Verbally committing to a Sandek or a Mohel

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The Rishonim discuss a case where a father committed to honor someone with part of the bris ceremony, either as a sandak or a mohel, and then changed his mind. (See Beis Yosef YD 264)

The Maharam says that since these commitments are routinely made and kept, the commitment is enforceable in court.

Rabbeinu Yechiyel limits this to a commitment made after the baby was born.

The Radvaz holds that if the commitment was made before the baby was born, he is not obligated to honor it at all, for this would have the status of selling something that is not yet in existence. However, if he told him this after the baby was born, since these commitments are routinely made and kept, he cannot retract from his words. He concludes by saying that it is a well established principle by us that a custom is extremely significant, and one should not break it.

He proves this from our Gemora, which states: Rav Papi said in Rava’s name: A mark of identification (which the buyers would mark if they planned on buying it) on the wine barrels can effect possession (although they left them in the possession of the seller). This proves that although a proper kinyan was not performed, the making of an identifying mark can effect acquisition based on the custom of that locality.

The Rosh disagrees and says that only a standard kinyan is enforceable.

Rabbeinu Tam says that if one committed to a mohel to do his son’s bris, this has the status of a verbal commitment, and one who does not keep it is considered untrustworthy.

The Pri Yitzchak says that committing to a mohel has the status of a small gift, since the father typically cannot perform the bris, and he is simply giving the right to choose the mohel. However, committing to a sandak is a large gift, since the father himself can do that, and he is giving that right to the sandak. Since it is a large gift, a verbal commitment would not be binding.

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Subjugating their Poor Brethren

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Rav Pappa said to Rava: My master should see how the rabbis pay the head tax for others, and then they work them excessively. Rava replied: I might have died without ever having told you this thing: Rav Sheishes said: The seal of bondage of these people lies in the king’s archives, and the king has decreed that he who does not pay his head tax should be made the servant of the one who pays it on his behalf.

Other Rishonim explain this Gemora differently: they say that the rabbis violated the prohibition of ribbis. This is because they paid the tax for their poor brethren, and by working them excessively, they were paid back more than what they laid out.

The Radvaz asks: How can the principle of “the law of the land is the law” trump the prohibition of subjugating a fellow Jew excessively?

He answers that since the excessive work is not regarded as money, for by law, they are obligated to serve them; the prohibition falls off by itself, for if there is no loan, there cannot be any ribbis.

The Ritva writes that by paying their taxes to the king, they acquire them as slaves until they are repaid; the money is not regarded as a debt at all.

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Waiter in a Non-Jewish Restaurant

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(From Meoros Daf HaYomi)

Our Gemara (Kiddushin 69) quotes the words of Nechemiya ben Chachalya, who is referred to in Ezra (2:63) as “Hatirshasa.” His job was to attend to King Nebuchadnezzar and to serve him his wine. Based on the Talmud Yerushalmi, Rashi (s.v. Hatirshasa) explains that part of Nechemiya’s task was to taste the wine before serving it as a security measure to prove that he was not trying to poison the king. As such, chachamim granted Nechemiya a special dispensation [heter] to drink [shasa] wine made by non-Jews, and therefore was given the name “Hatirshasa.”

Source of the prohibition against non-Jewish wine: Since Nebuchadnezzar was not an idol-worshipper, his wine was not considered libation wine, which is forbidden by the Torah (Avoda Zara 29b). Still, the Sages had to grant Nechemiya explicit permission to drink his wine because when Daniel was exiled to the Babylonian king’s palace, he pledged not to defile himself by drinking the king’s wine, even if it was not used for libation offerings (Daniel 1:8). This decree was enacted once again for Klal Yisrael by the talmidim of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel (Shabbos 17b), who prohibited drinking non-Jews’ wine, even in a Jewish home (see Beis Yosef, Y.D. 123, Os 1; see also Encyclopedia Talmudis, “Yayin shel goyim” p. 335).

A man who made his living as a waiter asked the Radvaz (Part IV §22) whether he would be allowed to work in a non-Jewish restaurant and serve wine there. The Radvaz replied that although Nechemiya ben Chachalaya served wine to Nebuchadnezzar, this should not be used as an example, for he had no alternative. Had he tried to disobey the king’s standing orders, he would have placed his life in danger. But a Jew may not engage in this profession of his own volition, and he should be rebuked and, if possible, prevented from doing so. Furthermore, said the Radvaz, a Jew should not set foot at non-Jewish parties to prevent him from learning their ways.

The Kol Eliyahu (Responsa II §27) adds that if a waiter is involved in warming or preparing the food, he is liable to come to taste it and to transgress a Torah prohibition.

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Ransoming for more than their Value

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The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b) had stated: We do not redeem captives for more than their true value for “the benefit of the world.”

The Gemora inquires: Does “the benefit of the world” (with respect to redeeming the captives for more than their worth) relate to the burden which may be imposed on the community (they will all become impoverished), or to the possibility that the bandits will take more captives? [The difference would be in a case where a private individual, such as a relative, wishes to redeem him.]

Come and hear: Levi ben Darga ransomed his daughter for thirteen thousand golden dinars.

Abaye asked: But are you sure that he acted with the consent of the Sages? Perhaps he acted against their will!

Rashi explains that “more than their true value” is referring to the amount that they would fetch if they would be sold in the slave market.

The Meiri writes that their value is based upon their individual wealth and prominence.

The Radvaz rules that we may ransom any captive with the amount of money that is usual to redeem other captives during that time period.

He adds: It has become the custom to redeem captive for more than their worth in the market, for an elderly person or a minor are not worth more than ten dinars, and nevertheless, they are ransomed for more than one hundred dinars. His explanation why there is no concern that the bandits will take more captives is because the captives are not being ransomed for any more that their gentile counterparts. He concludes that nothing should be told to Klal Yisroel about this, for they are a charitable nation, and it is better for them to remain that way.

Tosfos and the Ramban disagree regarding the halachah if the captive himself is allowed to ransom himself for more money than he is actually worth.

The Gemora in Kesuvos (52b) states: If one’s wife was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time the husband must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).

This issue had an extraordinary public application about 700 years ago. The leader of Ashkenazic Jewry at the time was Rabbi Meir ben Boruch of Rottenberg. He was imprisoned by a German ruler, Rudolph, whose voracity knew no bounds. Rabbi Meir (known as Maharam Mi’Rottenberg) was imprisoned until his death, and his body was not released. The community did not ransom him, as he himself had ruled. Seven years after his death, a private member of the community paid almost all of his own money to release the body, with the stipulation that he be buried next to him.

There is a question whether according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel a man would be permitted to ransom his wife if the ransom exceeds her worth. The Ritva holds that he may do so, and the Chelkas Mechokeik disagrees.

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An Idolatrous Name

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel (Daf Yomi: Gittin 34b): The Jews from abroad sent to Rabban Gamliel the following inquiry: If a man comes here from Eretz Yisroel whose true name is Yosef, but who is known here as Yochanan, or whose name is Yochanan, but who is known here as Yosef, how can he divorce his wife? Rabban Gamliel thereupon stood up and decreed that they should write in the get, “This man So-and-so or by whatever names he is known,” “This woman So-and-so or by whatever names she is known,” in order to benefit the public.

They asked Rabbeinu Tam regarding a Jew who worships idols and he divorced his wife with a get which had only his Jewish name written on it, and not his idolatrous name. What is the status of such a get?

He answered: Heaven forbid to even mention an idolatrous name on a get which is written according to the law of Moshe and all of Israel!

The Ra”dach in his response explains that his idolatrous name is not regarded as his name at all, and if that would be the only name written on the get, it would be as if the get would be written without the name of the divorcing husband.

However, Reb Yosef Engel notes that from the language of Rabbeinu Tam, it would seem that there is a different explanation. It is on account of the sanctity of the get that his idolatrous name cannot be written.

And the Rad”vaz in his response writes like that as well. He says that any holy scroll, such as a Sefer Torah, Tefillin, or Mezuzah, where there lies an obligation that it should be written lishmah, and also a get has sanctity, for it is also has a requirement to be written lishmah.

He concludes that the matzah which is being baked to be eaten on Pesach night also possesses sanctity, for it is required to be baked lishmah.

It is possible that this could explain the custom of many righteous people to kiss the matzah before they eat it on the night of the seder.

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Women in Battle

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 44b) had stated: When do these words (the exemptions mentioned in the Mishna) apply? It is only with respect to a voluntary war; however, with respect to wars of mitzvah, everyone is required to go out, even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her chupah.

Rabbi Yehudah says: These words were only said with respect to wars of mitzvah; however, with respect to an obligatory war, everyone is required to go out, even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her chupah.

The commentators ask: What does the Mishna mean whit it says, “even a bride from her chupah”? Women are not obligated to go to war! The Chinuch (§ 403) writes with respect of the mitzvah of erasing Amalek’s name that it is only applicable to men, but not to women, for it is the practice of men to wage war against their enemies, not women. The Radvaz on the Rambam also rules like that, and he bases it upon the verse: The complete glory of the princess is within. Accordingly, he asks from our Mishna, which would seem to indicate that they do go out for war! They also ask from the Gemora in Nazir (59a) which states: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: How do we know that a woman shall not go out wearing weapons of war? It is because it’s written: A man’s attire shall not be on a woman.

The Radvaz answers: The Mishna simply means that when the bridegroom goes to fight, the bride will leave the chupah, but not to go to war.

Alternatively, he answers that she does go to war, but not to fight. They provide water and food for their husbands. The Reshash adds that they go to the battlefield to cook and to bake for the soldiers. (The Tzitz Eliezer understands that the Radvaz and the Reshash are arguing if the women supply food only to their husbands or to all men.)

The Ben Yehoyadah writes that she goes out to war to guard the weapons.

In the sefer Hon Ashir, he writes that even if a woman is confident that she can stand up to the enemy and she will not back down; we do not allow her to fight.

The Minchas Chinuch writes that according to our Gemora, a woman would be obligated to fight in all wars of mitzvah and to wage war against Amalek. Evidently, this mitzvah overrides the prohibition of wearing weapons of war.

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Sacrificing One's Life for Another

The Gemora (Kesuvos 61b) records an incident: Ameimar, Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi were once sitting at the gate of King Izgur’s palace (a Persian king). The King’s table-steward passed them by (carrying food for the king). Rav Ashi, observing that Mar Zutra turned pale in the face, took some of the food with his finger and put it into his mouth. “You have ruined the king’s meal,” the table-steward exclaimed. “Why did you do such a thing?” he was asked by the king’s officers. Rav Ashi responded, “The man who prepared that dish has rendered the King's food objectionable.” “Why?” they asked him. “I noticed,” he replied, “leprous pig meat in it.” They examined the dish but did not find anything. Rav Ashi took hold of the chef’s finger and put it on one piece of meat, and he asked them, “Did you examine this part?” They examined it and miraculously found it to be as Rav Ashi had said. The Rabbis asked him, “Why did you rely upon a miracle?” Rav Ashi replied, “I saw the demon of leprosy hovering over him.”

The Maharsha explains that the Rabbis asked Rav Ashi: Why did you put yourself into a severely dangerous predicament in order to save Mar Zutra from a minor danger.

What did Mar Zutra answer? Reb Avi Lebovitz explains: The Gemora answers that Rav Ashi saw the demon of leprosy hovering over him. One could interpret that he wasn't relying on a miracle since he saw that there were signs of leprosy on the meat. However, Rashi implies that Rav Ashi’s answer was that he saw signs of leprosy on Mar Zutra, indicating that the element of danger for Mar Zutra was actually more severe, therefore he was willing to give up his own life to save the life of Mar Zutra.

The Chasam Sofer proves from this dialogue that one is obligated to risk their own life in order to save another. Although this Gemora doesn't prove any obligation, and would only prove that one is allowed to risk their life to save another; the Chasam Sofer seems to hold that when it comes to life, there can't be a choice; it is either mandatory to sacrifice one’s own life or a prohibition.

The Radvaz rules that one is not permitted to sacrifice a limb of his own in order to save the life of another.

The Chasam Sofer challenges this form our Gemora. He understands that the danger to Rav Ashi was that the king will sever his finger. Rav Ashi relied on the miracle in order to save the life of Mar Zutra, for if would not have interceded, Mar Zutra would have died.

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WHICH MITZVAH TAKES PRECEDENCE? - Yevamos 39 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that although it might be preferable for the older brother to perform a yibum, we do not wait for him. This is based on the principle that we do not delay the performance of a mitzvah in expectation of some future, better performance.

The Terumas Hadeshen (35) comments that the only time you do delay the performance of the mitzvah is we are concerned that by delaying, the mitzvah will not be fulfilled.

Similarly, the Gr”a (O”C 426) rules that this halacha is only applicable if the brother is overseas, but otherwise, we would be required to wait for him.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha brings a proof from here to the Rama’s ruling regarding Kiddush Levanah. One should wait to recite the blessing for the moon for Motzei Shabbos if it will occur prior to the tenth of the month, but if it is afterwards, one should not wait for Motzei Shabbos, and he should recite the blessing in middle of the week. This is because there might be a few consecutive cloudy days and he will have missed the opportunity for the mitzvah this month.

There is an argument between the Radvaz (187) and the Chacham Tzvi (106) regarding a person who was in jail and he did not have the ability to perform any mitzvos and his captors gave him one day that he can choose to be released and perform the mitzvos of that day, which day should he choose. The Radvaz says he should choose the first opportunity that he has and the Chacham Tzvi disagrees and holds that one should wait until there is a mitzva of great prominence.

The Gemora in Yoma (34a) discusses the obligation of nesachim - the wine libations by the two temidin which were brought every day. There is an argument there if we derive the morning tamid from the afternoon or vice-versa. Tosfos comments that there would be a difference l'halacha if they would have only enough nesachim for one korban; which tamid should have the nesachim. Is the primary tamid the morning or the afternoon? Rabeinu Chananel says that there is no difference l'halacha; it's just a matter as to how we expound the pesukim. The Sfas Emes asks on Tosfos that the din should be clearly that whichever mitzva one is holding by, that is the one he should perform and if one is ready to bring the morning tamid, he should bring the nesachim with that one, even if the afternoon tamid is the primary one.

The Biur Halacha (109) has a shaila if one davens normally a long Shemoneh Esrei and he will certainly miss kedusha, should he daven with the tzibur and fulfill the mitzva of tefila b'tzibur or should he wait and fulfill the mitzva of reciting kedusha.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 16 - Jail and the Sefer Torah

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank asks on our Gemora that permitted them to bring the Sefer Torah from the house to the shul when the halacha is explicit (135:14) that we do not bring a Sefer torah for people in jail? Some answer that bringing it from a house to a shul is an honor and therefore it is allowed. Others answer based on the Biur Halacha that it is only prohibited if there are only individuals in the jail and they do not have an obligation of krias haTorah, however if there is a congregation that requires it, it is permitted.

There is a question regarding people in jail that we posted before, but is always interesting. There is an argument between the Radvaz (187) and the Chacham Tzvi (106) regarding a person who was in jail and he did not have the ability to perform any mitzvos and his captors gave him one day that he can choose to be released and perform the mitzvos of that day, which day should he choose. The Radvaz says he should choose the first opportunity that he has and the Chacham Tzvi disagrees and holds that one should wait until there is a mitzva of great prominence.

The Biur Halacha (109) has a shaila if one davens normally a long shemone esrei and he will certainly miss kedusha, should he daven with the tzibur and fulfill the mitzva of tefila b'tzibur or should he wait and fulfill the mitzva of reciting kedusha.

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 83 - Story Regarding the Riva

The Radvaz (3:444) relates an incident regarding the Riva, one of the Baalei HaTosafos, who was ill with an illness that he eventually succumbed to. The doctor informed the Riva that if he were to fast on Yom Kippur he definitely would not be able to continue living and were he to eat, it would be possible that he could continue to live. The Riva was adamant in his refusal to eat on Yom Kippur and he subsequently died. The Radvaz writes that the Riva certainly did not maintain that one is permitted to be stringent with regard to his own health, as one is prohibited from disobeying the directives of the doctor. If one was coerced to violate a mitzvah in the Torah, if through his death HaShem’s Name will be sanctified, he is permitted to forgo his life. Rather, the Riva was aware that even if he were to eat he was not going to live and this is an illustration of the proverbial dictum that the heart knows the bitterness of its soul.

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Which Mitzva takes Precedence? - Yoma 34 - Daf yomi

The Gemora on Daf 34a learns out the obligation of nesachim - the wine libations by the two temidin which were brought every day. There is an argument there if we learn the morning tamid from the afternoon or vice-versa. Tosfos comments that there would be a difference l'halacha if they would have only enough nesachim for one korban, Which tamid should have the nesachim. Is the primary tamid the morning or the afternoon. Rabeinu Chananel says that there is no difference l'halacha, it's just a matter as to how we expound the pesukim. The Sfas Emes asks on Tosfos that the din should be clearly that whichever mitzva one is holding by, that is the one he should perform and if one is ready to bring the morning tamid, he should bring the nesachim with that one, even if the afternoon tamid is the primary one.

This actually is an argument between the Radvaz (187) and the Chacham Tzvi (106) regarding a person who was in jail and he did not have the ability to perform any mitzvos and his captors gave him one day that he can choose to be released and perform the mitzvos of that day, which day should he choose. The Radvaz says he should choose the first opportunity that he has and the Chacham Tzvi disagrees and holds that one should wait until there is a mitzva of great prominence.

The Biur Halacha (109) has a shaila if one davens normally a long shemone esrei and he will certainly miss kedusha, should he daven with the tzibur and fulfill the mitzva of tefila b'tzibur or should he wait and fulfill the mitzva of reciting kedusha.

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