Rebbe and the Laundryman

The Gemora (Kesuvos 103a) records: On the day that Rebbe died, a Heavenly voice went forth and announced: “Whoever has been present at the death of Rebbe is destined for the life of the World to Come.” A certain laundryman who used to come before Rebbe every day, failed to come on that day. When he heard this (the announcement), he went up upon a roof, jumped to the ground and died. A Heavenly voice came forth and announced: “That laundryman also is destined for the life of the World to Come.”

The commentators ask: Who permitted him to commit suicide; it is evident from the Gemora that this laundryman was a wise man and a Torah scholar?

Ben Yehoyadah answers: This roof was not high off the ground and his intention was to fall on his feet. He did not wish to kill himself. His plan was to injure his feet that it should serve as an atonement for not attending Rebbe’s funeral procession. Heaven turned his plans around and he fell backwards, breaking his neck and bringing about his immediate death.

The Rama Mipano in his sefer Gilgulei Neshomos writes that Rebbe was the reincarnation of Avraham Avinu and the laundryman was the gilgul of Lavan. A laundryman whitens clothes as the name Lavan connotes. This was Lavan’s rectification.

He also says, along with many other commentators that Rebbe was a reincarnation of Yaakov Avinu and that is why the Gemora relates that Rebbe came back to life even after his death; this is because we know that Yaakov did not die.

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Meriting the World to Come

The Gemora (Kesuvos 103a) records: On the day that Rebbe died, a Heavenly voice went forth and announced: “Whoever has been present at the death of Rebbe is destined for the life of the World to Come.”

The commentators are bewildered: How can it be that one can merit a share in the World to Come just by being present when Rebbe departed this world? The World to Come is a spiritual level that one may attain through his actions; how can it be given away for free?

Rav Dessler writes: We are compelled to say that those who were present when Rebbe died elevated themselves to an extremely high level. The passing on of such a righteous and holy person caused them to mend their ways and transform themselves into completely different people. They removed themselves from a world of falsehood and became children that merited the World to Come.

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Rebbe: “Gather my Children”

The Gemora (Kesuvos 103a)cites a braisa: When Rebbe was about to depart this world, he said, “I require the presence of my sons.” He then proceeded to give them instructions regarding the arrangements of matters after his death.

The Yalkut Gershuni explains: As long as Rebbe was alive, he made the utmost effort to increase his Torah studying, his observance of mitzvos and performance of good deeds, so he will be destined to merit his share in the World to Come. It was not necessary for anyone to assist him in this endeavor. As he was dying, he realized that after his death, he will no longer be able to help himself and elevate his soul; it was this realization that caused him to call his sons and inform them that now they will be needed.

The Aruges Habosem adds: Rebbe was making an introspection of his life and realized that he still was lacking in his task of rectifying his soul. His time was passing and he would not have the ability to fill this void. His only hope was to call his sons and give them instructions in how they should act after his death. A son’s good deeds, says the Gemora in Sanhedrin (104a), can provide merit for a father even after his death.

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The Day that Rebbe Died

Rabbi Chiya said (Kesuvos 103a) : “On the day that Rebbe died, holiness ceased.” This is why he was known as Rabbeinu Hakodosh.

The Gemora in Sotah (49a) states: When Rebbe died, humbleness and fear of Hashem ceased.

The Maharal writes that there is a distinction between the two statements. The Gemora in Sotah does not say, “On the day that Rebbe died, humbleness and fear of Hashem ceased.” This is because these traits still continued after Rebbe died for those people that were in his generation. Those people that were humble and Feared Hashem in the times of Rebbe continued doing so even after his death. However, the trait of holiness completely ceased on the day that Rebbe died. Even if there were those that were regarded as being holy in Rebbe’s lifetime, as soon as he died, their holiness ceased. This is why our Gemora says: “On the day that Rebbe died, holiness ceased.”

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Blood Libel

The Gemora (Kesuvos 102b) relates an incident where they placed the orphan young son with his relatives. The very first evening, the relatives killed him (in order to take the inheritance; it is this very concern that causes us to say that the girl should reside with her mother and not with her relatives because she also receives a tenth of her father’s property).

The Meiri and the Hagahos Yavetz state this incident actually transpired on Erev Pesach. It is interesting that the Gemora uses a strange abbreviation for this. Rabbi Yosef Dov Karr and later I found this in the Mesifta Gemora explain that blood libels were common at the time of the Gemora and it would be a grave desecration of Hashem’s name if it would be known that Jews killed a young boy Erev Pesach as the idolaters would start persecutions of the Jews, and accuse the Jews of using the blood for the baking of matzah. The blood libels were marked by constant and unrelenting Christian persecution so it was understandable why an abbreviation was used. It is next to impossible to explain the accusations that were hurled at the Jews during this time. Jews were persecuted not only for being "Christ-killers" but as "baby-killers." The libels were not logical and occurred when a Jewish or Christian baby was killed. This is why the printers wrote this word in this manner.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 103 - Highlights

Residing with her Mother

The Mishna had stated: If someone marries a woman and promises to support her daughter (from a previous marriage) for five years, he must do so. If she (is divorced from him and) marries someone else (within those five years), and she makes that same condition with her new husband, he must keep this condition as well. The first husband cannot say, “If her mother would be married to me I will feed her.” He is obligated to bring her food to where her mother resides.

Rav Chisda says: From the Mishna, it may be derived that a girl, whether she is an adult or whether she is a minor, resides with her mother. This is true even if she is being supported by her brothers.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps the Mishna is only referring to a minor girl and that is when she resides with the mother? We would be concerned because of the following incident cited in a braisa: If someone died and he left over a young son to his mother; the heirs of the father claim that the son should reside with them and his mother claims that her son should reside with her, the halacha is that we place him with his mother and not with those who would inherit him (if he would die). There was such an incident and they place the son with his relatives. The very first evening, the relatives killed him (in order to take the inheritance; it is this very concern that causes us to say that the girl should reside with her mother and not with her relatives because she also receives a tenth of her father’s property).

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would be referring only to a minor girl, it should have stated, “He brings her the food to where she is residing” (and it would be self evident that the minor girl is with her mother and the adult girl is with the brothers). By the fact that the Mishna said that the food is brought to where her mother resides, we learn that she resides with her mother, even if she is an adult. (102b – 103a)

Paying Twice

The Mishna had stated: Both husbands cannot say that they will split the costs of her food, but rather one buys her food and the other gives her the monetary equivalent.

The Gemora records a related incident: A certain man once leased his mill to another for the consideration of the latter’s services in grinding his wheat to sustain his household. Eventually, he (the original owner of the mill) became rich and he bought another mill and a donkey (in order to sustain his household himself). Thereupon, he said to the other, “Until now I have had my grinding done by you, but now (that I can grind myself), pay me rent for the mill. The other replied, “I will continue to grind for you.”

Ravina intended to rule that it involved the very same principle that was taught in our Mishna: Both husbands cannot say that they will split the costs of her food, but rather one buys her food and the other gives her the monetary equivalent (so too, in this case, the owner can demand to be paid with cash even though the original arrangement was for payment in service).

Rav Avira said to him: Are the two cases comparable? There, the daughter has only one stomach, not two; but here, the renter might tell the owner, “Grind with your own mill and sell it and that which I grind for you in mine, you shall keep for your household. This halacha is only applicable in a case where the renter has no other people that need grinding at his mill (and he himself must use the mill), but if he has sufficient orders for grinding at his mill, he may in such circumstances be compelled not to act in the manner of Sodom (and he would be required to pay the rent with money). (103a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If a widow said, “I do not want to leave my husband’s house,” the heirs may not say to her, “Go to your father’s house and we shall support you,” but rather they support her in her husband’s house and they provide her with a room in accordance with her condition.

If she said, “I do not want to move from my father’s house,” the heirs may say to her, “If you reside with us, you will be maintained, but if you do not reside with us, you will not be maintained.” And if she claims, “It is because I am young and they are young (and she is concerned that a sin will be committed),” they support her even if she remains in her father’s house. (103a)

Widow’s Dwelling

The Gemora cites a braisa: A widow may use her deceased husband’s dwelling just as she used it during his lifetime. She may also use the slaves, the cushions, the coverings and the silver and gold utensils just as she used them during his lifetime. For he wrote for her in the kesuvah: And you shall dwell in my house and be supported from my estate throughout the duration of your widowhood in my house.

Rav Yosef taught: This halacha is only applicable if the husband left for the widow a house to dwell in; however, if he left only a shack, the inheritors live there, but not the widow (she must find her own place of lodging).

Rav Nachman said: If the orphans sold the house that was reserved for the widow, the sale is not valid.

The Gemora asks: Why is it different than that which Rav Assi taught in the name of Rabbi Yochanan? For Rav Assi taught in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If the male orphans pre-empted the female orphans (before it came to Beis Din) and sold property from a small estate, their sale is valid (even though the daughters should have legally received the estate and the sons would go begging door to door)?

The Gemora answers: There, the property was not mortgaged to the daughters during her father’s lifetime, but here, the house was mortgaged to the widow during her husband’s lifetime.

Abaye stated: It has been our tradition to rule that if a widow’s dwelling collapsed, the inheritors are not obligated to rebuild it.

The Gemora cites a braisa which supports this ruling: If a widow’s dwelling collapsed, the inheritors are not obligated to rebuild it. Furthermore, even if she says, “Let me rebuild it at my own expense,” we do not listen to her (and the orphans can do whatever they desire with the property).

Abaye inquired: What is the halacha if she fixed up the house (in a manner that it will last much longer than previously anticipated; can the orphans demand that she leave the house after she lives there for the amount of years it would have lasted without her repairs or not)?

The inquiry remains unresolved. (103a)

Blessing, Wealth and Healing

The Mishna had stated: If she said, “I do not want to move from my father’s house,” the heirs may say to her, “If you reside with us, you will be maintained, but if you do not reside with us, you will not be maintained.”

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t they be obligated to support her even in her father’s house?

The Gemora answers: This would support that which Rav Huna said. For Rav Huna said: The blessing of a house is proportionate to the amount of people residing in the house (and if she does not stay with them, the blessing is diminished).

The Gemora asks: But shouldn’t they be obligated to support her and deduct the amount of the loss?

The Gemora answers: That is precisely what the halacha is.

Rav Huna said: We can derive blessing, wealth and healing from the language of the Chachamim. In respect to ‘blessing,’ we have the statement just mentioned. ‘Wealth’ is learned from the following Mishna: If one sold fruits to his fellow and the buyer pulled them (effecting a kinyan), though they have not yet been measured, he has acquired them. If, however, they have been measured, but the buyer has not pulled them, he has not acquired them. But if the buyer is wise, he should rent the place where they are kept (and then he acquires the fruits and the seller cannot retract before the buyer pulls all the fruit; this is where the Chachamim taught us how to become wealthy). ‘Healing’ is derived from the following Mishna: A man should not chew wheat and place it on his wound during Pesach because it ferments (it becomes chametz from his saliva; the Chachamim taught us a remedy). (103a)





Rebbe’s Instructions

The Gemora cites a braisa: When Rebbe was about to depart this world, he said, “I require the presence of my sons.” When his sons entered, he instructed them, “Take care that you show proper respect to your mother. The candle shall continue to burn in its usual place. The table shall be laid in its usual place and my bed shall be spread in its usual place. Yosef of Chaifa and Shimon of Efrat who attended on me during my lifetime shall attend on me after I die.”

The Gemora explains Rebbe’s instructions: “Take care that you show proper respect to your mother.” The Gemora asks: Isn’t this a Biblical commandment? The Gemora answers: She was their father’s wife (not their mother; she merely raised them). The Gemora asks: There is a Biblical obligation to honor a father’s wife as well? The Gemora answers: That is only when the father is alive; after he dies, there is no obligation to honor his wife.

“The candle shall continue to burn in its usual place. The table shall be laid in its usual place and my bed shall be spread in its usual place.” The Gemora asks: What was the reason for these instructions? The Gemora answers: Rebbe used to come home every Erev Shabbos. On a certain Erev Shabbos a neighbor came to the door calling aloud, when his maidservant whispered, “Be quiet for Rebbe is sitting there.” When he heard this, he came no longer, in order that it should not look bad for earlier righteous people (who were denied the privilege of returning to their home after their death).

“Yosef of Chaifa and Shimon of Efrat who attended on me during my lifetime shall attend on me after I die.” He was understood to mean that they should attend to him in this world by burying him. When it was seen however, that their biers preceded his (they were buried before Rebbe), it became evident that Rebbe was referring to the World to Come. And the reason why Rebbe mentioned this was in order that people would not say that they were guilty of some sin and that it was only with the merit of attending to Rebbe that protected them until that moment.

The Gemora continues with its recording of Rebbe’s instructions prior to his death. Rebbe said, “I require the presence of the Chachamim.” When they entered, he instructed them, “Do not eulogize me in the towns (as my coffin is being carried to my place of burial). Begin studying Torah again in the Beis Medrash thirty days after my death (don’t eulogize me any longer). Shimon, my son is very wise, but my son Gamliel shall be the Nasi. Chanina bar Chama should be appointed the head of the Yeshiva.”

The Gemora explains Rebbe’s instructions: “Do not eulogize me in the towns (as my coffin is being carried to my place of burial).” They thought that Rebbe was concerned that it would be an unnecessary burden on the townspeople. However, once they saw that when he was eulogized in the big cities, all the townspeople came to participate, they realized that the purpose of his instructions was to honor the Torah (by having more people attend his eulogy).

“Begin studying Torah again in the Beis Medrash thirty days after my death (don’t eulogize me any longer).” This was because Rebbe did not wish to be greater than Moshe Rabbeinu, who was eulogized for thirty days and no longer. The Gemora recounts that they eulogized Rebbe for thirty days and thirty nights. Afterwards, they either eulogized him by day and studied Torah at night, or they eulogized him at night and studied Torah by day, until he was eulogized for the entire year.

The Gemora records: On the day that Rebbe died, a Heavenly voice went forth and announced: “Whoever has been present at the death of Rebbe is destined for the life of the World to Come.” A certain laundryman who used to come before Rebbe every day, failed to come on that day. When he heard this (the announcement), he went up upon a roof, jumped to the ground and died. A Heavenly voice came forth and announced: “That laundryman also is destined for the life of the World to Come.”

“Shimon, my son is very wise, but my son Gamliel shall be the Nasi.” The Gemora asks: Why did Rebbe say that Shimon his son was wise? The Gemora answers: He was saying that although Shimon was wise, Gamliel should be the Nasi. The Gemora explains: If not for Rebbe’s explicit instructions, Gamliel would not have been appointed Nasi even though he was older, for he was not as worthy as his brother Shimon. The Gemora asks: So why did Rebbe choose Gamliel over Shimon? The Gemora answers: In respect to his fear of sin, Gamliel was the most suited of all his brothers.

“Chanina bar Chama should be appointed the head of the Yeshiva.” The Gemora records that Rabbi Chanina did not accept this position, for Rabbi Afeis was two and a half years older than him. Rabbi Afeis was appointed head of the Yeshiva, and Rabbi Chanina sat outside. Levi went and joined Rabbi Chanina. After some time, Rabbi Afeis died and Rabbi Chanina was appointed head of the Yeshiva. Levi did not have a partner to sit with outside, so he went to Bavel.

And this is in accordance with what the Chachamim said to Rav: A great man (Levi) arrived in Nehardea, and he limped and he ruled that a woman may wear a tiara on Shabbos (although there was a decree against wearing adornments on Shabbos in a public domain, Levi ruled that a tiara was permitted; since they were only worn by prominent women, we were not concerned that they will remove their jewelry to show to their friends). Rav said: It is understood that Rabbi Afeis has died and Rabbi Chanina is now the head of the Yeshiva. Levi, evidently, did not have a partner to sit with outside, so he came to Bavel.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps it was Rabbi Chanina who died, and Rabbi Afeis was still the head of the Yeshiva? The Gemora answers: Levi would have studied under Rabbi Afeis (since he was younger than him). Alternatively, since Rebbe had declared that Rabbi Chanina the son of Rabbi Chama would be the head of the Yeshiva, Rav knew that this would eventually happen. This is because it is written that a righteous person decrees and Hashem fulfills his words.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t Rebbe appoint Rabbi Chiya as the head of the Yeshiva? The Gemora answers: Rabbi Chiya had already died. The Gemora asks: But Rabbi Chiya said: “I saw the coffin of Rebbe and I cried over it”? The Gemora answers: It must be that Rebbe said that regarding Rabbi Chiya. The Gemora asks: But Rabbi Chiya said: “On the day that Rebbe died, holiness ceased.”? The Gemora answers: It must be that Rebbe said that regarding Rabbi Chiya. The Gemora asks further: But we learned in the following braisa: When Rebbe became sick, Rabbi Chiya came to visit him and found that he was crying. Rabbi Chiya asked him: Why are you crying? Didn’t we learn that if a man dies smiling, it is a good omen for him; if he dies weeping, it is a bad omen for him; if he dies with his face upwards, it is a good omen, if he dies with his face downwards, it is a bad omen; if he dies with his face towards the public it is a good omen, if he dies with his face towards the wall, it is a bad omen. If his face is greenish, it is a bad omen; if his face is bright and ruddy, it is a good omen. If he dies on Erev Shabbos, it is a good omen; if he dies on Motzoei Shabbos, it is a bad omen; if he dies on Erev Yom Kippur, it is a bad omen; if he dies on Motzoei Yom Kippur, it is a good omen. If he dies because of a stomach disease, it is a good omen because most righteous men die from stomach sickness. (Why are you crying, Rabbi Chiya was asking him?) Rebbe replied: I weep because I will no longer be able to study Torah and to perform the mitzvos. (It emerges from this braisa that Rebbe died before Rabbi Chiya?)

The Gemora answers: We must reverse the namesin the braisa. Alternatively, we can answer that Rabbi Chiya was engaged in the performance of mitzvos, and Rebbe thought that it would be best not to disturb him by becoming the head of the Yeshiva. (103a – 103b)

[END]

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Redeeming with a Check

The Gemora (Kesuvos 102a)explains that the son is not redeemed because of Ula’s decree. For Ula said: Biblically, his son would be redeemed when he gives the money; the Rabbis decreed that he is not redeemed because people might mistakenly say that one may redeem a firstborn son with a third-party debt document (and those are Biblically invalid for redemption; his own debt document, like in our case, would be Biblically valid, but the Rabbis were concerned that people would not understand the difference between the two types of documents).

The Chasam Sofer in a teshuva (Y”D 134) discusses if redemption would be valid when the father pays the Kohen by check. Is a check regarded as money because it is accepted as cash all over or do we say that it is regarded as a document since there is no inherent value in the paper itself?

He concludes that a check can be regarded as money for some things, but as a document for others. If it is regarding a matter which is between people, then a check would be considered money, since it is commonly accepted. However, regarding redemption of a firstborn, which is between man and Hashem, a check would be regarded as a document and the redemption would not be valid.

He explains: The father is actually redeeming his firstborn son from Hashem, but He gave over the monetary rights to the five selaim to the Kohen. Since it is the Torah that set the requirement for the money, the redemption will only be valid if the father gives to the Kohen something that is itself valued at five selaim.

The Chazon Ish (Y”D 72:10) disagrees and maintains that a check would be regarded as money and the redemption would be valid.

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Redemption with a Minor Kohen

The Pischei Teshuva (Y”D 305:4) cites a Chasam Sofer who holds that one may not redeem his firstborn son by using a Kohen who is a minor. For, generally, the Kohen uses his ability to remove the obligation of redemption from the father; a minor does not have the power to accomplish this.

Reb Chaim Kanievsky proves from our Gemora (Kesuvos 102a)otherwise. The Mishna (Bechoros 51a) states: If one wrote a document to a Kohen which said, “I am obligated to you for five selaim,” he is liable to pay him five selaim, but his son is still not redeemed (one who has a firstborn son is obligated to give five selaim to a Kohen in order to redeem him; since this document is regarded as an admission to a debt, it cannot be used for the independent obligation of redeeming his firstborn; if this document is an unsigned one, and nevertheless, it is regarded as a valid and binding admission to a debt, it would be following the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan and not Rish Lakish).

The Gemora deflects the proof: This case is different because there is a Biblical obligation to the Kohen (this, in turn, strengthens the unsigned document and renders it effective even according to Rish Lakish, just as if it would be a signed document).

The Gemora explains that the son is not redeemed because of Ula’s decree. For Ula said: Biblically, his son would be redeemed when he gives the money; the Rabbis decreed that he is not redeemed because people might mistakenly say that one may redeem a firstborn son with a third-party debt document (and those are Biblically invalid for redemption; his own debt document, like in our case, would be Biblically valid, but the Rabbis were concerned that people would not understand the difference between the two types of documents).

Reb Chaim states: It is evident from the Gemora that the father did not inform the Kohen that he was giving him the document for the sake of redemption, for if he would have done so, it would not be regarded as a new obligation according to Rabbi Yochanan.

It would emerge from here that if one gave money to a Kohen without informing him of the purpose, his son would be considered redeemed. This would prove that the Kohen is not actually effecting anything; it is the father’s giving of the money that accomplishes the redemption. Therefore, one would be able to give the five selaim to a Kohen who is a minor, and his firstborn son would be redeemed.

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Marriage of a Minor

Rabbi Yehoshua says (Kesuvos 101a): The actions of a minor (girl regarding marriage) are significant. Her husband does acquire lost objects that she finds; he is entitled to her earnings; he can annul her vows; he inherits her and he can become impure to her (if she dies and he is a kohen).

*** Rashi in Yevamos (108a) explains that the husband is entitled to her earnings because the Rabbis enacted that her findings are regarded as ownerless in respect to the husband.

The Aruch Lener asks: Why didn’t Rashi explain differently; the findings of every wife belong to the husband, for otherwise, it would create animosity between the two of them?

He answers: Since Biblically, the findings of a minor belong to her father; the logic of “not creating animosity” would not suffice to take the findings away from her father and give it to her husband. It is only because the Rabbis made it ownerless that the husband is entitled to it.

*** Tosfos writes that even if the vows of someone close to adulthood are Biblically valid, the husband can nevertheless annul her vows even though they are only Rabbinically married. This is because when a wife pronounces a vow, she does so with the understanding of her husband, and therefore, he has the ability to annul her vows.

*** Tosfos also explains that the husband is allowed to contaminate himself to her even if he is a Kohen although their marriage is only Rabbinic in nature. This is because his wife is regarded as a meis mitzvah, a corpse that nobody is interested in burying. Since he inherits her, there is no one else who is willing to get involved in her burial.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 101 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: A minor girl who has refused her husband (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.); a woman who is a secondary ervah (Rabbinically forbidden to marry this man); and the aylonis (a woman incapable of procreating) have neither a kesuvah, nor the produce (this refers to the fact that the husband will ransom her if she is taken captive, which is in exchange for his rights to her produce), nor the support, nor the worn-out articles.

If at the outset, he married her knowing that she was an aylonis, she has a kesuvah.

If a widow is married to a Kohen Gadol, a divorced woman or a chalutzah to an ordinary Kohen, a mamzeres or a nesinah to a Yisroel, the daughter of a Yisroel to a nesin or to a mamzer, they receive their kesuvah. (100b)

Does the Argument Between Rav and Shmuel Have an Earlier Source?

Rav learned the Mishna as follows: A minor girl who is divorced does not receive a kesuvah and certainly a minor girl who refused her husband. Shmuel learned: A girl who refused her husband does not receive her kesuvah, but a minor girl who is divorced does receive her kesuvah (he obviously maintains that the marriage of a minor girl is valid).

Let us say that this argument (between Rav and Shmuel) is an argument among the Tanaim. Rabbi Elazar says: The actions of a minor (girl regarding marriage) are insignificant. Her husband is not entitled to the lost objects that she finds; he does not receive her earnings; he cannot annul her vows; he does not inherit her and he cannot become impure to her (if she dies and he is a kohen). The rule is that she is not considered his wife regarding anything, aside for the fact that to get out of the marriage, she must perform mi’un (refuse the marriage).

Rabbi Yehoshua says: The actions of a minor (girl regarding marriage) are significant. Her husband does acquire lost objects that she finds; he is entitled to her earnings; he can annul her vows; he inherits her and he can become impure to her (if she dies and he is a kohen). The rule is that she is considered his wife regarding everything, aside from the fact that she is able to get out of the marriage by performing mi’un (refusing the marriage).

The Gemora asks: Let us say that Rav holds like Rabbi Elazar and Shmuel holds like Rabbi Yehoshua.

The Gemora answers: This that you said that Rav holds like Rabbi Elazar while Shmuel does not is clearly true. The argument between Rav and Shmuel can even take place according to Rabbi Yehoshua. It is obvious that Shmuel can hold like Rabbi Yehoshua. How can Rav hold like Rabbi Yehoshua? Rav will say: Rabbi Yehoshua only said that she is considered his wife in regards to what she gives him (or what he has rights to in her, i.e. denying her vows). However, regarding his obligations to her, even Rabbi Yehoshua would agree that he is not obligated like he would be to a regular wife. (100b – 101a)

Shmuel’s Statement

Rav Huna bar Chiya said to Rav Kahana: You told us in the name of Shmuel that (the Mishna’s statement that he does not have to return used clothes) this only applies to nichsei melog (possessions brought into a marriage that a husband may freely use). However, this does not apply to nichsei tzon barzel (possessions brought into a marriage that a husband must return at the value that they were evaluated at the beginning of the marriage).

Rav Papa wondered: Which case in the Mishna is Shmuel’s statement referring to? If it is talking about a girl who performs mi’un, then if the clothes still exist, it makes sense she should take both types of clothes with her out of the marriage! If they are not extant, she should not be able to take both types! [Rashi explains that he can claim that he will only give back their value when he divorces her, as he still has the potential to inherit her.]

Rav Papa therefore entertains that this is referring to an aylonis (a woman with no signs of femininity, see Yevamos 80b). The Gemora asks: If the clothes still exist, it makes sense she should take both types of clothes with her out of the marriage! If they do not exist, then the opposite should be true. The clothes that are nichsei melog which he has no right to use up (his right to benefit is not a right to destroy) should go to her. The clothes that were nichsei tzon barzel that were not in her possession (and which he had a right to use) she should not receive!

The Gemora therefore concludes that this statement of Shmuel is referring to a shniyah (a woman who is forbidden to marry based on a rabbinic prohibition). The Rabbis gave each of them a fine. She loses what she would normally collect from him, and he loses what she would normally let him keep.

Rav Simi bar Ashi says: We see from here that a coat (that is nichsei melog) is considered principle, and a husband cannot wear it (saying that he is merely benefiting) until it gets worn out. The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav Nachman say such usage is appropriate benefit? The Gemora answers: Rav Nachman argues. (101a)

Additional Amounts

Shmuel says: When the Mishna says these women do not have a kesuvah, it means they do not have the standard amounts of one (widow) or two hundred (never married). However, they do receive the additional amounts pledged to them.

The following Beraisa supports this statement. The Beraisa states: The women who the sages said do not have a kesuvah, for example a girl who does mi’un and others listed with her, do not receive one or two hundred, but they do receive the additional monies. The women whom the sages said must get divorced without a kesuvah, like woman who sins (see 72a) and her friends, do not receive additions, and certainly not one or two hundred. A woman who is divorced because of a bad name (that she was promiscuous), takes what is in front of her (nichsei melog) and leaves. (101a)

Does She Lose Her Clothes?

This supports the statement of Rav Huna. Rav Huna said: If she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog).

A Beraisa was taught in front of Rav Nachman: If she was promiscuous, she loses the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog). Rav Nachman said: If she was promiscuous, were her clothes promiscuous? Rav Nachman therefore said the correct text must be: If she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog).

Rabah bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: These (the text as it was presented to Rav Nachman) are the words of Rabbi Menachem Stimtah. However, the Chachamim say the correct text is that if she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog). (101a – 101b)

Knowing Beforehand

Rav Huna said: An aylonis is sometimes considered like a wife and sometimes not. A widow who marries a kohen gadol is like a regular wife. An aylonis is sometimes considered like a wife and sometimes not, as if he knew beforehand she was an aylonis (and agreed to marry her anyway) she receives a kesuvah, but if he didn’t know she does not. A widow who marries a kohen gadol receives a kesuvah, whether or not he knew she was a widow. Rav Yehudah argues: In both cases she only receives a kesuvah if he knew of her status beforehand.

The Gemora asks from a Beraisa. The Beraisa states: If he married her knowing that she was like this and she indeed was, she receives a kesuvah. This implies that if it was simply not discussed, she does not receive a kesuvah!

The Gemora answers: The implication could be otherwise. It could be that if he married her based on a lie (that she had never married previously) and he later realized she was a widow, she does not receive a kesuvah. However, if it was never discussed, it is possible she does receive a kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: If this is true, why doesn’t the Beraisa state this case instead (where nothing was discussed), and we would certainly know about a case where it was discussed that she would receive a kesuvah! Additionally, there is another Beraisa that explicitly states that if he knowingly married her as a widow, she receives a kesuvah. If he married her without having discussed her status, she does not receive a kesuvah. This seems to be a strong question on Rav Huna!

The Gemora explains that Rav Huna made a mistake in understanding the text of the Mishna. He thought that because the Mishna only discussed this difference regarding an aylonis and not a widow, it must be that a widow would receive a kesuvah when the topic was not discussed. This, however, was incorrect. The Mishna’s statement about a widow was based on the previous distinction made by aylonis. (101b)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
ALMANAH NIZONESS

Mishna

If someone marries a woman and promises to support her daughter (from a previous marriage) for five years, he must do so. If she (is divorced from him and) marries someone else (within those five years), and she makes that same condition with her new husband, he must keep this condition as well. The first husband cannot say, “when she comes to me I will feed her.” He is obligated to bring her food to where her mother resides. Both husbands cannot say that they will split the costs of her food, but rather one buys her food and the other gives her the monetary equivalent. If the daughter marries within this time, her husband gives her food and the husbands give her their monetary equivalent. If the husbands die, their daughters are fed from possessions that do not liens, and this daughter (that we are discussing) can be fed from possessions that do have liens, as she is considered like a creditor. Smart people who were asked to make such a condition (before marrying a woman) would stipulate that they would support their wife’s daughter as long as they stay married. (101b)


Talking About Owing Money in a Document

It is taught: If someone says to his friend “I am obligated to give you a manah,” Rabbi Yochanan says he is indeed obligated, while Reish Lakish says he is not. The Gemora asks: In what case are they arguing? If the case is where he took witnesses aside beforehand and said “you are my witnesses that I am obligated etc,” why would Reish Lakish say he is not obligated? If he didn’t say this, why would Rabbi Yochanan say he is obligated?

The Gemora answers: The case is where he did not say this. He said: “I owe you a manah as stated in this document.” Rabbi Yochanan says he is obligated, because saying that it is stated in the document is as strong as saying “you are my witnesses.” Reish Lakish says he is not obligated, as just the statement and the giving over of a document (that Rashi says merely states “I owe you a manah”) is not as strong as a statement along with saying “you are my witnesses.” (101b)

[END]

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Terumah More than a Sixth

The Gemora (Kesuvos 100a) asks: Why is this case (an agent undercharging for the property of an orphan) any different than that which we learned in the following Mishna: If one tells an agent, “Separate terumah for me (without specifying an amount), he should separate according to what the agent perceives is the mindset of the owner (either one-fortieth, one-fiftieth or one-sixtieth). If he cannot ascertain what the owner would want, he should separate one-fiftieth. If the agent has separated one in forty or one in sixty as terumah, the terumah is nevertheless is valid. (It is evident that although the agent has made a mistake, his actions are nevertheless valid?)

The Gemora answers: By the terumah, the agent has a valid excuse; he can say that he figured that the owner would separate terumah in a stingy manner or generously; however, in this case (where the agent charged too little for the property), the owner may tell the agent, “You should not have made a mistake.”

The Beis Yaakov asks: Isn’t the case of terumah a case where the agent erred in an amount which is more than a sixth; everyone would agree that the sale is invalid?

He answers: Since it is extremely common to err in this regard when separating terumah; even more than a sixth is regarded as having the same halacha as precisely a sixth.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 100 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: The property sold according to the assessment of the judges who undervalued it by one sixth or added one sixth, their sale is void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Their sale is valid, for otherwise, how is the power of the Court superior?

However, if they made a letter of inspection (a public announcement of the impending sale, whereupon people may inspect the property and assess its true value), even if they sold what is worth a maneh for two hundred, or what is worth two hundred for a maneh, their sale is valid. (99b)

An Undercharging Agent
The Gemora inquires: What is the halacha if an agent makes a mistake?

Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The agent is like the judges (the sale is valid as long as the mistake was less than a sixth). Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said in the name of Rav Nachman: An agent is like a widow (any mistake, even minimal, invalidates the sale).

The Gemora explains their respective opinions: Rava maintains that an agent is comparable to the judges because they both are not selling the property for their own sake. Rav Shmuel bar Bisna compares an agent to the widow because they are both individuals; Beis Din, on the other hand, are many people.

The Gemora rules: An agent is like a widow.

The Gemora asks: Why is this case any different than that which we learned in the following Mishna: If one tells an agent, “Separate terumah for me (without specifying an amount), he should separate according to what the agent perceives is the mindset of the owner (either one-fortieth, one-fiftieth or one-sixtieth). If he cannot ascertain what the owner would want, he should separate one-fiftieth. If the agent has separated one in forty or one in sixty as terumah, the terumah is nevertheless is valid. (It is evident that although the agent has made a mistake, his actions are nevertheless valid?)

The Gemora answers: By the terumah, the agent has a valid excuse; he can say that he figured that the owner would separate terumah in a stingy manner or generously; however, in this case (where the agent charged too little for the property), the owner may tell the agent, “You should not have made a mistake.” (99b – 100a)
Beis Din Errs
The Mishna cites the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Chachamim.

Rav Huna bar Chanina rules in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with the Chachamim (if Beis Din makes a mistake of a sixth in the selling of a field, the sale is invalid).

The Gemora asks: Doesn’t Rav Nachman agree with the following logic (of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel): “How is the power of the Court superior”? But Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel: If a father dies leaving over minor orphans, Beis Din sets up for each of them a guardian, and the guardians choose a positive portion for them. When they become adults, they can protest, and claim that they would like to redivide the property. Rav Nachman himself states: They cannot protest, for otherwise, it degrades the power of Beis Din. (We see that Rav Nachman does use this principle?)

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where the Beis Din made a mistake (in that case, Beis Din is not superior). Rav Nachman’s ruling was in a case where the Beis Din did not make any mistake.

The Gemora asks: If there was no mistake, why are the orphans protesting?

The Gemora answers: They are claiming that they desire a field in a different location (which shares the boundary of an independently owned field).

When Rav Dimi came to Bavel from Eretz Yisroel, he said that there was such an incident (like in the Mishna) and Rebbe ruled in accordance with the Chachamim (and the sale was deemed invalid). Rebbe was asked, “If so, how is the power of the Court superior”? Rebbe, upon hearing the question, reversed his ruling.

Rav Safra learned the above incident differently: Rebbe wanted to rule in accordance with the Chachamim (and the sale was deemed invalid). Rebbe was asked, “If so, how is the power of the Court superior”? Rebbe, upon hearing the question, did not rule in that manner.

The Gemora comments: Let us say that Rav Dimi and Rav Safra disagree regarding the following concept: One holds that in a case where a judge makes an elementary mistake, written explicitly in a Mishna, the ruling should be retracted. The other argues that even in such a case, it should not be retracted.

The Gemora answers: No, this cannot be, as everyone agrees such a mistake must be retracted. They are arguing as to how the incident occurred. (100a)
The Orphan’s Guarantee
Rav Yosef ruled: When a widow sells property from her husband’s estate with a guarantee (that the purchaser will be compensated if the land is seized by a creditor), the obligation to pay for this guarantee rests upon the orphans (because they are responsible to pay for her support and kesuvah). The same applies if Beis Din sells the property.

The Gemora notes: The novelty of Rav Yosef’s ruling is that even when Beis Din sells the property, the orphans are obligated to honor the guarantee. We might have thought that one who buys from Beis Din understands that this was a public sale (and it should be regarded as if he purchased it without a guarantee); Rav Yosef informs us that this is not the case. (100a – 100b)
Up Until Half
The Gemora had stated: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: The property sold according to the assessment of the judges who undervalued it by one sixth or added one sixth is valid.

The Gemora states that the sale is valid as long as Beis Din did not sell the property for less than half of its true value.

The Gemora cites a braisa where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states this ruling explicitly. (100b)
Public Announcement
Ameimar said in the name of Rav Yosef: If Beis Din sold the orphan’s property without publicly announcing the sale (prior to the sale), it is as if they made a mistake regarding an explicit ruling of a Mishna, and the sale is deemed invalid.

The Gemora asks on the language, “it is as if.” Didn’t we learn a Mishna in Arachin explicitly like that?

The Gemora answers: Without this ruling, we would have thought that the Mishna is only referring to a case where an agent made a mistake; Rav Yosef informed us that this ruling is applicable even if Beis Din made the mistake.

Rav Ashi asked Ameimar from our Mishna: The property sold according to the assessment of the judges who undervalued it by one sixth or added one sixth, their sale is void. It can be inferred that if the price would have been equal to its value, the sale would be valid. This would be so even though there was no public announcement prior to the sale.

The Gemora answers: No! The sale would only be valid if there was a public announcement prior to the sale.

The Gemora counters: Since the latter ruling of the Mishna is when there was an announcement, the first part of the Mishna is referring to a case where there was no announcement, and yet the sale would be valid if it was sold for equal value!?

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is referring to things which are not announced prior to the sale, such as slaves, movables and loan documents.

The Gemora explains the reason: We do not issue a public announcement prior to the sale of slaves, for we are afraid that they will run away. We do not announce the sale of movables or documents because we are afraid that they will get stolen when they are being shown to the public.

Alternatively, we can answer that our Mishna is referring to cases where we do not publicly announce the sale prior to the sale. For they said in Nehardea: For taxes, support and burial, we sell the property of orphans without an announcement.

Alternatively, we can answer that our Mishna is referring to places that they did not issue public announcements. For Rav Nachman said: They never issued a letter of inspection in Nehardea.

The Gemora thought that the reason for that custom was because they were experts in property assessment, but then they were told that it was because people were embarrassed to buy property that was auctioned by Beis Din. (100b)
Selling Orphan’s Possessions
Rav Yehudah ruled in the name of Shmuel: The movables of orphans must be assessed and sold immediately. Rav Chisda ruled in the name of Avimi: They are to be sold in the markets.

The Gemora explains: There is, however, no difference of opinion between them. Rav Chisda is discussing a place in the proximity of a market, whereas Rav Yehudah is dealing with a case where the time for the market is far off.

The Gemora relates an incident: Rav Kahana had in his possession some beer that belonged to the orphan Rav Mesharshiya bar Chilkai. He kept it until the festival, saying, “Though it might begin to spoil, it will bring in quick money then.”

The Gemora records another related incident: Ravina had in his possession some wine belonging to the orphan Ravina Zuti, his sister’s son. He also had some wine of his own which he was about to bring to Sichra to sell. He came to Rav Ashi and asked him: May I take the orphan’s wine with my own (or perhaps I should be concerned that the ship will sink)? Rav Ashi told him: You may take it with you, for it is not superior to your own wine. (100b)

[END]

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Price Fraud - Kesuvos 99 - Daf yomi

The Keli Yakar writes that the reason there is no onaah (price fraud) in respect to land is because land stays forever; even if presently, the land is not worth that price, it will eventually go up. This cannot be said in respect to movable property, for who knows if this particular item will be in existence by the time the price rises.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 99 - Highlights

A Deviating Agent

The Gemora states a different version of the inquiry. Others say: There is no inquiry regarding the following case: If the owner told the agent, “Go and sell for me a lesech (half of a kor) of my fields,” and the agent went and sold a full kor. The agent is certainly adding on to the owner’s instructions (by selling more, and the sale of the lesech is valid). The question would be in the following case: If the owner told the agent, “Go and sell for me a kor of my fields,” and the agent went and sold only a lesech.

The Gemora explains: Do we say that the agent will tell him, “It is advantageous for you to sell only half the field because if I would have sold the full kor and then you would realize that you do not need the money, you would not be able to retract on the deal”? Or perhaps, the owner will say, “I do not wish to have so many documents saying that I sold a field (now that he will sell the other half with a new document)”?

Rav Chanina from Sura cites a Mishna as an attempt to resolve this inquiry. The Mishna states: If an owner gave an agent a golden dinar and told him, “Buy me a shirt with this money,” but the agent bought a shirt for three selas and a cloak for three selas (there are six selas in a dinar), they both have committed me’ilah (it was subsequently found out that the dinar was in fact consecrated money; one who has unintentionally benefited from hekdesh or removed it from the ownership of the Beis Hamikdosh has committed the transgression of me’ilah, and as a penalty, he would be required to pay the value of the object plus an additional fifth of the value; he also brings a korban asham).

Now, if the agent is merely adding to the owner’s instructions (for he meant that not more than a dinar should be spent on the shirt), it is understandable why the owner has committed me’ilah, for the agent followed his instructions. However, if the agent is violating the owner’s instructions, why has the owner committed me’ilah?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where the agent bought a shirt that was worth six selas at a discounted price of three selas.

The Gemora asks: If so, why has the agent committed me’ilah?

The Gemora answers: He has committed me’ilah on account of the cloak.

The Gemora asks: If so, let us examine the end of the Mishna. The Mishna states: Rabbi Yehudah says: In this case as well, the owner has not committed me’ilah, for he can say, “I wanted a bigger shirt, and you bought for me a small and inferior shirt.” (If we are referring to a case where he purchased the shirt that the owner requested at a discounted price, how can the owner claim that it is small and inferior?)

The Gemora answers: The owner meant that he should have bought a shirt for six selas that would be worth even more than twelve selas.

The Gemora provides support for this explanation from a braisa.

The Gemora attempts to resolve the original question by citing our Mishna: If her kesuvah was worth four hundred, and she sold property worth one hundred to one person and property worth one hundred to another, and to the last person, she sold property that was actually worth a manah and a dinar for just a manah, only the last sale is invalid and the others are valid. (Although the widow has deviated from the instructions of the inheritors by selling less than the intended amount (in the initial three sales), they are nevertheless valid; this would prove that the agent is keeping with the instructions of the owner, and not violating them.)

The Gemora deflects the proof by saying that the Mishna can be interpreted using Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi’s explanation. For he said that the Mishna may be discussing a case where there were four small parcels of land (that could not be used by one individual, and obviously were never intended to be sold together). (99a – 99b)

A Deviating Agent (again)

The ruling in the following case is simple: If a person told his agent, “Sell the field to one person and not to two people,” the sale is invalid if the agent sells the field to two people. What is the halacha if he says, “Sell the field to one person” and he does not specify, “and not to two people”?

Rav Huna says: He meant that it should be sold to one and not to two. Rav Chisda and Rabbah bar Rav Huna says: He meant that it may be sold to two people, and even to a hundred people.

The Gemora relates an incident: Rav Nachman came to Sura and Rav Chisda and Rabbah bar Rav Huna came to visit him. They asked him: What is the halacha in such a case (if he says, “Sell the field to one person” and he does not specify, “and not to two people”)? Rav Nachman responded: He meant that it may be sold to two people, and even to a hundred people. They asked him: Would the halacha be the same if the agent made a mistake (and sold it for less than the value)? He replied: I was not discussing such a case. They asked him: But didn’t you say that there is no law of onaah (price fraud) in respect to land? Rav Nachman replied: That is correct when the owner made a mistake; however, when the agent made a mistake, he may be told, “You were sent to help my situation, not to make it worse.”

The Gemora cites a Mishna in Kiddushin as proof for Rav Nachman’s distinction between the owner making a mistake and the agent making a mistake. (99b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 98 - highlights

Seizure Regarding Vows and Evaluations

There was a woman who seized a silver cup as partial payment for her kesuvah, and then demanded food support. When they came to Rava, he said to the orphans: “Give her food support, as nobody holds like the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who say that we do not say that some of the money is like all of the money.

Rabbah the son of Rava sent the following question to Rav Yosef. If a woman sells without Beis Din, does she need to take a vow (that she did not receive more money than what she claims she received for the sale)?

Rav Yosef replied: You should first ask whether or not she must announce the sale of the possessions (in order to get as much money as possible for the good of the estate)!

Rabbah replied: I do not have any question about announcement. This is because Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Rav Nachman that if a widow seizes a field for herself based on her own evaluation of the property, what she has done is invalid. What is this case? If she announced beforehand that the property was for sale, why is what she has done considered invalid? She must not have announced, and the seizure is invalid because she seized the field for herself. This implies that if she would have seized it and sold it to someone else, it would be valid even without announcement.

The Gemora answers that this is not proof, as the case is where she did announce that the field was up for sale. She is told: “Who evaluated this for you?” [This is why her seizure is invalid.]

This is akin to a case of someone who had deposited by him a large amount of fodder (or coral, see Rashi DH “Kista”) which belonged to orphans. He evaluated it at four hundred (zuz) and took it for himself, and it then went up in value to six hundred. When the case went before Rabbi Ami he said to the man: “Who evaluated this for you?” The law is she needs to take a vow, but she does not need to announce the sale.

Mishna

A widow whose kesuvah was worth two hundred, and she proceeded to sell something from the estate worth one hundred for two hundred, or something worth two hundred for one hundred, has received her kesuvah. A widow who kesuvah is worth one hundred and she sells something worth a manah and a dinar for just one hundred, the sale is invalid. Even if she says I will give back a dinar to the inheritors, the sale is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that her sale is always valid (she just makes up the monetary difference to the inheritors). This is true unless she got cheated to the point where the amount would but an entire nine kav of field, half a kav of garden, or according to Rabbi Akiva a beis rova (a different size that according to Rabbi Akiva is called a garden). If her kesuvah was worth four hundred, and she sold one hundred to one person and one hundred to another, and to the last person she sold something that was actually worth a manah and a dinar for just a manah, only the last sale is invalid and the others are valid.

Who Gets the Profit?

The Gemora asks: Why is the case where she sells something worth two hundred for one hundred different, in that we say she has to take the loss? The Gemora assumes that it must be because the orphans say to her that she lost out on her own value of the item she was given (that was two hundred). Accordingly, the Gemora asks: Why in the case where she sold something worth one hundred for two hundred can’t she say that she is still owed one hundred, as the extra hundred was her self-made profit!

Rav Nachman says in the name of Rabah bar Avuhah: Rebbi taught here that all of the profit goes to the owner of the money (not a messenger who sells for more than instructed).

This is as stated in the following Beraisa. The Beraisa states: If another unit was given to the messenger (who was making a purchase for someone), Rabbi Yehudah is of the opinion that everything goes to the owner of the monies. Rabbi Yosi states: They divide the money.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rabbi Yosi state in a different Beraisa that this goes to the owner? Rami bar Chama answers: This is not difficult. In a case where the seller is suuposed to supply a certain amount of goods and he adds units to the buyer, the addition is a present which the messenger and owner split evenly. In a case where the sale is for a set value and the seller decides to reduce the price of the buyer, the addition is a reduction in the sale which goes to the owner.

Rav Papa states: The law is that where the sale is for a set amount of units, the messenger and owner split what is extra. If the seller merely reduces the price for the buyer, the addition is to the benefit of the owner.

The Gemora asks: What is novel about this teaching? The Gemora answers that Rav Papa is confirming that the answer stated above (Rami bar Chama’s explanation of Rabbi Yosi) is halachically valid.

The Rebellious Messenger

The Gemora inquires: If someone told his messenger to sell a half-kur of land, an instead he sold an entire kur, what is the law? Did he merely add on to his instructions, in which the case the sale for the half-kur should still be valid? Or is he considered to have went against orders, and therefore the entire sale is invalid?

Rav Yaakov from Pakod River said in the name of Ravina that we can answer this question from the following Beraisa. The Beraisa states: If a person said to his messenger to give a piece of food (i.e. meat) to each guest, and the messenger instructs each to take two pieces, and they each take three pieces, everyone has transgressed using hekdesh (items dedicated to the Temple, as the food had been dedicated to be sold/used for the Temple). Rav Yaakov explains that if the messenger is considered to have merely added another piece to the instruction of the host, it is understandable why the owner is considered to have used hekdesh. However, if he is considered to have totally disobeyed the orders of the host, why should the host be considered to have transgressed hekdesh? Doesn’t the Mishna say that if a messenger carries out such orders the owner (in this case host) transgresses, but if he did not the messenger transgresses?

The Gemora answers: The case above is where the messenger said to the guests to take one piece with the permission of the owner and one more because the messenger allowed. The guests went ahead and took three pieces.

[END]

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A Mistaken Deal - Kesuvos 97 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cited the following incident: There was once a food shortage in Nehardea. All the people sold their mansions. Eventually, wheat arrived and Rav Nachman told them: The law is that the mansions must be returned to their original owners!

The Gemora notes that the sales were made in error since it became known that the ship carrying the wheat was waiting in the port.

The Gemora adds that this would explain the following conversation: Rami bar Shmuel said to Rav Nachman: If you rule like this, you will cause them trouble in the future (for people will be fearful of selling). He replied: Is a food shortage a daily occurrence? Rami bar Shmuel retorted: Yes, a food shortage in Nehardea is indeed a common occurrence!

This Gemora is used to resolve various questions.

*** Reuven desperately needed an operation and he desired a certain expert doctor to perform the surgery. The hospital told him that he presently was outside of Eretz Yisroel and will only be returning the following week. Reuven vowed an enormous amount of money to charity if the surgeon would return earlier than he originally intended. As soon as he uttered those words, the doctor was standing by his bedside. He told Reuven that he had decided to shorten his vacation. The question was asked: Was Reuven obligated to fulfill his vow? Perhaps, he was not required to give the money to charity, for at the time that he pronounced the vow, the doctor was already in Eretz Yisroel!

*** There was a certain city where a terrible edict was issued against the Jewish residents. They sent a message to a well-known Tzadik, who was famous for delivering miracles to daven for them. The Tzadik agreed, but requested of them to send a certain amount of money that he would be able to distribute to the widows and orphans residing in his city. A short amount of time after they sent the money, they received a letter that the decree had been cancelled. The city was overjoyed. However, one resident sent a letter to the Maharsham saying that perhaps, they should get their money back because he noticed that the date on the letter stating that the decree had been cancelled was before they actually sent the money. It emerges, he claimed, that the giving of the money was erroneous.

*** Reuven and Shimon bought two lottery tickets together. They made up that they each will share the winnings of each ticket. The reason for this decision was based on the Gemora in Bava Metzia that states that the mazal of two people together is better than one. After the lottery numbers were chosen, Reuven went to Shimon attempting to switch the deal. He said, “Let us each keep the winnings of our own individual ticket.” Reuven did this because he already knew that the ticket which he was holding was chosen and he would receive $50,000.00. Shimon agreed to this new deal. The reason that Shimon agreed was because the ticket which he was holding was chosen, and he would now receive the full share of a $200,000.00 winning. The question arose. Can Reuven now retract from the second deal?

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 97 - Highlights

Widow Selling the Estate

The Gemora asks: How does the widow sell her husband’s property (to be used for her support)?

Rav Daniel bar Katina said in the name of Rav Huna: We allow her to sell his property once a year, and the buyer pays her in installments once every thirty days (it is done in this manner in order to ensure that she does not take money that doesn’t belong to her; she is to be supported only until she remarries).

Rav Yehudah says: We allow her to sell his property once every six months, and the buyer pays her in installments once every thirty days.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rav Huna’s opinion and then cites a braisa supporting Rav Yehudah’s opinion.

Ameimar rules in accordance with Rav Yehudah. (97a)

Widow Seizing Land that she Sold


They inquired of Rav Sheishes: If the widow sold property from the husband’s estate in order to be supported, may she collect from that very same property for her kesuvah?

The Gemora explains the inquiry: Rav Yosef ruled: When a widow sells property from her husband’s estate with a guarantee (that the purchaser will be compensated if the land is seized by a creditor), the obligation to pay for this guarantee rests upon the orphans (because they are responsible to pay for her support and kesuvah). Since the orphans are responsible, she may seize the property that she previously sold, or perhaps, the purchasers can tell her, “If others would seize the property, the orphans are responsible for your guarantee, but you did accept to guarantee that you yourself will not seize the property”?

Rav Sheishes proves from a braisa that she may not collect for her kesuvah from land that she had sold as means to be supported. (97a)


A Seller Rescinding


The Gemora inquired: If a seller of property decided that he did not need the money (it was well known that he was selling property because he needed cash for another business transaction, and now, the other sellers retracted from the deal), is the sale automatically invalid (as if it was stipulated that he was selling the property on condition that the money would be used for this other transaction) or not?

The Gemora attempts to bring a proof from the following incident: A man sold property to Rav Papa for he needed money to buy oxen. At the end, he did not need the money and Rav Papa returned the property to him.

The Gemora deflects the proof: Perhaps Rav Papa was acting beyond the literal letter of the law?

The Gemora attempts to bring a proof from another incident: There was once a food shortage in Nehardea. All the people sold their mansions. Eventually, wheat arrived and Rav Nachman told them: The law is that the mansions must be returned to their original owners!

The Gemora deflects the proof: There also, the sales were made in error since it became known that the ship carrying the wheat was waiting in the port.

The Gemora notes that this would explain the following conversation: Rami bar Shmuel said to Rav Nachman: If you rule like this, you will cause them trouble in the future (for people will be fearful of selling). He replied: Is a food shortage a daily occurrence? Rami bar Shmuel retorted: Yes, a food shortage in Nehardea is indeed a common occurrence!

The Gemora issues a ruling: If a seller of property (thinking that he needed the money) decided that he did not need the money, the sale is automatically deemed invalid. (97a)

Mishna


The Mishna states: A widow, whether after the erusin or after the nisuin, may sell without Beis Din (provided that three people determine that she is not underselling the property).

Rabbi Shimon says: After the nisuin, she may sell without Beis Din (for she is selling it to be supported and she is not required to wait); after the erusin, she may sell only through Beis Din because she does not a right to be supported, and whoever does not have this right may sell only through Beis Din. (97a)


Moveable Property for her Support


The Gemora asks: Why does the Tanna Kamma permit the widow from erusin to sell the property without Beis Din; she is not selling it to be supported?

Ula says: It is because of favor (a woman will not refrain from marriage if she realizes that it is not so difficult to sell the property).

Rabbi Yochanan said: It is because a man would not want that his wife should be exposed to a court of law.

The difference between them would be a case of a divorcee.

The Gemora cites the next Mishna which states: A divorcee may sell only through Beis Din. This would provide support to Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion, for according to him, it is understandable why there is a distinction between a widow and a divorcee.

The Gemora defends Ula by stating that this Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. (97a – 97b)

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