Sent Goat and Yom Kippur

The Gemora discusses who is the author of the Mishna, which says that the sent goat atones for all sins, apparently even without repentance. The Gemora concludes that Rebbi is the author, as Rebbi says that Yom Kippur atones for all sins, except for three very severe ones, even without repentance. The commentators note that Rebbi does not make any direct mention of the sent goat, but only of the day of Yom Kippur, which seems to be at odds with the Mishna. A number of answers are offered to this question:

1. The day atones partially, and the sent goat achieves full atonement (Tosfos 13a d'ovad)
2. The day atones, but the repentance requirement is waived only if the goat is sent (Ritva)
3. The sent goat atones, but its atonement is due to the power of Yom Kippur day (Tosfos, Rashba)
4. The day atones, but when there is a Bais Hamikdash, it depends on the sent goat being brought (Minchas Chinuch 364)

The Gemora had objected that if one did not repent, the goat cannot atone, as it is a sacrifice of the wicked, which is an abomination. The Ritva explains that Rebbi says that the goat is an exception, and the rule of a sacrifice of the wicked applies only to other sacrifices. The Rashba suggests that since the goat only completes the atonement of the day (following the first explanation above), it is not simply a sacrifice of the wicked, and therefore is effective.

The Gemora introduces a sifra which states that the day of Yom Kippur atones even if the sinner did not commemorate it. The Gemora says that this sifra implies that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance. The Ramban explains that if Yom Kippur needs repentance, it is like any other sacrifice, e.g., chatas, which is not effective if the sinner denies its effectiveness.

Rava says that Rebbi agrees that Yom Kippur does not atone for infractions of the day without repentance. Rava says this must be so, since otherwise there would be no case of one being punished for Yom Kippur prohibitions, since the day itself would atone for them. The Gemora objects, and provides two cases where the day would not atone for the transgression, even if repentance is not generally necessary:

1. The person died choking on food he ate, leaving no time after the transgression for atonement
2. The person ate at the end of the day, leaving no part of the day to atone
Tosfos (13a d'ovad) notes that the goat atones even for sins committed later on the day of Yom Kippur, since otherwise the Gemora should have suggested that the case is one who ate after the goat was sent. Some texts of the Gemora continue by citing a braisa, comparing the atonement of the goat and the day. The braisa states that the goat has the advantage of atoning right away, while the day atones only at the end. The day has the advantage of atoning without a sacrifice, while the goat atones only with a sacrifice. Rashi cites this text and rejects it, noting that it is incompatible with the answers provided by the Gemora, which both imply that any part of the day would atone, not just the end. The Ramban and Rabbeinu Chananel keep the text, and the Ramban explains that this is an alternate answer offered by the Gemora. According to this approach, only the end of the day atones, and therefore one would be liable for violating Yom Kippur if he died before the end of the day.

The Rashba offers two explanations of the advantage of Yom Kippur cited in the braisa:
1. The “sacrifice” refers to sending the goat off the azazel cliff. The braisa refers to this as a “sacrifice” since it is considered a sacrifice like standard ones, and follows its rules.
2. The “sacrifice” refers to the chatas goat whose blood was sprinkled inside the mishkan. The braisa is stating that the atonement of Yom Kippur is independent of this sacrifice, while the sent goat only atones if this sacrifice is also brought.
These two explanations seem to differ as to whether the sent goat is considered a standard sacrifice or not. The answer cited by the Ritva for how the goat atones without repentance seems to consider it a standard sacrifice, while the fact that the goat atones for sins committed later seems to indicate it is not.

The Rambam (Teshuva 1:2) rules that the sent goat atones on all lenient prohibitions (i.e., generic positive and negative commandments) even without repentance, but on all others only with repentance. The commentators attempt to explain the Rambam's source for this ruling, since the Gemora presents the opinions of the Sages, who require repentance, and Rebbi, who does not, with no indication of a middle position. The Lechem Mishne says that the Rambam rules like the Sages, but attempts to limit the extent of the dispute between Rebbi and the Sages. The braisa in which they differ on the explanation of the verse mandating karais is discussing only severe prohibitions, and only in that case do we find the Sages explicitly requiring repentance. The Rambam therefore says that the Sages agree with Rebbi that the sent goat atones for lenient transgressions without repentance. The Meshech Chochma (Vayikra 16:30) explains the Rambam based on the Gemora in Yoma (85b), which says that Rebbi holds that Yom Kippur atones for severe transgressions without repentance, but repentance does not atone for them without Yom Kippur. From here we see that Yom Kippur is more potent that repentance alone. Therefore, the Sages, who say that repentance alone atones for lenient prohibitions, surely say that Yom Kippur alone atones for these.

Sifra's authorship

The Gemora states that an anonymous sifra is Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore proves that Rabbi Yehuda requires repentance for the atonement of Yom Kippur. The Gemora then cites another sifra, which indicates that repentance is not required. Abaye answers that the first sifra is Rabbi Yehuda, while the second is Rebbi. The Ritva asks how Abaye can offer this answer if the Gemora stated that an anonymous sifra is Rabbi Yehuda. He offers two answers:
1. The two sifras are different opinions of Rabbi Yehuda's position. Thus, both follow Rabbi Yehuda, but differ on what Rabbi Yehuda holds on this point.
2. The rule of authorship is a general rule for most sifras, but has exceptions. Similarly, the Gemora identifies anonymous mishnas as Rabbi Meir, since most are, but there are many exceptions to this rule.

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Freezing Mikvah and Returning a Lost Article

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The king or the Kohen Gadol may not be members of the Beis Din involved with the intercalation of the year The king cannot on account of the upkeep of his army (since they are paid annually, he might wish to make a leap year in order to save money). The Kohen Gadol cannot because of the cold the following year (since he might be against intercalation of this year, for if the year is extended, Yom Kippur, being a month later, will be colder, and it will cause him distress during his five immersions on that day).

Tosfos asks from a Gemora in Yoma (31b) which states that if the Kohen Gadol found it difficult to immerse in a cold mikvah, iron bars were heated prior to Yom Kippur and placed into the mikvah to warm it up!?

Tosfos learns that the Kohen Gadol would be cold from the floor of the Beis Hamikdash, since he performed the Temple service while barefoot.

The Margoliyos Hayam answers Tosfos’ question by saying that the Mishna is Yoma states that they would only do that if the Kohen Gadol was finicky or elderly; otherwise, it would not be done for him. Accordingly, a healthy Kohen Gadol would not want the year extended.

Alternatively, he answers based upon Reb Akiva Eiger, who asserts that this allowance was not permitted for his first immersion on Yom Kippur, since that did not take place in the sanctified part of the Temple; rather, it was done outside. The Rabbinic prohibition against throwing a heating element into the cold mikvah was only permitted in the Mikdash (based upon the dictum of “ein sh’vus ba’Mikdash). Accordingly, the Kohen Gadol would not want the year extended, for there was no way to avoid the cold water of the first immersion.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

When is One Exempt from Returning a Lost Item

The Mishna had stated: The Kohen Gadol may testify and others may testify about him

The Gemora asks from a braisa: And you will look away. This teaches that sometimes one looks away (from returning a lost article), and sometimes one cannot look away. What is the case? If a Kohen saw a lost object in the cemetery, or an elderly man saw an object that it was not honorable for him to carry, or if his work is more valuable that the lost object of his friend, this is why it says: And you will turn away from them. [Seemingly, it should not be respectful for a Kohen Gadol to testify on behalf of a common person!?]

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 263:1) clarifies that even a young Torah scholar, or a well respected person (Aruch Hashulchan), is exempt from returning a lost item which is below their dignity to deal with, for example a bale of hay.

Although they are usually exempt from returning a lost item that is beneath their dignity to deal with, they will be required to do so if they actually moved or picked up the item, since they started the mitzvah (ibid 263:2).

The Shach directs us to a halachah (in 261:2) where the Shulchan Aruch rules that if one found an animal grazing in someone else’s vineyard or field, then he is obligated to return it, because the animal is damaging that property. This is termed aveidas karka (in other words, the owner of the vineyard is being caused a loss, so the person seeing the animal grazing has an obligation to return it to his owner, so as not to cause a loss to the owner of the field).

At first glance it is difficult to see the apparent connection. Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains that the Shach is proving that since the Shulchan Aruch does not state that he should just simply move the animal to a ownerless field, that shows that once he moved the animal he is obligated to return to its owner. However, the Or Zerua cites Ritva who disagrees and maintains that it is enough if he merely moves it to an ownerless field.

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid 263:3) rules that if the these people want to go beyond the call of duty and lower themselves to return the lost item, they may do so. The Rema disagrees, and quotes Rosh that the most such people are allowed to do is to pay the owner for the lost item.

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Opportunity to Repent - Kiddushin 49

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If he says, “Become betrothed to me on condition that I am a righteous person,” she is mekudeshes even if he is completely wicked, because perhaps he intends to repent.

The Beis Yosef writes in the name of Rabbeinu Yeruchem that if he is a rasha due to sins committed between his fellow man, such as a thief, he cannot be considered righteous until he returns the stolen object. And so it would be by all such sins; if he wounded his fellow man, he cannot be regarded as a Tzadik until he compensates the injured party.

However, some say that as long as he has resolved to make amends, he is considered a righteous person.

The sefer Shai Lemoreh asks: The Gemora in Bava Kamma states that if a person stole money and he decided that he will return it, but before he had the opportunity to return it, he died, he is not regarded as a wicked person. Yet we find that Yom Kippur does not atone for sins between a man and his fellow until one asks forgiveness from the one that he offended. It emerges that even though he already repented, Yom Kippur will not atone for those sins!?

He answers that by Yom Kippur, it is different. Since the injured party is still alive, he still has the opportunity to ask him for forgiveness. So long as he does not take advantage of that opportunity, he will not be forgiven. However, one who steals and later intended to return that which he stole, but he died beforehand, he is not regarded as a rasha, for now, he does have the availability to make amends.

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Food for Thought - Nedarim Daf 32

*** The Beraisa quotes Rebbi as making the following statement: Milah is a great mitzvah, as there is no one who was involved in mitzvos like Avraham Avinu, and yet he was only called complete through milah, as the passuk says “walk before me and be complete,” and it says “and I will put my covenant between us.”

The Ksav Sofer asks: Perhaps milah is a minor mitzvah, but it was the mitzvah that rendered Avraham Avinu complete, for even a minor deficiency can prevent completeness?

*** Rabbi Ami bar Aba also says: The “Satan” numerically equals three hundred and sixty four (implying that one day a year he is powerless, which is Yom Kippur).

The Chidah asks: What is the advantage to us that the Satan is powerless on Yom Kippur? Why, there are so many other days in the year where he is detrimental to us?

He answers: On Yom Kippur, the Satan contradicts what he is saying the rest of the year. On Yom Kippur he says that there is no nation with such kedusha as Klal Yisroel. This renders him a liar (for that which he says the rest of the year) and gives us the strength to fend off his attacks on us for the rest of the year.

*** Rabbi Zecharyah said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Hashem wanted to have kehunah descend from Shem, as the passuk says “and he was a kohen for Hashem on high.” However, once Shem said a blessing to Avraham before saying a blessing to Hashem, Hashem decided to have kehunah descend from Avraham. This is as the passuk states, “and he blessed him and he said: blessed is Avram to the Hashem on high, Owner of heaven and earth, and praised is Hashem.” Avram asked Shem: Is it appropriate to mention first a blessing of the servant before that of his master? Kehunah was immediately given to Avraham, as the passuk states, “the word of Hashem was to my master, until I make your enemies into a footstool for your feet,” and it states “and he is a kohen for Hashem on high.” This implies that he (Shem) was a kohen, but his children would not be kohanim.

It is written in Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer that Avraham married Keturah, who was Hagar, after she converted.

Reb Yosef Engel asks: If Avraham was a kohen, how was he permitted to marry a divorcee?

He answers: This Medrash is of the opinion that Avraham did not have a daughter. Consequently, he had not fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation yet. There was no other woman fitting for Avraham to marry, and therefore, the positive commandment of procreation was able to override the prohibition against a kohen marrying a divorcee.

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Timtum Haleiv

The Gemora cites a braisa (Kesuvos 60a): A child may be nursed until he is twenty-four months. From that age and onwards, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing (the Rabbis forbade it); these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua said: He may nurse even for four or five years. If, however, he ceased nursing after twenty-four months and started again, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing.

The Rashba asks: Something that is forbidden on a Biblical level, we are not permitted to provide for a child; however, there is no prohibition to give a child something that is only Rabbinically prohibited. Why would it be forbidden to let the child nurse?

Rav Elyashiv adds: Here, there is not even a Rabbinical prohibition!

He answers: We find that there is a halachic stringency not to allow a child to nurse from an idolater; this may result in timtum. So too, when a child is beyond the age where he should be nursing, if we allow him to nurse, it can lead to timtum.

There is a discussion amongst the Poskim if one eats a permitted item in a time that it is prohibited to eat (such as Yom Kippur, prior to davening or kiddush etc.); does that eating result in timtum or not. However, in our case, Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein asks: The milk is not a forbidden item at all! If we would extract the milk and place it into a utensil, it would be permitted for consumption; the prohibition is only when the child is nursing directly from the mother. Why should we assume that this may result in timtum?

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Postponing Yom Kippur

The Gemora asks: Yom Kippur that falls out on a Monday should be postponed until Tuesday because of the concern that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the feast that will be held on the day prior to Yom Kippur?

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: It would emerge that Rosh Hashanah would be on A Sunday, and we have a principle that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on Sunday, Wednesday or Friday?

He answers: The reason that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on a Tuesday is because then, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos; that is also a preventive measure. The decree based on the concern of slaughtering a young bird takes precedence over the decree of taking the aravos on Shabbos. The reason is: Here, there are no other options; by Hoshanah Rabbah, there is an option, namely, not to take the aravos on Shabbos, just like the shofar is not blown and the lulav is not taken on Shabbos.

The Chasam Sofer answers: While it’s true that if Yom Kippur is postponed until Tuesday, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos, it is nevertheless preferable to uphold the decree of not slaughtering a young bird on Shabbos and sounding the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, even though we will forfeit the mitzvah of taking the aravos on Hoshanah Rabbah. Two is better than one.

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INVITE KOHANIM TO PARTAKE IN PURIM FEAST - Yevamos 90 - Daf Yomi

It is brought in the name of the Arizal that one should invite Kohanim to partake in the Purim feast. The explanation is based on the Tikunei Zohar which states that Purim is similar to Yom Kippur. Just as the day of Yom Kippur provides atonement without eating and drinking, Purim provides atonement only through eating and drinking. Kohanim should be invited to partake in the Purim feast because the Gemora states that through the Kohanim’s eating, the owners will receive atonement.

Sefer Shevet Mi’Yehudah

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 9 - Eating on Yom Kippur

by Rabbi Yoseph Dov Karr

The Gemara says that the Jewish people did not observe the fast of Yom Kippur that year, but they ate on that day as part of the celebration of the Chanukas ha'Mikdash. The Gemara says that they derived the allowance to eat on Yom Kippur from the Torah's description of the Chanukas ha'Mishkan in the Midbar. When the Mishkan was dedicated, the Nesi'im brought Korbanos as part of the celebration, even on Shabbos. The Jewish people derived from there that when the Mikdash is dedicated, the celebration overrides the obligation to fast on Yom Kippur. Hashem was pleased with their decision, as He demonstrated at the end of the celebrations by sending forth a Bas Kol to proclaim that they were all destined to eternal life in Olam ha'Ba.

The Gemara mentions that before they heard the Bas Kol, the Jewish people were worried that they may have acted wrongly by eating on Yom Kippur and would be liable for the severe punishment of Kares.

Why were the people concerned that they would be liable for punishment? Even if their ruling was incorrect, at worst their act was an inadvertent transgression, an act of Shogeg, for which there is no punishment of Kares. Moreover, the people certainly followed the ruling of Beis Din in this matter, and thus there was no reason for them to be held accountable. Even if the ruling was wrong, the people would be liable only to bring a Par he'Elem Davar (the Korban offered when the entire nation acts upon an erroneous ruling of Beis Din which permits an act that is actually forbidden with a punishment of Kares). Why were they afraid that they would be punished with Kares?

Perhaps the answer may be dependent upon whether or not the permission of eat on Yom Kipper was D'chuya or Hutra. Apparently it was D'chuya and therefore they were concerned that even though it was mutar to eat there was still a partial sin and needed to be forgiven and they were worried perhaps they made a mistake. The Bas Kol came and told them not to worry, as Hashem decided it was the right thing to do and was completely Hutra.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 9 - EATING ON THE NINTH

Rabbi Akiva, who derived the principle of adding from the ordinary onto the holy from a different verse, uses the verse “And you shall afflict yourself on the ninth” to teach that anyone who eat and drinks on the ninth, it is considered as if he fasted on the ninth and the tenth.

Rashi in Yoma 81 explains that by eating on the ninth, one will be able to fast better on the tenth. In Shibolei Haleket it is written exactly the opposite logic. Eating a lot the day before a fast makes you fell the withdrawal from eating even more the second day, and so the hunger pangs are increased, making your fast equivalent to a two day fast. Rabbeinu Yonah (shaar daled) writes that it would be proper to have a meal on Yom Kippur since it is also a Yom Tov and since that isn’t possible; there is an obligation to eat on the day prior to Yom Kippur. There are other reasons mentioned in the Rishonim.

The Ksav Sofer (O”C 112) wonders regarding one who is sick and will not be fasting, if he has an obligation to eat on the ninth. The Netziv learns from the language of the Sheiltos that eating on the ninth is a component of the mitzva of afflicting oneself on Yom Kippur and therefore one who is not required to fast does not have a mitzva to eat on the ninth.

Reb Akiva Eiger (16) speculates if women will be included in this mitzva. Do we say that it is a positive commandment governed by time and therefore women will be exempt from this obligation? Or perhaps since the mitzva is learned from the possuk which teaches the requirement of affliction on Yom Kippur and women are included in that mitzva, they would be obligated to eat on the ninth as well.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 12 - Sukkah-A Life Saver

The Gemara earlier on Daf 2 states that according to Rabbah, the Chachamim maintain that a Sukkah whose s’chach is higher than twenty Amos is invalid, because it is said: so that your generations shall know that I made the Jewish People dwell in Sukkos. Since the purpose of the Sukkah is to remind us that Hashem protected the Jewish People in the Wilderness, we say that if the s’chach is within twenty amos of the ground, then one is aware that he his sitting in a Sukkah. If the s’chach is higher than twenty Amos, however, a person is not aware that he is sitting in a Sukkah, because one cannot see the s’chach.

The Bach writes that whenever one performs a mitzvah that is biblically ordained, he is required to have kavanah, focusing on the intention of the mitzvah. The mitzvah of Sukkah is unique in that one must also be mindful of the fact that Hashem made the Jewish People dwell in Sukkos, i.e. the Clouds of Glory, in the Wilderness. One must wonder why Sukkah is unique in this regard in contrast to all other mitzvos.

The explanation for this ruling is that the Vilna Gaon writes that we commemorate Sukkos on the fifteenth of Tishrei as a reminder that after the sin of the Golden Calf, Hashem removed the Clouds of Glory, and they only returned after Yom Kippur and the Jewish People were granted atonement for their grievous sin. The Clouds of Glory protected the Jewish People from their enemies, as is evident from the battle with Amalek. If not for the Clouds of Glory, the Jewish People would have been vulnerable to attacks from their enemies, and they may have been annihilated.

The mitzvah of remembering that Hashem surrounded the Jewish People with the Clouds of Glory is not just symbolic, but a demonstration of our gratitude to Hashem for saving our lives. This is why the mitzvah of Sukkah is unique in that we need to have kavanah that Hashem surrounded us with the Clouds of Glory in the desert.

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 87 - Maariv is Only voluntary if .....

Rav holds that the tefillah of neilah, the final tefillah prayed on Yom Kippur can be recited at night. Therefore, he rules that if one davened neilah after dark, he will be exempt from davaning maariv that night. His reasoning is neilah is considered an extra tefillah and since one davened a tefillah at night, that will be valid for maariv as well, which is a tefillah that is normally recited at night.

The Gemora asks on Rav that he rules in Berochos that the tefillah of maariv is only voluntary and not required, so why would our Gemora say that neilah exempts him from maariv - he is not obligated anyway? The Gemora answers that his ruling here would be relevant to the one's that hold maariv is mandated.

Tosfos quotes the opinion of the R"i that maariv is only voluntary if he has other pressing needs at the time, such as performing a mitzva that cannot be done at another time, but if there is no other urgent necessities at this time, he would be obligated to daven maariv.

Tosfos asks that according to the R"I, what is our Gemora's question? While it is true that Rav holds maariv is only voluntary, that is only in circumstances where he has other obligations but normally one would be duty-bound to daven maariv. He answers that on Yom Kippur night, there is automatically pressing needs such as the preparing of the meal for after the fast. The Midrash states that the meal after Yom Kippur is tantamount to a Yom tov meal and there would be a mitzva to involve oneself in the preparation. This would cause that the davaning of maariv is only voluntary.

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 83 - Story Regarding the Riva

The Radvaz (3:444) relates an incident regarding the Riva, one of the Baalei HaTosafos, who was ill with an illness that he eventually succumbed to. The doctor informed the Riva that if he were to fast on Yom Kippur he definitely would not be able to continue living and were he to eat, it would be possible that he could continue to live. The Riva was adamant in his refusal to eat on Yom Kippur and he subsequently died. The Radvaz writes that the Riva certainly did not maintain that one is permitted to be stringent with regard to his own health, as one is prohibited from disobeying the directives of the doctor. If one was coerced to violate a mitzvah in the Torah, if through his death HaShem’s Name will be sanctified, he is permitted to forgo his life. Rather, the Riva was aware that even if he were to eat he was not going to live and this is an illustration of the proverbial dictum that the heart knows the bitterness of its soul.

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 80 - Yom Kippur's Eating is Different

The Gemora states that in order to be liable for eating on Yom Kippur, one must eat food the size of a date. This must be eaten in the time it takes to eat a פרס - half a loaf.

By all other prohibitions in the Torah, there is a halacha that one must eat it in the normal manner in order to be liable. The Shagas Aryeh rules that if one eats raw meat on Yom Kippur, he would have violated the Torah's prohibition. This is because the Torah does not state by Yom Kippur "Don't eat," rather the Torah states "you should be afflicted." It therefore does not have the standard guidelines of eating.

The Ksav Sofer rules, based on this, that if one ate before Yom Kippur an amount less than a date and on Yom Kippur ate more which accumalatively equals a date and he is satiated, he will be liable for eating on Yom Kippur. This again can only be understood by saying that we must distinguish between the 'eating' on Yom Kippur and elsewhere. This person did not eat the full amount on Yom Kippur and yet has violated the trangression. On Yom Kippur, the prohibition is not to eat in a manner that will lead to satisfaction. The Achiezer discusses if one would be allowed to have food inserted through intravenous. The reason to say that it is not permitted is because the Torah is not particular on the action of eating, rather the satiation that comes from it.

This could be the explanation in our Gemora. Even though one who eats food in the amount of a date in a longer span that it would take to eat a half a loaf is considered eating, however he is not satiated through this and hence not liable.

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 78 - Touching Food on Yom Kippur

There is a question discussed in some of the Poskim if one is allowed to touch food on Yom Kippur. Perhaps it has a halacha similar to muktza. Mahril Diskin brings a proof from our Gemora that it is permitted. Rav Yehuda stated that one is permitted to cool himself off with fruit and he actually did so with a certain type of vegetable. However, he retracts from this proof because the Gemora can be referring to fruits and vegetables that cannot be eaten raw and there is no suspicion that he will come to eat it, however a food that we are worried that one might forget and eat it, should not be touched on Tom Kippur.

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 76 - Drinking is Included in Eating

The Gemora states that there are five afflictions that we are obligated to submit ourself to on Yom Kippur. The Gemora asks that actually there are six? The answer given is that drinking is included in eating.

The Gemora in Chulin states that if one melts forbidden fats into a liquid and drinks it, he will be liable. This is learned from an extra word in a passuk. Tosfos asks that why is an extra possuk necessary, let us say that drinking is included in eating? Tosfos answers that this is only said by something that is normal to drink, however something which really is a food item and now it has been transformed into a liquid, there drinking is not included in eating and therefore we need a special possuk.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks a question on this from a Gemora in Shavuos. A similar question can be asked on our Gemora. Why does our Gemora say that there are only five afflictions, when in fact there are six? Drinking a liquid on Yom Kippur, which was originally a solid will not be included in eating and hence would be considered a sixth affliction?

Perhaps we can answer that Tosfos' distinction only pplies by something that is an 'issur cheftza'. Chelev, which is intrinsently forbidden, we can say that when it is transformed into a liquid, it is not included in the standard prohibition of eating. However, by Yom Kippur, which is an 'issur gavra', the food is not intrinsently forbidden, rather the person is obligated not to eat, here there is no difference between a standard liquid and a food item transformed into a liquid. All liquids are included in the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur.

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Daf Yomi - Yoma 75 - Agadta in Specific Mesechtos

posted by Reb Ben

The Gemara incorporated in Maseches Yoma the lessons of the manna that fell from heaven. Prior to the discussion of the manna the Gemara derives from verses that are stated regarding the manna the concept of inuy, affliction, which is the theme of Yom Kippur. Reb Tzadok HaKohen from Lublin writes in Tzidkas HaTzaddik that the Chachamim incorporated the agadata regarding the manna in Maseches Yoma similar to the discussion regarding the Receiving of the Torah which is recorded in Maseches Shabbos. The reason the Gemara discusses the receiving of the Torah in Maseches Shabbos is because the Torah was given on Shabbos and the power of Torah is through the Shabbos. Similarly, the Gemara expounds on the miracles of the manna in Maseches Yoma because the manna was absorbed into the bodies of those who consumed the manna. On Yom Kippur one is nourished from the spiritual aspect contained in the manna, and one needs Divine Assistance to merit this. In Maseches Gittin we find the discussion regarding the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash, as the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash and the exile of the Jewish People from Eretz Yisroel was similar to a divorce of which it is said, “what is your mother’s bill of divorce by which I sent her away?” Mahri Chagiz writes that all spiritual matter is clothed in this world in a physical garment, and one who is capable can separate the physical from the spiritual and the remnants are absorbed into one’s physical being. Such a person will not have a need to expel any waste. The Torah refers to the manna as lechem haklokel, the insubstantial food. Rashi in Avodah Zara and in Parashas Chukas writes that the manna was thus referred to because it was absorbed in the limbs of the Jewish People and they had no need to expel any waste from their system.

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