CIRCUMCISION QUESTIONS - Yevamos 71 - Daf Yomi

*** The Gemora states: The words in the verse teach us that a circumcised Arab and a circumcised Gibeonite are included in the prohibition against eating from the Pesach offering.

The Gemora asks: But aren’t these people considered circumcised? We learned in a Mishna: If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from areilim (uncircumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from uncircumcised Jews, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from a circumcised idolater. If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from mulim (circumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from circumcised idolaters, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from an uncircumcised Jew. (It is evident that a circumcised idolater is regarded as uncircumcised.)

What is the comparison between the two cases? Perhaps it can be said that regarding vows, the halacha is that we interpret his words based on the vernacular, and an idolater is described as being uncircumcised even though they in fact are circumcised.

*** Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a convert who circumcised, but did not immerse himself yet in a mikvah is considered a full-fledged Jew; and he maintains that a child who born circumcised does not need covenantal blood to flow from him.

The Rama rules that if one circumcises a child at night, he is required to cause covenantal blood to flow from him. He also rules that if one circumcises a child before he is eight days old, he is not required to cause covenantal blood to flow from him.

What is the difference between the two cases?

*** Rava explained the braisa (the father was not considered negligent for not circumcising his son at the time of the slaughtering of the korban Pesach, but he is negligent for not circumcising him at the time of the eating) to be referring to a case where the father and mother of the child were released from prison after their korban was slaughtered. (An agent slaughtered the korban for them, but the circumcision of their child is incumbent on them to perform.)

Rashi explains that the mitzvah of circumcision rests on the father and the mother.

Doesn’t the Gemora in Kiddushin state that a woman is exempt from circumcising her son based on a verse in the Torah?

Why can’t the father appoint an agent to circumcise his son for him?

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 71 - Highlights

The Gemora asks: It is written [Shmos 12:43]: And any strange man shall not eat of it. What do we derive from the words “of it”?

The Gemora answers: It teaches us that apostasy is disqualified from the Pesach offering, but he is not disqualified from eating ma’aser sheini (a tenth of one’s produce that he brings to Yerushalayim and eats there in the first, second, fourth and fifth years of the Shemitah cycle). (70b – 71a)

The Gemora asks: It is written [Shmos 12:48]: No uncircumcised male shall eat of it. What do we derive from the words “of it”?

The Gemora answers: It teaches us that an uncircumcised man cannot partake in the Pesach offering, but he eats matzah and marror. (71a)

The Torah wrote that an uncircumcised man, and an apostate may not eat from the korban Pesach. The Gemora states that both verses are necessary. If the Torah would only have written the law regarding an uncircumcised man, I would have thought that he is disqualified because he is repulsive, however, an apostate, who is not repulsive, I would think that he is not disqualified. If the Torah would only have written the law regarding an apostate, I would have thought that he is disqualified because his heart is not devoted to Heaven, however, an uncircumcised man, who is devoted to Heaven, I would think that he is not disqualified. It emerges that both verses are necessary. (71a)

The Gemora cites a braisa mentioned above: Rabbi Akiva stated: This deduction is unnecessary. Since it was stated [Vayikra 22:4]: A man, a man from the offspring of Aaron who is a metzora, or a zav shall not eat of the holies. The extra words, “A man, a man” teaches us that the uncircumcised also is included in the prohibition against eating terumah.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps the extra word teaches us that an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet) is included in this prohibition?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina stated: And any strange man implies that the Torah has imposed a prohibition concerning a non-Kohen from eating terumah, but not concerning an onein.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps we can say that the verse “And any strange man” implies that the Torah has imposed a prohibition concerning a non-Kohen from eating terumah, but not concerning an uncircumcised man?

The Gemora answers: The extra words, “A man, a man” teaches us that the uncircumcised also is included in the prohibition against eating terumah.

The Gemora asks: What did you see that compelled you to expound the verses in that manner? Perhaps it should be exactly the opposite? (Let us learn as follows: “A man, a man” prohibits an onein from eating terumah, but not concerning an uncircumcised Kohen; and “And any strange man” will teach us that an uncircumcised man may eat terumah?)

The Gemora answers: It is logical that we should include an uncircumcised Kohen in the prohibition of eating terumah because the following stringencies are applicable to him: He is missing a positive action to make him fit; an action must be performed on his body to make him fit; if he remains uncircumcised, he is subject to the penalty of kares; circumcision is a mitzvah that was given prior to the Giving of the Torah; the lack of circumcision by his male sons and servants prevents him from bringing the Pesach offering.

The Gemora asks: On the contrary. It is logical that we should include an onein in the prohibition of eating terumah because the following stringencies are applicable to him: It is a prohibition that is applicable at all times (in contrast to circumcision, where after he is circumcised, the prohibition is not applicable any longer); it applies to men and women; he is not able to remedy the situation himself.

The Gemora answers: The stringencies pertaining to an uncircumcised Kohen are more numerous than those relevant to an onein; therefore, we include an uncircumcised Kohen in the prohibition of eating terumah, and an onein is permitted to eat terumah. (71a)

The Gemora asks: What does Rabbi Akiva expound from the words “toshav v’sachir”?

Rav Shemaya answered: The words in the verse teach us that a circumcised Arab and a circumcised Gibeonite are included in the prohibition of eating from the Pesach offering.

The Gemora asks: But aren’t these people considered circumcised? We learned in a Mishna: If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from areilim (uncircumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from uncircumcised Jews, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from a circumcised idolater (regarding vows, the halacha is that we interpret his words based on the vernacular). If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from mulim (circumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from circumcised idolaters, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from an uncircumcised Jew. (It is evident that a circumcised idolater is regarded as uncircumcised.)

Rather, the Gemora answers that the words “toshav v’sachir” are including a case where a convert was circumcised (and he is regarded as a circumcised person because it was performed for the purpose of becoming a Jew), but did not immerse himself yet in a mikvah, and it is also referring to a case where a child was born circumcised; for Rabbi Akiva maintains that one must cause covenantal blood to flow from him. (The Torah is forbidding them from partaking in the Pesach offering.)

Rabbi Eliezer disagrees on both counts. He holds that a convert who circumcised, but did not immerse himself yet in a mikvah is considered a full-fledged Jew; and he maintains that a child who born circumcised does not need covenantal blood to flow from him. (71a)

Rav Chama bar Ukva inquired: (There exists a prohibition for an uncircumcised Kohen to anoint himself with terumah oil.) Are we permitted to anoint an uncircumcised infant (prior to eight days old) with terumah oil?

The Gemora explains the inquiry: Does being uncircumcised before its time (the mitzvah of milah does not take effect until the eighth day) prevent him from benefiting from terumah, or does it not prevent him from benefiting from terumah?

Rabbi Zeira brings a proof from the following braisa: The Torah states explicitly that the non-circumcision of one’s children at the time of the slaughtering prevents him from offering the korban Pesach; and the Torah states explicitly that the non-circumcision of one’s slaves at the time of the eating prevents him from eating the korban Pesach. How do we derive the laws stated by this one to that one, and the laws stated by that one to this one? The word “then” was specifically stated in both categories so that an analogy between the two might be drawn.

Rabbi Zeira analyzes the braisa: We can find a case where the uncircumcised slaves were in his possession at the time of the eating of the korban Pesach, but they were not in his possession at the time of its slaughtering; if he bought the slaves after the slaughtering, but prior to the eating. However, how is it possible to have a case where his uncircumcised sons were present during the eating of the korban Pesach, but they were not present during the slaughtering? It must be referring to a case where the son was born in between the slaughtering and the eating (and the braisa rules that this will prevent him from eating the korban Pesach; this is indeed a proof that an uncircumcised child before its time is regarded as uncircumcised, and it should be forbidden to anoint him with terumah oil).

Rava disagrees: It is written [Shmos 12:48]: Let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near to perform it. If the father is obligated to circumcise his son; refraining from doing so, will prevent him from offering the korban Pesach. The father has no obligation to circumcise his newborn infant, and his lack of doing so will not prevent him from offering the korban Pesach.

Rather, the explanation of the braisa is as follows: The child had fever at the time of the slaughtering, but disappeared at the time of the eating. (The father’s failure to circumcise him will prevent him from eating the korban Pesach.)

The Gemora asks on this interpretation: Why do we fault the father in this situation? The halacha is that after a child recovers from his illness, we do not circumcise him until seven days after his recovery. The child could not have been circumcised at the time of the eating.

The Gemora answers: The braisa is referring to a case where the seven days of recovery were completed on the fourteenth of Nissan (the day of the slaughtering).

The Gemora asks: How can that be the case? The father should have been required to circumcise him in the morning, even prior to the slaughtering?

The Gemora answers: The halacha is that we are required to wait seven complete days before circumcising the child (the seven twenty-four-hour periods were not completed at the time of the slaughtering).

This halacha is in contrast to the halacha of a regular child. The mitzvah of performing a circumcision on the eighth day does not mandate that it should be seven twenty-four-hour periods since he was born; the circumcision can be performed on the morning of the eighth day. (71a – 71b)

The Gemora presents another four explanations of the braisa: Rav Pappa said: The braisa is referring to a case where the child’s eyes were hurting him in the morning of the fourteenth, and later in the afternoon (after the slaughtering), he recovered. (The seven day waiting period is only necessary when recovering from a fever or an illness which affects the entire body.)

Rava said: The braisa is referring to a case where the father and mother of the child were released from prison after their korban was slaughtered. (An agent slaughtered the korban for them, but the circumcision of their child is incumbent on them to perform.)

Rav Kahana the son of Rav Nechemia said: The braisa is referring to a case where the child was a tumtum (undetermined sex) whose genital covering was ripped open after the korban Pesach was slaughtered, and he was found to be a male.

Rav Sheravya said: The braisa is referring to a case where the child stuck his head out of his mother’s womb (on the seventh of Nissan), but did not completely emerge until the fourteenth, after the Pesach was slaughtered. (The child is regarded as born as soon as the majority of his head emerges. It was physically impossible to circumcise him until his entire body emerged.)

The Gemora asks: Can a child in such a situation actually live? But it was taught in a braisa: As soon as the child emerges into the air of the world the closed organ (the mouth) is opened and the opened (the navel) is closed, for otherwise he could not survive even for one moment. (In the embryonic state the mouth is closed and the navel, by means of which it draws sustenance, open.)

The Gemora answers: The braisa is referring to a case where a fever sustained the child.

The Gemora asks: If the child had a fever, we should be required to wait another seven days?

The Gemora answers: The mother’s fever sustained him.

Alternatively, you can say that a child cannot survive in such a situation when he doesn’t cry out, but if he cries out, the child can survive (his crying generates heat and the heat sustains him, similar to the heat from the fever). (71b)

Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Benaah: An uncircumcised man is eligible to receive sprinkling (from the water of purification if he was tamei from corpse tumah; he is, thereby, enabled to eat terumah immediately after the circumcision, no other sprinkling being required); for so we find that our forefathers received sprinkling while they were still uncircumcised, as it is said [Yehoshua 4:19]: And the people came up out of the Jordan on the tenth day of the first month. The Gemora explains: On the tenth they were not circumcised owing to the fatigue of the journey (this would have threatened their lives; it is evident that they were circumcised on the eleventh); when, then, could the sprinkling have been performed (to purify them from the corpse tumah from the Wilderness)? Obviously, they were sprinkled while they were still uncircumcised (since they need to be sprinkled on the third and seventh days of the seven clean days, and only then could they partake in the korban Pesach).

The Gemora asks: Perhaps they did not offer a korban Pesach that year?

The Gemora answers: This suggestion cannot be entertained at all, since it is written [Yehoshua 5:10]: And they kept the Pesach.

Mar Zutra asked: It is possible that it was a Pesach offering that was offered in tumah?

Rav Ashi replied: It was explicitly taught in a braisa: They circumcised themselves, they immersed in a mikvah, and they offered the korban Pesach in a state of purity. (71b)

[END]

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IS THE TORAH WRITTEN FOR IDOLATERS? - Yevamos 70 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora concludes that the words “toshav v’sachir” mentioned in respect to the Pesach offering are extra. What does “toshav v’sachir” mean when it is written here? It cannot be referring to the two types of Jewish servants (a Jewish servant who is acquired for an acquisition of years, and a Jewish servant who is acquired as an everlasting acquisition) because for what reason should they be exempt from eating the Pesach offering? We have previously established that they cannot eat terumah because their master, the Kohen, has not acquired them as a “monetary acquisition.” They are obviously included in the obligation of bringing and eating a Pesach offering.

It is evident that the words are extra for the purpose of teaching us the gezeirah shavah (to teach us that n uncircumcised person is forbidden to eat terumah), and it cannot be refuted.

Tosfos asks: How can the Torah make a false statement (a toshev and sachir may not eat the Korban Pesach) just for the purpose of teaching a gezeirah shavah?

Tosfos answers: The Torah is referring to non-Jewish workers. Although it is unnecessary (because there is another verse excluding non-Jews from the korban Pesach), at least it is halachically correct. Tosfos concludes that there actually is a Mechilta that expounds the verse in this manner.

The Rambam in Hilchos Korban Pesach (9:7) rules: One is prohibited to give an idolater to eat from the Pesach offering. One who does provide the idolater with meat from the Pesach has violated a negative precept in the Torah.

The Kesef Mishna asks: The Torah does not forbid a Jew from giving the idolater from the Pesach offering; the Torah states: A toshav and a sachir may not eat of it.

He answers: It is obvious that the Torah is not referring to the idolater himself because an idolater is not concerned for that which is written in the Torah. We are compelled to understand the verse to be referring to the Jew. He is forbidden from giving meat from the Pesach to an idolater. Tosfos HaRosh comments similarly on our Gemora.

Rabbi Chaim Braun cites a dissenting opinion: The Yereim in mitzvah 410 states: The Holy One, blessed is He commanded an idolater against partaking in the Pesach offering that his master has slaughtered.

Minchas Chinuch in mitzvah 14 asks on the Rambam from the Gemora Pesachim (3b) which states the following: A gentile would always go up to Jerusalem and eat the Pesach offering. The gentile once told Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira that although it is written in the Torah that strangers or an uncircumcised male cannot eat from the Pesach offering, he had eaten from the best meat of the Pesach offering. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira told the gentile to ask for the fat tail of the animal. When the gentile asked for the fat tail, he was told that the fat tail is burned on the mizbeach and was not eaten. When the gentile informed them that Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira had instructed him to make this request, they investigated and discovered that he was a gentile and they had him killed. They sent the following message to Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira: “Peace upon you, Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira, for you are in Netzivin but your net is spread in Jerusalem.” The Minchas Chinuch asks: Why did they kill him; the prohibition is not written for the gentile; it is written for the Jew. What did the gentile do wrong that he was deserving to be killed?

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Daf Yomi- Yevamos 70 - Highlights

The Mishna states: One who is uncircumcised and all those that are tamei (ritually impure) may not eat terumah. Their wives and their slaves may eat terumah. One who has wounded or crushed testicles and one whose member is severed, they and their slaves are permitted to eat terumah. Their wives, however, are not permitted to eat terumah. If they did not have relations with their wife after becoming one with wounded or crushed testicles or one whose member is severed, their wives are permitted to eat terumah.

What is a petzuah dakah? Any man whose testicles were wounded, and even if only one of them was wounded. What is a kerus shafchah? Any man whose member was cut off; however, if a hairsbreadth of the corona remained, he is permitted to marry into the congregation. (70a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Eliezer said: How do we know that an uncircumcised Kohen may not eat terumah? The words “toshav v’sachir” are mentioned in connection with the Pesach offering, and the words “toshav v’sachir” are mentioned in respect to terumah. Just as the “toshav v’sachir,” in connection with the Pesach offering, an uncircumcised person is forbidden to partake in it, so too, in respect to the “toshav v’sachir” mentioned by terumah, an uncircumcised person is forbidden to eat it. Rabbi Akiva stated: This deduction is unnecessary. Since it was stated [Vayikra 22:4]: A man, a man from the offspring of Aaron who is a metzora, or a zav shall not eat of the holies. The extra words, “A man, a man” teaches us that the uncircumcised also is included. (70a)

The Gemora cites the first opinion mentioned in the braisa. Rabbi Eliezer said: The words “toshav v’sachir” are mentioned in connection with the Pesach offering, and the words “toshav v’sachir” are mentioned in respect to terumah. Just as the “toshav v’sachir,” in connection with the Pesach offering, an uncircumcised person is forbidden to partake in it, so too, in respect to the “toshav v’sachir” mentioned by terumah, an uncircumcised person is forbidden to eat it.

The Gemora states: This gezeirah shavah (one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics; it links two similar words from dissimilar verses in the Torah) must consist of free words (the words in the Torah are extra), for if they would not be free, we could ask on this gezeirah shavah as follows: How can we compare the Pesach offering to terumah? The Pesach offering has stringencies that one will be liable for eating piggul (literally translated as rejected; an offering that is rendered invalid because of an improper intent), nossar (part of a sacrifice that is left over after the time to eat it has passed), and tamei (whereas terumah does not have any of these stringencies). (Since the words are extra, the rule is that we cannot refute the gezeirah shavah by asking questions on the comparison.)

The Gemora states: The words indeed are extra.

The Gemora asks: Which words are extra? It cannot be the “toshav v’sachir” mentioned in respect to terumah because these are surely necessary for a teaching that we learned in the following braisa: “Toshav” is referring to a Jewish servant who is acquired as an everlasting acquisition, and “sachir” is referring to a Jewish servant who is acquired for an acquisition of (six) years. The Torah teaches us that both of these servants cannot eat terumah.

The braisa continues by asking the following question: Let the Torah write “toshav,” and not “sachir,” and I would say: If a Jewish servant who is acquired as an everlasting acquisition cannot eat terumah, certainly a Jewish servant who is acquired for an acquisition of years may not eat terumah?

The braisa answers: If that were the case, I would have said that “toshav” is a Jewish servant who is acquired for an acquisition of years, and he may not eat terumah, but a servant who is acquired as an everlasting acquisition may eat terumah. The Torah writes “sachir” to teach us that “toshav” is a servant who is acquired as an everlasting acquisition, and nevertheless, he cannot eat terumah.

The Gemora concludes that the “toshav v’sachir” mentioned in respect to the Pesach offering are extra. What does “toshav v’sachir” mean when it is written here? It cannot be referring to the two types of Jewish servants because for what reason should they be exempt from eating the Pesach offering? We have previously established that they cannot eat terumah because their master, the Kohen, has not acquired them as a “monetary acquisition.” They are obviously included in the obligation of bringing and eating a Pesach offering.

It is evident that the words are extra for the purpose of teaching us the gezeirah shavah, and it cannot be refuted. (70a – 70b)

The Gemora asks: Once we have the gezeirah shavah between terumah and Pesach, let us learn the following halacha: Just as an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet) is prohibited from participating in the Pesach offering, so too, in respect to terumah, he should be prohibited to eat it?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina stated: And any strange man implies that the Torah has imposed a prohibition concerning a non-Kohen from eating terumah, but not concerning an onein.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps we should derive from that verse that the Torah has imposed a prohibition concerning a non-Kohen from eating terumah, but not concerning an uncircumcised Kohen?

The Gemora answers: The words “toshav v’sachir” teaches us that an uncircumcised Kohen may not eat terumah.

The Gemora asks: What did you see that compelled you to expound the gezeirah shavah in that manner? Perhaps it should be exactly the opposite? (Let us learn as follows: And any strange man should imply that the Torah has imposed a prohibition concerning a non-Kohen from eating terumah, but not concerning an uncircumcised Kohen; and “toshav v’sachir” will teach us that an onein may not eat terumah?)

The Gemora answers: It is logical that we should include an uncircumcised Kohen in the prohibition of eating terumah because the following stringencies are applicable to him: He is missing a positive action to make him fit; an action must be performed on his body to make him fit; if he remains uncircumcised, he is subject to the penalty of kares; circumcision is a mitzvah that was given prior to the Giving of the Torah; the lack of circumcision by his male sons and servants prevents him from bringing the Pesach offering.

The Gemora asks: On the contrary. It is logical that we should include an onein in the prohibition of eating terumah because the following stringencies are applicable to him: It is a prohibition that is applicable at all times (in contrast to circumcision, where after he is circumcised, the prohibition is not applicable any longer); it applies to men and women; he is not able to remedy the situation himself.

The Gemora answers: The stringencies pertaining to an uncircumcised Kohen are more numerous than those relevant to an onein; therefore, we include an uncircumcised Kohen in the prohibition of eating terumah, and an onein is permitted to eat terumah. (70b)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source which teaches us that an uncircumcised Kohen may not eat terumah, but a Kohen may eat terumah even though his sons or servants remain uncircumcised. (70b)

[END]

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HAPPY ANNIVERSARY

Mazel Tov to Daf Notes on our first year anniversary. We would like to thank all the contributors for their superb efforts in keeping up with the Daf and for all the comments. Our gratitude is also extended to all those throughout the world who have disseminated the Daf Notes and made others aware of this unprecedented tool to studying the Daf in depth. Yasher koach, and HaShem should give us the strength to continue being marbitz Torah, lihagdil Torah ulehadirah.



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INVERTING HERSELF AFTER RELATIONS WITH HER DERANGED HUSBAND - Yevamos 69 - Daf Yomi

Rabbah bar Rav Huna states: We are only concerned for pregnancy in cases of cohabitation during marriage; however, in cases that involve promiscuity, we are not concerned for pregnancy (because women who engage in illicit relations invert themselves after cohabitation in order to avoid becoming pregnant).

Tosfos writes: A Kohen’s daughter who is married to a deranged man is permitted to eat terumah. Although she assumes that her marriage is valid, she is concerned that she will not be able to tolerate him, and eventually will leave him. She therefore inverts herself after relations with her husband in order that she will not conceive and bear his children.

The Noda B’Yehudah (II Y”D:202) brings a question from Reb Zaruch Eidelwitz from Prague: The Tur (Y”D 331) rules that a Kohen’s daughter who is married to a deranged man is disqualified from eating terumah. How can that be if the kiddushin does not take effect even Rabbnically?

The Noda B’Yehudah’s son answers: The Tur disagrees with Tosfos, and maintains that a woman who is married to a deranged man is under the impression that her marriage is valid, and therefore she does not invert herself after relations. The Tur rules that she is disqualified from eating terumah because we are concerned that she might be pregnant.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 69 - Highlights

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source which teaches us that a man who is forbidden to her by a negative precept will disqualify her from eating terumah, if he cohabits with her (we might have thought that she would become disqualified only by cohabiting with those men that are forbidden to her under penalty of kares). (68b)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source which teaches us that an idolater or a slave that cohabits with a woman has disqualified her from eating terumah (we might have thought that she would become disqualified only by cohabiting with those men that can be legally married to her). (68b – 69a)

The Gemora asks that according to Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that kiddushin does not take effect on women who are forbidden to him by a negative precept, the verse “And if a Kohen’s daughter should become a widow or divorcee” is seemingly superfluous.

The Gemora states the verse is necessary even according to Rabbi Akiva. If the Torah would only have written the laws regarding a widow, we might have thought that a widow is permitted to eat terumah when she had no children from her husband because she is still qualified to marry a Kohen; however, a divorcee, who is disqualified from marrying a Kohen may not eat terumah even if she didn’t have children from him. If the Torah would only have written the laws regarding a divorcee, we might have thought that only a divorcee, who had children from her husband may not eat terumah because she is disqualified from marrying a Kohen; however, a widow, who is qualified to marry a Kohen may eat terumah even if she did have children from him. (The Torah wrote both a widow and a divorcee to teach us that they may eat terumah if they didn’t have children, and they cannot eat terumah if they did have children.) (69a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source which teaches us that one who remarries his divorcee after she had been married to someone else will not disqualify her from eating terumah. (69a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source which teaches us that a chalal (the offspring of an illegitimate marriage specific to a Kohen’s forbidden marriages) who cohabits with a woman has disqualified her from eating terumah. (69a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source which teaches us that the woman becomes disqualified from eating terumah by cohabiting with an unfit man, and not by being betrothed to him. It also teaches us that she will become disqualified with cohabitation alone, even without a betrothal first. (69a)

The Gemora cites the braisa mentioned above: A boy who is nine years and one day old, who is an Amonite, Moabite, Egyptian, or Edomite convert (who are not permitted to marry into the congregation), or is a Cuthean, Nasin, chalal, or mamzer, who cohabited with a Koheness, Leviah, or an Israelite woman has disqualified her from the Kehunah.

Rabbi Yosi states: Any man, whose children are disqualified, will disqualify a woman with whom he cohabits from the Kehunah. Any man, whose children are not disqualified, will not disqualify a woman with whom he cohabits from the Kehunah.

The Gemora asks: What is the difference between the two opinions?

The Gemora answers: The difference between them would be in a case where a second-generation Egyptian or a second-generation Edomite cohabited with a woman. (According to the Chachamim, she would be disqualified, whereas according to Rabbi Yosi, she will not be disqualified because his son would be a third-generation convert, who is permitted to marry into the congregation.) The Gemora cites the Scriptural sources for their respective opinions. (69a)

The Gemora cites the braisa mentioned above: Rabbi Yosi states: Any man, whose children are disqualified, will disqualify a woman with whom he cohabits from the Kehunah. Any man, whose children are not disqualified, will not disqualify a woman with whom he cohabits from the Kehunah.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Any man, whose daughter a Kohen is permitted to marry, he would be permitted to marry his widow. Any man, whose daughter a Kohen is not permitted to marry, he would not be permitted to marry his widow.

The Gemora asks: What is the difference between the two opinions?

Ula answers: The difference between them would be in a case regarding an Ammonite or Moabite convert cohabited with a woman. (According to Rabbi Yosi, she would be disqualified, just like their children would be disqualified, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, she will not be disqualified because the daughters of these converts are permitted to marry into the congregation.) The Gemora cites the Scriptural sources for their respective opinions. (69a)

The Mishna states: A violator, a seducer, and one who is deranged does not disqualify a woman from eating terumah, nor does he entitle her to eat terumah. If these men are unfit to enter the congregation of Israel, they will disqualify her from eating terumah.

What is the case? If a Yisroel cohabited illicitly with a Kohen’s daughter, he does not disqualify her, and she is still permitted to eat terumah. If she becomes pregnant because of him, she is disqualified from eating terumah. If the fetus was cut up in her womb, she may eat terumah.

If a Kohen cohabited illicitly with a Yisroel’s daughter, he does not entitle her to eat terumah. If she becomes pregnant because of him, she is still not entitled to eat terumah. If she gave birth, she may eat terumah. It emerges that the son’s strength is greater than the father’s strength.

The Mishna continues: A Canaanite slave, who cohabits with a woman, disqualifies her from eating terumah. He would not be regarded as her descendant to disqualify her from eating terumah.

What is the case? If a Yisroel’s daughter was married to a Kohen, or a Kohen’s daughter was married to a Yisroel, and she had a son. The son went and cohabited with a Canaanite slavewoman, and she had a son. This son is regarded as a slave. If his father’s mother is a Yisroel’s daughter who was married to a Kohen (and the Kohen and the son died), she cannot eat terumah (because she doesn’t have any offspring from the Kohen, and a slave is not regarded as her descendant). And if his father’s mother is a Kohen’s daughter who was married to a Yisroel (and the Yisroel and the son died), she can eat terumah (because she doesn’t have any offspring from the Yisroel, and a slave is not regarded as her descendant).

The Mishna continues: A mamzer will disqualify the Kohen’s daughter from eating terumah, and will entitle the Yisroel’s daughter to eat terumah.

What is the case? If a Yisroel’s daughter was married to a Kohen, or a Kohen’s daughter was married to a Yisroel, and she had a daughter. The daughter went and married a Canaanite slave or an idolater, and she had a son. This son is a mamzer. If his mother’s mother is a Yisroel’s daughter who was married to a Kohen (and the Kohen and the daughter died), she may eat terumah (because she has offspring from the Kohen). And if his mother’s mother is a Kohen’s daughter who was married to a Yisroel (and the Yisroel and the daughter died), she may eat terumah (because she has offspring from the Yisroel).

The Mishna concludes: A Kohen Gadol can disqualify his grandmother from eating terumah.

What is the case? If a Kohen’s daughter was married to a Yisroel, and she had a daughter. The daughter went and married a Kohen, and she had a son. This son is fit to be a Kohen Gadol, who may stand and serve on the mizbeach. He entitles his mother to eat terumah, but disqualifies his mother’s mother from eating terumah. The grandmother can say: “There shouldn’t be many like my son the Kohen Gadol, who disqualifies me from eating terumah. (69a – 69b)

The Mishna had stated: One who is deranged does not disqualify a woman from eating terumah, nor does he entitle her to eat terumah.

The Gemora cites a braisa that teaches a similar halacha. A deranged person, or a minor marry a woman, and they die childless, their wives are exempt from chalitzah and yibum (since it is not a valid marriage). (69b)

The Mishna had stated: If a Yisroel cohabited illicitly with a Kohen’s daughter, he does not disqualify her, and she is still permitted to eat terumah. If she becomes pregnant because of him, she is disqualified from eating terumah.

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t she be prohibited from eating terumah immediately? Let us be concerned as soon as she cohabited that she might be pregnant? Didn’t we learn in a Mishna above the following: (If two men betrothed two women, and if at the time when they entered the chuppah, they exchanged this one's wife for that one, and that one's wife for this one (and they cohabitated with each other’s wife), they are liable for cohabitating with another man's wife. The women go back to their rightful husbands.) They are required to separate from their husbands for three months, lest they be pregnant. We see that we are concerned for pregnancy.

Rabbah bar Rav Huna answers: We are concerned for pregnancy regarding genealogical matters, but not in regards to terumah.

The Gemora asks from the following braisa which indicates that we are concerned for occurrences happening in regards to terumah: If a Kohen says to his wife: “Here is your get on the condition that it should take effect one moment before my death.” She is forbidden from eating terumah immediately because we are concerned that he will die the next moment.

Rabbah bar Rav Huna offers a different answer: We are only concerned for pregnancy in cases of cohabitation during marriage; however, in cases that involve promiscuity, we are not concerned for pregnancy (because women who engage in illicit relations invert themselves after cohabitation in order to avoid becoming pregnant).

The Gemora asks: Are we concerned for pregnancy in cases of marriage? But we have learned in the following braisa: If a Kohen’s daughter was married to a Yisroel, and he dies, she immerses herself (in order to purify herself from the tumah from relations with her husband), and she will be permitted to eat terumah in the evening. (If there is a concern for pregnancy by marriage, she should not be allowed to eat terumah, for perhaps she is pregnant?)

Rav Chisda answers: She immerses and may eat terumah until forty days. If she is not pregnant, there is no concern; if she is pregnant, the initial forty days the fetus is considered water, and is not regarded as a child. (69b)


[END]

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CHAZAKAH HA’ASUYAH L’HISHTANOS - Yevamos 68 - Daf Yomi

Rava interprets the Mishna: The Mishna is referring to a case where a nine year old boy with a blemished lineage (a mamzer) cohabited with a woman; she is disqualified from eating terumah (and the latter part of the Mishna teaches us that she is disqualified even if there is uncertainty regarding his age), as is stated in the following braisa: A boy who is nine years and one day old, who is an Amonite, Moabite, Egyptian, or Edomite convert (who are not permitted to marry into the congregation), or is a Cuthean, Nasin, chalal, or mamzer, who cohabited with a Koheness, Leviah, or an Israelite woman has disqualified her from the Kehunah.

Tosfos asks: Why don’t we apply the principle of chazakah; any matter which is uncertain to us should be resolved by a presumption that the previous status continues to prevail until there is a clear indication that it has indeed changed? Let us say that since he was younger than nine previously, we will assume that he was still a minor at the time that he cohabited with her, and she should still be qualified to eat terumah?

Tosfos answers: We are referring to a case where the boy is presently older than nine years old, and therefore his present status of precludes the use of chazakah.

It is evident from Tosfos that if we still would be uncertain if he is older than nine years old, we would have relied on the chazakah that during cohabitation, he was younger than nine, and she would still be qualified to eat terumah.

This proves that Tosfos maintains that a chazakah which is likely to change still has the force of a regular chazakah until it has been established that this status changed.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 68 - Highlights

The Mishna states: The fetus, and the yavam, and the betrothal, and the deaf-mute, and a boy nine years and one day old, disqualifies others from eating terumah (if a Kohen’s daughter marries a Yisroel and he dies; if she is pregnant, the fetus disqualifies her from eating terumah from her father’s house; so too, falling for yibum would disqualify her; if she becomes betrothed to a Yisroel, he will disqualify her; if she marries a non-Kohen deaf-mute, he will disqualify her), but they do not entitle her to eat terumah (if a Yisroel’s daughter marries a Kohen and he dies, if she is pregnant, the fetus does not entitle her to eat terumah; so too, falling for yibum would not entitle her to eat terumah; if she becomes betrothed to a Kohen, she cannot eat terumah; if she marries a Kohen deaf-mute, he will not entitle her to eat terumah).

The same halacha would apply if there exists a doubt whether he is nine years and one day old, or not; if there exists a doubt whether he has produced two hairs, or not.

If a house fell on him and on his brother's daughter, and it is not known which one died first, her co-wife submits to chalitzah and is not married by yibum. (If the wife died first, the co-wife falls to yibum, since at the time of her husband’s death, he was not married to the ervah; therefore, chalitzah is necessary. If he died first, she would be released because she is the co-wife of an ervah.) (67b)

The Gemora explains each case of the Mishna, and cites the reason for the halacha. The first case of the Mishna was regarding a fetus: If a Kohen’s daughter marries a Yisroel and he dies; if she is pregnant, the fetus disqualifies her from eating terumah from her father’s house. If a Yisroel’s daughter marries a Kohen and he dies, if she is pregnant, the fetus does not entitle her to eat terumah. The Gemora cites Scriptural sources for both halachos. (67b)

The next case of the Mishna was regarding a yavam: If a Kohen’s daughter marries a Yisroel and he dies childless, falling for yibum would disqualify her from eating terumah. If a Yisroel’s daughter marries a Kohen and he dies childless, falling for yibum would not entitle her to eat terumah. The Gemora cites Scriptural sources for both halachos. (67b)

The next case of the Mishna was regarding a betrothal. If a Kohen’s daughter is betrothed to a Yisroel, he will disqualify her from eating terumah because he has acquired her. If a Yisroel’s daughter is betrothed to a Kohen, he would not entitle her to eat terumah because of Ula’s teaching. (Ula maintains that she is Rabbinically forbidden from eating terumah because we are concerned that she will bring the terumah to her father’s house, and feed it to her brothers and sisters.) (67b – 68a)

The next case of the Mishna was regarding a deaf-mute. If a Kohen’s daughter is married to a deaf-mute, he will disqualify her from eating terumah because he has Rabbinically acquired her. If a Yisroel’s daughter is married to a Kohen deaf-mute, he would not entitle her to eat terumah because she is not an acquisition of his money. (68a)

The next case of the Mishna was regarding a boy nine years and one day old. Abaye explains the case to be referring to a Kohen minor, who is over nine years and one day old, who performs a yibum and cohabits with her. Since he Biblically has acquired her, we might have thought that she would be entitled to eat terumah. The Mishna teaches us that she cannot because the Rabbis treated the minor’s cohabitation as if it was a ma’amar performed by an adult, and therefore it is only a Rabbinical acquisition; therefore, she may not eat terumah.

Rava asked: If that is the explanation of the first portion of the Mishna, what is the explanation for the latter part? The Mishna had stated: The same halacha would apply if there exists a doubt whether he is nine years and one day old, or not. Now, if he does not entitle her to eat terumah when he is definitely nine years of age, then he certainly would not entitle her to eat terumah when there is a doubt regarding his age. What is the necessity to teach this latter halacha?

Rava interprets the Mishna differently: The Mishna is referring to a case where a nine year old boy with a blemished lineage (a mamzer) cohabited with a woman; she is disqualified from eating terumah (and the latter part of the Mishna teaches us that she is disqualified even if there is uncertainty regarding his age), as is stated in the following braisa: A boy who is nine years and one day old, who is an Amonite, Moabite, Egyptian, or Edomite convert (who are not permitted to marry into the congregation), or is a Cuthean, Nasin, chalal, or mamzer, who cohabited with a Koheness, Leviah, or an Israelite woman has disqualified her from the Kehunah.

The Gemora asks: By the fact that the latter portion of our Mishna discusses cases where a man who is unfit to enter into the congregation cohabits with a woman, she is disqualified from the Kehunah; this would indicate that the earlier part of the Mishna is not referring to men who have a blemished lineage.

The Gemora answers: The first portion of the Mishna is referring to men who are unfit to enter the entire congregation; the latter portion of the Mishna is discussing men who are unfit for Kehunah. (68a)

The Gemora cites the braisa mentioned above: A boy who is nine years and one day old, who is an Amonite, Moabite, Egyptian, or Edomite convert (who are not permitted to marry into the congregation), or is a Cuthean, Nasin, chalal, or mamzer, who cohabited with a Koheness, Leviah, or an Israelite woman has disqualified her from the Kehunah.

Rabbi Yosi states: Any man, whose children are disqualified, will disqualify a woman with whom he cohabits from the Kehunah. Any man, whose children are not disqualified, will not disqualify a woman with whom he cohabits from the Kehunah.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Any man, whose daughter a Kohen is permitted to marry, he would be permitted to marry his widow. Any man, whose daughter a Kohen is not permitted to marry, he would not be permitted to marry his widow. (68a)

The Gemora asks: From where do we derive these halachos?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: It is written [Vayikra 22:12]: And if a Kohen's daughter should be married to a strange man, she may not eat of the separated holies. This teaches us that as soon as she has cohabited with an unfit person, the latter disqualifies her.

The Gemora asks: But the verse cited is surely required for another purpose? Didn’t we learn form this verse that the daughter of a Kohen who was married to a non-Kohen may not eat terumah?

The Gemora answers: That may be deduced from the next verse: And if a Kohen’s daughter should become a widow or divorcee…she shall return unto her father's house, as in her youth; she may eat of her father's bread. Since the Torah ordained, she shall return unto her father's house … she may eat, it follows that prior to that, she was not permitted to eat.

The Gemora asks: But if this halacha would be derived only from this verse, one might have assumed that as a negative precept which is derived from a positive commandment, it has only the force of a positive commandment. The Torah required the other verse to indicate that it is a negative precept.

The Gemora answers: That it is a negative precept may be deduced from an earlier verse, which states: And any strange man may not eat of the holy foods.

The Gemora asks: But that verse is required for its own purpose (to teach that a non-Kohen shall not eat terumah)?

The Gemora answers: The expression, And any strange man, is written twice. (One verse teaches us that a non-Kohen cannot eat terumah, and the other verse teaches us that a Kohen’s daughter cannot eat terumah if she marries a non-Kohen.)

The Gemora asks: But still, isn’t the second verse required for the exposition of Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina? For Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina stated: And any strange man implies that the Torah has imposed a prohibition concerning a non-Kohen from eating terumah, but not concerning an onein (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet).

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina 's exposition may be deduced from the Scriptural use of the longer expression “And any strange man” instead of “any strange man”.

The Gemora persists: But still, isn’t the verse (And if a Kohen's daughter should be married to a strange man, she may not eat of the separated holies) required for the halacha which was taught in the following braisa: When she returns, she returns only to the privilege of eating terumah, but does not return to the privilege of eating the breast and thigh (of the shelamim korbanos). And Rav Chisda stated in the name of Ravina bar Rav Shila: What Scriptural text proves this halacha? It is written: And if a Kohen's daughter should be married to a strange man, she may not eat of the separated holies. This teaches us that she may not eat the breast and thigh which is separated from the holies.

The Gemora answers: The Torah could have written “she may not eat of the holies;” why did the Torah write then the longer expression of “she may not eat of the separated holies”? Two deductions may consequently be made. (One is, that a Kohen’s daughter who cohabits with an unfit person, the latter disqualifies her; and the other is, a daughter of a Kohen who marries a non-Kohen may never eat the breast and thigh which is separated from the shelamim.)

We have now deduced the law pertaining to a Kohen’s daughter; how do we derive this halacha in respect of the daughter of a Levite or an Israelite?

The Gemora answers: As Rabbi Abba stated in the name of Rav: The Torah could have written “a Kohen's daughter;” why did the Torah write then the longer expression of “And if a Kohen's daughter”? It is to teach us that a daughter of a Levite or an Israelite can also become disqualified.

The Gemora asks: Is this only in accordance with the view of Rabbi Akiva who bases expositions on superfluous vavin (and)?

The Gemora answers: This exposition will even be according to the Sages because the entire word is superfluous.

The Gemora asks: It has proven that they are disqualified in respect to terumah; how do we derive that the disqualification extends also to the prohibition of marrying a Kohen?

The Gemora answers: Has not the daughter of a Levite or of an Israelite been included in respect of marrying a Kohen? For, regarding terumah, neither of them is ever eligible to eat it (since we are not discussing marriage).

The Gemora asks: Perhaps the exclusion would be relevant to cases where they would eat on account of their child who is a Kohen (if she has a child from a Kohen, she would be permitted to eat terumah even if she was not married to him)?

The Gemora answers: A verse would not be necessary to teach this halacha, for it can be derived by means of a kal vachomer. If a Koheness, who may eat terumah on account of her own sanctity, nevertheless becomes disqualified when she cohabits with an unfit man; the daughter of a Levite or an Israelite, who may only eat terumah on account of their children, certainly would be disqualified by cohabiting with an unfit man.

The Gemora asks: On the contrary; a Koheness who has her own sanctity can become disqualified, but the others, who are not sanctified will not become disqualified.

The Gemora retracts and derives the halacha (the disqualification extends also to the prohibition of marrying a Kohen) from a kal vachomer. If a divorcee, who is permitted to eat terumah (if she is a Kohen’s daughter), is forbidden to marry a Kohen; then this woman, who may not eat terumah, will certainly be disqualified from marrying a Kohen.

The Gemora asks: Can we derive a negative precept from a kal vachomer?

The Gemora answers: The kal vachomer reveals to us that one who is disqualified from eating terumah is disqualified from marring a Kohen. (68a – 68b)

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HOW MANY JEWS ARE NEEDED TO MAKE SOMETHING PUBLIC? - Yevamos 67 - Daf Yomi

Shmuel once said to Rav Chana Bagdasaah (from Baghdath, or an Aggada expert), “Go out and bring me ten people (so that the ruling should be publicized) in order for me to say to you before them that one who gives something to a fetus, the fetus has acquired it.”

It would seem form this Gemora that if something should be publicized, ten people are required.

This is also evident from the Gemora Sanhedrin (74b) which states that a person who is in public must be martyred even for a minor precept rather than violate it. Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The minimum for publicity is ten. This is derived from the verse [Vayikra 22:32]: And you shall not profane My holy name; but I will be holy among the children of Israel.

It is written [Bamidbar 16:21]: Separate yourselves from among this congregation, that I may consume them in a moment. An analogy is drawn from the use of congregation (edah) in two passages; one, just quoted, and the second, [ibid 14:27]: How long shall I bear with this evil congregation. ‘Congregation’ there refers to the Spies sent out by Moshe. As Yehoshua and Calev had dissociated themselves from their evil report, ten were left, all Israelites. Thus we see, that ten Israelites creates a quorum.

This applies to desecrating the Shabbos in public as well. The Peri Megadim (Sifsei Daas Y”D 2:17) states in the name of the Rashba: If there are ten men present when one violates the Shabbos, one is regarded as a desecrator of Shabbos in public.

This would seemingly be inconsistent with a Gemora in Bava Basra (39b) which states according to one opinion: A protest must be lodged in the presence of three people because this way, we are certain that the protest will become known.

The Gemora in Gittin (33a) also states that three people make a matter public. The Gemora rules that if a husband wishes to nullify a get, he must do so in front of three people. This is to ensure that the matter becomes known, and his wife will not mistakenly get married.

The Sdei Chemed (V p. 260) answers: Three people are sufficient when we wish to make something public knowledge; once three people know about the matter, we are certain that the public will become aware of this. However, when something must be performed in public, it is only regarded as being public, if ten Jews are present at the moment it occurred.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 67 - Highlights

The Mishna states: If the daughter of a Yisroel is married to a Kohen, and he died, and left her pregnant, her slaves do not eat terumah because of the portion belonging to the fetus, for the fetus can disqualify others from eating terumah, and does not entitle others to eat. These are the words of Rabbi Yosi.

The Chachamim said to him: After you testified to us about a daughter of a Yisroel to a Kohen, even a daughter of a Kohen who was married to a Kohen, and he died, and left her pregnant, her slaves should not eat terumah, because of the portion belonging to the fetus. (67a)

The Gemora inquires into Rabbi Yosi’s reasoning: Is it because he maintains that a fetus in the womb of a Yisroel is regarded as a non-Kohen (and therefore the slaves, who are owned partially by a non-Kohen, cannot eat terumah)? Or perhaps it is because he holds that only a born Kohen can entitle others to eat terumah; an unborn Kohen cannot.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?

The Gemora answers: A fetus in the womb of a Koheness will be the difference between them.

The Gemora asks: What is indeed the halacha in this case?

Rabbah answers: Rabbi Yosi’s reason is because he maintains that a fetus in the womb of a Yisroel is regarded as a non-Kohen.

Rav Yosef said: it is because he holds that only a born Kohen can entitle others to eat terumah; an unborn Kohen cannot.

The Gemora asks on Rav Yosef from the following braisa: The Chachamim said to him: After you testified to us about a daughter of a Yisroel to a Kohen, even a daughter of a Kohen who was married to a Kohen, and he died, and left her pregnant, her slaves should not eat terumah, because of the portion belonging to the fetus.

Rabbi Yosi responded to them: Regarding this case (if the daughter of a Yisroel is married to a Kohen) I heard; however, regarding the other case (a daughter of a Kohen who was married to a Kohen), I did not hear (that the slaves may eat terumah; rather, they are prohibited from eating terumah).

The Gemora explains its challenge: If Rabbi Yosi’s reasoning is because he maintains that a fetus in the womb of a Yisroel is regarded as a non-Kohen, it is understandable why he distinguishes between a fetus of a Yisroel and a fetus of a Koheness; however, if his rationale is because he holds that only a born Kohen can entitle others to eat terumah; an unborn Kohen cannot, there should not be any distinction between a fetus of a Yisroel and a fetus of a Koheness.

The Gemora remains with a difficulty. (67a)

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: These are the words of Rabbi Yosi (if the daughter of a Yisroel is married to a Kohen, and he died, and left her pregnant, her slaves do not eat terumah because of the portion belonging to the fetus), but the Chachamim say: If the deceased Kohen has other children, the slaves can eat on their account. They can also eat because of the deceased Kohen’s brothers or any member of his family (whoever inherits him). (This opinion maintains that the fetus does not acquire any rights in the slaves until he is born; the relatives of the deceased Kohen inherit the slaves and entitle the slaves to eat terumah.)

The Gemora asks: Does Shmuel mean to say that he agrees with the Chachamim, and not Rabbi Yosi? But Shmuel once said to Rav Chana Bagdasaah (from Baghdath, or an Aggada expert), “Go out and bring me ten people (so that the ruling should be publicized) in order for me to say to you before them that one who gives something to a fetus, the fetus has acquired it.” (This is consistent with Rabbi Yosi’s viewpoint.)

The Gemora answers: Shmuel meant: “This is Rabbi Yosi’s opinion, and I agree with it.”

The Gemora asks: Do the Chachamim actually disagree with Rabbi Yosi? Rabbi Zakkai said: “Rabbi Yosi testified that his ruling came directly from Shemaya and Avtalyon, and the Chachamim agreed to him.”

Rav Ashi answers: They agreed to him that his logic was sound, but they didn’t accept his opinion as authoritative. (67a)

The Gemora cites a related braisa: If the Kohen died and left over sons, the melog slaves and the tzon barzel slaves are permitted to eat terumah (the melog slaves because the wife eats, and the tzon barzel slaves because of the sons, who are Kohanim).

If he died, and left her pregnant (without any sons), the slaves are not entitled to eat terumah.

If he died, and left over sons, and he left her pregnant, the melog slaves eat terumah on her account, whereas the tzon barzel slaves may not eat terumah because the fetus can disqualify others from eating terumah, and does not entitle others to eat. These are the words of Rabbi Yosi.

Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yosi said in the name of his father: A daughter may entitle others to eat terumah, but a son cannot.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said: If he leaves over male sons, the slaves are entitled to eat terumah (even if she is pregnant). If he left over only daughters, the slaves may not eat terumah, since the fetus may result in being a male and daughters do not inherit when there is a son.

The Gemora asks on the last ruling: Why did he say that the slaves cannot eat terumah because the fetus might be a male, even if it is found to be a female, the fetus should disqualify the slaves from eating terumah?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai is in fact stating two reasons: Firstly, the slaves cannot eat terumah because perhaps the fetus is a female, and female heirs will also disqualify others from eating terumah. And furthermore, if the fetus is found to be a male, the daughters will not inherit at all, and the fetus (the sole inheritor) will disqualify the others from eating terumah.

The Gemora turns its attention to his first ruling: The Gemora asks: Why can the slaves eat terumah when there are only sons, the fetus should disqualify the slaves from eating terumah?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai is not concerned with the minority (there is a fifty percent chance that the fetus is female, but even if it is male, there is a small percentage of miscarriages; it emerges that most scenarios will not result in the fetus owning any portion of the slaves, therefore, they are entitled to eat terumah).

Alternatively, you can answer the following: Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai is concerned with the minority, but the slaves are still permitted to eat terumah because we establish a remedy (and designate other property for the fetus instead of the slaves) in accordance with Rav Nachman in the name of Shmuel.

Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel: If a father dies leaving over minor orphans, beis Din sets up for each of them a guardian, and the guardians choose a positive portion for them. When they become adults, they can protest, and claim that they would like to redivide the property. Rav Nachman himself states: They cannot protest, for otherwise, it degrades the power of Beis Din. (It emerges that in our case as well, Beis Din can designate other property for the fetus; the slaves will be owned completely by the other sons, and therefore they can eat terumah.) (67a – 67b)

The braisa had stated: Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yosi said in the name of his father: A daughter may entitle others to eat terumah, but a son cannot.

The Gemora asks: What is the difference? The slaves should not be entitled to eat on account of the fetus?

The Gemora answers (in the conclusion): When the braisa said “daughter,” it was referring to the mother. The braisa is stating that her melog slaves are entitled to eat terumah. The son, however, cannot entitle the tzon barzel slaves to eat terumah because the fetus has a portion in the slaves, and are thus disqualified.

The Gemora asks: if so, this is precisely Rabbi Yosi’s opinion.

The Gemora answers: The entire braisa was taught by Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yosi. (67b)

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HOW TO RULE - Yevamos 66 - Daf Yomi

Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture, and they said: A braisa was taught which supports Rav Yehudah’s opinion, and a braisa was taught which support Rav Ami’s opinion. The Gemora cites those two braisos.

Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah.

Rava asked Rav Nachman: But there is a braisa supporting the viewpoint of Rav Ami (why are you ruling in accordance with Rav Yehudah)?

Rav Nachman replied: Although there is a braisa that supports Rav Ami, Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, since he had stated: (the wife has a valid claim to take the tzon barzel properties back) because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back.

The flow of the Gemora is a bit problematic. Rava was not talking to Rav Nachman when he said that the halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah. He said that over in his name. It seems a bit odd that he would then ask Rav Nachman.

Furthermore, why was he asking from a braisa that supports Rav Ami when the Gemora just quoted a braisa that supported Rav Yehudah as well?

Reb Yissochar Dov from Buska explains this Gemora. He states: There is a principle that whenever the Gemora cites two explanations, and introduces the second one with the terminology “v’ibais eima,” “alternatively, you can say,” the halacha follows the second opinion. This is also an established principle in Shulchan Aruch. When the Shulchan Aruch cites two opinions, the halacha follows the second one. This applies also when the Gemora cites two braisos, one supporting one viewpoint, and a second supporting the other opinion; the halacha is in accordance with the second one.

When Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman, Rava was there as well. The Gemora had stated that they were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture. The Likutei Maharil (78) states that whenever the Gemora uses the terminology “b’shilhei pirkei,” “at the conclusion of his lecture,” it means that the Amora was extremely tired and weak from his lecture. The Targum of the word “oyef,” meaning tired, is “shilhei.” Rav Nachman was not involved in the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef when they were citing the braisos. Rava, being a disciple of Rav Nachman, remembered that Rav Nachman had ruled according to Rav Yehudah. Upon hearing the discussion between Rabbah and Rav Yosef, and realizing that the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, Rava questioned Rav Nachman: “How can you rule according to Rav Yehudah when the second opinion cited was according to Rav Ami, and the halacha would follow the latter opinion?” Rav Nachman, who was extremely weak, did not respond at all, and Rava himself (or the Gemora) answered that the principle does not apply when the logic follows the other opinion. Since Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, we rule according to him, even though the braisa supporting Rav Ami was cited second.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 66 - Highlights

This chapter continues to discuss the prohibition of eating terumah when an unlawful marriage has taken place. To understand this mishnah, we must first mention (as already mentioned above [4:3]) that the property of a married woman is divided into two categories: (1) nikhsei melog (usufruct property) -- the property which the woman brings in with her from her father's house, and which is not recorded in the ketubah, as well as property which comes to her by inheritance or as a gift after the marriage. This property is hers, and her husband is not responsible for it, since he may only usufruct (the right to use and enjoy the profits and advantages of something belonging to another as long as the property is not damaged or altered in any way) it. The term nikhsei melog is derived from the Aramaic word meligah, plucking, i.e., the husband plucks the property just as a chicken is plucked. (2) nikhsei tzon barzel (ironclad property) -- the property which the wife brings in to her husband in the dowry, and which the husband records in the ketubah. The husband makes use of this property as he wishes, its profits or losses are his, and he is responsible for it. Hence the name, "ironclad property": the principal remains as does iron, for if it is lost, the husband is required to pay (see Bartenura). (from Rabbi Pinchas Kahati – Torah Community Connections)

The Mishna states: Concerning a widow who is married to a Kohen Gadol, or a divorcee or a chalutzah who is married to an ordinary Kohen; if she brought into the marriage melog slaves and tzon barzel slaves, the melog slaves are not permitted to eat terumah (they are regarded as belonging to the woman, and she is disqualified from eating terumah), whereas the tzon barzel slaves are permitted to eat terumah (they are regarded as belonging to the husband).

And these are melog slaves: If they die, it is her loss. If they increase in value, the increase belongs to her. Although the husband is required to sustain them, they are not permitted to eat terumah.

And these are tzon barzel slaves: If they die, it is his loss. If they increase in value, the increase belongs to him. Since he is responsible for these slaves, they may eat terumah.

If a daughter of a Yisroel is married to a Kohen, and she brings slaves into the marriage, whether they are melog slaves or tzon barzel slaves, they are permitted to eat terumah.

If a daughter of a Kohen is married to a Yisroel, and she brings slaves into the marriage, whether they are melog slaves or tzon barzel slaves, they are not permitted to eat terumah. (66a)

The Gemora asks: Why can’t the melog slaves of the widow be permitted to eat terumah? They should be regarded as the acquisition of the Kohen that bought other property (and that property is permitted to eat terumah). It was taught in a braisa: How do we know that a Kohen who married a woman or bought slaves that they are permitted to eat terumah? It is written [Vayikra 22:11]: If a Kohen shall buy any soul, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it. How do we know that a Kohen’s wife who bought slaves or a Kohen’s slave that bought other slaves that they are permitted to eat terumah? It is written If a Kohen shall buy any soul, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it. We derive from this verse that the acquisition of the Kohen that bought other property, the purchased property may eat terumah.

The Gemora answers using the following principle: Anyone who eats terumah himself can entitle others to eat terumah, whereas anyone who may not eat terumah himself cannot entitle others to eat terumah. (Since the widow married to the Kohen Gadol may not eat terumah, she cannot entitle others to eat terumah.)

The Gemora challenges this principle: But an uncircumcised Kohen or a Kohen who is tamei may not eat terumah, but they entitle others to eat terumah?

The Gemora answers: These people are only temporarily prohibited from eating terumah (the uncircumcised Kohen can become circumcised, and the Kohen who is tamei can become tahor; therefore they can entitle others to eat terumah, whereas the widow is disqualified permanently).

The Gemora asks: But a mamzer who cannot eat terumah, yet entitles others to eat terumah? (A Kohen marries a non-Kohen (Sarah) and they have a daughter. This daughter marries a mamzer and they have a son, who is also recognized as a mamzer. If the Kohen and his daughter dies, the grandmother, Sarah may continue to eat terumah on account of the mamzer grandson even though he himself cannot eat terumah.)

Ravina qualifies the principle: Any Kohanic acquisition who eats terumah himself can entitle others to eat terumah, whereas any Kohanic acquisition who may not eat terumah himself cannot entitle others to eat terumah. (This explains why the widow’s melog slaves cannot eat terumah.)

Rava answers differently: Biblically, her slaves are permitted to eat terumah; the Rabbis decreed that they should not eat in order for her to say, “I cannot eat terumah, and my slaves cannot eat either. It must be that I am nothing but a harlot to the Kohen.” (This will lead to strife between the two of them, and he will divorce her, which was the Rabbis intention.)

Rav Ashi offers a third answer: Biblically, her slaves are permitted to eat terumah; the Rabbis decreed that they should not eat out of the concern that they will eat terumah even after her husband’s death.

The Gemora asks: If so, let us apply the same decree when a daughter of a Yisroel marries a Kohen (legally)?

Rav Ashi clarifies his answer: The Rabbis issued a decree regarding a widowed Koheness who marries a Kohen Gadol. She might mistakenly feed her melog slaves terumah after her husband’s death by saying the following: “Initially (after I became a widow the first time), my slaves were permitted to eat terumah from my father’s house. I went and married the Kohen Gadol, and they still were permitted to eat terumah. Now that he died, I should return to my original status, and they should still be permitted to eat terumah.” She does not understand that initially, she was not a chalalah; now, that she married the Kohen Gadol, she has become a chalalah, and her slaves cannot eat terumah.

The Gemora asks: This decree is understandable concerning a widowed Koheness, but regarding a widow, who is a daughter of a Yisroel, what are we concerned about (she cannot possibly justify feeding her slaves terumah after the Kohen Gadol’s death)?

The Gemora answers: The Rabbis did not distinguish between the two types of widows. (66a)

The Gemora states: A woman who brings tzon barzel property into her marriage, and subsequently gets divorced. She wants to take her property, and the husband wants to give her its value. What is the halacha?

Rav Yehudah said: The law accords with her. Rav Ami said: The law accords with him.

The Gemora explains: Rav Yehudah said: The law accords with her because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back. Rav Ami said: The law accords with him because our Mishna stated (regarding tzon barzel slaves): If they die, it is his loss. If they increase in value, the increase belongs to him. Since he is responsible for these slaves, they may eat terumah. (It is evident that the tzon barzel property is considered his, and he has a right to keep the property, providing that he returns their value to her.)

Rav Safra rejects Rav Ami’s proof from the Mishna. It doesn’t say: “Since these slaves are his, they may eat terumah.” The Mishna states: “Since he is responsible for these slaves, they may eat terumah.” In truth, they are not regarded as his slaves.

The Gemora asks: Is it true that the Kohen may feed his slaves terumah merely because he is responsible for them? But we learned in a Mishna (Terumos 11:9): If a Yisroel rents a cow from a Kohen, he may feed the cow with legumes of terumah (a type of beans that is only consumed by animals). However, a Kohen, who rents a cow from a Yisroel, although the Kohen is responsible to sustain it, he is not permitted to feed it legumes of terumah. (We see from this Mishna that responsibility alone is not sufficient grounds to enable the Kohen to feed terumah to the slaves or animals.)

The Gemora answers: A renter does not have full responsibility on the animals, and that is why it is not regarded as being the property of the Kohen. While he is responsible if it gets lost or stolen, he will not be responsible in cases of unavoidable loss or if the animal weakened or lost some of its value.

The Gemora cites the latter portion of that Mishna to prove this. If a Yisroel rents a cow from a Kohen, and has it evaluated, he may not feed the cow with legumes of terumah. If a Kohen rents a cow from a Yisroel, and has it evaluated, he is permitted to feed the cow with legumes of terumah.

Rabbah and Rav Yosef were sitting before Rav Nachman at the conclusion of his lecture, and they said: A braisa was taught which supports Rav Ami’s opinion, and a braisa was taught which support Rav Yehudah’s opinion. The Gemora cites those two braisos. (66a - 66b)

Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with Rav Yehudah.

Rava asked Rav Nachman: But there is a braisa supporting the viewpoint of Rav Ami (why are you ruling in accordance with Rav Yehudah)?

Rav Nachman replied: Although there is a braisa that supports Rav Ami, Rav Yehudah’s reasoning is more logical, since he had stated: (the wife has a valid claim to take the tzon barzel properties back) because these properties represent the assets of her father’s house, and she has a valid claim to take them back. (66b)

[END]

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