Daf Yomi - Chagigah 21 - Food For Thought

*** There are eleven halachos (stringencies that apply by kodesh and not terumah) listed in the Mishna and yet Rabbi Ila said that there were only ten. It is evident that two of them are based upon the same reasoning; the first (one utensil inside the other) and the fifth (a garment with a knot) are both because of chatzitzah.)

If they are both on the account of chatzitzah, why did the Mishna separate them; shouldn’t they be listen one after the other?

(Turei Even, Merumei Sadeh)


*** The Mishna had stated: We may immerse utensils inside of other utensils in a mikvah for terumah, but not for kodesh.

Rabbi Ila answered: It is because the weight of the inside utensil prevents the water from circulating freely between the two utensils; if this would occur, the immersion would not be valid because the water must touch every part of the utensil. (This case would not constitute a Biblical chatzitzah (an interposition between the water and the utensil) because the water does find a way to pass through the utensils, but since it appears like a chatzitzah, the Chachamim were stringent regarding kodesh, but not in regards to terumah.)

In the sefer Masaas Binyomin (81), he rules that a woman who is physically unable to stand can be immersed in the mikvah while she is laying on a mat that is not susceptible to tumah.

The Sidrei Tahara (198: 47) asks from our Gemora: Shouldn’t her weight on the mat constitute a chatzitzah; the water will not be able to circulate freely between the woman and the mat?

I had a similar question on the Gemora above: If a wave that consisted of forty se’ah separated from the sea and fell on a person or utensils that were tamei, they become tahor. The Gemora explains that the Mishna is referring to a case where the person is sitting on the shore waiting for the wave to separate from the sea and fall on him or on the utensils. It is evident from our Gemora that even though the person did not directly immerse the utensils in the water; he was merely anticipating that the wave will detach itself from the sea and fall on the contaminated utensils, this is sufficient, provided that he has intention that the water should purify the utensils.

How does the water get in between the person or the utensils and the ground on the shore?


*** Dayan Weiss (4:35) has a teshuva regarding the validity of immersion while wearing a bathing suit.



*** Shoel Umeishiv (I:2:122) writes: “In the year 5615, I was learning Meseches Chagigah on the yahrtzeit of my mother because my father told me that the holy seforim say that it is beneficial to study Meseches Chagigah on a yahrtzeit.”

What is the source for this and what is the reasoning?

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 21 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: We may immerse utensils inside of other utensils in a mikvah for terumah, but not for kodesh.

The Gemora asks: Why is this forbidden to do by kodesh?

Rabbi Ila answered: It is because the weight of the inside utensil prevents the water from circulating freely between the two utensils; if this would occur, the immersion would not be valid because the water must touch every part of the utensil. (This case would not constitute a Biblical chatzitzah (an interposition between the water and the utensil) because the water does find a way to pass through the utensils, but since it appears like a chatzitzah, the Chachamim were stringent regarding kodesh, but not in regards to terumah.)

The Gemora asks: One of the other stringencies listed later in the Mishna is on account of chatzitzah; this would imply that the reason for the first stringency is not because of chatzitzah. The Mishna had stated: When immersing garments for kodesh, one must first untie them and dry them, but for terumah one may immerse them while they are knotted (and/or wet). The reason for this halacha is because of chatzitzah (the water cannot touch every part of the garment when it is tied); shouldn’t the first stringency be on account of something else?

The Gemora answers: Both of these stringencies are in fact because of chatzitzah, and they are both necessary. The first stringency is based upon the logic that the weight of the utensil causes the chatzitzah; this does not apply by the latter case, which is referring to a garment where there is no weight. The second stringency is based upon the logic that a knot prevents the water from touching all parts of the garment; this does not apply by the former case, where the water can cause the inside utensil to float and the water will be able to circulate freely. (21a – 21b)

The Gemora comments: Rabbi Ila is consistent with a different statement that he said in the name of Rabbi Chanina bar Papa. He said: There are ten stringencies for kodesh listed in the Mishna. (This is the proof to the consistency: There are eleven halachos listed in the Mishna and yet Rabbi Ila said that there were only ten. It is evident that two of them are based upon the same reasoning; the first (one utensil inside the other) and the fifth (a garment with a knot) are both because of chatzitzah.)

Rabbi Ila continues: The first five apply to kodesh and to chulin which was made according to the tahara standard of kodesh (pious people would treat chulin in their house as if it was kodoshim in order to train the members of their family with these stringencies). The last five only apply to kodesh.

The Gemora asks: Why is there this distinction?

The Gemora answers: The first five are stricter because they have legitimate Biblical concerns; the last five are merely Rabbinic decrees and therefore they apply to kodesh, but not to chulin which was made according to the tahara standard of kodesh. (21b)

Rava presents an alternative explanation to the Mishna: The reason that the Chachamim issued a decree against immersing one utensil inside the other is because they were concerned that people might immerse needles or spinning hooks (small items) inside a utensil whose opening is not the required size of a skin bottle’s tube (if the opening is less than that, the immersion is not valid because we view the water inside the utensil as separate from the water in the mikvah).

The Gemora cites a Mishna in Mikvaos (6:7) which states: In order to connect a mikvah which is lacking forty se’ah to a mikvah which contains forty se’ah, there must be an opening in the wall separating the two mikvaos at least the size of a skin bottle’s tube. The Mishna explains that we measure the outer circumference of the tube, which the Chachamim established to be where one can freely rotate his two fingers inside the hole. (The connection of the two mikvaos is known as hashakah.) (21b – 22a)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 20 - Food For Thought

*** Our Gemara states that one must be more scrupulous regarding utensils that are used on Shabbos than those that are used on weekdays.

The Mabit writes that the Gemara states that one is required to purify himself prior to a festival by immersing in a mikveh. The Mabit wonders why one would not also be required to immerse himself prior to Shabbos? The Mabit answers that one is not required to immerse in a mikveh prior to Shabbos because the sanctity of Shabbos will cleanse the person from any impurities.

Reb Yosef Engel questions this answer, as our Gemara clearly states that one is required to be more scrupulous on Shabbos regarding matters of impurity.

*** The Gemora states that a person cannot watch something that is in his friend's hand. We need to be certain that the utensil did not become tamei; only the holder can provide us with that assurance.

The Minchas Chinuch (10) proves from here that whenever intention is needed, the one who is performing the action must be the one who has the intention. Therefore, he rules that a non-Jew, mute or minor cannot knead the dough for matzah even if there will be someone else watching. Only the person kneading the dough can be certain that it did not become chametz.

Other Acharonim disagree and differentiate between those with intellect and those without. If the person has his own intellect, then he cannot be watched; however, a mute or a minor that have no intellect on their own may be watched.

*** The Mishna states: If one hand became tamei, the other is tamei as well; but only regarding kodoshim and not in respect for terumah.

The Minchas Chinuch (106)writes that if a Kohen loses concentration regarding one of his hands during the Bais HaMikdosh service; he has to sanctify that hand again, but not the other hand.

The distinction is that the mitzvah for the Kohen to wash his hands and feet prior to performing the sacrificial service is a Biblical one; our Mishna is discussing Rabbinical stringencies that were applied to kodoshim.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 19 - Praying without the Proper Intention

In the sefer Torah Lishma from the Ben Ish Chai, the following inquiry was asked: Our sages said that prayer without the proper kavanah (intent) is akin to a body without a soul. This being the case, what would be the purpose of prayer when one is unable to concentrate during his Tefillah due to the worries that weigh on his mind? Would such a prayer be accepted?

Furthermore, if one understands the words of tefillah and the basic translation of the prayers but does not comprehend the secrets hidden in the tefillos, then the depths of the prayers revealed to us by the Zohar and the Arizal will remain a mystery to him. One who is capable of performing a mitzvah in its entirety but does not grasp the hidden meanings of the mitzvah would seem to be missing an integral part of the mitzvah. Most people are on this level as they fulfill mitzvos and pray three times a day according to their basic understanding and because it is the will of Hashem. Is it possible, then, that most of our generation is deficient in tefillah and the performance of mitzvos due to a lack of comprehension regarding the profound implications of prayer and mitzvah performance?

The Ben Ish Chai responds: One who cannot concentrate on his prayers because he is entertaining other thoughts during tefillah should nevertheless continue to pray. This can be proven from the following Zohar in Parashas Vayechi: Rav Chizkiyah said that it is said that one should first prepare the praise of his Master and then pray. What should one do, however, if his heart is heavy and he wishes to pray, yet, since he is in distress he cannot properly formulate the praise of his Master? Rabbi Yosi responded that despite the fact that he cannot focus properly on his prayers and he will not be able to formulate the praise of his Master properly, he should still formulate the praises of his Master and he should pray. This is what it is said, a prayer of Dovid: Hear HaShem, what is righteous, be attentive to my supplication. First, hear HaShem righteous, as this is the formulation of praises for his Master, and subsequently, be attentive to my supplication, [give ear to my prayer]. One who is capable of formulating the praises of his Master and does not do so, regarding him it is said, even if you were to intensify your prayer, I will not listen.

In regards to the second question, the Ben Ish Chai writes that one is obligated to attempt to learn and understand the secrets of Hashem as Dovid told his son Shlomo: Know the G-d of your father and serve Him. Nonetheless, one who did not merit understanding these concepts and concentrates on the basic translation of the words and performs a mitzva with all its intricacies, his tefillah and mitzvos are considered complete and they are not deficient. This idea can be proven from the words of the Zohar in Parashas Yisro: If a mitzvah comes his way and he focuses on it, he is meritorious. If one did not have the proper intention he is meritorious as he has performed the will of his Master. Yet, he is not deemed to be like one who has fulfilled HaShem’s will selflessly and has performed the deed with the intention of fulfilling HaShem’s will for the sake of HaShem’s glory like one who does not know how to think. The reason for this is because the matter is dependant on the will performed selflessly and with the action selflessly performed below, the action above is removed and is purely rectified. In a similar vein, the action of the body rectifies the action of the soul with that will, as HaShem desires the heart and will of a person. Nonetheless, one needs to act wholeheartedly, which is the essence of everything, and regarding this Dovid prayed and said, may the pleasantness of the Lord, our G-d, be upon us, our handiwork, establish for us. No man is wise enough to align his will and his heart to rectify a matter completely, and for that reason he prays, our handiwork, establish for us. What is meant by the words establish for us? Establish and rectify Your rectifications above appropriately upon us. This, despite the fact that we are not capable of aligning our will completely. Rather, we perform the action, and You establish our handiwork. One who is on that level who requires rectification, establish it as one so that this matter should be rectified properly.

It thus emerges that this is precisely what Dovid requested of HaShem; a mitzvah or tefillah should not be regarded as deficient because of one’s lack of understanding regarding the secrets that are contained in the mitzvos. Rather it should be considered complete and whole without the slightest blemish.

For this reason our sages have instructed us to recite the tefillah of vihi noam prior to the performance of any mitzvah or the recital of any tefillah. The
recital of this verse inspires Dovid’s prayer and our deeds will be accepted completely despite the fact that we did not have the proper intention.

Rabbeinu Chaim, son of Rabbeinu Yitzchak, one of the Rishonim quotes our Gemora: We have learned in a Mishna in Mikvaos (5:6): If a wave that consisted of forty se’ah separated from the sea and fell on a person or utensils that were tamei, they become tahor. The Gemora explains that the Mishna is referring to a case where the person is sitting on the shore waiting for the wave to separate from the sea and fall on him or on the utensils. It is evident from our Gemora that even though the person did not directly immerse the utensils in the water; he was merely anticipating that the wave will detach itself from the sea and fall on the contaminated utensils, this is sufficient, provided that he has intention that the water should purify the utensils.

The Gemora in Chulin (31) states a similar halacha regarding a woman who was a menstruant. If water fell on her and her friend anticipated this and had intention for her, the immersion would be valid even though the menstruant herself was not intending for this to happen.

It would follow that we can apply this principle to other mitzvos as well. One who bakes matzah must have intention that it is being baked for the commandment of matzah. If one was baking without the proper intention, but another person was observing and did have the proper intention, the baking is valid and the matzah may be used for the mitzvah.

Rabbeinu Chaim concludes: If the intention of one’s fellow can facilitate the fulfillment of the mitzvah for his friend, then certainly the intentions of the Holy One, Blessed is He can achieve the same result. We entreat of HaShem before our prayers and prior to the performance of a mitzvah that He should establish our handiwork and rectify our actions for we are not capable of aligning our will completely. It is our mission to perform the actions to the best of our capabilities and Hashem will rectify the deeds appropriately.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 18 - Placing a Stumbling Block by a Rabbinic Prohibition

There is a matter of dispute among the Rishonim if the prohibition against performing labor on Chol Hamoed (the intermediate days of Pesach and Sukkos) is Biblical (Rashi) or Rabbinic (Tosfos).

Our Gemora cites Scriptural verses illustrating that it is forbidden to perform labor during Chol Hamoed. Tosfos states that it is implicit from the Gemora that this is a Biblical prohibition.

Tosfos asks: It is permitted to work on Chol Hamoed to prevent an irretrievable loss or various types of labor; this would be understandable if the prohibition would be Rabbinic in nature, however, if it is a Biblical prohibition, where do we find distinctions in the types of work that some will be forbidden and some will be permitted?

Tosfos concludes that the prohibition against working during Chol Hamoed is only a Rabbinic injunction and the verses cited are merely Scriptural supports for this decree.

Tosfos asks from a Gemora in Avodah Zarah (22a) which states that there would be a prohibition of placing a stumbling block before a blind man (lifnei iver) by performing labor on Chol Hamoed. (One is forbidden from assisting another fellow to violate a prohibition, where the sinner could not accomplish the transgression without his aid.)

The Reshash explains Tosfos: The prohibition of lifnei iver is only applicable by a Biblical prohibition and not when it pertains to a Rabbinical injunction; accordingly, Tosfos asks why the Gemora states that lifnei iver applies by the prohibition of working on Chol Hamoed, when that is only a Rabbinic injunction.

Tosfos in Avodah Zarah (22a) states explicitly that the commandment of lifnei iver applies by a Rabbinic prohibition, as well. The Steipler Gaon explains a different Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 15b) that Tosfos is uncertain regarding this principle and it is indeed a dispute among two answers in Tosfos if lifnei iver applies by a Rabbinic prohibition or not.

This principle requires an explanation. Why should lifnei iver not apply by a Rabbinic prohibition? One is forbidden from providing flawed advice to his fellow (the Minchas Chinuch discusses if giving shoddy counsel violates this prohibition); every Rabbinic decree entails a Biblical prohibition of not swaying from the words of our sages.

What is the logic to differentiate between assisting someone to violate a Biblical prohibition or one that is merely Rabbinic?

Don't forget to vote please - thanks.

Torah Blog

New Blog

Difference Maker Blog

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 18 - Highlights

The Gemora cites several Scriptural verses illustrating that it is forbidden to perform labor during Chol Hamoed (Intermediary Days).

The Gemora concludes: The Torah delegated the authority to the Chachamim to decide which days are Yom Tov (through their declaration of Rosh Chodesh) and all types of labor is forbidden and which days are Chol Hamoed when certain types of work is permitted; and it was entrusted to the Chachamim to decide which type of labor is prohibited during Chol Hamoed and which types will be permitted. (18a)

The Mishna had stated: It is permitted to eulogize and fast on the Day of Slaughter in order to counter the opinion of the Sadducees, who claimed that Shavuos is always on a Sunday.

The Gemora asks from a braisa: There was once an incident where Alexa died in the city of Lod and everyone came to eulogize him. Rabbi Tarfon prevented them from doing so because it was the Festival of Shavuos.

The Gemora analyzes the braisa: The braisa cannot be referring to the actual day of Shavuos because they would not have even attempted to eulogize him then; it obviously is referring to the Day of Slaughter and nevertheless, Rabbi Tarfon ruled that eulogies are forbidden. This contradicts the ruling of our Mishna.

The Gemora answers: The braisa is referring to a case where Shavuos fell out during a weekday and the Day of Slaughter was not on a Sunday; there was no reason to permit eulogizing on that day. The Mishna was referring to a case where Shavuos fell out on Shabbos and the Day of Slaughter was on Sunday; they permitted eulogies on that day to counter the opinion of the Sadducees, who claimed that Shavuos is always on a Sunday. (18a)

The Mishna states: One is required to wash his hands before involving himself with chulin, maaser (maaser sheini, a tenth of one’s produce that he brings to Yerushalayim and eats there in the first, second, fourth and fifth years of the Shemitah cycle) and terumah. (The Chachamim declared that unrinsed hands are considered tamei because they probably touched unclean parts of his body. They decreed that only his hands will be rendered tamei, but not the rest of his body.) If he wants to eat Kodoshim (sacrifices that are eaten by the owner or the Kohen); he must immerse his hands in a body of water that contains forty se’ah. Prior to handling the chatas water (the water and ashes mixture of the parah adumah used to purify people and tools that have been contaminated through corpse-tumah).

The Mishna continues: One who immersed himself with the intention of purifying himself for chulin, is prohibited from eating maaser sheini; one who immersed himself with the intention of purifying himself for maaser sheini, is prohibited from eating terumah; one who immersed himself with the intention of purifying himself for terumah, is prohibited from eating kodoshim; one who immersed himself with the intention of purifying himself for kodoshim, is prohibited from handling the chatas water. (An immersion with the intention of becoming pure for items of lesser stringency will not be effective for items of greater stringency.) If he immerses himself with the intention of becoming pure for items of a greater stringency, he is permitted to eat items that have a lesser degree of stringency. If he immersed himself with no intention whatsoever (only to wash himself); it is regarded as if he didn’t immerse himself at all.

The Mishna continues: The clothing of an am haaretz (one who is not particular in regards to the laws of tumah and tahara) is regarded as tumas midras (objects that become tamei when a zav, zavah or niddah place their weight on them – they are classified as an av hatumah and have the ability to contaminate people or utensils) for the perushim (people that are meticulous about eating their chulin in a state of tahara). The clothing of the perushim is regarded as tumas madras for those that are eating terumah. The clothing of those eating terumah is regarded as tumas madras for those that are eating kodoshim. The clothing of those eating kodoshim is regarded as tumas madras for those that are handling the chatas water.

The Mishna concludes: Yosef ben Yoezer was the most devout Kohen, but his napkin was regarded as tumas madras for those that are eating kodoshim. Yochanan ben Gudgeda used to eat all his chulin food as if it was kodoshim his entire lifetime and yet his napkin was regarded as tumas madras for those that are handling the chatas water. (18b)

The Gemora asks: Do chulin and maaser require the washing of one’s hands? The Gemora cites a Mishna in Bikkurim which explicitly states that one must wash his hands for terumah but not for maaser or chulin.

The Gemora answers: There is actually a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Chachamim if one is required to wash his hands prior to eating maaser.

The Gemora asks: The contradiction regarding maaser has been answered, but not the contradiction pertaining to chulin.

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is referring to eating bread; one is required to wash his hands prior to eating bread, even if it is only chulin. The Mishna in Bikkurim is discussing the eating of other produce; there it is not necessary to wash one’s hands. (18b)

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 17 - Shmini Atzeres - Independent Festival or Not?

The Beis Yosef (Y"D 120:20) cites a Yerushalmi in Nedarim: Rabbi Yochanan says: One who makes an oath against drinking wine on the "Chag," is prohobited from drinking wine on Sukkos, including Shmini Atzeres. The Beis Yosef writes that even though Shmini Atzeres is a festival by itself; that is only in respect to the six laws delineated in the Gemora, however in regard to the manner in which people speak, it is included in the festival of Sukkos, and the laws of vows are based on the way people speak.

The Meiri comments: Shmini Atzeres is only included in his vow if he just said "Chag," however if he explicitly said "Chag Hasukkos," Shmini Atzeres will not be included in his vow.

Proof is brought from here to one who mistakenly said "Chag Hasukkos" in Shemoneh Esrei instead of "Shmini Atzeres"; he has not fulfilled his obligation and must recite Shemoneh Esrei again.

The Turei Even (Megillah 5a) disagrees and he states that one who mistakenly said "Chag Hasukkos" in Shemoneh Esrei instead of "Shmini Atzeres" would not be required to repeat Shemoneh Esrei. His proof is from our Gemora which states that Shmini Atzeres is considered part of the compensation period for the korbanos of the first day of Sukkos. Furthermore, one who vows to bring a korban has three festivals to bring it before he will have transgressed the prohibition against delaying. If the third festival is Sukkos, he will not violate this prohibition until after Shmini Atzeres.

The Nishmas Adam rules that even though Shmini Atzeres is an independent festival, it is nevertheless related to Sukkos by the fact that one still eats in the sukkah and therefore one who mistakenly said "Chag Hasukkos" in Shemoneh Esrei instead of "Shmini Atzeres" would not be required to repeat Shemoneh Esrei.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 17 - RABBINIC MITZVAH OF SEFIRAS HAOMER

Tosfos states that after the counting of the omer, one should say the following tefillah: Is should be the will of Hashem that the Beis Hamikdosh should be rebuilt. This is recited because the mitzvah nowadays is rabbinic and serves to commemorate the biblical mitzvah in the times when the Beis Hamikdosh was in existence.

Tosfos asks: What is the difference between the mitzva of sefiras haomer and the mitzvos of sounding the shofar and taking a lulav which is also only rabbinic nowadays and this additional tefillah is not recited?

He answers: The mitzvah of sefiras haomer is merely a reminder of the Beis Hamikdosh and the other mitzvos involve an action. The distinction is extremely ambiguous and the commentators struggle to explain the difference.

The Gemora in Menochos (66a) says: Ameimar would count days and not weeks. He said: The mitzvah of counting the omer is only to commemorate the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Brisker Rov explains: The rabbinic mitzvah of sefiras haomer is different that other rabbinic mitzvos. A regular rabbinic mitzvah, such as eating marror on Pesach, is the identical mitzvah nowadays as was in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh. The only difference is that then it was biblical and now it is only rabbinic. Sefiras haomer is different. The purpose of the mitzvah mitzva of counting the omer nowadays was not for the counting, but rather it was established to commemorate the Beis Hamikdosh. The mitzvah nowadays is not the same mitzvah as it was then. This is why Ameimar maintains that in the times of the Beis Hamikdosh, they counted days and weeks and nowadays, we only count the days.

According to this, he explains the Ba’al Hamaor at the end of Pesachim. The Ba’al Hamaor says that we do not recite a shehechiyonu on sefiras haomer like we do by other mitzvos because it is only a mitzvah of remembering the Beis Hamikdosh. Shehechiyonu is recited at a time of joy and it would not be appropriate to recite it when we are recalling the tragedy of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh and the present exile. By other rabbinical mitzvos, a shehechiyonu is recited because the purpose of the mitzvah was for the sake of the mitzvah and not to remind us of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

This is the explanation of Tosfos. The special tefillah of requesting the building of the Beis Hamikdosh is exclusively reserved for the mitzvah of sefiras haomer, which was only instituted to commemorate the Beis Hamikdosh.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 16 - Food For Thought

*** The Gemora states that the demons can hear what is being announced from behind the Partition in the same manner as the ministering angels.

The question is asked: If they can hear from behind the Partition, what is the purpose of the Partition?

*** Why was the Satmar Rebbe extremely particular that the beds should be placed next to a wall and not in the middle of the bedroom, even the beds that children sleep on?

*** The Gemora states: If a person feels that his evil inclination is overpowering him, he should travel to a place where he will not be recognized, dress in black and there he could do whatever his heart desires; this way, he will not be desecrating Hashem’s name.

How should this Gemora be understood?

*** The Gemora states: The stones located in a person’s house will testify against him if he sins; the beams of his house will testify against him. The Chachamim say: His soul will testify against him. Rabbi Zreika said: The two ministering angels that accompany a person will testify against him. Others say: A person’s limbs will testify against him.

Are all these opinions arguing with each other? What is the significance of all these testimonies?

Read more!