the zealots are permitted to kill him. However, why was he allowed to kill the Midyanis woman; she does not have any prohibition of cohabiting with a Jew? The answer is: It was due to her that a tremendous desecration of Hashem’s name occurred; for this, she was deserving to die.

The Chasam Sofer writes that we are not permitted to strike him with a blow that will kill him; permission is granted to hit him time after time until he eventually agrees to fulfill the mitzvah. When do we stop beating him? When he dies from the beatings.

The Chinuch writes that one who does not repay a debt has violated a negative commandment in the Torah. The Minchas Chinuch asks: If so, why does our Gemora inquire if a person who refuses to repay a debt should be compelled to do so; of course, we should force him, just like any other negative commandment?

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Thirty Days Before

The Gemora (Kesuvos 86a) cites a braisa: When does one receive forty lashes for violating a Biblical law? That is only in regard to a negative commandment; however, with respect to a positive commandment, for example – if we tell someone, “Make a sukkah” and he refuses, or we tell him, “Make a lulav,” and he refuses, we beat him until his soul departs.

The question is asked: At what time are we referring to? If this is occurring before Sukkos, why do we beat him; he could say that he has plenty of time to prepare for the mitzvah? If it is already Sukkos, what benefit will there be from the beating; he cannot construct a sukkah now anyway?

Rav Nosson Gishtetner explains that the Gemora is referring to thirty days before Sukkos. From that time and on, there is an obligation for one to build a sukkah; and if he refuses, we can beat him until his soul departs.

The Chidushei HaRim writes that this is true regarding all mitzvos. Thirty days prior to the time a mitzvah is supposed to be performed, one has an obligation to begin involving himself with the mitzvah; it is incumbent upon him to properly prepare himself from that time on in order to fulfill the mitzvah. To such an extent that one is obligated to worry about the poor people in his city thirty days prior to Pesach and to investigate and see if they have sufficient enough funds for all the mitzvos on Pesach.

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The Apple doesn't Fall Far Away

The Mishna (Kesuvos 57a) had stated regarding the amount of terumah a husband may provide his wife: Rabbi Tarfon says: They give her everything (all her food) of terumah. Rabbi Akiva says: Half of her food must be chulin (for the days in which she is tamei and therefore prohibited from eating terumah) and the other half may be terumah.

Abaye said (58a): This argument only applies to a daughter of a Kohen who is betrothed to a Kohen; however, regarding a daughter of a Yisroel who is betrothed to a Kohen, everyone agrees that half of her food must be chulin and the other half may be terumah (the chulin is needed for the days that she is tamei; a daughter of a Kohen is familiar with the halachos of terumah (from her father’s house), and she knows that the terumah must be sold when she is tamei and exchanged for other food).

Rabbi Braun, in his sefer She’orim Mitzuyanim B’halacha notes that this is the custom of the world; that which the daughter observes in her parent’s house is the manner in which she acts after she is married.

This can be seen from the Gemora above (23a) records an incident where the daughters of Shmuel were taken captive. They were taken to Eretz Yisroel from Bavel and leaving their captors outside, they entered the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Chanina and proclaimed, “We were captured but we are pure.” Rabbi Chanina permitted them to marry Kohanim (based on the principle of happeh she’assar; for the very mouth that would have rendered them forbidden to Kohanim is the mouth that has permitted them). Immediately afterwards, their captors entered the Beis Medrash. Rabbi Chanina said: It is evident that these women are the children of a halachic master (for they had known to speak to the Beis Din before their captors entered; our knowledge of them being taken captive came through their mouth and not from their captors).

Unfortunately, this can be the case in a negative manner as well. The Gemora in Sukkah states that if a child talks in a crude manner in the market, it is obvious that he heard this type of language from his parents in the house.

It is incumbent upon all parents to be constantly aware of their own behavior and manner of speech, especially, when their children are present.

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Postponing Yom Kippur

The Gemora asks: Yom Kippur that falls out on a Monday should be postponed until Tuesday because of the concern that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the feast that will be held on the day prior to Yom Kippur?

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: It would emerge that Rosh Hashanah would be on A Sunday, and we have a principle that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on Sunday, Wednesday or Friday?

He answers: The reason that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on a Tuesday is because then, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos; that is also a preventive measure. The decree based on the concern of slaughtering a young bird takes precedence over the decree of taking the aravos on Shabbos. The reason is: Here, there are no other options; by Hoshanah Rabbah, there is an option, namely, not to take the aravos on Shabbos, just like the shofar is not blown and the lulav is not taken on Shabbos.

The Chasam Sofer answers: While it’s true that if Yom Kippur is postponed until Tuesday, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos, it is nevertheless preferable to uphold the decree of not slaughtering a young bird on Shabbos and sounding the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, even though we will forfeit the mitzvah of taking the aravos on Hoshanah Rabbah. Two is better than one.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 14/15 - Yevamos 64 - Help Please

The Gemora states that the prayers of the righteous are likened to a pitchfork, as just like a pitchfork turns over the grain on the threshing floor from one place to another, so too the prayers of the righteous transform the manner in which HaShem conducts Himself from the Attribute of Cruel Judgment to the Attribute of Mercy.

I once heard or saw a very good vort on this comparison, but I have not been able to locate it. Anyone care to help me please? Thanks

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 17 - Shmini Atzeres - Independent Festival or Not?

The Beis Yosef (Y"D 120:20) cites a Yerushalmi in Nedarim: Rabbi Yochanan says: One who makes an oath against drinking wine on the "Chag," is prohobited from drinking wine on Sukkos, including Shmini Atzeres. The Beis Yosef writes that even though Shmini Atzeres is a festival by itself; that is only in respect to the six laws delineated in the Gemora, however in regard to the manner in which people speak, it is included in the festival of Sukkos, and the laws of vows are based on the way people speak.

The Meiri comments: Shmini Atzeres is only included in his vow if he just said "Chag," however if he explicitly said "Chag Hasukkos," Shmini Atzeres will not be included in his vow.

Proof is brought from here to one who mistakenly said "Chag Hasukkos" in Shemoneh Esrei instead of "Shmini Atzeres"; he has not fulfilled his obligation and must recite Shemoneh Esrei again.

The Turei Even (Megillah 5a) disagrees and he states that one who mistakenly said "Chag Hasukkos" in Shemoneh Esrei instead of "Shmini Atzeres" would not be required to repeat Shemoneh Esrei. His proof is from our Gemora which states that Shmini Atzeres is considered part of the compensation period for the korbanos of the first day of Sukkos. Furthermore, one who vows to bring a korban has three festivals to bring it before he will have transgressed the prohibition against delaying. If the third festival is Sukkos, he will not violate this prohibition until after Shmini Atzeres.

The Nishmas Adam rules that even though Shmini Atzeres is an independent festival, it is nevertheless related to Sukkos by the fact that one still eats in the sukkah and therefore one who mistakenly said "Chag Hasukkos" in Shemoneh Esrei instead of "Shmini Atzeres" would not be required to repeat Shemoneh Esrei.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 11 - Mitzva of Constructing a Maakeh

The Mishna states: One is permitted to build a fence (maakeh) for a roof or a porch, provided that it is done in an amateur fashion.

The Ritva states that our Mishna is not referring to the mitzva of maakeh since a porch is exempt from the obligation of constructing a maakeh. Furthermore, if there would be a mitzva, he should be permitted to build a maakeh using a professional.

The Gemora in Sukkah (3a) states that if one has a house that is less than four amos squared, he is exempt from building a fence around the roof, for this is not considered a house. The commentators ask that it is still a stumbling block and if one doesn't build a fence there, it will endanger people's lives? The Gemora in Bava Kamma (15b) learns from the passuk of lo sasim damim beveisecha that one should not raise a wild dog in his house or a rickety ladder. Shouldn't he be required to build a fence here because of the possibility of someone falling?

The Chazon Ish (Y”D 214) answers that in truth a roof is not a dangerous area and it is not considered a stumbling block. People who ascend a roof understand beforehand that they must be careful and this is a worldly custom. The Torah, nevertheless mandated that one who builds a house is required to build a fence on the roof and this halacha has its guidelines. A house that is less than four amos squared is not regarded as a house for this halacha.

The Emek Brocha adds that this explains why one is not allowed to build a professional maakeh on Chol Hamoed even though he would be permitted to build and fix other things for the fear of bandits. The lack of a maakeh is not an inherent danger and therefore is not considered a dovor heovud, an irretrievable loss and will not be allowed to build on Chol Hamoed. (This is not like the Ritva we mentioned above.)

Reb Akiva Eiger asks on the obligation to recite a blessing when building a maakeh. Tosfos in Chulin (105a) rules that one does not recite a blessing on mayim acaharonim (water after the meal) for it was instituted for the benefit of man that he shouldn't harm himself due to the melach sdomis (certain type of poisonous salt). It would stand to reason that constructing a maakeh should not have a blessing either, for it is only to prevent damage? Rabbi Dovid Goldberg answers according to the Chazon Ish: A maakeh is not built to prevent damage. In truth, it would not be necessary; the Torah taught us that it is required even if it is merely a distant possibility for a damage occurring, hence a blessing is recited.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 30 - Red and Green Decorations

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 10 - "Holiday" Decorations (A review again)

The Gemara discusses hanging ornaments to beautify the Sukkah. The Shelah writes that hanging ornaments in the Sukkah reflects our endearment for the mitzvah of Sukkah. Thus, the more one enhances the beauty of the Sukkah with ornaments, the more praiseworthy he is. Amongst the various items that the Gemara lists for the purpose of decorating the Sukkah are fruits and foods such as grapes, wine, oil and flour. It is noteworthy that these same items are listed in the Gemara Avodah Zara 51 as items that are used for idol worship. Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha (ad loc) rules that one does not have to be concerned with using items for Sukkah decorations even if these same items are used by the gentiles for their winter holidays season. The Chasam Sofer (Orach Chaim 42) rules in a similar vein that one can use for lighting in the synagogue candles that were designated for idolatry but were not actually used in the pagan service. Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halacha to our Gemara explains why one who uses items that are designated for idolatry is not in violation of the prohibition not to walk in the ways of the gentiles who worship idols. The reason for this is because the Gemara (Sanhedrin 52) states that one can perform any action that is recorded in the Torah, even if such an action subsequently was performed for idolatry. A Jew is not performing the act on account of the idolaters. Rather, he is performing the act because this is what he has been instructed to do by the Torah. The same idea can be said regarding the Sukkah decorations mentioned in the Gemara. One would be allowed to hang Sukkah decorations that are used by the gentiles for their holiday season, as a Jew would be hanging the decorations because the decorations are mentioned in the Gemara and not on account of the gentile’s custom.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 56 - Women should Recite Kiddush and then Hagafen

Beis Hillel maintains that first one recites the brocha on the wine and then he recites kiddush. This is because the wine is the cause for the kiddush. The Tzlach in Brochos (51b) explains that this is because one has already discharged his obligation of kiddush when he davened maariv. The Chachamim stated that kiddush must be recited with a cup of wine and therefore now the wine is the cause for the kidush.

The Gemora states another reason to explain the opinion of Beis Hillel and that is because of the principle that the blessing which is recited more frequently takes precedence and the brocha on wine is more frequent than the one recited for kiddush. The Tzlach explains this reason in a similar way. He states that the logic of the wine taking precedence because of its frequency is only referring to a case where he previously fulfilled his obligation of kiddush during maariv; however in an instance where one would be reciting kiddush prior to davening maariv, kiddush would take precedence over the blessing on the wine. This is based on a Gemora Zevachim (90b) which concludes (according to the Tzlach) that when presented with two mitzvos and one has more kedusha than the other, but the other is more frequent - the one with the higher level of sanctity takes precedence. If one is still obligated Biblically to recite kiddush, then the kiddush is regarded as being more kodosh and it would take precedence over the brocha on the wine, even though the wine is more frequent.

The Tzlach concludes l'halacha that women who do not daven maariv and thereby are obligated Biblically to recite kiddush, they should make kiddush first and then recite the blessing on the wine.

The Acharonim disagree with the Tzlach arguing that the Gemora in Zevachim is not conclusive and it is quite possible that a mitzva which is more frequent takes precedence over a mitzva with more kedusha.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 55 - Shir shel Yom by Mincha

It is evident from the Gemora Rosh Hashana (30b) that the Leviim would sing a shira by the korban tamid in the afternoon as well. The Maharam Alshich is bothered as to why we do not recite a shir shel yom nowadays by mincha? He answers that since it is ruled that if the Leviim did not sing the shirah in the afternoon, the korban will become passul, they could not institute that we who do not have the korban should recite the shir (in the morning, it is not meakev).

The Magen Avrohom (132:14) offers two answers. Firstly, he cites Tosfos who rules that if the libations of the afternoon were not brought until the evening, they could be offered the entire night, however the shirah cannot be sung then since they didn't sing at night. Since there would be times in the Beis Hamikdosh that they did not sing the shirah in the afternoon (when the nesachim were delayed until the evening), the Chachamim didn't institute that we should recite it by mincha.

Secondly, he answers, that the halacha was that after the korban tamid was offered on the mizbeach, they didn't sing the shirah. Shirah was only sung before the tamid was completed. The Chachamim could not institute that we should recite the shir shel yom after mincha since mincha is corresponding to the korban tamid and after the tamid, they could not sing shirah anymore.

The Chasam Sofer in Beitza (4b) answers that there are two reasons as to why we say the parsha of korbanos and the avodos that were performed in the Beis Hamikdosh nowadays. Firstly, we recite these parshiyos based on the verse which says that our lips are regarded as the offering of the korbanos. There is another reason as well. The reciting of these tefilos is indicating our desire and anxiousness for the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdosh in our time. In the morning, we do not have the second explanation in mind. The halacha is that the mizbeach is only inaugurated with the offering of the aftrenoon tamid. Even if the Beis Hamikdosh would be built today, we would not be able to offer the morning tamid. Our primary kavanah in the morning is that our tefilos should be accepted as if we were offering the korbanos. In the afternoon, the primary kavanah we should have is to signify our desire to see the Beis Hamikdosh built speedily and if the Beis Hamikdosh would be built at that moment (which is what we should be thinking), there would not be a shirah sung, since the Beis Yosef (51) rules that shirah will not be sung in the times of the third Beis Hamikdosh (except mizmor l'sodah). It is for this reason that we do not recite the shir shel yom by mincha for it will prevent us from having our correct kavanos.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 51 - Bimah in the Center

The Gemora states that in this magnificent Beis hakneses in Alexandria, the bimmah was located in the middle of the Beis Hakneses and the gabbai would stand there and wave a flag when it was time for the congregation to respond with saying amen. (There is a big halachic discussion regarding answering amen when the blessing was not heard and also answering amen some time after the chazan finished reciting the brocha. We might have time to post on these issues. If anyone has any information for us on this topic (or any topic for that matter), we would greatly appreciate it if you sent it to us. Thank you.)

The Rambam in Hilchos Tefillah (11:3)rules that the bimah should be in the center of the shul in order for the congregation to be able to hear the chazan and the Rav (what a concept!).

The Kesef Mishna writes that perhaps we can judge favorably those Shuls that have the bimah in the back by saying that nowadays that the Shuls are small in comparison with those from previous generations, it is not necessary to have the bimah in the center.

The Chasam Sofer proves from our Gemora not like this. In Alexandria, the bimah was in the middle of the Beis Hakneses even though the chazan was not heard anyways.

Perhaps we can answer this question by saying that the bimah should be in the center to give the opportunity for the most possible people to hear. In Alexandria, it was so large that not everyone was able to hear, but that was their intention.

The Chasam Sofer states that the reason for the bimah in the center is because the bimah is regarded as the mizbeach since we read the parshiyos of the korbanos there. This is why we circle the bimah with the lulav and esrog. The inside mizbeach was located between the menorah and the shulchan. Therefore the Chasam Sofer rules that any size Shul must always have the bimah in the center.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 45 - How does Bamboo Grow?

The Gemora states in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai that all mitzvos must be perfomed by holding the object in the manner in which it grows.

The Tur writes that there are some that rule that the walls of the sukkah when they are constructed with wood must be positioned in the way which they grew. The Tur disagrees and maintains that one does not have to be strict regarding this since the walls can be made from things that do not grow from the ground such as metal and there obviously this halacha would not apply, so too when they are made out of wood this halacha doesn't apply.

According to this, s'chach which must be from items that grow from the ground would have this requirement to be positioned in the manner in which they grew. The Bach writes that since the essense of s'chach is to cover the width of the sukkah, it is self evident that the Torah did not prescribe that this mitzva must be done in the manner in which it grew.

Meshech Chochmah writes that this requirement only applies by a mitzva that stands by itself, such as a lulav or the wood for the Mishkan; however the walls and s'chach of the sukkah that are dependent on each other does not have this halacha.

Rav Elyashiv states that this halacha only applies by a mitzva where the Torah mandates that the item should be in the same form as it grew; however by s'chach and the walls of a sukklah, one could theoretically grind up the wood or branches and use the pieces for his sukkah. Obviously there is no requirement that it should be positioned in the same manner in which it grew.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 42 - Wrong Place Esrog

Rabbi Yosi rules that if one forgets and carries the lulav to a public domain on Shabbos, he is not liable since he was preoccupied with a mitzva. Abaye qualifies this to be referring to a case where he had not fulfilled the mitzva yet. The Gemora asks that he seemingly would automatically fulfill the mitzva when he picks up the lulav. Abaye answers that he turned it around and therefore did not discharge his obligation.

Rashi explains that he turned the esrog over with the pittum down. Rabbeinu Chananel learns that he took the lulav in his left hand and the esrog in his right hand.

The Ritva asks that even if he placed the lulav in the wrong hand, he nonetheless fulfills the mitzva? Chasam Sofer answers that by switching hands he is indicating that he does not intend to fulfill the mitzva now.

This can be the source for the two options brought down in halacha regarding the reciting of the brocha on the lulav. In Shulchan Aruch, it states that one should hold the esrog upside down during the brocha in order that the brocha will be prior to the performance of the mitzva. The Gra rules that one should have intention that he does not want to fulfill the mitzva at this moment and this will be sufficient even if the esrog is being held correctly.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Un...tzum...drite...mol!! Sold!!!

The Gemora relates a story that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav which he had purchased for over a thousand zuz. It is evident from this Gemora how precious mitzvos were to them that Rabban Gamliel spent a thousand zuz on his lulav.

The Aruch Lener asks on the language of the Gemora. Why does it say "How precious mitzvos were to them" when in fact, Rabban Gamliel was the only one who purchased the lulav for that enormous sum?

He answers that from the fact that Rabban Gamliel paid a thousand zuz for the lulav, it is evident that there were other potential buyers that were interested and a bidding war erupted, especially since it is well documented that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva were rich people.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 41 - Preferential Treatment

The Gemora relates a story that Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaryah and Rabbi Akiva were journeying on a boat and only Rabban Gamliel had a lulav which he had purchased for over a thousand zuz. Rabban Gamliel initially fulfilled his mitzva with the lulav and then gave it to the other Tanaim to enable them to discharge their obligation. The Gemora states that from the extra wording in the story we can derive that a present given with the stipulation to be returned is considered a present and they can fulfill the mitzva even on the first day when the lulav must be yours. It is also evident from this Gemora how dear mitzvos were to them that Rabban Gamliel spent a thousand zuz on his lulav.

The Chasam Sofer asks on the order of the Tanaim. Why did Rabbi Yehoshua who was a Levi receive the lulav before Rabbi Eliezer who was a kohen? He answers that it must be because Rabbi Yehoshua was exceptional in Torah learning and an elder, therefore they honored him first. If so, continues the Chasam Sofer, why wasn't Rabbi Akiva the first? He answers that the merit of being a Talmid Chocham can propel him one level and that is why Rabbi Yehoshua who was a levi and an exceptional Talmid chocham can have preferential treatment over Rabbi Eliezer who was a kohen; however Rabbi Akiva, who was a yisroel cannot skip over two levels and therefore Rabbi Eliezer was before him.

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