Story on the Daf

The Gemora states that the terms Mishkan and Mikdash are interchangeable. One must wonder if the terms are interchangeable, why Scripture would not just employ one term, either always using the term Mishkan or always using the term Mikdash. An answer to this puzzle can be found with a story that occurred many years ago.

Rabbi Stein, an executive director of a well-known Yeshiva, rand the doorbell one evening at the Miller’s home. Mr. Miller invited Rabbi Stein inside to partake of supper with Mr. Miller’s family. Rabbi Stein began apologizing for interrupting the family, when Mr. Miller said, “Please, I am certain you are here for an important reason. How can I be of help to you?”

Rabbi Stein explained that the yeshiva was in desperate need of funds, so Mr. Miller sent his son to bring his checkbook. After writing out a very generous check to the Yeshiva and handing it to Rabbi Stein, Rabbi Stein thanked Mr. Miller and rose to leave. “I would like to apologize again for coming at such an inconvenient time,” Rabbi Stein said. “The opposite is true,” declared Mr. Miller. “Let me share with you something.

Reb Yitzchak Hutner of Yeshivas Chaim Berlin calls me from time to time asking for financial assistance for his Yeshiva. When Rav Hutner once called me while I was eating supper, I told Rav Hutner the following: I am very organized in my method of giving tzedakah. I set aside ten percent of my income and I distribute the funds systematically. I would probably give the Rosh HaYeshiva a donation even without the Rosh HaYeshiva calling me, but I actually appreciate the call. I would never interrupt my supper to pay a utility bill, but I will interrupt my supper to give tzedakah, because I feel that this is something that is every important for my children to witness. Rabi Stein, I must thank you too for ringing my doorbell as we were about to commence our supper. You could not have arrived at a better time.”

This story teaches us that there is a Mikdash, a shul, a yeshiva, or any worthy Jewish organization, but there is also a Mishkan, from the generosity and beauty of performing the mitzvah of tzedakah, that allows the Divine Presence to reside in the homes of those who support the Torah.

Sent out of a Walled City

The Gemora mentions that there is a special sanctity regarding cities in Eretz Yisroel that were surrounded by a wall in the times of Yehoshua. Rashi writes some of these halachos: One who sells a house inside a walled city has one year to redeem the house, but if he chooses not to redeem the house, it becomes the property of the buyer permanently; sending a metzora outside the city; and that the open space (1,000 cubits) surrounding the city should be left uncultivated.

Why does a Metzora need to leave a city that is surrounded by a wall, but may otherwise remain in all other cities--as long as they are unwalled? The Be'er Yosef provides a fascinating p'shat based on the Chazal in Erachin (15b) which states that Hashem provided for the tongue two protections -- two walls: one of flesh--the lips, and one of bone--the teeth. A metzora breached his very own walls of protection by speaking lashon hora; he cannot therefore remain in a city protected by a wall!

Hakhel Note: An average city has only one wall--yet Hashem in his benevolence gives us a truly enhanced fortification--a dual safeguard! How can a person be so imprudent, so unwise, so as to take down not only one wall made for his own protection--but two! We will add one other point, as well. One of the most famous Metzora scenes in Tanach is that of Gechazi and his sons outside the city of Shomron (the Haftorah for Parshas Metzora)--perhaps a lesson to us that the sin of Lashon Hora is easily spread within or among a family(Miriam and Aharon speaking regarding Moshe Rabbeinu provides a similar lesson)--and this may be why it is easier to succeed at taking down the 'double wall'--it is an unfortunate and misguided team effort, and one family member encourages the next in what to the casual observer may otherwise be described as a self-defeating struggle. If one sees a weakness in his family--or in a particular family member (even if that family member is himself) -- he should bolster the fortifications--so that the security of the entire family is not breached--and the lips and tongue can take their noble places in protecting home, life and family!

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Shame of Tzara'as

Shame and Embarrassment

The examination of the nega’im detailed in our sugya requires much study. When a Kohen goes to see a suspect tsara’as, he is accompanied by many young kohanim who come to learn. It is obvious that the person afflicted does not enjoy great honor in such a situation. According to the Netziv, this is explicitly mentioned in the Torah: “This is the law…to teach about the day of becoming tamei and the day of becoming tahor” (Vayikra 14:54-57). In other words, a kohen calls his students to come with him to be taught. The Torah thereafter concludes: “…this is the law of tzara’as” – this is the penalty of a slanderer, who insulted others (Ha’amek Davar).

Three Sorts of Metzora’im

There are three types of tzara’as: s’eis, sapachas and baheres. HaGaon Rav Moshe Sternbuch explains that these names express the nature of those who slander:
1. S’eis (a raised mark): someone who slanders with the object of rising above another.
2. Sapachas (an “accompanying” mark): someone who slanders because he blindly follows those around him.
3. Baheres (a bright mark): someone who slanders with the object of “clarifying” the truth…
But all of them are “the plague of tsara’as (Ta’am Veda’as, Vayikra 13:2). (Hame’or)

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Nullified Metzora Bird

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 57) had stated: One verse comes to include the metzora bird that is set free in the category of permitted birds. Another verse comes to include the slaughtered metzora bird in the category of forbidden birds.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps it is exactly the opposite!?

Rava answers: It is not logical to assume that the Torah said that the bird should be sent away in a matter where it will create a stumbling block (for if this would be the bird that is forbidden, someone might mistakenly find this bird and eat it, for there is no way to recognize that this was a metzora bird).

The Acharonim ask: What stumbling block would there be? The metzora bird will become nullified because of the majority of birds in the world that are permitted!?

The Shaar Hamelech answers: We are concerned that someone will find the metzora bird before it intermingles with other birds.

The Peleisi answers: The halachah is that if there is one person in the world that recognizes the forbidden item, it is not nullified, even for the people who do not recognize it. Accordingly, we are concerned that a person will be standing on the top of a mountain and will see where the metzora bird went.

Reb Shimon Shkop answers that the principle of nullification does not apply here, for all the birds in the world are not intermingled with each other in one location; rather, they are all scattered about. And even though it will be permitted, for we follow the majority and say that this one came from the permitted birds, the metzora bird does not lose its prohibited status and will therefore still be considered a stumbling block.

The Chasam Sofer answers that we are not concerned with the finder, for he will not violate any prohibition. We are concerned that the sender will violate the prohibition of outrightly nullifying a prohibition.

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Depilatory

Rami bar Chama’s Inquiry

Rami bar Chama inquired (Daf Yomi: Nazir 61a): Is the reason that these four shavings are done because of the mitzvah of shaving, or is the purpose merely to remove the hair? The difference between these two reasons is whether or not they can be done with a depilatory. If they have the same laws as shaving when it is a mitzvah, it must be done with a razor. If it is just a matter of removing the hair, it can be done with a cream. What is the law?

Rami bar Chama’s question cannot be with respect to all the shavings, for a metzora and a nazir tahor are definitely required to shave with a razor. His inquiry can only be relevant to a nazir tamei.

Furthermore, Tosfos explains, he cannot be discussing the precise case of the braisa, for there, all four shavings must be done with a razor, since we are uncertain which of the four shavings is for the nazir tamei. He must be referring to a case where it was definitely known that the nazir was tamei. In truth, Rami bar Chama could have inquired simply: Does the shaving of a nazir tamei require a razor or not!

The Gemora brings a proof from the braisa which explicitly states that four shavings are required. Tosfos explains: Since in the braisa’s case, he would not be permitted to drink wine until after the fourth shaving; if a razor would not be necessary for the shaving of a nazir tamei, we would not have required a razor for the third shaving out of the concern that he might be concluding his nezirus with this shaving.

Depilatory

The Rambam rules that a nazir who shaves will receive lashes, whether he used a razor, and even if a different type of implement was used. However, if he used a depilatory, he will not incur lashes; rather, he will have negated the nazir’s positive commandment of growing his hair.

The Brisker Rav notes that it is evident from the Rambam that using a depilatory does not constitute a shaving at all! Accordingly, Rami bar Chama’s inquiry regarding a nazir tamei is not merely if a razor is required for his shaving; rather, his inquiry is if a nazir tamei has an obligation to shave! Perhaps, it is not necessary for him to shave at all; as long as his hair is removed, that is sufficient.

Based on this understanding, we can understand Rava’s proof from the braisa which states that a nazir, who might be tamei, is obligated to “shave” four times. The Gemora had stated earlier that he must shave four times, and not less, because one shaving cannot count for the other. This would only be understandable if a nazir tamei has an obligation to shave. However, if the halacha merely is that the hair of a nazir tamei must be removed, and this can even be done by means of a depilatory, which does not constitute a shaving at all, it would not be necessary to require a special shaving for the nazir tamei. When he shaves his hair for the tzaraas, it should automatically be valid for his “removal of hair,” needed for a nazir tamei. By the fact that the braisa rules that four shavings are required and not one of them can count for the other, this proves that a nazir tamei also has a mitzvah of shaving, and therefore, a depilatory may not be used.

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Two for One

Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said (Daf Yomi: Nazir 60b): The shaving of a nazir, whether he is tahor or tamei cannot count for the shaving of a metzora. This, he explains, is because each of the shavings are different than the other (either because one is to remove hair and one is to grow hair, or because one is before the korbanos and one is afterwards, or because one is after immersion in a mikvah and the other is before immersion).

Shulchan Aruch rules that on Purim, one must cease from learning Torah in order to go and hear the Megillah.

The Beis Efraim asked the son of the Noda B’Yehuda as to why this would be considered bitul Torah. Isn’t the reading of the Megillah also considered learning?

The Chachmas Shlomo answers according to our Gemora, which states that one action cannot count for two different things. If he will be intending to fulfill the mitzvah of studying Torah, it cannot count for the mitzvah of reading the Megillah. And if he intends to discharge his obligation for reading the Megillah, it cannot count for learning Torah. This is why it is regarded as bitul Torah. (This, he says, is according to those that rule that one needs intent in order to discharge his obligation; it is impossible to have in mind for two mitzvos when he is only performing one action.)

This answer is perplexing in light of the halacha that one who recites kerias shema is also fulfilling his mitzvah of studying Torah! We see that one action can accomplish two things.

The Beis Efraim maintains that one who reads the Megillah or listens to it will not be fulfilling a mitzva of studying Torah. The Avnei Neizer (O”C 517) disagrees with him vehemently to such an extent that he writes: “I do not believe that those words came out of the mouth from such a righteous person as the Beis Efraim.”

Reb Chaim Voloziner talks at great length that there is a concept of neglecting to study Torah in depth and not only time. According to this, the Gemora can be explained to mean that even though reading the Megillah is considered learning, nonetheless it would be regarded as bitul Torah since he is not delving into the depths of Torah; if not for the special halacha that one is obligated to close the Gemora and hear the Megillah.

The Beis Efraim himself speculates that perhaps one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of learning Torah through the reading of the Megillah because it is part of Tefillah. This is based on the viewpoint of the Beis Yosef, who rules regarding one who had forgotten to recite birchas hatorah in the morning. The blessing of Ahava Rabbah can be utilized as a birchas hatorah, providing that he learns immediately after Shemoneh Esrei. The recital of kerias shema will not be sufficient because that is part of Tefillah. Perhaps, the same logic can be used for the reading of the Megillah.

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Merely Growing his Hair

Rav Sheravya asks from our Mishna, which stated that he does not have to redo the days of nezirus that he had already observed and he can start counting right away. Now, if the Mishna is referring to a case of a thirty-day nezirus, how can it rule that he does not forfeit the days that he had already observed? He needs to count another thirty days in order for him to have a thirty-day growth of hair! It must be referring to a case where he declared a long nezirus, but the Mishna states that he can start counting right away. [This implies that the days of tzaraas are not counted towards his term of nezirus. This is direct contrast to Rav Chisda’s ruling!]

Rav Sheravya himself answers the question: The Mishna is referring to a case where he declared to be a nazir for fifty days, and he became a metzora after twenty days. He must undergo the purification process for a metzora and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

Tosfos notes that the Gemora could have stated a case where he declared to be a nazir for forty days, and he became a metzora after ten days. He must undergo the purification process for a metzora and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

The Brisker Rav asks: Couldn’t the Mishna be referring to a case where he declared to be a nazir for one hundred days, and he became a metzora after seventy days. He would not forfeit the original days, and the days that he was a metzora will not count towards his nezirus, for he needs to have a thirty-day growth of hair. When the purification process is completed, he will be compelled to count another thirty days!

He answers that if there are not thirty days remaining from the time that the purification process is completed, the days that he was a metzora will not count at all, and the days that he observes afterwards will be days of an actual nezirus; not only days where he is growing his hair. This is true only if he did not have a fulfillment of thirty days before he became a metzora; however, if he became a metzora after thirty days, then even if when the purification process is completed, he does not have thirty days remaining, the days that he was a metzora counts towards the nezirus, and the days of waiting afterwards are merely days where he is growing his hair. They are not regarded as days of nezirus!

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Positive Commandment Overriding Two Prohibitions

Reb Moshe Rozmerin in Dvar Moshe states that the Rambam maintains that one who rounds the corners of his head has violated two prohibitions; one for cutting his payos (corners), and another for following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

Our Gemora states that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head. According to the Rambam, it is actually overriding two prohibitions. Tosfos in Yevamos (3b) discussed this issue and did not cite our Gemora as a proof. Other Rishonim maintain that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions.

A question is brought in the name of the Lubliner Gaon: The Gemora in Yevamos (20b) states regarding a widow falling to yibum to a Kohen Gadol that it is a situation where the positive commandment of yibum can possibly override the prohibition of a Kohen Gadol marrying a widow. He asks: There are two prohibitions for a Kohen Gadol to marry a widow; one is lo yikach (he shall not take her), and the other is lo yechallel (he shall not desecrate the kehuna). How can the positive commandment of yibum override two prohibitions?

Reb Chaim Ozer in Achiezer (Even Ezer, 4) answers: The Rishonim concede that when the two prohibitions are dependent on each other, the positive commandment can override both prohibitions. The basis for the prohibition of desecrating the kehuna is because it is an illicit relationship; once the mitzvah of yibum overrides the prohibition of lo yikach, it becomes a permitted relationship and there will be no prohibition of lo yechallel.

[It would seem to me that this is dependent on how we understand that a positive commandment cannot override two prohibitions. We can explain that each prohibition strengthens one another and the positive commandment cannot override any of them; or perhaps the positive commandment does override one of the prohibitions, but it does not have the capabilities to override the second one. Reb Chaim Ozer would be in accordance with the latter explanation.]

According to the Achiezer, we can answer the Dvar Moshe’s question. The positive commandment for the metzora to cut his hair overrides the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head, and consequently, there will be no prohibition of following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

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