Healing an Idolater

(Gittin 70) For a skin disease (moist outside and dry inside), he should take seven plump wheat stalks and roast them over a new hoe and smear himself with the oil that exudes from them. Rav Shimi bar Ashi used this remedy for a certain idolater for “something else” (leprosy), and it cured him.

Tosfos asks from the Gemora in Avodah Zarah (26b) which states that it is forbidden to heal an idolater. The Gemora rules that one may not assist an idolater woman giving birth, even for payment, for she will raise the child to serve idols!?

Tosfos answers that Rav Shimi was permitted to heal the idolater, for this would help him perfect his medical skills, and thus enable him to heal other Jews.

Tosfos in Avodah Zarah adds that Rav Shimi was not an expert practitioner at all, and he was training when he cured the idolater.

Furthermore, in cases where the idolater knows that the Jew has the ability to cure him, it would be permitted to heal him, for otherwise, it would propagate hatred from them to us.

Alternatively, there may be a distinction between a child being born, who will serve idols, and one who already worships idols.

The Geresh Yerachim asks: How was Elisha permitted to heal Naaman from his leprosy?

He answers that Elisha knew that Naaman would not serve idols any longer, and therefore, it was permitted.

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Decree when the reason no longer applies

Tosfos (Daf Yomi: Gittin 18a) asks: One of the reasons mentioned for the decree that the date should be recorded on a get is because perhaps the husband will want to save his niece from capital punishment if she committed adultery. Nowadays, Tosfos asks, when we do not execute anyone, why is there still a necessity to write the date in the get?

The Avnei Neizer (E”H: 188) cites a challenge to Tosfos’ question: Although the reason may not be applicable, the sages’ decree should still apply unless a greater Beis Din comes and nullifies it!

He answers that Tosfos understood that the initial decree was only established in a time and a place where they administered capital punishment. Accordingly, if nowadays, it is universal that we do not execute anyone, we are not nullifying the decree; rather, the enactment was never instituted for such cases. This is why it is not necessary for another Beis Din to annul the initial decree.

This would be comparable to that which Tosfos in Beitzah (6a) states: Tosfos writes that a matter that was only prohibited because of a specific concern will be permitted when the concern no longer exists. This principle justifies why we do not have to be concerned for water that was exposed at night and one is allowed to drink from it because in modern times snakes are not frequent in our homes.

The Gemora (Beitzah 30a) cites a Mishna that states that one is not allowed to clap or dance on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Rashi explains that the reason that one is prohibited from performing any of these actions is because they can lead to one fixing musical instruments. Tosfos states that this prohibition only applied in those days when they were experts in fashioning musical instruments. Presently, however, the decree does not apply, because we do not know how to fashion these instruments.

The Rema (O.C. 339:3) rules in accordance with Tosfos. Teshuvos HaRema (125) writes that there was an incident where a marriage occurred on Friday night and the people were not concerned that the groom would write the kesuvah, marriage contract on Shabbos. The reason for this permit was because it is not common in our times for the groom to write his own kesuvah.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l poses an interesting question. The halacha is that presently we do not have a legally qualified reshus harabim and for this reason one would be permitted to walk in a public thoroughfare on Shabbos while wearing various ornaments. According to this ruling, then, why are we still forbidden to blow shofar, shake a lulav and read the Megillah. Regarding these mitzvos there is a concern that one may come to carry the shofar, lulav or Megillah in the reshus harabim. Yet, the halachah is that our public thoroughfares are not deemed to be a legal reshus harabim, so we should no longer have these concerns.

Reb Shlomo Zalman also questions the opinion of the Raavad who maintains that muktzah is forbidden on account of a rabbinical decree that one should not come to carry into a reshus harabim. Why should this decree still apply when there is no longer a legally qualified reshus harabim?

Rav Shlomo Zalman explains that Tosfos is only referring to musical instruments. In previous times, everyone was capable of playing and repairing musical instruments. For this reason there was a decree prohibiting clapping and dancing. In our times, however, only a minority of people is capable of fixing musical instruments and because it is uncommon for people to fix musical instruments, there is no necessity for the decree against clapping and dancing.

Rabbah (Beitzah 5a) maintained that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai rescinded the prohibition against accepting witnesses after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, and subsequently an egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah was permitted to be eaten on the second day. Rav Yosef challenged Rabbah’s ruling because if the Chachamim assembled to render a ruling, they would need to reassemble to revoke their ruling. Rav Yosef added that one could not say that Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai convened with his colleagues to permit one to eat the egg, because their decision was only to accept the testimony after the offering of the afternoon tamid sacrifice, but they never took a vote on permitting the egg to be eaten.

Tosfos HaRosh in Avodah Zara (2a) rules that one is permitted to conduct business with gentiles during their holiday season as initially this was prohibited because gentiles in the past worshipped idols and now that gentiles do not worship idols, the decree is irrelevant.

Tosfos in Brachos (53b) writes that people are not scrupulous regarding mayim acharonim, washing the hands at the end of a meal, because we no longer have melach sedomis, salt from Sodom. Tosfos notes that although the practice of washing mayim achronmim was instituted by an assembly of a Bais Din, this institution was not unanimously accepted and thus this institution is not categorized as a ruling that is irrevocable unless a Bais Din reassembles and rescinds the ruling.

Reb Shlomo Kluger in Elef Lecho Shlomo (116) rules that one is permitted to learn by candlelight on Shabbos and we are not concerned that he may come to move the wick which will cause the fire to burn brighter, thus violating a biblical prohibition, because one does not need to move the wick of our present-day candles.

Teshuvos HaRosh (klal 2:8) rules that one is permitted to tie strings of linen on a four-cornered garment that is made from linen to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis and we are not concerned that one might tie strings of wool to the garment. The reason for this ruling is because all know that techeiles, a blue-dyed wool used for tzitzis, is not prevalent, thus there is no permit to tie strings of wool to a linen garment.

Teshuvos HaRosh writes that if is common knowledge why a decree was instituted and the rationale no longer applies, then the decree is considered irrelevant. Teshuvos HaRosh draws a contrast of this supposition to the case in our Gemora regarding the egg that was laid on the first day of Rosh HaShanah, because some people are not aware whey the egg was initially prohibited, nor do they understand why the reason to prohibit no longer applies.

Shearim Mitzuyanim B’Halachah rules that if necessary, one is permitted to take medicine on Shabbos. Taking medicine on Shabbos was initially forbidden as there was a concern that one would violate the prohibition of grinding. Now that medicine is prepared by the manufacturer and most people are not even aware of the process involved in manufacturing the medicine, there is no longer a concern that one who wishes to take medicine will violate the Shabbos prohibition of grinding herbs or spices.

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Mummies and Kohanim Entering the Land of the Nations

By: Reb Avi Lebovitz (Heoros al Hadaf)

The Mishna L'melech (Avel 3:1) has a teshuva where he discusses Kohanim going into the mummy business. He begins by saying that although they may consist of very dry bones, theywill still transmit tumah. However, his reason to be lenient is based on the opinion of the Yerai'im that we follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai that aside from idolaters not transmitting tumah through roof association, they also do not transmit tumah via “touching.” (Tosafos 54a clearly rejects this and says that even according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, they will transmit tumah via “touching.”) Based on the combination of the Yerai'im, and the Ra'avad who says that any Kohen who is already tamei (even after he separates from the corpse) has no prohibition of becoming tamei again, the Mishna L’melech creates a s'fek sfeika (double doubt) to be lenient, but eventually rejects it, since it is clear from the many places, including our Tosfos, in the name of Rabbeinu Chaim Cohen that a Kohen cannot make himself tamei even if he is already a tamei meis.

The issue that is related to our Gemora is that the Gemora in Avoda Zara (13a) says that a Kohen cannot enter into the Land of the Nations except for a mitzvah because of the decree of tumah on the Land of the Nations. The Rambam in Hilchos Ohalos (2:3) seems to understand that the concern of the Land of the Nations is because of the fetuses of idolaters that are buried there. This would clearly indicate that there is at least a prohibition of touching and carrying for Kohanim even related to the corpses of idolaters. However, the Mishna L'melech rejects this proof based on Tosfos, who says that the decree of tumah on the Land of the Nations is due to “the many Jews that were killed outside of Eretz Yisroel,” not because of the idolaters.

Practically speaking, what happened to the prohibition for a Kohen to go from Eretz Yisroel to the Land of the Nations (other than for mitzvah purposes)? The Shulchan Aruch (369) rules that a Kohen cannot go into the Land of the Nations, but the Shach (3) writes that it only applies when Eretz Yisroel is presumed to be in a state of taharah, but nowadays, this does not apply. This opinion is also quoted in the b'er hagola from the maharshal. The Shevus Yakov (brought in pischei teshuva) argues and claims that it applies even nowadays. Reb Akiva Eiger justifies the custom to be lenient about this, either because “sustaining one’s family” is a significant enough of a mitzvah (but this would not justify those who travel to chutz la'aretz for vacation) or because we are all tamei meisim. The second rationale seems to be either based on the opinion of the Ra’avad that the prohibition of tumas meis in general only applies when the Kohen is tahor, and although we are not lenient for a Biblical tumah, we rely on the Ra'avad for the Land of the Nations, which is only Rabbinical. But more likely he means to say that the entire decree of the Land of the Nations is in order to maintain the taharah of the Kohen, and it would not apply when the Kohen is a tamei meis.

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