Insights and More for Daf 11

The Lots for the Goats

The halachah that that the lot (for the two goats) does not assign the goat to Azazel unless it is fit to be the one offered to Hashem can be explained in two ways. Either, that it is a law in the assigning of the lot - to be regarded as a proper lot - they both have to be fit for the chatas which will be offered to Hashem - if one is found to be a tereifah, it is a deficient lot; or perhaps there is an inherent law that the goat being sent to Azazel must be fit to be offered as the chatas for Hashem; a tereifah is therefore disqualified from being the goat sent to Azazel, and that is why it is not considered a lot. 

Rav Elchanan Wasserman in Koveitz Heoros says that a practical difference between the two explanations is if it became a tereifah after the lot. According to the first explanation it is valid because at the time of the lot it was not a tereifah. According to the second understanding, it is still invalid because the goat being sent to Azazel cannot be a tereifah.

As they Intended

The Mishna teaches us that the zomemin witnesses are only punished if they attempted to have someone executed, but they were found to be zomemin before the defendant was executed (as long as it was after the verdict was handed down). However, if they were discredited through hazamah only after the defendant had been executed, they will not be punished. This is derived from the Scriptural verse: as they intended to do; but not as they actually accomplished.

The Kesef Mishnah explains this seemingly perplexing halachah in two manners:

1.       When the zomemin witnesses actually carry out their plan and the accused is executed - such a sin is of such a magnitude that they cannot get punished in this world. The punishment for such a hideous sin can only take place in the next world- in Gehinnom.

2.       Alternatively, he explains, if the accused was actually executed, we assume that he was indeed guilty and deserved to die. Hashem is present by every court case and it must be attributed to Divine Providence that the second set of witnesses did not arrive until after the defendant was executed.

DAILY MASHAL

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Most Drunkards

HaGaon Rabbi Yehonasan Eibeschitz zt”l was once asked by a gentile king why he doesn’t convert as gentiles constitute a majority as compared to the Jews. He replied that a majority is only used in case of a doubt but not when the situation is definite. Though this is true, there’s another simple answer. A hundred drunkards do not outweigh one chacham and who is like the wise of Israel who are pure of ulterior motives? (HaGaon E. Wasserman, Beiurei Agadaos ‘al Derech HaPeshat).

From Sacrifices

to Honoring One’s Father

The source of the halachah of the majority stems from sacrifices, which are offered without worrying about treifos. Maharal Tzintz writes that it is possible that we can thus explain the verse “And you will sanctify him for he offers the bread of your G-d” (Vayikra 21:8). You should sanctify the kohen and if you have a doubt if he is a kohen lest his declared father is not his true father (see Chulin 11b: “…and maybe he is not his father”), the answer is “for he offers the bread of your G-d” – learn from sacrifices that we should follow the majority and if so, he’s certainly his father and you should sanctify him (Melo Ha’Omer).

Who Distinguishes Between the Holy and the Mundane

Our sugya says that the two goats of Yom Kippur, the chatas and the goat for Azazel, must be equal. This teaches us that the holy and the mundane are likely to be equal, almost without any difference. How much must we concentrate to know what is holy and what is mundane! (Leket Amarim).

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Chullin Starting!!! Join thousands!!!

Tractate Chulin: Hakol Shochatin

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

With Hashem’s help we have finished Menachos and now we pass from the realm of kodshim to the realm of chullin - the mundane. Chullin is one of the longest tractates in the Talmud and its sugyos treat practical and most important subjects. It is one of the most varied tractates as it addresses a number of utterly different topics and therefore learners find much interest and satisfaction because of the many concepts they discover.

The tractate before us: First we shall learn the details of slaughtering, without which an animal is a neveilah. In the third chapter we shall learn about the signs of treifah and the signs of kashrus of land animals, fish and locusts. In the next chapter we shall complete different details of the topics learnt in the previous chapters and especially concerning the embryo of a slaughtered animal (ben peku’ah) and the impurity of a neveilah. Further on, the chapters are full of different subjects accompanying slaughtering and kashrus. In Chapter 5 we shall examine the details of the negative mitzvah not to slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day and in the next chapter we shall explore the mitzvah to cover up the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or fowl. In Chapter 7 we shall learn about the prohibition of gid hanasheh and Chapter 8 is devoted to the prohibition of meat and milk. In these chapters we shall also become aware of the great questions of mixtures. The halachos of a limb from a live animal and the impurity of a neveilah are detailed in Chapter 9 and in Chapter 10 and 11 we shall learn halachos concerning gifts to kohanim. The final chapter addresses the mitzvah of shiluach haken (chasing away a mother bird before taking its eggs).

After we finish chullin, we shall again learn about kodshim. chullin is like an island of matters of mundane meat among the tractates dealing with kodshim and some say that it is therefore called chullin or Shechitas chullin, as Rashi often calls it. Rambam (in the preface to his commentary on the Mishnah) explains that chullin was placed after Zevachim and Menachos because the Torah also treats the halachos of sacrifices and then addresses eating mundane meat: “Yet as much as you desire you shall slaughter and eat meat” (Devarim 12:15).

Who is fit to be a shochet?

In the first paragraph of the first chapter of Yoreh De’ah the Remo details who is fit to serve as a shochet: “He shouldn’t slaughter, though he is an expert and knows the halachos of shechitah, till he slaughters three times before a chacham expert in the halachos of shechitah, so that he knows that he is expert and will not faint (Tur in the name of Rambam). Therefore, we are accustomed that no one slaughters unless he received a kabalah (approval to slaughter) from a chacham. The chacham does not grant him a kabalah unless he knows that he knows the halachos of shechitah and is expert with his hands. Therefore we are accustomed to rely on anyone who comes to slaughter (that he surely received a kabalah)… and in some places they have the custom to be stricter, that the recipient takes a written kabalah as proof. Every shochet, though he has a kabalah, should review the halachos of shechitah from time to time, that he should be expert in them not to forget them (Rav Yaakov HaLevi in the name of the Maharash). The same applies to the halachos of examining the lungs and to the bodeik - the person who examines - their halachah and custom are equal in this entire matter. And the beis din should inspect the bodekim and shochetim to see that they should be expert and kosher (Mahariu, 50) for the hazard of any transgression concerning shechitah and bedikah, accessible to everyone, is immense.”

How often must he review of the halachos of shechitah: When the Remo said “from time to time”, he meant that a shochet should review the halachos every month! (Baer Heiteiv, S.K. 8). Beer HaGolah wrote in the Maharil’s name that during the first 30 days of his position a shochet should review the halachos of slaughtering and examination every day. After the first 30 days he should review them every 30 days and when he completes his first year, he should review them once in a while but if he doesn’t do so, his slaughtering is disqualified!

ShUB: shochet ubodek: It has always been known that a shochet must be an outstandingly G-d-fearing person and the title Shub, the initials of shochet ubodek is a source of pride to many, such that some adopted it as their family name. The need for an outstandingly G-d-fearing slaughterer is not mere stringency but concerns the basic halachos of slaughtering, as follows.

The three phases of shechitah: The process of rendering an animal fit to eat by shechitah consists of three phases: (1) examining the knife, (2) slaughtering, (3) examining the lungs.

Examining the knife: Rabeinu Yonah writes in his Sha’arei Teshuvah (sha’ar 3, os 96) that examining the knife demands extreme scrupulous care: “And regarding someone who is not conscientious, his heart will not understand to be meticulous about examining the knife for he must greatly concentrate all his attention on his examination. You will see that a person sometimes checks two or three times without detecting a slight fault and then he finds it, for he concentrated the last time.” Indeed, the task of examining the knife was given to the chacham or Rabbi and a shochet who didn’t show his knife to the Rabbi before slaughtering would be ostracized (chullin 18a)! Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 18:17) maintains that in later eras the custom arose to appoint special people for this task and the Rabbi relinquishes his honor to them as they are scrupulously careful. In fact, the author of Shulchan Aruch HaRav (18, Kuntres Acharon, S.K. 9) maintains that the Rabbanim only relinquished their honor for G-d-fearing people but others are not allowed to examine knives!

Slaughtering: One witness is believed regarding prohibitions (chullin 10b), as opposed to halachos of property and marriage, which require at least two witnesses. According to the Reem, one witness is still not believed to testify that an animal was properly slaughtered as, opposing his testimony there is a chazakah (previous knowledge) of prohibition to eat the (unslaughtered) animal, and one witness is not believed against a chazakah. Only a witness known to be faithful and kosher may testify (Mordechai, chullin, §579). There is therefore a need for a G-d-fearing shochet because otherwise, if he slaughtered an animal alone, he is not believed to testify that he slaughtered it properly. We emphasize that the Reem’s opinion was not accepted as halachah (see Pri Megadim in the preface and „Aroch HaShulchan, 4). But all the poskim repeatedly warn that we must eat from the shechitah of a G-d-fearing and scrupulous shochet, as Baer Heiteiv asserts (S.K. 29): “Not to give a kabalah to anyone who is frivolous but only to the G-d-fearing.”

Examining the lungs: An examination of the lungs is conducted to eliminate the possibility of a hole or another disorder of the lung, rendering the animal treifah. Though most animals are not treifah, one must examine the lungs because of the frequency of treifos (Shach, ibid) and Shulchan Aruch warns (Y.D. 39:1): “Anyone who breaches the fence - to eat without examination - should be bitten by a snake.”

Only the G-d-fearing may be lenient: Regarding two types of suspected treifah that could occur in a lung, Shulchan Aruch states (ibid, se’if 11 and 13) that in certain instances we may be lenient but he limits his statement: “We rely on this leniency only in case of an outstandingly G-d-fearing and kosher examiner.” We thus see that the need for an outstandingly G-d-fearing ShuB is essential, as otherwise one must not be lenient.

DAILY MASHAL

A Fast

The Chasam Sofer zt”l decreed a fast in his yeshivah before learning chullin according to Sefer Chasidim (261 and 1012; Mekor Chesed on Sefer Chasidim, 261, remark 6). Some believe that the reason is because of the danger that arises when a person demonstrates the matters of slaughtering and treifos on his own body (Sichas chullin in the preface, according to the Maharsha, Gitin, end of 57b).

What Is an Outstandingly G-d-fearing Person?

As explained in the article “Who Is Fit to Slaughter”, a shochet must be an outstandingly G-d-fearing person (yerei shamayim meirabim). People say in the name of the Belzer Rebbe that an outstandingly G-d-fearing person means that he must practice every stringency practiced by two people in his town as the least number of rabim (many) is two!

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Last Daf in Menachos - learning about the sacrifices

Anyone who learns about the chatas is as though he sacrificed it

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

With the conclusion of Menachos the Gemora teaches us: “Rabbi Yitzchak said, “…Anyone who learns about the chatas is as though he sacrificed it and anyone who learns about the asham is as though he sacrificed an asham.”

The Tur wrote (O.C. 1) that one had well say the parshah of the sacrifices every day and after saying the verses of the sacrifce one should say “May it be Your will” that saying the verses should be accepted as though the sacrifice were offered (see an expansion of this topic in the article “The parallel between saying korbanos and offering sacrifices” in Vol. 224).

Temporary atonement: Many sugyos indicate that even one who says the parshyos of the sacrifices devotedly does not become exempt from the obligation of his sacrifice and when the Temple will be built, he must offer them. Saying korbanos is temporary atonement, “as though he offered”, but he is surely not exempt from the Torah’s obligation (Responsa Har Tzvi, O.C. 1; Bnei Yisaschar, Maamar Rosh Chodesh, maamar 2, os 8; Responsa Torah Shleimah, 120; and see Kemotzei Shalal Rav, parshas Tzav).

Apropos, as we approach the end of Menachos, we mention two augmentive tidbits to explain Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha’s famous words when once, on Shabbos, he tilted a light unintentionally and wrote down “I, Yishmael ben Elisha, read and tilted a light on Shabbos; when the Temple will be built, I’ll bring a fat chatas” (Shabbos 12b). Why wasn’t he satisfied with reading the parashah of the chatas?

Saying korbanos lacks the advantage of the kohanim’s eating:. The author of Yeshu’os Ya’akov (O.C. 1) wrote in the name of the Rishonim that as the atonement of the chatas is also achieved by the kohanim’s eating – “kohanim eat and the owners are atoned” (Pesachim 59b) – hence by saying the verses of the chatas we do not achieve that same level accomplished by offering the sacrifice. This is also the reason, he adds, that Rabbi Yishmael undertook a fat chatas – to emphasize the inability to make up for the kohanim’s part by saying the verses.

By saying the verses we do not achieve the advantage of an embellished sacrifice: Rabbi Yitzchak Shvadron, the Maharsham’s son, solved this question in the following manner (in the preface to Responsa Maharsham, II, os 32). A few times we have already cited the halachah mentioned by Rambam (Hilchos Isurei Mizbeiach 1:1): “It is a positive mitzvah that all the sacrifices should be perfect and choice, as we are told: „It should be perfect for a good will‟. This is a positive mitzvah.” It is obvious that though saying the verses of the sacrifices is considered like offering them, it can never achieve the level of observing the mitzvah with embellishment such as offering a fat sacrifice. This is what Rabbi Yishmael meant when he said “I’ll bring a fat chatas.”

Still, saying the verses of the sacrifices has advantages over their being offered. The first is if a person has a doubt as to if he committed a transgression unintentionally, he is forbidden to bring a sacrifice because of the doubt but he may say the appropriate verses and that is considered his atonement (Responsa Har Tzvi, ibid; see ibid, that he proves so from the Tur).

Saying korbanos atones for intentional sins: The Bnei Yisachar of Dinov zt”l tells of the second advantage (in the preface to his Derech Pikudecha, preface 5, os 8; cf Rabeinu Yonah to Rif, Berachos 3a, s.v. kivan), that saying korbanos can atone for intentional sins! This is based on Chazal’s statement (Taanis 27a, etc.) that Avraham said, “Ribono shel ‘olam…when there’s no Temple what will be with them?” He told him, “I already arranged the order of korbanos. When they read them before Me, I attribute to them as though they offered them and forgive them all their sins (‘avonoseihem).” An ‘avon is an intentional sin. We thus see that learning the verses of the sacrifices can ease atonement for intentional sins (Kemotzei Shalal Rav, ibid).

Hadran Aloch Maseches Menachos. We shall review it and learn about the sacrifices to atone for us before Hashem.

DAILY MASHAL

Korbanos!

It is told about HaGaon Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (Halichos Shlomo, I, Ch. 6, remarks 20 and 24) that he took care to come ten minutes before the start of prayers to say birchos hashachar and korbanos patiently and pleasantly. He told to those who asked to at least be careful to say the parshah of the tamid and the ketores (incense). If he didn’t say them before prayers, it is fitting to say the parshah of the tamid after prayers but not the ketores as they already said it at the end of the prayer. He was unsatisfied that people were careless about saying korbanos and would urge his pupils to heed such and in cheider the pupils should be taught to say at least part of korbanos.

A Minchah:

 Like a Body Without a Soul

At the start of Menachos (Vol. 228) we cited the following peninah: The pupils of HaGaon Rav Chayim of Volozhin zt”l write in the name of their mentor: Prayer resembles the tamid. “Prayer without concentration is like a body without a soul.” This means that prayer without concentration does not have the advantage of an animal sacrifice, which has a soul, but the advantage of a minchah, which is “a body without a soul” (Tosefes Ma’aseh Rav, 12; Keser Rosh, 22; Beiurei Rabeinu Chayim MiVolozhin, 163).

A reader sent us an interesting addition which he heard from HaGaon HaTzadik Rav Gedalyah Eiseman, mashgiach of Kol Torah Yeshivah. Chazal’s satement, that prayer without concentration is like a body without a soul, denegrates the value of such prayer while Rav Chayim’s statement apparently enlivens it as he treats such prayer as a minchah! However, a minchah was offered by a poor person who could not afford to offer an animal. From such a person, who is not able to pray with concentration, his prayer is accepted like a minchah. But someone who could have prayed with concentration should not expect his prayer to be regarded…

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Ramps in the Mishkan

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Rav Yehudah said: Two small ramps branched off from the main ramp, by which one (on the west side) turned to the base and one (on the east side) to the ledge, and these were also separated from the altar by a hairsbreadth, because it is written: around.

HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V’Kailav, notes: This is referring to the altar in the Beis HaMikdash. It is logical to assume that there would also be one to the ledge in the Mishkan if the ledge in the Mishkan was for the Kohanim to walk upon. According to Rashi in Chumash there was no ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan, so there was no need for a small ramp to the ledge. There are commentators that maintain that there was a ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan (page 234), so according to them there was a need for a small ramp to the ledge.

Regarding if in the Mishkan there was a small ramp to the base, according to what Shitah Mekubetzes (letter 12) that the purpose of the small ramp to the base was because if the Kohen would have to go down the ramp and then go to the base, the blood might coagulate and become unfit for sprinkling, it would seem that there should also be one in the Mishkan. Even though it would seem that the ramp in the Mishkan was a little shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, it is not logical to say that since the ramp in the Mishkan was a few amos shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, there would be no concern that the blood would coagulate. According to what we have written, it seems that there was only one small ramp in the Mishkan,

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Sent Goat and Yom Kippur

The Gemora discusses who is the author of the Mishna, which says that the sent goat atones for all sins, apparently even without repentance. The Gemora concludes that Rebbi is the author, as Rebbi says that Yom Kippur atones for all sins, except for three very severe ones, even without repentance. The commentators note that Rebbi does not make any direct mention of the sent goat, but only of the day of Yom Kippur, which seems to be at odds with the Mishna. A number of answers are offered to this question:

1. The day atones partially, and the sent goat achieves full atonement (Tosfos 13a d'ovad)
2. The day atones, but the repentance requirement is waived only if the goat is sent (Ritva)
3. The sent goat atones, but its atonement is due to the power of Yom Kippur day (Tosfos, Rashba)
4. The day atones, but when there is a Bais Hamikdash, it depends on the sent goat being brought (Minchas Chinuch 364)

The Gemora had objected that if one did not repent, the goat cannot atone, as it is a sacrifice of the wicked, which is an abomination. The Ritva explains that Rebbi says that the goat is an exception, and the rule of a sacrifice of the wicked applies only to other sacrifices. The Rashba suggests that since the goat only completes the atonement of the day (following the first explanation above), it is not simply a sacrifice of the wicked, and therefore is effective.

The Gemora introduces a sifra which states that the day of Yom Kippur atones even if the sinner did not commemorate it. The Gemora says that this sifra implies that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance. The Ramban explains that if Yom Kippur needs repentance, it is like any other sacrifice, e.g., chatas, which is not effective if the sinner denies its effectiveness.

Rava says that Rebbi agrees that Yom Kippur does not atone for infractions of the day without repentance. Rava says this must be so, since otherwise there would be no case of one being punished for Yom Kippur prohibitions, since the day itself would atone for them. The Gemora objects, and provides two cases where the day would not atone for the transgression, even if repentance is not generally necessary:

1. The person died choking on food he ate, leaving no time after the transgression for atonement
2. The person ate at the end of the day, leaving no part of the day to atone
Tosfos (13a d'ovad) notes that the goat atones even for sins committed later on the day of Yom Kippur, since otherwise the Gemora should have suggested that the case is one who ate after the goat was sent. Some texts of the Gemora continue by citing a braisa, comparing the atonement of the goat and the day. The braisa states that the goat has the advantage of atoning right away, while the day atones only at the end. The day has the advantage of atoning without a sacrifice, while the goat atones only with a sacrifice. Rashi cites this text and rejects it, noting that it is incompatible with the answers provided by the Gemora, which both imply that any part of the day would atone, not just the end. The Ramban and Rabbeinu Chananel keep the text, and the Ramban explains that this is an alternate answer offered by the Gemora. According to this approach, only the end of the day atones, and therefore one would be liable for violating Yom Kippur if he died before the end of the day.

The Rashba offers two explanations of the advantage of Yom Kippur cited in the braisa:
1. The “sacrifice” refers to sending the goat off the azazel cliff. The braisa refers to this as a “sacrifice” since it is considered a sacrifice like standard ones, and follows its rules.
2. The “sacrifice” refers to the chatas goat whose blood was sprinkled inside the mishkan. The braisa is stating that the atonement of Yom Kippur is independent of this sacrifice, while the sent goat only atones if this sacrifice is also brought.
These two explanations seem to differ as to whether the sent goat is considered a standard sacrifice or not. The answer cited by the Ritva for how the goat atones without repentance seems to consider it a standard sacrifice, while the fact that the goat atones for sins committed later seems to indicate it is not.

The Rambam (Teshuva 1:2) rules that the sent goat atones on all lenient prohibitions (i.e., generic positive and negative commandments) even without repentance, but on all others only with repentance. The commentators attempt to explain the Rambam's source for this ruling, since the Gemora presents the opinions of the Sages, who require repentance, and Rebbi, who does not, with no indication of a middle position. The Lechem Mishne says that the Rambam rules like the Sages, but attempts to limit the extent of the dispute between Rebbi and the Sages. The braisa in which they differ on the explanation of the verse mandating karais is discussing only severe prohibitions, and only in that case do we find the Sages explicitly requiring repentance. The Rambam therefore says that the Sages agree with Rebbi that the sent goat atones for lenient transgressions without repentance. The Meshech Chochma (Vayikra 16:30) explains the Rambam based on the Gemora in Yoma (85b), which says that Rebbi holds that Yom Kippur atones for severe transgressions without repentance, but repentance does not atone for them without Yom Kippur. From here we see that Yom Kippur is more potent that repentance alone. Therefore, the Sages, who say that repentance alone atones for lenient prohibitions, surely say that Yom Kippur alone atones for these.

Sifra's authorship

The Gemora states that an anonymous sifra is Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore proves that Rabbi Yehuda requires repentance for the atonement of Yom Kippur. The Gemora then cites another sifra, which indicates that repentance is not required. Abaye answers that the first sifra is Rabbi Yehuda, while the second is Rebbi. The Ritva asks how Abaye can offer this answer if the Gemora stated that an anonymous sifra is Rabbi Yehuda. He offers two answers:
1. The two sifras are different opinions of Rabbi Yehuda's position. Thus, both follow Rabbi Yehuda, but differ on what Rabbi Yehuda holds on this point.
2. The rule of authorship is a general rule for most sifras, but has exceptions. Similarly, the Gemora identifies anonymous mishnas as Rabbi Meir, since most are, but there are many exceptions to this rule.

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Shades of Leprosy and "the Bald One"

Varying Degrees of White

The Gemora discusses Rabbi Akiva’s and the Sages’ positions on the four categories of whiteness of tzara’as. Rabbi Akiva lists them in order of whiteness, while the Sages list them as two categories, each with its own subcategory.

Rashi explains that Rabbi Akiva holds that the main categories are baheres (snow), and the duller se’ais (wool), but that se’ais has two subcategories, plaster and the duller egg membrane. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva says that the two main categories can combine with each other, since they are on equal footing, but the subcategories only combine with each other and with se’ais, their parent category, but not with baheres, which has no relation to them.

Tosfos (6a Af) disagrees, and says that Rabbi Akiva agrees to the general formulation of two categories, each with a subcategory, but just disagrees on the rules of combinations. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva agrees that the subcategory of baheres is plaster, and the subcategory of se’ais is egg membrane, but says that since plaster is two steps duller than its parent, it can only combine with se’ais.

The Raavad says that, according to the Sages, each subcategory can combine with its parent, and each category can combine with each other.

The Rambam (Tumas Tzara’as 1:1-3) says that all four levels of whiteness can combine with each other.

See the Kesef Mishneh (1:1) for a lengthy discussion of how the Rambam learned our Gemora, and his suggestion that the Rambam understands that the Gemora concludes that there is no dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages. He notes that the Gemora is not clear as to whether a source was provided for Rabbi Akiva’s position on the combination of the differing shades of white.

Rabbi Akiva’s Son

The Gemora cites a braisa which records a dialogue between Rabbi Akiva and his son, Yehoshua. Rashi says that this son is Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah. Since Rabbi Akiva was bald, his son was referred to as the son of Karchah – the bald one.

Tosfos (Bechoros 58a Chutz) disagrees, noting that the chronology would not place Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah early enough to be Rabbi Akiva’s son. Tosfos also says that Rabbi Akiva would not be constantly referred to as karchah – the bald one, as that is a derogatory term. Rather, Tosfos says Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah was a later Tanna, whose father was named Karchah.

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