Daf Yomi - Beitza 33 - Two Categories of Muktza

The Gemora cites a Braisa which rules that one is prohibited from supporting a pot or a door with a piece of wood on Yom Tov. The reason given is that one has permission to use wood only for kindling and not for anything else.

Rashi explains that since the primary purpose of wood is for making utensils, something that is forbidden on Yom Tov to do, it is considered muktza; however there was a special dispensation given that the wood may be used for kindling purposes.

This is a unique concept that an object can be considered muktza and not muktza at the same time. It would depend on what the intended use is for.

The Maharsha comment that although Tosfos had previously stated that it is permitted to handle muktza for the sake of ochel nefesh on Yom Tov, that permission is only granted to remove the muktza (removal of the ashes from the oven) but not to use the muktza (supporting the pot with the wood). Using muktza is compared to eating muktza which is prohibited.

The distinction of the Maharsha requires clarification. If there is permission to handle the muktza due to ochel nefesh, why can't the muktza be used as well?

This can be explained by analyzing the words of the Chasam Sofer in regards to muktza.

The Gemora in Shabbos (124b) states that the reason handling muktza is forbidden is because it will lead to carrying objects from a private domain to a public one. The Sages decreed that muktza items cannot be handled because of the concern of carrying. (They did not forbid handling any objects because Klal Yisroel would not be able to uphold this decree.) The Raavad in Hilchos Shabbos (24:13) states this reason as well.

However Rashi in Beitza (26b) seems to offer a different reason for the prohibition against muktza. Rashi states that the Tanna that holds of muktza maintains that in order for objects to be used on Shabbos, they must be prepared prior to Shabbos and he cites a verse in the Torah that states "On the sixth day, you should prepare etc." It is evident from this Rashi that the principle prohibiting muktza is due to the lack of designation and preparation from before Shabbos and not because of a concern of carrying.

The Chasam Sofer answers this question by stating an important principle regarding muktza. There are two types of muktza. One is muktza which is forbidden to eat and that is either a Biblical prohibition (or close to it, like an asmachta) learned from the verse V'heichinu etc. which teaches us that food cannot be eaten on Shabbos or Yom Tov unless they were prepared prior to Shabbos or Yom Tov. The Chasam Sofer states unequivocally that there is no argument regarding this at all. Everyone agrees to this drasha. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree as to the guidelines of this muktza but they both agree that this type of muktza exists.

There is a second type of muktza and that includes objects that are forbidden to handle. This is a Rabbinic enactment instituted by the Prophet Nechemiah. Nechemiah saw that the people were becoming extremely lax in regards to the prohibition of carrying and therefore he decreed that there are certain objects which may not be handled at all. (I found a strong question on the Chasam Sofer in the introduction to the Sefer Imrei Yehuda from Rabbi Yehuda Wiezner. The Gemora in Shabbos relates that Dovid Hamelech died on Shabbos and was laying in the sun. Shlomo asked how Dovid can be moved since a dead body is muktza on Shabbos. It is evident from here that there existed a concept of muktza hundreds of years before Nechemia?)

With this principle, we can now explain the Maharsha (I found this tzu shtel in the Sefer Hayovel for the Chasam Sofer from Rav Shmuel Borenstein who learns Kollel Volozin in Bnei Brak). The Maharsha stated that the permission to handle muktza for the sake of ochel nefesh on Yom Tov is only granted to remove the muktza (removal of the ashes from the oven) but not to use the muktza (supporting the pot with the wood). Using muktza is compared to eating muktza which is prohibited. Handling muktza is forbidden because of the concern that it will lead to carrying and carrying itself is permitted for the sake of ochel nefesh. It will obviously follow that handling muktza for the sake of ochel nefesh will also be permitted. Eating muktza, which is prohibited on the account that it wasn't prepared from beforehand does not have the permission of ochel nefesh.

Using this principle from the Chasam Sofer, we explained the Tosfos on daf beis. If an egg was laid on Yom Tov, Bais Shammai rules that one is permitted to eat it on Yom Tov and Bais Hillel disagrees. Tosfos wonders why the Mishna states tochal, that one is permitted to eat it, and lo tochal, that one is prohibited to eat it. Why did the Mishna not state matirin, it is permitted, and osrin, prohibited? Tosfos answers that one might have erroneously assumed that it is permitted for one to handle the egg but it is forbidden to eat it.

Reb Menachem Kohn zt”l in his Sefer Ateres Avi explains the answer of Tosfos according to the Chasam Sofer who writes that there are two types of muktzeh. One type of muktzeh is derived from the verse regarding the manna where it is said vehayah bayom hashishi veheichinu eis asher yaviu, and it shall be that on the sixth day when they prepare what they bring, which means that one should prepare the Shabbos and Yom Tov meals beforehand and if one does not, one is forbidden to eat from that food. A second type of muktzeh is the muktzeh instituted by Nechemiah that one cannot handle certain objects on Shabbos as there is a concern that he might carry them into a public domain.

There are differences between the two types of muktzeh. One who did not prepare a food item prior to Shabbos or Yom Tov is prohibited from eating the food, whereas an object that is muktzeh because of the decree of Nechemiah cannot be handled on Shabbos or on Yom Tov. A further distinction between the two categories of muktzeh is that the decree of Nechemiah was only instituted with regard to utensils, whereas food cannot become muktzeh unless it was not prepared prior to Shabbos or Yom Tov.

Based on the words of the Chasam Sofer, we can now understand the answer of Tosfos. Given the fact that the decree of Nechemiah was not instituted regarding food items, the egg would only be muktzeh because it was not prepared prior to Yom Tov and one may have assumed that there would be a prohibition from eating the egg. Therefore, Bais Shammai teaches that one is permitted to eat the egg. Bais Hillel, however, who maintains that the egg is muktzeh and cannot be eaten, maintains that the egg forfeits its status as a food item and subsequently the egg also cannot be handled.

We previously cites a Beis Halevi who makes a very similar distinction. Bais HaLevi, cited in sefer Matikei Shemuah, writes that when the Baraisa rules that an egg is forbidden in a case of doubt, that only refers to the prohibition of eating the egg, as it is biblically prohibited to eat an egg which was not prepared prior to Yom Tov. It is permitted to handle the egg, however, as handling the egg is only a rabbinical decree and we are not stringent in a case of doubt.

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[KOLLEL IYUN HADAF RESPONDED TO ONE OF MICHAEL POST'S QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A SUKKAH AND AN ESROG AND AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES A SUKKAH
HERE.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 24 - A Doubt on the Preparation

The Gemara explains the Mishna as follows: If there is an object that there is a doubt whether it was sufficiently prepared from before Yom Tov, the object will be prohibited. Rabban Gamliel, however, disagrees and permits them.

The reason that an item that is not prepared prior to Yom Tov is prohibited is because of muktzeh. This is difficult, however, because muktzeh is only rabbinically prohibited, so a case of doubt should also be permitted, as there is a principle that safek derabannan lekula, an uncertainty regarding a rabbinical prohibition is judged leniently?

One answer that is suggested is that the prohibition of muktzeh can be derived from a verse in the Torah that states veheichinu, and they shall prepare. Thus, muktzeh can be viewed as a biblical prohibition and regarding an uncertainty we will rule stringently.

Tosfos Yeshanim on Daf 3b writes that even if muktzeh is not biblically prohibited, the Chachamim treated muktzeh as if it would be biblically prohibited and therefore we rule strictly even in a case of uncertainty.

The Meiri answers that muktzeh is a dovor sheyeish lo matirin', a matter that will be permitted after Yom Tov, so we will rule stringently even in a case of uncertainty.

The Shaar Hatziyon (497:10) writes, based on the Meiri, that if the fish were most likely to spoil if we would wait until after Yom Tov, we can rule leniently and allow one to eat the fish, although this is a case of safek muktzeh, a possibility of the fish being muktzeh.. Shaar HaTziyun does not conclude that this is the halacha, because there are other factors that necessitate a stringent ruling, such as the fact that muktzeh is akin to a biblical prohibition, and for this reason, even if the fish were to spoil, one cannot eat them, unless the fish spoiling will be a complete loss.

Please look here for further discussion regarding muktza.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 23 - Smoking on Yom Tov

Please make sure you scroll down to the comments as people are linking to very interesting articles - Halachically and health related.

UPDATE : Many people have mentioned that the number one issue should be second hand smoke - now that it has been proven that this is extremely dangerous. Here is a ruling issued by the Tzitz Eliezer.

"...וכמו כן כשמעשנים במקומות ציבוריים יכול שפיר כל אחד ואחד מהנמצאים שם החושש מזה לפיגוע בבריאותו, למחות בידי המעשנים שלא יעשנו"²³.

When one is smoking in a public place, anyone in the vicinity who is concerned about his personal health can protest and demand that the person should not smoke in the area.

HaRav Moshe Feinstein Zt"l writes sharp words for those who smoke in a Beis Medrash, Yeshiva or kollel building.

(דברים חריפים יותר על חומרת איסור העישון בבית המדרש בישיבות ובכוללים, כתב הגר"מ פיינשטיין שליט"א, ראה צילום מכתבו להלן עמ' 251-248.

Please read this introduction again from the Kollel Iyun Hadaf: Most contemporary authorities state that there is no allowance to smoke at all, even on an ordinary weekday, due to the established and documented health hazards which the effects of cigarettes and second-hand smoke pose to the smoker and to those around him.

I have recently been asked during the Daf Yomi shiur a few times regarding smoking on Yom Tov. Does the principle of 'mitoch' apply? Is it a 'dovor hashaveh lechal nefesh'? If it's unhealthy for the lungs, can the logic of calming the digestive system outweigh the health factors? There are many issues. Kollel Iyun Hadaf has done extensive research on this topic and I copy it here for you. Please visit their site often as there is a wealth of information there.

Kollel Iyun Hadaf

HALACHAH: CIGARETTES ON YOM TOV
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the act of placing incense on coals on Yom Tov, which involves the Melachos of kindling and extinguishing. The Gemara's discussion is relevant to a debate among the Acharonim with regard to the question of whether or not one is permitted to use cigarettes on Yom Tov.

Most contemporary authorities state that there is no allowance to smoke at all, even on an ordinary weekday, due to the established and documented health hazards which the effects of cigarettes and second-hand smoke pose to the smoker and to those around him. Nevertheless, according to those who do permit a Jew to smoke, may one smoke on Yom Tov? (This discussion is a summary of the issues involved and is not intended as a Halachic ruling.)

There are four major issues involved with smoking on Yom Tov.

(a) The MAGEN AVRAHAM (OC 514:4) cites the KENESES HA'GEDOLAH who prohibits smoking on Yom Tov because it involves the Melachah of Mechabeh, extinguishing.

In a lengthy Teshuvah, the DARCHEI NO'AM (#9) asks that the act of smoking appears to involve no act of Mechabeh, but rather an act of Hav'arah (burning). Any conceivable form of Mechabeh involved (such as diminishing the fire by squeezing the cigarette) would be a "Davar she'Eino Miskaven" and not a "Pesik Reishei," and thus should be permitted.

(b) The MAGEN AVRAHAM proposes a more basic reason to ban smoking on Yom Tov. Even if it does not involve Mechabeh but only Hav'arah, and Hav'arah is permitted on Yom Tov because of the principle of "Mitoch," the principle of "Mitoch" permits only an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," which everyone enjoys. Smoking is certainly not something which everyone enjoys.

However, the PNEI YEHOSHUA (Shabbos 39b, DH v'Omer) and RAV YONASAN EIBESHITZ (in BINAH L'ITIM, Hilchos Yom Tov 4:6) write that this reason is not enough to prohibit smoking on Yom Tov. TOSFOS in Shabbos (39b, DH u'Veis Hillel) discusses whether one may enter a bathhouse to sweat on Yom Tov. He writes that although the act of washing the entire body is not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and is therefore prohibited (see Tosfos to Beitzah 21b, DH Lo), nevertheless sweating is permitted because it is for the sake of maintaining one's health (Refu'ah) and not for pleasure. Similarly, the medicinal properties of nicotine may be grounds to permit smoking.

HAGA'ON RAV YISRAEL ZEV GUSTMAN zt'l was asked if this argument is valid grounds to permit smoking on Yom Tov today, when the dangerous effects of smoking have been proven beyond any doubt. Rav Gustman answered that any person who smokes convinces himself that it is beneficial for him. The issue of whether an activity is considered one that merely provides pleasure or one that provides health benefits does not depend on whether or not the activity is objectively healthy, but whether the person himself does it for pleasure (in which case it is not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and is forbidden on Yom Tov), or for the perceived positive chemical effects that it has on his body. One who smokes presumably does so for the artificial calming effect of the nicotine. In that respect it could be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," because with regard to acts of Refu'ah what matters is the ultimate effect and not what causes that effect, as the KESAV SOFER explains (Teshuvos OC #64). Since everyone appreciates the sense of being relaxed, any act which provides relaxing effects is considered to be "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh."

The KORBAN NESANEL (Beitzah 2:22:10) cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH (511:4) mentions another rational to consider smoking an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." Since many people, and not merely a few, have the practice to smoke, the act can be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." The Bi'ur Halachah adds that this obviously applies only in a place where smoking is the accepted cultural norm and most people smoke.

The KORBAN NESANEL himself, however, prohibits smoking on Yom Tov. The fact that in a certain place most people smoke does not make the act "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," because smoking is harmful to those who are not accustomed to it. Lighting the "Mugmar" and washing one's entire body are also things that many people do and are still considered things which are not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" since some people do not appreciate such "pleasures." The PNEI YEHOSHUA (Shabbos 39b) also presents this argument.

(c) The PRI MEGADIM (OC 511) points out that an additional problem is involved when there is printing or letters on the outside of the cigarette wrapper, and by smoking one destroys those letters and transgresses the Melachah of Mochek (erasing). Because of this concern, some people who smoke on Yom Tov do not finish the cigarette when it burns down to the letters, but they let it burn by itself so that they should not transgress the Melachah of Mochek.

RAV HILLEL RUVEL shlit'a pointed out that this practice does not circumvent the problem of Mochek according to the NIMUKEI YOSEF in Bava Kama (22a). The Nimukei Yosef rules that when one lights a fire, he is considered to have burned everything that will eventually be burned by the fire. When Rav Ruvel brought this issue to the attention of Rav Gustman zt'l, Rav Gustman said that those who act leniently may rely on the OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Shabbos 23:2) who says that one who burns a book on Yom Tov is not liable for the Melachah of Mochek, because Mochek involves taking away the words and not the entire paper.

(d) The KORBAN NESANEL (loc. cit.) writes that even if no Isur d'Oraisa forbids smoking on Yom Tov, it is almost impossible for one who smokes on Yom Tov to avoid transgressing Isurei d'Oraisa, such as Hav'arah when he attempts to light the pipe, cigar, or cigarette, or when he adds or removes tobacco from a pipe, or when he taps the ashes off of a cigarette. (This may be the intention of the Keneses ha'Gedolah cited in (a) above.)

Other Acharonim (BIRKEI YOSEF OC 511) write that this reason cannot be used as grounds for prohibiting smoking on Yom Tov, because it is accepted that the sages today do not enact new Gezeiros. Since this reason entails making a Gezeirah (that one may not smoke lest he transgress an Isur d'Oraisa), today's sages cannot enact a rabbinical prohibition to prohibit smoking on Yom Tov in order to prevent one from transgressing Isurei d'Oraisa.

HALACHAH: The KORBAN NESANEL concludes in very strong terms that one who smokes on Yom Tov acts reprehensibly, and "one who wants to honor Hash-m and his Torah should refrain from smoking for just one or two days (Yom Tov), even though his Yetzer ha'Ra might suggest ways to permit it based on the Shas."

However, most Acharonim (as cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH loc. cit.) rule that in a city where most of the people smoke, the act of smoking can be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and thus one may smoke on Yom Tov. RAV MOSHE STERNBUCH shlit'a points out that nowadays, since even in places where people smoke they know that it is harmful to their health, and since in more and more places smoking is looked upon disapprovingly, it is very difficult to rely on these reasons to permit smoking on Yom Tov.

When asked by Kollel Iyun Hadaf whether smoking is permitted on Yom Tov, HAGA'ON RAV CHAIM PINCHAS SHEINBERG shlit'a said that it is certainly not considered an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and thus it is forbidden on Yom Tov.

Rav Sheinberg added that it has been proven that smoking is hazardous to one's health, and therefore smoking is never permitted, even on an ordinary weekday. (Regarding those who already smoke and who suffer from nicotine addiction, see IGROS MOSHE YD 2:49, and TESHUVOS V'HANGAHOS 1:316.)

Another interesting question raised by the Acharonim is whether one who maintains that smoking is forbidden on Yom Tov may light a cigarette for someone who is lenient. The KESAV SOFER (ibid.), based on the SHA'AR HA'MELECH (Hilchos Ishus 7:12), writes that if one person maintains that a certain practice is prohibited and he helps another person, who maintains that the practice is permitted, to do that act, he transgresses the prohibition of "Lifnei Iver." Therefore, one who maintains that smoking is prohibited may not help another person smoke on Yom Tov, and he must treat cigarettes and other smoking implements as Muktzah. However, the Kesav Sofer adds, if he maintains that the Halachah permits smoking but he personally is stringent and does not smoke, then he may light a cigarette for someone else who smokes.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 4 - Fundamental Explanation in the Decrees of the Chachamim

The Gemora drew a comparison between the halacha of an object that will eventually become permitted to a case where there is a uncertainty regarding the status of the egg. When an egg was laid on Yom Tov and became mixed with permissible eggs, we would not nullify the egg in question as the egg will be permitted after Yom Tov. Similarly, in our case where there is a doubt if the egg is rabbinically forbidden, we will not rule leniently as after Yom Tov the egg will nonetheless be permitted.

The Ran in Nedarim (52) offers what seems to be a different reason why an item that will eventually be permitted cannot be nullified. Normally if a forbidden food becomes intermingled with food that is permitted, the entire mixture will be permitted to eat, as long as the permitted food will comprise a majority of the mixture. There are certain exceptions to this rule. One exception is that if the two foods are similar to the point that they are indistinguishable from each other, the permitted foods cannot nullify the forbidden food. The Ran explains that a prohibited item which will eventually be permitted is not discernable from the permitted items and therefore it cannot be nullified.

Rav Elchonon Wasserman in Kovetiz Shiurim questions the words of the Ran from our Gemora. Here we equated the halacha of a case where there is an uncertainty if the egg is rabbinically forbidden to the case where the item will eventually be permitted and we ruled that the forbidden item is not nullified because it will nonetheless be permitted after Yom Tov. According to the Ran, however, there is no comparison. In the cases where the item will eventually be permitted, there is no nullification as the two items are indistinguishable from each other and that is why we cannot be lenient. In our case there is an egg which we have an uncertainty regarding to when the egg was laid, thus creating a Rabbinic doubt, so why should we not be lenient?

Rav Elchonon asks further on the essence of the Ran’s explanation. Why is an item which will eventually be permitted deemed to be indistinguishable from the other permitted items, if at present the item is forbidden. It is evident that they are distinguished from each other because the item is biblically permitted due to the nullification of the majority of items. What, then, compelled the Chachamim to rule stringently and state that an item that will eventually be permitted cannot be nullified?

The most obvious answer to the latter question is that logic dictates that one should not eat something until it is completely permitted, rather than nullifying it in its present state. The Ran, however, maintains that this reason alone would be insufficient for such a stringency. Rav Elchonon writes that there are two fundamental ideas that are required for every rabbinic injunction. First, there must be a legitimate reason for the decree and furthermore, there must be a biblical source that justifies the decree, as the Chachamim need to have a source in the Torah that will reinforce their decree.

The Chachamim saw fit to decree that a forbidden item that will eventually be permitted cannot be eaten now. The reason for this is because one can wait until the item will become permitted and then he can eat it. The justification for the Chachamim issuing this decree was based on the biblical law that a forbidden item which is indistinguishable from the permitted items cannot be nullified.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 3 - Eating and Handling the Egg

The Gemara cites a Baraisa that rules that when there is a doubt, one is not permitted to eat the egg. The Gemara assumes that the doubt is where the egg was laid on Yom Tov or prior to Yom Tov. According to Rabbah, who maintains that an egg that is laid on Yom Tov is prohibited because of the principle of hachanah, i.e. preparation, then we can understand why the Baraisa rules that in a case of doubt the egg is prohibited. This is because the principle of hachanah is biblical in nature and we always rule stringently regarding biblical uncertainties.

The Rashba in Avodas HaKodesh rules that one is forbidden to eat an egg that was laid on Yom Tov, thus rendering the egg muktzeh, and one is prohibited from handling the egg on Yom Tov. The Eimek Bracha asks on the Rashba from our Gemara because it would appear from the Baraisa that in the case when there is a doubt if the egg was laid on Yom Tov and the Baraisa rules that it is forbidden, one is also prohibited from handling the egg. The Gemara can ask on Rabbah that Rabbah rules that one is biblically prohibited from eating an egg which was laid on Yom Tov and therefore in a case of doubt, it will also be forbidden. Regarding handling the egg, however, which in a case of certainty is only rabbinically forbidden, it should not be forbidden to handle the egg. The Emek Bracha wants to prove from this Gemara that the reason of hachanah will biblically prohibit one from eating the egg and from handling it and that is why in a case of doubt, it will be forbidden to eat and to handle the egg.

Bais HaLevi, cited in sefer Matikei Shemuah, writes that when the Baraisa rules that the egg is forbidden in a case of doubt, that only refers to the prohibition of eating the egg, as it is biblically prohibited to eat an egg which was not prepared prior to Yom Tov. It is permitted to handle the egg, however, as handling the egg is only a rabbinical decree and we are not stringent in a case of doubt.

Reb Dovid Newman in his sefer Avodas Yom Tov offers two answers to the question on the Rashba.

The Shach (Yoreh Deah 110) rules that when there is a case of doubt and there are two halachic ramifications, we must either rule stringently or leniently regarding both applications. We cannot rule stringently regarding one halacha and leniently regarding another. For this reason, since the ruling in our case is that the egg is forbidden to eat, it must follow that the egg cannot be handled even though it is only a rabbinical prohibition.

Another answer is that once it is decided that the egg cannot be eaten because it might not have been prepared prior to Yom Tov, the egg automatically becomes muktzeh. We are not ruling that it cannot be handled because of the uncertainty. Rather, once it has been decided that the egg cannot be eaten, the egg is rendered muktzeh for certain and subsequently the egg cannot be handled.

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Daf Yomi - Beitza 2 - Two Types of Muktza

If an egg was laid on Yom Tov, Bais Shammai rules that one is permitted to eat it on Yom Tov and Bais Hillel disagrees. Tosfos wonders why the Mishna states tochal, that one is permitted to eat it, and lo tochal, that one is prohibited to eat it. Why did the Mishna not state matirin, it is permitted, and osrin, prohibited? Tosfos answers that one might have erroneously assumed that it is permitted for one to handle the egg but it is forbidden to eat it.

Reb Menachem Kohn zt”l in his Sefer Ateres Avi explains the answer of Tosfos according to the Chasam Sofer who writes that there are two types of muktzeh. One type of muktzeh is derived from the verse regarding the manna where it is said vehayah bayom hashishi veheichinu eis asher yaviu, and it shall be that on the sixth day when they prepare what they bring, which means that one should prepare the Shabbos and Yom Tov meals beforehand and if one does not, one is forbidden to eat from that food. A second type of muktzeh is the muktzeh instituted by Nechemiah that one cannot handle certain objects on Shabbos as there is a concern that he might carry them into a public domain.

There are differences between the two types of muktzeh. One who did not prepare a food item prior to Shabbos or Yom Tov is prohibited from eating the food, whereas an object that is muktzeh because of the decree of Nechemiah cannot be handled on Shabbos or on Yom Tov. A further distinction between the two categories of muktzeh is that the decree of Nechemiah was only instituted with regard to utensils, whereas food cannot become muktzeh unless it was not prepared prior to Shabbos or Yom Tov.

Based on the words of the Chasam Sofer, we can now understand the answer of Tosfos. Given the fact that the decree of Nechemiah was not instituted regarding food items, the egg would only be muktzeh because it was not prepared prior to Yom Tov and one may have assumed that there would be a prohibition from eating the egg. Therefore, Bais Shammai teaches that one is permitted to eat the egg. Bais Hillel, however, who maintains that the egg is muktzeh and cannot be eaten, maintains that the egg forfeits its status as a food item and subsequently the egg also cannot be handled.

The Bircas Avrohom qualifies this novel approach and writes that a food can only forfeit its status as a food item if the food was definitely muktzeh. A food item that is only possibly muktzeh does not forfeit its status as a food and subsequently one would be permitted to handle the food.

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 78 - Touching Food on Yom Kippur

There is a question discussed in some of the Poskim if one is allowed to touch food on Yom Kippur. Perhaps it has a halacha similar to muktza. Mahril Diskin brings a proof from our Gemora that it is permitted. Rav Yehuda stated that one is permitted to cool himself off with fruit and he actually did so with a certain type of vegetable. However, he retracts from this proof because the Gemora can be referring to fruits and vegetables that cannot be eaten raw and there is no suspicion that he will come to eat it, however a food that we are worried that one might forget and eat it, should not be touched on Tom Kippur.

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