Showing posts with label kiddush. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kiddush. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

WHERE TO STOP AND START

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 32a) lists statements that must be made in Hebrew. One of them is the bikkurim (the first ripe fruits which had to be brought to the Beis Hamikdosh in Yerushalayim) recitation. When he brings the fruits to the Beis Hamikdosh to be given to the Kohanim, he recites several verses from Devarim. Rashi writes that he says the verse beginning with Arami oved avi, An Aramean tried to destroy my father [Devarim 26:5], and he continues until the end of the passage.

In truth, however, he does not complete the entire passage. As a matter of fact, he stops in middle of verse 10, when he says asher nasatah li Hashem, that You have given me, Hashem. The Rambam in Hilchos Bikurim states this explicitly.

The commentators ask that the last words of this recital conclude in middle of a verse and this is against the dictum of stopping in a place that Moshe did not stop. The Gemora Brochos (12b) rules that any place in the Torah that Moshe Rabbeinu did not pause; we are forbidden to pause as well. How could they institute to stop the recital in middle of a verse?

Reb Yaakov Kaminetzky in his sefer Emes L’Yaakov in Parshas Ki Savo answers that this ruling does not apply by mitzvos, such as bikkurim. It is only a concern when verses are being recited because of Torah.

There are other examples where this principle may be applicable. The Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (31a) discusses the hymns that were recited by the Levites in the Beis Hamikdosh on Shabbos. The Gemora concludes that they would divide Parshas Haazinu into six segments, and one segment was recited each week by the korban mussaf.

The Turei Even asks from the aforementioned Gemora in Brochos. How were the Leviim permitted to stop in places that Moshe did not stop? He answers that since they intended to complete it the next week, it is not regarded as interrupting the portion (even though there will be different Leviim the next week). According to Reb Yaakov, we can suggest that the hymns of the Leviim were not being sung as Torah; but rather, as a part of the mitzvah of the bringing of korbanos. They therefore were permitted to stop and start in the Torah, even in the middle of a passage.

Magan Avrohom (O”C 282) asks this question as well, inquiring into different verses from the Torah that we recite during tefillah which are incomplete. He also answers that we only apply the principle that one cannot interrupt in middle of a verse when one is engaged in Torah study or reading from the Torah. If, however, one is reciting verses for the purpose of prayer or mitzvah observance, there is no prohibition of interrupting in middle of a verse.

Rav Nosson Grossman states that perhaps through this principle, we can answer the Turei Even’s question. The Leviim are not reciting these pesukim as Torah, rather they are being said on account of shirah, song, and therefore it will not be subject to the prohibition of stopping in an incorrect place. However, it would seem evident that the Magen Avrohom will not concur with this, since he states that principle, and nevertheless, does not apply it to the Leviim’s shirah.

It would seem that many other Acharonim do not agree with this qualification of that rule. The tefillah which is recited when the Sefer Torah is raised in shul is a combination of two different verses. There are those who stop after saying, “lifnei B’nei Yisroel,” for the next part (al pi Hashem b’yad Moshe) is not a complete verse. This reason is brought in the name of Reb Chaim Volozhiner. Once again, according to the qualification mentioned above, we could have explained that there is no concern during tefillah; it is only when we are reciting Torah for the sake of Torah where the dictum applies.

The Chasam Sofer in his Teshuvos (O”C 10) discusses why during kiddush, do we begin with the verse, Va’yehi erev va’yehi boker,” when that is the middle of a verse in the Torah. He explains that the first part of the verse has a reference to “death,” and we did not want that alluded to during kiddush. It is evident that the Chasam Sofer as well did not concur with this qualification.

Read more!

Sunday, May 04, 2008

Post # 1,500!!! Reciting Korbanos in the Morning and the Reason for the Nazir's Chatas

Shulchan Aruch (O”C 1:5) rules that it is beneficial to recite every morning the portions in the Torah dealing with the korban olah, mincha, shelamim, chatas and asham.

The Magen Avraham asks: Shouldn’t the chatas be mentioned before the olah, since the chatas always takes precedence?

The Chidah offers the following answer: The Gemora in Menachos (110a) states that whoever recites the portion in the Torah discussing the korban chatas is recognized as if he offered a chatas on the Altar. This, he explains, is only applicable to the portions of the korban which are burned on the Altar; however, with respect to the portion that is given to the Kohanim, and that which they eat which provides atonement for the owner, the recital of the relevant verses does not help for this. Therefore, he says, that which our Gemora said that a chatas takes precedence over an olah, that is only with respect to the sacrifice; however, with respect to the recital of the korbanos, it is preferable to recite the olah portion prior to the portion dealing with the chatas. When one recites the verses of the chatas, he only receives credit for the portion that was to be brought on the Altar, but he does not receive credit for the portion of the korban which was to be eaten by the Kohanim; however, with the recital of the olah verses, it is regarded as if he offered the entire korban, for an olah is completely burned on the Altar. This is the reason that the olah is recited before the chatas.

The Nazir’s Chatas

The nazir brings three animals; a chatas, olah and a shelamim.

It is not explained why a nazir brings a korban chatas. The Ramban writes that it is for the following reason: A nazir separates himself to serve Hashem in a manner of extreme sanctity. It is only fitting, that after he has reached such a high level, he should strive to remain on that level for the remainder of his life. Since he concluded his nezirus and he reverted back to the desires of this world, he is required to offer a korban chatas to atone for this reversal.

The Meshech Chochmah writes that the accepting of nezirus upon oneself results in the forfeiture of many mitzvos, such as involving himself with the burial of his close relatives, reciting kiddush over wine and making havdalah. Although, a nazir accomplishes much in his abstainment and he is considered praiseworthy for this, he nevertheless is required to bring a korban chatas to atone for the mitzvos that he has lost.

Read more!

Monday, December 24, 2007

Drinking Wine by Kiddush

The Gemora (Nedarim 4a)explains that the novelty of a chatas nazir is that it cannot be pledged to be brought as a vow. When we asked earlier that this is a trademark of all chatas offerings, it is possible to answer that all other chatas offerings are obviously not brought because they are pledged, as they are obligated to be brought to atone for a sin. However, why is a korban chatas of a nazir brought? [One might therefore have thought the prohibition of delaying vows does not apply to it, which is why the hekeish is needed.]

The Gemora asks: The korban chatas of a woman who gives birth is also not brought for a sin that she committed, but nonetheless we know the prohibition for delaying vows does apply to her korban chatas. [Why should a korban chatas of a nazir be different?]

The Gemora answers: Her korban chatas is still different than that of a nazir, as it enables her to eat kodoshim (korbanos, which she was unable to eat beforehand and is a mitzvah).

The Meiri asks: Doesn’t the chatas offering of a nazir help him that he is now permitted to drink wine?

Tosfos and the Ran answer that drinking wine is a voluntary act, and it is not a mitzvah like the eating of kodoshim.

However, we can ask: What about the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush and havdalah? The Gemora Pesachim (106a) derives from the verse Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it that there is an obligation to recite kiddush over a cup of wine. Accordingly, we should say that a nazir’s bringing of the korbanos is similar to that of a woman who gave birth; he is bringing the korban in order to be permitted to partake in the mitzvah of drinking wine for kiddush?

The Meiri answers: The mitzvah of drinking the wine for kiddush is only a Rabbinical one, and the korban is not coming for that.

Tosfos explains that although there is a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush with wine, the obligation that the one who recites the blessing should drink the wine is only Rabbinical.

Reb Koby Shapiro in the Hebrew Midrashiya states that there may be a practical difference in halacha whether the mitzvah of drinking the wine is a Biblical one or merely Rabbinical.

It is ruled upon in Shulchan Aruch that a woman is Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush on Shabbos. Accordingly, she would be allowed to discharge a man of his obligation by reciting the kiddush for him.

The Acharonim raise the following question: When a man comes home from Shul Friday night, he has already fulfilled his Biblical obligation of kiddush in the Shemoneh Esrei of ma’ariv. He still has a Rabbinical obligation to recite the kiddush over a cup of wine. His wife, on the other hand, who did not daven ma’ariv, still has a Biblical obligation to recite kiddush. How can the man, who only has a Rabbinical obligation discharge his wife of her Biblical obligation?

Some answer that she should recite vayechulu prior to kiddush.

Reb Akiva Eiger answers that there is no concern here because of the principle that one who has fulfilled the mitzvah can nevertheless discharge an obligation for someone who did not yet fulfill the mitzvah. This works because every Jew is a guarantor for another. Some Acharonim are not satisfied with this answer because they say that a woman is not included in this guarantee for each other.

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is as if the husband had intention not to fulfill the Biblical obligation of kiddush when he is davening ma’ariv. This way, they are both Biblically obligated in the mitzvah of kiddush.

This entire discussion is based upon the Meiri’s opinion that the mitzvah of drinking the wine is merely a Rabbinical mitzvah. However, if we would hold that there is a Biblical mitzvah to drink the wine of kiddush, then, there would be no discussion, for the husband still has not discharged his own obligation by davening ma’ariv; he still has a Biblical obligation to drink the wine.

Read more!