A Single Grain is Sufficient

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here

Rabbi Chiya bar Avin inquired of Rav Huna (Kiddushin 58) : Is the “benefit of gratitude” regarded as money or not?

The Gemora comments: Let us say that this is a matter of a Tannaic dispute, for we learned in a braisa: If one steals the tevel (untithed produce) of his fellow, he is obligated to pay him for the value of the entire tevel (including the terumah and ma’aser that is mixed in, according to its value to him based upon his ability to choose who he wants to give them to). Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah says: He is only obligated to pay him for the value of the chulin. It must be that Rebbe holds that the ability to choose who to give something to has a monetary value, while Rabbi Yosi holds it does not.

The Gemora rejects this, and gives an alternate explanation to their argument. Everyone holds that the matanos (gift portions for the Kohen) that were not yet separated are considered as if they were separated, and the “benefit of gratitude” is not regarded as money, and the dispute is regarding Shmuel’s ruling, for Shmuel said: One grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile (and there would be no need to separate any more terumah). Rebbe holds of Shmuel’s ruling (and the thief would be required to pay the full value, for the owner could have exempted himself with one grain of wheat), and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah does not.

The Acharonim ask that Shmuel is only discussing the Biblical requirement, but the Chachamim instituted that one must give at least one sixtieth of his produce to the Kohen as terumah! If so, the thief should be exempt from paying the value of terumah that he is Rabbinically required to give!?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers based on the Tosfos Ri”d, who says that even Rabbinically speaking, one grain of wheat can exempt an entire pile from the prohibition of tevel. The Chachamim instituted that there is a mitzvah of giving to the Kohen. This, however, the owner could claim that he would not have given, and the thief would therefore be required to pay the entire amount.

The Mishnah Lamelech disagrees and holds that if one does not give at least one-sixtieth to the Kohen, it is Rabbinically regarded as tevel. Accordingly, the thief should not be required to pay the entire amount!?

Read more!

Husband's Knowledge

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b - 46a)had stated: Rabbi Meir says: If it is a vow which requires examination by a Chacham (and the husband cannot annul it by himself), he may not take her back, but for one which does not require examination by a Chacham (the husband can annul it himself), he may take her back (because in this case, the husband cannot advance the claim that the divorce was due to a misunderstanding). Rabbi Elozar said: They prohibited him to remarry in the case where the vow required examination by a Chacham to annul it only on account of the case where the vow did not require examination by a Chacham to annul it (since in the latter case, the husband might claim that he was not aware that he had the right to disallow the vow; in the former case, however, no such claim can be advanced because no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law).

The Gemora asks: What is the core of their argument? Rabbi Meir maintains that a husband does not mind his wife’s being exposed to a court of law and therefore forbids remarriage on account of the first reason mentioned above, since the first husband might claim that if he had known that the vow could be disallowed by a Chacham, he would not have consented to give a divorce. Rabbi Elozar holds that no man would consent that his wife should be exposed to a court of law.

The Tosfos Rid explains the argument in the following manner. If the vow required a Chacham to permit it, he may not remarry her. This is because we are scared that he will say that if I merely knew that a Chacham could permit it, I would never have divorced her. He would have had her go before a Beis Din to have her vow permitted, despite the fact that this is embarrassing. However, if it is a vow that he could have nullified as her husband, there is no suspicion. This is because everyone knows that they can nullify certain vows that their wives make. The fact that he did not do so shows that he clearly wanted to divorce her; regardless of whether or not the vow was actually made. Rabbi Elozar holds that a husband does not always realize that he can nullify his wife’s vows. Therefore, they cannot remarry if he divorced her because of such a vow, as he will later claim that if he had known he could have done so, he would not have divorced her. Furthermore, Rabbi Elozar says that a vow that requires a Chacham or Beis Din is not really cause for them not to remarry. This is because he would not have taken his wife to a Chacham or beis din anyway, because it is denigrating. However, in this case as well they are forbidden to remarry because of the similarity to the case where a Chacham is not required.

Read more!

A Show of Intent

Giddul bar Re’ilai (Daf Yomi: Gittin 34a) sent a get to his wife. The agent went and found her sitting and weaving. He said to her, “Here is your get.” She said to him, “Go away now and come again tomorrow.” The agent returned to Giddul and told him what happened. Giddul exclaimed, “Blessed be He Who is good and does good!”

Abaye said: Blessed be He Who is good and does good, but the get itself is not cancelled. Rava, however, said: Blessed be He Who is good and does good, and the get is cancelled.

The Gemora explains the point at issue between them. It is the revealing of intention in respect of a get. Abaye holds that the revealing of intention (without verbalizing it) in respect of a get makes no difference (and therefore, the get is still valid). Rava maintains that it does make a difference.

The Tosfos R”id explains that the dispute is based upon the following: Do we consider his show of intention as merely “words of the heart” (thoughts), and therefore, it would not be regarded as words? Or perhaps, his display of intent is more than merely a thought, but rather, it is regarded as if he spoke it out!

Accordingly, he adds that if it would be clear beyond a shadow of a doubt as to what his intent was, even Abaye would concede that the get is void, for throughout halachah, we always say that when someone’s thoughts are clear to everyone, it is not regarded as thoughts, but rather as words. Our Gemora is discussing a case where it is not so clear as to what he was thinking, and therefore, Abaye and Rava disagree.

The Chasam Sofer understood the Gemora differently. He explains that even in our Gemora, it is definitely clear as to what the husband is thinking. He wants to cancel the get. Nonetheless, Abaye holds that it still remains only a thought, and to rescind his verbal instruction from before, it is necessary to verbalize it. Thoughts, even thoughts that are clear to everyone, are not sufficient to cancel his previous order.

Read more!