Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 4 - PROHIBITION AGAINST DELAYING

There are two braisos that enumerate the obligations that are subject to the prohibition against delaying. The first braisa lists one who makes a vow obligating him to give his value to the treasury of the Beis Hamikdosh, one who consecrates a specific object to the Beis Hamikdosh and one who states that he will give the fixed value of himself or someone else to the Beis Hamikdosh treasury. The second braisa lists other obligations as well. Included in the listing are many korbanos offerings such as a chatos, asham, olah and shelamim. Also included in this listing are leket, shich’chah and peah. One is commanded to leave certain portions of his land or produce for the poor.

Rabbi Isser Zalman Meltzer comments that there is a fundamental dispute between the two braisos. The first braisa maintains that one is not subject to the prohibition against delaying except by matters that the person obligated himself through his words. Any oath or vow will be subject to this prohibition. The second braisa holds that one can be subject to the prohibition against delaying by any obligation that he has, even if the commitment did not come about by his words.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 4 - THE TORAH IS PRECIOUS TO THE JEW

The Gemora explains a verse in Tehilim to mean the following: Since the Torah is precious to the Jews as a female dog to gentiles; they will receive the golden jewelry of Ophir.

The comparison is astounding and needs to be explained. The Netziv explains that a gentile’s infatuation and attraction to a female dog cannot be explained and cannot be fathomed by an ordinary person. So too, the love that Klal Yisroel have to the Torah cannot be understood by someone who doesn’t possess the desire to learn. Torah and Klal Yisroel are one and the same. The soul of a Jew is bound to the Torah.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana - DOG DRINKING WINE

The Gemora offered proof that Daryavesh morally deteriorated later on in life from a verse which states that he had a female dog which he would sodomize. This dog was as beloved to him as a queen. This is based on the word ‘sheigel’ meaning a female dog.

The Gemora asks from the next verse which seems to state that Daryavesh’s ‘sheigel’ drank wine. If ‘sheigel’ means a female dog, is a dog able to drink wine? The Gemora answered that he can train a dog to drink wine.

There was once an incident where a dog entered a wine cellar and drank some wine from an opened barrel. There were those that held that the dog owner should be liable to pay since this should be included in the animal damages listed in the Mishna in Bava Kamma, where the owner is responsible.

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank ruled that the dog owner is exempt from paying. His ruling was based on our Gemora that states that it’s abnormal for a dog to drink wine. The payment incurred from an unusual case is considered a penalty and Beis Din does not issue rulings on penalties since the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 4 - Highlights

DARYAVESH’S DETORIORATION

 Rabbi Yitzchak explains two contradictory verses in Ezra regarding Daryavesh’s reign. One verse calculates his reign as beginning from Nissan and the other verse counts his years from Tishrei. The first verse was at the time that Daryavesh was still righteous, however the second verse, which is discussing Ezra’s ascent to Eretz Yisroel, is referring to Daryavesh at a time in his life when his character changed for the worse and therefore his years were dated from Tishrei like any gentile king.

The Gemora questions if Daryavesh actually degenerated for it is written that Daryavesh instructed the governors of Judah to supply the Jews with whatever they may need for the Beis Hamikdosh and to do so every day. Rabbi Yitzchak answers that Daryavesh did this for his own selfish reasons and not for the sake of Heaven.

The Gemora cites a braisa which states that one who performs a mitzva with the intention of receiving a reward is regarded as being completely righteous. The Gemora qualifies this ruling as only referring to a Jew, however for a gentile to be considered righteous; he must perform the mitzva for the sake of Heaven.

The Gemora presents proof that Daryavesh soured from a verse which states that he instructed the builders to construct the Beis Hamikdosh with rows of marble and with wood. Daryavesh wanted wood as one of the materials to ensure that he will be able to burn the walls with fire if the Jews will rebel against him. Daryavesh strategically placed the wood on the bottom in order that the building will collapse if burned.

The Gemora offers further proof that Daryavesh morally deteriorated later on in life from a verse which states that he had a female dog which he would sodomize. This dog was as beloved to him as a queen. (3b – 4a)

NEW YEAR OF NISSAN

 The Mishna had stated that the first of Nissan is considered the New Year in regards to the festivals. The Gemora questions this since Pesach is on the fifteenth of Nissan. Rav Chisda answers that the Mishna means that Nissan is the month that has the New Year for the festivals in it.

The Gemora clarifies the halachic implications of this New Year. One who makes a vow to offer a sacrifice to the Beis Hamikdosh has a commandment not to delay. Rabbi Shimon, who is the Tanna of our Mishna, maintains that one will transgress this commandment if he waits three festivals and does not bring the korban. The three festivals must be in succession, with Pesach being the first. (4a)

DO NOT DELAY

 There are several different opinions cited in a braisa as to when a person will have transgressed the commandment of not delaying. One Tanna holds that if any three festivals pass without the korban being brought, he has violated this commandment. Rabbi Shimon maintains that one will transgress this commandment if he waits three festivals and does not bring the korban. Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that he transgressed the commandment as soon as one festival passes. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that he is liable if two festivals pass. Rabbi Elozar holds that he violates this commandment if the Festival of Sukkos passes. The Gemora cites the sources for each one of the opinions. (4a – 4b)

FESTIVALS

 In the course of the discussion pertaining to the commandment of not delaying, the Gemora learns out other halachos as well. One is obligated to bring a shelamim offering on the first day of every festival. The Gemora learns that there is a seven day compensation period for anyone that didn’t bring the korban. The exception is Sukkos, which actually has eight days of compensation.

Shmini Atzeres, the eighth day of Sukkos is considered an independent festival in regards to six matters. (4b)

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashanah 4 - Lekavod Shabbos

The Gemara states that Rabbi Yonah compares all the festivals to each other, in that all the festivals atone for the ritual contamination of the Bais HaMikdash and consecrated matter. The Maharal in Chiddushei Aggados to Shabbos 119b writes that unlike the festivals, which are distinct from each other, the Shabbosos of the year are all linked to each other. The reason for this is because Shabbos reflects the idea that HaShem created the world in six days and rested on the seventh day. Thus, when the good angel sees that one’s candle is lit, his table is set, and his bed is made on Friday night, then the good angel declares that so shall it be every Shabbos, i.e. all the Shabbos of the year should be this way as well.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 3 - MENTIONING SHABBOS

Rabbi Elozar learns from a different source that kings are counted from the month of Nissan. It is written in Divrei Hayomim regarding Shlomo Hamelech “He began to build in the second month, in the second, in the fourth year of his sovereignty.” The words ‘in the second’ are extra. Why are those words repeated? Rabbi Elozar explains it to be referring to the second month from when the king’s reign is counted. It is evident that the second month of the year, Iyar is the second month of the king’s year, which starts in Nissan.

The Gemora explains that the extra words ‘in the second’ cannot be referring to the second day of the week since we do not find such a term written in the Torah.

Tosfos cites from a Yerushalmi that the verse in Breishis “There was evening, there was morning, a second day” is not referring to the day of the week but rather to the second day of Creation.

Sfas Emes asks from several verses in Parshas B’shalach that state that the manna fell on the sixth day. He answers that perhaps our Gemora was only referring to the second day but other days of the week are mentioned in the Torah.
The Ramban in Parshas Bo points out that other nations assign intrinsic names to the days of week (such as Sunday, Monday . . . or dimanche, lundi . . .) whereas we denominate every day relative to Shabbos (yom rishon, - “first day” - yom sheni - “second day . . B’Shabbos). This is a fulfillment of the mitzvah “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.” This is similar to the custom of Shamai who would eat every day in honor of Shabbos. When he would find a better-quality animal, he would say that this should be set aside for Shabbos. This is why we mention every day in the ‘song of the day’ that today is the first day from Shabbos.

Rav Yeruchem Fishel Perlow in his classic commentary on Rabbeinu Sadya Gaon writes that it is apparent from our Gemora not like the Ramban since the Gemora states unequivocally that we do not find the term ‘second day of the week in the Torah.’ The Yerushalmi adds that this calculation is not found in the Torah. According to the Ramban that it’s a mitzvah to mention the days of the week in this manner, why don’t we find the names of the days mentioned in this manner in the Torah?

Rav Nosson Grossman in his sefer Poseach Shaar offers a novel approach to explain the Ramban and our Gemora. There is a mitzvah to count the days of the week relative to Shabbos providing that this will bring about sanctity for this Shabbos or the Shabbos in the future. One who relates that a certain incident occurred on the second day since Shabbos does not sanctify the Shabbos at all. The custom of Shamai to designate an animal for this Shabbos, stating in the ‘song of the day’ that today is the second day of the Shabbos and writing in a divorce contract the day relative to Shabbos are all sanctifying this Shabbos and one fulfills the mitzvah of “Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it.”

I found the following discussion in the Hearos blog on the daf related to our issue.

Hearos/

When we refer to the day of the week as "rishon b'Shabbos, sheini b'Shabbos".... Does it mean: 1. Day one from Shabbos. 2. Day one to Shabbos 3. Day one of the week?
The Beis Shmuel (Even Haezer 126:7) says that in Gittin we should write "b'Shabbos" and not "l'Shabbos" because the language "l'Shabbos" implies from Shabbos including Shabbos. Therefore, "l'Shabbos" would imply Shabbos is day 1, Sunday is day 2, Monday is day 3 etc. But now that we say "b'Shabbos" the problem is solved. Although I can't prove it, it seems to me that "b'Shabbos" also implies that we are counting from Shabbos, just that the language "b'Shabbos" indicates that Shabbos is not included in the number so that "sheini b'Shabbos" would correctly refer to Monday. Just as "l'Shabbos" is clearly counting from Shabbos, so too "b'Shabbos" is counting from Shabbos without including Shabbos in the count.

It would seem to me that according to the Poseach Shaar, this would not be the case. There is no mitzvah to mention that today is the second day since Shabbos. That is ancient history. The point of mentioning Shabbos is to sanctify the present Shabbos or the future Shabbos. Therefore, the meaning of “rishon b’Shabbos” is today is the first day of the week leading up to the upcoming Shabbos.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 3 - STORY FROM THE DAF

Tosfos quotes a Medrash that states that the king of Arad was actually Amalek. The Yalkut adds that they dressed and spoke like the Canaanites. Amalek changed their language to speak in the Canaanite tongue, so that the Jews would pray to their G-d to give the Canaanites into their hands, but they were not Canaanites. When they came close to the Jews, it was apparent by their faces that they were from Amalek.

Reb Chaim Volozin was once walking in the streets of Peterburg. A young gentile approached him and gave him a beating. Reb Chaim was very interested to discover the name of this gentile lad. He found out that this was Alexander, the son of Czar Nikolai.

Reb Chaim was asked as to why he was so curious to learn the name of the boy. Reb Chaim responded that his Rebbe, the Vilna Gaon, had given over to him the signs of recognizing who is a descendant of Amalek. Reb Chaim said that he noticed all the symbols on the face of that ‘sheigetz.’

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 3 - WAS KORESH A JEW?

Rabbi Avahu explained that Koresh was a righteous king and therefore his reign was calculated from Nissan as they would do for the Jewish kings.

It is evident from this Gemora that Koresh was a gentile.

Tosfos comments that Koresh was the son of Esther. This can be found in several Medrashim.

The question is obvious that if Koresh is the son of Esther, he is not a gentile but rather a Jew. The Gemora in Yevamos (45b) rules that a gentile that lives with a Jewish woman and has a child, the child is indeed Jewish. The Rambam in Hilchos Issurei Biah (15:3) rules according to this Gemora as well. Why does our Gemora state that he was a righteous gentile and that is the reason his years were calculated from Nissan? The Gemora could have answered that Koresh was a Jew and that is why his years are counted from Nissan?

Rashi’s opinion is that a gentile that lives with a Jewish woman and has a child, that child is a gentile and the meaning of the Gemora that states that he is kosher means that he is not considered illegitimate. If the child would be a Jew, he must be considered illegitimate since he is the product of two people that cannot be married to each other.

Rav Elyashiv Shlita answers that in the times of Koresh the ruling was that the child is a gentile and that is why the Gemora inquired as to why the counting of his years was from Nissan. It was only afterwards that the ruling was established that the child is considered a Jew.

This would be similar to the ruling in the times of Boaz. Until the time of Boaz, it was ruled that one is not permitted to marry an Amonis woman. This is why Ploni Almoni refused to marry Rus. It was only after Boaz ruled that she was permitted that the halacha was established for the future that an Amonis is indeed permitted.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 3 - Highlights

COUNT FROM NISSAN

 Rabbi Yochanan cites a scriptural verse proving that kings are counted from the month of Nissan. He learns from a verse in Kings that the same way the years after the Exodus from Egypt are reckoned from Nissan, so too the years of the king are counted from Nissan.

The Gemora questions the premise that regarding the Exodus from Egypt, we count the years from Nissan; perhaps the count is from Tishrei? The Gemora proves from several Scriptural verses that the count cannot be from Tishrei. However in conclusion, the Gemora rejects Rabbi Yochanan’s viewpoint since perhaps the years were counted from Tamuz, Av or Adar. The Gemora does cite a braisa supporting Rabbi Yochanan.

Rabbi Elozar learns from a different source that kings are counted from the month of Nissan. It is written in Divrei Hayomim regarding Shlomo Hamelech “He began to build in the second month, in the second, in the fourth year of his sovereignty.” The words ‘in the second’ are extra. Why are those words repeated? Rabbi Elozar explains it to be referring to the second month from when the king’s reign is counted. It is evident that the second month of the year, Iyar, is the second month of the king’s year, which starts in Nissan. (2b – 3a)


JEWISH KINGS – NISSAN
GENTILE KINGS - TISHREI

 Rav Chisda qualifies the ruling of the Mishna and states that our Mishna’s ruling that Nissan is the New Year for kings is only referring to Jewish Kings, however in regards to gentile kings, we count from Tishrei. This is proven from two verses in Nechemia. The first verse states that in the month of Kislev, in the twentieth year, Nechemia was notified of the pathetic condition of the Jews residing in Yerushalayim. It is further written that in the month of Nissan, in the twentieth year of Artachshasta (a Persian king), Nechemia requested permission from the king to build the walls of Yerushalayim. Since the first event took place in Kislev and the second in Nissan and they are both described as taking place in the twentieth year of Artachshasta, it is obvious that there was not a New Year between them. This proves that the New Year for gentile kings cannot be in Nissan and thus we assume that the New Year for them is Tishrei.

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The Gemora questions the proof: How do we know that the Kislev event preceded the incident that happened in Nissan? Perhaps the Nissan incident occurred prior to the Kislev event, thereby explaining why they are both described as happening in Artachshasta’s twentieth year and Nissan can still be considered the New Year for gentile kings?

This question is answered by citing a braisa which states explicitly that the matters that were told to Nechemia in Kislev were repeated by Nechemia to the king in Nissan.

Rav Yosef challenged Rav Chisda’s ruling from the verses in Chagai. It is written that the people resumed construction of the Beis Hamikdosh on the twenty-fourth day of the month, in the sixth month, in the second year of Daryavesh. In the next verse, it states that in the seventh month on the twenty-first day of the month, Hashem told Chagai that the splendor of this Beis Hamikdosh will be greater that of the first one. According to Rav Chisda, the second verse should have stated “In the seventh month of the third year” since the seventh month is Tishrei and Tishrei is the beginning of the New Year for gentile kings.

Rabbi Avahu answers that Koresh was a righteous king and therefore his reign was calculated from Nissan as they would do for the Jewish kings.

Rav Yosef questions how Rav Avahu’s statement that Koresh was righteous has any bearing on the verses in Chagai which are discussing Daryavesh. The Gemora answers that we learned in a braisa that Koresh, Daryavesh and Artachshasta are all the same person. He is referred to as Koresh since he was righteous. He is called Artachshasta since that is the royal title for all the Persian kings. His name was actually Daryavesh. (3a – 3b)

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 2 - Names of the Months

It is noteworthy that the Mishna states the names of the months according to their names given to them during the Babylonian Exile.

The Ritva writes that the same way the Torah does not give designated names for the days of the week, so too there are no designated names for the months, rather they are identified by number in reference to the month of Nissan which the Torah states is the first month of the Year. This is because it is through this that we can constantly remind ourselves about the Exodus from Egypt. The names Nissin, Iyar etc. are names originating from the Persians that we became accustomed to when we were in Exile.

The Ramban in Parshas Bo writes in his commentary to explain the following verse. (translation of the Ramban taken from OU.org)

“Hashem said to Moshe and Aharon in the Land of Egypt, 'This month shall be for you the beginning of the months; it shall be for you the first of the months of the year.' " (Shemot, 12:1-2)

"The verses mean that this month should be counted first. And beginning with it, should the count proceed to the second, the third, and so on, till the end of the sequence of months with the twelfth month. For the purpose that this month should be a commemoration of the Great Miracle. For every time we mention the months, the Miracle will be alluded to. It is for that reason that the months do not have names in the Torah, but rather they are identified by number…"

"And it is similar to the way that days are referenced with reference to the Day of Shabbat; for example, the First Day of Shabbat (for Sunday), and the Second Day of Shabbat (for Monday), as I will explain in the future…Thus, when we call the Month of Nisan "the first" and Tishrei "the seventh," the meaning is the first with reference to the Redemption and the seventh with reference to it…"

"And our Rabbis have mentioned this matter, and they said that the names of the months came back with us from Bavel. For originally they had no "names" for us, and the reason is that they were "in commemoration of the Exodus from Egypt." But when we returned from Bavel, and the prophecy of "it will no longer be said 'by the Life of Hashem, who took the Jewish People out of Egypt,' rather it will be said 'by the life of Hashem, who raised up and brought the People of Israel from the Northern Land' (Yirmiyahu 16:14-15) was fulfilled, we changed our practice and began to call the months by the names which were used in those lands, as a reminder that we had been there, and that it was from there that Hashem took us out…"

"For these names, Nisan, Iyar and the rest are Persian names, and appear only in the Books of the Prophets who prophesied in Bavel, and in Megilas Esther… And still today, the non-Jews in those lands use the names Nisan and Tishrei, etc. as we do. And thus we are following the same practice with reference to the second redemption as we did in connection with the first."

Rav Yeruchem Fishel Perlow in his classic commentary on Rabbeinu Sadya Gaon writes that there is a dispute as to how to understand the Ramban. The Abarbanel maintains that there still exists a mitzvah nowadays to count the months according to Nissan, thereby remembering the Exodus from Egypt. However, when they left Bavel, they wanted to be reminded of the Babylonian Exile as well and therefore the months are called by their Persian names. Sefer Haikrim holds that when they left Bavel, the Prophets abolished the mitzvah of counting the months according to the Exodus from Egypt and instituted that the months should be counted only according to the Babylonian Exile.

The Binyan Shlomo states that it is impossible to say like the Sefer Haikrim since a mitzvah cannot be abolished. A prophet does not have the ability to annul a Biblical obligation. Furthermore, he cites verses throughout Scripture that count the months according to the Exodus from Egypt.

Rav Yeruchem Fishel states that from the fact that the Mishnayos mention the months according to their Persian name, it is a proof to the explanation of the Ein Yaakov who explains the Ramban to mean that there is no obligation to count the months according to the Exodus from Egypt, rather if one is counting the months, he cannot count them according to any other order but from Nissan. If one wants to call the months a different name, he may do so.

The Binyan Shlomo learns differently and states that the obligation to count the months according to the Exodus from Egypt was only given to the Beis Din when they were sanctifying the new moon. He cites Rashi who maintains that the names of the months that we have now did not originate from the Persians, rather, the Members of the Great Assembly saw with divine spirit that these should be the names of the months and that there are hidden secrets involved in each one of the names.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 2 - IS MONARCHY AN INHERITANCE OR NOT?

The Gemora stated that if one king died during the month of Adar and another king succeeded him in Nissan, we count the first year according to the first king and the second year according to the second king. The Gemora explains this case to be referring to a case where it was decided in the month of Adar who should be the second king and he was the son of the previous king. One would think that since the kingdom is an inheritance passed down from the father to his son, it should be regarded as the second king’s reign began in Adar. The braisa teaches us that this is not so and the reign begins when he actually ascends the throne.

The Rambam in Hilchos Melochim (1:7) rules that when the son of a king is appointed to become the king after his father died, there is no need to anoint him since the monarchy is an inheritance which is passed down from father to son.

The Chasam Sofer (O”C 12) asks that if so, why does our Gemora learn that the son is not the king until Nissan and what is all the deliberation about? As soon as the father died in Adar, his son should automatically ascend the throne and become the king?

He answers that there is a distinct difference between the inheritance of the Jewish Kings and those of the Gentiles. By us, it is not automatic that a son who is a fool or an imbecile will succeed his father in becoming the king. He will ascend the throne only if he is fit for it. If the son is an appropriate choice to become the king, it is an inheritance and he takes preference over someone else even if the other person is better qualified. This is the deliberation that our Gemora is referring to.

However, the question is not completely resolved since after the deliberation and the decision that the son is suitable to become the king, shouldn’t he become king automatically? Why was it necessary to wait for Nissan to formally appoint him as the king?

HaRav Elyashiv Shlita answers that while it is true that he becomes the king immediately after the conclusion of their deliberation, he is not considered the king in regards to contracts and documents until he actually ascends the throne and that took place in Nissan. The Sages instituted this in order for it to be extremely clear as to when the king’s year began.

Rabbi Dovid Goldberg cites a Meiri and a Chinuch (497) that one is not considered a king unless there is approval from the entire nation and if they do not approve, he is not regarded as the king. According to this, we can answer that initially the Chachamim deliberated to perceive if the son is fit and after they reached their conclusion in Adar, he still may not ascend the throne until the nation agreed to their decision and that transpired in Nissan.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 2 - Highlights

FOUR NEW YEARS

The Mishna enumerates as to when a new year begins for four different matters. The first day of Nissan is the New Year for the kings and for the festivals. The first day of Elul is considered the New Year for animal tithing. Rabbi Elozar and Rabbi Shimon disagree and hold that the New Year for animal tithing is on the first day of Tishrei. The first day of Tishrei is the New Year for reckoning the years, for the Shemitah (a Sabbatical year which occurred every seven years in which farmland had to remain uncultivated), for the Yovel (the 50th year after seven cycles of Sabbatical year), for the sapling (one is not permitted to derive any pleasure from fruits that grow from trees which are less than three years old) and for vegetable tithing. The first day of Shevat is the New Year for the trees according to Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel maintains that it is on the fifteenth. (2a)

FIXED DATE FOR EVERY KING

The Gemora inquires as to what was the purpose for having a fixed date to establish the New Year for the king. Why can’t each king start his new year on the anniversary of his appointment to become the king?
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The Gemora explains the importance of having a New Year for kings is to precisely date a contract. It is with this date that we will be able to determine if a document is predated. Predated contracts are invalid because a lender could use it to illegally repossess properties that the borrower sold prior to the genuine date of the loan but after the date written down in the contract. If the years of every king’s reign do not begin on the same date and we forget when the king’s reign began, it could be difficult to ascertain if the contract is predated. (2a)

RECKONING THE YEARS

We learned in a braisa that if the king began his reign on the 29th of Adar, as soon as the first day of Nissan arrives, a year is reckoned for him. It is learned from here that even one day in a year can be regarded as a year. The braisa continues that if he was appointed on the first day of Nissan, a year will be counted for him on the following Nissan, even if the decision to appoint him as the king was made in the month of Adar. (2a – 2b)

TWO KINGS

We learned in a braisa that if one king died during the month of Adar and another king was appointed during that same month, we can count the remaining portion of the year to either king. If one king dies in Nissan and another king was appointed during that same month, we can count the remaining portion of the year to either king. If one king died during the month of Adar and another king succeeded him in Nissan, we count the first year according to the first king and the second year according to the second king. The Gemora explains this last case to be referring to a case where it was decided in the month of Adar who should be the second king and he was the son of the previous king. One would think that since the kingdom is an inheritance passed down from the father to his son, it should be regarded as the second king’s reign began in Adar. The braisa teaches us that this is not so and the reign begins when he actually ascends the throne. (2b)

COUNT FROM NISSAN

Rabbi Yochanan cites a scriptural verse proving that kings are counted from the month of Nissan. He learns from a verse in Kings that the same way the years after the Exodus from Egypt are reckoned from Nissan, so too the years of the king are counted from Nissan. (2b)

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 2 - Counting the Months

THE DAFYOMI DISCUSSION LIST

brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Yerushalayim

Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld

daf@dafyomi.co.il

Rosh Hashanah 002: Counting Months

avrohom adler asked:

can you explain pshat in the ein yaakov that learns the ramban in parshas bo as follows. there is no positive mitzva to count the months acc to nissan however if one is counting them, it must be from nissan and not from tishrei l'zichron haneis hagadol.

If we are so concerned to remember yetzias mitzrayim in the months why isnt the mitzva that way always and therefore it should be ussur to say nissan , iyar, etc.? (minchas chinuch 311 agrees with ein yaakov)

avrohom adler, usa

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The Kollel replies:

Reb Avrohom,

The Ramban himself explains why it is permissible and even important to use the Persian names. Here is a copy of our Insights to Shabbos 129 where we address that issue.

Be well,

Mordecai Kornfeld

3) USING THE SECULAR NAMES OF DAYS AND DATES

We have seen how the days of the week are derived from the names of gods in Greek and Norse mythology (see previous Insight). This raises the question of whether it is permissible for a Jew to refer to the days of the week by such names. This question is related to the broader question of whether a Jew may refer to the months of the year by their Julian names, four of which are named after Roman gods (January, named after Janus, known as the god of the doorway; March, named after Mars, the god of war; May, named after Maia, the goddess of plant growth; June, from junius, Latin for Juno, the queen goddess and wife of Jupiter).

Similarly, is one permitted to refer to the year by the number used by the Gregorian calendar, which refers to the year of the death of the god of the Nazarenes?

Furthermore, is one permitted to refer to the hours of the day (e.g., 6:00 in the morning), which begin their count from midnight? The count of hours from midnight is based on a foreign belief that maintains that their god was born at midnight.

I. MONTHS AND DAYS

QUESTION: There are two reasons to prohibit using the secular names of months and days, as follows. Based on these reasons, are we permitted to use such names?

(a) The MAHARAM SHIK (#117) writes that one should not use the secular names of months, and certainly not the secular count of the months (counting January as the first month). The reason is because the secular system does not make Nisan the first month, and the Torah commands us, with a Mitzvas Aseh, to count the months from Nisan, and to count Nisan as the first month, in order to always remember the redemption from Mitzrayim (RAMBAN to Shemos 12:1). The same logic applies to the days of the week. The Gemara in Beitzah (16a) says that we should refer to the days of the week in reference to Shabbos ("the first day from Shabbos" and "the second day from Shabbos," etc.) as a way of honoring Shabbos. Consequently, we should not be permitted to use the secular names of the days of the week.

(b) The names of the months and the days of the week are based on names of gods that were used in idol worship.

ANSWERS:

(a) The RAMBAN (in Parshas Bo) addresses these questions. With regard to the months, he points out that when the Jewish people returned from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael, they referred to the months with their Babylonian names (which are the names that we now use -- Nisan, Iyar, Sivan, etc.) as a way of commemorating the redemption from Bavel (see TOSFOS to Rosh Hashanah 7a), just as, until then, they counted the months from Nisan in order to remember the redemption from Mitzrayim.

The SEFER HA'IKARIM (3:16) understands that since the exile to Bavel effectively ended the liberty the Jews had enjoyed as a result of the redemption from Mitzrayim (890 years earlier), there was no longer a necessity to count the months from Nisan in order to commemorate the redemption from Mitzrayim (see also CHASAM SOFER, Choshen Mishpat 1, DH Nachzir).

However, the PERUSH HA'KOSEV in the Ein Yakov at the beginning of Megilah (3a) strongly opposes this view and explains that when the Jews left Bavel, they only *added names* to the months; they did *not* change the numbering system. They continued to count the months from Nisan. One is permitted to refer to each month by its name, but when one gives each month a number, he must count the month based on the original system, with Nisan as the first month. This opinion is supported by the GET PASHUT (127:35), MINCHAS CHINUCH (311:3), and RAV OVADYAH YOSEF (in YABI'A OMER 6:9:4). (It is interesting to note that even according to the Perush ha'Kosev, in practice the Sefer ha'Ikarim's conclusion appears to be correct, since once the months were named, it was rare for anyone to refer to a month by its number; see Teshuvos v'Hanhagos 1:830.)

Rav Ovadyah Yosef concludes, therefore, that one should refrain from referring to the months by the secular numbering system (with January as month "1" and so on). (It should be noted that the months of September, October, November, and December are named according to their numbers ("septem," or seven, "octo," or eight, "novem," or nine, and "decem," or ten). However, these numbers are not in reference to January, since two months were added at a later point in time. It happens that they conform to the count from the time of the year which usually corresponds to Nisan.)

RAV MOSHE STERNBUCH shlit'a (in Teshuvos v'Hanhagos 1:830) takes issue with Rav Ovadyah Yosef's ruling. He asserts that the Mitzvah to count the months from Nisan has no bearing on the months of the *solar* year. The Mitzvah applies only to the months of the *lunar* year. Therefore, one is permitted to use even the secular numbering system. (Rav Sternbuch cites support for his approach from the practice of the Brisker Rav and Rav Chaim Soloveitchik.)

Based on a similar line of reasoning, it seems that according to all opinions, one who uses the names of the days of the week and not their numbers does not transgress a Mitzvas Aseh. However, it might be prohibited to refer to the days of the week by a different *numbering* system (for example, to call Monday the first day of the week).

(b) With regard to mentioning the names of idols, since these idols are no longer known or worshipped in the civilized world, one should be permitted to mention their names, since he has no intention to refer to the idols when he says the name of the day or month.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 40 - CHANGE OF HEART

The Gemora stated that public animals are those that go out during the Pesach season, graze in the meadow and return by the first rain of the season. These are considered muktza and cannot be slaughtered on Yom Tov.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach comments that it seems from the Gemora that if these animals would return to the city by themselves before Yom Tov and the owner would decide on Yom Tov to slaughter them, they would nonetheless be regarded as muktza since the owner was particular in deciding that he will bring them back after Yom Tov.

An analogy can be made to utensils that are designated for Pesach use; they are considered muktza on Shabbos even if the owner would decide to use them for chametz during the year.

Rav Shlomo Zalman articulates a distinction between the two cases. The utensils are just as fitting to be used now as they would be on Pesach and perhaps they are not considered muktza. However, an animal when it’s alive is not in actuality a food item. It is regarded as a food item because there is a possibility of slaughtering it which enables it to be eaten. An undomesticated animal while it is grazing outside the city cannot be designated as a food item since in its present state, it is forbidden to slaughter it. This explains why he cannot decide on Yom Tov that he wants to slaughter this animal.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 39 - HEAVENLY FIRE

The Mishna ruled that one who uses a coal of hekdesh for his private purposes will be obligated to bring a korban (asham meilos) for his action. One is Rabbinically forbidden from deriving pleasure from a flame of hekdesh; however there is no korban obligation. This is because a flame is not considered a tangible item.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach inquires as to what the halacha would be regarding the flame of the mizbeach. This fire originated from heaven and cannot be extinguished. Perhaps it is considered tangible and therefore one would be obligated to bring a korban meilah for deriving pleasure from this fire.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 39 - A SAGA OF TWO SALTS

I found this interesting piece here.

By Rabbi Mendel Weinbach
From Ohr Samayach

Sodom-salt is a mysterious ingredient which keeps popping up throughout the Talmud. In Mesechta Chulin (105b) it is described as a salt which can cause blindness if it contacts the eyes. This is why we wash our fingers before saying the blessings after a meal.

Rashi here describes this salt as being very thin and therefore capable of clinging to the fingers without being detected. Our gemara distinguishes between two kinds of salt regarding whether they become part of the food they flavor (and thus can be carried on the holiday only as far as the food can). Rashi concludes that the one which is considered assimilated is the thinner, more soluble Sodom-salt. (Maharim Shif points out that this apparently contradicts Rashi's commentary in Bava Batra (20b) where he describes Sodom-salt as "thick and hard as a rock.")

The salt with which Sodom-salt is contrasted both here and in Bava Batra is Astrokhanite salt. This name - explains the early Talmudic dictionary-type commentary Rabbi Natan the "Aruch" - is based on the area where this salt is found. Rashash suggests that this area is Astokhan (near the Asian part of Russia where the Volga River flows into the Caspian Sea) whose salt is distributed throughout Russia by way of the Volga River.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 38 - RABBI ABBA’S PRAYER

Rabbi Abba went from Bavel to Eretz Yisroel and prayed that Hashem should help that he will say something that the Chachamim of Eretz Yisroel will accept.

It is evident from the discourse of the Gemora that his tefillah was not accepted. The Chasam Sofer explains that his prayer was improper. A person should pray like the tefillah Reb Nechunya ben Hakonah instituted that he should not cause anyone to stumble in a halachic matter. One’s concern in a halachic dispute should not be that his words will be accepted, rather that all sides of the argument should be examined thoroughly and the truth should be determined. A person’s words and theories should be solely for the sake of Hashem, to honor Him and not for his own personal reputation and dignity.

The Marcheses, in his introduction to his sefer, wonders as to why the tefillah of Rabbi Abba was not accepted by all of Klal Yisroel in the same manner as Reb Nechunya ben Hakonah’s tefillah was? Why did Rabbi Abba need this tefillah exclusively when he was traveling from Bavel to Eretz Yisroel? He answers that there are many different styles of learning. It varies according to every location and time. The style of learning in Eretz Yisroel was vastly different than that of Bavel. Rabbi Abba was comfortable in Bavel and his manner of learning and his insights were accepted by the students. He was concerned that his style of learning would not be accepted among the scholars of eretz Yisroel and that is what prompted him to initiate this tefillah.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 38 - Highlights # 1

THE FATTENER AND THE SHEPHERD

Shmuel rules that if one purchases an ox from a fattener on Yom Tov, the ox must remain in the techum boundary of the person who bought the ox. Rashi explains that this halacha applies even if a person from another city buys the ox. The reason why the techum for the ox is established by the buyer even though he was not the owner until after Yom Tov began is because Shmuel holds of the principle of bereira in this case because it is clear that the fattener intends to sell this animal. This law applies even if the purchaser was from another city since it was extremely common for a person to travel from one city to the city where the fattener resides in order to buy an ox from him.

If the ox is purchased from a shepherd, the ox must remain in the techum boundary of the person who bought the ox providing that he is from this city. A shepherd’s animals, which are not specially fattened, are usually only sold to the residents of that particular city. If an outsider bought the ox, the purchaser cannot move the animal outside the techum of the residents of that city. (38a)

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 38 - Highlights # 2

THE BORROWER AND THE LENDER

The Mishna had ruled that one who borrows a utensil from his friend prior to Yom Tov, the techum for the utensil is established by the borrower. This is the halacha even if the utensil was not given over until Yom Tov began. If the utensil is borrowed on Yom Tov, it can only be taken to the techum boundary of the lender. This is the law even in an instance where the borrower is accustomed to borrow from this lender. The lender assumes that since the borrower did not ask to borrow the utensil before Yom Tov, he will be retaining possession of the utensil on Yom Tov and therefore the techum boundary is established according to the lender. (38a)

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 38 - Highlights # 3

THE NULLIFICATION OF THE SALT AND WATER

The Mishna ruled that if a woman borrowed from her friend water and salt for her dough, the dough becomes limited to the techum mutual to both of them.

Rabbi Abba went from Bavel to Eretz Yisroel and prayed that Hashem should help that he will say something that the Chachamim of Eretz Yisroel will accept.

When he arrived there, a group of Amoraim was discussing the aforementioned Mishna and questioned its ruling. The water and the salt are the minority in this mixture and the flour is the majority. Why don’t we say that the water and the salt should become nullified in the dough and only the techum of the flour should apply?

Rabbi Abba offered the following answer: If one kav of wheat belonging to Reuven would become mixed with ten kavin of Shimon’s wheat, would Shimon be permitted to eat the entire mixture and be joyful that he obtained an extra kav? It is evident that this is not the case. Nullification applies in instances of issur and heter, not to financial matters. The ownership of the salt and water cannot be nullified. Boundaries for a techum are determined at the commencement of Yom Tov and at that time the salt and the water belonged to the lender and that cannot be negated.
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The scholars laughed at Rabbi Abba for this explanation.

Rabbi Oshaya justified the scholars’ laughter, stating that Rabbi Abba’s logic is flawed. Rabbi Abba did not mention a case where a kav of wheat became mixed with barley since he would certainly agree that when there are two types of grain, the wheat would become nullified even pertaining to the ownership of the wheat. While it is true that Rabbi Yehuda does not allow nullification when the grains are the same type, the Chachamim do allow it and therefore the wheat will become nullified even pertaining to the ownership.

Rav Safra defended Rabbi Abba’s position by citing Rav who rules regarding someone who picks pebbles from the wheat in his friend’s granary. The one that picked the pebbles must reimburse the seller the worth of the extra wheat that he received equal to the volume of the pebbles that he removed. It is evident that even items that are insignificant, such as pebbles maintain their status as property of the seller. This was Rabbi Abba’s analogy to the salt and water that although they are seemingly insignificant, they nonetheless are still regarded as belonging to the original owner and the techum boundary of the dough must be established by determining the owner of the flour, salt and water.

Abaye asked Rav Safra that there should be a basic distinction between the salt and the pebbles. The pebbles, although worthless, represent value to the owner of the wheat since otherwise he would have to replace the volume of the pebbles with wheat. The salt and water were lent prior to Yom Tov and the owner has no financial interest in owning them. Therefore, it can be stated that the salt and water should be nullified and the pebbles should not.

Rav Safra countered that Abaye’s distinction cannot apply in regards to the laws of techumin. He proves this by citing Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri who rules that even an ownerless item has a techum boundary and cannot be moved more than 2,000 amos away from its original location on Shabbos. It is clear that even if the original owner has no financial interest in the water and salt, they will still have their independent techum boundary, just like an ownerless item.

Abaye concludes his argument by stating that the laws of techumin cannot be compared to the case of the pebbles. The pebbles are solely a financial issue and the principle of nullification does not apply. Techumin, however, is a prohibition and the prohibition is not necessarily connected to the ownership of the items. The prohibition stemming from the salt and the water can be nullified and thus the original question remains intact. (38a – 38b)

The Gemora offers three different answers to the original question.

Abaye answers that the Rabbis were concerned that if they would disregard the boundaries originating from the salt and water, people might mistakenly disregard the owner of the salt and water when two women are making dough together as partners. Obviously in a case of partners, we cannot nullify the prohibitions stemming from the salt and water because they are partners.

Rava adds that the spices cannot be nullified in a pot of cooked food since the spices are added to provide taste and taste can never become nullified in a mixture.

Rav Ashi answers that the principle of nullification cannot apply in this case because it is an object that will become permitted eventually (after Shabbos or Yom Tov) and forbidden objects that will become permitted after time do not become nullified. (38b – 39a)

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 37 - RAV’S SILENCE

Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav as to the reason why he is not concerned about the element of muktza. Since it was clearly their intent to divide the animal, it should be considered as if they each put the other one’s portion out of his mind and therefore each portion should be regarded as muktza. Rav kept quiet and did not answer this question.

The Ran writes that the reason Rav didn’t answer them is because the question didn’t bother him. The Meiri explains that a person does not set aside something that is in his friend’s hand as long as it is fitting for him and therefore it is not considered muktza.

The Rosh writes that the reason Rav was silent was because he agreed with them and didn’t have a response. Tosfos in Bava Basra (62a) comments that whenever the Gemora states that Rav was quiet to Rav Kahana and Rav Assi, it is because he didn’t have a response and therefore retracted from his original ruling.

In the sefer Divrei Torah from the Munkatcher Rebbe, he cites from the Rama Mipano that Rav is in actuality Rabbi Abba who is mentioned in the Zohar as being a student of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai. Whenever it states that Rav was quiet, it is because he received an answer based on the secrets of kabbalah from his mentor Rabbi Shimon and he did not have permission to reveal the hidden reason.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 37 - What Time is the Party?

The Gemora cites a braisa that rules regarding two people that borrowed a garment in partnership. One intended to wear it in the morning to go the Beis Medrash and the other intended to wear it in the evening to go to a party.

The Mishna Berura (397:22) asks that from the simple reading of the braisa, it would seem that the second fellow intended to wear the garment on the second night of Yom Tov. If so, each person should be able to wear the garment and go anywhere in his own complete boundary since the two days of Yom Tov are regarded as two distinct sanctities?

He is compelled to answer that the correct meaning of the braisa is that the second fellow intended to go to a party which was on the first night of Yom Tov.

Reb Menachem Kohn Zt”l in his sefer Ateres Avi answers that perhaps the meaning of the braisa is that the second fellow intended to go a party which was to take place in the afternoon of the first day. The word ‘arvis’ can connote afternoon as well as the evening.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 37 - Highlights

The Gemora explains the reasons for the prohibitions listed in the Mishna. One cannot perform the mitzvah of yibum or chalitza on Yom Tov because there is a concern that it will lead to writing. Rashi states that the worry is that the Beis din (Jewish court of law) will write the contract or documents.

One may not generate any form of consecration on Yom Tov since it resembles a business transaction. Rashi offers two reasons why it is forbidden to conduct business on Yom Tov. Firstly, he cites a verse in Yeshaye which states that it is forbidden to talk about business matters on Yom Tov. A second reason is because business transaction can lead to writing which is Biblically forbidden. (37a)
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The Mishna had ruled that one cannot separate terumah and maasros on Yom Tov. Additionally, one cannot bring the terumos to the kohen. The Gemora qualifies this ruling to be referring to terumah which was separated prior to Yom Tov; however chalah may be separated and given to the kohen from dough that is baked on Yom Tov. (37a)

The Gemora cites the last ruling of the Mishna that the only difference in halacha between Shabbos and Yom Tov is regarding the preparation of food for Yom Tov. This statement is questioned from the previous Mishna which ruled that one may lower the fruits through the skylight in order to prevent a financial loss on Yom Tov but not on Shabbos.

The Gemora attempts to resolve this contradiction by stating that Mishna which rules that certain activities are permitted on Yom Tov to prevent financial loss is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua. The Mishna that equates Shabbos and Yom Tov is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemora presents a dispute regarding an animal and its offspring that fall into a pit on Yom Tov. One is allowed to lug an animal out of a pit providing that it will be slaughtered and used on Yom Tov. It is Biblically prohibited to slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day and therefore it should be permitted to pull only one of the animals out. Rabbi Eliezer rules that one can pull one of the animals out and provide food for the other in the pit in order to sustain it and ensure that it doesn’t die. Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that one is permitted to pull out one of the animals with the intent of slaughtering it on Yom Tov and afterwards he can decide against slaughtering it. Subsequently, he can haul the second one out and decide which of the animals he wants to slaughter.

It is evident that Rabbi Yehoshua permits certain activities to be done on Yom Tov in order to prevent a financial loss and Rabbi Eliezer maintains that this is forbidden.

Abaye rejects this analogy and makes a distinction between the two cases. Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not allow the second animal to be hauled up because it is possible to sustain it where it is presently but he will permit the lowering of the fruits since otherwise they will spoil. Perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua permitted both animals to be pulled up since it is possible to accomplish that through the ploy that he mentioned; however he will prohibit the fruits from being lowered.

The Gemora concludes that the two Mishnayos can represent the opinions of Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel. The Mishna on daf 12 cites a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding transferring objects that are not food related from one domain to another on Yom Tov. Beis Shamai maintains that one cannot carry a child, a lulav, or a Sefer Torah into a public domain and Beis Hillel permits it.

It can be said that Beis Shamai forbids the carrying or handling of objects that are not for the direct purpose of Yom Tov and Beis Hillel allows this. The Gemora questions this comparison by saying that perhaps there is a distinction between carrying and handling. The Gemora answers that the analogy is correct because handling objects on Yom Tov is forbidden as a decree that it will bring about carrying. (37a)

One is limited to walk on Shabbos or Yom Tov more than 2,000 amos beyond the place that is considered his residence. This law applies to objects as well. The Mishna discusses the halachos pertaining to different items and their specific laws.

A person’s animal and his utensils have the same boundary as the person himself. If one gives his animal to his son or a shepherd, the animal has the same boundary as the owner.

The next case the Mishna discusses is where brothers inherited a house and everything in it but have not yet divided them and they presently share the utensils. If a utensil is designated for one brother, this utensil has the same boundary as that specific brother. If it is not designated for any brother, the utensil can only be taken to a place where all the brothers can go. (37a)

The Mishna ruled that one who gives his animal to his son or a shepherd, the animal has the same boundary as the owner.

The Gemora states that this is inconsistent with the viewpoint of Rabbi Dosa who rules that if one gives his animal over to a shepherd, the animal has the same boundary as the shepherd. This is the halacha even if the animal was not given over until after Yom Tov started.

The Gemora answers that Rabbi Dosa is referring to a case where there is only one shepherd in the city and therefore it is evident that the owner will assign the animal to the shepherd. Since they are both aware of this prior to the commencement of Yom Tov, the animal is established in the boundary of the shepherd. (37a – 37b)

The Gemora cites a braisa that rules regarding two people that borrowed a garment in partnership. One intended to wear it in the morning to go the Beis Medrash and the other intended to wear it in the evening to go to a party. One of them made an eruv techumin to the north and the other made one to the south. An eruv techumin is a mechanism where a person can extend the techum in one direction. This is done by placing food before Yom Tov at a place that is within 2,000 amos. This determines that his legal dwelling is at the location of the food. The braisa rules that the garment must remain in an area that is mutual to both people.

The Gemora presents a dispute regarding two people that purchased a barrel and an animal in partnership prior to Yom Tov and they divided it on Yom Tov. Rav rules that they each can take their portion of the wine from the barrel in their complete boundary but the animal must remain in an area which is mutual to both of them. Shmuel maintains that the barrel also must remain in area which is mutual to both of them.

Shmuel’s reasoning is because he does not hold of the principle of bereira and therefore we cannot say that it has been retroactively clarified as to whose portion was whose. Since each person’s portion has some of the others portion included in his, he cannot take the barrel unless it is an area mutual to both of them.

Rav subscribes to the principle of bereira and therefore the portion of wine they received was always considered exclusively theirs and therefore each one can take the wine to his complete boundary. The animal must remain in an area which is mutual to both of them since each portion of the animal comprises nutrients drawn from the others portion.

Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav as to the reason why he is not concerned about the element of muktza. Since it was clearly their intent to divide the animal, it should be considered as if they each put the other one’s portion out of his mind and therefore each portion should be regarded as muktza. Rav kept quiet and did not answer this question. (37b)

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