Interest-Free Loans

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The Gemora quotes a different version of Rav Huna’s statement. Rav Yosef explained that the verse discussing lending states: if you will lend money to Ami – my nation, to the Ani – the poor one – Imach – with you. This verse teaches that the priority in lending is first to a Jew over a non Jew (Ami), then to a poor person over a rich person (Ani), and to a local poor person over a poor person somewhere else (Imach). Rav Huna says that the priority given to a Jewish debtor is even when the non Jewish debtor will pay interest.

The Pnei Yehoshua discusses what the halachah would be in a case where if he would lend money with interest to a gentile, he would gain substantially. Is he still required to lend to a Jew without interest?

He questions the basis of the halachah: Do we not say that whenever a person would suffer a loss, his needs take precedence over others?

He answers that it is different here, for the mitzvah to lend to a poor person is a mitzvah of tzedakah; one is required to do whatever is in his means in order to sustain his fellow Jew. One must be concerned about his own losses only when the mitzvah regarding his fellow is to prevent him from a loss.

The Megilas Esther writes that one is obligated to lend to a Jew interest-free even if he has the possibility of lending to a gentile for a substantial amount of interest. This is because the Jew is not losing; he is merely not gaining.

The Shaar Hamishpat disagrees with this, and Ahavas Chesed cites several different opinions with respect to this issue.

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Takkanas Nigzal

The Gemora (daf yomi - Bava Kamma 62) lists a number of diverse cases where the Sages applied the rule for the robbery victim, without clarifying in exactly what circumstances the rule was applied, nor why. There is discussion in the Rishonim about what the parameters for these cases are. Rabbeinu Tam (Tosfos 62a asu) states that the debate in the case of an informer is only when the informer claims with certainty that he did not cause as large a loss as the victim claims. However, when the informer is uncertain, then there’s no question that the victim can use the rule of the robbery victim, and collect with an oath. The Ri, on the other hand, states that the Gemora is currently following the discussion of applying the robbery victim rule to fire damages of embedded items. In that case, the damager obviously has no knowledge how much he damaged, so similarly the discussion by an informer must be also in the case of the informer not knowing how much damage he caused.

According to the Ri, the application of takanas nigzal is only due to the fact that the damager doesn’t know how much the damage is. If the damager claims with certainty a lesser amount, the usual procedure must be followed, and the victim must bring proofs. The Gemora is only using the case of nigzal as a borrowed term, to apply in a case where the damager cannot counter claim with certainty. However, Rabbeinu Tam applies the takanas nigzal even to cases where the damager claims a lesser amount with certainty. The application must be a more direct analogy to the robbery case. In the robbery case, the robber is not able to swear, since we punish his status as a robber by invalidating his oath. Therefore, the Sages placed that oath on the victim, to allow him to collect. Similarly, Rabbeinu Tam holds that one who lights a fire – a gross negligence, and a very direct form of damage – and an informer – a very severe and dangerous form of damage – are punished for their crime by allowing the victim to collect with an oath. Rabbeinu Tam would therefore equally apply the takanas nigzal to any fire damages, even in the simple non tamun case that the Chachamim discuss. [See the Rosh paragraph 16, who mentions both reasons by the case of fire.]

The Pnei Yehoshua points out that the Gemora flow seems to indicate Rabbeinu Tam’s approach is correct. The Gemora concludes the discussion of takanas nigzal with a seeming non sequitur – the distinction between a chamsan and gazlan. The Pnei Yehoshua explains that the Gemora was discussing different types of criminals, and the sanctions put on them by takanas nigzal, and therefore concluded with a statement about two types of criminals who cause another person monetary loss.

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Craftsmen Standing for Torah Scholars

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Rabbi Yochanan states (Kiddushin 33a) : They stood before those bringing the bikkurim, but not before Torah scholars.

Rabbi Yosi bar Avin explains: Come and see how precious a mitzvah is in its proper time, for the craftsmen would rise before those bringing the bikkurim, but not before Torah scholars.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps they would only rise before those bringing bikkurim (but not for an ordinary mitzvah) because if not, they will not bring the bikkurim in the future (for they will think that the people living in Yerushalayim have no respect for them).

The Pnei Yehoshua writes that although it is obvious that the studying of Torah is greater than the performance of mitzvos, and even a mitzvah which has a set time, nevertheless, here, those that are performing a mitzvah are greater than Torah scholars. This is because it is quite possible that the Torah scholar is not engrossed in learning as he is walking.

The Chasam Sofer asks: And is a Torah scholar not occupied in performing mitzvos as he is walking? The Gemora Brochos states that a Torah scholar does not walk even four amos without thinking in Torah!? Why shouldn’t they stand before him?

He answers that according to halachah, thinking in learning is not equivalent to studying out loud, and therefore it is not in the same category as one who is performing a mitzvah while he is walking.

The Noda BeYehudah answers that a mitzvah which does not apply every day is more significant than the mitzvah of studying Torah, which applies every day.

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Name of Hashem Written without the Proper Intent

A braisa (Daf Yomi: Gittin 20a) was taught: A scribe was supposed to write the Name of Hashem in a Sefer Torah, and instead intended to write the name Yehudah. [The name Yehudah is similar to the letters in the Name of Hashem, except that the word Yehudah has a letter “dalet” between the “vav” and the “hey.”] He forgot to insert the “dalet” and ended up writing the Name of Hashem but without the required intention necessary to write the Holy Name. Rabbi Yehudah posits that the scribe can pass his quill over the Name of Hashem and have the proper intention of writing the Name. The Chachamim disagree, claiming that this is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem (and the Sefer Torah is subsequently invalid).

The Rishonim ask: According to Rav Chisda, who holds that the Chachamim maintain that the Sefer Torah is disqualified, why does he use the term that it is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem? This would indicate that the writing is good, but it is not written in the most preferable method! Why didn’t he say that the new writing does not accomplish anything?

The Rashba answers that they actually hold that the tracing over of the word is not regarded as an act of writing at all and the Sefer Torah is disqualified. They only used that term to discuss Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion.

The Pnei Yehoshua suggests a novel approach to explain the Chachamim’s terminology: Although the Chachamim maintain that the Sefer Torah is disqualified, they nevertheless hold that the Name of Hashem retains its sanctity and is forbidden to be erased. He proves that the Name of Hashem, although it wasn’t written with the correct intention, cannot be erased. This is why the Chachamim say that it is not the best way to write the Name of Hashem.

The Tashbatz, however, proves from our sugya that it is permitted to erase the Name of Hashem when it is written without the correct intention.

The Gemora in Yoma (38a) states that Ben Kamtzar had a unique talent that he was able to write four letters with one hand at the same time and he did not teach this talent to anyone else. The Gemora says that this was considered a shame and due to this, he was referred to as an evil person. What were the Chachamim concerned about? Rashi comments that this was referring to the Name of Hashem which has four letters.

The Tosfos Yom Tov explains that there is an advantage for the Name of Hashem to be written at one time, so that His Name should not be missing for a moment.

The Minchas Chinuch has a novel approach and says that if one writes the first two letters of the Name of Hashem which is the “yud” and the “hey,” that itself is one of the Name’s of Hashem, and by subsequently writing the third letter, the “vav,” it constitutes erasing Hashem’s Name. Ben Kamtzar was able to avoid with his special skill.

The Emek Brocha asks that if the Name of Hashem is written without proper intent, there is no prohibition to erase it, so why should there be a prohibition here when the scribe did not intend to write the ‘two letter’ Name of Hashem, but rather His ‘four letter’ Name?

According to the Pnei Yehoshua, this is not a question, for this, in fact, a prohibition to erase the Name of Hashem, even when it is written without the proper intent!

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Suspected of Lying

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 10a) had stated: Any document that has a Cuthean witness signed on it is disqualified (for he is suspected of lying) except that of a get for a woman and for the freeing of a slave.

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: Since they are suspect of lying, they should be regarded as a rasha (wicked person) with respect of monetary matters, and the halacha is that a thief is disqualified form all testimony!?

He answers that the Yerushalmi says that the Cutheans are eligible to sign on a get because they are only suspect with regards to monetary matters, but not with respect of illicit relations. The Pnei Yehoshua explains: The Yerushalmi holds that a witness who is suspected of stealing is only disqualified from testifying with regards to money matters, but he would still be eligible to testify on arayos (relationships). However, l’halacha we hold that such a person is ineligible to testify on all matters, so accordingly, how could the Mishna rule that the get is valid?

He answers that in truth, we do not know definitely that they would lie; it is only that they are suspect of lying. The halacha is that if they are suspected of lying, they are disqualified from testifying with respect of monetary matters, but not with respect of other testimonies.

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