Showing posts with label chavos yair. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chavos yair. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 09, 2009

Assets Discovered Posthumously

By: Meoros HaDaf Hayomi

Orphans are assumed to know nothing about their parents’ business and the Torah therefore empowers dayanim to represent them in case of claims, argue for them and demand claimants to take an oath or produce solid proof. Almost every Rishon expressed an opinion as to the claims a beis din may present on an orphan’s behalf. Ramban and other Rishonim hold that they may assert any claim (see Responsa Maharit, 112; Shach in C.M. §69 S.K. 26, and §297) but Tosfos on our sugya (70a, s.v. Veleima) and other Rishonim believe a beis din is limited to only reasonable claims. If, for example, someone produces a document proving he deposited funds with the deceased, the beis din may not claim they were subject to force majeure (oness), exempting the orphans, as oness such as an armed robbery is uncommon and would usually have become known. (Shulchan ‘Aruch cites both opinions in C.M. 108:4; see Shach, ibid, S.K. 8, who rules according to Ramban). Still, all agree that a beis din must not counter with utterly unreasonable claims that, if submitted by the father, would be rejected. Halachic authorities were consequently required to decide which claims should be considered realistic and acceptable.

Taxation in German Communities

Poskim subsequently discussed the autonomous taxation methods practiced in German Jewish communities. Each member of the community had to submit a periodic declaration of assets to enable proportional collection of internal revenue tax to cover expenses such as maintenance of public services (synagogues, medical care, mikvaos, etc.); wages of rabbis, shochatim, lobbyists and the like; and incidental costs. Declarations had to detail promissory notes, deposits, cash, silver, gold, wine and grain, all to be assessed for taxation (Minhagei Vormaiza, II, p. 134). A relevant incident occurred in Nikolsburg, Moravia, now in the Czech Republic but then ruled by Germans.

Fisk’s Tax Declaration

About 350 years ago Yaakov Fisk was one of the richest men in Nikolsburg and, like his companions, periodically declared his assets and paid his taxes. After his demise, his heirs found the inheritance to be worth 300% more than his last assessment and the gabaim of the community demanded arrears. Some dayanim, though, countered on the heirs’ behalf that Fisk could have become richer just before his death, after the last taxation, and they could hence not be forced to pay arrears for previous years (Responsa Tzemach Tzedek HaKadmon, 24).

We don’t all have the Luck of Yosef Mokir Shabos

A similar case is judged in Responsa Chavos Yair (57-58) and ruled that claims of sudden enrichment are unrealistic as most people become wealthy gradually, over a long period: “Should we assume he opened a fish and found a precious stone like Yosef Mokir Shabos or got rich by a stroke of luck?” A beis din, then, cannot make such claims and the heirs must pay the demanded arrears.

Read more!

Rav did not Reveal the “Sod”

A person sold a field to his friend, and drew one border long and one border (on the opposite side)short. Rav says: In such a case, the buyer only acquires the amount of field that is opposite the short side.

Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav: Why shouldn’t the border should be from the small side to the long side (a diagonal line)?

Rav was quiet, and did not answer.

The Chavos Yair (responsa: 152) quotes the Rema who writes that it is well known that Rav is in fact Rav Abba, the chosen disciple of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai. And everytime that the Gemora says, “Rav was quiet,” it does not mean that he was silent because he did not know; rather, he knew how to answer according to “sod” – the hidden secrets of the Torah, and he did not want to reveal them.

The Chavos Yair explains the Gemora in Bava Kamma (11a), which relates that since Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav, “Is this truly the halachah?” and he kept quiet, we can conclude that the law of assessment does indeed apply. Although it couls have been said that Rav remained silent for he did not want to reveal the hidden secrets of the Torah, nevertheless, we do not rule in halachic matters based on “sod,” rather, it is solely dependent on the “revealed” portion of the Torah.

Read more!

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

Rav did not want to Reveal the "Sod"

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

A person sold a field to his friend, and drew one border long and one border (on the opposite side) short. Rav says: In such a case, the buyer only acquires the amount of field that is opposite the short side.

Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav: Why shouldn’t the border should be from the small side to the long side (a diagonal line)?

Rav was quiet, and did not answer.

The Chavos Yair (responsa: 152) quotes the Rema who writes that it is well known that Rav is in fact Rav Abba, the chosen disciple of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai. And everytime that the Gemora says, “Rav was quiet,” it does not mean that he was silent because he did not know; rather, he knew how to answer according to “sod” – the hidden secrets of the Torah, and he did not want to reveal them.

The Chavos Yair explains the Gemora in Bava Kamma (11a), which relates that since Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav, “Is this truly the halachah?” and he kept quiet, we can conclude that the law of assessment does indeed apply. Although it couls have been said that Rav remained silent for he did not want to reveal the hidden secrets of the Torah, nevertheless, we do not rule in halachic matters based on “sod,” rather, it is solely dependent on the “revealed” portion of the Torah.

Read more!

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

Childhood Mistakes Remain Throughout Life

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

Rava stated: Teachers of children, gardeners, butchers, circumcisers, and the town scribe are all regarded as being warned from beforehand (that they will be dismissed if they cause a loss). The general principle is this: If the loss is irrecoverable, the workers are regarded as being warned from beforehand.

Rashi explains that a child, who was taught incorrectly, will always remain with that mistake.

Tosfos asks: Rava himself (in Bava Basra 21a) states that a mistake learned in one’s childhood will most likely be corrected when he becomes an adult! Why then should this be regarded as irreversible?

The Rishonim answer this question by saying that the Gemora in Bava Basra is referring to a teacher who is precise in his studies; however, he is lax and doesn't see to it that the children properly understand the material. Such mistakes can be corrected at a later date. Here, Rava was referring to a teacher who didn’t understand the material in the first place. Such mistakes will not be easily corrected.

Tosfos explains our Gemora to mean that the child will never be able to recover the time spent learning incorrectly.

The Ran answers that Rava is discussing a teacher who excessively hits his students.

The Chavos Yair does not understand why that would be considered irreversible. [Perhaps the excessive force will make an indelible impression upon the student, and he will have no desire to study when he becomes an adult.]

Read more!

Sunday, August 09, 2009

The Designation of Money and the Timeliness of a Mitzvah

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

The Gemora cited a braisa: The Purim collections must be used for Purim only, and we are not required to be so precise in the matter (how much is needed for Purim, and how much the poor of the city needs). The poor may not even buy straps for their shoes, unless it was stipulated in the presence of the townspeople that such shall be granted; these are the words of Rabbi Yaakov, who said it in the name of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient in the matter (and allows the poor person to use the charity funds for other uses besides the Purim feast).

The Chavos Yair quotes a Sefer Chasidim, who derives from this Gemora that if one sends his fellow a gift of food to be eaten on Shabbos, it is forbidden for the recipient to eat it during the weekdays. If he has leftover, he should let the rest of household partake in it, but only on Shabbos. If the donor explicitly stipulated that he should be the only one to eat from it, he may not give it to others.

It would seem from our Gemora that this is not merely an act of piousness; but rather, it is halachically mandated. We can extrapolate further that if one gives money or wine to his fellow and he tells him that is should be used for Kiddush, he must use it for Kiddush, and nothing else. It would be forbidden to buy fish for Shabbos with this money, for Kiddush is a Biblical mitzvah, and eating fish on Shabbos is merely a Rabbinic one.

However, according to the prevailing custom that money is given to Torah scholars, and they are told to use it for Shabbos and Yom Tov, that is only out of respect, but they are not actually being particular as to what it should be used for; in such cases, they could use the money for whatever they desire.

Reb Yosef Engel cites the following Yerushalmi: If one vows to bring a flour-offering on Yom Tov, he should not bring it on a weekday. This is why the seforim write that a transgression committed on Shabbos is more severe than one committed on a weekday, for the holiness of the day plays a role. So too it may be said regarding the performance of a mitzvah; There will be a greater reward for a mitzvah performed on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

Read more!

Friday, July 03, 2009

The Famous Taz

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

Estate Money and Interest

The Gemora allowed an administrator of an estate to invest the orphan’s money in an investment with favorable terms for them, although this is generally Rabbinically prohibited.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 160:18), based on the Rambam and Rosh, applies this license to all Rabbinically prohibited interest, and extends this to money of charity, money donated to Torah scholars, and money donated for use in a synagogue.

What did the Torah Permit?

The Gemora quotes a statement of Rav Huna that prohibits charging interest from a non Jew. The Gemora debates why this is prohibited, and how to reconcile this statement with the verse and Mishna that seem to permit such a loan.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) asks why the Gemora was concerned with reconciling this Rabbinic law with the verse and Mishna, and answers that the Gemora assumed that the Sages would not prohibit something the Torah permitted.

The Taz states in numerous places that although the Sages have leeway to enact their own new prohibitions, they may not prohibit something explicitly permitted by the Torah.

The Taz in YD 117:1 applies this to the Rabbinic prohibition on commerce in forbidden foods. Since the Torah explicitly allows one to sell neveilah meat to a non Jew, the Rabbinic prohibition had to allow for such commerce when one chanced upon the forbidden food, so as to not fully prohibit an act the Torah explicitly allows.

The Taz in OC 588:5 discusses a question raised by earlier poskim. We find the Sages prohibited the performance of numerous mitzvos on Shabbos (e.g., Shofar, Lulav), due to a concern of one accidentally carrying to perform the mitzvah. Why did the Sages not apply this to bris milah, prohibiting a bris milah which falls on a Shabbos.

The Taz says that since the Torah explicitly said that one must perform a bris milah on the eighth day, even if it is a Shabbos, the Sages could not prohibit it.

The Chavos Yair 142 challenges this Taz from our Gemora, among others. Our Gemora is an instance where the Sages prohibited an action explicitly permitted by the Torah – i.e., charging a non Jew interest on a loan. Therefore, the Chavos Yair rejects the Taz’s thesis.

Later poskim dispute the Chavos Yair’s disproof. The Shla, quoted by the Chasam Sofer (YD 106), says that the Sages did not prohibit charging a non Jew interest, since that is indeed explicitly permitted by the Torah. Instead, the Sages prohibited a Jew from lending to a non Jew at all, and only thereby precluded the Jew from receiving interest from him.

The Chasam Sofer (YD 106, 109) says that Tosfos themselves (70b Tashich, 64b v’Lo) seem to support the Taz, and actually explain the Gemora based on his principle. According to Tosfos, when the Gemora challenged Rav Nachman from the verse, the Gemora was stating that since the Torah explicitly allowed a Jew to charge a non Jew interest, the Sages cannot prohibit it. The Chasam Sofer says that the reason the Sages were allowed to do so is due to the exclusions built in to their prohibitions (for livelihood, or for a Torah scholar). Just as the Sages allowed commerce in forbidden food when the Jew chanced upon it in order to avoid explicitly prohibiting an act allowed by the Torah, so too, the Sages allowed charging a non Jew interest in some cases, to avoid explicitly such a prohibition.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 1:134) says that the Gemora’s answer that we read the verse only as tashich – explicitly allowing a Jew only to pay interest, means that the Torah never did explicitly allow a Jew to charge interest, giving the Sages the leeway to prohibit it. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger YD 117 on the Taz for more details.

Tosfos (70b Tashich) says that nowadays we lend money to non Jews with interest. Tosfos advances three reasons for this behavior:
1. The economic situation and lack of other professions available to Jews makes the interest necessary for the creditor’s basic needs, in which case it is permitted.
2. Ravina’s answer understood that the prohibition was to limit our interactions with non Jews. Since we are forced into such interactions due to economic circumstances, there is no added interaction that will be prevented by refraining from charging interest.
3. The second version of Rav Huna’s statement does not prohibit interest from a non Jew at all, but only prioritized an interest free loan to a Jew above it.

The Shulchan Aruch (YD 159:1) rules that charging interest from a non Jew is prohibited by the Sages, unless the creditor needs the interest for his basic needs, or is a Torah scholar. However, the Shulchan Aruch says that it is permitted nowadays, based on the first two reasons of Tosfos (see Shach 2).

Read more!

Friday, January 16, 2009

Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here. We now have a “less than ten minute” audio summary as well.

The Rambam (Hilchos Mamrim 1:3) writes: There cannot be an argument regarding a halachah learned from a Halachah l’Moshe mi’Sinai. The obvious question is from our Gemora (Bava Kamma 17 - 18) where we have the disagreement between the Chachamim and Sumchos regarding the payment for the case of “pebbles.” The Chachamim maintain that the Halachah l’Moshe mi’Sinai teaches us that half damages are collected, whereas Sumchos disagrees.

The Maharitz Chayus quotes this question from the Chavos Yair (192), and suggests based on the Rambam in his explanation to a Mishna at the end of Eduyos that we have a tradition that Eliyahu Hanavi will do good for Klal Yisroel at the end of time, but there is a disagreement on the specifics. Here too, all agree that pebbles is a Halachah l’Moshe mi’Sinai that it is included in damages that one is responsible for, but they argue as to the extent of the liability.

The Gemora cites Rav Ashi inquiry: According to Sumchos, do we treat the damage caused by the force of the animal’s force the same way as the force of the animal itself? There are several approaches to understand this.

The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that since Sumchos does not agree that pebbles are learned from a Halachah l’Moshe mi’Sinai, the reason he holds that one is liable in full is purely based upon logic. Accordingly, there can be a distinction between damage caused by the animal’s force and damage caused by the force of the animal’s force.

The Rosh understands the inquiry as follows: Sumchos was uncertain if there was a Halachah l’Moshe mi’Sinai by pebbles at all. If there was one, perhaps it was coming to teach us that one is not liable to pay full damages by a case where the damage was caused by the force of the animal’s force; rather, he is only obligated to pay half.

According to both these approaches, it is evident that they did not learn like the Maharatz Chiyus.

Reb Avi Lebovitz quotes a Chasam Sofer (Beitzah 5a - pg. 20), who offers another approach. We certainly find many cases where there is a dispute regarding a Halachah l’Moshe mi’Sinai. The Rambam doesn’t mean to say that an argument cannot develop on a tradition; rather, he means to say that when there was a disagreement about a tradition and the Sages of the generation agree to one approach and reject the other – they essentially are deciding that the tradition of the one they accept is correct and the other is not. At that point, no later generation can restore the argument and rely on the tradition of the individual.

Read more!

Monday, May 14, 2007

Daf Yomi - Yevamos 9 - SHAMING A STUDENT

Levi asked of Rebbe: Why did the Mishna list only fifteen cases of women who exempt themselves and their co-wives from yibum and chalitzah; the Mishna should have listed sixteen? Rebbe said: It would seem to me that he doesn’t have any brains in his head.

The commentators ask: How could Rebbe talk to Levi in such a demeaning way? Doesn’t it say in Koheles [9:17]: The words of the wise are heard when spoken softly, more than the shout of a ruler of fools? The Mishna in Pirkei Avos [2:10] says: Rabbi Eliezer said: Let the honor of your fellow be as precious to you as your own. Why did Rebbe degrade Levi in such a manner?

The Chavos Yair (152) answers: Levi was the student of Rebbe and since Rebbe understood that Levi was a tremendous Torah scholar, it wasn’t possible for him to err unless he did not thoroughly examine the matter prior to his question. Rebbe did not talk this way out of anger or haughtiness; as a matter of fact, the Gemora in Sotah (49a) states that when Rebbe died, humbleness was lost. Rebbe was instructing his student Levi that one must always scrutinize all relative material on any subject before openly discussing it.

This is the source for the following Rambam in Hilchos Talmud Torah (4:5) and cited in Shulchan Aruch (Y”D 246:11) as well (Torah.org): The student should not be embarrassed because his peers grasped [the lesson] after one or two times and he learned it only after many times. If he is embarrassed from this matter, he will end up coming in and going out of the Beit Midrash without learning anything. Therefore, the early sages said: "The shy one does not learn and the short-tempered one cannot teach" (Avot 2:5). When does this apply? If they didn't understand because of the depth of the Halakha or their limited abilities. However, if it became apparent to the teacher that they were not applying themselves to the words of Torah and were being lax about them - and therefore, they did not understand - , he is obligated to become angry with them and to shame them with words in order to sharpen them. In this context, the sages said: "Cast fear into the students." (BT Ketubot 103b).

Read more!