Saving the Whales

by: Reb Avi Lebovitz

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

The Gemora suggests a kal vachomer that would result in their being a mitzvah of preserving the life of animals. Although one may have a mitzvah to feed his own animals, the Gemora concludes that there is surely no mitzvah to support the animal (when it is no longer profitable), and certainly one is not obligated to support animals that are not his.

The Tosfos HaRosh asks in the name of Rabbeinu Meir: Why would we have thought differently? There should be an obvious challenge to this kal vachomer from the fact that one is not allowed to slaughter people, but may slaughter animals - this obviously shows that there isn’t any mitzvah to preserve the life of animals!?

The Tosfos HaRosh responds to this question by saying that we would have thought that this mitzvah would apply to animals that one is not allowed to slaughter, such as a bechor that is intermingled with an ox that is destined to be stoned (shor haniskal).

Aside from the actual question of the Tosfos HaRosh, the entire thought that one would be obligated to support animals and help them survive seems a little strange. Especially since in the end, the mitzvah of preserving a life only applies to a Jew and not to an idolater!?

The Biur Halachah (330:2) writes that one is obligated to help a ger toshav woman give birth because on a ger toshav, there is a mitzvah to preserve their life. He entertains the possibility that the Jew can even violate a Rabbinic prohibition to help the ger toshav give birth because when there is a mitzvah to preserve a life, the Rabbis did not issue their decrees. Based on this application of the mitzvah to preserve a life, the mitzvah goes beyond tzedakah; it compels one to actually take care of others and help them through physically challenging circumstances.

Read more!

Ma'aser on Purchased Produce

by: Reb Avi Lebovitz

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

There is a fundamental argument between Rabbeinu Tam and Rivam quoted by Tosfos regarding the exemption from ma’aser on produce that Reuven sold to Shimon.

Rabbeinu Tam holds that if Reuven processed the produce prior to selling and it became obligated in ma’aser and assumes a status of tevel, by selling it to Shimon, the tevel status is removed and it is exempt once again. But if Reuven never processed it, when Shimon does the processing, he will be Biblically obligated in ma’aser because it is considered his own produce.

Rivam says exactly the opposite. If Reuven processed the produce prior to selling it, since it has become obligated in ma’aser and assumes a status of tevel, this status cannot be removed. Therefore, when he sells it to Shimon, Shimon will have a Biblical obligation to separate ma’aser. But if Reuven sold it to Shimon prior to processing it and it was processed in the home of Shimon, then it is not subject to a ma’aser obligation.

When the produce was grown by an idolater (assuming his acquisition in Eretz Yisroel will not remove the ma’aser obligation), the Gemora says in Bechoros (11b) that if the idolater processed them and then sold them to a Jew, they are exempt from ma’aser, but if the Jew processed them, they are obligated.

Rabbeinu Tam holds that if the produce was processed by the original farmer, it makes no difference if he were a Jew or an idolater, the buyer would be exempt. But, if they weren’t processed by the original farmer, the buyer would be obligated.

The Rivam holds that when the original farmer was an idolater, the halachah is exactly the opposite from when the original farmer would be a Jew. An idolater farmer who processes and sells would be exempt since it was processed by the idolater and it will remain exempt even after it is sold. But if an idolater farmer didn’t process it, it is not considered his at all, so that when he sells it to the Jew and the Jew processes it, it is obligated.

The greatest difficulty with Rabbeinu Tam is that produce that is tevel can be sold and revert back to being exempt from ma’aser (and then if sold back to Reuven would revert back to being obligated in ma’aser)! The greatest difficulty in the Rivam is that produce of an idolater is not considered to be his unless he processed it, so that if sold to a Jew, it is as if the Jew grew it himself and is obligated in ma’aser.

Another hybrid approach (possible Reb Chaim’s explanation in a Rambam) is that it is not dependent on who processed it, but rather what the intent was when it was processed. If Reuven processed it for personal use and it becomes obligated, nothing can remove that status of tevel (like the Rivam). If Reuven did not process it; rather he sold it to Shimon who processed it, then it is also obligated (like Rabbeinu Tam). Only if Reueven processed it with the intent of selling it to Shimon, it will be exempt.

Read more!

Interest-Free Loans

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

The Gemora quotes a different version of Rav Huna’s statement. Rav Yosef explained that the verse discussing lending states: if you will lend money to Ami – my nation, to the Ani – the poor one – Imach – with you. This verse teaches that the priority in lending is first to a Jew over a non Jew (Ami), then to a poor person over a rich person (Ani), and to a local poor person over a poor person somewhere else (Imach). Rav Huna says that the priority given to a Jewish debtor is even when the non Jewish debtor will pay interest.

The Pnei Yehoshua discusses what the halachah would be in a case where if he would lend money with interest to a gentile, he would gain substantially. Is he still required to lend to a Jew without interest?

He questions the basis of the halachah: Do we not say that whenever a person would suffer a loss, his needs take precedence over others?

He answers that it is different here, for the mitzvah to lend to a poor person is a mitzvah of tzedakah; one is required to do whatever is in his means in order to sustain his fellow Jew. One must be concerned about his own losses only when the mitzvah regarding his fellow is to prevent him from a loss.

The Megilas Esther writes that one is obligated to lend to a Jew interest-free even if he has the possibility of lending to a gentile for a substantial amount of interest. This is because the Jew is not losing; he is merely not gaining.

The Shaar Hamishpat disagrees with this, and Ahavas Chesed cites several different opinions with respect to this issue.

Read more!

CIRCUMCISION BEFORE EXECUTION

Tosfos states that if a person would destroy his fellow’s eye while he was killing him, it would not be regarded as if he blinded him and murdered him (in which case, you might think that we should punish him for both actions, by executing him and exacting payment for the eye); but rather, it is considered as if he killed him in a more painful manner. Chashukei Chemed derives from this Tosfos that there is no prohibition to wound a fellow at a time that he is being executed anyway.

Using this principle, it is possible to answer the following question posed by Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei HaShas to Avoda Zara (10b). The Gemora states: The Caesar decreed that Ketiah (a gentile) should be put to death. As they were escorting him to the death chamber, a certain matron called out and said, “Woe is to the ship that leaves without paying its taxes first.” Rashi explains: Ketiah was being executed for supporting the Jews; if he would not circumcise himself before his death, he will not merit a portion in the World to Come together with them. Ketiah thereby, fell on top of his foreskin and cut it off. He said, “I now have paid my tax. I will leave this world and enter into the World to Come.”

Reb Yosef Engel asks: It appears that Ketiah did not satisfy all the requirements of conversion, for he didn’t immerse in a mikvah and he didn’t accept the yoke of fulfilling all the mitzvos; if so, shouldn’t there have been a prohibition to cut his foreskin? Isn’t he violating the prohibition of wounding oneself?

In the sefer Shabbos Shaboson, the following novel ruling is brought in the name of Rav Yosef Tzikonovsky: If one is being brought to be executed, he is allowed to circumcise himself even though his brothers had died on account of circumcision (normally, that would preclude a third brother from circumcision). Since he is going to die anyway, he would be permitted to circumcise himself, although the procedure itself can lead to his death. He provides a fascinating source from the Abudraham: It is our custom, when saying the words: “V’omer lach b’damayich chayi,” that we place some of the wine on the lips of the child. This is based upon the Medrash which states that after the sin of the Golden Calf, as some of the Jewish people were being killed, Moshe would circumcise them, Aharon would uncover the foreskin and Yehoshua would give them to drink (from the ashes of the Golden Calf causing them to die). All forty years in the Desert, there was no circumcision because of the burdens of traveling and because the Northern Wind did not blow (which was necessary to heal them). Moshe and Aharon did not want them to die without a circumcision and without accepting the yoke of mitzvos. Yehoshua gave them to drink, leading to their death. We give the circumcised child to drink and say: This circumcision and drinking should lead to life, not death.

Accordingly, Ketiah, could circumcise himself prior to his death, and he needn’t be concerned with the prohibition of wounding himself unnecessarily.

Read more!

PATERNAL RELATIONSHIPS OF NON-JEWISH FATHERS AND SONS - Yevamos 98 - Daf Yomi

A braisa had stated: If there were twin brothers whose conception was not in sanctity, but their birth was in sanctity (their mother converted after conception, but before they were born), they do not perform chalitzah or yibum, but they would be liable to the punishment of kares if they would cohabit with their brother’s wife.

Rava seeks to explain why these brothers are regarded as maternal brothers (and are
liable for the prohibition against cohabiting with a brother’s wife), but they are not regarded as paternal brothers (and that is why they are not subject for yibum and chalitzah). Rava said: The Rabbis said that an Egyptian, who converts has no father. This is so, even if we know with a certainty the father’s identity. This can be proven from the braisa cited above regarding twin brothers, where one drop of semen (from their father) divided into two, and the braisa rules that they are not subject to the laws of yibum and chalitzah. It seems evident from here that the Torah voided their paternity, as it is written [Yechezkel 23:20]: Their flesh (the Egyptians of old) is the flesh of donkeys and their issue is the issue of horses. (A Jewish child that converted is considered halachically fatherless.)

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Kovetz Heoros (51:3) asks: It is evident from our Gemora that the Torah voided the paternal lineage of an idolater, yet the Gemora above (62a) clearly states that they do have lineage. The Gemora cited a verse [Melachim II 20:12]: At that time, Berodach-baladan son of Baladan, the king of Bavel, sent etc. We see that an idolater is identified as the son of another idolater.

Reb Elchonon answers: The Gemora above is referring to a case where an idolater cohabited with another idolater and had a child. That child is regarded as being the son of that idolater. Our Gemora is discussing a case where an idolater cohabited with a Jewess, or with another idolater and she converted while she was pregnant. In these cases, we do not recognize the paternal relationship. (It would seem to me that this is precisely what Rish Lakish stated in the Gemora 62a. Rish Lakish said: While they are idolaters, they have genealogical connections to their offspring; once they convert, they lose that connection.)

Reb Elchonon concludes that this distinction will not be halachically correct according to the Ramban. The Ramban states that the Torah voided the paternal relationship between a non-Jewish father and their sons even as idolaters. The reason why an idolater son inherits his father is unique to the laws of inheritance.

I found that Rabbi D. Bloom from Kollel Iyun Hadaf discusses the Ramban’s opinion in an insight to Bechoros 46.

(Please click the "read more" link to view the rest of the post.)

THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
THE FIRSTBORN SON OF A WOMAN WHO CONVERTED WHILE PREGNANT

QUESTIONS: The Mishnah states that if a Nochri, who had sons, married a woman who never had children and they later converted while she was pregnant, her firstborn son is considered the Bechor with regard to Pidyon ha'Ben, but not with regard to inheriting the double portion of his father's estate. RASHI (DH Nisgairah) explains that the husband converted together with the wife. The baby is a Bechor and must be given to the Kohen, because he is the first to emerge from the mother's womb ("Peter Rechem") and is a Yisrael. However, he is not a Bechor with regard to inheritance, because he was conceived "she'Lo b'Kedushah," before the conversion. The Torah teaches that a Ger does not have familial ties to his father, as the verse states, "Zirmas Susim Zirmasam" (Yechezkel 23:20).

Rashi's explanation is difficult to understand. (a) First, why does Rashi need to mention the reason that the offspring of a Mitzri has no familial ties? There seems to be a more basic reason why the child does not inherit from his father, and that is because of the principle, "Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad Dami" -- a Nochri who converts is like a newborn child. Accordingly, the baby, after his conversion together with his mother, has no familial bond to his biological father. Why does Rashi not mention this reason?

(b) The RAMBAN (Chidushim to Yevamos 98a) states that the principle that the offspring of a Nochri is not related to its father ("Afkerei Rachmana l'Zar'ei") applies even when the Nochri does not convert. For this reason, a Nochri is permitted to marry relatives from his father's side, even though he is forbidden to marry those same relatives from his mother's side. The Ramban there adds that when the Gemara in Kidushin (18a) says that a Nochri inherits his father, it means that there is a Gezeirah Shavah that even though he is not considered to be related to his father, he still inherits him.

We see from the words of the Ramban that the principle of "Afkerei Rachmana l'Zar'ei" does *not* prevent the son from inheriting! Why, then, does Rashi write that the reason why the son does not inherit his father is because of "Afkerei Rachmana l'Zar'ei"? (See also TOSFOS DH Nisgairah.)


ANSWERS:
(a) RAV SHMUEL ROZOVSKY zt'l (in Chidushim to Yevamos 12:4, DH v'Hineh) answers that Rashi in Yevamos (98a, DH Ha d'Amur, and DH Lo Teima) indeed writes that a baby born after the conversion is not considered a "Katan she'Nolad," even though he was conceived before the conversion. Accordingly, Rashi was forced to find a different reason to explain why the child does not inherit his father.

(b) Rav Shmuel Rozovsky (ibid., DH Achen) answers the second question by pointing out that the reason why a Nochri inherits his father even though they are not considered related is because of a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv, as mentioned above. However, it must be that this Gezeiras ha'Kasuv is a special Halachah that applies only to Benei Noach; once a Nochri converts and is no longer a Ben Noach, this special Halachah no longer applies to him. If not for the reason of "Afkerei Rachmana l'Zar'ei," the son would have had a connection to his father and would have inherited him after converting, because -- according to Rashi in Yevamos -- in the case of a mother who converted while pregnant, the law of "Ger she'Nisgayer k'Katan she'Nolad" does not apply to the baby. Therefore, Rashi writes that the child has no connection to his father because of "Afkerei Rachmana," and that is why he does not inherit him after conversion. The law that every Nochri (who did not convert) inherits his father is due to a different Halachah -- a special Gezeiras ha'Kasuv among the Halachos of Benei Noach which does not apply to this baby, who is now a Yisrael.
For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,
daf@shemayisrael.co.il

Reb Chaim Qoton discusses a similar issue here: rchaimqoton. Rav Papa says (Bechoros 47a) that if the daughter of a Levite (a Bas Levi, or Levia) and non-Jew have a firstborn baby boy together, the child is exempt from the Kohanic redemption of the firstborn because the boy is a Levite. How can the boy be a Levite if Levitical status is reliant on the father’s lineage and the father, as a non-Jew, lacks any lineage (Yevamos 98a)? Rabbi Chaim Brisker (al HaRambam Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 15:9) explains that a Levi is not exempt from this requirement of redemption because he is part of the tribe of Levi, for tribal affiliation is inherited paternally. Rather the reason the boy is exempt is that he himself is a Levi as determined by his genealogy from his mother, albeit his tribal affiliation is not Levitical. According to this, one can properly be called a descendent of Levi'im by just having a Levia as a mother, but would not be called part of the tribe of Levi unless his father was also a Levite. In the opinion of Rav Papa, the exemption from the redemption of the firstborn comes from just being a descendant of Levi (usually from the father’s side, but if the father lacks lineage because he is not Jewish, then from the mother’s side), so even if the boy is not a Levite, he is exempt from the redemption. Tosafos (Bechoros 47a) assert that even if this boy is considered a non-Jew, he is still considered a Levi according to Rav Papa.

[END]

Read more!

FORBIDDEN RELATIONSHIPS FOR A GENTILE - Yevamos 98 - Daf Yomi

Reb Chaim Qoton discusses this topic here: rchaimqoton. While the Jews have their own 613 commandments which G-d gave them in the Torah, G-d only commanded the rest of Humankind to follow the seven (categories of) Noahide laws. While there are over twenty forbidden relationships applicable to a Jew, the Rambam lists only six for a gentile: his mother, his father’s wife, another man’s wife, his maternal sister, another man, and an animal. Each of these sexual prohibitions is learned exegetically from one passage in Bereishis, save for the case of maternal sister, which is learned from Abraham’s encounter with Abimelech.

The Maimonides’s enumeration, by all means, is not accepted by everyone. The Kesef Mishna (Maran Rav Yosef Ben Efraim Karo, 1488-1575) points out (ad loc.) that the Maimonides decided the Halacha according to Rabbi Akiva (of Sanhedrin 58b), but according to Rabbi Eliezer (Ibid.) one’s father’s sister and mother’s sister should also be prohibited. Indeed the Sefer HaMizrachi (written by Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, 1455-1526) says (Genesis 46:10) that we follow the law of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of a father’s maternal sister. Additionally, to the list of the Maimonides, the Lechem Mishneh (printed on the side of the Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah in more standard editions) adds one’s daughter (Sanhedrin 58b, second version of Rav Huna’s statement). The Ritva (Rabbi Yom Tov ben Avraham Alshevili, circa. 1300) seemingly argues (Yevamos 98b) on the Maimonides’s view and permits a non-Jew to marry his father’s wife. However, such an opinion contradicts the Talmud (Sanhedrin 58b) which proved otherwise from the fact that had Adam lain carnally with his daughter, he would have prohibited her to Cain under the prohibition of “father’s wife”, and thus the world’s population would never have successfully propagated. Kayin himself has a special exemption on the rule against marrying one’s sister due to the verse (written prophetically by Avrham Aveinu under the pen name “Ethan the Ezrahite,” Bava Basra 14b) which says, “For I said, ‘Forever will kindness be built’” (Psalms 89:2). Adam’s abstinence from relations with his daughter was deemed a gracious act, and upon that act of kindness, the world founded.

Read more!

RIDDLES

(The following are riddles on the possible complications of relatives, proposed in order to arm the Torah scholars against the heretics.) My paternal brother, but not my maternal brother; and he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife. (This may be stated by a daughter who was born as a result of her father violating a woman, where the son of the father by another wife has subsequently married her mother.) Rami bar Chama said: Such a relationship is not halachically possible according to the ruling of Rabbi Yehudah in our Mishna (since Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one may not marry a woman with whom his father violated).

A woman says: He whom I carry on my shoulder is my brother and my son, and I am his sister. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his own daughter, and had a son by her. (This child is her son and her brother.)

A woman says: Greetings to you my son; I am the daughter of your sister. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own daughter's daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its sister’s daughter.)

Men who draw water with pails, we shall ask you a riddle that defies solution: He whom I carry is my son and I am the daughter of his brother. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his own son’s daughter. (She is the child’s mother and its brother’s daughter.)

A woman says: Woe, woe! For my brother who is my father, who is my husband, who is the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; and he provides no food for his orphan brothers, the children of his daughter. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his mother and had a daughter from her. He then cohabited with that daughter (becoming her husband).Then the idolater’s father cohabited with her (thus becoming the grandfather’s husband as well) and had children from her. (The idolater is the daughter’s brother; he is her father; he is her husband; he is the son of her (second) husband; he is the husband of her mother; she is the daughter of his wife.)

A woman says: I and you are brother and sister, I and your father are brother and sister, and I and your mother are sisters. This is possible where an idolater cohabited with his mother and had two daughters from her. He then cohabited with one of these and had a son from her. When the son's mother's sister (the other daughter) carries him, she addresses him in this manner.

I and you are the children of sisters, I and your father are the children of brothers, and I and your mother are the children of brothers. This indeed is possible also in the case of a permissible marriage. There were for instance, three brothers; Reuven, Shimon and Levi. Reuven had two daughters, and Shimon came and married one of them. And then came the son of Levi, and married the other. The son of Shimon can address the grandson of Levi in this manner.

Read more!

PURPOSE OF THE RIDDLES: AN IDOLATER’S MARRIAGE WITH A WOMAN WHO IS FORBIDDEN TO HIM

The Aruch Lener asks on this from the principle that one prohibition cannot take effect upon another prohibition. The father’s brother’s wife was initially forbidden to the son on account of being an aunt; how can the second prohibition of the father’s yevamah take effect?

The Yashreish Yaakov answers that this is an exception to the rule derived from this verse that the second prohibition can in fact take effect, and the son will be liable for both prohibitions.

The Aruch Lener answers that the Gemora does not mean to say that the son will be liable for two prohibitions and he will incur lashes twice. Rather, the Gemora means that he will have violated two transgressions and when he dies, he will be buried among the truly wicked (like the Gemora above 32a stated).

The Mishna L’melech in Perashas Derochim inquires as to what the halacha would be if an idolater cohabits with a woman that is forbidden to him on account of being a close relative, and he has intention to acquire her as his wife. Does the idolater in fact acquire her as a wife, and she will be regarded as a married woman, or perhaps the kiddushin does not take effect, in the same manner that it has no validity by a Jew? He quotes from the Ashkenaz Scholars that the idolater does not acquire her.

The Minchas Chinuch disagrees and maintains that she will be regarded as a married woman. He explains: A verse is required to teach us that kiddushin cannot take effect with a woman who is an ervah; the verse is relevant to a Jew, not to an idolater, and therefore, there is no Scriptural source that will invalidate the kiddushin of an idolater, even if it is with a woman that he is forbidden to have relations with.

The Aruch Lener proves from our Gemora that there is validity to the kiddushin. The Gemora cited the following riddle: A woman says: Woe, woe! For my brother who is my father, who is my husband, who is the son of my husband; he is the husband of my mother and I am the daughter of his wife; and he provides no food for his orphan brothers, the children of his daughter. This is possible when an idolater cohabited with his mother and had a daughter from her. He then cohabited with that daughter (becoming her husband).Then the idolater’s father cohabited with her (thus becoming the grandfather’s husband as well) and had children from her. (The idolater is the daughter’s brother; he is her father; he is her husband; he is the son of her (second) husband; he is the husband of her mother; she is the daughter of his wife.)

It is evident that even though the idolater cohabited with his mother, which he is prohibited from doing, he is nevertheless regarded as her husband. The Aruch Lener concludes that it is quite possible that this novel ruling is precisely what the Gemora is intending to teach us with this obscure riddle.

Read more!

CIRCUMCISION QUESTIONS - Yevamos 71 - Daf Yomi

*** The Gemora states: The words in the verse teach us that a circumcised Arab and a circumcised Gibeonite are included in the prohibition against eating from the Pesach offering.

The Gemora asks: But aren’t these people considered circumcised? We learned in a Mishna: If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from areilim (uncircumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from uncircumcised Jews, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from a circumcised idolater. If one takes a vow that he will not derive any pleasure from mulim (circumcised people), he is permitted to derive pleasure from circumcised idolaters, but he is prohibited from deriving pleasure from an uncircumcised Jew. (It is evident that a circumcised idolater is regarded as uncircumcised.)

What is the comparison between the two cases? Perhaps it can be said that regarding vows, the halacha is that we interpret his words based on the vernacular, and an idolater is described as being uncircumcised even though they in fact are circumcised.

*** Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a convert who circumcised, but did not immerse himself yet in a mikvah is considered a full-fledged Jew; and he maintains that a child who born circumcised does not need covenantal blood to flow from him.

The Rama rules that if one circumcises a child at night, he is required to cause covenantal blood to flow from him. He also rules that if one circumcises a child before he is eight days old, he is not required to cause covenantal blood to flow from him.

What is the difference between the two cases?

*** Rava explained the braisa (the father was not considered negligent for not circumcising his son at the time of the slaughtering of the korban Pesach, but he is negligent for not circumcising him at the time of the eating) to be referring to a case where the father and mother of the child were released from prison after their korban was slaughtered. (An agent slaughtered the korban for them, but the circumcision of their child is incumbent on them to perform.)

Rashi explains that the mitzvah of circumcision rests on the father and the mother.

Doesn’t the Gemora in Kiddushin state that a woman is exempt from circumcising her son based on a verse in the Torah?

Why can’t the father appoint an agent to circumcise his son for him?

Read more!

IS THE TORAH WRITTEN FOR IDOLATERS? - Yevamos 70 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora concludes that the words “toshav v’sachir” mentioned in respect to the Pesach offering are extra. What does “toshav v’sachir” mean when it is written here? It cannot be referring to the two types of Jewish servants (a Jewish servant who is acquired for an acquisition of years, and a Jewish servant who is acquired as an everlasting acquisition) because for what reason should they be exempt from eating the Pesach offering? We have previously established that they cannot eat terumah because their master, the Kohen, has not acquired them as a “monetary acquisition.” They are obviously included in the obligation of bringing and eating a Pesach offering.

It is evident that the words are extra for the purpose of teaching us the gezeirah shavah (to teach us that n uncircumcised person is forbidden to eat terumah), and it cannot be refuted.

Tosfos asks: How can the Torah make a false statement (a toshev and sachir may not eat the Korban Pesach) just for the purpose of teaching a gezeirah shavah?

Tosfos answers: The Torah is referring to non-Jewish workers. Although it is unnecessary (because there is another verse excluding non-Jews from the korban Pesach), at least it is halachically correct. Tosfos concludes that there actually is a Mechilta that expounds the verse in this manner.

The Rambam in Hilchos Korban Pesach (9:7) rules: One is prohibited to give an idolater to eat from the Pesach offering. One who does provide the idolater with meat from the Pesach has violated a negative precept in the Torah.

The Kesef Mishna asks: The Torah does not forbid a Jew from giving the idolater from the Pesach offering; the Torah states: A toshav and a sachir may not eat of it.

He answers: It is obvious that the Torah is not referring to the idolater himself because an idolater is not concerned for that which is written in the Torah. We are compelled to understand the verse to be referring to the Jew. He is forbidden from giving meat from the Pesach to an idolater. Tosfos HaRosh comments similarly on our Gemora.

Rabbi Chaim Braun cites a dissenting opinion: The Yereim in mitzvah 410 states: The Holy One, blessed is He commanded an idolater against partaking in the Pesach offering that his master has slaughtered.

Minchas Chinuch in mitzvah 14 asks on the Rambam from the Gemora Pesachim (3b) which states the following: A gentile would always go up to Jerusalem and eat the Pesach offering. The gentile once told Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira that although it is written in the Torah that strangers or an uncircumcised male cannot eat from the Pesach offering, he had eaten from the best meat of the Pesach offering. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira told the gentile to ask for the fat tail of the animal. When the gentile asked for the fat tail, he was told that the fat tail is burned on the mizbeach and was not eaten. When the gentile informed them that Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira had instructed him to make this request, they investigated and discovered that he was a gentile and they had him killed. They sent the following message to Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira: “Peace upon you, Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira, for you are in Netzivin but your net is spread in Jerusalem.” The Minchas Chinuch asks: Why did they kill him; the prohibition is not written for the gentile; it is written for the Jew. What did the gentile do wrong that he was deserving to be killed?

Read more!

FULFILLING A MITZVAH AT THE TIME OF THE OBLIGATION - Yevamos 62 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states: If he had children while he was an idolater, and then he converted; Rabbi Yochanan said: He has fulfilled his obligation of procreation (with the children born before his conversion). Rish Lakish said: He did not fulfill his obligation.

The Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (28a) states: They sent to the father of Shmuel a halacha that if the Persians forced someone to eat matzah on Pesach night, he has fulfilled his obligation.

The Gemora states further that if he was temporarily deranged at the time that he performed the mitzvah, he has not fulfilled his obligation.

The Turei Even asks from our Gemora: The idolater is not commanded in the mitzvah of procreation; how can the convert discharge his obligation with the children born to him at the time that he wasn’t obligated in the mitzvah?

The Minchas Chinuch (1:15) comments: Since the halachic ruling is that if one had children and they subsequently died, he has not discharged his obligation, it is apparent that the mitzvah is the having of children, cohabitation is only a preparatory action. Accordingly, we can answer the Turei Even’s question. One cannot discharhe his obligation for a mitzvah at a time that he is not obligated in the mitzvah, such as a deranged person eating matzah. This principle is only applicable if the mitzvah is the action; it must be performed at the time that he is obligated in the mitzvah. However, regarding a mitzvah where the action is only a preparation for the mitzvah, the principle would not apply. The idolater cohabited with a woman and had children; afterwards he converted. The mitzvah of procreation is having the children, and now that he is a Jew, he is fulfilling the mitzvah presently.

Read more!

FOOD FOR THOUGHT - Yevamos 62 - Daf Yomi

*** Rabbi Yochanan asked Rish Lakish: It is written [Melachim II 20:12]: At that time, Berodach-baladan son of Baladan, the king of Bavel, sent etc. (We see that an idolater is identified as the son of another idolater; this would seemingly be inconsistent with Rish Lakish’s viewpoint.)

Why did the Gemora use specifically this idolater’s name; there are many other names in the Torah, such as Balak ben Tzipor and others? What is the significance of mentioning Berodach-baladan son of Baladan?

*** Rav said: Everyone agrees that a slave does not have genealogical connections to their offspring, for it is written [Breishis 22:5]: Stay here by yourselves with the donkey. We understand that to mean that a slave is similar to a donkey.

Why would Avraham use such a seemingly derogatory language to his servant Eliezer and to his son Yishmael?

*** Rav Assi said: “The son of David will not come until all the souls are vacated from guf.” (There exists a chamber in heaven that contains the souls created during the six days of creation. The mitzvah of procreation is to bring the souls out of guf and advance the coming of Mashiach. One who has children fulfills this obligation even if they subsequently die.)

The Maharal writes that the souls which descend into this world before the Redemption are contained in a chamber called guf, body. This is because the souls residing in this world prior to the arrival of Mashiach have a connection to the body, the physical world. After the arrival of Mashiach, the souls will not be embedded inside the body; rather, they will be separate from the body.

*** Rabbi Akiva had twelve thousand pairs of students spread out from Gevas until Antiparis, and they all died during one period because they did not treat each other with respect.

Why does the Gemora say that there were twelve thousand pairs of students; it should have stated that there were twenty four thousand students?

Ben Yehoyadah answers: Rabbi Akiva observed that there was jealousy amongst them. He intentionally paired the younger students with the older ones in order that the younger disciples will be forced to respect those that were older than them. Nevertheless, it didn’t work, and they still didn’t honor each other.

Read more!

ASKARAH AMONGST GENTILES - Yevamos 62 - Daf Yomi

The Gemara in Shabbos (33a) offers various reasons for the disease known as Askarah, identified with diphtheria, a disease that affects the throat. One opinion maintains that Askarah comes because people do not separate Maaser. A second opinion states that Askarah comes because of slanderous speech.

The Gemara then quotes the opinion of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, who maintains that Askarah comes because of the neglect of Torah study, and this is why the mouth is affected, because the mouth does not vocalize words of Torah. The Gemara challenges this opinion, as we find that women are also affected with this disease The Gemara resolves this challenge by stating that women are also susceptible to Askarah because they cause their husbands not to study Torah. The Gemara then questions this opinion from the fact that the disease also affects gentiles. The Gemara answers that gentiles are also affected with Askarah because they cause the Jews not to be able to study Torah. The Gemara then questions this opinion from the fact that children who are too young to study are afflicted with Askarah. The Gemara answers that children are afflicted with Askarah because they cause their fathers not to study Torah.

The difficulty with the Gemara is that according to the opinions that Askarah comes because of slanderous speech or because people do not separate Maaser, how do we understand why gentiles are affected with Askarah? Gentiles are not commanded to refrain from slanderous speech, nor are they commanded to separate Maaser.

The Ben Yehoyada answers that when one slanders someone else, the ensuing result may be bloodshed. A gentile is also prohibited from killing, so they are certainly liable for the end result of slanderous speech. Furthermore, if a Jew who does not separate Maaser is afflicted with Askarah, then it follows that a gentile who steals produce would be afflicted with the same disease. For this reason, the Gemara only challenges the opinion that maintains that Askarah comes because of neglect of Torah study.

The Maharsha suggest an alternative answer to this question. Gentiles have the option of refraining from slanderous speech and they can separate Maaser from their produce, although they are not obligated to do so. Regarding Torah study, however, a gentile is forbidden to study Torah, and if he studies Torah, the Gemara in Sanhedrin states that he is liable the death penalty.

by Reb Ben Adler top of the line promotions

Read more!

Coffee Heated by a Gentile - Yevamos 46 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states: Anything which is normally eaten raw is not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking. (Water does not need to be heated and therefore should not be subject to this prohibition.)

The Radvaz in his teshuvos (3:637) writes: It is permitted to drink coffee heated by a gentile and it is not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking; even though coffee cannot be eaten in its raw state, it is something which does not eaten at a king’s table as an accompaniment to the bread and therefore it is permitted. There is also no concern that they cooked something forbidden in those pots beforehand, since it is well known that they have designated utensils for the coffee (because otherwise, the taste of the coffee would be ruined). He concludes: One should not drink coffee in the accompaniment of gentiles since that will result in many transgressions.

It is brought like that in the Hagahos from the Maharikash (114) as well. He rules that one should be stringent about drinking coffee in a coffee house of gentiles, similar to the halacha regarding wine and beer. Furthermore, it is considered a moishev leitzim (i.e. a session of jesters) and should be avoided.

The Knesses Hagedolah in his sefer Ba’ey Chayei (Y”D 145) disagrees and maintains that coffee heated by a gentile is prohibited to drink. He states: Anything which is eaten or drunk at the royal table by itself, even if it does not come as an accompaniment to the bread is subject to the prohibition of gentile cooking. Furthermore, the requirement that the food must be something that accompanies bread on the royal table is limited to food items, not liquids. He continues: “Even though when I was younger, I would rely on those who ruled that it is permitted, I have now investigated it thoroughly and cannot find a reason for its permission and therefore I refrain from drinking it.” He found that the Arizal prohibited drinking coffee heated by a gentile. He concludes that he is not prohibiting it for the public, but he himself refrained from drinking it.

Pri Chadash (114:6) writes that it is permitted based on Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 31b): Wheat is nullified in water in regards to reciting the blessing of shehakol, so too it is nullified in regards to the prohibition against gentile cooking. Similarly, the coffee is nullified in the boiling water that it is being cooked with and it is therefore not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking.

Teshuvos Beis Yehudah (Y”D 21) objects to the reasoning of the Pri Chadash. The Gemora Brochos (39a) rules: The proper blessing on water which was cooked with vegetables is ha’adamah and this is the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (205:2). The reasoning is based on the fact that this is the common method for these vegetables. Accordingly, the blessing on coffee should be ha’adamah as well. Our custom of reciting shehakol on coffee is astounding, but we cannot add to this novelty by being lenient with the prohibition against gentile cooking.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in his sefer Mor U’ktziah (204) writes that actually the proper blessing on coffee should be ha’eitz since it is a fruit from a tree and that was the original intent of those that planted the coffee beans; to drink from the liquid. He concludes that the custom is to recite a shehakol anyway, similar to date beer and barley beer.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 22 - AVOIDING STRIFE

There are numerous places throughout Chazal, where the sages permitted various things (that should have been prohibited) because otherwise it would crate animosity amongst each other. Here, in brief, are some of these situations.

*** If a Kohen Gadol became unfit on Yom Kippur and we appointed another Kohen Gadol to replace him for that day; the first one returns to his position and the second one cannot serve as a Kohen Gadol or as a Kohen Hedyot (common Kohen). He cannot serve as a regular Kohen because of the principle that one can ascend in matters of sanctity but one cannot descend in matters of sanctity. He cannot serve as a Kohen Gadol because this would create animosity between him and the original Kohen Gadol. There is an opinion that disagrees and allows the substitute Kohen Gadol to serve as a Kohen Gadol. (Yoma 12a)

*** Even according to the opinion mentioned above that we allow the substitute Kohen Gadol to serve as a Kohen Gadol, that is only by a similar type of Kohen Gadol; however, we do not allow the Kohen Gadol who was appointed to lead the battle to serve in the Bais HaMikdosh together with the other Kohen Gadol; this would create certain animosity.

*** We do not anoint two Kohanim Gedolim simultaneously because it will create animosity. (Yerushalmi Yoma 1:1)

*** One who makes a vow that his friend should eat with him (otherwise, he will be forbidden to derive benefit from him) and the friend does not trust the one who took the oath in regards to maaser; he is permitted to eat by him the first Shabbos (a marital feast) because otherwise it would create animosity. (D’mai 4:2)

*** One who is particular not to eat bread baked by a non-Jew is permitted to eat the bread if he is eating at the same table along with those that are not particular on this stringency. This is because otherwise, it would create animosity. He is not permitted to eat the butter of a gentile because it is not considered the primary part of the meal and he could say that he is not interested in eating butter now. (Beis Yosef in the name of Rabbeinu Simcha Y”D 112)

*** We are required to make Eruvei Chatzeros with a full loaf of bread and not with pieces since this will lead to strife among the partners; those who give full loaves might resent those who give pieces. (Eruvin 81a)

*** We should not have festivities for two brides in the same city unless there are enough people to bring about joy to each of them. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar says: Even in that case it’s forbidden because one might be pretty and the other not; they might bestow more honor on one than the other and this will lead to animosity.

*** The Mishna in Taanis ruled that if it still did not rain after the seven fasts, they should conduct less business. They should not become involved with building, planting, marrying or greeting their friends. They should conduct their lives as if they were condemned by Hashem.

The Gemora elaborates on the ruling of the Mishna that one should not greet his friend. The Gemora states that Torah scholars should not greet each other at all. If an unlearned man greets a Torah scholar, he should respond in a low tone and in a somber manner because otherwise it would lead to strife amongst them.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Chagigah 13 - TEACHING TORAH TO AN IDOLATER

Rabbi Ami said: One is forbidden from teaching Torah to a non-Jew. This is derived from the verse [Tehillim 147: 19 – 20]: He declared His word unto Yaakov, His statutes and ordinances unto Israel. He has not done so with any nation; and as for His ordinances, they have not known them.

Tosfos asks: The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death; accordingly, one should be forbidden to teach him Torah because he is transgressing the prohibition against placing a stumbling block in front of a blind man? The idolater cannot study Torah, so the Jew should not be able to teach him Torah, why is this new verse necessary?

Tosfos states: The gentile is permitted to study the seven Noahide laws as the Gemora Sanhedrin (ibid) states: Rabbi Meir said: A gentile who engages in the study of Torah is like a Kohen Gadol and the Gemora explains that this is referring to the seven laws which are incumbent upon him to adhere to. A Jew has an obligation to teach him these halachos.

Tosfos answers: Our Gemora is referring to a case where the idolater has another idolater who is willing to teach him Torah and therefore there would be no prohibition (based on the Gemora in Sanhedrin) of teaching him Torah; our Gemora teaches us that nevertheless, a Jew is forbidden from teaching a non-Jew Torah.

The Meor Veshemesh (Parshas Chukas) writes that it is permitted to teach the Written Law to an idolater as we find that Moshe wrote the Torah in seventy languages. The prohibition of teaching Torah to a gentile applies only to the Oral Law.

The Divrei Chaim (Chanukah) rules similarly: The Torah was written on the stones and the nations of the world copied it over. The Medrash states that the Holy One, Blessed is He did not protest and allowed them to study the Written Law. It is forbidden to teach them even one word of the Oral Law.

There are many commentators who disagree with this vehemently and they maintain that it is evident from many sources that it is even forbidden to teach the Written Law to a non-Jew.

In the sefer, Beis Pinchas (I P. 169) from Rabbi Pinchas HaLevi Horowitz, he writes that all are in agreement that it is forbidden to teach even the Written Law to a non-Jew; the aforementioned commentators are merely stating that we are not obligated to protest and prevent a non-Jew from studying the Written Law. This is derived from the Medrash which stated that Hashem allowed the idolaters to copy over the Written Law. It is incumbent on us, however, to ensure that the gentiles do not study the Oral Law.

This explanation is seemingly inconsistent with a ruling issued by Reb Moshe Feinstein in Igros Moshe (Y”D II: 132): He states that it is forbidden to directly teach Torah to a gentile; however, if he happens to be in the room when one is teaching Torah to other Jews, the teacher is permitted to continue teaching Torah since it is not his intention to teach the gentile.

If there is an obligation to ensure that the gentile does not study the Oral Law, it should follow that one would be compelled to cease his discourse and wait for the non-Jew to leave before continuing with the teaching of Torah.

Read more!

Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 12 - DRINKING COFFEE HEATED BY A GENTILE

The Gemora states: Anything which is normally eaten raw is not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking. (Water does not need to be heated and therefore should not be subject to this prohibition.)

The Radvaz in his teshuvos (3:637) writes: It is permitted to drink coffee heated by a gentile and it is not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking; even though coffee cannot be eaten in its raw state, it is something which does not eaten at a king’s table as an accompaniment to the bread and therefore it is permitted. There is also no concern that they cooked something forbidden in those pots beforehand, since it is well known that they have designated utensils for the coffee (because otherwise, the taste of the coffee would be ruined). He concludes: One should not drink coffee in the accompaniment of gentiles since that will result in many transgressions.

It is brought like that in the Hagahos from the Maharikash (114) as well. He rules that one should be stringent about drinking coffee in a coffee house of gentiles, similar to the halacha regarding wine and beer. Furthermore, it is considered a moishev leitzim (i.e. a session of jesters) and should be avoided.

The Knesses Hagedolah in his sefer Ba’ey Chayei (Y”D 145) disagrees and maintains that coffee heated by a gentile is prohibited to drink. He states: Anything which is eaten or drunk at the royal table by itself, even if it does not come as an accompaniment to the bread is subject to the prohibition of gentile cooking. Furthermore, the requirement that the food must be something that accompanies bread on the royal table is limited to food items, not liquids. He continues: “Even though when I was younger, I would rely on those who ruled that it is permitted, I have now investigated it thoroughly and cannot find a reason for its permission and therefore I refrain from drinking it.” He found that the Arizal prohibited drinking coffee heated by a gentile. He concludes that he is not prohibiting it for the public, but he himself refrained from drinking it.

Pri Chadash (114:6) writes that it is permitted based on Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 31b): Wheat is nullified in water in regards to reciting the blessing of shehakol, so too it is nullified in regards to the prohibition against gentile cooking. Similarly, the coffee is nullified in the boiling water that it is being cooked with and it is therefore not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking.

Teshuvos Beis Yehudah (Y”D 21) objects to the reasoning of the Pri Chadash. The Gemora Brochos (39a) rules: The proper blessing on water which was cooked with vegetables is ha’adamah and this is the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (205:2). The reasoning is based on the fact that this is the common method for these vegetables. Accordingly, the blessing on coffee should be ha’adamah as well. Our custom of reciting shehakol on coffee is astounding, but we cannot add to this novelty by being lenient with the prohibition against gentile cooking.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in his sefer Mor U’ktziah (204) writes that actually the proper blessing on coffee should be ha’eitz since it is a fruit from a tree and that was the original intent of those that planted the coffee beans; to drink from the liquid. He concludes that the custom is to recite a shehakol anyway, similar to date beer and barley beer.

Read more!