Friday, April 25, 2008

Summary of the Specifications, Generalizations, Limitations and Extensions

Generalization and a specification – only the specifics mentioned are included.

Specification and a generalization – everything is included.

Generalization, specification and a generalization – other cases must resemble the specifications mentioned at least in one way.

Specification, generalization and a specification - other cases must resemble the specifications mentioned in two ways.

Limitation and extension – everything except for one thing is included.

Extension and limitation - other cases must resemble the limitations mentioned.

Extension, limitation and extension - everything except for one thing is included.

Limitation, extension and limitation – there is no such type. (Hame’or)

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Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Benefits of a Nazir

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 34a) had stated: There are three different types of prohibitions relevant to a nazir. He is forbidden to become tamei through corpse tumah; he may not shave his head; he is prohibited from eating grapes or drinking wine and anything that comes from a vine.

Reb Tzadok in Pri Tzadik (Naso) explains that abstaining from these three things can be a remedy for the three things that can cause a person to be driven out of this world. Growing one’s hair can be a cure for the character traits of jealousy and anger. Refraining from eating or drinking any product that comes from a vine can be a remedy for desire. Withholding from becoming tamei can be an antidote for someone who chases after his own honor. This is because of the fact that one who pursues honor can be punished with death. This can be proven from the Torah, where after the snake convinced Adam and Chava to eat from the tree of knowledge, where they were told that would be like Hashem, the concept of death was brought into this world.

K’zayis and Revi’is

The Mishna had stated: And he will not be liable for lashes until he eats a k’zayis (size of an olive) from the grapes. According to the earlier Mishna, a nazir will not be liable until he drinks a revi’is (one-fourth of a log) of wine. Rabbi Akiva said: Even if he soaked his bread in wine and there is enough in it to equal a k’zayis, he will be liable. (Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the earlier Mishna, and holds that even regarding drinking wine, the amount for which a nazir incurs lashes is a k’zayis, which is the amount displaced from a full cup of wine when an olive is placed within it; therefore, edibles combine with liquid to equal a k’zayis. He also teaches us that a permissible item can combine to equal the amount needed to be liable.)

The Bartenura explains the first opinion of the Mishna to be like Rabbi Akiva that a nazir will be liable for eating a k’zayis of grapes or drinking a k’zayis of wine. The early Mishna maintains the exact opposite that he will only be liable if he eats a revi’is of grapes or drinks a revi’is of wine.

Rabbeinu Tam asks on this explanation: Why would the Tanna of the Mishna first state the later Mishna’s opinion, then teach the early Mishna’s ruling and then return to the later teaching? He asks other questions as well.

Tosfos therefore explains that when the Mishna taught that the required amount to be liable for grapes is a k’zayis, that is according to everyone. There is only an argument regarding drinking. According to the early Mishna, it is a revi’is, and according to Rabbi Akiva, it is a k’zayis.

The Rambam rules that a nazir is liable if he eats a k’zayis of grapes, and he would be liable if he drinks a revi’is of wine. It would emerge that he is ruling according to the earlier Mishna. This is extremely odd, for the ruling is usually according to the later teaching!

The Brisker Rav explains that the Mishna actually lists three opinions. The Tanna Kamma holds that grapes are a k’zayis and wine is a revi’is. The Rambam rules that this is indeed the halacha. The second opinion is the early Mishna which rules that he is not liable unless he eats or drinks the equivalent of a revi’is. Rabbi Akiva holds that everything is a k’zayis.

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Tuesday, April 22, 2008

The Annonymous Man

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 32b) had stated: They (six people) were walking on a road, and there was one person coming towards them. One of them said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is So-and-so,” and a second one said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is not So-and-so.” The third one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is a nazir,” and the fourth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is not a nazir.” The fifth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that both of you (the first two) are nezirim.” The sixth person said, “I am hereby a nazir that all of you (the first five) are nezirim.”

Tosfos explains the rationale of each person: They (six people) were walking on a road, and there was one person coming towards them, who could not be identified from afar. One of them said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is So-and-so,” for he was convinced that he recognized the far away person to be Reuven.

The second one said, “I am hereby a nazir that this person is not So-and-so,” for he was in fact certain that the person was not Reuven.

The third one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is a nazir,” for he figured that one of them was certainly correct.

The fourth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that one of you (the first two) is not a nazir.” He is in essence saying the same as the third one, except it is the converse of his declaration.

The fifth one said, “I am hereby a nazir that both of you (the first two) are nezirim,” for he thinks that both of them should be a nazir since they both accepted upon themselves nezirus according to what they honestly thought to be the truth.

The sixth person said, “I am hereby a nazir that all of you (the first five) are nezirim,” for in his opinion, they should all be nezirim.

Retracting from Nezirus and Hekdesh

The Mishna had stated: Beis Hillel rules that none of them are nezirim except the one whose words were not fulfilled.

The Gemora asks: Why is he a nazir if his words were not fulfilled?

Rav Yehudah emends the Mishna to say that none of them are nezirim except the one whose words were fulfilled.

Abaye says: The case is where he added, “If it is not So-and-so, I am hereby a nazir.” (The novelty of this ruling is that he may retract from his original statement if his retraction was within the time of an utterance.) [Accordingly] What does Beis Hillel mean when they said, “His words did not come to fruition?” They meant that his first words did not come to fruition; only his second words.

The Tiferes Tziyon writes that this would be a distinction between the halachos of a nazir and the halachos regarding hekdesh. If one vows to become a nazir under a certain condition and immediately retracts, we accept his second declaration, for his intention is to become a nazir. However, regarding hekdesh, we would not allow one to retract from a vow declaring something to be hekdesh.

The Be’er Moshe disagrees and states that just like one may immediately retract from his nezirus vow, he may retract from a hekdesh declaration as well. He concludes that since the Rambam rules that one may not retract from hekdesh, even within the time of an utterance, it is apparent that he does not rule like our Gemora, and one may not retract from a nezirus vow either.

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Chanah and Elkanah

The Mishna had stated: A father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, but a mother cannot impose a nezirus vow on her son.

The Redak (Shmuel I, 1:11) asks: How could Chanah’s vow of nezirus for Shmuel her son be effective? Our Mishna rules explicitly that only a father can impose upon his son a nezirus vow, but a mother cannot impose a nezirus vow on her son! Furthermore, he is astounded that Chazal do not discuss this matter at all; not in the Medrash or Gemora!

In the sefer Ziv Halevanon, he cites the Sforno, who says that when Elkanah (Shmuel’s father) said (ibid. v.23), Do whatever is good in your eyes, he was in essence agreeing to his wife. By demonstrating his consent, it was regarded as if he declared the nezirus for his son.

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Sheitel

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Nazir 28) had stated: This ruling only applies upon the conclusion of her nezirus; however, if she was bringing the korbanos because she became tamei, the husband may revoke her nezirus, for her husband can say, “I am not interested in having an abstinent wife.” Rabbi Meir said: Even upon the conclusion of her nezirus taharah, he may revoke her vow, for the husband can say, “I am not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.”

The Gemora explains the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna: Since it is possible for her to wear a wig, he cannot claim that he is not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.

Rabbi Meir would hold that the husband is not interested in having his wife wear a wig (his wife wearing someone else’s hair is repulsive to him).

The Beis Yitzchak asks on the Tanna Kamma: Even though she can wear a wig, it will still not be pleasing for the husband, because she will not be permitted to go outside in a public domain on Shabbos with it!

The Mishna Lemelech answers: The reason why a woman is forbidden to walk outside on Shabbos with a wig is because she might take it off and carry it four amos in a public domain. Here, where she has no hair, we are not concerned that she will show her wig to her friends because it is humiliating to her.

It is brought in the name of the Shiltei Geborim that our Gemora is a proof that married women are permitted to be seen publicly with a wig on their head. Some poskim held that it was forbidden because the hair of a woman is regarded as ervah, and cannot be seen.

The Be’er Sheva disagrees and refutes the proof. He maintains that it is only permitted if she wears a covering besides the wig. And on the contrary; it is evident from our Gemora that only women without hair would wear a wig. This was to appease the husband, for otherwise she would be repulsive to him. An ordinary woman, however, would not wear a wig, and it is in fact forbidden.

The Magen Avraham rules that a wig is permitted.

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