INTERMINGLED CHILD: WHICH FATHER SHOULD HE HONOR?

Shmuel states that if one Kohen from a group of ten Kohanim had relations with a woman who gave birth to a child, the child is considered a Shtuki. What does Shmuel mean that this child is a “Shtuki?” If he means that he is quieted from claiming inheritance from any of these ten Kohanim when they die, that is obvious! He has no claim, as no one knows who his father really is! It must be that Shmuel means that he is quieted from proclaiming himself to have the laws of a Kohen.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this? The verse states regarding Pinchas’ gift of Kehunah, “and it will be for him and his children after him.” This implies that for someone to be a Kohen, his father must be clearly identifiable, something not present in this case.

In the sefer, Korban Chagigah it is written that the child would be required to honor each one of the fathers because honoring one’s father is a Biblical mitzvah, and in cases of uncertainty, we act stringently.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei Hashas asks: Why don’t the laws of nullification (bittul) apply? We should say that the majority of these men are definitely not his father, and he should therefore be exempt from honoring any of them.

He writes that perhaps the laws of bittul are not applicable by positive commandments. Additionally, he suggests that a person is regarded as being prominent, and therefore they cannot become nullified.

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SHABBOS IN THE DAF - Yevamos 100 - Daf Yomi

By Reb Ben

The Gemara discusses a case where limbs of a chatas offering, which are meant to be eaten, became mixed up with limbs of an olah offering, which are meant to be burned on the mizbeiach. The Gemara states that for a satisfying aroma, i.e. with sacrificial intent, one cannot offer on the mizbeiach something that is supposed to be eaten, but one can offer it for the sake of firewood. This is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar who maintains that we can view the limbs of the chatas as fuel for the fire of the mizbeiach. In his opinion, one is only prohibited to place the edible part of an offering on the mizbeiach if it was placed there with sacrificial intent. We see from the Gemara the importance of intent regarding a sacrifice. We do not currently have the Bais HaMikdash and thus we are not able to offer sacrifices. Yet, in lieu of the Bais HaMikdash and sacrifices, we have Shabbos, which serves as an atonement for the Jewish People. In the Shabbos Mussaf prayers, we offer the following supplication: vies Mussaf yom HaShabbos hazeh naaseh vinakriv lefeonecho beahavah kimitzvas ritzonecho, and the Mussaf of this Shabbos day we will perform and offer to You with love according to the commandment of Your will. Besides the fact that we will be offering the sacrifices in the future, we will also be offering them with love. According to an explanation of the Tiferes Shlomo (Bereishis 2:31) we can interpret this to mean that through the infusion of holiness that we have now on Shabbos in the exile, we will merit the holiness of Shabbos in the World to Come. Thus, our intent in observing the Shabbos now predicates the reward of Shabbos that we will receive in the future.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 100 - Highlights

PEOPLE WHO CANNOT COLLECT TERUMAH

The Gemora cites a braisa: There are ten classes of people that we do not give a share of terumah at the granary. They are the following: The deaf-mute, the imbecile, the minor, the tumtum (undetermined sex), the hermaphrodite, the slave, the woman (a Kohen’s wife), the uncircumcised (a Kohen, whose brothers died as a result of their circumcision, and who, owing to the fatal effect of such an operation on members of his family, is himself exempt from circumcision), the tamei, and one who married a woman who is unsuitable for him. And regarding all of these, however, terumah may be sent to their houses, with the exception of the one who is tamei and one who married a woman who is unsuitable for him. Now, one can well understand the prohibition in respect of the deaf-mute, the imbecile and the minor, since they lack intelligence (and it would be a mark of disrespect were the sacred terumah to be entrusted to the care of persons who are mentally defective, or undeveloped, or in any other way below the normal standard of intellectual or physical fitness), and in respect of the tumtum and the hermaphrodite also, they are regarded as creatures unto themselves (and it would be disrespectful for the sacred terumah to be given to these people). We do not give terumah to the slave a Kohen, as we are scared that people might eventually think that he himself is a Kohen (when he is not even a full-fledged Jew). A Kohen who has not had a circumcision, or one who is tamei, may also not collect terumah, as it is inappropriate that terumah should be collected by people who are considered defiled. A Kohen who marries a woman forbidden to Kohanim is fined that he cannot even have terumah sent to him. (99b – 100a)

THE WIFE OF A KOHEN

The Gemora asks: Why can’t the wife of a Kohen collect terumah? Rav Papa and Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua argue about this law. One says: The reason is because the woman might get divorced, and will subsequently be unable to eat terumah. People might not realize that this happened, and will still give her terumah. The Rabanan therefore decreed as a preventive measure that she should not collect terumah. The other one says: The reason is to avoid possible situations of yichud (prohibition against a man being alone with a woman) between her and people giving out terumah at their granaries.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between these two reasons?

The Gemora offers two differences: One is in a case where the granary is close to the city where she lives, but people are not frequently in the area of the granary. If the reason is because she might get divorced, it doesn’t seem applicable, as local people always know if someone in their town was divorced. If the reason is because of yichud, it is obviously still applicable. A second difference would be in the opposite case, where the granary is far from the town, but always has many people in its vicinity. While a divorce from a different town might not become known there, there is clearly no problem of yichud. (100a)


PEOPLE WHO CANNOT HAVE TERUMAH SENT TO THEIR HOUSES

All of the people listed in the previous braisa, who cannot collect terumah, may nonetheless have it delivered to their homes, besides a Kohen who is tamei and a Kohen who marries a woman who is forbidden to Kohanim. The Gemora notes that while a tamei cannot have terumah sent to him, a Kohen who was not circumcised (whose brothers died as a result of their circumcision, and who, owing to the fatal effect of such an operation on members of his family, is himself exempt from circumcision) may have terumah sent to him. The reason must be because he simply was forced not to circumcise himself, as it would be too dangerous. He therefore is allowed to have terumah sent to him. The Gemora therefore asks: Why should a Kohen who is tamei be any different? He was also a victim of forced circumstances, where he had to become tamei! Even so, the Gemora answers, the Kohen who was not circumcised due to his brothers deaths is a greater ones (forced circumstance), and is the reason why he can have terumah sent to his house (see Rashi 99b DH “Mishagrin” who states that he himself is not allowed to eat Terumah, only the people of his household).

COLLECTION OF WOMEN AND SERVANTS

The braisa states that we do not give a servant and woman terumah at the granaries. However, where they do give women and servants at the granaries, the woman receives first and is sent immediately on her way.

The Gemora asks: What does this mean? The braisa first states in a definite fashion that we do not give them terumah at the granaries, and then it states that they do receive?

The Gemora explains that the second statement was not talking about terumah, but rather ma’aser ani (tithe that is given to the poor), which was given out at houses in the city, not at granaries. The braisa was stating that women should be given ma’aser ani first, as it is degrading for them to wait to collect ma’aser ani, which is essentially charity.

On a similar note, Rava states: Originally, when two cases would come before him to judge, one involving a female plaintiff and one involving a male plaintiff, he would judge the case of the male first. His reasoning was that the male is more important, as he is obligated in more mitzvos than a woman. However, once he heard the law above regarding ma’aser ani, he realized that he should judge the case of the woman first, as it is embarrassing for a woman to wait for the judges to judge her case. (100a)

THE SLAVE AND KOHEN WHO WERE INTERMINGLED AT BIRTH

The Mishna had stated regarding the child of a Kohenes who became intermingled with her slavewoman's child: If they grew up, and they freed one another, they must marry wives eligible for the Kehuna.

The Gemora asks: Is this optional? If they do not free each other, they can’t get married, as they would not be able to find a marriage partner suitable for them. They can’t marry a slavewoman, or a free woman.

Rava explains that the Mishna means that they are forced to free each other. (100a)

HIS FLOUR-OFFERING

After listing the various applicable stringencies that a person who might be a Kohen or a freed slave have to abide by, the Mishna states that this person receives the stringencies of Kohanim and Yisraelim (regular Jews).

The Gemora asks: What law is the Mishna alluding to that was not already mentioned?

The Gemora answers: It is referring to a korban minchah (flour offering) which would be voluntarily brought by such a person. His minchah would have kemitzah (a Kohen takes three fingers full of the minchah offering and offers it on the altar) done to it, like the minchah of a Yisrael, and it is not eaten at all, like the minchah of a Kohen.

How would his minchah be offered? After having kemitzah done to it, the kemitzah would be offered, separate from the rest of the minchah (which would also be offered).

The Gemora asks: Isn’t there a law that if the appropriate part of a korban has been offered, the rest of it (that is not supposed to be burned) is explicitly forbidden to be burned on the altar? Accordingly, if this person is really a freed servant whose minchah is supposed to be partially eaten, how can we burn that portion on the altar?

Rav Yehudah, son of Rebbi Shimon Ben Pazi answers that it can nonetheless be offered like a wood offering without transgressing this prohibition, in accordance with the opinion of Rebbi Elozar whom explicitly states that this is permissible in a braisa.

The Gemora asks, although we see our Mishna’s statement fits the opinion of Rabbi Elozar, can it fit the opinion of the Rabanan who argue on him?

The Gemora says it can, in light of the position of Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon regarding the way a Kohen brings a minchas chotei (flour offering for a Kohen who sins). n of Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon understands that the minchas chotei of a Kohen must undergo kemitzah, while the rest of it is simply placed on the beis hadeshen (where the ashes of the altar were placed). Although the Rabanan argue on n of Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon regarding a minchas chotei, that is because they understand that a regular minchas chotei of a Kohen must be completely offered on the altar, without having some of it placed in a place usually reserved for ashes. However, they would agree that in a strange case such as that of our mixed up servant/Kohen, where there is no regular solution, as we are unsure what type of korban he is supposed to bring, one should place the leftovers on the beis hadeshen. (100a)

MISHNA

A woman is required to wait three months between marriages (to different people) in order to ensure that any child she will have after her second marriage will clearly belong to the second parent. If a woman did not wait three months, and has a child, a mere seven months after marrying her second husband, the identity of the child’s father is unclear. Accordingly, if this child grows up and dies without having had children from his marriage, his possible brothers from both of his possible fathers may only perform chalitzah and not yibum, as it is unclear if this yevamah is theirs. Similarly, he may only perform chalitzah to the widow of his possible brothers.

The Mishna continues: If he had possible half-brothers from both of his possible fathers, he can do both chalitzah and yibum to their widow. [Rashi explains that the Mishna is talking about a case where he is the only possible brother from that father. He can therefore perform yibum or chalitzah, because if he really is a half-brother, the yibum or chalitzah is valid. If he is not, he is either marrying someone who is not his relative, or doing chalitzah to someone who didn’t need it in the first place.] If his widow falls to yibum, she can have chalitzah done by the half-brother of one possible father, and a half-brother from the second possible father can then perform yibum (or chalitzah).

If one of the husbands was a Kohen and the other husband was a Yisroel, the son may only marry a woman who is fit for Kehunah. He may not render himself tamei through corpse tumah, but if he did render himself tamei, he does not incur lashes (for perhaps he is a Yisroel, and not a Kohen). He is prohibited to eat terumah; and if he ate inadvertently, he does not repay the principal and the chomesh (the extra fifth to the Kohen as a penalty; this is because the burden of proof rests on the one attempting to exact payment from him, and he must bring a proof that the one who ate is not a Kohen). He does not share a portion at the granary (since he is forbidden to eat terumah), and he sells his own terumah (since he is not obligated to give it to a Kohen because the burden of proof will be on the Kohen), and the proceeds are his. He does not share in the consecrated foods of the Beis Hamikdosh, and we do not give him kodoshim items (such as bechor) and we may not take his kodoshim away from him. He is exempt from the requirement of giving the foreleg, the jaws, and the stomach to the Kohen (when a Jew slaughters a non-sacrificial animal, he is required to give these animal parts to the Kohen), and his firstborn shall graze until it becomes blemished (when it becomes disqualified for the altar, and may be eaten by its owner; the reason why an Israelite owner may not eat of the flesh of his firstborn, even after it has contracted a blemish, is not because of its sanctity but because its consumption by a non-Kohen is regarded as stealing from the Kohanim; no such consideration arises in a case where the owner can claim that he himself is a Kohen). All the stringencies of Kohanim and the stringencies of Israelites are applied to him.

If both possible husbands were Kohanim, the son acts as an onein (person who cannot involve himself in mitzvos before his close relative is buried) if they die, and they act as an Onein if he dies (regarding Kohanim there are other pertinent laws of being an Onein, such as not being allowed to eat from korbanos during the period that one is an Onein). He cannot become tamei to them, and they cannot become tamei to him (if one of them dies, as they might be transgressing the prohibition against a Kohen becoming tamei to a non-relative). He does not inherit either family (as each family can claim that he is not their relative), but both families inherit his possessions. He is exempt from death if he strikes or curses either of his possible fathers. He can serve as a Kohen in the Beis Hamikdosh during the shift of each father’s household, but cannot demand a share in the division of korban meat, as the household can claim that he does not really deserve a share because he might belong to a different household. (100a – 100b)

GEMORA

The Gemora points out that the Mishna carefully stated that if his widow falls to yibum, she must first have chalitzah done by the half-brother of one possible father, and only then can yibum be performed by a half-brother from the second possible father. The first possible father’s offspring cannot first perform yibum, as they would possibly encounter someone else’s yevamah (forbidden to others by a negative prohibition).

STATUS OF A CHILD WITH UNIDENTIFIABLE PATERNAL KOHEN LINEAGE

Shmuel states that if one Kohen from a group of ten Kohanim had relations with a woman who gave birth to a child, the child is considered a Shtuki. What does Shmuel mean that this child is a “Shtuki?” If he means that he is quieted from claiming inheritance from any of these ten Kohanim when they die, that is obvious! He has no claim, as no one knows who his father really is! It must be that Shmuel means that he is quieted from proclaiming himself to have the laws of a Kohen.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this? The verse states regarding Pinchas’ gift of Kehunah, “and it will be for him and his children after him.” This implies that for someone to be a Kohen, his father must be clearly identifiable, something not present in this case.

Rav Papa asked that we find a similar verse by Avraham Avinu, “to be for you for a G-d and for your children after you.” If Shmuel understands that the words “after him” in the verse above teaches us that paternal lineage of a Kohen must be identifiable or someone cannot be deemed a Kohen, would he say that this verse regarding all Jews means that someone’s father must be identifiable or his son is not Jewish? According to Shmuel, what does this verse regarding Avraham Avinu teach us? It must be, the Gemora answers that this verse indeed tells us that one should make sure not to marry a non-Jew or slavewoman, in order that his children should not follow her status of being not Jewish.

The Gemora asks that this seems difficult from a braisa that discusses a case similar to that of our Mishna. If a woman did not wait three months before having yibum, and has a child a mere seven months after marrying her second husband, the identity of the child’s father is unclear. If both potential fathers were Kohanim, the braisa states that the child is fit to be proclaimed the Kohen Gadol (high priest of the Beis Hamikdosh). This seems to be in direct contradiction to Shmuel, who would seemingly say that he does not even have the status of a Kohen!

The Gemora answers that Shmuel’s law was only a Rabbinical law, and did not derive the law from the verse that he quoted. The verse was only used as an asmachta (a hinted support to his law). Additionally, even Shmuel only stated that such a Rabbinical law was decreed when the relationship that bore the child was an illicit relationship, not when a marriage was merely consummated before the appropriate time (as in the case of the braisa).

The Gemora asks: Does the decree apply even in a case of an illicit relationship? Our Mishna discussed someone who didn’t wait three months before marrying her second husband, and then gave birth to a child. What does our Mishna mean when it says that she didn’t wait three months “after he husband?” If it refers to “after her first husband died,” the end of the Mishna that states that if both possible fathers are Kohanim, he acts as an onein if they die, and they act as an onein if he dies seems to be unclear. It is understandable that he could become an onein from both possible fathers, as his mother married her second husband and the first possible father may cause him to become an onein if his bones are collected when the son is alive (giving him the status of an onein on that day, see Rashi). However, the second statement “they become an onein to him,” seems nonsensical, as the case is where the first father is already dead! It must be, therefore, that the case is not where the first husband died, but rather divorced his wife. When the Mishna states “After her husband,” it must mean after she received a get (divorce) from her husband.

The Gemora states that the rest of the Mishna still seems difficult. The Mishna further states that if both possible parents were Kohanim, “he cannot become tamei to them, and they cannot become tamei to him.” It is understandable that they must be stringent and cannot become tamei to him, as he might not be the son of one of them (and the non-parent would become tamei to a regular person). However, why can’t he become tamei to them? It is understandable that he cannot become tamei to the second possible father (as he might be the son of the first father, and thereby become tamei to a non-relative). However, he should definitely be allowed to become tamei to his first possible father. If he is his son, he clearly is allowed to become tamei to his father. If he is not, this means that he is the product of a Kohen and divorcee, which means he has the status of a chalal (product of a forbidden Kohen marriage) who in any event does not have the status of a Kohen and can become tamei to dead people! Why, then, would the Mishna say he cannot become tamei to his first possible father? It must be that she did not wait “after her husband” in our Mishna means that she had an illicit relationship with two different men within three months of each other. When the Mishna stated “Achar Ba’alah” – “after her husband,” it really meant “Achar Bo’alah” – “after her first illicit relationship.” Despite the fact that this child was the product of an illicit relationship, the Mishna concludes that he may serve as a Kohen. This clearly proves that Shmuel, who stated that the child of an illicit Kohen relationship that does not have a clear father does not have the status of a Kohen, was incorrect.
Rav Shmaya answered the position of Shmuel. He explained that the Mishna may mean “after her husband,” and be talking about a first marriage which ended in mi’un (when a child is married off by her mother or brothers when she is a minor, and can refuse the marriage). [Being that the first marriage did not end in divorce, the second Kohen who marries her does not produce a chalal, which is why he cannot become tamei to either possible parent.] However, the Gemora asks, this does not seem plausible, as a minor does not normally give birth. This is apparent from the braisa that Rav Bibi cited in front of Rav Nachman: Three types of women are permitted to insert a wad into their bodies prior to engaging in marital relations in order to prevent conception. They are: A minor, a pregnant woman and a nursing woman. A minor is permitted because otherwise, she may become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman is permitted because otherwise, she might become pregnant again, and the second fetus will crush the first one. A nursing woman is permitted because otherwise, she might be compelled to wean her child, resulting in his death. The braisa continues: What age minor are we referring to? We are concerned when the minor is between eleven and twelve years old. If she is younger or older than that, she is not permitted to cohabit in that manner; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim disagree with the entire ruling and state that these women should cohabit in the regular manner and Heaven will have compassion on them (becoming pregnant in these situations is highly unusual and therefore we prohibit them from utilizing and type of contraceptive measures) as it is written [Tehillim 116:6]: Hashem protects the fools. This braisa shows that a minor does not normally have a child, as she would normally either not become pregnant or die due to the pregnancy.

The Gemora suggests a different answer for Shmuel. The case is when the first Kohen marriage was not actually a marriage, as the kiddushin was later rendered mistaken and therefore invalid. [Being that both father’s claims to fatherhood were during “marriages,” even though the first marriage was later found to be invalid the Rabbanan did not decree that the product of such Kohen fathers is not a Kohen (although they would have made this decree if the fathers had illicit relationships).]

The fact that a mistaken kiddushin does not fully make relations between the supposed bride and groom into an illicit relationship is like the position of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel. Rav Yehuda quoted Shmuel as saying in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that when the verse states (regarding a married woman who consents to having an affair) “and she was not held,” it is saying that she is therefore forbidden to her husband. This implies that if she was violated, she is permitted to her (Yisrael) husband. Rebbi Yishmael derives from the word “and she” that there is a case where a different woman was not held, and is still permitted to her husband. What is this case? It must be where her kiddushin was mistaken, such as in a case of mi’un, where even if she has a child sitting on her shoulder she can perform mi’un and leave the marriage. [Although we are not talking about a case of Miun, Rebbi Yishmael is clearly stating that if a girl who eventually did Miun had an affair before doing Miun, she retroactively did not become forbidden to her husband (due to the affair) once she does Miun. This is because Miun retroactively causes her marriage to have never taken place, and the law that a husband is forbidden to his wife who consents to have an affair is only relevant if she had the affair when they were actually married. The Gemora therefore applies Rebbi Yishmael’s law and logic to an adult woman who had an affair during a marriage that was later found out to have never existed in the first place, as the kiddushin was invalid. Anything that happened during that marriage is not actually classified as an illicit relationship. This allows Shmuel to state that our Mishna is talking about a case that is not an illicit relationship.] (100b)

[END]

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INFALLIBILITY

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Elozar bar Tzadok said: I testified once in my life regarding the genealogical status of a person, and through that testimony, I elevated a slave to the genealogically qualified.

The Gemora asks: Do you think that he actually elevated a slave to the genealogically qualified? Hashem does not even allow the animal of a righteous person to transgress (referring to the animal of Rabbi Pinchas of Yair, who would not eat untithed produce); certainly Hashem would not bring a stumbling block to the righteous person himself!

The Gemora answers: Rather, Rabbi Elozar bar Tzadok wanted to elevate a slave to the genealogically qualified, but he realized at the end that he was in fact a slave. The Gemora explains the incident: Rabbi Elozar was in the city of Rabbi Yosi when he observed them giving terumah to a slave in the granary. He went and testified regarding his lineage in the city of Rabbi Yehudah. (He then realized that he could not testify regarding his genealogy, for even though, in Rabbi Yehudah’s locale, they would elevate one’s status on the evidence of having received a share of terumah, that was only because they didn’t give a slave terumah when he wasn’t in the presence of the master, whereas, in Rabbi Yosi’s locale, they did give terumah to a slave in absence of the master, but they didn’t testify regarding his genealogy based on that evidence.)

Tosfos s.v. salka da’atach states that the text of our Gemora should not have the challenge from the fact that Hashem does not even allow the animal of a righteous person to transgress; certainly Hashem would not bring a stumbling block to the righteous person himself. This principle is applicable only to the inadvertent consumption of forbidden foods. (The reason for this is because it is degrading for the righteous to eat forbidden foods.) Here, the scholar did not violate any prohibition by elevating the status of the slave; this would not be included in the protection that Hashem provides for the scholars.

Reb Dov Zupnik from Kollel Iyun Hadaf discusses this Tosfos at length.
THE DAFYOMI DISCUSSION LIST
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Yerushalayim
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld

Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu asked:

I understand that a chacham can decide if the Bet Din has erred. If he knows it erred but nevertheless goes by its decision to allow something forbidden, he is guilty. But in the Torah we are commanded that we must follow decisions, even if we are told "left is right and right is left". In Horayot, the chacham is deciding whether to follow the bet din or not, thereby putting himself above the bet din. Please clarify.
Shvua tov--Tzvi

Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, Bet Yatir Israel

Shmuel K. asked:

Our Mishna states that if the individual knew the the Psak of Bet Din was wrong, and yet follows their Psak, he is liable. Yet we see many cases in Shas that individuals are forced to follow the majority, Rov, and do things that they feel is Asur. In these cases the individual knew the Bet Din was wrong, and yet we see it is a Mitzvah to follow them. I.e.. 1 - Bava Metziah 59B, R. Eliezer Ben Horkanis, and the oven 2 - Rosh Hashana 25B, and the debate as to which day is Yom Kippur. Are we to say that our Mishna is referring to a case, where the individual did not share his information with the Bet Din. But had he shared his information, and they don't accept it. Then he is obligated to follow the Bet Din, even though it is against his beliefs?

Thank You,
Shmuel Katz

Aurel Littmann asked:

How could beis din err? Did they not have daas torah that would have prevented them from erring? The donkey of a rabbi would not eat food that was not tithed...certainly these rabbis? Many stories are said of R.Moshe how he did not err in permitting agunos....where it was easy to err as people got separated during the war...but he had siyato d'shmayo.

What is the halacha of lo sosuru min... where if the rabbis tell you something that you may not fully understand, still follow them...in the first mishnah in horeyos ... if one suspects that the beis din paskened wrong he should not follow them!? Does the first mishnah show that we don't have a concept of papal infalibility? But, again...when is one to follow daas torah?

The Kollel replies:

(a) Let us first refer to the words of the RAMBAN in Sefer ha'mitzvos la'Rambam, Shoresh ha'Rishon (p. 24 in Frankel edition):

"And one who transgresses the words of the Sanhedrin of his generation, and relies on his own opinion, has transgressed this Lo Saa'seh (of Lo Sasur) and this Aseh. Even if Beis Din is divided on the issue, we follow the majority as it is said in Sanhedrin 88.... And one who transgresses and relies on his own opinion is a Zaken Mamrei... and this is what is said in the verse regarding one who acts 'b'Zadon' not to heed the Kohen. For the Written Torah which was given to us by Moshe Rabeinu A'H clearly will not be understood in the same way by each person, and therefore Hashem decreed that we follow the Sanhedrin in whatever they say, whether they have received the interpretation through transmission or whether they interpret the Torah as they understand it, for the Torah was given according to the understanding of the Sanhedrin.

"And this is what is written in the Sifri: 'Even if they tell you regarding right that it is left.' For that is the Mitzvah of the Giver of the Torah -- that a dissenter should not say, 'I shall permit this to myself for I know clearly that they are mistaken,' for we will reply to him, 'It is this that you are commanded (i.e. to follow the Torah according to the Sanhedrin's interpretation), as Rebbi Yehoshua conducted himself with Raban Gamliel on the Yom Kipur of the latter's calculation, as related in the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah.

"However, there is a contingency, as can be seen in the Gemara in Horayos 2, which is that if there was in the time of the Sanhedrin a scholar who had reached the level of Hora'ah and the Sanhedrin ruled to allow an Isur, and this scholar thinks that they have made a mistake, he may not listen to them and be lenient with himself, but rather he should observe the stringency with regard to his own conduct, and surely if he was actually a member of the Sanhedrin... he must come before them and voice his objections, and if they all agreed to dismiss his objection and his reasoning, he must then follow their ruling."

(b) We do not believe in infallibility, nor do we believe in the pope. Tosfos throughout Shas (Shabbos 12b, Gitin 7a, Yevamos 99b, etc.) says in the name of Rabeinu Tam that "Ein ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu Mevi Takalah Al Yedeihem" applies only to where the Chacham eats something Asur, but not with regard to a ruling that a Chacham makes for someone else or with regard to a transgression that does not involve eating. (Everywhere the Gemara seems to cite this principle with regard to another type of mistake, Rabeinu Tam changes the Girsa.)

(c) As for the rulings regarding Agunos, although in general there is Siyata d'Shemaya in any Pesak Halachah and mistakes are rare, the Agunah situation is something else entirely. If the husband were to arrive, it would not be because the Rav erred in his understanding of the Torah's laws; he may have ruled correctly, in accordance with the Torah, and decided that the evidence that was presented sufficed to permit the woman to get married. However, the husband may actually be alive (because the Torah does not require 100% certain evidence to remarry; a near certainty will suffice). Rav Moshe says about such situations that a Rav has Siyata d'Shemaya that since his Pesak was correct according to the parameters of the Torah, nothing wrong will come about because of his correct Pesak (and the husband will not be alive).

Here, in contrast, we are talking about a mistaken Pesak, where the judges erred in their interpretation of the Torah's laws. Such a mistake may have come about because the Sanhedrin were not on the impeccable level that Hashem expected of them, or because the people of the generation were not fit.

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AN UNCERTAIN KOHEN RECITING THE PRIESTLY BLESSING - Yevamos 99 - Daf Yomi

The Mishna discusses a case regarding the child of a Kohenes who became intermingled with her slavewoman's child.

The Shvus Yaakov in his responsa (3) rules that in such a case, each one of the sons will recite the Priestly Blessings and the blessing beforehand. Now, even though, a non-Kohen transgresses a positive commandment by reciting the Priestly Blessing and he will be saying a blessing in vain, since the Priestly Blessing entails three positive commandments, it will override the questionable prohibition.

Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei HaShas challenges this ruling: He states that there are not three positive commandments involved in this mitzvah; it is mentioned three times in the Torah. And that which the Shvus Yaakov stated that once he is reciting the Priestly Blessing, he might as well recite the blessing beforehand, why is this different than any time someone performs a mitzvah in a case of uncertainty? He should perform the mitzvah without reciting the blessing!

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 99 - Highlights

INTERMINGLED
The Gemora cites a braisa (a variation of the Mishna’s case): If some of them were brothers and some of them were not brothers, the ones who are brothers should submit to chalitzah, and the ones who are not brothers should perform yibum.

Rav Safra explains the braisa: If some of them (from the mother’s surviving sons, who were not involved in the confusion) were paternal brothers (to the ones that were intermingled and subsequently died) and some were maternal brothers (a paternal brother to one and a maternal brother to another), the maternal brothers should submit to chalitzah (thereby releasing the widows of their paternal brothers). (They may not perform yibum even after the widows had performed chalitzah with all the other brothers, since, should one of them happen to marry the widow of his maternal brother, he would thereby incur the penalty of kares.) And the paternal brothers may perform yibum with one or more of the widows after she submitted to chalitzah to all the brothers.

The braisa continues: If some of them were Kohanim (and therefore, they may not perform yibum with any widow receiving chalitzah) and some of them were not Kohanim, the Kohanim should submit to chalitzah, and the non-Kohanim may perform yibum.

The braisa continues: If some of them were Kohanim and some were maternal brothers, they should all submit to chalitzah, and they may not perform yibum. (98b)

LEGAL ODDITIES
The Rabbis taught in a braisa: A man must sometimes submit to chalitzah from his mother because of an uncertainty, from his sister because of an uncertainty and from his daughter because of an uncertainty. What is the case? If his mother and another woman had two male children, and then they gave birth to two male children in a hiding place (the children were interchanged and it was impossible for either mother to ascertain which was her own child) and the son of one mother married the mother of the other son, while the son of the other mother married the mother of the first, and they both died childless. Each son must submit to chalitzah from both women. It emerges that each submits to chalitzah from his mother because of an uncertainty.

What is the case where one will submit to chalitzah from his sister because of an uncertainty? If his mother and another woman gave birth to two female children in a hiding place (and they each had a son from a different marriage) and these son’s brothers from a different mother married these two girls and died childless. Each of the surviving brothers must submit to chalitzah from both widows. It emerges that a man submits to chalitzah from his sister because of an uncertainty.

What is the case where one will submit to chalitzah from his daughter because of an uncertainty? If his wife and another woman gave birth to two female children in a hiding place, and one of their husbands had two brothers. Each of the brothers married one of the girls and died childless. The father submits to chalitzah from both widows even though one of them is certainly his daughter. It emerges that a man submits to chalitzah from his daughter because of an uncertainty. (99a)

SAME PARENTS; FIVE NATIONS
The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Meir said: A husband and wife may sometimes produce five different nations. What is the case? If a Jew bought a slave and a slavewoman in the market (they did not yet undergo the process of becoming Canaanite slaves), and they had two sons from beforehand, and one of those sons converted. The result is that one is a convert and the other is an idolater. If subsequently, the master immersed them in a mikvah for the purpose of becoming slaves and then they cohabited with one another and bore a son, behold, we have a convert, an idolater and a slave. If the master subsequently freed the slavewoman and the slave cohabited with her and had another son, behold, we have a convert, an idolater, a slave and a mamzer. If the master then freed the slave and they (the freed slave and slavewoman) married each other and had another son, behold, we have a convert, an idolater, a slave, a mamzer and a Jew.

The Gemora asks: What does this teach us?

The Gemora answers: It teaches us that a child born from a union of an idolater or a slave with a Jewess is classified as a mamzer. (99a)

A SON SELLING A FATHER
The Gemora cites a braisa: There is a case where a man sells his father to enable his mother to collect her kesuvah. What is the case? If a Jew bought in the market a slave and a slavewoman, and they had a son from beforehand (who was not included in the sale, thus he remains an idolater). The master freed the slavewoman and then, he married her. He got up and bequeathed, in writing, his entire estate to her son. (The son now owns his father, the slave.) The husband dies and the wife demands payment for her kesuvah (which she can collect from any property the husband sold or gave away after the lien took effect).This results in the fact that the son sells his father (the slave) in order to enable his mother to collect her kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: What does this teach us?

The Gemora answers: The braisa represents the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that a slave is regarded as movable property, and such property is mortgaged for the payment of a kesuvah.

Alternatively, you can say that a slave is regarded as real property, and that is why a slave can be used for a collection of a kesuvah. (99a)

MISHNA
If a woman's child became intermingled with her daughter-in-law's child, and they grew up, married, and died childless, the halacha is as follows: The sons of the daughter-in-law must submit to chalitzah to the two widows and may not marry them by yibum, since we are uncertain which widow is his brother's wife (and would be permitted to take in yibum), and which widow is his father's brother's wife (and she would be forbidden); and the sons of the elder woman either submit to chalitzah or marry them by yibum, since it is uncertain which widow is his brother's wife or his brother's son's wife (and she is also permitted to them, provided that the sons of the daughter-in-law submit to chalitzah first).

If the legitimate (the sons whose identities are known) ones died, the halacha is as follows: The intermingled sons submit to chalitzah from the sons of the elder woman, and may not perform yibum since it is uncertain whether she is his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife (and she would be forbidden). And with regards to the sons of the daughter-in-law, one submits to chalitzah (he may not take her in yibum first because perhaps she is awaiting yibum with the other son, and she is forbidden to the general population) and the other one marries by yibum (if he is the son of the daughter-in-law, he is rightfully performing yibum with her, and if he is the son of the elder woman, the widow is the wife of his brother’s son, who is permitted to him).

The Mishna continues: If the child of a Kohenes became intermingled with her slavewoman's child, they may both eat terumah (for even a slave of a Kohen is permitted to eat terumah), but they share one portion at the granary (this will be explained in the Gemora). They may not render themselves tamei through corpse tumah, and they may not marry women, whether eligible (to marry a Jew) or ineligible. If they grew up, and they freed one another, they must marry wives eligible for the Kehunah, and they may not render themselves tamei through corpse tumah, but if they did rendered themselves tamei, they do not incur lashes (for perhaps he is a freed slave, and not a Kohen). They are prohibited to eat terumah; and if they ate inadvertently, they do not repay the principal and the chomesh (the extra fifth to the Kohen as a penalty; this is because the burden of proof rests on the one attempting to exact payment from them, and he must bring a proof that the one who ate is not a Kohen). They do not share a portion at the granary (since they are forbidden to eat terumah), and they sell their own terumah (since they are not obligated to give it to a Kohen because the burden of proof will be on the Kohen), and the proceeds are theirs. They do not share in the consecrated foods of the Beis Hamikdosh, and we do not give them kodoshim items (such as bechor) and we may not take their kodoshim away from them. They are exempt from the requirement of giving the foreleg, the jaws, and the stomach to the Kohen (when a Jew slaughters a non-sacrificial animal, he is required to give these animal parts to the Kohen), and his firstborn shall graze until it becomes blemished (when it becomes disqualified for the altar, and may be eaten by its owner; the reason why an Israelite owner may not eat of the flesh of his firstborn, even after it has contracted a blemish, is not because of its sanctity but because its consumption by a non-Kohen is regarded as stealing from the Kohanim; no such consideration arises in a case where the owner can claim that he himself is a Kohen). All the stringencies of Kohanim and the stringencies of Israelites are applied to them. (99a – 99b)

GEMORA
The Mishna had stated: If the legitimate (the sons whose identities are known) ones died, the halacha is as follows etc. We can infer from here that the intermingled ones are illegitimate.

The Gemora asks: Are they regarded as illegitimate because they became intermingled?

Rav Papa answers: The Mishna should be emended to state that the definite ones died. (99b)

The Mishna had stated: If a woman's child became intermingled with her daughter-in-law's child, and they grew up, married, and died childless, the halacha is as follows: The sons of the daughter-in-law must submit to chalitzah to the two widows and may not marry them by yibum, since we are uncertain which widow is his brother's wife, and which widow is his father's brother's wife; and the sons of the elder woman either submit to chalitzah or marry them by yibum, since it is uncertain which widow is his brother's wife or his brother's son's wife.

The Gemora states: The chalitzah must be performed prior to the yibum because if one will perform yibum first, and he is not the actual yavam, he is violating the prohibition of a yevamah marrying someone from the general population without being released by the yavam with a yibum or chalitzah. (99b)

GIVING TERUMAH TO A SLAVE
The Mishna had stated: If the child of a Kohenes became intermingled with her slavewoman's child, they may both eat terumah, but they share one portion at the granary.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t it obviously that they only receive one share (since no more than one of them can lay claim to the Kehunah; why state the obvious)?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna should be understood to mean that they do not receive terumah from the granary unless they are both present together (only when the two come together do they receive one share; one without the other receives nothing). The Tanna of our Mishna follows the opinion who holds that we do not give a share of terumah to a slave unless his master is with him (and since one of the two is obviously a slave, neither of them can claim a share unless the other is with him). For it was taught in the following braisa: We do not give a share of terumah to a slave unless his master is with him (people might mistakenly think that he is a Kohen, and they will allow him to marry a Jewess); these were the words of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Yosi, however, ruled: The slave may claim, “If I am a Kohen, give me for my own sake, and if I am a Kohen's slave, give me for the sake of my master.”

The Gemora explains this dispute: In the place of Rabbi Yehudah, people were raised to the status of the genealogically qualified, enabling them to marry women of unblemished and priestly descent on the evidence that they received a share of terumah at the granary (therefore, terumah must not be given to a slave in the absence of his master). In the place of Rabbi Yosi, however, no one was raised to the status of the genealogically qualified on the evidence of having received a share of terumah.

The Gemora cites a related braisa: Rabbi Elozar bar Tzadok said: I testified once in my life regarding the genealogical status of a person, and through that testimony, I elevated a slave to the genealogically qualified.

The Gemora asks: Do you think that he actually elevated a slave to the genealogically qualified? Hashem does not even allow the animal of a righteous person to transgress (referring to the animal of Rabbi Pinchas of Yair, who would not eat untithed produce); certainly Hashem would not bring a stumbling block to the righteous person himself!

The Gemora answers: Rather, Rabbi Elozar bar Tzadok wanted to elevate a slave to the genealogically qualified, but he realized at the end that he was in fact a slave. The Gemora explains the incident: Rabbi Elozar was in the city of Rabbi Yosi when he observed them giving terumah to a slave in the granary. He went and testified regarding his lineage in the city of Rabbi Yehudah. (He then realized that he could not testify regarding his genealogy, for even though, in Rabbi Yehudah’s locale, they would elevate one’s status on the evidence of having received a share of terumah, that was only because they didn’t give a slave terumah when he wasn’t in the presence of the master, whereas, in Rabbi Yosi’s locale, they did give terumah to a slave in absence of the master, but they didn’t testify regarding his genealogy based on that evidence.) (99b)

[END]

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NOT BELIEVING A SCHOLAR

The Gemora asks on the aforementioned braisa: How could Ben Yasyan accept the convert’s statement from Rabbi Akiva? Surely Rabbi Abba stated in the name of Rav Huna in the name of Rav: Wherever a scholar issues a halachic ruling (that was previously unknown) and such a point comes up for a practical decision, he is obeyed if he made the statement before the incident occurred, but if the statement was made only after the incident occurred, he is not obeyed.

The Gemora answers: If you wish I might say that the incident occurred after he made his statement.

Alternatively, I might say that it was because he brought proof from the woman and her seven children.

Alternatively, I might say that here it is different because he related another Rabbi Akiva’s other statement together with it (just as he was believed regarding that statement, he was believed regarding the other one as well).

From Rashi’s commentary (77a), it would seem that the reason we do not accept the scholar’s statement is because we are concerned that he might deliberately falsify the halacha.

The Ritva forcefully disputes this. Heaven forbid that a Torah scholar would deliberately falsify the ruling. Rather, the reason why we don’t believe him in these situations is because he might make a mistake; in the excitement of the moment, it would appear to him that he remembers the tradition in one manner, when in fact, it is really the opposite.

The Ritva explains that the third answer of the Gemora is very understandable according to his explanation. Since he related another one of Rabbi Akiva’s statements that was said at the same time, this is an indicator that the scholar does remember accurately what his teacher taught; he is not just misremembering. The Ritva states further that according to Rashi’s explanation, it is hard to comprehend the Gemora’s answer. If we are concerned that the scholar is lying, why would the additional elements added help to dispel that concern? He might be embellishing his lie in order to give it greater authenticity.

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PATERNAL RELATIONSHIPS OF NON-JEWISH FATHERS AND SONS - Yevamos 98 - Daf Yomi

A braisa had stated: If there were twin brothers whose conception was not in sanctity, but their birth was in sanctity (their mother converted after conception, but before they were born), they do not perform chalitzah or yibum, but they would be liable to the punishment of kares if they would cohabit with their brother’s wife.

Rava seeks to explain why these brothers are regarded as maternal brothers (and are
liable for the prohibition against cohabiting with a brother’s wife), but they are not regarded as paternal brothers (and that is why they are not subject for yibum and chalitzah). Rava said: The Rabbis said that an Egyptian, who converts has no father. This is so, even if we know with a certainty the father’s identity. This can be proven from the braisa cited above regarding twin brothers, where one drop of semen (from their father) divided into two, and the braisa rules that they are not subject to the laws of yibum and chalitzah. It seems evident from here that the Torah voided their paternity, as it is written [Yechezkel 23:20]: Their flesh (the Egyptians of old) is the flesh of donkeys and their issue is the issue of horses. (A Jewish child that converted is considered halachically fatherless.)

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Kovetz Heoros (51:3) asks: It is evident from our Gemora that the Torah voided the paternal lineage of an idolater, yet the Gemora above (62a) clearly states that they do have lineage. The Gemora cited a verse [Melachim II 20:12]: At that time, Berodach-baladan son of Baladan, the king of Bavel, sent etc. We see that an idolater is identified as the son of another idolater.

Reb Elchonon answers: The Gemora above is referring to a case where an idolater cohabited with another idolater and had a child. That child is regarded as being the son of that idolater. Our Gemora is discussing a case where an idolater cohabited with a Jewess, or with another idolater and she converted while she was pregnant. In these cases, we do not recognize the paternal relationship. (It would seem to me that this is precisely what Rish Lakish stated in the Gemora 62a. Rish Lakish said: While they are idolaters, they have genealogical connections to their offspring; once they convert, they lose that connection.)

Reb Elchonon concludes that this distinction will not be halachically correct according to the Ramban. The Ramban states that the Torah voided the paternal relationship between a non-Jewish father and their sons even as idolaters. The reason why an idolater son inherits his father is unique to the laws of inheritance.

I found that Rabbi D. Bloom from Kollel Iyun Hadaf discusses the Ramban’s opinion in an insight to Bechoros 46.

(Please click the "read more" link to view the rest of the post.)

THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
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THE FIRSTBORN SON OF A WOMAN WHO CONVERTED WHILE PREGNANT

QUESTIONS: The Mishnah states that if a Nochri, who had sons, married a woman who never had children and they later converted while she was pregnant, her firstborn son is considered the Bechor with regard to Pidyon ha'Ben, but not with regard to inheriting the double portion of his father's estate. RASHI (DH Nisgairah) explains that the husband converted together with the wife. The baby is a Bechor and must be given to the Kohen, because he is the first to emerge from the mother's womb ("Peter Rechem") and is a Yisrael. However, he is not a Bechor with regard to inheritance, because he was conceived "she'Lo b'Kedushah," before the conversion. The Torah teaches that a Ger does not have familial ties to his father, as the verse states, "Zirmas Susim Zirmasam" (Yechezkel 23:20).

Rashi's explanation is difficult to understand. (a) First, why does Rashi need to mention the reason that the offspring of a Mitzri has no familial ties? There seems to be a more basic reason why the child does not inherit from his father, and that is because of the principle, "Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami" -- a Nochri who converts is like a newborn child. Accordingly, the baby, after his conversion together with his mother, has no familial bond to his biological father. Why does Rashi not mention this reason?

(b) The RAMBAN (Chidushim to Yevamos 98a) states that the principle that the offspring of a Nochri is not related to its father ("Afkerei Rachmana l'Zar'ei") applies even when the Nochri does not convert. For this reason, a Nochri is permitted to marry relatives from his father's side, even though he is forbidden to marry those same relatives from his mother's side. The Ramban there adds that when the Gemara in Kidushin (18a) says that a Nochri inherits his father, it means that there is a Gezeirah Shavah that even though he is not considered to be related to his father, he still inherits him.

We see from the words of the Ramban that the principle of "Afkerei Rachmana l'Zar'ei" does *not* prevent the son from inheriting! Why, then, does Rashi write that the reason why the son does not inherit his father is because of "Afkerei Rachmana l'Zar'ei"? (See also TOSFOS DH Nisgairah.)


ANSWERS:
(a) RAV SHMUEL ROZOVSKY zt'l (in Chidushim to Yevamos 12:4, DH v'Hineh) answers that Rashi in Yevamos (98a, DH Ha d'Amur, and DH Lo Teima) indeed writes that a baby born after the conversion is not considered a "Katan she'Nolad," even though he was conceived before the conversion. Accordingly, Rashi was forced to find a different reason to explain why the child does not inherit his father.

(b) Rav Shmuel Rozovsky (ibid., DH Achen) answers the second question by pointing out that the reason why a Nochri inherits his father even though they are not considered related is because of a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv, as mentioned above. However, it must be that this Gezeiras ha'Kasuv is a special Halachah that applies only to Benei Noach; once a Nochri converts and is no longer a Ben Noach, this special Halachah no longer applies to him. If not for the reason of "Afkerei Rachmana l'Zar'ei," the son would have had a connection to his father and would have inherited him after converting, because -- according to Rashi in Yevamos -- in the case of a mother who converted while pregnant, the law of "Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad" does not apply to the baby. Therefore, Rashi writes that the child has no connection to his father because of "Afkerei Rachmana," and that is why he does not inherit him after conversion. The law that every Nochri (who did not convert) inherits his father is due to a different Halachah -- a special Gezeiras ha'Kasuv among the Halachos of Benei Noach which does not apply to this baby, who is now a Yisrael.
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Reb Chaim Qoton discusses a similar issue here: rchaimqoton. Rav Papa says (Bechoros 47a) that if the daughter of a Levite (a Bas Levi, or Levia) and non-Jew have a firstborn baby boy together, the child is exempt from the Kohanic redemption of the firstborn because the boy is a Levite. How can the boy be a Levite if Levitical status is reliant on the father’s lineage and the father, as a non-Jew, lacks any lineage (Yevamos 98a)? Rabbi Chaim Brisker (al HaRambam Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 15:9) explains that a Levi is not exempt from this requirement of redemption because he is part of the tribe of Levi, for tribal affiliation is inherited paternally. Rather the reason the boy is exempt is that he himself is a Levi as determined by his genealogy from his mother, albeit his tribal affiliation is not Levitical. According to this, one can properly be called a descendent of Levi'im by just having a Levia as a mother, but would not be called part of the tribe of Levi unless his father was also a Levite. In the opinion of Rav Papa, the exemption from the redemption of the firstborn comes from just being a descendant of Levi (usually from the father’s side, but if the father lacks lineage because he is not Jewish, then from the mother’s side), so even if the boy is not a Levite, he is exempt from the redemption. Tosafos (Bechoros 47a) assert that even if this boy is considered a non-Jew, he is still considered a Levi according to Rav Papa.

[END]

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FORBIDDEN RELATIONSHIPS FOR A GENTILE - Yevamos 98 - Daf Yomi

Reb Chaim Qoton discusses this topic here: rchaimqoton. While the Jews have their own 613 commandments which G-d gave them in the Torah, G-d only commanded the rest of Humankind to follow the seven (categories of) Noahide laws. While there are over twenty forbidden relationships applicable to a Jew, the Rambam lists only six for a gentile: his mother, his father’s wife, another man’s wife, his maternal sister, another man, and an animal. Each of these sexual prohibitions is learned exegetically from one passage in Bereishis, save for the case of maternal sister, which is learned from Abraham’s encounter with Abimelech.

The Maimonides’s enumeration, by all means, is not accepted by everyone. The Kesef Mishna (Maran Rav Yosef Ben Efraim Karo, 1488-1575) points out (ad loc.) that the Maimonides decided the Halacha according to Rabbi Akiva (of Sanhedrin 58b), but according to Rabbi Eliezer (Ibid.) one’s father’s sister and mother’s sister should also be prohibited. Indeed the Sefer HaMizrachi (written by Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, 1455-1526) says (Genesis 46:10) that we follow the law of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of a father’s maternal sister. Additionally, to the list of the Maimonides, the Lechem Mishneh (printed on the side of the Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah in more standard editions) adds one’s daughter (Sanhedrin 58b, second version of Rav Huna’s statement). The Ritva (Rabbi Yom Tov ben Avraham Alshevili, circa. 1300) seemingly argues (Yevamos 98b) on the Maimonides’s view and permits a non-Jew to marry his father’s wife. However, such an opinion contradicts the Talmud (Sanhedrin 58b) which proved otherwise from the fact that had Adam lain carnally with his daughter, he would have prohibited her to Cain under the prohibition of “father’s wife”, and thus the world’s population would never have successfully propagated. Kayin himself has a special exemption on the rule against marrying one’s sister due to the verse (written prophetically by Avrham Aveinu under the pen name “Ethan the Ezrahite,” Bava Basra 14b) which says, “For I said, ‘Forever will kindness be built’” (Psalms 89:2). Adam’s abstinence from relations with his daughter was deemed a gracious act, and upon that act of kindness, the world founded.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 98 - Highlights

LEGALLY FATHERLESS
A braisa had stated: If there were twin brothers whose conception was not in sanctity, but their birth was in sanctity (their mother converted after conception, but before they were born), they do not perform chalitzah or yibum, but they would be liable to the punishment of kares if they would cohabit with their brother’s wife.

Rava seeks to explain why these brothers are regarded as maternal brothers (and are liable for the prohibition against cohabiting with a brother’s wife), but they are not regarded as paternal brothers (and that is why they are not subject for yibum and chalitzah). Rava said: The Rabbis said that an Egyptian, who converts has no father. This is so, even if we know with a certainty the father’s identity. This can be proven from the braisa cited above regarding twin brothers, where one drop of semen (from their father) divided into two, and the braisa rules that they are not subject to the laws of yibum and chalitzah. It seems evident from here that the Torah voided their paternity, as it is written [Yechezkel 23:20]: Their flesh (the Egyptians of old) is the flesh of donkeys and their issue is the issue of horses. (A Jewish child that converted is considered halachically fatherless.) (97b – 98a)

TWO BROTHERS BORN FROM A MOTHER WHO CONVERTED AFTERWARDS
The Gemora (97b) had cited a dispute between Rav Acha bar Yaakov and Rav Sheishes regarding whether brothers, who converted are permitted to marry each other’s wives or not. The Gemora attempts to bring a proof to Rav Acha bar Yaakov that such a marriage is permitted from the following braisa: Ben Yasyan related: When I traveled to the coastal towns, I came across a certain convert who had married the wife of his maternal brother. I said to him: My son, who permitted you to marry her? He replied: Behold, there is woman who converted and all her seven children married their brother’s wives. It was on this bench that Rabbi Akiva sat when he made the following two statements: A convert may marry the wife of his maternal brother, and he also stated: It is written [Yonah 3:1]: And the word of Hashem came unto Yonah the second time, saying. The phrase, “the second time” indicates that only a second time did the Shechinah speak to him; a third time, the Shechinah did not speak to him.

The braisa stated here that a convert may marry the wife of his maternal brother. Does this not refer to a case where his brother married her while he was a convert (and nevertheless such a marriage is permitted; this would support Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s opinion)?

The Gemora answers: No! The braisa is referring to a case where he married her while he was still an idolater (and the marriage was subsequently voided when he converted).

The Gemora asks: What was the necessity to state such an obvious law?

The Gemora answers: It might have been assumed that a preventive measure should be enacted in the case of a brother's betrothal while he is still an idolater lest erroneous conclusions be drawn in the case where he is married her while he was already a convert, therefore, the braisa taught us that no such measure was enacted. (98a)
BELIEVING THE CONVERT
The Gemora asks on the aforementioned braisa: How could Ben Yasyan accept the convert’s statement from Rabbi Akiva? Surely Rabbi Abba stated in the name of Rav Huna in the name of Rav: Wherever a scholar issues a halachic ruling (that was previously unknown) and such a point comes up for a practical decision, he is obeyed if he made the statement before the incident occurred, but if the statement was made only after the incident occurred, he is not obeyed.

The Gemora answers: If you wish I might say that the incident occurred after he made his statement.

Alternatively, I might say that it was because he brought proof from the woman and her seven children.

Alternatively, I might say that here it is different because he related another Rabbi Akiva’s other statement together with it (just as he was believed regarding that statement, he was believed regarding the other one as well). (98a)
HASHEM SPEAKING TO YONAH
Rabbi Akiva was cited in the braisa above as saying the following: It is written [Yonah 3:1]: And the word of Hashem came unto Yonah the second time, saying. The phrase, “the second time” indicates that only a second time did the Shechinah speak to him; a third time, the Shechinah did not speak to him.

The Gemora challenges this statement from a verse written elsewhere [Melachim II, 14:25]: He restored the border of Israel from the entrance of Hamas until the sea of Aravah, according to the word of Hashem, the God of Israel, which He spoke by the hand of His servant Yonah the son of Amittai, the prophet, who was from Gas-cheifer. (It seems apparent that Hashem did in fact speak to Yonah a third time?)

Ravina answers: Rabbi Akiva’s statement was specifically referring to the city of Nineveh. Hasham said that He will not speak to him any further regarding Nineveh, but He will speak to him concerning other matters.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers: He actually only spoke to Yonah twice, and the following is the explanation of the verse in Melachim: According to the word of Hashem … which He spoke by the hand of his servant, the prophet. Just as His intention towards Nineveh was turned from evil to good, so was his intention towards Israel, in the days of Yerovam the son of Yoash, turned from evil to good. (98a)
TWO BROTHERS BORN FROM A MOTHER WHO CONVERTED AFTERWARDS
The Gemora attempts once again to bring a proof to Rav Acha bar Yaakov from the following braisa: A convert whose conception was not in sanctity, but his birth was in sanctity has maternal relatives, but he does not have paternal relatives. If he married his maternal sister, he must separate from her, but if he married his paternal sister, he may remain with her. If he married a maternal sister of his father, he must separate from her, but if he married a paternal sister of his father, he may remain with her. If he married a maternal sister of his mother, he must separate from her, but if he married a paternal sister of his mother, he may remain with her. Rabbi Meir says: He must separate from her (since there is a maternal element to this relationship). The Chachamim say: He may remain with her (it does not resemble a maternal sister). He is permitted to marry his (older) brother’s wife (who was born not in sanctity; the Rabbis did not issue their decree regarding his brother’s wife since she is not a blood-relative) and his father’s brother’s wife and all other arayos are permitted to him. If an idolater marries a mother and a daughter and he subsequently converts, he may marry one of them and he must separate from the other. He should not marry them initially. If his wife dies, he is permitted to marry his mother-in-law. There are those that learn this braisa that if his wife dies, he is prohibited from marrying his mother-in-law.

The braisa stated here that a convert may marry his brother’s wife. Does this not refer to a case where his brother married her while he was a convert (and nevertheless such a marriage is permitted; this would support Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s opinion)?

The Gemora answers: No! The braisa is referring to a case where he married her while he was still an idolater (and the marriage was subsequently voided when he converted).

The Gemora asks: What was the necessity to state such an obvious law?

The Gemora answers: It might have been assumed that a preventive measure should be enacted in the case of a brother's betrothal while he is still an idolater lest erroneous conclusions be drawn in the case where he is married her while he was already a convert, therefore, the braisa taught us that no such measure was enacted. (98a – 98b)
MOTHER-IN-LAW
The braisa had stated: If his wife dies, he is permitted to marry his mother-in-law. There are those that learn this braisa that if his wife dies, he is prohibited from marrying his mother-in-law.

The Gemora explains that these two versions of the braisa correspond to the opinions of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. The version that says that he is prohibited to marry his mother-in-law is following the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who states that a mother-in-law, after the death of his wife is subject to the same prohibition as a mother-in-law while the wife was alive, and therefore, in respect to a convert, a preventive measure was enacted. The version that says that he is permitted to marry his mother-in-law is following the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who states that that a mother-in-law, after the death of his wife is subject to a weaker prohibition than a mother-in-law while the wife was alive, and in respect to a convert, the Rabbis did not decree that a preventive measure should be enacted. (98b)
MISHNA
The Mishna states: If there were five women whose children became intermingled (and it is not known which is the son of which mother, and each of them has another son who did not become intermingled), and grew up, married and died childless, the halacha is as follows: Four submit to chalitzah from one of the widows (since she is possibly his brother's wife), and the remaining one performs yibum (for she is permitted to him either way: if she is in reality his brother's wife, he is fulfilling the mitzvah of yibum, and if not, her yavam has submitted to chalitzah from her and she is permitted to marry anyone in the general population). Then, he (the one who had performed yibum), and three of the others submit to chalitzah from another one of the widows, and the remaining one performs yibum. Thus, there are four chalitzos and one yibum to each one of the widows. (98b)
GEMORA
The Gemora states: The chalitzah must be performed prior to the yibum because if one will perform yibum first, and he is not the actual yavam, he is violating the prohibition of a yevamah marrying someone from the general population without being released by the yavam with a yibum or chalitzah. (98b)

[END]

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Riddles Update

Rabbi Sedley illustrates each and every riddle here. Please take the time to visit that post. It will be extremely beneficial for understanding the Gemora.

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BELZER REBBE: REAPING THE BENEFITS EVEN AFTER DEATH

Rabbi Elozar related a discussion in the Beis Medrash, but did not relate the discussion in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. When Rabbi Yochanan heard about this omission, he was perturbed.

The Gemora asks: Why was Rabbi Yochanan so perturbed in the first place?

The Gemora answered: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, what is the meaning of the following verse? “I will dwell in your tent in many worlds?” Is it possible for someone to dwell in a tent in both worlds? It means that David stated before Hashem: Master of the Universe, it should be Your will that after I die, they should say a statement in my name in this world (as well as my being in the next world), for Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: Any deceased Torah scholar, in whose name a traditional statement is reported in this world, his lips move gently in the grave (it is as if he is living in both worlds).

The Belzer Rebbe said over on the last Shabbos of his lifetime: After a person dies, he is unable to perform any mitzvos or acts of kindness in order to receive reward, as the Gemora in Eruvin (22a) states: Today (this world) is the time designated for performance of His commandments, tomorrow (in the next world) is the time designated for reward.

However, there are ways that a person can receive reward even after his death. If one does a mitzvah with full intention, and as a result of that, others are influenced because of him and they also perform that mitzvah, the mitzvah of others is credited on his account. If one leaves behind Torah insights, and others relate his words, his lips move gently in the grave, and he will be rewarded for the Torah being studied.

This is the explanation of the verse [Devarim 11:21]: That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children, upon the land which Hashem swore unto your fathers to give them, as the days of the heavens above the earth. How will a person’s days be multiplied when he is in heaven? In the preceding verse, it is written: And you shall teach Torah to your children. If one teaches his children Torah and trains them in the proper method of serving Hashem, their torah studying and mitzvos observance will be credited to the parent. Even when one is residing in heaven, it is regarded as if he is still living on the earth, because he is reaping the benefits of his productive lifetime.

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RIDDLES

(The following are riddles on the possible complications of relatives, proposed in order to arm the Torah scholars against the heretics.) My paternal brother, but not my maternal brother; and he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife. (This may be stated by a daughter who was born as a result of her father violating a woman, where the son of the father by another wife has subsequently married her mother.) Rami bar Chama said: Such a relationship is not halachically possible according to the ruling of Rabbi Yehudah in our Mishna (since Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one may not marry a woman with whom his father violated).

A woman says: He whom I carry on my shoulder is my brother and my son, and I am his sister. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his own daughter, and had a son by her. (This child is her son and her brother.)

A woman says: Greetings to you my son; I am the daughter of your sister. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own daughter's daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its sister’s daughter.)

Men who draw water with pails, we shall ask you a riddle that defies solution: He whom I carry is my son and I am the daughter of his brother. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own son’s daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its brother’s daughter.)

A woman says: Woe, woe! For my brother who is my father, who is my husband, who is the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; and he provides no food for his orphan brothers, the children of his daughter. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his mother and had a daughter from her. He then cohabited with that daughter (becoming her husband).Then the idolater’s father cohabited with her (thus becoming the grandfather’s husband as well) and had children from her. (The idolater is the daughter’s brother; he is her father; he is her husband; he is the son of her (second) husband; he is the husband of her mother; she is the daughter of his wife.)

A woman says: I and you are brother and sister, I and your father are brother and sister, and I and your mother are sisters. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his mother and had two daughters from her. He then cohabited with one of these and had a son from her. When the son's mother's sister (the other daughter) carries him, she addresses him in this manner.

I and you are the children of sisters, I and your father are the children of brothers, and I and your mother are the children of brothers. This indeed is possible also in the case of a permissible marriage. There were for instance, three brothers; Reuven, Shimon and Levi. Reuven had two daughters, and Shimon came and married one of them. And then came the son of Levi, and married the other. The son of Shimon can address the grandson of Levi in this manner.

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PURPOSE OF THE RIDDLES: AN IDOLATER’S MARRIAGE WITH A WOMAN WHO IS FORBIDDEN TO HIM

The Aruch Lener asks on this from the principle that one prohibition cannot take effect upon another prohibition. The father’s brother’s wife was initially forbidden to the son on account of being an aunt; how can the second prohibition of the father’s yevamah take effect?

The Yashreish Yaakov answers that this is an exception to the rule derived from this verse that the second prohibition can in fact take effect, and the son will be liable for both prohibitions.

The Aruch Lener answers that the Gemora does not mean to say that the son will be liable for two prohibitions and he will incur lashes twice. Rather, the Gemora means that he will have violated two transgressions and when he dies, he will be buried among the truly wicked (like the Gemora above 32a stated).

The Mishna L’melech in Perashas Derochim inquires as to what the halacha would be if an idolater cohabits with a woman that is forbidden to him on account of being a close relative, and he has intention to acquire her as his wife. Does the idolater in fact acquire her as a wife, and she will be regarded as a married woman, or perhaps the kiddushin does not take effect, in the same manner that it has no validity by a Jew? He quotes from the Ashkenaz Scholars that the idolater does not acquire her.

The Minchas Chinuch disagrees and maintains that she will be regarded as a married woman. He explains: A verse is required to teach us that kiddushin cannot take effect with a woman who is an ervah; the verse is relevant to a Jew, not to an idolater, and therefore, there is no Scriptural source that will invalidate the kiddushin of an idolater, even if it is with a woman that he is forbidden to have relations with.

The Aruch Lener proves from our Gemora that there is validity to the kiddushin. The Gemora cited the following riddle: A woman says: Woe, woe! For my brother who is my father, who is my husband, who is the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; and he provides no food for his orphan brothers, the children of his daughter. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his mother and had a daughter from her. He then cohabited with that daughter (becoming her husband).Then the idolater’s father cohabited with her (thus becoming the grandfather’s husband as well) and had children from her. (The idolater is the daughter’s brother; he is her father; he is her husband; he is the son of her (second) husband; he is the husband of her mother; she is the daughter of his wife.)

It is evident that even though the idolater cohabited with his mother, which he is prohibited from doing, he is nevertheless regarded as her husband. The Aruch Lener concludes that it is quite possible that this novel ruling is precisely what the Gemora is intending to teach us with this obscure riddle.

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REPORTING A STATEMENT IN YOUR OWN NAME - Yevamos 97 - Daf Yomi

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, what is the meaning of the following verse? “I will dwell in your tent in many worlds?” Is it possible for someone to dwell in a tent in both worlds? It means that David stated before Hashem: Master of the Universe, it should be Your will that after I die, they should say a statement in my name in this world (as well as my being in the next world), for Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: Any deceased Torah scholar, in whose name a traditional statement is reported in this world, his lips move gently in the grave (it is as if he is living in both worlds).

The Kinsker Rav in Chelkas Yoav (O”C 46) states that this is applicable even if one relates a Torah statement in his own name. In Heaven, it is known who was the author of this statement, and it will be attributed to him. He does say, however, that the one who said over the statement without attributing it to the proper author, has transgresses the negative prohibition of stealing. He has stolen the honor that the actual author duly deserved.

The Yefeh Mareh in his gloss to the Yerushalmi in Brachos disagrees, and he writes that it is only when the Torah scholar’s name is mentioned that his lips begin to move. From the fact that his name was mentioned in this world, it is regarded as if he is alive and his lips can move. The reason for this is based on a Yerushalmi in Shekalim (7b) which states that when a person is relating a Torah statement from another scholar, he should envision as if that scholar is standing beside him; it is through this that he is considered as if he is alive.

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AUNT AND HIS FATHER’S YEVAMAH

It is written [Devarim 23:1]: A man shall not take his father's wife, and he shall not uncover his father's robe. The Torah is referring to a woman awaiting yibum by his father; and the meaning of his father's robe is: He shall not uncover the robe which is designated for his father.

The Gemora asks: Why is this verse necessary; this woman is prohibited regardless, from the fact that she is his aunt?

The Gemora answers: The verse is necessary to make him liable for two transgressions.

The Aruch Lener asks on this from the principle that one prohibition cannot take effect upon another prohibition. The father’s brother’s wife was initially forbidden to the son on account of being an aunt; how can the second prohibition of the father’s yevamah take effect?

The Yashreish Yaakov answers that this is an exception to the rule derived from this verse that the second prohibition can in fact take effect, and the son will be liable for both prohibitions.

The Aruch Lener answers that the Gemora does not mean to say that the son will be liable for two prohibitions and he will incur lashes twice. Rather, the Gemora means that he will have violated two transgressions and when he dies, he will be buried among the truly wicked (like the Gemora above 32a stated).

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos - Highlights

LIPS OF TORAH SCHOLARS MOVE GENTLY IN THEIR GRAVE
Rabbi Elozar related a discussion in the Beis Medrash, but did not relate the discussion in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. When Rabbi Yochanan heard about this omission, he was perturbed.

The Gemora asks: Why was Rabbi Yochanan so perturbed in the first place?

The Gemora answered: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, what is the meaning of the following verse? “I will dwell in your tent in many worlds?” Is it possible for someone to dwell in a tent in both worlds? It means that David stated before Hashem: Master of the Universe, it should be Your will that after I die, they should say a statement in my name in this world (as well as my being in the next world), for Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: Any deceased Torah scholar, in whose name a traditional statement is reported in this world, his lips move gently in the grave (it is as if he is living in both worlds).

Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Zeira, and others say that Shimon Nezira said: What is the verse? It is written [Shir Hashirim 7:10]: And the utterance of your palate is like the best wine; it goes to my beloved with sincerity, moving gently the lips of those who are asleep. The Sages are likened to a heated mass of grapes. As a heated mass of grapes (sitting in the vat for a week until they become warm; the wine then emerges easily), as soon as a man places his finger upon it, the wine moves immediately, so too with the scholars, as soon as a traditional statement is made in their name in this world, their lips move gently in the grave. (96b – 97a)

STATUS OF A TWENTY-YEAR-OLD WHO IS NOT PHYSICALLY DEVELOPED
The Mishna had stated: These laws do not only apply to a nine-year old, but also to a twenty-year- old man who has not yet developed two pubic hairs which qualify him as a halachic adult.

The Gemora challenges this ruling from the following Mishna in Niddah (47b): If a man dies childless and leaves a brother who at the age of twenty did not produce two pubic hairs, they (the relatives of the widow who wish to exempt her from chalizah and yibum) must bring evidence that he is in fact twenty years of age and that he is a saris (by a display of the required symptoms). If that happens, he neither submits to chalizah nor performs yibum. If a man dies childless and leaves a wife who at the age of twenty did not produce two pubic hairs, they must bring evidence that she is in fact twenty years of age and that she is an aylonis. If that happens, she does not require chalizah or yibum. (It emerges from this Mishna that a twenty-year- old man who has not yet developed two pubic hairs qualify him as a halachic adult, albeit a saris, but he is not regarded as a minor.)

The Gemora answers: Didn’t Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak say in the name of Rav that this Mishna is applicable only where he has already developes the signs of being a saris; that is when we regard him as an adult. Otherwise, a twenty-year-old man who has not developed two pubic hairs is considered a minor.

The Gemora asks: Up until what age do we regard him as a minor, and not a saris?

The Gemora answers: The Beis Medrash of Rabbi Chiya taught a braisa: Until a majority of his years have passed (until he is thirty-six years of age since man's span of life is taken to be seventy years, as it is written in Tehillim 90:10).

Whenever people came with such a case (twenty without developing pubic hairs) before Rava, he would look at their stature. If the youth was thin, he would say to them: Let him first be fattened; and if he was stout, he would say to them: Let him first be made to lose weight. For pubic hairs, they can disappear sometimes as a result of emaciation and sometimes they disappear as a result of obesity. (97a)

WE WILL RETURN TO YOU,
HA’ISHAH RABBAH

MISHNA
The Mishna states: One may marry the relatives of a woman who was violated or seduced by him. He who violates or seduces a relative of his wife is liable. A man may marry the woman violated by his father, and the woman seduced by his father, the woman violated by his son, or the woman seduced by his son. Rabbi Yehudah prohibits the woman violated by his father or the woman seduced by his father. (97a)

MARRYING THE RELATIVES OF A WOMAN WITH WHOM HE HAD RELATIONS WITH
The Gemora cites the following braisa which supports the ruling of the Mishna: If one violated a woman, he is permitted to marry her daughter. If one married a woman, he is prohibited from marrying her daughter.

The Gemora asks on this ruling from the following braisa: One who is suspected of adultery with a woman is forbidden to marry her mother, daughter, and sister. It is apparent from this braisa that one is forbidden to marry the relatives of a woman he was intimate with, even though he wasn’t married to her.

The Gemora answers that the prohibition mentioned in the second braisa is only a Rabbinical prohibition. (The reason for this prohibition is because the marriage to one of her relatives might bring him closer to that woman, and if he would have relations with her now, it would be violating a Biblical prohibition since he is married to her relatives.)

The Gemora asks: if there is a Rabbinical prohibition to marry the relatives of a woman which he violated, how could our Mishna write that it is permitted to marry the relatives?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is referring to a case where the woman, with whom he had relations, is dead. (There is no longer any reason to be concerned if he marries the woman’s relatives.)

The Gemora cites two Scriptural sources for the Mishna’s ruling that one is permitted to marry the relatives of a woman with whom he had relations with. (97a)

PROHIBITION OF THE WOMAN VIOLATED BY HIS FATHER
The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Yehudah prohibits the woman violated by his father or the woman seduced by his father.

Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: What is Rabbi Yehudah’s reason? It is because it is written [Devarim 23:1]: A man shall not take his father's wife, and he shall not uncover his father's robe. Rabbi Yehudah understands this verse to mean that the robe which his father saw, he shall not uncover.

The Gemora asks: And how is it inferred that the Torah is discussing a woman who was violated? It is from the preceding verse, which states [Devarim 22:29]: Then the man that lay with her shall give the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver. (Since that verse is referring to a violated woman, the following verse is also referring to a violated woman; based on the principle of the juxtaposition between two verses.)

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis disagree?

The Gemora answers: If one phrase had occurred in close proximity to the other (if one verse directly followed the other verse without any other phrases in between), your exposition would have been justified. Now, however, that it does not occur in close proximity, the verse is required for an exposition of Rav Anan. For Rav Anan said in the name of Samuel: The Torah is referring to a woman awaiting yibum by his father; and the meaning of his father's robe is: He shall not uncover the robe which is designated for his father.

The Gemora asks: Why is this verse necessary; this woman is prohibited regardless, from the fact that she is his aunt?

The Gemora answers: The verse is necessary to make him liable for two transgressions.

The Gemora persists: Why is this verse necessary; this woman is prohibited regardless, from the fact that she is a yevamah, who is prohibited to the general population?
The Gemora answers: The verse is necessary to make him liable for three transgressions.

Alternatively, you can say that the verse is necessary for the case when his father died; she will not be forbidden on account of being a yevamah, but she will be forbidden on account of being a woman who had once fallen to yibum to his father. (97a)

RIDDLES
(The following are riddles on the possible complications of relatives, proposed in order to arm the Torah scholars against the heretics.) My paternal brother, but not my maternal brother; and he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife. (This may be stated by a daughter who was born as a result of her father violating a woman, where the son of the father by another wife has subsequently married her mother.) Rami bar Chama said: Such a relationship is not halachically possible according to the ruling of Rabbi Yehudah in our Mishna (since Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one may not marry a woman with whom his father violated).

A woman says: He whom I carry on my shoulder is my brother and my son, and I am his sister. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his own daughter, and had a son by her. (This child is her son and her brother.)

A woman says: Greetings to you my son; I am the daughter of your sister. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own daughter's daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its sister’s daughter.)

Men who draw water with pails, we shall ask you a riddle that defies solution: He whom I carry is my son and I am the daughter of his brother. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own son’s daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its brother’s daughter.)

A woman says: Woe, woe! For my brother who is my father, who is my husband, who is the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; and he provides no food for his orphan brothers, the children of his daughter. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his mother and had a daughter from her. He then cohabited with that daughter (becoming her husband).Then the idolater’s father cohabited with her (thus becoming the grandfather’s husband as well) and had children from her. (The idolater is the daughter’s brother; he is her father; he is her husband; he is the son of her (second) husband; he is the husband of her mother; she is the daughter of his wife.)

A woman says: I and you are brother and sister, I and your father are brother and sister, and I and your mother are sisters. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his mother and had two daughters from her. He then cohabited with one of these and had a son from her. When the son's mother's sister (the other daughter) carries him, she addresses him in this manner.

I and you are the children of sisters, I and your father are the children of brothers, and I and your mother are the children of brothers. This indeed is possible also in the case of a permissible marriage. There were for instance, three brothers; Reuven, Shimon and Levi. Reuven had two daughters, and Shimon came and married one of them. And then came the son of Levi, and married the other. The son of Shimon can address the grandson of Levi in this manner. (97b)

MISHNA
The Mishna states: The sons of a female convert who converted with her do not submit to chalitzah and do not marry by yibum (since they are not regarded as brothers). Even if the conception of the first one was not in sanctity (prior to her conversion) and his birth was in sanctity (post-conversion), and the conception and the birth of the second were in sanctity, the same halacha applies. And so too, the same halacha would apply regarding the sons of a slavewoman who were freed together with her. (97b)

TWO BROTHERS BORN FROM A MOTHER WHO CONVERTED AFTERWARDS
When the sons of the slavewoman, Yudan were emancipated, Rav Acha bar Yaakov permitted them to marry each other's wives (since a convert has the status of a newly born child, all his previous family relationships are dissolved; the prohibition against marriage with a brother's wife does not, therefore, apply). Rava said to him: But Rav Sheishes forbade such marriages? Rav Acha bar Yaakov replied: He forbade, but I allow.

The Gemora elaborates on their dispute. When they are brothers from the same father, but not from the same mother, everyone agrees that it would be permitted for them to marry each other’s wives. When they are brothers from the same mother, but not from the same father, everyone agrees that it would be forbidden for them to marry each other’s wives (since they have the same mother, it appears as if they truly are brothers). They argue in a case where they have the same father, and the same mother. Rav Acha bar Yaakov would permit them to marry each other's wives because we ascribe them to their father, since people refer to them as the sons of Mr. So-and-So. Rav Sheishes would prohibit them from marrying each other’s wives because people also refer to them as the sons of Mrs. So-and-So.

Others say: Rav Acha bar Yaakov would even argue in a case where they have only the same mother. What is his reason that they would still be permitted to marry each other’s wives? It is because one who converts is regarded as a newborn child.

The Gemora asks on Rav Acha bar Yaakov from our Mishna, which stated the following: The sons of a female convert who converted with her do not submit to chalitzah and do not marry by yibum. What is the reason for prohibiting the brother and the other brother’s widow to marry each other? Is it not because they are forbidden to marry each other? (This would be inconsistent with Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s opinion.)

The Gemora answers: No! The Mishna is stating that the widow is not subject to the laws of yibum and chalitzah here (since they are not regarded as brothers). The widow can marry into the general population, and she may marry the remaining brother as well.

The Gemora asks: But how would we explain the next part of the Mishna? The Mishna states: Even if the conception of the first one was not in sanctity (prior to her conversion) and his birth was in sanctity (post-conversion), and the conception and the birth of the second were in sanctity, the same halacha applies. If you learn that the Mishna is teaching us that the widow and the brother are forbidden to marry each other, it would be understandable for the Mishna to state that the prohibition is applicable even in the second case. One might think that since the first brother’s conception was prior to the mother’s conversion and the second one’s conception was after her conversion, it should be regarded as if they had two different mothers (and they should be permitted to marry). The Mishna teaches us that nevertheless, they are prohibited to marry each other. However, if you learn (like Rav Acha bar Yaakov) that the Mishna is teaching us that she is permitted to marry into the general population, what is the Mishna’s point that she is even permitted when the brothers were born in sanctity? (The brothers being born in sanctity have no bearing on her permission to marry into the general population; that is solely dependent on the fact that they are not paternal brothers.)

The Gemora answers: The novelty of this case is that even though both brothers were born in sanctity, and therefore, they might be mistaken for full-fledged Jews, nevertheless, she is permitted to marry into the general population (since people know that the first brother, who was conceived prior to the mother’s conversion, is not an actual halachic brother).

Others said this discussion in reverse: The Mishna supports Rav Acha bar Yaakov’s opinion. The Mishna taught the second case to teach us that even though both brothers were born in sanctity, and therefore, they might be mistaken for full-fledged Jews, nevertheless, she is permitted to marry into the general population.

However, if the Mishna is teaching us that they are prohibited from marrying each other, how can the Mishna say that even when both brothers were born in sanctity, they are still forbidden to marry each other? (The brothers being born in sanctity is more of a reason to prohibit them from marrying each other, not less.)

The Gemora answers: One might think that since the first brother’s conception was prior to the mother’s conversion and the second one’s conception was after her conversion, it should be regarded as if they had two different mothers (and they should be permitted to marry). The Mishna teaches us that nevertheless, they are prohibited to marry each other. (97b)

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