Obeying a Jewish King in Eretz Yisroel

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

It is evident from the Gemora that the law of the kingdom has the full force of halachah behind it. The Ritva writes that we do not find anyone that disagrees with this principle.

The Rashbam explains the rationale for this halachah: All citizens of a country voluntarily accept upon themselves to obey the king’s decrees and laws. All of their laws are therefore binding. Accordingly, one who possesses his fellow’s property based upon that particular country’s law, does not violate a prohibition of stealing at all.

The Rashba explains it differently: Since the entire land belongs to the king, he is entitled to chase anyone away from his land if he wishes, and he has the right to tax everyone for the privilege of residing in his land.

A difference between these two opinions may be if this halachah would apply in Eretz Yisroel with a Jewish king. According to the Rashba, it might not apply in Eretz Yisroel, for every Jew has an inalienable right to live there, and no king would have the jurisdiction to banish anyone from the Land.

The Ra”n in Nedarim 28a rules that this principle applies only in the lands of the exile. The reason for this, he explains, is that in these countries, the land is the property of the kingdom, and one is therefore obligated to abide by the laws and ordinances of the country in which he resides. But, in Eretz Yisroel, which belongs to the entire Jewish nation, there is no obligation to comply with the laws of a Jewish king. The Rambam and Shulchan Aruch both rule that this principle does apply to a Jewish king in Eretz Yisroel.

Read more!

Oath Taken Outside of Beis Din

Rav Nachman said (Bava Kamma 106) that if a custodian swears falsely outside of Beis Din and afterwards witnesses testify against him, Rav would concede that he is still liable to pay kefel.

Rashi explains that an oath taken in Beis Din is stronger than one taken outside of Beis Din, and if one swears in Beis Din, the claim against him is dissolved.

It is also evident from the Gemora that if the plaintiff jumped up and adjured the custodian to swear before Beis Din had the chance to impose the oath upon him, and afterwards he admitted, Rav would concede that he is liable in paying the extra fifth and to bring a korban asham, but he will not be liable to pay the kefel.

The Rishonim cite Rabbeinu Chananel who explains that one who is Biblically mandated to take an oath in Beis Din, and he swears outside of Beis Din, or he swore in Beis Din before the court imposed the oath upon him, he is not exempt from his obligation and he can be mandated to swear again.

The Ramban and the Rashba disagree and hold that an oath taken outside of Beis Din is regarded as a valid oath and he would not be required to swear again. Our Gemora holds that one is not liable to pay kefel for such an oath, for it is not as strong as an oath imposed by the court.

Read more!

Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 91) states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

Read more!

Through Desolation, the Gate is Broken Apart

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here. We now have a “less than ten minute” audio summary as well.

Rav Sechorah said in the name of Rav Huna in the name of Rav (Bava Kamma 21a) : Someone who lives in his friend’s courtyard without his knowledge is not obligated to pay him rent, for it is written: Through desolation, the gate is broken apart (demons destroy a vacant house; it emerges that the dweller actually benefits the owner).

Mar the son of Rav Ashi remarked: I myself have seen such this demon and the damage was as great as a rampaging bull.

Rav Yosef said: Houses that are inhabited by remain in a better condition (for they maintain it).

It would seem from this Gemora that without this benefit that the dweller provides for the owner, he would be liable to pay. The Rashba asks: Why would this be? It seemed from the entire Gemora above that everyone holds that when one benefits and the other one does not lose, he is not liable to pay!?

He answers that although the Gemora here agrees that one who benefits from another is exempt from liability if he did not cause a loss, practically speaking, this would not be the halachah. This is because, generally, one who dwells in someone else’s house does cause a slight damage to the house. The Gemora had previously ruled that whenever there is a loss to the owner, the one who benefits is obligated to pay for the pleasure that he derived. The Gemora here is explaining that the benefit which the dweller is providing the owner by dwelling in his house offsets the loss in damages that the owner incurs on account of the dweller. It is therefore classified as a case where one benefits and the other is not losing.

Read more!

Deriving Benefit from a Corpse

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here. We now have a “less than ten minute” audio summary as well.

By Reb Avi Lebovitz Hearos on the Daf

Tosfos (Bava Kamma 10) asks: Why do we need a special verse to exempt a person who is killed by falling in a pit? It should be included in the exposition of “and the corpse shall belong to him”!? This means that the owner of the pit is only liable when the corpse can belong to the owner of the animal. Just as we exclude an animal that is a disqualified sacrifice, which cannot belong entirely to its owner (since certain restrictions apply to it even after it is redeemed), we should exclude man as well, since it is forbidden to derive pleasure from a corpse!?

Tosfos answers that from this verse alone, I would have said that the owner of the pit is liable for damaging a gentile, since one is permitted to derive pleasure from his corpse, so we need a verse to exempt the pit owner for the death of all people.

Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 349:1) writes that it is forbidden to derive benefit even from a gentile corpse. The Nekudas Hakesef quotes this from a Teshuvas Harashba. But, the Nikudas Hakesef points out that both our Tosfos and the Magid Mishnah hold that only a Jewish corpse is forbidden to derive pleasure from.

The Vilna Gaon proves that Tosfos is correct from David who used the foreskins from the Philistines to betroth the daughter of King Shaul. He also points out that the Rashba in his commentary on the Daf says like Tosfos.

However, the Pischei Teshuva reconciles Tosfos and the Rashba by saying that it is not Biblically forbidden, and that is why a special verse is needed to exempt the pit owner when a person is killed in a bor, but it is Rabbinically forbidden to derive pleasure from any corpse.

Read more!

Uncertainty regarding Liability by Damages

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 3a) asks: Why didn’t the Torah just write v’shilach, which connotes both shein and regel (which the Gemora proceeds to prove), and u’vier would not be necessary?

The Gemora answers: If the Torah would only write v’shilach, we would only have learned that one is liable for one of those damages; either regel because its damage is usual, or shein because it has physical pleasure when damaging (but we would not have learned that there is liability for both types).

The Gemora asks: But they are both equal, so let us derive both types of damages from one verse, for which one of them would be excluded?

The Gemora answers: If shein and regel would be derived from one verse, we might have said that one is liable only if the owner sent the animal out; however, one would not be liable if the animal went out by itself and damaged. The Torah therefore writes u’vier as well.

The Rashba asks on the Gemora’s question: Why would we learn out both damages from one verse based on the fact that we do not know which one of them to exclude? On the contrary! Since we are trying to extract money from the damager, why don’t we apply the principle that the one who is attempting to extract money is the one who is obligated to bring the proof?

A possible answer on this question is that damages are treated as prohibitions, and the rule is with respect to prohibitions that when in doubt, we rule stringently. Accordingly, we can understand why both damages will be included in one verse since we do not know which one to exclude. Why didn’t the Rashba answer like this?

The Chasam Sofer adds that this is even more problematic, for the Rashba himself (2b) uses this principle to answer a different question. The Gemora had stated: One might think that when the Torah differentiates between a tam (an ox that did not yet gore three times; the owner only pays for half the damage) and a mu’ad (an ox that gored already at least three times; the owner pays the full amount of the damage), it is only when the horn is disconnected from the animal (in a case where the animal took its uprooted horn in its mouth and gored; as the case of Tzidkiyah was of an unattached set of horns). However, when an animal gores with its horns attached to its head, it should always pay full damages. This is why the braisa quotes the additional verse from the Torah.

The Rashba there asked: On the contrary! Let us say that when an animal gores with its horns attached to its head, it should always pay half damages!?

He answered that damages are treated as prohibitions, and the rule is with respect to prohibitions that when in doubt, we rule stringently. Accordingly, when faced with the option of always paying full damages or paying half, the Gemora chooses the option of paying in full.

It would therefore seem that the Rashba is contradicting himself! How do we treat damages? Do we automatically rule stringently because it is like a prohibition, or do we rule leniently, for we are attempting to extract money away from the one who possesses the money, and for that, proof is needed?

The Har Tzvi suggests the following answer: The Levush (C”M 378) writes that not only does the Torah obligate the damager to compensate the person who was damaged, but there also is a prohibition to damage someone else’s property, in the same manner that it is forbidden to steal. If someone does not guard his possessions against inflicting damage on someone else’s property, he has violated a Biblical prohibition.

Accordingly, the Rashba can be explained as follows: The Gemora above was discussing a case where the damager is certainly obligated to pay. The animal inflicted damage with a disconnected horn in its mouth. The Gemora’s only question was with respect to the amount of the compensation. Should he always (whether it’s a tam or a mu’ad) pay full damages, or should he only pay half. In such a case, we would rule stringently, for the owner has indeed transgressed the prohibition of allowing his animal to cause damage. He now has to “fix” his sin by compensating the owner for his loss. This would be similar to a case where one said to his fellow, “I know that I owed you money, but I do not know if I paid.” He would be obligated to pay. However, in our case, where the Gemora is not certain if one should be liable at all for shein or regel; we must rule leniently. For it is quite possible that the Torah did not mandate that there should be any obligation to guard one’s property against causing such a damage. This is why the Rashba asks that if we are uncertain if there is any liability at all, we should rule leniently, and apply the principle of the one who is attempting to extract money is the one who is obligated to bring the proof. Accordingly, there is no contradiction at all.

Read more!

Kiddushin 62 - Two Perutos

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here

The Mishna states: One cannot take off terumah from what is detached from the ground in order to exempt things still attached to the ground. If he does, it is invalid.

Rav Assi asked Rabbi Yochanan: If someone says that the fruit of this row that is detached should be terumah for the fruit of this row that is still attached or visa versa, but he adds that this should take effect when the fruit becomes detached, what is the law? [Perhaps the attached fruit should be regarded as something that has not yet come into the world (for it is not yet subject to the halachos of terumah)?]

Rabbi Yochanan answered: Anything that is in his hands to do is not considered as if it is lacking an action (and it is therefore valid). [If one has the ability to change its status, the transaction can be valid, even though it presently is still not in the world.]

The Gemora asks a question from a statement of Rabbi Oshaya. Rabbi Oshaya says: If someone gives a perutah to his wife and says that this is her kiddushin for after he divorces her, it is invalid. However, according to Rabbi Yochanan this should be valid!?

The Gemora answers: Although he can indeed divorce her, he cannot make her accept kiddushin afterwards (this is not “in his hands”).

We should therefore be able to answer Rabbi Oshaya’s question. He asked: If someone gives two perutos to a woman, and says, “With the first one, I am betrothing you today, and with the second one, I am betrothing you after I divorce you,” what is the law? According to the above statement (he cannot make her accept kiddushin), the kiddushin should be invalid!?

The Gemora answers: Being that she is already accepting kiddushin from him now, it is possible that the kiddushin after future divorce is also valid.

What would be the halacha if one purchased a field with one perutah and stipulated that he is buying it back after he gives it back to the seller?

The Rashba proves from out Gemora that it will be ineffective because the Gemora needs to say a case where there were two perutos.

The Chasam Sofer makes a distinction: Our Gemora needs to discuss a case with two perutos, for kiddushin cannot take effect without a perutah. However, regarding a field, there are other ways to acquire a field, and it would not be necessary to have two perutos.

Read more!

Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here

The Gemora states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

Read more!

Compliance with the Rabbis - Gittin 73

Rabbah and Rava did not agree with Rav Huna (and they hold that if a deathly ill person gives a get and recovers, it is a valid get), as they were afraid it might lead people to think that a get could be given after death.

The Gemora asks: Since the get is void in accordance with Biblical law, how can we allow a married woman, owing to the authority of Beis Din, to marry anyone in the world?

The Gemora answers: Yes! Anyone who betroths a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis have in this case retroactively revoked the original betrothal. (They accomplished this by transforming retroactively the money of the betrothal given to the woman at her first marriage into an ordinary gift. Since the hefker of money comes within the authority of Beis Din, they are thus fully empowered to cancel the original betrothal, and the divorcee assumes, in consequence, the status of an unmarried woman who is permitted to marry any stranger.)

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is a satisfactory explanation where betrothal was effected by means of money; what, however, can be said in a case where betrothal was effected by cohabitation?

Rav Ashi replied: The Rabbis have assigned to such cohabitation the character of a promiscuous cohabitation. (From the moment a divorce is annulled in such a manner, the cohabitation, it was ordained, must assume retroactively the character of a promiscuous cohabitation, and since her original betrothal is thus invalidated, the woman resumes the status of the unmarried and is free to marry whomsoever she desires.)

The Rashba asks: Why don’t we apply this rule in the case in Yevamos where a man fell into water that has no end? There, we rule that the wife will remain an agunah because the husband might have exited the water from a place that was not visible to us. Why don’t we say that the Chachamim revoked the original kiddushin from him, and she may remarry another man?

He answers: It is only applicable in certain cases. If, for example, there was a get, except that it was written with a condition, and an uncertainty arose regarding the condition, the Chachamim can revoke his kiddushin. Another example where the Chachamim would revoke the kiddushin is where one witness is testifying on the woman’s behalf (that her husband died). However, when there is no get and no witness, the Chachamim did not go ahead and revoke a kiddushin.

The Gemora in Yevamos (110a) records an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Chachamim therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

The Chachamim were empowered to remove the kiddushin in this case because he acted improperly in the beginning of the kiddushin.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we only apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Chachamim acted improperly with him” in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who instructs his fellow to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and the agent goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

This can also be proven from the fact that even if one betroths a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition, kiddushin, nevertheless takes effect. This is also true if someone marries a woman who is a secondary ervah to him. Obviously, sometimes this principle is applied, and sometimes, it isn’t.

The Chasam Sofer asks: Why, in these cases (where he betroths a woman subject to a negative prohibition, or a secondary ervah) do we not say that the Chachamim revoked his kiddushin?

He answers, based upon Tosfos, who says that it is for this reason that the groom tells the bride that he is betrothing her according to the laws of Moshe and all of Israel. The kiddushin is only effective if Israel, i.e. the Chachamim consent to the marriage. However, one who is violating the Torah, or the sages, is obviously not marrying with such a stipulation and therefore, the marriage can still be effective. [According to the Chasam Sofer, not every marriage has that stipulation attached to it.]

The Shiltei Giborim states that this principle applies by a get as well. Anyone who divorces a woman does so in implicit compliance with the ordinances of the Rabbis, and the Rabbis may, in certain cases retroactively revoke the divorce.

Based upon this, the Taamei Yaakov answers the following famous question on Rabbeinu Gershom’s decree: Since the Torah expressly permits one to divorce his wife without her consent, how can this be banned? The Taz lais down a rule that the Rabbis do not have the authority to prohibit something which is explicitly permitted by the Torah!?

He answers that since the Rabbis forbid giving a get in such a manner, it is automatically nullified, for one’s betrothal and divorce can only be effective if he is compliance with the Rabbis’ ordinances. In these cases, the Rabbis did not consent to such a get.

[I am uncertain as to how this answers the question. Granted, the get will be ineffective since it is prohibited to give a get without the woman’s consent; but how did the Rabbis have the authority to issue such a decree? If the Torah expressly permits it, they cannot forbid it!?]

Path to Sanctity

The Gemora states: Whoever betroths a woman in Jewish marriage, betroths her subject to the will of the Rabbis.

The baalei mussar say: One who wants to sanctify and purify himself in his service to his Creator, should do so subject to the will of the Rabbis. He should go to the Rabbis and the righteous people of his generation, and they shall guide him in his quest. One who tries to forge a path himself is apt to stumble and make mistakes; nothing substantive will result from it.

Read more!

Chalifin for a MInor - Gittin 65

Rava said: There are three categories of a minor: If he would be given a rock, he would discard it, but if given a walnut, he would accept it, he can make an acquisition on things, but he may not acquire for others.

Tosfos asks that it seems from a Gemora in Bava Basra that a minor does not have the ability to acquire anything!?

Tosfos answers: The Gemora there could be referring to a minor who has not yet reached this stage of understanding.

Alternatively, they answer that the Gemora there is referring only to a kinyan chalifin (acquiring something through an exchange with a kerchief or other object), where a minor has a more difficult time grasping the mechanics of the kinyan.

The Ra”n explains that the Rabbis instituted for a minor only those kinyanim where the object is raised or pulled by the minor; however, other types of kinyanim, where the concepts are difficult to grasp, are not effective for the minor.

The Rashb”a adds that since we rule that the object being used for the chalifin must be owned by the one making the acquisition, it emerges that the minor must convey the object to the seller. He does not have enough knowledge to accomplish that and therefore the kinyan is not effective.

Read more!

Rav Kahana and the Poor Man's Dates

The Gemora (Gittin 61) relates an incident: Rav Kahana was going to Hutzal and he saw a certain person who was throwing sticks at a palm tree so that the dates would fall to the ground. Rav Kahana picked up the dates and ate them. The person said to Rav Kahana, “You saw that I had picked some of the dates with my hand (and therefore it is actual theft for you to take them).”

Rav Kahana said to him: You must be from Rabbi Yoshiyah’s city (who often gave public discourses in the city; that is why you know these halachos). Rav Kahana applied the following verse to Rabbi Yoshiyah: And a righteous man is the foundation of the world.

Tosfos asks: Even if Rav Kahana did not know that the person picked the dates with his hand, he still should not have eaten them!? Why was he not concerned with our Mishna’s ruling that we do not take from the poor in the interest of peace?

Tosfos answers that the man was taking the branches off the tree and the dates were falling off themselves. Rav Kahana thought that the man had no interest in the dates.

The Ramban answers that Rav Kahana thought that he was an idolater and the Mishna did not rule that the produce of an idolater is protected because of harmony.

The Rashba answers that Rav Kahana himself was a poor person (or he was regarded as one since he was traveling). [This answers why he would have been permitted to take the dates that was seemingly reserved for the poor.]

The Meiri writes that the decree of promoting harmony was instituted primarily for a poor person who would be taking for himself and eating in his house; however, the enactment for the interest of peace would not affect a passerby, such as Rav Kahana, who would be eating on the road.

The Vilna Gaon says that this decree was instituted only with respect to olives, but not for dates.

Read more!

Afflictions Purge a Person's Sins

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 42b) states that if a master knocks out the tooth of his slave, or if he blinds his eye, he must release the slave.

It is noteworthy that Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemora in Brochos (5a) derives from here that a person is considered fortunate if Hashem inflicts him. It is taught through a kal vachomer as follows: If the loss of a tooth or an eye, which is only one of the limbs in a person’s body, nevertheless, a slave gains his freedom because of it, then afflictions, which cleanse the person’s entire body, should certainly free a person from sin because of them!

Rish Lakish derives this same lesson from a different source. He says: The word covenant is written with respect to salt and the word covenant is written with respect to afflictions. Just as salt sweetens the meat, so too, afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins.

The Bobover Rebbe in Kedushas Tziyon notes that there is a distinction between the two expositions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, the afflictions will only cleans a person if they emanate from Heaven, similar to the halachos of a slave, where he will only be set free if his master knocks out his tooth or eye. He will not gain his freedom if someone else injures him. However, according to Rish Lakish, any type of afflictions will cleanse him, in the same manner as the salt sweetening the meat. It makes no difference as to who applies the salt.

Based upon this, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank explains the following. It is written [Shmos 6:5]: And also, I heard the moans of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians are holding in bondage, and I remembered My covenant. The Jewish people thought that the Egyptians were their masters and they were those who were afflicting them. They did not realize that their suffering was decreed from Heaven. Because they didn’t know who was causing them their hardships, they did not gain their freedom. It was only because Hashem remembered His covenant, that all afflictions cleanse a person from his sins, that was the reason they were released from the bondage.

Reb Meir Shapiro adds to this: If a slave does not come to court and testify that his master knocked out his tooth or eye, he will not gain his freedom. If he says that it happened by happenstance, he will not go free. So too, it is with afflictions. If a person does not believe with complete faith that the afflictions are affecting him because of Divine Providence, the afflictions will not purge him of his sins. However, if this principle was derived through the gezeirah shavah from salt, it would not make any difference.

The Rashba was asked the following question: If a slave initiates a fight with his master and strikes the first blow, and the master counters with some strikes of his own and knocks out the slave’s tooth, will the slave gain his freedom?

He replied that the slave goes free. The proof is from the aforementioned Gemora, where Rabbi Yochanan derived that afflictions will cleanse a person from his sins through a kal vachomer from the laws of the slave. How can the two be compared? Afflictions come to a person because he has sinned! It was his own fault! Perhaps, then, those afflictions will not purge him from his sins!? Evidently, we see that a slave also gains his freedom, even if he was the one who initiated the fight!

Read more!

Half and Half

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 38a) relates an incident: There was a certain slavewoman in Pumbedisa who was used by men for sinful acts. Abaye said: Were it not that Rav Yehudah has said in the name of Shmuel that whoever emancipates his Canaanite slave violates a positive commandment, I would compel her master to write an emancipation document for her.

Ravina said: In such a case, Rav Yehudah would agree that this is proper, in order to prevent the immorality.

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t Abaye permit this as well? But Rav Chanina bar Rav Katina has said in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak: There was an incident regarding a certain woman who was half slavewoman and half free woman (she had two masters, and one of them freed her), and they forced her master to make her a free woman. And Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: It was because people were acting immorally with her!?

The Gemora answers: In that case, she was not suitable to marry a slave or a free man; here, they could have designated a slave for her, and he would have protected her (therefore, there is no reason to free her).

The Minchas Chinuch (§ 347) asks from this Gemora on the Rashba, who holds that there is no prohibition against freeing a half slave, half free man because of his “free half.” If so, what is the Gemora asking on Abaye from the case of the half slavewoman and half free woman? Abaye would concede there that it is permitted to free her because she is already half free!?

The Oneg Yom Tov (§ 51) answers that the Rashba only said that regarding a slave, where his free half is obligated in more mitzvos than his slave half, for if he gains his freedom, he will have the ability to fulfill the mitzvah of procreation. The Torah, therefore, did not obligate the master to work him forever. However, by a slavewoman, who will not have the mitzvah of procreation even if she gains her freedom, the prohibition against emancipating her remains!

Read more!

Mechanics of a pruzbul

We learned in a Mishna: A pruzbul is not made out unless the borrower has some land. If he has none, the creditor can give him ownership (through a third party) from any amount of his own land (and then a pruzbul may be written).

Rav Chiya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav (Daf Yomi: Gittin 37a): Even land the size of a carob stalk is sufficient.

Rav Yehudah said: Even if the creditor only lends him a place sufficient for the borrower to put his stove or oven, a pruzbul may be written because of it.

Rashi explains that the Rabbinical establishment of a pruzbul is only for a usual case, and since, generally, one did not lend money to someone who did not possess land, a pruzbul cannot be written in such a case.

The Rashba asks on Rashi: Is the case where the creditor lends the debtor land in order to collect from considered a usual case? Why there did we allow a pruzbul to be written? He explains that the Rabbis did not differentiate between the cases, and as long as the debtor has some property, a pruzbul may be written.

The Tumim (67:22) writes that it would seem from Rashi that the debtor is required to have land at the time of the loan, for then, it will be usual for the creditor to lend him money. However, there is no necessity for him to have land at the time that the pruzbul is being written! This, he states, is bewildering, for the primary reason for the land is that the creditor should have what to collect from!?

He answers that this case would also be an unusual one. For it is not common for a debtor to have land at the time of the loan and afterwards sell it, for there will not be many purchasers interested in buying land that is pledged to a creditor. Therefore, the presumption is that if he had land at the time of the loan, he would still have land at the time the pruzbul is being written.

Accordingly, the Tumim concludes, that if the loan would be a verbal one, and there is no land to collect from, it is not considered a usual case and a pruzbul would not be written.

The Rash explains differently. He states that a pruzbul is written only when the debtor has land, for then, the debt is regarded as if it has been already collected. This is comparable to the case where he lent with a collateral, where in that case, shemitah does not cancel the loan for that very same reason.

The Rashbam in Bava Basra (66a) also explains like that, but he adds that when the debtor has land, it not completely regarded as if it is paid already like the collateral case; rather, it appears as if there is a security on the loan. If there would be a collateral, shemitah would not cancel the debt according to the Biblical law. The Chachamim did not want to establish this institution in a manner that appeared as if they were uprooting a halachah from the Torah.

The Ran writes that there is an apparent distinction between the two explanations. According to the Rash, it would be necessary for the debtor to possess the land at the conclusion of shemitah, for then is when the loan would be cancelled. According to Rashi, it is only necessary for the debtor to possess land in the beginning, for then it is a usual circumstance, and a pruzbul may be written.

Read more!

An Ignorant Person's Recognition

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 27a) had stated: If an agent (who was bringing a get) lost the get and found it immediately, it is still valid. However, if he found it after some time, it cannot be used (for we are concerned that it fell from someone else and it is not the get which he lost). If he found the get in a chafisah or in a deluskema (types of containers), or if he recognizes the get, it is valid.

Rashi explains that if the agent himself found the get (not in a container) and he recognizes it, the get is valid.

Other Rishonim understand the Mishna to mean that the get is valid if he recognizes the container.

The Rashba writes that the get will be valid if the agent found it and claims that he recognizes it. This is true even if the agent is an ignorant person. That which the Gemora says below that an ignorant person cannot be trusted that he recognizes the get is only true when someone else found it and the agent is trying to claim it from him. There, we suspect that he is lying. However, if he himself found the get, he is trusted that he recognizes it, for he has a migu (believe me what I am saying, for if I would want to lie, I could have said a better lie); he could have said that he never lost it in the first place. (The Ritva seems to say that the ignorant person is believed even without the migu.)

The Ramban writes that it is only with respect to a lost article that we do not trust an ignorant person when he claims that he recognizes it. However, with regards to a get, which is a prohibitory matter, he is trusted. (The Magid Mishnah explains that this is because one witness is believed with respect to prohibitory matters.)

There are two glaring questions on the Ramban. Firstly, the Gemora below states explicitly that to return it to someone who claims that he recognizes it by sight, it is only to a Talmudic scholar who would be trusted, but not any ordinary person!? Secondly, a get should be regarded as a davar she’b’ervah, a matter with respect to relations, and two witnesses are required for testimony involving such matters!?

The Toras Gittin answers the first question as follows: When the Gemora states that an ordinary person will not be trusted that he recognizes the get, that is only with respect to the monetary issues of the get; however, with respect to the prohibitions stemming from the get, he will be trusted.

The Maharam Schick answers the second question: The halacha is if a father said, “I accepted a kiddushin for my daughter, but I do not know from whom,” and a fellow comes to us and says that it was him, he is believed and she is married to him. The Ran explains that although ordinarily, a davar she’b’ervah requires two witnesses, here it doesn’t, for his testimony is not in contrast with any preexisting status quo; it is merely a clarification as to whom the father accepted the kiddushin from. One person is sufficient for this. So too, here, the one witness is not testifying on the divorce; rather, he is clarifying for us as to who this get belongs to.

The Oneg Yom Tov answers this question by saying that the concern for two Yosef ben Shimon’s in the same city is only a Rabbinical one, and therefore, although it is a davar she’b’ervah, only one witness is required.

Read more!

Essence of a Get

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 26a) states: A scribe who writes the tofes (the text of the get, not including the names of the people and the date) of a get must leave blank spaces for the names of the man, woman and the date.

The Mishna Lamelech writes that it is necessary to write the location of the man and the woman as well.

Tosfos Yom Tov asks: Why doesn’t the Mishna mention that it the scribe is required to leave spaces blank for their locations as well?

He proves from here that the omission of the city names will not invalidate a get.

The Rashba rejects the proof by saying that perhaps it is included in that which the Mishna says: the names of the man and the woman.

It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that if their locations are omitted from the get, the get is invalid.

Proof to this is from the fact that the Mishna did not make mention of the fact that he has to leave a blank space for the words “Behold, you are permitted to any man,” and if that is not written, the get is rules to be invalid.

Tosfos writes that this precise language was not found in the earlier gittin, however, similar expressions were used and therefore, their gittin were valid.

The Ramban concludes that if this exact expression (“Behold, you are permitted to any man”) is not written in the get, the get is disqualified and if she has already remarried, she must leave that man.

The Steipler Gaon notes that the verse, sefer kerisus venasan beyadah veshilchah (a document of severance; and he shall place it in her hand and send her out) is the same numerical value as “zehu gufo shel get: harei at muteres lechal adam” (this is the essence of the get: “Behold, you are permitted to any man”).

Read more!

Name of Hashem Written without the Proper Intent

A braisa (Daf Yomi: Gittin 20a) was taught: A scribe was supposed to write the Name of Hashem in a Sefer Torah, and instead intended to write the name Yehudah. [The name Yehudah is similar to the letters in the Name of Hashem, except that the word Yehudah has a letter “dalet” between the “vav” and the “hey.”] He forgot to insert the “dalet” and ended up writing the Name of Hashem but without the required intention necessary to write the Holy Name. Rabbi Yehudah posits that the scribe can pass his quill over the Name of Hashem and have the proper intention of writing the Name. The Chachamim disagree, claiming that this is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem (and the Sefer Torah is subsequently invalid).

The Rishonim ask: According to Rav Chisda, who holds that the Chachamim maintain that the Sefer Torah is disqualified, why does he use the term that it is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem? This would indicate that the writing is good, but it is not written in the most preferable method! Why didn’t he say that the new writing does not accomplish anything?

The Rashba answers that they actually hold that the tracing over of the word is not regarded as an act of writing at all and the Sefer Torah is disqualified. They only used that term to discuss Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.

The Pnei Yehoshua suggests a novel approach to explain the Chachamim’s terminology: Although the Chachamim maintain that the Sefer Torah is disqualified, they nevertheless hold that the Name of Hashem retains its sanctity and is forbidden to be erased. He proves that the Name of Hashem, although it wasn’t written with the correct intention, cannot be erased. This is why the Chachamim say that it is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem.

The Tashbatz, however, proves from our sugya that it is permitted to erase the Name of Hashem when it is written without the correct intention.

The Gemora in Yoma (38a) states that Ben Kamtzar had a unique talent that he was able to write four letters with one hand at the same time and he did not teach this talent to anyone else. The Gemora says that this was considered a shame and due to this, he was referred to as an evil person. What were the Chachamim concerned about? Rashi comments that this was referring to the Name of Hashem which has four letters.

The Tosfos Yom Tov explains that there is an advantage for the Name of Hashem to be written at one time, so that His Name should not be missing for a moment.

The Minchas Chinuch has a novel approach and says that if one writes the first two letters of the Name of Hashem which is the “yud” and the “hey,” that itself is one of the Name’s of Hashem, and by subsequently writing the third letter, the “vav,” it constitutes erasing Hashem’s Name. Ben Kamtzar was able to avoid with his special skill.

The Emek Brocha asks that if the Name of Hashem is written without proper intent, there is no prohibition to erase it, so why should there be a prohibition here when the scribe did not intend to write the ‘two letter’ Name of Hashem, but rather His ‘four letter’ Name?

According to the Pnei Yehoshua, this is not a question, for this, in fact, a prohibition to erase the Name of Hashem, even when it is written without the proper intent!

Read more!

Wearing the Clothing of a Woman

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said (Daf Yomi: Nazir 59a): How do we know that a woman shall not go out wearing weapons of war? It is because it’s written: A man’s attire shall not be on a woman. And the verse, nor may a man wear a woman’s garment teaches us that a man is prohibited from beautifying himself with the adornments of a woman (included in this prohibition would be the removal of his hair).

The Beis Yosef rules that even according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, the Torah only forbade something that is in the open and recognizable to all; however, something that is hidden from the eye, it will only be Rabbinically forbidden. Therefore, he explains, that although the Rambam rules according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, it is not Biblically forbidden to shave the hair by the underarms and the pubic area, for that is something that is not seen.

The Bach wonders where the Beis Yosef saw such a distinction in the Gemora.

The Bach himself explains the Rambam as follows: Only things which are done for the sake of beauty is forbidden. This is why it would be Biblically forbidden for a man to wear make-up, eye shadow or wear colorful garments of a woman; however, shaving his body hairs is only removing things that are repulsive to him. That is why the Rambam rules that it is only Rabbinically forbidden.

The Bach rules that it is permitted for a man to wear the clothing of a woman if his purpose is not to appear like a woman. It is therefore permitted for a man to wear a woman’s clothing in order to protect himself from the rain or to shield him from the sun.

The Shach qualifies this ruling to be referring only to the embellishments of a woman; however, if he wears a woman’s garment in a manner that it would not be recognizable that he is a man, even the Bach would prohibit this.

The Darkei Moshe rules that this prohibition is not applicable on Purim. A man may wear the garment of a woman and a woman may wear the garment of a man. He explains: Whenever there is a custom for a man and a woman to wear the same clothing, there is no prohibition. (This is why the Rashba rules that in a place where it was the custom for the men to remove the hair by their underarms, there is no prohibition.) Since on Purim, it became the custom to switch clothing, there is no prohibition. Additionally, since it is being done for the joy of Purim, it is permitted.

The Yereim writes that a man may not wear a woman’s clothing, even if it just temporary and even if it is being done just for fun. The Mishna Berura rules like this.

Read more!

Kohen’s Sanctity based upon his Service

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 49) answers: Both words are necessary. For if the Torah would have only written for his father (that the nazir may not become tamei to), we would have thought that it is only the father that he cannot become tamei to for there is merely a presumption of paternity (for perhaps his mother committed adultery), but regarding his mother, whom we know gave birth to him, he could become tamei to her (the Torah therefore has to write “his mother” to teach us that he cannot become tamei to her). And if the Torah would have only written for his mother (that the nazir may not become tamei to), we would have thought that it is only the mother that he cannot become tamei to for her children’s lineage is not reckoned through her, but regarding his father, where the halacha is that family is determined by the father, he could become tamei to him (the Torah therefore has to write “his father” to teach us that he cannot become tamei to him).

The following question is asked: Why is the fact that we cannot prove for certain that the Kohen Gadol’s father is truly his father grounds to suggest that the Kohen Gadol may not become tamei to his father? If his father is not his actual father, for that very reason he should be permitted to become tamei to him! If the deceased man (a Kohen) is not his father, the Kohen Gadol is in all probability a Yisroel! Why would we think that he cannot become tamei to him, for he might not be his father? That is precisely the reason why he should be able to become tamei to him!

The Rashba ask a similar question on the Toras Kohanim (Parshas Emor). The verse states that an ordinary Kohen is permitted to become tamei to his father and mother. The Toras Kohanim notes that had the verse said only that he may become tamei to his mother, we might have thought that he would be forbidden to become tamei to his father, because his father is only his father based upon a presumption. He asks that the possibility that the man is not his father should not be a reason to forbid him from becoming tamei to him. On the contrary, it is precisely the reason to permit him to become tamei to him, because if this man is not his father, he is not a Kohen altogether!

The Chasam Sofer (based on Rishonim) explains it as follows: We are dealing with a case where this man was presumed to be a Kohen. He performed the service in the Beis Hamikdosh for many years. When his father dies, if not for the fact that the Torah explicitly permits him to become tamei to him, it would be forbidden. Even though on the chance that the deceased is not his father, he would be a Yisroel, he still would be forbidden to become tamei to him. This is because the verse states: You shall sanctify him, for he offers up the food offering of your God. Since he was allowed to perform the service in the Beis Hamikdosh (based on the presumption that he is indeed a Kohen), he is forbidden to contaminate himself with corpse tumah, even if he is a Yisroel. His sanctity comes about because of his service. This would be the explanation in our Gemora as well.

Read more!