HaRav Elyashiv Shlita on Smoking on Yom Tov

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 7a) states the principle of "mitoch." Since kindling is permitted on Yom tov for the sake of food preparartion, it is also permitted when it is not for the sake of food preparation. The Gemora applies this to the prohibition of causing a wound as well.

The Gemora states: This is only applicable if it is something that is enjoyable to all. The Gemora explains that one would be permitted to slaughter a deer on Yom Tov even though only rich people eat deer. This is because it is enjoyable to all; practically speaking, only the rich eat it, but that does not effect the halacha. Placing incense on the coals, which is only enjoyed by few would be prohibited.

This brings up the question regarding smoking on Yom Tov. We cite many of the opinions below, but we would like to add the ruling of Rav Elyashiv Shlita. He states that those that permitted smoking on Yom tov (for the reasons mentioned below), that was only in previous generations, when it was done for medicinal purposes. Nowadays, where it is well documented that smoking is unhealthy and extremely dangerous, and people are definitely not smoking to improve their health, and it is not something that is enjoyable by all because the majority of people do not smoke, smoking would be prohibited on Yom Tov.

Please make sure you scroll down to the comments as people are linking to very interesting articles - Halachically and health related.

UPDATE : Many people have mentioned that the number one issue should be second hand smoke - now that it has been proven that this is extremely dangerous. Here is a ruling issued by the Tzitz Eliezer.


"...וכמו כן כשמעשנים במקומות ציבוריים יכול שפיר כל אחד ואחד מהנמצאים שם החושש מזה לפיגוע בבריאותו, למחות בידי המעשנים שלא יעשנו"23.

When one is smoking in a public place, anyone in the vicinity who is concerned about his personal health can protest and demand that the person should not smoke in the area.

HaRav Moshe Feinstein Zt"l writes sharp words for those who smoke in a Beis Medrash, Yeshiva or kollel building.

(דברים חריפים יותר על חומרת איסור העישון בבית המדרש בישיבות ובכוללים, כתב הגר"מ פיינשטיין שליט"א, ראה צילום מכתבו להלן עמ' 251-248.

Please read this introduction again from the Kollel Iyun Hadaf: Most contemporary authorities state that there is no allowance to smoke at all, even on an ordinary weekday, due to the established and documented health hazards which the effects of cigarettes and second-hand smoke pose to the smoker and to those around him.

I have recently been asked during the Daf Yomi shiur a few times regarding smoking on Yom Tov. Does the principle of 'mitoch' apply? Is it a 'dovor hashaveh lechal nefesh'? If it's unhealthy for the lungs, can the logic of calming the digestive system outweigh the health factors? There are many issues. Kollel Iyun Hadaf has done extensive research on this topic and I copy it here for you. Please visit their site often as there is a wealth of information there.

Kollel Iyun Hadaf

HALACHAH: CIGARETTES ON YOM TOV
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the act of placing incense on coals on Yom Tov, which involves the Melachos of kindling and extinguishing. The Gemara's discussion is relevant to a debate among the Acharonim with regard to the question of whether or not one is permitted to use cigarettes on Yom Tov.

Most contemporary authorities state that there is no allowance to smoke at all, even on an ordinary weekday, due to the established and documented health hazards which the effects of cigarettes and second-hand smoke pose to the smoker and to those around him. Nevertheless, according to those who do permit a Jew to smoke, may one smoke on Yom Tov? (This discussion is a summary of the issues involved and is not intended as a Halachic ruling.)

There are four major issues involved with smoking on Yom Tov.

(a) The MAGEN AVRAHAM (OC 514:4) cites the KENESES HA'GEDOLAH who prohibits smoking on Yom Tov because it involves the Melachah of Mechabeh, extinguishing.

In a lengthy Teshuvah, the DARCHEI NO'AM (#9) asks that the act of smoking appears to involve no act of Mechabeh, but rather an act of Hav'arah (burning). Any conceivable form of Mechabeh involved (such as diminishing the fire by squeezing the cigarette) would be a "Davar she'Eino Miskaven" and not a "Pesik Reishei," and thus should be permitted.

(b) The MAGEN AVRAHAM proposes a more basic reason to ban smoking on Yom Tov. Even if it does not involve Mechabeh but only Hav'arah, and Hav'arah is permitted on Yom Tov because of the principle of "Mitoch," the principle of "Mitoch" permits only an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," which everyone enjoys. Smoking is certainly not something which everyone enjoys.

However, the PNEI YEHOSHUA (Shabbos 39b, DH v'Omer) and RAV YONASAN EIBESHITZ (in BINAH L'ITIM, Hilchos Yom Tov 4:6) write that this reason is not enough to prohibit smoking on Yom Tov. TOSFOS in Shabbos (39b, DH u'Veis Hillel) discusses whether one may enter a bathhouse to sweat on Yom Tov. He writes that although the act of washing the entire body is not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and is therefore prohibited (see Tosfos to Beitzah 21b, DH Lo), nevertheless sweating is permitted because it is for the sake of maintaining one's health (Refu'ah) and not for pleasure. Similarly, the medicinal properties of nicotine may be grounds to permit smoking.

HAGA'ON RAV YISRAEL ZEV GUSTMAN zt'l was asked if this argument is valid grounds to permit smoking on Yom Tov today, when the dangerous effects of smoking have been proven beyond any doubt. Rav Gustman answered that any person who smokes convinces himself that it is beneficial for him. The issue of whether an activity is considered one that merely provides pleasure or one that provides health benefits does not depend on whether or not the activity is objectively healthy, but whether the person himself does it for pleasure (in which case it is not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and is forbidden on Yom Tov), or for the perceived positive chemical effects that it has on his body. One who smokes presumably does so for the artificial calming effect of the nicotine. In that respect it could be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," because with regard to acts of Refu'ah what matters is the ultimate effect and not what causes that effect, as the KESAV SOFER explains (Teshuvos OC #64). Since everyone appreciates the sense of being relaxed, any act which provides relaxing effects is considered to be "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh."

The KORBAN NESANEL (Beitzah 2:22:10) cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH (511:4) mentions another rational to consider smoking an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." Since many people, and not merely a few, have the practice to smoke, the act can be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh." The Bi'ur Halachah adds that this obviously applies only in a place where smoking is the accepted cultural norm and most people smoke.

The KORBAN NESANEL himself, however, prohibits smoking on Yom Tov. The fact that in a certain place most people smoke does not make the act "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh," because smoking is harmful to those who are not accustomed to it. Lighting the "Mugmar" and washing one's entire body are also things that many people do and are still considered things which are not "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" since some people do not appreciate such "pleasures." The PNEI YEHOSHUA (Shabbos 39b) also presents this argument.

(c) The PRI MEGADIM (OC 511) points out that an additional problem is involved when there is printing or letters on the outside of the cigarette wrapper, and by smoking one destroys those letters and transgresses the Melachah of Mochek (erasing). Because of this concern, some people who smoke on Yom Tov do not finish the cigarette when it burns down to the letters, but they let it burn by itself so that they should not transgress the Melachah of Mochek.

RAV HILLEL RUVEL shlit'a pointed out that this practice does not circumvent the problem of Mochek according to the NIMUKEI YOSEF in Bava Kama (22a). The Nimukei Yosef rules that when one lights a fire, he is considered to have burned everything that will eventually be burned by the fire. When Rav Ruvel brought this issue to the attention of Rav Gustman zt'l, Rav Gustman said that those who act leniently may rely on the OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Shabbos 23:2) who says that one who burns a book on Yom Tov is not liable for the Melachah of Mochek, because Mochek involves taking away the words and not the entire paper.

(d) The KORBAN NESANEL (loc. cit.) writes that even if no Isur d'Oraisa forbids smoking on Yom Tov, it is almost impossible for one who smokes on Yom Tov to avoid transgressing Isurei d'Oraisa, such as Hav'arah when he attempts to light the pipe, cigar, or cigarette, or when he adds or removes tobacco from a pipe, or when he taps the ashes off of a cigarette. (This may be the intention of the Keneses ha'Gedolah cited in (a) above.)

Other Acharonim (BIRKEI YOSEF OC 511) write that this reason cannot be used as grounds for prohibiting smoking on Yom Tov, because it is accepted that the sages today do not enact new Gezeiros. Since this reason entails making a Gezeirah (that one may not smoke lest he transgress an Isur d'Oraisa), today's sages cannot enact a rabbinical prohibition to prohibit smoking on Yom Tov in order to prevent one from transgressing Isurei d'Oraisa.

HALACHAH: The KORBAN NESANEL concludes in very strong terms that one who smokes on Yom Tov acts reprehensibly, and "one who wants to honor Hash-m and his Torah should refrain from smoking for just one or two days (Yom Tov), even though his Yetzer ha'Ra might suggest ways to permit it based on the Shas."

However, most Acharonim (as cited by the BI'UR HALACHAH loc. cit.) rule that in a city where most of the people smoke, the act of smoking can be considered "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and thus one may smoke on Yom Tov. RAV MOSHE STERNBUCH shlit'a points out that nowadays, since even in places where people smoke they know that it is harmful to their health, and since in more and more places smoking is looked upon disapprovingly, it is very difficult to rely on these reasons to permit smoking on Yom Tov.

When asked by Kollel Iyun Hadaf whether smoking is permitted on Yom Tov, HAGA'ON RAV CHAIM PINCHAS SHEINBERG shlit'a said that it is certainly not considered an act which is "Shaveh l'Chol Nefesh" and thus it is forbidden on Yom Tov.

Rav Sheinberg added that it has been proven that smoking is hazardous to one's health, and therefore smoking is never permitted, even on an ordinary weekday. (Regarding those who already smoke and who suffer from nicotine addiction, see IGROS MOSHE YD 2:49, and TESHUVOS V'HANGAHOS 1:316.)

Another interesting question raised by the Acharonim is whether one who maintains that smoking is forbidden on Yom Tov may light a cigarette for someone who is lenient. The KESAV SOFER (ibid.), based on the SHA'AR HA'MELECH (Hilchos Ishus 7:12), writes that if one person maintains that a certain practice is prohibited and he helps another person, who maintains that the practice is permitted, to do that act, he transgresses the prohibition of "Lifnei Iver." Therefore, one who maintains that smoking is prohibited may not help another person smoke on Yom Tov, and he must treat cigarettes and other smoking implements as Muktzah. However, the Kesav Sofer adds, if he maintains that the Halachah permits smoking but he personally is stringent and does not smoke, then he may light a cigarette for someone else who smokes.

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Ask the Doctors

The Gemora had inquired: May one cohabit with his virgin wife for the first time on Shabbos? The Gemora explains the inquiry: Is the blood (which is produced when the hymen is broken) in the womb stored up (and cohabitation would he permitted, since the blood flows out of its own accord, and not because of any wound), or is it the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), and therefore be prohibited?

The Gemora’s inquiry is difficult to understand. This is not a question regarding a specific woman, but rather, it is relevant to all women in the world, including idolaters. This point of inquiry should be an established fact; let us inquire from the expert doctors in this field as to the facts?

Perhaps, one may counter and say that doctors are not believed regarding halachic issues. This is not the case. The Divrei Chaim (vol. II, 77) writes regarding a woman who bleeds every time that she has relations: Even if an idolater midwife will inform us that the woman has a wound in that area, she is believed because this is a fact that we can verify with another midwife. The Maharsham relied many times on two doctors, when we asked each of them separately. Certainly in our Gemora, where it is relevant to every woman in the world, why don’t we ask the doctors?

The Chasam Sofer sheds light on our Gemora by saying the following: The Gemora is not inquiring as to the facts. In truth, the blood is loosely stored in the womb similar to the manner which liquid is contained in a sponge. Our Gemora is uncertain regarding the amount of force necessary to release the blood.

The Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos writes that threshing, squeezing, wounding and milking are all liable on Shabbos, and are included in the same category of melachah. Accordingly, the Chasam Sofer asks: The husband should certainly be liable in this case because he is separating the blood from the womb?

He answers: If this would be performed by hand, similar to squeezing and milking, he would certainly be liable. However, the question of our Gemora is regarding the strength necessary to release this blood. If it requires minimal strength, it is considered as if the blood is coming out on its own accord, and he will not be liable. However, if a considerable amount of force is necessary, he then would be liable for such an act.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 6 - Highlights

Rav’s Ruling Regarding Initial Cohabitation on Saturday Night

The Gemora had inquired: May one cohabit with his virgin wife for the first time on Shabbos? The Gemora explains the inquiry: Is the blood (which is produced when the hymen is broken) in the womb stored up (and cohabitation would he permitted, since the blood flows out of its own accord, and not because of any wound), or is it the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), and therefore be prohibited?

In the Beis Medrash of Rav, they said that Rav permitted it and Shmuel prohibited it. In Nehardea (where Shmuel lived), they said: Rav prohibited it and Shmuel permitted it.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: The mnemonic to remember who said which version is: These make it lenient for themselves, and these make it lenient for themselves.

The Gemora asks: Does Rav actually allow it? But surely Rav Simi bar Chizkiyah said in the name of Rav: One is forbidden to push a cloth into a barrel on Yom Tov, although he does not intend to perform a prohibited act of labor. The issue at hand is that when one presses on the cloth, he will be unintentionally squeezing out beer, which is forbidden to do on Yom Tov. (The prohibition involved is either melaben, whitening the cloth by cleaning it, or a derivative of the melachah of dash, threshing, as taking the wine out of the cloth is akin to removing kernels of grain from their husks. Apparently, Rav follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who prohibits unintentional acts, and not Rabbi Shimon, who permits them!?)

The Gemora answers: Since it is inevitable that beer will be removed from the cloth, even Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that one is not liable for an unintentional act, will agree that here one is liable. For Abaye and Rava both said: Rabbi Shimon agrees that when the act performed is a pesik reishei, literally defined as ‘if one cuts of the chicken’s head, is it not certain that it will die?’ i.e. inevitable, that one is forbidden to perform the act even if unintentionally. (Thus, although one does not intend to squeeze the beer out when pushing the cloth into the barrel, it is inevitable that he will squeeze the beer out, and it is forbidden.)

The Gemora asks: But surely Rav Chiya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: The halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah? And Rav Chanan bar Ami said in the name of Shmuel: The halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemora answers: In truth, Rav follows Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion that unintentional acts are prohibited, but he nevertheless, rules that one may cohabit with his virgin bride on Shabbos. According to the version which stated that the blood in the womb stored up, Rav permits cohabitation because he is doing damage (to the woman) in regard to the opening (because it destroys the commodity of her virginity, and one who acts in a destructive manner on Shabbos, is exempt). According to the version which stated that the blood coming out is the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), Rav permits cohabitation because he is doing damage (to the woman) in making the wound. (6a)

Hymenal Bleeding

Rav Chisda asks on Shmuel (who rules that one may not cohabit with his virgin bride on Shabbos) from a Mishna in Niddah: If a girl, who has not reached the age of menstruation, got married, Beis Shamai say: We give her four nights (where she is permitted to have marital relations) and Beis Hillel say: We give her until the wound is healed up. (The blood that comes out is attributed to the wound and not to menstruation. Ordinarily, after the first cohabitation, further cohabitation is forbidden until the menstruation, is over. But in this case, in which the young bride had never yet had any menstruation, it is assumed that the blood is not due to menstruation, but to the wound caused by cohabitation. According to Beis Shamai, this assumption holds good for four nights, and according to Beis Hillel it holds good until the wound is healed up.) If she has reached the age of menstruation (but she had in fact not yet seen blood; that is, she had the maturity for it, but the maturity had not yet manifested itself; a girl has reached the period of puberty when she is twelve years and one day old) and she married, Beis Shamai say: We give her the first night (even several times during the night is permitted) and Beis Hillel say: We give her until Saturday night, a total of four nights (assuming that they got married on Wednesday).

The Gemora analyzes the Mishna: Does it not mean that if he had not yet cohabited with his wife, he may cohabit with her even on Shabbos? (The question presumes that ‘we give her until Saturday night, a total of four nights’ means any one of the four nights, and thus he may cohabit with her on Shabbos; this indicates that one may cohabit with a virgin on Shabbos, for if her hymen has been ruptured completely by the previous cohabitations, there would be no basis to attribute any subsequent bleeding to hymenal bleeding, and cohabitation would be prohibited.)

Rava answers: The Mishna is discussing a case when he already cohabited with her (fully, and nevertheless, all subsequent bleeding can still be attributed to the hymen, and not due to menstruation).

The Gemora asks: If so, what novelty is the Mishna teaching us?

The Gemora answers: It is stated to show that cohabitation is permitted on Shabbos even if it will result in further bleeding. For Shmuel said: One may enter into a narrow opening on Shabbos even though he will cause pebbles to break loose. (6a – 6b)

Preoccupied

Rav Yosef asked on Shmuel from the following Mishna: The groom is exempt from reciting kerias shema from the first night of his marriage until after Motzoei Shabbos if he did not yet cohabit with his virgin bride. (He is exempt from the mitzvah of shema because he is thinking about the mitzvah of procreation, and one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah. This only applies if he is marrying a virgin, when he is worried that he will not be able to rupture the hymen and complete cohabitation.) Isn’t this exemption based on the fact that he wants to cohabit with her, and nevertheless, he is permitted to cohabit with her on Friday night? (We see that he may cohabit with his virgin wife on Shabbos.)

Abaye answers: No! He is preoccupied with the thought that he has failed to cohabit with her.

Rava asks: Is one exempt from performing a mitzvah because he is preoccupied with another matter (that is not a mitzvah)? If someone’s ship sank at the sea, will he be exempt from reciting shema because he is thinking about his loss?

If you will say that he is indeed exempt, but surely Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said in the name of Rav: A mourner is required to observe all mitzvos except for Tefillin which is called pe’er, glory, and a mourner is not allowed to glorify himself. (The source for this ruling is from a verse in Yechezkel, where HaShem instructed Yechezkel regarding the laws of mourning and HaShem told Yechezkel explicitly that he should don his Tefillin. This commandment implies that all other mourners are not permitted to don Tefillin. A mourner, although he is thinking about his sorrow, he is not preoccupied with performing a mitzvah and for this reason he is still obligated to observe mitzvos.)

Rather, Rava says: It is a Tannaic dispute. One braisa states: If he did not cohabit with her the first night, he is exempt from reciting kerias shema even on the second night (Thursday night). If he did not cohabit with her the on the second night, he is exempt from reciting kerias shema even on the third night (Friday night). However, it was taught in another braisa: He is only exempt on the first and second night, but not on the third (Friday night, because this braisa maintains that it is forbidden to cohabit with a virgin on Shabbos).

The Gemora cites another braisa where the Tannaim dispute this point: One who marries a virgin is prohibited from cohabiting with her for the first time on Shabbos. The Chachamim, however, permit him.

The Gemora asks: Who is the Chachamim?

Rabbah answers: It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an unintentional act is permitted on Shabbos.

Abaye asked: But Rabbi Shimon agrees that when the act performed is a pesik reishei, literally defined as ‘if one cuts of the chicken’s head, is it not certain that it will die?’ i.e. inevitable, that one is forbidden to perform the act even if unintentionally?

Rabbah answers: The braisa is not referring to the Babylonians who dare not skilled in cohabiting on an angle (without causing bleeding), but rather, the braisa is referring to people who are skilled regarding the possibility of cohabiting on an angle (and therefore it is not inevitable that bleeding will occur). (6b)

Bursting a Boil

Rabbi Ami asked on Shmuel from the following Mishna: One who bursts a boil on Shabbos; if his intention is to create an opening for the boil so that air can enter and the boil will heal, he is liable for performing a melachah on Shabbos, but if his intention, however, was to remove the pus from the boil, he is exempt and such an act is permissible.

The Gemora answers: There (by the boil) the blood is stored up (in the abscess) and is entirely loose (from the flesh), whereas here (by the virgin), the blood is stored up in the womb, but is not entirely loose. (6b – 7a)

[END]

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Postponing Yom Kippur

The Gemora asks: Yom Kippur that falls out on a Monday should be postponed until Tuesday because of the concern that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the feast that will be held on the day prior to Yom Kippur?

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: It would emerge that Rosh Hashanah would be on A Sunday, and we have a principle that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on Sunday, Wednesday or Friday?

He answers: The reason that Rosh Hashanah may not occur on a Tuesday is because then, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos; that is also a preventive measure. The decree based on the concern of slaughtering a young bird takes precedence over the decree of taking the aravos on Shabbos. The reason is: Here, there are no other options; by Hoshanah Rabbah, there is an option, namely, not to take the aravos on Shabbos, just like the shofar is not blown and the lulav is not taken on Shabbos.

The Chasam Sofer answers: While it’s true that if Yom Kippur is postponed until Tuesday, Hoshanah Rabbah will fall out on Shabbos, it is nevertheless preferable to uphold the decree of not slaughtering a young bird on Shabbos and sounding the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, even though we will forfeit the mitzvah of taking the aravos on Hoshanah Rabbah. Two is better than one.

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Tosfos s.v. Dam (Blood)

The Gemora discusses the prohibition of cohabiting for the first time on Shabbos. The Gemora states: If the blood is the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), it would therefore be prohibited.

Why is one liable on Shabbos for causing a wound?

Rashi in Shabbos (107a) states that bruising an animal falls under the category of dyeing, as the skin of the animal is discolored.

Tosfos here asks: There is a Gemora in Chullin which states that one is liable by other rodents when the blood comes out. He cannot be liable for dyeing, for they do not have any hides. Furthermore, in our Gemora there is no dyeing occurring.

Tosfos quotes Shmuel, who states in Gemora Shabbos (75a) that one who slaughters an animal on Shabbos is liable for taking the live of a live creature. Accordingly, one who causes a wound on Shabbos will be liable because he is weakening a life and that is tantamount to taking away life. Tosfos rejects this explanation since in our Gemora, there is no necessity for the weakening of the woman, and one would not be liable for wounding in such a manner. It would be possible to say that our Gemora is discussing a mere Rabbinical prohibition, but there are other Gemoros where it is evident that one would be subject to a Biblical prohibition.

Tosfos concludes that the removal of blood is regarded as the taking of life because the blood is the life of a creature, and when one removes a little blood, it is as if he removed a little life.

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Matchmaker

The Gemora states that although mundane matters may not be discussed on Shabbos to preserve the sanctity of the day, conversations relating to Shidduchim [matchmaking] are perfectly permissible to conduct as they are considered sacred matters. This idea has been immortalized in a well known Shabbos zemer [song] entitled “Mah Yedidus.”

Rabbi Elazar Meisels discusses the concept of a matchmaker. The use of a shadchan and the involvement of the parents also contributed to the stability of traditional marriages.

In considering the match, they tended to focus on the important aspects, not just the trivial ones that youngsters are prone to concentrating on. Additionally, the Shadchan could be called upon to assist by conducting and smoothing over the financial negotiations between the two families. This eliminated much of the personal animosity that is common in the entire dating process. Payment for suggesting a match is generally expected, and there is a considerable amount of discussion in the halachic responsa regarding this point. Questions such as how to compensate two people who suggested the match, or a situation in which one person suggested the match, but another person did most of the negotiating, are dealt with in great detail.

Interestingly, Rabbenu Nissim of Gerona [Ra”n Tractate Shabbos 12a], posits that the word “Shidduch” is rooted in the word “Menuchah,” which means peace and tranquility. He bases this on the Targum Yonasan’s [Shoftim 3:11] rendering of the word “VaTishkot” – and (the land) was peaceful, as “V’Shidduchis”. Teshuvos HaGeonim [Siman 425] suggests that it stems from the word “Shadachi,” which refers to long stems that shoot forth and intertwine with one another. The word “Shidduch” then, means to knot or tie together.

May we hear of many happy matches and successful marriages!

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 5 - Highlights

Initial Cohabitation on Saturday Night

The Gemora had stated: He shall never cohabit with his virgin bride for the first time on Erev Shabbos (Friday night) or Motzoei Shabbos (Saturday night). The Gemora asks: It is understandable that he shall not cohabit with his bride for the first time on Friday night because he will be causing a wound, which is prohibited to do on Shabbos, but what is the reason for the prohibition on Saturday night?

Rabbi Zeira answers: It is prohibited because this will result in making calculations on Shabbos (if he will consummate the marriage on Motzoei Shabbos, the wedding feast will be held then and he will make calculations on Shabbos as to the cost of that festive meal, which is prohibited).

Abaye asked: Are those calculations in fact forbidden to make on Shabbos? But surely we learned that Rav Chisda and Rav Hamnuna both said: Accounts for the sake of a mitzvah may be calculated on Shabbos. And Rabbi Elozar said: One may determine the amount of charity he will be giving to the poor on Shabbos. And Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One may go to the synagogues and study halls to attend to communal affairs on Shabbos. And Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One may publicize matters of life and death on Shabbos. And Rav Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in the name of Rabbi Yonasan: One may go to amphitheatres and circuses to attend to communal affairs on Shabbos. And a Tanna in the Beis Medrash of Menashya taught: One is permitted to negotiate a match for a young girl for the sake of betrothal on Shabbos, and for someone to teach a young boy Torah or to teach him a trade. (Why can’t we calculate the cost of the wedding feast on Shabbos?)

Rather, Rabbi Zeira answers: It is prohibited to cohabit with his bride for the first time on Motzoei Shabbos because the Rabbis were concerned that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the wedding feast.

Abaye asked: If so, Yom Kippur that falls out on a Monday should be postponed until Tuesday because of the concern that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos to prepare for the feast that will be held on the day prior to Yom Kippur?

The Gemora answers: Regarding Yom Kippur, where the preparations are only for himself, we are not concerned that he will become preoccupied and forget that it is Shabbos, and slaughter a young bird; however, here, where the preparations are for all the people that will be attending the wedding feast, we are concerned that he will become preoccupied and forget that it is Shabbos, and slaughter a young bird.

Alternatively, you can answer that regarding Yom Kippur, where the feast is not eaten until the next day, there is ample time after Shabbos to prepare the meal, and we are not concerned that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos; however, here, where the wedding feast takes place immediately after Shabbos, we are concerned that he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos.

The Gemora adds: Now that we have provided this answer, we can say that this could be the reason for not cohabiting with his bride for the first time on Friday night, because perhaps he will slaughter a young bird on Shabbos (since the wedding feast might extend into Shabbos). (4b – 5a)

Wednesday or Wednesday Night?

The Gemora inquires: Does the Mishna mean that a virgin is married on Wednesday and she cohabits with her husband on Wednesday, and we are not afraid that his anger will subside before Thursday morning (when Beis Din will be in session)? Or perhaps the Mishna means that a virgin is married on Wednesday and she cohabits with her husband only on Wednesday night, because we are afraid that his anger will subside before Thursday morning?

The Gemora attempts to resolve the inquiry: Come and hear from the braisa which Bar Kappara taught: A virgin is married on the Wednesday and she cohabits with her husband on Wednesday night because it was on the fifth day (of Creation) that the blessing for the fish was pronounced (Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea). A widow is married on Thursday and she cohabits with her husband on Thursday night because it was on the sixth day that the blessing for man was pronounced (Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth). It emerges that the only reason that the virgin cohabits on Wednesday night is on account of the blessing, but as to his anger subsiding, we are not afraid.

The Gemora asks: If so, the widow should cohabit on Wednesday night as well, since it was on the fifth day that the blessing for the fish was pronounced?

The Gemora answers: The blessing for man is a stronger reason.

Alternatively, you can answer that it was because the Rabbis were diligent in their concern for the welfare of Jewish women, like it was taught in the following braisa: Why did we say that a widow is married on Thursday and she cohabits with her husband on Thursday night? For if you would say that she should cohabit with her husband on Thursday, the next morning, the husband will rise and go to his work (leaving his bride home alone). Therefore the Sages watched over the welfare of the Jewish women that he should rejoice with her for three days, namely, Thursday, Friday and Shabbos.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?

The Gemora answers: A difference between them will be in a case where the husband does not work, or in a case where there was a festival on Friday (in both cases, we are not concerned that the husband will go to work, but the reason to cohabit on Friday because of the blessing for man still applies). (5a)

Hand or Hands?

Bar Kappara expounded: The handiwork of the righteous is greater than the handiwork of God’s creation of the heaven and earth. For in regard to the creation of heaven and earth, it is written [Yeshaya 48:13]: Also, My hand has laid the foundation of the earth, and My right hand has spread out the heavens, while in regard to the handiwork of the righteous it is written [Shmos 15:17]: The foundation of your dwelling place which You, Hashem have, the Sanctuary, My Lord, which Your hands have established. (Hashem created the earth with one “hand,” while the righteous created the Temple with “two hands.”)

A Babylonian replied, and his name was Rabbi Chiya: It is written [Tehillim 95:5]: And the dry land, His hands formed!

The Gemora answers: It is written: His hand (in the singular form).

The Gemora asks: But it is written, they formed?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: His fingers formed it.

The Gemora raises a further objection: It is written [Tehillim 19:2]: The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows work of His hands?

The Gemora answers: This is the explanation of the verse: Who shows the handiwork of the righteous? The firmament. And how? Through the rain. (Rain descends because the righteous pray for it. The handiwork of the righteous is called the ‘work of His hands,’ because in the rain, the work of God and the work of the righteous meet. The rain is the work of God, but it comes as the result of the good deeds of the righteous, whose prayers God fulfills.) (5a)

Purpose of the Fingers

Bar Kappara expounded: What is the meaning of that which is written [Devarim 23:14]: You shall have a peg in addition to your weapons? Do not read it “your weapons,” but rather, “your ears.” This means to say that if a man hears something unworthy, he shall insert his finger (shaped like a peg) into his ears.

And this is the same as Rabbi Elozar said: Why do the fingers of man resemble pegs? The Gemora interrupts: What is the meaning of his question? Shall I say because each finger is divided from the other? Surely, each finger has been made for its own purpose! For the master said: The smallest finger is the zeres (the distance from the little finger to the thumb of a spread hand), and it is used for measuring the Kohen Gadol’s breastplate; the fourth finger is the kemitzah, and it is used for taking a scoop of the flour-offering; the middle finger is the amah, and it is used for defining the cubit measure (the cubit is a measure equal to the distance from the elbow to the tip of the middle finger); the index finger is the etzbah, and it is used to apply the blood of a chatas-offering on the Altar; and the thumb is the gudel, and blood from offerings are sometimes applied there. (Obviously, there is good reason for the fingers to be divided.) Rather, the question is why are the fingers pointed like pegs? The reason is that if a man hears something unworthy, he shall insert his finger (shaped like a peg) into his ears.

A braisa was taught in the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yishmael: Why is the ear hard except for the ear lobe, which is soft? The reason is that if a man hears something unworthy, he shall bend the lobe into it.

The Gemora cites a braisa: One should not hear unworthy things, because the ears are the most easily burned from all the other organs. (5a – 5b)

Cohabitating the First Time
on Shabbos

The Gemora inquires: May one cohabit with his virgin wife for the first time on Shabbos (they were not aware of the braisa mentioned above, or they inquired if the halacha follows that opinion)? The Gemora explains the inquiry: Is the blood (which is produced when the hymen is broken) in the womb stored up (and cohabitation would he permitted, since the blood flows out of its own accord, and not because of any wound), or is it the result of a wound (caused by the tearing of the vaginal walls when they separate from each other), and therefore be prohibited?

And if you will say that the blood is stored up in the womb, we can ask: Is the husband’s main concern to release the blood (in order to ascertain if she is a virgin), and it is permitted: or is he concerned with creating an opening (for the future), and it is forbidden (making an opening on Shabbos is forbidden under the category of building)? And if you will say that the husband’s main concern to release the blood and the opening comes by itself (without his intention for it), we can ask: Is the halacha according to Rabbi Shimon who says: Something which is not intended is permitted (an act which is in itself forbidden but is the unintended though unavoidable result of an act which is permitted; thus one may, according to Rabbi Shimon, push a couch on the floor on Shabbos, if one is not intending to make a rut in the floor, although, as a matter of fact, such a rut is made as the unavoidable result of pushing the couch), or is the halacha according to Rabbi Yehudah who says: Something which is not intended is forbidden? And if you will say that the halacha follows Rabbi Yehudah, we may ask: Is he doing damage (to the woman) in regard to the opening (and one who acts in a destructive manner on Shabbos, is exempt), or does he improve (her) in regard to the opening?

The Gemora cites another version of the above Gemora: Others say: And if you will say that the blood the result of a wound, we can ask: Is the husband’s main concern to release the blood (in order to ascertain if she is a virgin), and it is prohibited, or is he concerned with his own pleasure, and it is permitted (according to Rabbi Shimon)? And if you will say that he concerned with his own pleasure and the blood comes by itself (without his intention for it), we can ask: Is the halacha like Rabbi Yehudah who says: Something which is not intended is forbidden, or is the halacha like Rabbi Shimon that it would be permitted? And if you say the halacha is like Rabbi Yehudah, we may ask: Is he doing damage (to the woman) in making the wound (and one who acts in a destructive manner on Shabbos, is exempt), or does he improve (her) in regards to the wound? And if you will say that he is doing damage in regards to the wound, we may ask: Is the halacha like Rabbi Yehudah (that one is exempt for doing damage while causing a wound), or is the halacha like Rabbi Shimon (that although generally, one is exempt for causing damage on Shabbos, making a wound is an exception, and he would be liable)? (5b – 6a)

[END]

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Food for Thought - Kesuvos 4 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cites the following braisa: One whose bread was already baked, his animals were slaughtered, his wine was diluted in preparation for the wedding meal (all these items would spoil if the wedding would be delayed significantly), and the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died, the law is the following: We move the corpse to a room and we bring the groom and the bride to the chupah. (After burial, there would be a seven-day mourning period, in which they would be prohibited to marry.) He then would perform his dutiful marital act with his bride, and then he separates from her. (Immediately afterwards, the burial would take place.) They then observe seven days of the wedding feast, and afterwards, he observes the seven days of mourning. During all those (all fourteen) days, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women (in order that they shouldn’t cohabit with each other; a mourner is forbidden to engage in cohabitation during the shivah days). We do not withhold ornaments for the bride all thirty days. (This is the case that the braisa is referring to; if the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died on a Monday, the marriage takes place immediately.)

*** The reason that we do not postpone the wedding is because otherwise, all the food will be lost. What is the reason that the Rabbis allowed the initial cohabitation? He should be regarded as an onein (one whose close relative has died and has not been buried yet), and the cohabitation should be Biblically prohibited?

*** Why is the initial marital act referred to as a mitzvah-cohabitation? The Chasam Sofer adds: A woman cannot become pregnant from her first act of cohabitation; if anything the second act should be regarded as the mitzvah-cohabitation?

*** During all those (all fourteen) days, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women. How many men are required? How many women are required?

*** The Rambam writes that the thirty days of mourning begin after the seven days of the wedding feast. Why can’t the seven days of the wedding feast be included in the thirty days? This should be similar to the law that the days of the festival are included in the thirty days.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 4 - Highlights

Marriage on Monday
The Gemora had stated: On Monday one should not marry, and if he did so due to the forced circumstances it is permitted. The Gemora offers an alternative explanation as to what the forced circumstances was. It refers to a case that we were taught in the following braisa: One whose bread was already baked, his animals were slaughtered, his wine was diluted in preparation for the wedding meal (all these items would spoil if the wedding would be delayed significantly), and the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died, the law is the following: We move the corpse to a room and we bring the groom and the bride to the chupah. (After burial, there would be a seven-day mourning period, in which they would be prohibited to marry.) He then would perform his dutiful marital act with his bride, and then he separates from her. (Immediately afterwards, the burial would take place.) They then observe seven days of the wedding feast, and afterwards, he observes the seven days of mourning. During all those (all fourteen) days, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women (in order that they shouldn’t cohabit with each other; a mourner is forbidden to engage in cohabitation during the shivah days). We do not withhold ornaments for the bride all thirty days. (This is the case that the braisa is referring to; if the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died on a Monday, the marriage takes place immediately.) (3b – 4a)

Preparations Lost

The Gemora qualifies the above ruling: The marriage takes place immediately if the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died because there is nobody else who would bother preparing for them (if everything that was prepared will be lost); however, in the reverse situation (if the mother of the groom or the father of the bride died), we do not delay their burial.

Rafram bar Papa said in the name of Rav Chisda: We delay the burial only if water was placed on the meat in preparation for its cooking (it will spoil if the wedding is postponed and it can no longer be sold in the market); but if the water was not placed on the meat, we delay the wedding until after the burial, because the meat may still be sold in the market.

Rava said: If this occurred in a big city (where people buy all types of meat), the wedding is postponed even if the water was placed on the meat because the meat may still be sold in the market.

Rav Papa said: If this occurred in a village, the wedding is not postponed even if the water was not placed on the meat because it is improbable that all the meat from the wedding feast will still be sold in the market.

The Gemora asks: If so, when does Rav Chisda’s distinction (if the water was placed on the meat or not) apply?

Rav Ashi answers: In a city like Masa Mechasya, which is smaller than a big city, but larger than a village.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rav Chisda: One whose bread was already baked, his animals were slaughtered, his wine was diluted in preparation for the wedding meal and water was placed on the meat, and the father of the groom or the mother of the bride died, the law is the following: We move the corpse to a room and we bring the groom and the bride to the chupah. He then would perform his dutiful marital act with his bride, and then he separates from her. (Immediately afterwards, the burial would take place.) They then observe seven days of the wedding feast, and afterwards, he observes the seven days of mourning. During all those (all fourteen) days, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women (in order that they shouldn’t cohabit with each other; a mourner is forbidden to engage in cohabitation during the shivah days). And similarly, if the bride would begin to menstruate after the chupah, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women. We do not withhold ornaments for the bride all thirty days. He shall never cohabit with his virgin bride for the first time on Erev Shabbos (Friday night) or Motzoei Shabbos (Saturday night). (4a)

Treating a Prohibition Lightly

The braisa had ruled: If the bride or groom is in a state of mourning or if the bride began to menstruate, the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women.

Rav Yosef the son of Rava expounded in the name of Rava: The braisa’s ruling applies only if the husband did not cohabit with his wife yet, but if he did cohabit with her, his wife is permitted to sleep with him.

The Gemora asks: But in the case where one of their parents died, he has cohabited with her, and nevertheless, the braisa rules that the groom should sleep among all the men, and the bride should sleep among the women?

The Gemora answers: Rava was referring to the case where the bride began to menstruate.

(It emerges that if the bride began to menstruate and they had already cohabited, we trust them to be secluded together, but if one of them is in mourning, we do not trust them to be secluded together even if they had already cohabited.) The Gemora asks: Do people treat a prohibition pertaining to mourning more lightly that a prohibition regarding menstruation? But surely Rabbi Yitzchak bar Chanina said in the name of Rav Huna: All kinds of work that a woman performs for her husband, a menstruant may perform for her husband, except the mixing of the cup (of wine to serve him), and the making of his bed and the washing of his face, his hands and his feet (because these actions may bring about temptation); while with regard to mourning, it has been taught in the following braisa: Although the Rabbis said: No man has a right to force his wife (while she is mourning) to paint her eyes or powder her face, in truth they said: She may mix the cup for him, and she makes the bed for him and she washes his face, his hands and his feet? (It would seem that people treat a prohibition pertaining to menstruation more lightly that a prohibition regarding mourning!?)

The Gemora answers: This is not a difficulty. Here (where the braisa rules: he sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women), it is referring to a case where the husband was mourning (for he might become tempted); there, the braisa is referring to a case where she was mourning (and she would resist any temptations).

The Gemora unsuccessfully challenges this distinction from a braisa.

Rav said to Chiya his son, when Chiya’s father-in-law died: You should observe the laws of mourning when your wife is present, but you are not required to observe the laws of mourning when she is not present. (4a – 4b)

Newlyweds

Rav Ashi answers the original question differently: Can you compare this mourning (by the newlywed couple) with an ordinary mourning? Ordinary mourning is strict in the eyes of people, and one would not treat it lightly (a wife is permitted to perform certain actions for her husband). But by this mourning, since the Rabbis were lenient regarding it, one might treat it lightly. What is the leniency? If you will say it is because he may perform the dutiful act of marriage with her first, that is only because the laws of mourning have not taken effect upon him yet. The Gemora explains: According to Rabbi Eliezer, the mourning does not begin until the body has been taken out the door of the house, and according to Rabbi Yehoshua, the mourning does not begin until the top of the casket has been closed! Rather, the leniency is this: They then observe seven days of the wedding feast, and afterwards, he observes the seven days of mourning. (4b)

[END]

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Revoking a Kiddushin

The Gemora asks, is there any kind of get (halachic divorce document) that the Torah says is invalid, and due to the concern regarding modest or brazen women, we will permit the men in the world to marry what is essentially a married woman?! The Gemora answers that yes, it is possible, as there is a principle that whoever effects kiddushin does so based on the standards of the Rabbanan. The Rabbanan took away the kiddushin from this man (and therefore the woman is not married, although she never received a get).

The Rashba asks: Why is this case different than the case in Yevamos where a man fell into water that has no end? There, we rule that the wife will remain an agunah because the husband might have exited the water from a place that was not visible to us. Why don’t we say that the Rabbanan took away the kiddushin from them, and she may remarry another man?

He answers: The two cases are very different. Here, there was a get, except that it was written with a condition, and an uncertainty arose regarding the condition. Another example where the Rabbanan would revoke the kiddushin is where one witness is testifying on the woman’s behalf (that her husband died). However, when there is no get and no witness, the Rabbanan did not go ahead and remove a kiddushin.

The Gemora in Yevamos (110a) records an incident in Narsh where a girl was married off when she was a minor. When she became an adult, they sat her by a Chupah (wedding canopy, in order to validate the first marriage), and someone else snatched her away before the “wedding” (and made her his wife)! Rav Bruna and Rav Chananel, students of Rav, were present when this happened, and they did not even require her to have a get from the second “husband” (as his kiddushin is invalid).

Rav Ashi explains that being that the wife snatcher acted improperly, the Rabbanan therefore acted improperly with him and removed the validity of his kiddushin. (This is following the opinion of Rav, who maintains that for the marriage of a minor to become valid, she must have marital relations with her husband when she becomes an adult, and if not the marriage is invalid.)

The Rabbanan were empowered to remove the kiddushin in this case because he acted improperly in the beginning of the kiddushin.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas cites a Teshuvos haRashba who writes that we do not apply the principle of “Since he acted improperly, the Rabbanan acted improperly with him” only in places that are specifically mentioned in Chazal. The Sages did not annul the marriage in every case where one acts with trickery. This can be proven from a Gemora in Kiddushin (58b). The Gemora states: One who tells his friend to marry a woman for him (as an agent), and he goes ahead and marries her for himself, she is married to the second one. We do not say that since he acted improperly, the Chachamim invalidated his marriage.

This can be proven from the fact that even if one betroths a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition, kiddushin, nevertheless takes effect. This is also true if someone marries a woman who is a secondary ervah to him. Obviously, sometimes this principle is applied, and sometimes, it isn’t.

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Path to Sanctity

The Gemora states: Whoever betroths a woman in Jewish marriage, betroths her subject to the will of the Rabbis.

The baalei mussar say: One who wants to sanctify and purify himself in his service to his Creator, should do so subject to the will of the Rabbis. He should go to the Rabbis and the righteous people of his generation, and they shall guide him in his quest. One who tries to forge a path himself is apt to stumble and make mistakes; nothing substantive will result from it.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 3 - Highlights

Rava’s Reasoning
The Gemora concludes that Rava used his own logic for his ruling. Biblically, if the husband does not return due to an accident, the get is not valid; however, the Rabbis, because of their concern for the modest and the brazen woman, declared that the get is indeed valid. The Gemora explains the concern for the modest woman: If you will say that it should not be a divorce, there might be times where the husband was not held back by an accident, but she would think that he was held back by an accident and she will remain unmarried as an agunah. The Gemora explains the concern for the brazen woman: If you will say that it should not be a divorce, there might be times where the husband was held back due to an accident, but she will say that he willingly did not return, and she will go and get married to another man, and later, when the husband returns (and we will realize that he was held back due to an accident), the get will be invalid and the children will be mamzeirim. (2b – 3a)

Kiddushin is Based on the Rabbanan

The Gemora asks, is there any kind of get (halachic divorce document) that the Torah says is invalid, and due to the concern regarding modest or brazen women, we will permit the men in the world to marry what is essentially a married woman?! The Gemora answers that yes, it is possible, as there is a principle that whoever effects kiddushin does so based on the standards of the Rabbanan. The Rabbanan took away the kiddushin from this man (and therefore the woman is not married, although she never received a get).

Ravina asked Rav Ashi: this makes sense regarding a kiddushin effected with money. [This is because the Rabbanan can assume the power of Beis Din to make the original money of kiddushin “hefker” – “ownerless.” Therefore, it is as if the original kiddushin was invalid as it was not done with his money.] However, how can they negate a kiddushin effected through marital relations? Rav Ashi answered that the Rabbanan essentially say that his marital relations are considered (akin to) promiscuity, not relations that acquire a woman for kiddushin. (3a)

Another Version of Rava

Rava says “And so too regarding gitin.” This indicates that Rava understands that there is a claim that one was delayed by circumstances beyond his control (and therefore did not fulfill his condition regarding the giving of his get).

The Gemora asks that the Mishna states that if someone says “this is your get if I do not come back within twelve months” and he died within twelve months, the get is invalid. This implies that only if he died is the get invalid, but if he fell sick (and could not come back) it is valid. The Gemora answers, really we can say that if someone fell sick it is not a get. The Mishna is telling us the sole teaching that there is no concept of get after someone dies.

The Gemora asks, the concept that there is no get after someone dies was already taught in the first part of this Mishna! The Gemora answers, perhaps this was too exclude the opinion of Raboseinu (see 2b).

The Gemora further tries to prove this point (from the end of the aforementioned Mishna). If the person says “(this is your get) from now if I do not come back within twelve months,” and he dies within twelve months, the get is valid. It must be that the same law applies if he got sick (and could not return, which is unlike the opinion of Rava). The Gemora answers that no, this specifically applies to a case where he died, as he does not want her to have to fall to yibum (if he dies).

The Gemora asks from a case where a person said that if he does not return within thirty days the get should be valid. He arrived at the end of the thirty days, but the river prevented him from arriving back (on time, as the ferry was not present at the time). He was saying “You see that I am coming! You see that I am coming!” Shmuel said that this is not called that he reached the city (and therefore the get takes effect). The Gemora answers that a forced circumstance that is common is different, as he should have made a condition beforehand (that if he comes back but cannot cross the river in time it is not included). The fact that he did not is his own loss. (3a)
Getting Married on Other Days

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak says that our Mishna is only discussing a case in the time of the decree of Ezra and on, that since then Beis Din is not permanently is session on days other than Monday and Thursday. However, before the decree of Ezra that Beis Din was in session every day, a woman could get married on any day. The Gemora asks, why is Rav Shmuel discussing the days before the decree of Ezra? Whatever happened, happened then (and is irrelevant now)! The Gemora answers that this is what he is saying. If there is a situation where Beis Din is in session every day of the week nowadays as they were before the decree of Ezra, a woman can get married any day. (3a)
Shakdu

The Gemora asks, don’t we need to fulfill the decree of “Shakdu” (that a husband should prepare for the wedding meal for the first three days of the week)? The Gemora answers that it is alright as long as he prepares.

The Gemora asks, what is the source of “Shakdu?” The Gemora answers that the Braisa states, why did they institute that a virgin should get married on Wednesday? In order that if he had a claim that he did not find besulim, he would wake up early and go to Beis Din (see 2a). The Gemora asks, let her get married on Sunday, and if he has a claim that he did not find besulim he could similarly wake up early and go to Beis Din Monday morning? The Gemora answers, the sages insisted for the good of Jewish girls that a person should be involved in preparing a wedding meal for three days: Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday. He should marry her on Wednesday. From the period of danger and on, the people had the custom to marry her off on Tuesday, and the sages did not protest against them. On Monday one should not marry, and if he did so due to the forced circumstances it is permitted. We separate the groom from the bride on Shabbos night from having their first marital relations because this causes a wound. (3a – 3b)
The Definition of Danger

What is the danger (referred to in the Braisa above)? If it was declared by a government that if a virgin marries on Wednesday she will be killed, why does the Braisa merely state that “they started a custom (to get married on Tuesday)?” We should totally uproot getting married on Wednesday! Rabah says that it is because the government said that a virgin who gets married on Wednesday must first have relations with the hegmon (governmental officer).

The Gemora asks, is this considered a danger? It is called a forced circumstance! The Gemora answers that there were some modest girls who would insist that they would rather be killed, and this led to a life-threatening situation. The Gemora asks, let it be told to them that under forced circumstances this is permitted? The Gemora answers that there are also some immodest women (and if we tell them this is permitted they will cooperate willingly, and this will mean that they are forbidden to their husbands). Additionally, the Gemora explains, some of these women are wives of Kohanim (who become forbidden to their husbands even through rape, see Rashi). The Gemora asks, so let us uproot getting married on Wednesdays? The Gemora answers that the decree will eventually be cancelled, and we do not uproot the decree of the Rabbanan before such a decree.

The Gemora asks, if so (they will switch to Tuesdays) on Tuesdays also the Hegmon will come to have relations! The Gemora answers that (being that the Hegmon is unsure if there will be a wedding on Tuesday) he will not travel to town in such a doubtful circumstance.

On Monday one should not marry, and if he did so due to the forced circumstances it is permitted. What is the forced circumstance? If it is the circumstance we have just discussed, there it is called a danger and here it is called a forced circumstance?! Additionally, there it says that they switched the custom to Tuesday, and here it says that it is permitted! Rava says that the forced circumstance here is that officers of the army come to town (to steal the wedding food).

What is the case? If they come (on Wednesday) and leave (that Wednesday), let the wedding be delayed (and held on the next Wednesday)! The Gemora answers that the case is where they come to settle in town on a Wednesday. The Gemora asks, so let the marriage be held on Tuesday? The Gemora answers that the officer’s servants arrive ahead on Tuesday (to gather provisions for the officer and his troops). (3b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 2 - Highlights

The Mishna states: A virgin is married on Wednesday and a widow is married on Thursday. Beis Din would be in session in the cities on Monday and Thursday. If a husband, who got married on Wednesday, will have a claim regarding his wife’s virginity, he would be able to go early the next morning to the Beis Din. (2a)

Rav Yosef said in the name of Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel: Why does a virgin get married on Wednesday? It is because we learned in the following Mishna: If the time arrived (In former times the betrothal (kiddushin) and the marriage (nisu'in) ceremonies were not performed at the same time as is our practice today. Rather it was customary for the bridegroom to first betroth his bride and make her his arusah (betrothed) and only later did he take her to the chuppah (bridal canopy) for the marriage ceremony. During the period intervening between the betrothal and the marriage, the arusah lived in her father's house, and the arus was not liable for her maintenance, and if she was the daughter of an Israelite, who had been betrothed by a kohen, she was not allowed to eat terumah, although, by Torah law, the daughter of an Israelite betrothed to a kohen is allowed to eat terumah, as it is written, "But if a kohen buy any soul, the acquisition of his money, he may eat of it" (Lev. 22:11), and the arusah is an "acquisition" effected by him with the money of the kiddushin, nevertheless, since she lives in her father's home, the Sages prohibited her from eating of the terumah, "lest they pour a cup of terumah for her in her father's home, and she offer it to her brothers and sisters" According to another opinion the prohibition was enacted "because of a blemish," i.e., if he found a physical defect in her, her kiddushin would be considered erroneous, and would be annulled retroactively and thus a non-kohen will have partaken of terumah. This Mishna discusses the case of one who betroths a woman without specifying a marriage date and teaches how they set the marriage date subsequently, and the law regarding an arusah whose bridegroom (arus) does not wed her when the marriage date arrives. Kehati) and they (the virgin or the widow) were not married by the husband, they eat from his food and they eat of the terumah. One might think that if the time for nisuin arrived on a Sunday, the husband would be obligated to supply her with food immediately; we therefore learned in our Mishna that a virgin is married on Wednesday (and the husband is not obligated to provide sustenance for her until Wednesday).

Rav Yosef asked: Our Mishna specifically states the reason why a virgin is married on Wednesday. The other does not offer a reason as to why the husband’s obligation does not begin on a Sunday. How can Shmuel use a Mishna which contains no reason at all to illuminate a Mishna which specifically states a reason for its ruling, and the former will be the reason why a virgin may not get married on Sunday?

The Gemora revises Shmuel’s statement: Rather, this is what Rav Yosef said in the name of Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel: Why does a virgin get married on Wednesday? It is because if a husband will have a claim regarding his wife’s virginity, he would be able to go early Thursday morning to the Beis Din. But, let them get married on Sunday, for Beis Din is in session on Monday as well? The Gemora answers: The sages were concerned for the welfare of the Jewish girls, and that the husband should be involved in preparing a wedding meal for three days: Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, and then he should marry her on Wednesday. And now that we have learned this concept, that which we have learned in the following Mishna: If the time arrived and they (the virgin or the widow) were not married by the husband, they eat from his food and they eat of the terumah; if the time for nisuin arrived on a Sunday, the husband would not be obligated to supply her with food then since he is not able to marry her. (2a)

(It emerges that if the delay is not because of the husband, he is not obligated to supply her with food.) Rav Yosef continues: Therefore, if he became ill, or she became ill, or if she began to menstruate, he is not obligated to supply her with food.

Other Amoraim asked this as an inquiry: What is the law if he became ill? If the wedding day falls out on a Sunday, he is not obligated to supply her with food because he is forced, and here too, he is forced? Or perhaps, there he is forced on account of a Rabbinical enactment, here, he is not (and therefore he will be obligated to supply her with food).

If you will say that when he became ill, he is obligated to supply her with food, what is the law if she became ill? Can the husband say to her: I am prepared to go ahead with the wedding (it is not me causing the delay)? Or perhaps, she can say to him: It is as if your field has become flooded (it is the husband’s bad luck and he must support her).

If you will say that when she became ill, he is obligated to supply her with food, what is the law if she began to menstruate? The Gemora qualifies this last inquiry: If she began to menstruate on the day that her period was due, she can certainly not say that it is his bad luck. The inquiry is in a case that she began to menstruate at a time that was not her fixed period. Do we say that since she began to menstruate in a time that was not her fixed period, she could say to him that it is his bad luck, and he would be obligated to supply her with food? Or perhaps, since there are women whose fixed periods change sometimes, it is as if she menstruated at the time of her fixed period (and he would be obligated to supply her with food).

Rav Achai attempts to resolve these inquiries from the Mishna, which states: If the time arrived and they were not married by the husband, they eat from his food and they eat of the terumah. The Mishna does not say that he did not marry (which would indicate that the delay was due to the husband); but rather, the Mishna states that they were not married (indicating that the delay could have been because of the brides as well). Now, what would be that case? It cannot be that she caused the delay, for why would he be obligated to supply her with food? Rather, it must be that she was forced to cause the delay, like our inquiries (she became ill or began to menstruate), and nevertheless, the Mishna states that she eats from him.

Rav Ashi rejects the proof: Indeed I can say that in the case of an accident, she does not eat of his food. The Mishna could have written that the husbands did not marry them, but since the first part of the Mishna refers to the brides, the latter part of the Mishna refers to them as well. (2a – 2b)

Rava said: And with regard to divorce, it is not so (an accident will not invalidate a divorce). Accordingly Rava holds that an accident is not a valid claim in regards to a conditional divorce.

How does Rava know this rule? If you will say that it is from the following Mishna: If a man says to his wife: Behold this is your bill of divorce if I do not come back until twelve months, and he died within the twelve months, the divorce is not valid. We can conclude from this that only if he died there is no divorce (because a dead person cannot divorce his wife), but if he became ill (and could not return within the twelve months), the divorce is valid (thus proving that an accident is not a valid claim in regards to a conditional divorce).

The Gemora rejects this proof: Perhaps I might say that even if he became ill, the divorce is not valid (because he may claim that an accident prevented him from returning) and the Mishna states the case where he died to teach us that there is no divorce after death.

The Gemora asks: That there is no divorce after death, we have learned in a previous Mishna?

The Gemora persists that the Mishna would still not be a proof: Perhaps the Mishna states the case where the husband died to exclude from that of our Rabbis, for it has been taught: Our Rabbis allowed her to marry again (even without chalitzah; she is regarded as being divorced).

Why do the Rabbis permit her to get married? It is because they hold like Rabbi Yosi who said that the date of the document indicates that the divorce is valid retroactively. (Even if the husband died, the divorce is still valid because the date written on the document was the date that the get was drawn up and delivered to the wife, and it is valid retroactively.) (2b)

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Connection between the Conclusion of Yevamos to the Beginning of Kesuvos

Tractate Yevamos concludes with the following Gemora: Rabbi Elozar said in the name of Rabbi Chanina: Torah scholars increase peace in the world, for it is said: And all your children shall be disciples of Hashem; and abundant shall be the peace of your sons. In other places (Brochos 64b), the Gemora adds: Do not read banayich, your sons, but rather, bonayich, your builders. This is referring to the Torah scholars who increase peace in the world. Torah scholars strengthen the spiritual and physical dimensions of the world. They are actually building the world.

Tractate Kesuvos commences with the following halacha: A virgin is married on Wednesday.

What is the connection between the conclusion of Yevamos with the beginning of Kesuvos?

Sefer Sedeh Tzofim explains as follows: There is a dispute (Yevamos 65b) regarding if women are obligated in the mitzvah of procreation or not. The Gemora explains the argument. It is written [Breishis 1:28]: And God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and conquer it.” Since it is the practice of men to conquer in battle, and not a woman, this indicates that the verse was addressed to men, and not to women. The Gemora asks: The term vechivshua, and conquer it, is a plural expression, and it would seem that the Torah is addressing the man and the woman to conquer the earth. Why would one opinion maintain that the obligation is only to the man? The Gemora answers: it is because it is written without a vav, and it may be read vechovshah, which is in the singular form.

Sefer Nachalas Binyomin explains that this opinion maintains that we say yeish eim lemasores, the transmitted written form has primacy, and that is why we expound the word in the singular to mean that only the man is obligated in the commandment of procreation, and not the woman. However, if we would hold yeish eim lemikra, the pronounced form has primacy, the word is read in its plural form, and we would be compelled to say that the mitzvah of procreation is applicable to the man and the woman.

Our Gemora says: A virgin is married on Wednesday. Tosfos asks: Why didn’t the Mishna say: A man marries a virgin on Wednesday? Tosfos answers: If it would have said it in that manner, we would have thought that a man may marry a woman even against her will; the Mishna says: She is married to teach us that marriage can only be effected with her consent.

The Shitah Mikubetzes adds: One might think that if the kiddushin was accomplished with her consent, one may effect nisuin, even against her will; it is for this reason that the Mishna says: She is married (nisuin), only if she agrees.

The sefer Shem Yisroel writes that this is only true if you hold that a woman is not obligated in procreation. However, if you would maintain that a woman is obligated in this mitzvah, she can be compelled to perform nisuin, once she has agreed to the kiddushin.

We can now explain the connection between the two tractates. It is evident from the Gemora at the end of Yevamos that that we say yeish eim lemasores, the transmitted written form has primacy, for Rabbi Elozar said in the name of Rabbi Chanina: Torah scholars increase peace in the world, for it is said: And all your children shall be disciples of Hashem; and abundant shall be the peace of your sons. In other places (Brochos 64b), the Gemora adds: Do not read banayich, your sons, but rather, bonayich, your builders. We do not follow the principle of yeish eim lemikra, the pronounced form has primacy, but rather, according to its written from.

This is why the next Mishna, the commencement of Kesuvos says: A virgin is married on Wednesday. We see from this language that we cannot force the woman into nisuin even if she already performed kiddushin willingly. This is because she is not obligated in the mitzvah of procreation. She is not included in this mitzvah because we say yeish eim lemasores, the transmitted written form has primacy, and the verse states: vechovshah, which is in the singular form, even though it is read vechivshua, in its plural form.

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Torah Scholars Increasing Peace

Rabbi Elozar said in the name of Rabbi Chanina: Torah scholars increase peace in the world, for it is said: And all your children shall be disciples of Hashem; and abundant shall be the peace of your sons.

The commentators ask: Why does it say that the Torah scholars will increase peace in the world? The Gemora should say that they will make peace in the world.

The Kedushas Tziyon explains based on a Gemora Kiddushin (30b) where Rabbi Chiya bar Abba states that even a father and son, or a teacher and student who are engaged in Torah study will become enemies with one another (as they debate the intricacies of Talmudical law), but they will not budge from there until they become friends with each other.

It emerges that Torah scholars are increasing peace in the world because every time they are engaged in Torah study, they become temporary enemies and then, they bring about peace with each other. Ordinary friends remain friends, and are not constantly making peace. Torah scholars; the more they learn, the more they are increasing peace.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 122 - Highlights

A certain idolater once said to an Israelite, “Cut some aspasta (grain in the early stages of its growth) and give it to my cattle on the Sabbath; if not, I will kill you as I have killed So-and-so, that son of an Israelite. For I said to him, ‘Cook for me a dish on the Sabbath,’ and whom, as he did not cook for me, I killed him.” His wife heard this and came to Abaye. As he kept her waiting for three festivals (to ask the Torah scholars who would gather there), Rav Adda bar Ahavah said to her: Go before Rav Yosef, whose knife is sharp (he can tell you if you are permitted to marry or not). When she came to him he decided her case from the following braisa: If an idolater who was selling fruit in the market declared, “These fruits are of orlah (which are forbidden to eat)” or he said, “These fruits are from Azeikah (a place in Eretz Yisroel, and thus subject to the laws of ma’aser)” or he said, “These fruits are from a plantation in its fourth year (which are forbidden to eat),” his statement is disregarded for his intention was merely to raise the value of his fruit. (It is assumed that he merely lied, in order to praise his fruit, so that he can charge a higher price. Similarly, in the case under consideration, the idolater's statement that he killed the Israelite is regarded as an idle boast intended as to frighten the Jew into cutting the grain for his animals on Shabbos.)

Abba Yudan of Tzaydan related: It once happened that a Jew and an idolater went on a journey together and when the idolater returned he said, “It is a pity for the Jew who was with me on the journey, for he died on the way and I buried him,” and the Rabbis, based on this evidence, allowed the Jew’s wife to marry again. And, another incident happened that a group of men were going to Antioch, and an idolater came and stated, “It is a pity for the group of men going to Antioch, for they died and I buried them,” and the Rabbis, based on this evidence, allowed their wives to marry again. And, it also once happened that sixty men were going to the siege of Beitar, and an idolater came and stated, “It is a pity for the sixty men going to the siege of Beitar, for they died and I buried them,” and the Rabbis, based on this evidence, allowed their wives to marry again. (121b – 122a)

The Mishna states: They may testify by the light of a lamp or by the light of the moon, and they allow a woman to remarry by a sounding voice (even if the person who uttered it was not seen). It once happened that someone stood on a mountaintop and said, “So-and-so the son of So-and-so from such-and-such a place died,” and they went and did not find anyone there, and they nevertheless, allowed his wife to remarry. Moreover, it once happened in Tzalmon that someone said, “I, So-and-so the son of So-and-so, was bitten by a snake, and I am dying,” and they went and did not recognize him, and they nevertheless, allowed his wife to marry. (122a)

Rabbah bar Shmuel stated: It was taught in a braisa: Beis Shamai ruled that a woman may not be permitted to marry again on the evidence of a sounding voice (bas kol) and Beis Hillel ruled that she may be permitted to marry again on the evidence of a bas kol.

The Gemora asks: What is Rabbah bar Shmuel teaching us? This, surely, is the ruling in our Mishna!

The Gemora answers: It is this that he teaches us: Should an anonymous statement be found that a woman, in such circumstances, is not permitted to remarry, that statement would represent the view of Beis Shamai. (122a)

The Mishna had stated: It once happened that someone stood on a mountaintop and said, “So-and-so the son of So-and-so from such-and-such a place died,” and they went and did not find anyone there, and they nevertheless, allowed his wife to remarry.

The Gemora asks: Is it not possible that it was a demon (who are suspect of evil behavior, such as deceiving people) that issued that proclamation?

Rav Judah replied in the name of Rav: The Mishna is referring to a case where they saw in him the form of a man.

The Gemora asks: But demons also are in the form of humans?

The Gemora answers: They saw his shadow.

The Gemora counters: But demons also have a shadow?

The Gemora answers: They saw a shadow of his shadow.

The Gemora asks: Is it not possible that demons also cast a shadow of a shadow?

Rabbi Chanina replied: The demon Yonasan told me that demons have a shadow, but not a shadow of a shadow.

The Gemora asks: Is it not possible that it was a co-wife (whom the man had married in another town, and who came for the specific purpose of misleading the woman to marry another man so that she might thereby become forbidden to her present husband; a co-wife is usually suspected of malice against her counterpart) that issued that proclamation?

The Gemora answers: A braisa was taught at the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yishmael: At a time of danger (when a man was cast into a pit and is in grave danger), a get may be written and delivered to the woman even if we cannot identify the man issuing the instructions as her husband. (Similarly, in the case dealt with in our Mishna, were the voice not be relied upon, the woman might have to remain all her life bereft of her own husband and unable to remarry.) (122a)

The Mishna states: Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nechemiah of Beis Deli who said to me, “I heard that in Eretz Yisroel, no one with the exception of Rabbi Yehudah ban Bava permits a married woman to remarry on the testimony of one witness.” “That is so,” I told him. “Tell them,” he said to me, “in my name: You know that this country is infested with ravaging troops; I have this tradition from Rabban Gamliel the Elder that a married woman may be allowed to remarry on the testimony of one witness.” And when I came and related the matter before Rabban Gamliel, he rejoiced at my words and said, “We have found a colleague for Rabbi Yehudah ben Bava.” During the conversation, Rabban Gamliel recalled that men were killed at Tel Arza, and Rabban Gamliel permitted their wives to remarry based upon the testimony of one witness. It was then established to allow a woman to remarry based upon the testimony of one witness. And it also became established to allow a woman to remarry based upon the testimony of a witness quoting another witness, on the testimony of a slave, on the testimony of a woman and on the testimony of a Canaanite maidservant. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua say: We do not allow a woman to remarry based upon the testimony of a witness. Rabbi Akiva says: not on the testimony of a woman, and not on the testimony of a slave, and not on the testimony of a Canaanite maidservant, and not on the testimony of relatives. (122a)

The Gemora asks: Is Rabbi Akiva then of the opinion that on the testimony of a woman, a wife is not permitted to remarry? Surely, it was taught otherwise in the following braisa: Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: A woman is eligible to bring her own letter of divorce, and this can be derived from the following kal vachomer (literally translated as light and heavy, or lenient and stringent; an a fortiori argument; it is one of the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics; it employs the following reasoning: if a specific stringency applies in a usually lenient case, it must certainly apply in a more serious case): If those women (being suspected of hatred towards the woman in whose favor they pretend to give their testimony) whom the Rabbis ruled that they are not trusted to say that a woman’s husband is dead are nevertheless eligible to bring her a letter of divorce, then regarding the wife herself, who is believed when she states that her own husband is dead, should certainly be eligible to bring her own letter of divorce. It follows that only those women of whom the Rabbis have spoken are not believed, but an ordinary woman is believed?

The Gemora answers: This is no difficulty. Our Mishna records Rabbi Akiva’s opinion before the law had been established; the braisa which records Rabbi Akiva’s statement was made after the law had been established. (122a)

The Mishna states: They said to Rabbi Akiva: It once happened that certain Levites went to Tzoar, the city of date palms, and one of them fell ill on the way, and they brought him into an inn. On their return, they said to the woman innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” She said to them, “He died and I buried him,” and they allowed his wife to remarry. And shall not a Kohenes be trusted just as a woman innkeeper is? Rabbi Akiva said to them: When her testimony will be like that of the woman innkeeper, she will also be trusted. The woman innkeeper brought out to them the dead man’s staff, and his bag, and the Torah Scroll which belonged to him. (122a)

The Gemora asks: What was the inferiority of the innkeeper?

Rav Kahana replied: She was an innkeeper who was an idolater and she said in innocence, “This is his staff, and this is his bag and this is the grave wherein I buried him.”

The Gemora asks: How can it be said that she spoke in innocence? But, surely, they had asked her, “Where is our friend?”

The Gemora answers: When she saw them, she began to cry, and when they asked her, “Where is our friend?” She replied, “He died and I buried him.” (122b)

The Rabbis taught in a braisa: It once occurred that a man came to give testimony on behalf of a woman (that her husband died) before Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: My son, how do you know this testimony? He answered: We were going on the same road and a troop of soldiers pursued us. He grasped the branch of an olive tree, pulled it down, and made the soldiers turn back. I said to him, “Lion, may your strength be affirmed.” He asked me, “How do you know that my name is Lion? So in fact, I am called in my home town: Yochanan, the son of Rabbi Yehonasan, the Lion of Kefar Shichaya.” After some time, he fell ill and died. Rabbi Tarfon permitted his wife to remarry based upon this testimony.

The Gemora asks: Doesn’t Rabbi Tarfon, however, hold that there should be a cross-examination and questioning of the witness? Surely it was taught in a different braisa: It once occurred that a man came to give testimony on behalf of a woman (that her husband died) before Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: My son, how do you know this testimony? He answered: We were going on the same road and a troop of soldiers pursued us. He grasped the branch of a fig tree, pulled it down, and made the soldiers turn back. I said to him, “Lion, may your strength be affirmed.” He asked me, “How do you know that my name is Lion? So in fact, I am called in my home town: Yochanan, the son of Rabbi Yehonasan, the Lion of Kefar Shichaya.” After some time, he fell ill and died. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: Did you not tell me that Yochanan, the son of Rabbi Yehonasan, from Kefar Shichaya Lion, was the man who died? The witness replied: This is what I told you: Yochanan, the son of Rabbi Yehonasan, the Lion of Kefar Shichaya died. Having examined him closely two or three times and the man's replies invariably agreeing, Rabbi Tarfon permitted his wife to remarry.

The Gemora answers: This is a point in dispute between Tannaim. For it was taught in the following braisa: Witnesses on matrimonial matters are not to be subjected to cross-examination and questioning; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Tarfon, however, ruled: They are to be subjected to cross-examination and questioning.

And they differ in respect of a ruling of Rabbi Chanina. For Rabbi Chanina stated: Biblically, both monetary and capital cases must be conducted with cross-examination and questioning, for it is said, There shall be one manner of law for you. What is the reason that the Sages have ordained that monetary cases do not require cross-examination and questioning? It is in order that you should not lock the door in the face of borrowers.

And what point do they differ about? One Master is of the opinion that since the woman has a kesuvah to receive; such cases are similar with those of monetary matters. And the other Master is of the opinion that since we are thereby permitting a married woman to marry a stranger, such cases are similar with capital cases. (122b)

Rabbi Elozar said in the name of Rabbi Chanina: Torah scholars increase peace in the world, for it is said: And all your children shall be disciples of Hashem; and abundant shall be the peace of your sons. (122b)

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