A Yahrtzeit

Rabbi Meir Shapiro, the founder of the Daf Hayomi passed away on the day that those who were studying the daf during that cycle were learning Kesuvos 91.

The Gemora states: The orphans have a mitzvah to pay the debt of their father.

Hundreds of Reb Meir Shapiro’s students, who viewed themselves as only children of their beloved Rebbe swore by his coffin that they would continue building the illustrious Yeshiva of their Rebbe spiritually and financially. It was in this manner that they felt that they were paying the debt of their father; continuing his legacy.

And so it was. For the next six years, until the Holocaust, his Yeshiva flourished; his spirit was present in the walls of the Yeshiva, and served as a tremendous influence to all of his disciples.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 91 - Highlights

Explaining the Argument of Rabbi Shimon and the Tanna Kamma

Is it possible to say that this is their argument? Doesn’t the Mishna state that Rebbi Shimon says: Even if there are possessions without achrayus (responsibility to replace to a buyer if seized) it is not enough to validate these kesuvos. There must be two dinar of possessions that have achrayus in order that both kesuvos should be valid.

The Gemora therefore answers: Here the argument is regarding if one dinar of property that has a lien on it is enough to validate both kesuvos. One opinion is that only property without a lien is valid, not property with a lien. The other opinion is that property with a lien is also valid.

The Gemora asks: If so, Rabbi Shimon’s statement that “if there is a dinar left” should read “because there is a dinar left!”

The Gemora therefore answers: The argument is regarding when there is a less than one dinar. One opinion is that only one dinar makes the kesuvos valid, not less. The other opinion (Rabbi Shimon) is that even less than a dinar validates the kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: This is a difficult interpretation, as Rabbi Shimon said that there must be a dinar! If you will say that the authors of these opinions should be switched (and Rabbi Shimon is the one who says that less than a dinar is not valid), the Tanna Kamma also clearly holds that a dinar is necessary! [Rashi explains that this is referring to the Tanna Kamma of the Mishna quoted at the beginning of this page. The Tanna Kmama there is the same Tanna Kamma as in this Beraisa, and he mentioned there that a dinar is required.]

The Gemora therefore answers: The argument is regarding one of the two arguments originally stated (whether a dinar is necessary from land, or whether possessions that have a lien count), with the authors of the opinions switched.

Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Papa: The halachah is that if one wife dies during his lifetime and one is alive when he dies, the children from the first wife still have a kesuvah for the male children. The halachah is also that a kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah (a dinar of the estate) can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah (which does not have that value as there is not two dinar in the estate).

The Gemora asks: It is understandable that if the first lesson (mentioned above) would be deduced from the Mishna and not and the second lesson, we would think that only if there is an extra dinar are both kesuvos valid. However, once we would know the second lesson is correct, the first lesson is obvious!

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would only state the second lesson, we would think that the case is where a person marries three wives, and two of them die in his lifetime and one survives him, and the survivor then dies and only left a girl who does not receive an inheritance anyway. However, in a case where there were only two wives and one died during his lifetime and one died after he died, we should suspect that this will lead to the two inheritors fighting over who they are inheriting (see Rashi at length). This is why the Mishna still had to tell us that in this case the first wife’s sons receive their kesuvah for the male children. (91a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If someone married two wives whom he survived, and then he died. One set of orphans wants to collect their kesuvah first (as it is greater than the kesuvah of the other wife), and there is only enough for two kesuvos. They should split the estate evenly. If there was a dinar for each kesuvah, each first collects their respective kesuvah. If the orphans say, we will add to the estate another dinar in order that we can collect our mother’s kesuvah, we do not listen to them. We rather have the property evaluated in Beis Din. If there were future monies coming to the estate after he died, they are not considered like actual possessions of the estate when the person died. Rebbi Shimon says: Even if there are possessions without achrayus it is not enough to validate these kesuvos. There must be two dinar of possessions that have achrayus in order that both kesuvos should be valid. (91a)
Property Value at Time of Death

The Beraisa states: If one set has a kesuvah of one thousand, and the other of five hundred, if there is an extra dinar each takes their kesuvah. If not, they split the estate evenly.

The Gemora asks: This is obvious! If the property was worth a lot when the father died and then went down in value, it is clear that the inheritors already were entitled to their kesuvos (as there originally was an extra dinar for each). What if the property was worth little when he died, and then appreciated in value?

The Gemora attempts to answer this question from the incident with the property of the house of Tzirtzur where these were the circumstances. They went before Rav Amram. Rav Amram said: Go compromise, but they did not listen. Rav Amram said: If you don’t listen, I will strike you with the thorn that does not draw blood (excommunication).

They sent this question to Rav Nachman. Rav Nachman stated: Just as in the case where the possessions were originally many the inheritors already acquired the kesuvah, so too in this case they already acquired their kesuvah. (91a – 91b)

Warding Off Creditors

There was a person who owed one thousand zuz, and he also owned two fields. He sold each for five hundred zuz. His creditor went and seized one of the fields from a buyer. When he was about to seize the other one, the buyer took one thousand zuz and went to him and said: “If this field is worth one thousand zuz to you, fine. If not, take this thousand zuz and go away.”

Rami bar Chama thought to rule that this is like our Mishna. The Mishna stated that the orphans who want to collect their kesuvah cannot simply donate a dinar to the estate to make them eligible to collect their kesuvah. Rava told him: Is this comparable? In that case, the other orphans will lose; here no one is losing out! He is giving one thousand and the creditor is getting one thousand!

The Gemora inquires: How much does Beis Din say the field is worth when the payment is recorded (in the incident above)? Ravina says one thousand, while Rav Avira says five hundred (its real value). The law is five hundred.

There was a person who owed one thousand zuz, and he also owned two small fields. He sold each for fifty zuz. His creditor went and seized one of the fields from a buyer. When he was about to seize the other one, the buyer took one hundred zuz and went to him and said: “If this field is worth one hundred zuz to you, fine. If not, take this hundred zuz and go away.”

Rav Yosef thought to rule that this is like our Mishna. The Mishna stated that the orphans who want to collect their kesuvah cannot simply donate a dinar to the estate to make them able to collect their kesuvah. Rava told him: Is this comparable? In that case the other orphans will lose, here no one is losing out! He is giving one hundred and the creditor is getting one hundred!

The Gemora inquires: How much does Beis Din say the field is worth when the payment is recorded (in the incident above)? Ravina says one hundred, while Rav Avira says fifty (its real value). The law is fifty.

There was a man who owed one hundred zuz. He died, and left a small field worth fifty zuz. The creditor went and seized the field. The orphans went and gave him fifty zuz, but then he seized it from them again (for the other fifty). They went before Abaye. Abaye said: It is a mitzvah for the orphans to pay the debt of their father. Now that he has seized the field again he has the right to do so. However, this is only of they paid him the value of the land as a sale, but if they paid him as paying off their father’s debt entirely, the creditor can no longer seize the property.

A person sold his mother’s kesuvah for a pittance. He told the buyer that if his mother comes and complains about the sale (see Rashi DH “Achrayus d’Nafsha” for the logistics of the complaint), he will not compensate him. His mother died and did not complain, but then the son went and complained. Rami bar Chama thought to say that he now takes the place of his mother. Rava replied: Although he did not accept liability for his mother’s actions, he did accept responsibility for his own actions (that he would not complain). (91b)

[END]

Read more!

Inheritors Reciting Shehechiyonu when they Pay their Father’s Debts

It is ruled in Shulchan Aruch (223:2) that one whose father dies should recite the blessing of dayan ha’emes, the truthful Judge. If there was an inheritance, he should also recite the blessing of shehechiyonu.

The question arises: What would be the halacha if there is an inheritance, but all of the money will be used to pay off the father’s debts? Will the children still recite a shehechiyonu or not?

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 90b) states: We also see that one kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah (a dinar of the estate) can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah (which does not have that value as there is not two dinar in the estate). How is this apparent from the Mishna? Being that the Mishna does not say that the second collection can only occur “if there is an extra dinar (corresponding to this kesuvah).”

Rashi explains: The Mishna taught us that if one set of inheritors is collecting the kesuvah of their mother because her husband died before their mother, this payment is regarded as an inheritance for all of the father’s inheritors, and will therefore be considered as the surplus for the validity of the kesuvah for the male children. Since all inheritors have a mitzvah to repay their father’s debts, they are inheriting it and then paying off the other inheritors. Rashi uses the following expression: There is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein states that accordingly, the children will recite the shehechiyonu blessing even though they are left with nothing because there is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts.

However, he concludes that there actually is no proof from Rashi for this halachic ruling. Rashi is only explaining the reason why the Gemora considers it an inheritance, and that is because of the logic that there is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts. However, in respect to the shehechiyonu blessing, that is a blessing that is only recited when one is rejoicing. Although, one whose father dies and leaves him with an inheritance is not rejoicing at all; he would much rather that his father would not have died altogether (as the Mishna Berura ibid explains), nevertheless, there is a positive result from the inheritance; that is a sufficient enough of a reason to recite the blessing (although it is mixed with pain and anguish). In this case, however, there is no positive advantage to the inheritors with this inheritance at all and therefore, they would not recite the shehechiyonu blessing.

Read more!

A Minor Getting Married

The Mishna (Kesuvos 90a) discussed a case where a minor was married off by his father. The Rishonim (Shitah Mekubetzes, Tosfos Yevamos 62b) bring proof from here that there is no prohibition for a minor to get married, for otherwise, the Mishna would not have mentioned this case without informing us that it is indeed forbidden.

The Rambam, however, in Hilchos Ishus (11:6) rules that it is forbidden to marry off a minor, and it is regarded as a promiscuous cohabitation.

The Pischei Teshuva (E”H, 1:3) cites a Knesses Yechezkel, who explains the Rambam’s opinion. The Rambam is referring to a case where the minor married a woman by himself, without his father. Our Mishna is referring to a case where the father married him off.

The explanation for this distinction is as follows: A minor who marries a woman by himself cannot obligate himself to pay the kesuvah and therefore, it is regarded as a promiscuous cohabitation since we have learned that one who cohabits with his wife when she doesn’t have a kesuvah is regarded as being involved in a promiscuous relationship. However, when the father marries him off, he has the ability to obligate himself to the kesuvah and there is a lien on the property; then, it is not regarded as a promiscuous cohabitation.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 90 - Highlights

Mishna

If a father married off his son when he was a minor, the kesuvah that he wrote when he was a minor is effective once he grows older, as he stayed married to her based on that kesuvah. If a convert converted with his wife, the kesuvah that they made when they were gentiles is effective, as he stayed married to her based on that kesuvah. (90a)

Are Additions Included?

Rav Huna says: She only receives the standard one (for a widow) or two hundred (for a girl who was never married) zuz kesuvah, but does not receive the additional monies discussed in the kesuvah. Rav Yehuda says: She receives those monies as well.

The Gemora attempts to solve this argument from a Beraisa. The Beraisa states: If they (adult or convert) wrote new additions to the kesuvah, she receives those new additions. This implies that she only receives new additions, not old additions to the kesuvah. The Gemora answers: It is possible that the Beraisa means that she even takes the new additions.

The Gemora asks: This is not what the Beraisa states. The Beraisa states: If they (adult or convert) wrote new additions to the kesuvah, she receives those new additions. If they did not add anything, she only receives one or two hundred zuz. This is seemingly a strong difficulty on Rav Yehuda’s position. The Gemora concludes that Rav Yehuda indeed made an incorrect inference from the Mishna. When our Mishna stated that “her kesuvah is valid,” Rav Yehuda thought this meant that whatever was stated in the kesuvah is valid. It really was only referring to the basic obligation of kesuvah, not whatever was in the kesuvah. (90a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
HAKOSEIV LE’ISHTO

Mishna

If a man married two wives and then died, the first wife comes before the second wife (in collecting her kesuvah). The inheritors of the first wife are also before those of the second wife. If a man married a wife and she died, and then he married a second wife and he died, the second wife and her inheritors are before the inheritors of the first wife. (90a)
Is the Seizure of a Later Creditor Valid?

The Gemora asks: Being that the Mishna says that “the first wife is before the second wife” and it does not say that “the first wife has and the second wife does not,” the implication is that if the second wife grabs what she is owed before the first wife we do not take it away from her. This implies that if a later creditor takes before an earlier creditor, his collection is deemed valid!

The Gemora answers: In fact, the collection of a later creditor who seizes possessions before an earlier creditor is invalid. What does the Mishna mean when it says she is “before?” It means totally (even regarding seizure of property), akin to the Mishna later that says that a son is “before” a daughter (in inheriting their father).

The Gemora cites others who have a different approach. Being that the Mishna does not say that if the second wife seized property before the first wife we do not take it away, this implies that if she indeed seized property we would take it away. This implies that if a later creditor takes before an earlier creditor, his collection is deemed invalid!

The Gemora answers: In fact, such a collection is deemed valid. Being that the second part of the Mishna stated that the second wife and her inheritors are “before” the inheritors of the first wife, the first part of the Mishna also used a terminology that the first wife is “before” the second wife. (90a – 90b)
The Three Lessons

We learn from our Mishna three things. Firstly, we learn that if one wife dies during his lifetime and one is alive when he dies, the children from the first wife still have a kesuvah for the male children, and we do not suspect they will fight (with the second set). How is this apparent from the Mishna? Being that the Mishna states “the second wife and her inheritors are before the inheritors of the first wife,” this implies that while they are before the inheritors of the first wife, the inheritors can still claim the kesuvah if there is any money left afterwards.

We also see that one kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah (a dinar of the estate) can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah (which does not have that value as there is not two dinar in the estate). How is this apparent from the Mishna? Being that the Mishna does not say that the second collection can only occur “if there is an extra dinar (corresponding to this kesuvah).”

We also see that a kesuvah for the male children cannot take away from property by way of a lien. If it could, then the inheritors of the first wife (whose kesuvah is earlier than that of the second wife) should be able to seize the property of the second wife.

Rav Ashi asked: How do we know that all of these conclusions are correct? It is possible that if one wife dies during his lifetime and one is alive when he dies, the children from the first wife no longer have a kesuvah for the male children. When the Mishna says “they are before the inheritors of the first wife” it means regarding inheritance, not regarding a kesuvah for the male children. Perhaps you will ask the following (if the Mishna is discussing inheritance due to the father): Why does the Mishna call the sons the “inheritors of the first wife?” Being that the Mishna addressed the second wife’s inheritors (who are inheriting her kesuvah) as such, it also called the sons of the first wife “her inheritors.”

Rav Ashi continues: The lesson that one kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah may also be untrue. The case of the Mishna may simply be where there is a dinar for each kesuvah.

The Gemora states: In fact, whether a kesuvah for the male children is still given to the first wife’s inheritors is an argument among the Tanaim. The Beraisa states: If one wife died in his lifetime and one is still alive when he dies, Ben Nanas says that the sons of the first wife can say to the sons of the second wife “You are the sons of one who owes money. Take the kesuvah of your mother and leave (and we will take our kesuvah for the male children).” Rabbi Akiva says: The kesuvah of the first wife jumped (at the time of the husband’s death) to the inheritors of the second wife.

The Gemora asks: It seems that their argument is that one holds that if one wife dies during his lifetime and one is alive when he dies, the children from the first wife still have a kesuvah for the male children, and one says they do not.

Rabbah says: I found the Rabbis of Rav’s Academy who were sitting and saying the following teaching: Everyone agrees that if one wife dies during his lifetime and one is alive when he dies, the children from the first wife still have a kesuvah for the male children. Here the argument (between Rebbi Akiva and Ben Nanas) is regarding whether one kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah. Ben Nanas says: One kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah, and even if a creditor is owed that money it can count towards validating a kesuvah. Rebbi Akiva says: Both another kesuvah and a creditor take away from making a kesuvah valid.

Rabbah added: I told them that everyone agrees that if a creditor is owed money the money counts towards validating a kesuvah. The only argument is if a kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah.

Rav Yosef asked: If this is the reasoning behind their argument, why does Rebbi Akiva use the terminology “the inheritance already jumped etc.?” He should say that it depends if there is an extra dinar!

Rav Yosef therefore states: It seems that their argument is indeed where one wife dies during his lifetime and one is alive when he dies, whether or not the children from the first wife still have a kesuvah for the male children.

This is similar to another argument among the Tanaim. The Beraisa states: If he married a first wife who later died, and he then remarried and died, the sons of this one (the Gemora will discuss which wife this is referring to) can come after his death and collect their Kesuvah. Rabbi Shimon says: If there is an extra dinar, each can come and collect their kesuvos. Otherwise, they split evenly. [The Gemora will explain this argument later.] (90b)

[END]

Read more!

Just in Time for Chanukah

The Gemora in Shabbos (21b) states that it is a mitzvah to place the menorah for Chanukah at the entrance to one’s house. During the dangerous times, they would light the menorah on the table inside and that would be sufficient.

What would be the halacha nowadays? Can one light the menorah on his table and with that, fulfill his mitzvah? Do we say that since it is not dangerous now, the halacha reverts back to the original ruling that the menorah must be lit facing outside?

The Dvar Yehoshua offers proof from the beginning of Meseches Kesuvos (3b). There it says that during the dangerous times and onward, they would marry on a Tuesday, and the Rabbis did not protest. The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that even after the danger was over, they still married on a Tuesday. This was because there was a concern that it may return to the dangerous times.

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 89a) states: Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the time of danger (when the idolaters decreed that mitzvos may not be performed) and onwards, a woman may collect her kesuvah without a get, and a creditor may collect without a pruzbul.

The Rambam in Hilchos shemitah (9:24) rules: If a lender claims that he had a pruzbul and he lost it, he is believed, for from the time of danger and onwards, a creditor may collect without a pruzbul.

The Kesef Mishna explains: Although presently, there is no danger, we do not differentiate between two different times. Accordingly, you might be able to apply the same logic regarding lighting the menorah on a table inside the house even when there is no danger.

The Reshash offers the following comment according to the Kesef Mishna: It is for this reason that the Mishna uses the precise terminology of, “and from the time of danger and onwards.” This teaches us that the halacha is applicable even after the danger is no longer here.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein writes that accordingly, there would be no proof from this halacha to the lighting of the menorah. There, the Gemora states that during the dangerous times, they would light the menorah on the table inside and that would be sufficient. It does not say, “and from the time of danger and onwards.” Therefore, it can be said that one would not fulfill his mitzvah of lighting the menorah if he lights it on the table.

Read more!

Causing the Loss to Who?

Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav (Kesuvos 89b): According to you, who maintains that if the woman produces her get, she would collect the primary amount for her kesuvah (even without producing her kesuvah), with what evidence, may a woman, widowed from nisuin, offer in order to collect her kesuvah? The answer is obvious: She brings witnesses that her husband died! However, the question may be raised, let us be concerned that she was previously divorced, and later, she will produce the get and collect the primary amount of her kesuvah with it (since Rav is of the opinion that we do not write a receipt for the inheritors)?

Rav answers: She may collect her kesuvah only if we know that she was living with her husband until he died (and there was no divorce).

They asked: But perhaps, he divorced her right before he died?

Rav replied: If that was the case, he has caused the loss upon himself.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (319) asks: Why would the inheritors be obligated to give her the kesuvah in this case; the father is not causing the loss to himself; he is causing a loss to his heirs, who will now be responsible to pay her for the kesuvah?

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 89 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: If she produced a get, but not the kesuvah, she collects her kesuvah (even though, normally, a creditor is not believed to say that the debt had not been paid if he cannot produce the document, a kesuvah is different, since it is regarded as an act of Beis Din, and the husband would not be believed that it was paid). If she produced a kesuvah, and not a get: She says, “My get was lost,” and he says, “My receipt was lost”; and similarly, if a creditor produced a loan document (after shemitah, when all debts are cancelled unless they wrote a pruzbul; a document which transfers all of one’s personal loans to the Beis Din, and their debts are not cancelled after shemitah) and not a pruzbul, then these shall not be paid. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the time of danger (when the idolaters decreed that mitzvos may not be performed) and onwards, a woman may collect her kesuvah without a get, and a creditor may collect without a pruzbul. (88b – 89a)

Writing Receipts

(The Mishna had stated: If she produced a get, but not the kesuvah, she collects her kesuvah.) The Gemora states: It may be inferred from our Mishna that in general, we write receipts for the debtor (in cases when the creditor was not able to produce the loan document; even though, there is now a burden on the debtor to safeguard the receipt); for if we would not rite a receipt, let us be concerned that she will produce her kesuvah (after the husband’s death) and demand payment for her kesuvah a second time? (We are not concerned that she will produce her get during her husband’s lifetime, for as soon as she collects her kesuvah, we tear up the get. We are also not concerned that she will demand payment for her kesuvah without producing the get, for the Mishna states that she will not be able to collect in such a case. The Gemora is concerned that she will wait for her husband to die, produce her kesuvah to the inheritors, denying that she was ever divorced and demand payment for her kesuvah; if the inheritors produce a receipt, she will not get away with it.)

Rav said: The Mishna is referring to a locality where they did not generally write a kesuvah; it is for this reason that we allow her to write a receipt for the husband (the halacha is that we do not force a debtor to write a receipt).

Shmuel said: The Mishna can be referring to either case: It may be referring to a case where they did not generally write a kesuvah, but the husband claimed that he wrote a kesuvah. He is required to prove that he did write a kesuvah (otherwise, he must pay the kesuvah and accept the receipt from her). It may also be referring to a case where they did not generally write a kesuvah, but the wife claimed that he did not write a kesuvah. She is required to prove that he did not write a kesuvah (and if she does provide proof, he must pay the kesuvah and accept the receipt from her).

The Gemora states: Rav retracted from his initial opinion. For Rav said: Whether it is in a locality where the custom was to write a kesuvah, or whether they were in a locality where the custom was not to write a kesuvah, the following is the halacha: If she produces her get, she collects the primary amount of her kesuvah (the one hundred or two hundred zuz). If she produces her kesuvah, she may only collect the additional amount that was written in the kesuvah. (Using this method, there will be no concern for fraud.)

The Gemora questions Rav from our Mishna: If she produced a kesuvah, and not a get: She says, “My get was lost,” and he says, “My receipt was lost”; and similarly, if a creditor produced a loan document (after shemitah, when all debts are cancelled unless they wrote a pruzbul; a document which transfers all of one’s personal loans to the Beis Din, and their debts are not cancelled after shemitah) and not a pruzbul, then these shall not be paid. Now, according to Shmuel, this statement is understandable since one might interpret it as applying to a locality where it was the custom not to write a kesuvah and the husband claimed, “I did write one.” In such a case, we would tell him to produce evidence that he wrote the kesuvah, and should he fail to do so, he will be told to go and pay up. According to Rav, however, the question arises, granted that she will not be able to collect her primary kesuvah, but let her at least collect the additional amount?

Rav Yosef answers: We are referring to a case where the woman did not produce witnesses that she was divorced. The husband is able to say that he divorced her and paid her kesuvah with a migu that he could have claimed that he did not even divorce her (therefore, she doesn’t collect anything at all).

The Gemora asks: (It is evident from the latter ruling of the Mishna that we are referring to a case where there are witnesses to the divorce.) The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the time of danger (when the idolaters decreed that mitzvos may not be performed) and onwards, a woman may collect her kesuvah without a get, and a creditor may collect without a pruzbul. If there are no witnesses, how will she be able to collect?

The Gemora answers: The entire Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and it is as if there are some words missing in the Mishna. The following is what the Mishna meant to say: If she produced a kesuvah, and not a get: She says, “My get was lost,” and he says, “My receipt was lost”; and similarly, if a creditor produced a loan document and not a pruzbul, then these shall not be paid. When are these words applicable? It is when there are no witnesses to the divorce; however, if there are witnesses, she may collect the additional amount. And in respect to the primary amount of the kesuvah; if she produces her get, she collects it, but if not, she may not collect it. And from the time of danger and onwards, she may collect the primary amount even without producing the get, for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: From the time of danger and onwards, a woman may collect her kesuvah without a get, and a creditor may collect without a pruzbul. (89a – 89b)
When there are no other Options

Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav: According to you, who maintains that if the woman produces her get, she would collect the primary amount for her kesuvah (even without producing her kesuvah), with what evidence, may a woman, widowed from nisuin, offer in order to collect her kesuvah? The answer is obvious: She brings witnesses that her husband died! However, the question may be raised, let us be concerned that she was previously divorced, and later, she will produce the get and collect the primary amount of her kesuvah with it (since Rav is of the opinion that we do not write a receipt for the inheritors)?

Rav answers: She may collect her kesuvah only if we know that she was living with her husband until he died (and there was no divorce).

They asked: But perhaps, he divorced her right before he died?

Rav replied: If that was the case, he has caused the loss upon himself.

They persisted: But how can a woman, widowed from erusin, collect her kesuvah? The answer is obvious: She brings witnesses that her husband died! However, the question may be raised, let us be concerned that she was previously divorced, and later, she will produce the get and collect the primary amount of her kesuvah with it (and we cannot answer that she was living with him up until his death because we are discussing a case of betrothal)?

Rav is compelled to answer that in a situation, where there are no other options, we do write a receipt. (89b)

Seeking a Source

Mar Keshisha the son of Rav Chisda asked Rav Ashi: How do we know that a woman, widowed from erusin has a right to collect her kesuvah (even without producing her kesuvah)?

Perhaps you will say that it is derived from the following Mishna (54b): A woman who was widowed or divorced, either after marriage or after betrothal, is entitled to collect everything (the basic obligations of the kesuvah, plus any additions that the husband included). But perhaps this Mishna is only referring to a case where the husband voluntarily obligated himself to her by writing for her a kesuvah (how would you know this to be true even if he didn’t write for her a kesuvah)?

The novelty of the ruling would be to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Elozar ban Azaryah, who states that the husband wrote the addition for her with the sole objective of marrying her (and since he did not marry her, she may not claim it).

Perhaps you will say that this halacha is derives from the following braisa taught by Rav Chiya bar Avin: If a wife from erusin dies, the husband is not deemed to be an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet), he may not become tamei to her if he is a Kohen; and similarly (if he dies) she is not an onein, she does not have to be busy with his burial. If she dies, he does not inherit her and if he dies, she collects her kesuvah. But perhaps this braisa is only referring to a case where the husband voluntarily obligated himself to her by writing for her a kesuvah (how would you know this to be true even if he didn’t write for her a kesuvah)?

The novelty of the ruling would be to teach us that if she dies, he would not inherit her. (The Gemora concludes that there is no Tannaic source teaching us that a woman, widowed from erusin has a right to collect her kesuvah even without producing her kesuvah.) (89b)
Tearing her Get

Rav Nachman asked Rav Huna: According to Rav, who maintains that if the woman produces her get, she would collect the primary amount for her kesuvah (even without producing her kesuvah), why aren’t we concerned that she will collect her kesuvah with her get in this Beis Din, and then, she will use the very same get to collect her kesuvah in a different Beis Din?

Perhaps you will answer that we tear up the get after she collects her kesuvah the first time; but doesn’t she need the get in order to provide proof that she is indeed a divorcee, and thus, she will be permitted to remarry?

Rabbi Huna answers: We do tear up the get, but we write on it the following: “We ripped up this get, not because that it was invalid, but rather, it is because we do not want her collecting her kesuvah with it a second time.” (She still may use it in order to remarry.) (89b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If a woman produced two gittin and two kesuvos, she collects two kesuvos; if she produces two kesuvos and one get, or a kesuvah and two gittin, or a kesuvah and a get and proof that her husband died, she collects only one kesuvah, for if a person divorces his wife and remarries her, he remarries her on the terms of the first kesuvah. (89b)

[END]

Read more!

Biblical and Rabbinical Oath

The Gemora (Kesuvos 88a) had stated: Rav Papa said (regarding the case where there is one witness testifying that the woman collected her kesuvah): A wise husband could bring his wife to take a Biblical oath with the following method: He pays her the kesuvah (a second time) in front of another witness (and now, if se will deny receiving the kesuvah, there will be two witnesses against her) and he claims that the first monies that he paid her were actually a loan (and if she denies the loan, there will be one witness testifying against her; she will be Biblically obligated to take an oath; this will be a case of taking an oath in order to retain the money and it will be a case which doesn’t involve a lien on land)!

The Raavad explains: Even if there is no severity in the Biblical oath more than the Rabbinical one, it is still regarded as advantageous for the husband to force her to be subject to a Biblical oath besides a Rabbinical one.

Rashi explains that there is a halachic severity in taking a Biblical oath. One is required to use the Name of God and hold a Torah scroll when he takes a Biblical oath; a Rabbinical oath does not have this stringency.

Tosfos points out that Rashi himself maintains that a Rabbinical oath of our Mishna is of the same severity as a Biblical oath; it is only an oath instituted by the Amoraim that is treated leniently.

The Rishonim discuss at great length other differences between the two oaths.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 88 - Highlights

Forcing her to Take a Biblical Oath

Rav Papa said (regarding the case where there is one witness testifying that the woman collected her kesuvah): A wise husband could bring his wife to take a Biblical oath with the following method: He pays her the kesuvah (a second time) in front of another witness (and now, if se will deny receiving the kesuvah, there will be two witnesses against her) and he claims that the first monies that he paid her were actually a loan (and if she denies the loan, there will be one witness testifying against her; she will be Biblically obligated to take an oath; this will be a case of taking an oath in order to retain the money and it will be a case which doesn’t involve a lien on land)!

Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi asks: How can the two witnesses combine to offer testimony against her (they did not observe the same event)?

Rather, he explains: The husband gives her the kesuvah (a second time) in front of the first witness and a second one and he claims that the first monies that he paid her were actually a loan!

Rav Ashi asks: The woman will be able to defend this claim by stating that there were two kesuvos (and there was no loan here at all)?

Rather, he explains: The husband notifies the two witnesses his intentions prior to giving her the money a second time. (87b – 88a)

Orphan’s Collecting with an Oath

The Mishna had stated: If she collects from encumbered properties or from the properties of orphans, she is required to take an oath (that she didn’t previously collect her kesuvah).

The Gemora cites a Mishna in Shavuos: When orphans collect a debt (owed to their father), they are required to take an oath. This is referring to a case where the orphans are attempting to collect a debt (owed to their father) from orphans (of the borrower).

Rav Zereika said in the name of Rav Yehudah: This ruling is only applicable in a case where the borrower’s children said, “Our father told us, ‘I borrowed the money, but I repaid it.’” However, if they said, “Our father told us, ‘I never borrowed the money,’” the lender’s orphans may collect even without an oath. This is because anyone who says that he did not borrow is as if he said that he did not repay it (and since it is evident (from the document) that he did in fact borrow, the orphans are required to pay). (88a)

Collecting a Debt
when the Debtor is not Present

The Mishna had stated: If the woman collects her kesuvah when the husband is not present, she is required to take an oath.

Rav Acha said: There was such an incident that came before Rabbi Yitzchak from Antochya, and he said: Only in regards to a woman’s kesuvah, may she collect even though the husband is not present. This is because of favor (in order that the women will not be concerned that they will not be able to collect their kesuvah, and therefore, they will not refrain from getting married). However, a creditor is not able to collect from the debtor when he is not present.

Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: Even a creditor may collect a debt without the debtor being present. This is because, otherwise, people will borrow money and go overseas, which would result in the fact that people will stop lending money. (88a)
Rabbi Shimon’s Disagreement

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Shimon said: If she demands her kesuvah, the inheritors may impose an oath on her; if she does not demand her kesuvah, they may not impose an oath on her.

The Gemora asks: To what case is Rabbi Shimon referring to?

Rabbi Yirmiyah answers: It is referring to the last ruling of the Mishna: The Tanna Kamma said: If the woman collects her kesuvah when the husband is not present, she is required to take an oath. This is applicable whether the woman is demanding that a portion of the husband’s property should be sold in order for her to be supported with the proceeds or whether she is demanding the money for her kesuvah (for the husband divorced her from abroad). Rabbi Shimon maintains that whenever she demands her kesuvah, the inheritors may impose an oath on her; if she does not demand her kesuvah, but rather, she is demanding to be supported, they may not impose an oath on her.

This argument would be the very same disagreement as Chanan and the sons of the Kohanim Gedolim had (which is cited in a Mishna later (104a)).

Rav Sheishes asks: Why does the Mishna state, “the inheritors may impose an oath on her”? It is the Beis Din that is imposing the oath, not the inheritors (for the husband is still alive in this case)?

Rather, Rav Sheishes explains: They are referring to an earlier ruling of the Mishna: The Tanna Kamma said: If she went from her husband’s grave to her father’s house, or she returned to her father-in-law’s house, but she did not become an administrator, the inheritors cannot impose an oath on her (since the husband released her from any vows), and if she did become an administrator, the inheritors may impose an oath on her regarding the future, but they cannot impose an oath on her regarding the past. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and maintains that whenever she demands her kesuvah, the inheritors may impose an oath on her; if she does not demand her kesuvah, they may not impose an oath on her even if she is an administrator; this is because she is the agent of their father and Rabbi Shimon holds that she has been released from taking the administrator’s oath).

This argument would be the very same disagreement as Abba Shaul and the Rabbis had (which is cited in a Mishna in Gittin (52a)).

Abaye asks: Why does Rabbi Shimon say, “whenever she demands her kesuvah,” implying that he is being more strict? He should have said, “if she demands her kesuvah.”

Rather, Abaye explains: They are referring to an earlier ruling of the Mishna: The Tanna Kamma said: If the husband wrote a document for his wife saying that he is releasing her from any vows or oaths that may come about later, he may not impose an oath on her. If he writes that he is releasing her from any vows or oaths that his inheritors wish to impose on her, they may not compel her to take an oath. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and maintains that whenever she demands her kesuvah, the inheritors may impose an oath on her (even if the husband explicitly released her from this vow).

Rav Papa asks: What is the second half of Rabbi Shimon’s statement coming to say?

Rather, Rav Papa explains: Rabbi Shimon is disagreeing with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling as well. Rabbi Eliezer said that a woman may be forced to swear regarding her spindle and her dough. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and maintains that the woman is never forced to take the administrator’s oath (this is because she will ultimately be compelled to swear at the time that she demands payment for the kesuvah). (88a – 88b)

[END]

Read more!

Migu with an Impaired Document

The Mishna (Kesuvos 87a) had stated: If a woman impairs her kesuvah (she admitted that a portion of it was paid), she can only collect the remaining portion if she takes an oath that the complete kesuvah has not been paid.

The Shitah Mekubetzes cites Rabbeinu Yonah, who asks the following question: Why is it necessary for her to take an oath? Shouldn’t she be believed with a migu; “Believe me that I was only paid in part, for if I would want to lie, I could have said that I wasn’t paid at all”?

He answers: There is a principle that we do not believe someone with a migu to extract money from someone else. Secondly, we do not apply the principle of migu to exempt someone from taking an oath.

The Ketzos Hachoshen (82:10) asks: There are several Rishonim who maintain that we do apply the principle of migu to extract money in cases when a legal document is present; since her kesuvah document is intact, let us use the migu to collect the remaining portion of her kesuvah?

He answers: Since the woman admitted that the kesuvah is impaired, she will no longer be allowed to collect from encumbered properties (even from the portion that has not been collected). Only a valid document that has the ability to collect from encumbered properties can assist a migu to extract money. This document will not help her in this respect and therefore, she is compelled to take an oath.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 87 - Highlights

Swearing Regarding her Husband’s Possessions

Rav Mordechai went and asked the following question in front of Rav Ashi. According to the opinion that she does not have to swear if she says there is a blemish in her kesuvah (meaning that she claims she did not receive the entire amount owed to her in the kesuvah), the condition is understood. She is scared she might need money and would want to collect it from her Kesuvah. She therefore makes her husband stipulate in advance that he will not make her swear to collect what is owed to her. However, according to the opinion that the condition is regarding her becoming a custodian of her husband’s possessions in his lifetime, did she know she would become a custodian that she stipulated beforehand that he could not make her swear in such a situation?

Rav Ashi replied: You have this question because you learned that this argument was based on the first part of our Mishna. We understood that it is based on the second part of the Mishnah (and therefore have no question). The Mishna stated: If she went from the grave of her husband to her father’s house, or if she went to her father-in-law’s house and was not made a custodian, the inheritors cannot make her swear. If she did become a custodian, the inheritors can make her swear on future issues but not on past issues regarding her husband’s property.

The Gemora asks: What exactly is deemed “past” issues? Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav: Issues before her husband died. However, any issues that were from the time of death until burial can require her to take an oath. Rav Masna says: She is exempt from swearing regarding issues that occurred between death and burial. This is as stated by Neharda: For taxes, food, and burial we sell the property of orphans without auction (accordingly we don’t make her swear on sales between the death and burial, see Rashi). (87a)

Exact Terminology for Vow Exemption

Rabbah says in the name of Rabbi Chiya: If he writes “without a oath or a vow” she does not have to take an oath or a vow, but the inheritors can make her take an oath or vow. If he writes “you are clean of an oath and clean of a vow” even the inheritors cannot make her take a vow, as he is telling her that she will not have to take an oath or vow from anyone.

Rav Yosef says in the name of Rabbi Chiya: If he writes “without a oath or a vow” she does not have to take an oath or a vow, but the inheritors can make her take an oath or vow. If he writes “you are clean of an oath and clean of a vow” both he and the inheritors can make her take a vow, as he is telling her that she will have to cleanse herself of suspicion by taking an oath or vow.

Rav Zakai sent to Mar Ukva: In all of these cases above (discussed by Rabah and Rav Yosef), if he adds “in my property,” he cannot make her swear but inheritors can make her swear. If he says “in these properties,” both her and the inheritors cannot make her swear.

Rav Nachman says in the name of Shmuel in the name of Aba Shmuel son of Ima Miriam: In all of the cases discussed above (by Rav Zakai) both him and the inheritors cannot make her swear. However, what can I do, as the sages proclaimed that if someone tries to collect from the property of orphans they must take an oath?

Some say the teaching was given over in the following manner (as a Beraisa). Aba Shaul the son of Ima Miriam says: In all of the case discussed above (by Rav Zakai) both him and the inheritors cannot make her swear. However, what can I do, as the sages proclaimed that if someone tries to collect from the property of orphans they must take an oath? Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel: The Halachah follows the son of Ima Miriam. (87a)
Mishna
If a woman says that her kesuvah has a blemish, she may only collect with a vow. If one witness says her kesuvah was paid, she should only pay with a vow. If she want to collect from the property of orphans, property that she has a lien on (through her kesuvah), and not in front of her husband, she may only collect with a vow.

What is the case of a woman who says there is a blemish on her kesuvah? If her kesuvah was one thousand zuz and her husband claims he paid her kesuvah, and she claims that she only received one hundred zuz payment, she should only collect the rest with a vow. What is the case where one witness says her kesuvah was paid? If her kesuvah was one thousand zuz and her husband claims he paid her kesuvah, and she claims that she only received one hundred zuz payment, and one witness says she received payment, she only collects the rest with a vow.

What is the case where she collects from property with a lien? If her husband had sold property to others, she can seize the property from the buyers but only with a vow. What is the case of collecting property from orphans? If her husband died leaving the property to orphans, she can only collect from them with a vow. What is the case of her collecting when he is not present? If he went overseas, she can only collect from his property when he is not present with a vow. Rabbi Shimon says: Whenever she demands her kesuvah, the inheritors can make her swear. If she does not demand her kesuvah, they cannot make her swear (the Gemora will explain what Rabbi Shimon is addressing). (87a - 87b)
The Woman’s Vow: Torah or Rabbinic in Nature?
Rami bar Chama thought to say that the Mishna is discussing a Torah vow. [It is like a case where] he claims two hundred and she says she paid one hundred, that she is admitting to part of the claim, and someone who admits part of the claim must swear according to Torah law.

Rava says that there are two reasons why this is incorrect. One reason is that all Torah vows make someone free from payment. In this case she is swearing and taking money! Additionally, one does not swear regarding a denial of owing land (a Kesuvah inherently is a lien on land).

Rava therefore says that this is a Rabbinic vow. Usually the one who pays is more careful that he paid, while the one who gets paid is not always as careful. The Rabbanan therefore made her swear, in order to show that she was careful and knows she has not yet received payment. (87b)
Blemishes on Kesuvos
The Gemora inquires: What is the law if she establishes a blemish on her kesuvah in conjunction with witnesses (who say she only received one hundred zuz)? Do we say, if he would have paid her the rest, he probably would have also paid it with witnesses? Or do we say that he merely happened to have witnesses on the first hundred, but did not plan on more witnesses afterwards?

The Gemora attempts to answer this question from the following Beraisa. The Beraisa states: All who swear according to Torah law, swear and do not have to pay. The following swear and collect money: a worker, a victim of theft, one who was injured, someone whose opponent is suspected of lying when taking an oath, a storekeeper regarding his records, and someone who makes a blemish on a document without witnesses. The fact that the Beraisa only lists a case of a blemish “without witnesses” indicates that if there were witnesses this ruling would not apply.

The Gemora answers that the Beraisa could be saying the following. Not only a blemish with witnesses requires a vow, but even a blemish without witnesses requires a vow. Being that the woman has a document for the entire sum and could have tried to collect the entire amount, one might say that she should certainly be believed on the amount that she claims she is owed. Just as one who returns a lost object is believed without having to take a vow that they did not find anything more than what they returned, she too should be believed. The Beraisa therefore states that even someone who has a blemish on a document must take a vow to collect the outstanding debt.

The Gemora inquires: What about a woman who details how she received the hundred zuz in installments, even as small as less than a perutah (small coin)? Do we say that because she is clearly careful about her reckoning of the debt she should be believed without having to take a vow? Or do we say she is simply being clever? The Gemora leaves this question unresolved.

The Gemora inquires: What about a woman who lessens the amount stated in the kesuvah (meaning that she says that the amount stated is not what they really agreed on, but she did not receive any of that amount)? Is this like a blemish, or do we say a blemish is where she admits to receiving partial payment which she is not doing in this case?

The Gemora attempts to answer this question from the following Beraisa. The Beraisa states: A lady who lessens the amount of her Kesuvah collects without a vow. What is the case? If the kesuvah says that he owes one thousand which he claims he already paid, and she says that she never received anything but is really only owed one hundred, she collects the hundred without taking a vow.

The Gemora asks: Where does her ability to collect stem from? It can’t be from the kesuvah document she is holding, as she herself says it is (inaccurate and therefore) like a piece of clay?

Rava the son of Rabah answers: The case is where she says that the kesuvah was indeed signed and witnessed, but there was an understanding between them that she would only claim one hundred zuz.

Rami bar Chama thought to say that the case where one witness testifies that she received her kesuvah resulting in her having to take a vow is a Torah law. The Torah states “a single witness will not establish facts against a man for any sin and for any transgression.” This implies that he cannot establish a sin or transgression, but he can force the taking of a vow. This is like Mar’s statement: Wherever two witnesses obligate one to pay money, one witness obligates the taking of an oath.

Rava says that there are two reasons why this is incorrect. One reason is that all Torah vows make someone free from payment. In this case she is swearing and taking money! Additionally, one does not swear regarding a denial of owing land (a Kesuvah inherently is a lien on land).

Rava therefore states that this is a Rabbinical vow, established to appease her ex-husband. (87b)

[END]

Read more!

Beat him Until he Dies

The Gemora (Kesuvos 86a) cites a braisa: When does one receive forty lashes for violating a Biblical law? That is only in regard to a negative commandment; however, with respect to a positive commandment, for example – if we tell someone, “Make a sukkah” and he refuses, or we tell him, “Make a lulav,” and he refuses, we beat him until his soul departs.

The question is asked: Why is there permission to kill one who is not interested in fulfilling a positive commandment; the punishment for not fulfilling a positive commandment is not death?

Reb Tuvia Lisitzin, in his sefer Kerem Tuvia answers that permission is granted to beat him until his death because by not fulfilling a positive commandment (and especially, when people are attempting to persuade him, and he, nevertheless, refuses), this is tantamount to desecrating the name of Hashem.

This can also explain why Pinchas was allowed to kill the Midyanis woman. He was able to kill Zimri because the halacha is that one who cohabits with an idolater, the zealots are permitted to kill him. However, why was he allowed to kill the Midyanis woman; she does not have any prohibition of cohabiting with a Jew? The answer is: It was due to her that a tremendous desecration of Hashem’s name occurred; for this, she was deserving to die.

The Chasam Sofer writes that we are not permitted to strike him with a blow that will kill him; permission is granted to hit him time after time until he eventually agrees to fulfill the mitzvah. When do we stop beating him? When he dies from the beatings.

The Chinuch writes that one who does not repay a debt has violated a negative commandment in the Torah. The Minchas Chinuch asks: If so, why does our Gemora inquire if a person who refuses to repay a debt should be compelled to do so; of course, we should force him, just like any other negative commandment?

Read more!

Thirty Days Before

The Gemora (Kesuvos 86a) cites a braisa: When does one receive forty lashes for violating a Biblical law? That is only in regard to a negative commandment; however, with respect to a positive commandment, for example – if we tell someone, “Make a sukkah” and he refuses, or we tell him, “Make a lulav,” and he refuses, we beat him until his soul departs.

The question is asked: At what time are we referring to? If this is occurring before Sukkos, why do we beat him; he could say that he has plenty of time to prepare for the mitzvah? If it is already Sukkos, what benefit will there be from the beating; he cannot construct a sukkah now anyway?

Rav Nosson Gishtetner explains that the Gemora is referring to thirty days before Sukkos. From that time and on, there is an obligation for one to build a sukkah; and if he refuses, we can beat him until his soul departs.

The Chidushei HaRim writes that this is true regarding all mitzvos. Thirty days prior to the time a mitzvah is supposed to be performed, one has an obligation to begin involving himself with the mitzvah; it is incumbent upon him to properly prepare himself from that time on in order to fulfill the mitzvah. To such an extent that one is obligated to worry about the poor people in his city thirty days prior to Pesach and to investigate and see if they have sufficient enough funds for all the mitzvos on Pesach.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 86 - Highlights

Selling the Loan and Forgiving it

Rava said to the son of Rabbi Chiya bar Avin: Come and I will tell you a fine saying from your fathe: Although Shmuel said: If a man sold a loan document to another person and then he (the seller) released the debtor, the latter is legally released (and the buyer cannot collect the debt); and, moreover, even the creditor’s heir may release the debtor; Shmuel, nevertheless, admits that, where a wife brought in to her husband a loan document (as melog property) and then she forgave the debt, the debt is not to be considered forgiven, because her husband’s rights (in the loan) are equal to hers.

The Gemora cites a related incident: Rav Nachman’s relative once sold her kesuvah for a minimal amount (the purchaser bought the rights to collect the kesuvah if the husband would divorce her or if he predeceases her). She was divorced and then died. Thereupon, the buyers came to claim the kesuvah from her daughter. Rav Nachman said to them: Is there no one who can tender her the following advice? Let her remit her mother’s kesuvah to her father, and then she may eventually inherit it from him. When she heard this, she went and remitted it to her father. Thereupon Rabbi Nachman said that he made himself like the lawyers (based on the Mishna in Avos 1:8, one should not act as a lawyer to aid a litigant before a judge).

The Gemora asks: Originally what did he hold (was correct), and in the end what did he hold (was correct)? Originally he held that he should give advice that was beneficial to his relatives, as the verse says [Yeshaya 58:7]: And from your flesh do not hide yourself. In the end he held that an important person like himself cannot use this leniency (for otherwise, people may learn from him and assist even non-relatives).

The Gemora stated above: Shmuel said: If a man sold a loan document to another person and then he (the seller) released the debtor, the latter is legally released (and the buyer cannot collect the debt); and, moreover, even the creditor’s heir may release the debtor.

Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua says: If the buyer is smart, he should offer a little money to the borrower (before the seller has a chance to forgive the loan) and he (the borrower) should write a new document in his own name (the buyer’s name; of course, he will now only be able to collect from encumbered properties from the date of the new document).

Ameimar said: A judge who judges the laws of garmi (one would be liable for causing a loss to another) would collect from the seller the amount of the debt (if the seller forgives the debt, since he is causing a loss to the purchaser). However, a judge who does not judge the laws of garmi will not collect anything from the seller.

There was once such an incident and Rafram forced Rav Ashi to collect from the damager (because of garmi). (85b – 86a)

Payment of a Kesuvah and a Debt

Ameimar stated in the name of Rav Chama: If a man has against him, the claim of his wife’s kesuvah and that of a creditor, and he owns a plot of land and he also has money (but only enough for one of the debts), the creditor’s claim is settled by means of the money while the woman’s claim is settled by means of the land. The Gemora explains the reason: The creditor is treated in accordance with his rights (he lent money, so it is fitting for him to receive money) and the wife in accordance with her rights (she entered the marriage relying on the fact that she would collect her kesuvah payment from the husband’s land).

If, however, he owns only one plot of land and it can only satisfy one of their claims, it is to be given to the creditor, and it is not to be given to the wife. What is the reason? It is because more than the man’s desire to marry is the woman’s desire to be married (and they will not refuse to be married because of this halacha; this law is applicable only if the documents were written on the same day; otherwise, the earlier document takes precedence). (86a)

Repaying a Debt with Money or Land

Rav Papa asked Rav Chama: Is it a fact that you have stated in the name of Rava that if a man owes another money and he owned a plot of land, and when his creditor approached him with the claim for repayment, he replied, “Collect your loan from the land,” we instruct the debtor: Go yourself and sell the land and bring the proceeds and give it to the creditor (wasn’t the creditor relying on land in the first place; why should he be compelled to sell the land)?

Rav Chama responded: No (Rava never said this)!

Rav Papa asked him: Tell me the specifics of the case.

Rav Chama answered him: The debtor (having money) alleged that his money belonged to an idolater (we did not believe his claim since there is a presumption that whatever is in a man’s possession belongs to him; we, however, were not able to take that money since the idolater was a powerful person), and since he acted in an improper manner, he was similarly treated in an improper manner (by compelling him to sell his land and give the money). (86a)
Forcing One to Fulfill a Mitzvah

Rav Kahana asked Rav Papa: According to you that maintains that the repayment of a debt is merely regarded as a mitzvah (for Biblically, the debtor’s properties are not pledged for the debt; it must be repaid because one is obligated to keep his word), what is the halacha if the debtor says, “I do not want to perform the mitzvah”?

Rav Papa responded by citing the following braisa: When does one receive forty lashes for violating a Biblical law? That is only in regard to a negative commandment; however, with respect to a positive commandment, for example – if we tell someone, “Make a sukkah” and he refuses, or we tell him, “Make a lulav,” and he refuses, we beat him until his soul departs. (86a – 86b)

Divorce After Thirty Days

Rami bar Chama inquired of Rav Chisda: If a husband would tell his wife, “Here is your letter of divorce but it should only take effect after thirty days,” and she went and laid it down at the side of a public domain, what is the halacha (is it regarded as if the get is in her possession at the end of thirty days)?

Rav Chisda responds: She is not divorced, on the basis of the ruling of Rav and Shmuel. For they both have stated that seizure from the orphans will only be valid if the produce was piled up in a public domain, and the sides of a public domain are regarded as the public domain itself (therefore, she will not be divorced).

Rami bar Chama counters: On the contrary! She should be deemed divorced by reason of a ruling of Rav Nachman. For Rav Nachman stated in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: If a man said to another, “Go and pull this cow, but it shall only become your legal possession after thirty days,” he legally acquires it after thirty days, even if it is standing at the time (after thirty days) in a swamp. Now, a swamp presumably has the same status as the sides of a public domain?

Rav Chisda replies: No! A swamp has a status of its own and the sides of a public domain have a status of their own.

The Gemora cites another version of the discussion: Rav Chisda responds: She is divorced by reason of a ruling of Rav Nachman. Now, a swamp presumably has the same status as the sides of a public domain!

Rami bar Chama counters: On the contrary! She should not be divorced, on the basis of the ruling of Rav and Shmuel. Now, the sides of a public domain are presumably regarded as the public domain itself?

Rav Chisda replies: No! A public domain has a status of its own and the sides of a public domain have a status of their own. (86b)
Mishna

The Mishna states: If one set up his wife as a shopkeeper, or he appointed her as an administrator, he may impose an oath on her whenever he wishes (this is true regarding any administrator; the Rabbis enacted that whoever suspects his manager of any type of embezzlement even with a doubtful claim, can exact an oath from them). Rabbi Eliezer says: Even on her spindle and on her dough (normal household chores). (86b)

Extension Oath or Directly

They inquired: Does Rabbi Eliezer mean that the oath regarding the spindle or dough is to be imposed by devolving it from her managing duties (only where the wife is compelled to take an oath in respect of her managing duties may an oath in respect of her normal household chores be added; this is known as a gilgul shevuah, an extension or rollover oath) or does he mean that it may be imposed directly?

The Gemora answers by citing the following braisa: They said to Rabbi Eliezer, No one can live with a serpent in the same basket (a wife will find her married life unbearable if she is constantly forced to take an oath). Now if you will assume that Rabbi Eliezer meant the imposition of a direct oath, one can very well understand the Rabbi’s argument; however, if you were to suggest that Rabbi Eliezer meant that the oath should be imposed by devolving it from her other oath, what would this (other oath) matter to her (if she must swear anyway regarding her managing duties)?

The Gemora answers: She might tell him, “Since you are so particular with me, it is unbearable for me to live with you.”

The Gemora cites a different braisa: If a man did not exempt his wife from a vow or from an oath and he set her up as a shopkeeper or appointed her as his administrator, he may impose upon her an oath whenever he desires to do so. If, however, he did not set her up as a shopkeeper and did not appoint her as his administrator, he may not impose any oath upon her. Rabbi Eliezer said: Although he did not set her up as a shopkeeper and did not appoint her as his administrator, he may nevertheless impose upon her an oath wherever he desires to do so, because there is no woman who was not an administrator for at least some moments during the lifetime of her husband in respect of her spindle and her dough. Thereupon, they said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket. It may be inferred from here that Rabbi Eliezer meant that the oath may he imposed directly. This is indeed a conclusive proof. (86b)

[END]

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 85 - Highlights

Seizing the Boat

The Gemora records an incident: Yeimar bar Chashu had a money claim against a certain person who died and left a boat. Yeimar said to his agent, “Go and seize it.” He went and seized it, but Rav Papa and Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua met him and told him, “You are seizing the ship on behalf of a creditor and thereby you are causing loss to other creditors (who cannot take it). And Rabbi Yochanan ruled: He who seizes a debtor’s property on behalf of a creditor and thereby causes loss to other creditors does not legally acquire it. Thereupon, they seized it themselves (for they too had money claims against the debtor). Rav Papa was rowing the boat while Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua pulled it by the rope (each one attempting to acquire it by moving it). One master declared, “I have acquired the boat,” and the other similarly declared, “I have acquired it.” (Each one claimed that their method of pulling it was superior to that of their fellow.) Rav Pinchas bar Ami met them and said to them: Both Rav and Samuel ruled that seizure from the orphans will only be valid if the produce was piled up in a public domain, but not in a side street (for then, it will belong to the orphans; how then, could they be attempting to seize the boat)? “We too,” they replied, “have seized it at the main current of the river (which is regarded as a public domain).” When they appeared before Rava, he said to them: You are like white (due to their age) geese (on account of their wisdom) that strip the cloaks off people. Rav Nachman has ruled: The seizure is valid only if it took place during the father’s lifetime (however, afterwards, his property may not be seized; this follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva). (84b – 85a)

Payment through an Agent

Avimi the son of Rabbi Avahu had a money claim against him by the people of Chozai. He sent the money to them by the hand of Chama the son of Rabbah bar Avahu. He went there and paid them, but when he asked them, “Return to me the document,” they replied as follows: “This payment was made in settlement of some other claims (this document remains unpaid).

He came before Rabbi Avahu to complain and Rabbi Avahu asked him, “Do you have witnesses that you have paid them?” “No,” he replied. Rabbi Avahu said to him, “Since they could claim that the payment was never made, they are also entitled to claim that the payment was made in settlement of some other claims.”

The Gemora asks: Must the agent in this case pay Avimi (for being negligent by paying them without taking the document first)?

Rav Ashi answers: We examine the exact situation: If the agent was told, “Take the document and give the money,” he is regarded as being negligent and he must therefore pay; however, if he was told, “Give the money and take the document,” he is not required to pay.

The Gemora rejects this ruling and states: The agent must pay no matter what he was told, for the debtor can tell him, “You were sent for my benefit, not for my detriment.” (85a)
Trusting One Witness

There was a certain woman with whom a sack of documents was once deposited (and the owner of the documents died). The inheritors of the depositor came to claim it from her and she said, “I seized them during the depositor’s lifetime (because he owed me money).” She came before Rav Nachman and he said to her, “Do you have witnesses that the depositor claimed it from you during his lifetime and that you refused to return it (and this would indeed prove that she seized it during his lifetime)?” “No,” she replied. Rav Nachman said to her, “If so, your seizure occurred after the owner’s death, and such a seizure is invalid.

A woman was once ordered to take an oath at Rava’s Beis Din. Rav Chisda’s daughter (Rava’s wife) said to him, “I know that she is suspected of swearing falsely.” Rava, therefore, transferred the oath to her disputant.

On another occasion, Rav Papa and Rav Adda bar Masna sat in Rava’s presence when a document was brought to him. Rav Papa to Rava: I know that this document has been paid. Rava asked him: Is there any other man with the master to confirm this statement? No, he replied. Rava said to him: Although the master has testified, there is no validity in the testimony of one witness.

Rav Adda bar Masna asked Rava: Shouldn’t Rav Papa be just as reliable as Rav Chisda’s daughter (who was believed without a corresponding witness)?

Rava answered: As to the daughter of Rav Chisda, I am certain of her that she would not lie; regarding the master, I am not positive about him.

Rav Papa said: Now that the master has stated that a judge who can assert that a certain person doesn’t lie, we may rely upon that person’s testimony, I would tear up a document on the testimony of my son Abba Mar, about whom I am certain that he doesn’t lie.

The Gemora asks: Would he actually tear up a document based upon the testimony of one witness? (Two witnesses would certainly be required to take away a signed document and destroy it; before, Rava relied on his wife’s testimony only to transfer the oath to the other party, but ultimately, the judgment will be decided based upon the oath!) Is such an act conceivable?

Rather, Rav Papa said: I would impair the document based upon his testimony (he wouldn’t collect with it, but he wouldn’t tear it up either).

A woman was once ordered to take an oath at Rav Bibi bar Abaye’s Beis Din. Her disputant suggested to them: Let her rather come and take the oath in our hometown, where she might possibly feel ashamed and confess. She said to them: Write for me the verdict in my favor so that after I shall have taken the oath it may be given to me. Write it out for her, Rav Bibi bar Abaye instructed them.

Rav Papi said: You are descendants of short-lived people (Abaye, being a descendant of Eli had a curse placed upon his family), therefore, you speak frail words. Surely Rava stated: A certification by judges that was written before the witnesses have identified their signatures is invalid. It is apparently evident that such an attestation has the appearance of a false declaration, and so here also, the document that she desires would appear to contain a false statement (since it is written prior to her oath).

This conclusion, however, is invalid, as may be inferred from Rav Nachman’s statement. For Rav Nachman said: Rabbi Meir ruled that even if a husband found a bill of divorce in a rubbish heap, and then signed and gave it to her, it is valid (even though it appears false). And even the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir only in respect to letters of divorce, where it is necessary that the writing shall be done specifically in her name, but in respect of other legal documents, they would agree with him. For Rav Assi stated in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A man may not borrow again using a document on which he has once borrowed and which he has repaid since the lien incurred by the first loan (to collect land that the borrower had at the time of the loan) was cancelled. It can be inferred that the only reason is because the lien was cancelled, but, otherwise, the document would be valid, and we are not concerned that it has the appearance of a falsehood. (85a – 85b)
Three Related Incidents

A certain man once deposited seven pearls wrapped in a kerchief with Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Rabbi Meyasha died and did not issue instructions regarding his property. They came before Rabbi Ami (the depositor wanted his pearls back and the family members claimed that perhaps the pearls’ belonged to their father). Rabbi Ami said to them: Firstly, I know that Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was not a wealthy man (and probably did not own these pearls). Secondly, the depositor indicated the identifying marks (by saying that there were seven pearls and that they were wrapped in a kerchief).

The Gemora qualifies this ruling: This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the Rabbi Meyasha’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there, the identifying marks are not evidence of ownership since it could very well be that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it.

A certain man once deposited a silver cup with Chasa. Chasa died and did not issue instructions regarding his property. They came before Rav Nachman (the depositor wanted his cup back and the family members claimed that perhaps the cup belonged to their father). Rav Nachman said to them: Firstly, I know that Chasa was not a wealthy man (and probably did not own the silver cup). Secondly, the depositor indicated the identifying marks.

The Gemora qualifies this ruling: This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the Chasa’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there, the identifying marks are not evidence of ownership since it could very well be that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it.

A certain man once deposited a silk garment with Rav Dimi the brother of Rav Safra. Rav Dimi died and did not issue instructions regarding his property. They came before Rabbi Abba (the depositor wanted his garment back and the family members claimed that perhaps the garment belonged to their father). Rabbi Abba said to them: Firstly, I know that Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was not a wealthy man (and probably did not own the silk garment). Secondly, the depositor indicated the identifying marks.

The Gemora qualifies this ruling: This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the Rav Dimi’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there, the identifying marks are not evidence of ownership since it could very well be that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it. (85b)

Toviah and Toviah

A dying man once said to those around him, “Let my estate be given to Toviah,” and then he died. A man named Toviah came to claim the estate. Rabbi Yochanan said: Behold, Toviah has come.

The Gemora qualifies the ruling: Now, if he had said, “Toviah,” and Rav Toviah came, he would not be entitled to the estate, since he said “To Toviah,” and not “To Rav Toviah.” If he, however, was on familiar terms with Rav Toviah, the estate must be given to him, since the omission of title might have been due to the fact that he was casual with him.

If two men called Toviah appeared, one of whom was a neighbor and the other a Torah scholar, the scholar is to be given precedence (since we may assume that the dying man desired merits and he granted his property to a Torah scholar). If one was a relative and the other a Torah scholar, the scholar is given precedence.

They inquired: What is the halacha where one is a neighbor and the other a relative? Come and hear from the following verse [Mishlei 27:10]: Better is a neighbor that is near than a brother far away.

If both men named Toviah are relatives, or both are neighbors, or both are Torah scholars, the decision is left to the discretion of the judges. (85b)

[END]

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 84 - Highlights

Rav and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

The Gemora asks: Does Rav hold such a condition is valid? Didn’t Rav say that if someone says to his friend (I am selling you this item) “on the condition that you have no claim of ona’ah (Torah prohibition against charging one-sixth more than the market value for an item)” that there is still ona’ah. Shmuel says: There is no ona’ah.

The Gemora answers: It must be that the law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that if someone makes a condition which is against Torah law, the condition is invalid. However, not because of Rabban Shimon’s reason. Rabban Shimon understands the reason leads to the conclusion that if the woman (in Mishna 83a) dies the husband inherits her, and Rav holds he does not.

The Gemora asks: This would mean that Rav should hold of Rabban Shimon’s reasoning and not his law, not (as Rav stated) that he holds of Rabban Shimon’s law but not based on his reasoning!

The Gemora answers: It must be that Rav holds like Rabban Shimon’s law that if she dies he inherits, but not based on his reasoning. Rabban Shimon’s reasoning was that a although a condition made against Torah law is invalid, a condition made against Rabbinic law is valid. Rav held that a condition cannot be made even against Rabbinic law.

The Gemora asks: This means Rav holds of both Rabban Shimon’s law and his reasoning. Rav merely adds that a condition against Rabbinic law is also invalid!

The Gemora answers: It must be that Rav holds like Rabban Shimon’s law that if she dies he inherits, but not based on his reasoning. Rabban Shimon’s reasoning was that a husband inherits from his wife according to Torah law, and any condition made against Torah law is invalid. Rav’s reasoning is that a husband only inherits his wife based on a Rabbinic decree, and the sages deemed it necessary to strengthen this law like it was a Torah law (that a condition against it would be invalid). (83b – 84a)

A Husband’s Inheritance: Torah or Rabinnic Law

The Gemora asks: Does Rav really hold that a husband only inherits from his wife because of a Rabbinic institution? The Mishna records that Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah said someone who inherits his wife should give back the fields by yovel (the jubilee year) and subtract money from them. The Gemara inquires: What is Rabbi Yochanan’s reasoning? If he holds that a husband inherits based on Torah law, why should he give it back at all? If he holds that this inheritance is Rabbinic in nature, why does he take money? Rav explained: Rabbi Yochanan holds that a husband’s inheritance is established in Torah law. However, the case here is where his wife owned her family’s burial plots. Being that their inability to bury their dead their and the burial of others there instead would denigrate the family, he should return the plot to them for a (small) amount of money.

The Gemora asks: What does it meant that he should subtract some money? The Gemora answers: This is the amount of money that his wife’s plot is worth. This is in accordance with a statement of a Beraisa that someone who sells his burial plot, the path to it, the place where one stands to deliver a eulogy and the place for the eulogy, his family can come bury him their anyway, as otherwise it is denigrating to the family. [The above shows that Rav says that a husband’s inheritance is a Torah law, not Rabbinic as we stated above!]

The Gemora answers: Rav was merely explaining the position of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah. He himself did not agree with Rabbi Yochanan that a husband’s inheritance is Torah law. (84a)
Mishna

If someone dies and left a widow, creditor, and inheritors, and he had deposited items of value with others or others owed him money (who receives the money)? Rabbi Tarfon says: It should be given to the weakest amongst them (see the Gemora later). Rabbi Akiva says: We do not have mercy in judgement, rather we give the money to the inheritors. This is because while the others must take an oath in order to collect this money, the inheritors do not. If he left fruit that was not connected to the ground, whoever takes it first (among those listed above) is entitled to it. If the widow grabbed more than her Kesuvah was worth, and a creditor grabbed more than the money owed to him, (what should be done with) the rest? Rabbi Tarfon says: It should be given to the weakest amongst them (see the Gemora later). Rabbi Akiva says: We do not have mercy in judgement, rather we give the money to the inheritors. This is because while the others must take an oath in order to collect this money, the inheritors do not. (84a)

Both a Deposit and a Loan

The Gemora asks: Why did the Mishna state a case where the deceased had either a loan or a deposit (either is enough to get the point across)? The Gemora answers: This was necessary. If the Mishna would have only stated a case of a loan, it is possible that specifically regarding a loan Rabbi Tarfon would say the weakest takes the money because a loan is made to be spent. [The money is not considered to be extant, and therefore not in the domain of the inheritors.] However, in a case of a deposit that is extant we might have thought that he agrees with Rabbi Akiva. If the Mishna would have only stated a case of a deposit, we might have thought that Rabbi Akiva only says that the inheritors receive the money because it is extant, but in a case of a loan he would agree to Rabbi Tarfon. Both cases are therefore necessary. (84a)
Who is “The Weakest”?

The Gemora asks: What does Rabbi Tarfon mean by “the weakest?” Rabbi Yosi b’Rebbi Chanina says: The one with the weakest proof (the document dated the latest). Rabbi Yochanan says: He is referring to the kesuvah of the widow, due to the sages will that the widow should have some money that will help her find favor in the eyes of another husband. This is as stated in a Beraisa. Rabbi Binyamin says: The one with the weakest proof (the document dated the latest), and it is appropriate to rule in this fashion. Rabbi Elazar says: He is referring to the kesuvah of the widow, due to the sages will that the widow should have some money that will help her find favor in the eyes of another husband.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Akiva, how can the extra fruit be described as “extra?” All of that fruit belong to the orphans/inheritors!

The Gemora answers: This is true. However, because Rabbi Tarfon discussed “extra fruit,” Rabbi Akiva also discussed the “extra fruit” (which according to him are not extra).

The Gemora inquires: Does Rabbi Akiva hold that grabbing works at all in this case? Rava says in the name of Rav Nachman: It only helps if he grabbed the fruit before the person died.

The Gemora asks: According to Rabbi Tarfon, where were these fruits situated? Rav and Shmuel say: They must have been piled up in a public domain, but not in a side street. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish say: They could even have been piled in a side street. [The argument being whether or not the inheritors automatically acquire the fruit if it is in a side street.]

Certain judges ruled like Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish made them retract their ruling. Rabbi Yochanan told him: You did the Torah law.

The Gemora asks: Let us say they argue regarding the following concept. One holds that in a case where a judge makes an elementary mistake, the ruling should be retracted. The other argues that it should not be retracted.

The Gemora answers: No, this cannot be, as everyone agrees such a mistake must be retracted. Here they are arguing in the following concept. One understands that the rule that the law always follows Rabbi Akiva’s ruling when he argues on a friend, but not when his Rabbi (Rabbi Tarfon) argues on him. The other says the law always follows his opinion even when he argues on his Rabbi.

Alternatively, the Gemora gives the following explanation. Everyone agrees that the law is only like his opinion when he argues on a friend, not his Rabbi. In this case one opinion is that Rabbi Tarfon was his Rabbi, and the other is that Rabbi Tarfon was his friend.

Alternatively, the Gemora gives the following explanation. Everyone agrees that Rabbi Tarfon was merely his friend. In this case, one opinion is that when we state the law is like Rabbi Akiva, we mean that it is absolute. The other opinion understands that it is the optimal ruling that should be ruled, but if the ruling was made against his opinion it should not be retracted.

The relatives of Rabbi Yochanan grabbed the cow of orphans (whose father owed them money) when it was in a side street. They came before Rabbi Yochanan, who endorsed their actions. When they came before Reish Lakish, he told them that they should return the cow. When they returned to consult with Rabbi Yochanan, he told them that he cannot do anything as someone as great as him argues on him.

A person who used to watch the animals of orphans was watching their animals when a creditor seized one of the animals. The creditor claimed that he seized the animal when the father was alive, while the animal watcher claimed that it was after the father had already died. They came before Rav Nachman. Rav Nachman asked the animal watchman: “Do you have witnesses on this seizure?” The watchman replied that he did not. Rav Nachman stated: Being that the creditor could claim that the animal was originally his, he is believed to say that he grabbed it while the father was still alive.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Reish Lakish say that certain domestic animals do not have a status quo of ownership (where whoever presently has them is believed to say that he bought them, as they frequently wander)? The Gemora answers: An ox is different, as it is given over to a shepherd (who makes sure it doesn’t wander too much).

The house of the Nasi (leader of the Jews in Israel) seized a maidservant of orphans in a side street. Rabbi Avahu, Rabbi Chanina bar Papi, and Rabbi Yitzchak bar Nafcha were sitting, and alongside them was Rabbi Abba. The first three said that the seizure was appropriate. Rabbi Abba said: Just because they are from the house of the Nasi you are flattering them? Weren’t judges who ruled like Rabbi Tarfon overruled by Reish Lakish who made them retract their ruling? (Therefore, the maidservant must be returned.) (84a – 84b)

[END]

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 83 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: If one writes to his wife, “I have no claim or rights to your property,” he may nevertheless eat the produce during her lifetime, and if she died, he inherits her property. If so (the Mishna asks), why did he write to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property?” It accomplishes that if she sold the property or gave them away, it is valid.

If he wrote to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property and its produce,” he does not eat the produce during her lifetime, but if she died, he inherits her property.

Rabbi Yehudah says: He always has the right of eating the produce of the produce unless he writes to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property and its produce and the produce of the produce forever.”

If he wrote to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property and its produce and the produce of the produce, during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not eat the produce during her lifetime, and if she died, he does not inherit her property.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she died, he does inherit her property because he stipulated contrary to that which is written in the Torah; and if one stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void. (83a)

Husband can Relinquish his Rights Prior to the Nisuin

The Gemora asks: Why is there any validity to what he writes? Did we not learn in a braisa that if one says to his fellow (a partner in the field): “I have no claim or rights regarding this field,” or he says: “I have no business with it,” or he says: “My hand is removed from it,” it is considered as if he said nothing (since he is not stating that he is giving his share to his partner)?

In the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yannai, they said: The Mishna is referring to a case where he wrote it to her while she was still an arusah (and therefore, it has validity since the husband does not own the property yet), and it would be in accordance with that which Rav Kahana said. For Rav Kahana said: A man may stipulate in advance that he does not wish to inherit an inheritance that will come to him through marriage.

This can be proven from Rava’s statement, for Rava said: If a person says, “I do not want to avail myself of a Rabbinic enactment (which was made for his benefit), such as this one, we listen to him.

The Gemora asks: What did Rava mean when he said, “such as this one”? He is referring to that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav. For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman is permitted to say to her husband, “I do not want to be supported by you, and I will not give you my earnings.” (She works and keeps the earnings to herself.)

The Gemora asks: If so, the husband should be able to waive his rights to her property even if she is a nesuah (since her property belongs to him based on a Rabbinic enactment; he should be entitled to refuse this right that was intended for his benefit)?

Abaye answers: His hand is equal to her hand (since she is a nesuah, they are equal partners, and therefore, he cannot waive his rights any longer; he must actually give it away).

Rava said: His hand is even stronger than her hand. (83a)

If he Makes a Kinyan

(The Gemora had stated: if one says to his fellow (a partner in the field): “I have no claim or rights regarding this field,” or he says: “I have no business with it,” or he says: “My hand is removed from it,” it is considered as if he said nothing since he is not stating that he is giving his share to his partner.) The Gemora inquires: If his partner made a kinyan (chalipin; he took a kerchief from his fellow in order to formalize the transfer), does this kinyan give more validity to his statement or not?

Rav Yosef said: He has acquired the waiver of the claim and rights regarding the field (and since the waiver was meaningless, so is the acquisition).

Rav Nachman said: He acquires the land itself.

Abaye said: It is logical that Rav Yosef is correct regarding a case where the initial owner of the field protested immediately (as the other fellow was attempting to take possession of the field; the owner said that his statement and kinyan was only for the purpose of not arguing with him regarding his portion), but if he would have stood quiet for a few days before objecting, we can assume that he (the recipient) has indeed acquired the land.

Ameimar said: The halacha is that he acquires the land itself.

Rav Ashi asked Ameimar: Is the halacha this way even if he objects immediately or only if he stands quiet for a few days?

The Gemora asks: What difference does it make?

Rav Ashi answers: For that which Rav Yosef said (and as Abaye explained).

Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: I do not agree that there is any such distinction (he acquires the land regardless of if the owner stood quiet or even if he objected immediately). (83a – 83b)

Interpreting his Statement

The Mishna had stated (regarding the case when one writes to his wife, “I have no claim or rights to your property,” he may nevertheless eat the produce during her lifetime, and if she died, he inherits her property): If so, why did he write to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property?” It accomplishes that if she sold the property or gave them away, it is valid.

The Gemora asks: Why can’t the wife tell the husband that he removed himself completely from retaining any rights in the property?

Abaye answers: The holder of the document is always at a disadvantage (since the language of the document is vague, we say that he has removed himself from the least valuable right that he had in the property; the husband possesses the rights of (1) produce, (2) inheritance after her death and (3) the seizure of any property she has sold or given away; the least valuable right is the ability to nullify her sale and that is what we assume he renounced).

The Gemora asks: But perhaps he was referring to the right of consuming the produce?

Abaye answers: A small gourd now is more preferable than a large one later (and we assume that the ability to eat the produce now is more advantageous to him).

The Gemora asks: But perhaps he was referring to his right of inheritance after her death?

Abaye answers: Death is common, whereas her selling her melog property is not. A person will generally renounce the rights of an uncommon occurrence rather than renouncing his rights to a common one.

Rav Ashi answers (the original question) differently: The husband had stated that he is withdrawing from any claims to her property. We can infer that he was referring to her property (the ability to nullify her sale), and not to its produce. We can also infer that he was referring to her property during her lifetime, and not to a claim which is only relevant after her death. (83b)

From Heaven

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yehudah says: He always has the right of eating the produce of the produce unless he writes to her, “I have no claim or rights to your property and its produce and the produce of the produce forever.”

The Gemora cites a braisa: If she brought in land into the marriage, the crops from that land are regarded as produce. If she sold the produce from that land and purchased land with the proceeds, the crops that grow from that land is regarded as produce of the produce.

The Gemora inquires as to the exact expression necessary according to Rabbi Yehudah. If the husband withdraws from the produce of the produce, does this include all future produce which comes from her melog property? Does he have to say “forever”? Or, perhaps both expressions are necessary.

The Gemora leaves this issue unresolved. (83b)

[END]

Read more!