Seudas Mitzvah

Seudas Mitzvah

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 80) tells Rav and Shmuel and Rav Assi once met at a circumcision of a boy, or as some say, at the house for the salvation of a son (the redeeming of a firstborn). Rav would not enter before Shmuel, nor Shmuel before Rav Assi (for Rav Assi was greater), nor Rav Assi before Rav (for Rav Assi was Rav’s student). They therefore discussed who should go in last, and they decided that Shmuel should go in last, and that Rav should enter and then Rav Assi.

Rashi comments that the “week of the son” refers to a bris milah, whereas the “salvation of the son” refers to a party that was done for the pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn).

The Maharsha points out that from Rashi we find a source for making a party for pidyon haben, but it is not a source for making a party for a bris milah.

The Maharsha seems to understand that the requirement to make a party for pidyon haben is better sourced than the requirement to make one for bris milah. However, the Maharshal (Yam Shel Shlomo 37), in his famous discussion about seudas mitzvah asks a question from the Gemora in Chulin 95b which states that Rav did not partake in any “voluntary” feast!? Why then was Rav participating in this seudah? The Maharshal explains that by milah, the feast itself is a mitzvah just like it is by a wedding, however, there is no mitzvah to have a party by pidyon haben. The Maharshal clearly understands that whether it was milah or pidyon haben, Rav was joining and eating at the party. He assumes that the requirement to have a seudah for milah is more basic than having one at pidyon haben. Since the seudah of pidyon haben is only voluntary, how could Rav join and eat? [Evidently he holds that it is not a mitzvah at all by pidyon haben!?]

From this, the Maharshal is mechadesh a major yesod that any seudah whose purpose is to give praise to Hashem and either publicize a mitzvah (such as pidyon haben) or a miracle (such as the birth of a child which is Rabbeinu Tam's explanation of “salvation of a son” i.e.a shalom zachor) qualifies as a seudas mitzvah.

The source for a siyum on a masechta of Gemora qualifying as a seudas mitzvah, the Maharshal says, is from a Gemora in Shabbos 118b that Abaye would make a party when he would see a torah scholar finish a masechta (the Maharshal then launches into a suggestion to make the bracha of “hasimchah bi’me’ono” at a siyum, which he retracted from after he felt that it was the reason that a siyum he once attended was totally ruined). At the end of the perek, the Maharshal continues to show from this Gemora in Shabbos that even those who aren't actually finishing the masechta should celebrate with the one completing the masechta, just as we find that Abaye would make the seudah for his students even when he didn't actually learn it with them.

The Maharshal also points out that the Gemora in Ta'anis 30b cites that one of the reasons for establishing a Yom Tov on the fifteenth of Av was because it was the day that they completed the mitzvah of cutting the wood for the mizbei’ach. Just as there is a point to make a seudah and Yom Tov upon the completion of a mitzvah, so too, there would be with the completion of a masechta, because there is no greater mitzvah than completing a sefer. As surprising as it may seem, the seudah at the siyum masechta seems to be better sourced as a seudas mitzvah, more than bris milah (which the Maharsha questions) and pidyon haben (which the Maharshal initially questioned).

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Accepting less than a Perutah - Kiddushin 46

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The Mishna had stated: If she was eating them one by one (as soon as one was given to her, she ate it), she is not mekudeshes unless one of the dates was valued at a perutah.

The Gemora asks: On which case of the Mishna is this ruling referring to?

Rav and Shmuel both answer: It is referring to the first case of the Mishna, and it is written in a “it was not necessary to state” format. Certainly, if she leaves the dates as is, the halachah is as follows: If one of them is valued at a perutah, the kiddushin is valid; otherwise, it is not. However, if she eats them one by one, perhaps she will be mekudeshes even if there is not one of them which is valued at a perutah. This would be because she derives the benefit from them immediately, and perhaps she decides to give herself to him even though it is less than a perutah. The Mishna teaches us that this is not so.

Tosfos Yeshanim writes that although the halachah is clear that kiddushin cannot take effect with an object valued at less than a perutah even if the woman consents to it; nevertheless, it is sufficient enough of a reason to explain why it was necessary for the Mishna to state such a case.

Poras Yosef explains based on a Gemora above (8a), which states: Rav Kahana indeed used to accept a (special male) head covering for the firstborn redemption, and he would say, “For me this is worth five sela’im.” The Ra”n there was uncertain if that logic could work for something that is not worth a perutah, and the person says, “To me, it is worth a perutah.” He specifically mentions kiddushin as a practical application for this. The reason to distinguish between the two is that perhaps something that is not “money” (if it less than a perutah), cannot be made into “money” by the fact that someone accepts it to be worth more than it actually is. Accordingly, it can be said that this is the novelty that our Mishna is teaching us. Although the woman accepts the date to be worth more than a perutah to her, the kiddushin is not valid, for the date (being valued at less than a perutah) is not regarded as “money” at all.

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Rav Kahana Ha'Kohen

Rav Yosef states (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 8a): How do I know this (that an equivalent of money used for kiddushin must have a defined monetary value)? The braisa states: If someone says, “This calf or garment is for the redemption of my firstborn son,” he has not said (or done) anything (even if he gives it to the Kohen). If he says, “This calf or garment that is worth five sela’im is to the Kohen for the redemption of my firstborn son,” it is valid. What is the case? If they are not actually worth five sela’im, why should we think it is valid? It must be the first case is where it really is worth five sela’im, but was not appraised.

The Gemora answers: The (second) case is where it was not appraised, but the Kohen accepted it as if it was worth five sela’im. Rav Kahana indeed used to accept a (special male) head covering for the redemption, and he would say, “For me this is worth five sela’im.”

Rav Ashi says: This only applies to Rav Kahana, who was a great man and required a head covering. This would not apply to everyone. This is similar to the incident where Mar bar Rav Ashi bought a head covering from the mother of Rabbah in Kubi, and paid thirteen although it was worth ten. [One explanation is that important people pay more for things that they need than regular people (others give a different explanation, see Chidushei Ha’Rashba).]

Tosfos deduces from our Gemora that Rav Kahana was a Kohen.

However, he asks that it is evident from a Gemora in Pesachim (49a) that he was not a Kohen (rather, his wife was a Kohenes)!?

Tosfos answers that the Rav Kahana mentioned in our Gemora was evidently not the same one mentioned in the Gemora Pesachim. Alternatively, Rav Kahana took the redemption money for the firstborn on behalf of his wife.

Reb Akiva Eiger notes that the father has discharged his obligation by giving the money to Rav Kahana, for his wife is certainly pleased that he accepted the money for her.

It is noteworthy that other Rishonim disagree with Tosfos and maintain that the redemption money for a firstborn must be given only to a male Kohen, and not to a Kohenes!

The Mishneh La’Melech writes that it would seem from Tosfos that he is uncertain regarding this matter, and that is why he offers two answers.

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