Pumbedisean Rouges

The Gemora (Kesuvos 62a) records an incident: A yevamah fell to a yavam in Masa Mechasya. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.” The younger brother replied, “I am afraid that you will treat me as the Pumbedisean rogue treated his brother.” (The people of Pumbedisa were known for being deceivers; in the incident cited above, the yavam refused to give up the land and then, Rav Yosef ruled like him.) The yavam said to him, “If you wish, you may take your half at once.”

It is noteworthy that this incident occurred in Masa Mechasya, and it was there that they spoke begrudgingly regarding the citizens of Pumbedisa.

The Gemora (Kerisus 6a) cites several teachings that Rav Mesharsheya told to his son. One such teaching was that it is better to dwell in the garbage heaps of Masa Mechasya than in the mansions of Pumbedisa.

What did Rav Mesharsheya have in mind? Rashi (Horayos 12a) states that in Masa Mechasya, there were Torah scholars who had the ability to answer Halachic questions and they also had exemplary midos. The scholars in Pumbedisa, however, did not excel in midos tovos, and therefore Rav Mesharsheya warned his son not to learn with them.

Reb Yaakov Emden cites our Gemora as proof that the Jewish population of Pumbedisa was known to be plagued with swindlers and cheats. Accordingly, perhaps we can say that Rav Mesharsheya was telling his son that Pumbedisa might not be the best location for one to reside in.

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Two Leniencies and Two Stringencies

The Gemora (Kesuvos 82a) had stated that we do not find a Tanna ruling stringently on two matters in respect to a kesuvah. Rashi explains that since a kesuvah is a Rabbinic enactment in the first place, we cannot rule with extreme stringencies. Therefore, we cannot rule that moveable objects are pledged for the kesuvah (in accordance with Rabbi Meir) and that the kesuvah may be collected from the debtor of the deceased husband (in accordance with Rabbi Nosson).

The Rif writes that this particular halachic ruling is not applicable nowadays. In the times of the Gemora, the society was an agricultural one and therefore, only real estate was pledged for the kesuvah. However, now that we maintain that all of the husband’s possessions are pledged for her kesuvah, this is not regarded as a stringency and therefore we can rule that the kesuvah may be collected from the debtor of the deceased husband.

Rabbi Braun in Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha points out that the inverse is true as well. In a situation where we rule leniently, we do not rule according to two leniencies. Shulchan Aruch (Y”D, 199:7) writes that although there are times that we allow a woman to immerse herself in a ritual bath during the daytime, we will inform her then that she must clean herself immediately prior to immersion, and we do not rely on the leniency which normally allows a woman to prepare herself a significant time before immersion.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 82 - Highlights

Delayed Kinyan

The Gemora records an incident: A yevamah fell to a yavam in Masa Mechasya. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.” The younger brother replied, “I am afraid that you will treat me as the Pumbedisean rogue treated his brother.” (The people of Pumbedisa were known for being deceivers; in the incident cited above, the yavam refused to give up the land and then, Rav Yosef ruled like him.) The yavam said to him, “If you wish, you may take your half at once.”

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Although when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisroel, he stated in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a man said to another, “Go and pull this cow, but it shall only become your legal possession after thirty days,” he legally acquires it after thirty days, even if it is standing at the time (after thirty days) in a swamp. That is because the giver had the ability to transfer possession of the cow at the initial time. However, in this case, the younger brother cannot acquire possession of the promised share, for it is not in his power to transfer immediate possession (since prior to yibum, the yavam has no rights on his brother’s land).

The Gemora asks: But, surely, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisroel, he reported in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that he does not acquire possession (in the case of the cow)?

The Gemora answers: This is no difficulty: The first ruling refers to a case where the seller said, “Acquire possession from now,” whereas the other ruling refers to a case where he did not say, “Acquire possession from now.” (82a)

Emend the Mishna

The Mishna had stated: The Chachamim said: The produce which is connected to the ground belongs to the yavam.

The Gemora asks: But why does it belong to him? Aren’t all of the brother’s properties pledges for her kesuvah?

Rish Lakish says that the Mishna must be emended to read that the produce belongs to her. (82a)

Just Like a Wife
The Mishna had stated: Once the yavam marries her, she is regarded as his wife in all respects.

The Gemora asks: Regarding what halacha is the Mishna referring to?

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: This teaches us that the yavam may divorce her with a get, and he also can remarry her afterwards.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obvious that he may divorce her with a get?

The Gemora answers: Since the verse [Devarim 25:5] states: The yavam shall cohabit with her, and take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibum with her; one might think that she is always regarded as his yevamah even after marrying her, and perhaps she would require a chalitzah to be released from him. The Mishna teaches us that a get is sufficient.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obvious that he may remarry her afterwards?

The Gemora answers: One might have thought that after he fulfilled his mitzvah and subsequently divorced her, she should become subject to the prohibition of being a brother’s wife and she should be forbidden to him; the Mishna teaches us that once she becomes permitted to him, she remains that way. (82a – 82b)

From Heaven
The Mishna had stated: If the yavam marries her, she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that the obligations stemming from the kesuvah rests upon the property of her first husband.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this?

The Gemora answers: The yavam did not obligate himself to her; the Torah bestowed her upon him. (He is required to write for her a new kesuvah, but his properties are not encumbered towards this obligation; only the properties of the deceased are encumbered for this obligation.) But if there are no assets available from the deceased, the Rabbis established that there should be a kesuvah from the yavam as well, in order that she should not be so easy to divorce. (82b)

Lying on the Table
The Mishna had stated: The yavam should not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table (designating some of his property for the kesuvah),” but rather, all of his properties are indebted to her kesuvah. Likewise, an ordinary man may not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table.”

The Gemora asks: Why is it necessary for the Mishna to teach us the same halacha regarding an ordinary marriage; why would we think that there is a distinction?

The Gemora answers: It might have been suggested that the restriction mentioned applies only in the case of the yavam because the yavam does not insert in her kesuvah the clause, “That which I possess and that which I will acquire.” (The yevamah, having her security limited to the yavam’s possessions that were inherited from her deceased husband, would naturally suspect that by “putting her kesuvah on the table,” the yavam intends to escape his full responsibility and desires to deprive her of the possibility of collecting her kesuvah when the occasion arises. This, as might well be expected, would create animosity between husband and wife.) But in the latter case, where he does insert the clause, “That which I possess and that which I will acquire,” she relies upon this guarantee (even if he would designate money); hence, we were told that the ruling applies in both cases. (82b)

Kesuvah when he Divorces her and Remarries her
The Mishna had stated: If the yavam remarries, she is like any other woman and she is entitled only to her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: What is the novelty in this halacha? We have learned in a Mishna regarding an ordinary wife that if the husband divorces her and then remarries her, she is entitled to the initial kesuvah.

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would not have stated this halacha in respect to a yavam, I would have thought that this would only apply to an ordinary marriage where the man wrote the kesuvah himself; however, in respect to a yevamah, where the yavam did not write the original kesuvah, perhaps when he divorces her and then remarries her, he should be obligated to write her a new kesuvah. The Mishna teaches us that this is not so. (82b)

Origin of the Kesuvah Enactments
Rav Yehudah said: Originally, they would write for a virgin two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh, and consequently, they grew old and could not take any wives (since the women would not marry if the husband’s possessions were not pledged for her kesuvah). Shimon ben Shetach took the initiative and ordained that all of the husband’s property is pledged for his wife’s kesuvah.

The Gemora cites a braisa which supports Rav Yehudah: Originally, they would write for a virgin two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh, and consequently, they grew old and could not take any wives. It was then ordained that the amount of the kesuvah was to be deposited in the wife’s father’s house (preventing the husband from hiding it). At any time, however, when the husband would become angry with his wife, he would tell her, “Go to your kesuvah.” It was ordained, therefore, that the amount of the kesuvah was to be deposited in the house of her father-in-law. Wealthy women converted it into silver or gold baskets, while poor women converted it into urinals. Still, whenever the husband had occasion to be angry with his wife, he would tell her, “Take your kesuvah and go.” It was then that Shimon ben Shetach ordained that the husband must insert the pledging clause, “All of my property is pledged to your kesuvah. (82b)
WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
HA’ISHA SHENAFLU

[END]

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A Childless Couple Divorcing and Remarrying

A couple who did not merit having children came to Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein with the following inquiry: Should they get divorced and then remarried, for they had heard that this is a segulah for having children? The woman, however, was refusing because getting divorced was degrading to her. What should they do?

He cited proof from our Gemora that a divorce, even just for a few moments is degrading and therefore, the wife has grounds to refuse the divorce.

The Gemora (Kesuvos 81b) states: Rava sent the following question to Abaye in the hands of Rav Shemayah bar Zeira: Is it indeed true that the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive? But didn’t we learn in the following braisa: Rabbi Abba said: I asked Sumchus: If a yavam (after performing yibum) wishes to sell some of his brother’s properties (something that he is not allowed to do), what should he do?

Sumchus responded: If he is a Kohen (and he cannot marry his divorcee), he should prepare for her a feast (with some wine) and persuade her to allow him to sell the property (which exceeds the amount of her kesuvah). If he is a Yisroel, he should divorce her and then, remarry her (he can either sell the properties before the second marriage or afterwards).

Rava concludes his question: If the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, let the yavam designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah, and then, he should be permitted to sell the remaining property? This, explains Rashi is a much more preferable option, for getting divorced is degrading!

The Steipler Gaon, when asked the same question, said that a childless couple may try to divorce and remarry (and the husband need not be concerned that after the divorce, the wife will refuse to remarry); however, he personally never heard that this is a valid segulah and he has no opinion regarding its veracity.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 81 - Highlights

The Obligation to Bury a Woman Awaiting Yibum

The Gemora inquires: Who is obligated to pay for the burial if a woman awaiting yibum dies? Is it the responsibility of the husband’s inheritors (namely, the yavam) because they inherit her kesuvah? Or, is it the responsibility of the father’s inheritors because they inherit her property that enters and leaves with her (the melog properties)?

Rav Amram said: Let me bring a proof from the following braisa: If a woman awaiting yibum dies, her inheritors, the inheritors of her kesuvah are obligated to bury her (it is evident that the responsibility rests on the yavam).

Abaye said: This ruling can be supported from the following Mishna: A widow is supported from the property inherited by the orphans and they are entitled to her earnings. They are not obligated in her burial. Her inheritors, the inheritors of her kesuvah are obligated to bury her.

Who is a widow that has two sets of inheritors? It must be a woman awaiting yibum (and it is evident that the responsibility rests on the yavam).

Rava asks: Let the yavam say, “I am inheriting my brother (it was only his brother’s responsibility to bury his wife in return for her kesuvah which he inherits, but not the yavam’s responsibility, since he does not inherit from the widow but from his brother), I have no responsibility to bury his wife.”?

Abaya responds: It is because we come at him from two sides: If he inherits the brother, he should be obligated to bury his wife; and if he wishes not to be responsible to bury his brother’s wife, then, he should pay for her kesuvah (since after all, the burial is in return for the kesuvah).

Rava counters: The following is what I meant to ask: Let the yavam say, “I am inheriting my brother, I have no responsibility to bury his wife.” And if you will say that this is not a valid claim, for then, he would be obligated to pay for her kesuvah, I could answer that a kesuvah is not meant to be payable during the husband’s lifetime (and since he was intending to perform yibum, he stands in the place of his brother; it is therefore regarded as if she died during her husband’s lifetime, where there would be no obligation for the husband to pay her kesuvah).

Abaye replies: Who is the Tanna that holds that we expound the language written in the kesuvah (the exposition being: Since the kesuvah contains the following statement: “When you will be married to another man, you will receive what is prescribed for you,” it may be inferred that, except in the case of divorce, the kesuvah is not payable during the lifetime of the husband, when his wife cannot be married to another man)? It is the opinion of Beis Shamai (in a Mishna in Yevamos, where it deals with a woman who was permitted to be married on the basis of her statement that her husband had died, and Beis Shamai said: She may marry and she takes her kesuvah. Beis Hillel said: She may marry but she does not take her kesuvah; it emerges that Beis Shamai expounds the language of the kesuvah). And we have heard that Beis Shamai holds that a contract which awaits collection is regarded as if it has been collected already (so, also regarding the amount of the kesuvah which is deemed to he in the virtual possession of the widow; the yavam is consequently inheriting it not from his brother but from the widow, in return for which he must incur the obligation of burying her).

The Gemora proves that Beis Shamai holds that a contract which awaits collection is regarded as if it has been collected already. (80b – 81a)

Yavam Selling Property

Rava sent the following question to Abaye in the hands of Rav Shemayah bar Zeira: Is it indeed true that the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive? But didn’t we learn in the following braisa: Rabbi Abba said: I asked Sumchus: If a yavam (after performing yibum) wishes to sell some of his brother’s properties (something that he is not allowed to do), what should he do?

Sumchus responded: If he is a Kohen (and he cannot marry his divorcee), he should prepare for her a feast (with some wine) and persuade her to allow him to sell the property (which exceeds the amount of her kesuvah). If he is a Yisroel, he should divorce her and then, remarry her (he can either sell the properties before the second marriage or afterwards).

Rava concludes his question: If the kesuvah of a yevamah was meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, let the yavam designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah, and then, he should be permitted to sell the remaining property?

Abaye said to Rava: And according to you that the kesuvah of a yevamah was not meant to be collected while the yavam is alive, why don’t you ask from our Mishna which states that the yavam should not say to her, “Your kesuvah is lying on the table (designating some of his property for the kesuvah),” but rather, all of his properties are indebted to her kesuvah. (The fact that he cannot do this should be a proof to Rava.)

Rava responds: The Mishna is not issuing a halachic ruling; rather, it is offering good advice to the yavam. He should not designate money for her kesuvah (for if the money would get lost, he would be obligated to write for her a new kesuvah).

Rava proves this from the latter part of the Mishna which states the same thing regarding an ordinary man, and there, he certainly is permitted to sell some of his own property; it is evident that the Mishna is only offering good advice to the husband.

Abaye answers Rava’s question: Rabbi Abba ruled that one should not designate land for her which equals the amount of the kesuvah (and then, he would be permitted to sell the remaining property) because this would promote hatred between them (for she would think that he is intending to divorce her; it is therefore preferable for him to divorce her and remarry her, for then, she will realize that he divorced her only as a means to sell the property). (81a – 81b)

Ruling on an Incident
The Gemora relates the following incident: There was a yevamah who fell to a yavam in Pumbedisa. His (younger) brother wanted to disqualify her for yibum by giving her a letter of divorce. The elder brother said to him, “What is it that you have in your mind? Are you troubled because of the property that I am destined to inherit, I will share the property with you.”

Rav Yosef, in considering this case said: Since the Rabbis have established that a yavam may not sell properties that belonged to the deceased brother; his sale is invalid even if he had already sold it (and therefore the agreement between the two brothers is not valid). For it was taught in the following braisa: If a man died and left a widow who was awaiting yibum and he also left property valued at a hundred maneh, the yavam may not sell the property although the widow's kesuvah amounts only to one maneh, because all of his property is pledged to her kesuvah.

Abaye said to him: Is it true that wherever the Rabbis ruled that one must not sell, the sale is invalid, even after it had taken place? Did we not, in fact, learn in a Mishna: (If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai said: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel said: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid. ?

The case was sent to Rabbi Chanina bar Papi who sent the same reply as that of Rav Yosef. On this Abaye remarked: Has Rabbi Chanina bar Papi hung jewels upon it? (He has not! His ruling is no more supported by proof or reason than that of Rav Yosef, and may he equally disregarded.)

It was then sent to Rav Minyumi the son of Rav Nachumi who sent the same reply as Abaye, but he added: “Should Rav Yosef offer a new reason, report it to me.”

Rav Yosef thereupon went out, investigated, and discovered that it was taught in the following braisa: If a man who had a monetary claim against his brother died, and left a widow who was awaiting yibum (to the borrower), the borrower is not entitled to claim, “Since I am the inheritor, I have acquired the amount of the debt,” but it must be taken from the yavam and spent on the purchase of land and he is only entitled to its produce (the debt in this case is similar to a sale ex post facto, and nevertheless it is invalid; which proves the correctness of Rav Yosef’s ruling).

Abaye asked: But perhaps they are just advising him in his own interests (since land is more secure than money)?

Rav Yosef replied: The Tanna stated that it is taken from the yavam and you say that it is merely good advice!

The case was again sent to Rav Minyumi the son of Rav Nachumi who said to them: So said Rav Yosef bar Minyumi in the name of Rav Nachman: This braisa is not an authentic teaching.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason (that he dismissed this braisa as a mistake)? If you will suggest that it is because the loan is a movable thing and movables are not pledged to a kesuvah, is it not possible that the statement represents the view of Rabbi Meir who maintains that movables are pledged to a kesuvah. And if you will suggest that it is because he could say to her, “You are not the party I have to deal with (since he didn’t borrow from her; it was from the brother), is it not possible that the statement represents the view of Rabbi Nosson, since it was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Nosson said: How do we know that if one has a claim of a maneh against his fellow and that fellow against another fellow, we will take out a maneh from this one (the debtor’s debtor) and give it to that one (the original creditor)? It is written: And he shall give it to the one to whom he is guilty.

Rather, the Gemora concludes, this is the reason: We never find that a Tanna will impose two stringencies in the matter of a kesuvah. He might agree either with Rabbi Meir or with Rabbi Nosson (but not with both of them).

Rava remarked: If so, I can well understand what Abaye meant when I heard him say, “This braisa is not an authentic teaching” and until now, I did not understand why he said so. (81b – 82a)

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Two Points to Ponder

*** The Gemora (Kesuvos 78b - 79a) discusses a case where the woman writes a document assigning her property to her daughter for the purpose of depriving her prospective husband from the estate. Would this procedure be effective to evade a creditor as well?

*** The Gemora discusses a dispute between Chanania and the Rabbis regarding the offspring of melog animals. Are they regarded as the principal because we are concerned that the mother might die and the entire principal will be depleted or are they regarded as produce because we are not concerned for death? Tosfos in Yoma says that we are not concerned that the wife of the Kohen Gadol will die on Yom Kippur because it is only one day; but in general, we are concerned for death over a long period of time. Shouldn’t that be the case here? The animal and the slavewoman will eventually die; they will not live forever!

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 79 - Highlights

Evading the Husband

A certain woman (a widow who was about to marry) wishing to deprive her prospective husband of her estate assigned it in writing to her daughter. After she married and was divorced, she came before Rav Nachman to demand the return of her estate (from her daughter, who claimed that the property was legally hers; she brought the document as proof). Rav Nachman tore up the document.

Rav Anan, thereupon, went to Mar Ukva and said to him: “See, master, how Nachman the peasant tears up people’s deeds.” “Tell me now,” Mar Ukva said to him, “how exactly the incident occurred.” “It occurred,” he replied, “in such and such a manner.” Mar Ukva exclaimed, “Did you speak of a deed that a woman intended as a means of evasion? Thus said Rav Chanilai bar Idi in the name of Shmuel: ‘I am an officially recognized judge, and should a deed which a woman intended as a means of evasion come into my hand I would tear it up.’”

Rava said to Rav Nachman: What in fact is the reason? It is obviously because of the fact that no man would neglect himself completely and give his property away to others. But this would apply to strangers only, but to a daughter, one might well give such a gift!

Rav Nachman responded: Even in the case of a daughter, a woman gives preference to herself (and therefore, the gift is invalid).

The Gemora raises an objection from the following braisa: If a woman desires to keep her property from her husband, how is she to proceed? She writes out a deed of trust to a stranger (a document of a pretended sale or gift with which one person entrusts another in order to make people believe that a proper sale or presentation had actually taken place); these are the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel. But the Chachamim said: If the recipient wishes, he may laugh at her (and retain the property) unless she wrote out for him, “You shall acquire possession from today, and whenever I shall approve.” (In this case only is the woman protected against the holder of the deed as well as against her husband. For should her husband claim the property, she can evade him by expressing consent to its acquisition by the stranger; and should the stranger claim possession, she can exercise her right of refusing to give her consent.) The reason that this plan works is because she wrote out for him in the manner prescribed; but, had she not done so, the recipient would have acquired possession of it? (Why did Shmuel rule that the document should be ripped up?)

Rabbi Zeira replied: There is no difficulty. Shmuel is referring to a case where the woman assigned to the stranger all her property (since no person would give away all his property to a stranger; it is pretty obvious that the document related to a fictitious transaction). The braisa is discussing a case where a woman assigned to a stranger only part of her property.

The Gemora asks: But if the buyer does not acquire her property, shouldn’t the husband acquire it!

Abaye answers: This property is treated as property that is unknown to the husband in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon. (78b – 79a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If money fell to a married woman as an inheritance, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. If she inherited produce which is detached from the ground, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. If she inherited produce which is attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir said: They assess the field as to how much it is worth with the produce, and how much it is worth without the produce, and with the difference, land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce. But the Chachamim say: That which is attached to the ground is his, and that which is detached from the ground is hers; land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the produce.

Rabbi Shimon says: Wherever he has an advantage upon her entry (into marriage), he has a disadvantage at her exit (when he divorces her); wherever he is at a disadvantage upon her entry, he has an advantage upon her exit. How is this? Produce which is attached to the ground – when he marries her, it is his, and when he divorces her, it is hers. And produce which is detached from the ground – when he marries her, it is hers, and when he divorces her, it is his. (79a)

Different Types of Land

(The Mishna had stated that when the woman inherits money, they should buy land with it. The Gemora discusses cases where a disagreement arises between husband and wife in regards to what type of real estate should be bought.) It is obvious that if husband and wife differ on the choice of purchase between land and houses, they should buy land (it is a safer and a better investment than houses). If they differ on the choice between houses and date palms, they should buy houses. If one insists on date palms and the other wants fruit trees, they should buy date palms. If one insists on fruit trees and the other wants grapevines, they should buy fruit trees. (79a)

Principal and Produce

If she inherited a thicket of sorb trees (which were primarily used for the cutting of its wood and which is valueless after the wood has been cut) or a fish pond, some maintain that it is regarded as produce (since no capital remains for the woman) and others maintain that it is regarded as principal (since eventually, it will be permanently depleted, the entire inheritance is regarded as principal). This is the general rule: If the stump regenerates, it is regarded as produce, but if the stump grows no new shoots, it is regarded as principal. (79a)

Offspring of Melog Property

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya who said in the name of Rabbi Yannai, and others said that Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya who said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: One who steals the offspring of a melog animal is required to pay the double payment to the wife (the Gemora is assuming now that the offspring is regarded as principal with which they would buy produce; this is because we are concerned that the mother might die and the principal will be lost).

The Gemora asks: Who is this going according to? It cannot be in accordance with the Rabbis nor Chanania, for we learned in the following braisa: The offspring of a melog animal belongs to the husband; the child of a melog slavewoman belongs to the wife. Chanania the son of Yoshiyah’s brother ruled: The child of a melog slavewoman has been given the same legal status as the offspring of a melog animal (and they both belong to the husband; according to both opinions, the offspring of the melog animal belongs to the husband, not to the wife!).

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yannai may be following both opinions, for it is the produce alone that the Rabbis in their enactment have assigned to the husband but not the produce that accrues from this produce.

The Gemora asks: Chanania’s opinion is understandable (that both, the offspring of the melog animal and slavewoman belong to the husband) because we are not concerned that the mother will die (and therefore, the principal will not be depleted). However, what is the logic behind the opinion of the Rabbis?

The Gemora answers: They are concerned that the mother will die, but an animal is different because (even if it dies) the hide of the animal will always remain (and the principal will not be depleted). (79a – 79b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If old slaves or slavewomen fell to her as an inheritance, they should be sold, and land should be purchased with them, and he enjoys the produce. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She does not sell them because they are the pride of her father’s house.

If old olive trees or grapevines fell to her as an inheritance, they should be sold for wood, and land should be purchased with them, and he enjoys the produce. Rabbi Yehudah says: She does not sell them because they are the pride of her father’s house. (79b)

Qualifying the Argument

Rav Kahana stated in the name of Rav: The argument in the Mishna is only where the olive trees or grapevines fell to the woman in her own field (so that even if the trees die, she will retain the field as principle); but, if they were in a field that did not belong to her, she must, according to everyone, sell them, because otherwise, the principal would be depleted.

Rav Yosef asked from our Mishna: Aren’t slaves and slavewomen the same as trees in a field that does not belong to her (for if they die, no principal will remain), and nevertheless, there is a dispute?

Rather, this is what Rav Kahana stated in the name of Rav: The argument in the Mishna is only where the olive trees or grapevines fell to the woman in a field that did not belong to her, but if they were in her own field, everyone holds that she is not required to sell them because she is entitled to retain the pride of her father’s house. (79b)

[END]

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Blessing by a Bas Mitzvah

The Rema (O”C 225:2) writes that one whose son is becoming bar mitzvah should recite the following blessing: Blessed are You, Hashem, our God, King of the universe, that You freed me from the punishment due this boy. He concludes that it is preferable to recite this blessing without mentioning Hashem’s name.

The question is asked: Why is this blessing not recited when one’s daughter becomes bas mitzvah?

The Peri Megadim states that it would depend on what the reason is for this blessing.

The Magen Avraham (ibid; 5) explains this blessing as follows: Up until this juncture, the father was punished when his son sinned because he obviously did not train him well enough. Once the child becomes an adult, he is responsible for his own actions.

The Levush, however, interprets this blessing in the exact opposite manner. Up until now, the child gets punished for the sins of his father, as the Gemora Shabbos (32b) states: For the sin of unfulfilled vows, a person’s children die when they are young. The meaning of the blessing is that his son will now not incur any punishments on account of the parents.

According to the Levush, there is no reason to make any distinction between a son and a daughter. However, according to the Magen Avraham, we can say that the blessing is only applicable to a son, where there is an obligation of chinuch. However, a father does not have a mitzvah of chinuch for a daughter and therefore there is no reason to recite the blessing when she becomes bas mitzvah.

The Kaf Hachayim writes that we can apply a different logic according to the Magen Avraham. It is customary for a father to sustain his daughter until she is married and therefore, she is naturally under his jurisdiction until then. He is capable of rebuking her until she marries and will be under the jurisdiction of her husband. He therefore does not recite the blessing when she becomes bas mitzvah since he is still rebuking her.

He explains according to the Levush as well. The Levush said that the reason for the blessing is because up until then, the son gets punished for the sins of his parents. It is possible to say that a daughter, who is already under the mazal of her husband, as it is said: It is announced in heaven, “The daughter of So-and-So will be married to So-and-So,” his mazal will benefit her that she will not be punished on account of her father’s sins.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein questions this explanation from our Gemora (Kesuvos 78a). The Gemora states: In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they replied: In the first case, it was into her possession that the property had come (prior to becoming an arusah, she is the legal possessor of whatever is given to her); in the latter case, the property came into his possession. I, however, do not understand his question. It seems that he understands the words “z’chuso and z’chusa” to mean “whose mazal caused the property to fall to her.” The simple explanation in our Gemora is in whose jurisdiction was the woman when the properties fell to her.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 78 - Highlights

Mishna

A woman to whom property fell before she became an arusah (and now she is an arusah), Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that she may sell them or she may give them away, and it is valid.(The Mishna is referring to nichsei melog - usufruct property - the property which the woman brings in with her from her father's house, and which is not recorded in the kesuvah, as well as property which comes to her by inheritance or as a gift after the marriage; this property is hers, and her husband is not responsible for it, since he may only usufruct (the right to use and enjoy the profits and advantages of something belonging to another as long as the property is not damaged or altered in any way) it; the term nikhsei melog is derived from the Aramaic word meligah, plucking, i.e., the husband plucks the property just as a chicken is plucked.)

If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!

If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, they both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, the husband may seize it from the hand of the purchasers.

If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, and now she is a nesuah, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

Rabbi Chanina ben Akavya said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? He said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new, and you impose on us the old!

Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property and property: property that is known to the husband, she may not sell, and if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is invalid. Properties that are not known to the husband, she may not sell, but if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid. (78a)

Erusin to Nisuin
The Gemora asks: What is the essential difference between the first case in which they do not differ (a woman to whom property fell before she became an arusah (and now she is an arusah), Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel agree that she may sell them or she may give them away, and it is valid) and the latter case in which they do differ (if the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them)?

In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they replied: In the first case, it was into her possession that the property had come (prior to becoming an arusah, she is the legal possessor of whatever is given to her); in the latter case, the property came into his possession.

The Gemora questions this distinction: If, however, it is maintained that the property came into his possession (since it is after erusin), why is the transfer valid after she sells them or gives them away?

The Gemora answers: In the first case, the property has beyond all doubt come into her possession. However, in the latter case, the property might be said to have come either into her, or into his possession (since at this present time, we are uncertain if a nisuin will take place). Hence, she may not initially sell the property, but if she does sell them or give it away, the transfer is legally valid. (78a)

Clarification of R’ Yehudah’s Statement
The Mishna had stated: (If the properties fell to her after she became an arusah (and she is still an arusah), Beis Shamai say: She may sell them, but Beis Hillel say: She may not sell them. They both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.) Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property?

The Gemora inquires: Is Rabbi Yehudah referring to Beis Shamai’s ruling, which allowed her to sell them initially (and the Chachamim are arguing that since she is an arusah, she should not be permitted to sell the properties)? Or, is he referring to Beis Hillel’s ruling, who ruled that the sale is valid after the fact (and the Chachamim are arguing that since she is an arusah,the sale should not be valid at all)?

The Gemora resolves this inquiry from the following braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: The Chachamim said before Rabban Gamliel: Since this one is his wife and this one is his wife (the nesuah and arusah), just as this one’s (the nesuah) sale is void, so too, this one’s (the arusah) sale should be void as well? Rabban Gamliel said to them: We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!

We see from this braisa that Rabbi Yehudah was referring to Beis Hillel’s ruling that the sale is valid after the fact. That is the point that the Chachamim are contending. (78a – 78b)

Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya
The Gemora cites the conclusion of the braisa cited above: Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya said: Rabban Gamliel did not respond like this (We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old!); rather, the following was his response: It is logical that a nesuah’s sale will be void because her husband is entitled to her findings, earnings and the right to annul her vows. However, regarding an arusah, whose husband is not entitled to these rights, would you say that her sale should be void?

The Chachamim replied: My master! That is understandable if she sold the properties prior to becoming a nesuah; however, what is the halacha if she first became a nesuah and then she sold the properties?

He said to them: In this case, she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid.

They said to him: Since he acquired the woman, should he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them:

We are embarrassed regarding the new (as to why the husband may take back property (that she acquired after she became a nesuah) that the purchasers bought from his wife), and you impose on us the old (regarding the properties that became hers before she became a nesuah)!

The Gemora asks: But in the Mishna, the following was said: If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, and now she is a nesuah, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid (and in the braisa that we just cited, Rabban Gamliel said that she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid)?

Rav Zevid answers: The Mishna should be emended to read that she is allowed to sell them or give them away and her sale would indeed be valid (which would be consistent with the braisa).

Rav Papa answers: The Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah in accordance with Rabban Gamliel (that even as an arusah, a woman is not permitted initially to sell or to give away, much less, may she do so after nisuin) and the braisa is following the opinion of Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya in accordance with Rabban Gamliel (that even a nesuah may sell or give away property that came into her possession before she became a nesuah).

The Gemora asks: If so, it will emerge that Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya follows the opinion of Beis Shamai?

The Gemora answers: This is what he was saying: Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel do not argue regarding this matter. (78b)

Rav and Shmuel
Rav and Shmuel both say: Whether the property fell to her before she became an arusah or whether they fell to her after she became an arusah, if she subsequently became a nesuah and sold the properties, the husband may extract the properties from the purchasers.

The Gemora asks: Who are they going accordsing to? This ruling is seemingly not following Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion, nor is it following Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya’s opinion?

The Gemora answers: They are following the viewpoint of “Our teachers,” for we have learned in the conclusion of the above-cited braisa: Whether the property fell to her before she became an arusah or whether they fell to her after she became an arusah, if she subsequently became a nesuah and sold the properties, the husband may extract the properties from the purchasers. (78b)

Husband Selling Nesuah’s Property
The Mishna had stated: If the properties fell to her after she became a nesuah, they both agree that if she sold them or if she gave them away, the husband may seize it from the hand of the purchasers.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t the Mishna teaching us the same halacha that we have learned as an enactment of Usha (which was decreed years after the Mishna)? For Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: In Usha they decreed that a wife who sells her melog property while her husband is alive and she dies, the husband may take the land from the purchasers (since he is regarded as a purchaser from the time of his marriage; his purchase of the property predates their purchase).

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is dealing with the halacha of the field during her lifetime and it is referring to the produce from the land (meaning that the sale is valid, but the husband may enjoy the produce that grows from the land). The decree of Usha was dealing with the status of the land itself and it is referring to the case where the wife died (and then, the husband may seize the land from the purchasers). (78b)

Unknown Properties
The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property and property: property that is known to the husband, she may not sell, and if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is invalid. Properties that are not known to the husband, she may not sell, but if she sold them or if she gave them away, it is valid.

The Gemora asks: What is regarded as known and what is regarded as unknown?

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: Known properties refer to land and unknown properties refer to moveables.

Rabbi Yochanan said: Both of those are regarded as known properties. Unknown properties refer to a case where the woman lives here and properties fell to her as an inheritance in a land overseas.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion: What is regarded as unknown properties? It is where the woman lives here and properties fell to her as an inheritance in a land overseas. (78b)

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