The Children of Yaakov and Leah

The Gemora (Nedarim 20b) states: It is written [Yechezkel 20:38]: And I will select from among you the rebels and those that transgress against me. Rabbi Levi said: This refers to children of people belonging to the following nine categories (the children will be adversely effected when they are born from such a union): Children of fear (if the husband cohabits with his wife even when she doesn’t want to) and children of a violated woman (he forced himself upon his wife); children of a hated wife; children of an excommunicated parent; children of a woman mistaken for another (he cohabited with one wife thinking she was his other wife); children of strife; children of intoxication; children of a wife whom the husband decided to divorce; children of a mingling women (such that the true father cannot be determined); children of a brazen woman.

The commentators ask from our forefather Yaakov: Cohabiting with Leah on their wedding night should have been forbidden based upon our Gemora? Firstly, Yaakov thought that she was Rachel! Our Gemora states that a union with a woman who was mistaken for another can produce degenerate children! Secondly, the Torah describes Leah as being hated. How then could Yaakov cohabit with her? Furthermore, the Ramban cites a Medrash that Yaakov hated Leah for colluding with her father and for not informing him who she truly was on her wedding night. The Medrash states: Once Yaakov saw that Leah tricked her sister, he resolved to divorce her. This is what Leah was alluding to when she called her second son, Shimon. Why was Yaakov permitted to be intimate with her under such circumstances?

There are several answers on these questions. The Ra’avad says that during the act of intimacy, Yaakov was at peace with Leah and did not harbor any ill feelings towards her.

The Beis Yosef answers that Leah was not as “well liked” by Yaakov as Rachel was, but she was not actually hated.

The Ra’avad continues that in truth, these prohibitions were only applicable after the Torah was given; they did not apply to Yaakov (in a similar vein; that is how some explain the fact that Yaakov married two sisters).

The Magen Avraham writes that Yaakov actually realized that it was Leah when she entered the chupah. Hence, at the time of cohabitation, he did not mistake her for Rachel.

The Alshich explains that the Gates of Heaven accepted the tears of Leah and caused Yaakov to never even realize that he was cohabiting with Leah (seemingly, he maintains that the adverse effect of having children from ‘an exchanged woman’ is only applicable if he realizes during cohabitation that she is the wrong woman).

P’ninei HaDaf - Lublin

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Second One Takes Effect

The Gemora (Nedarim 18a) states: Although the Mishna had stated that if someone makes two consecutive oaths that he will not eat something and he eats it, he has transgressed one prohibition (for the second one does not take effect), if the person asked for the first oath to be permitted (and it was), the second oath is now valid.

There is a discussion if the second oath (before the first one was annulled) is regarded as an oath taken in vain (similar to an oath to nullify a mitzvah).

The Ritva writes: If he has the first one annulled, the second one is not regarded as an oath taken in vain, for now, it takes effect. He, therefore, would not incur lashes for the second oath.

The Nimukei Yosef maintains that even while the first oath is intact, the second oath is not regarded as an oath taken in vain. This is because it has potential for being a valid oath, i.e. if the first one is annulled. Others say that it is not considered in vain for the second oath is essentially an oath in order to uphold a mitzvah (fulfilling the first one), and we learned above that this is an admirable thing to do.

Rashi in Shavuos explains the reason why the second oath takes effect after the first one is annulled. He says it is because a sage has the power to retroactively revoke the oath in a manner as if the oath was never uttered. Accordingly, the second one is valid, for there is no first one any longer.

The Shach writes that according to this, the second one will only take effect if a sage annulled the oath. However, if the husband annulled the oath of his wife, her second oath would not take effect. This is because a husband does not retroactively revoke her oath; it is only considered void from this moment and on. The first oath is not regarded as if it never existed and therefore, the second one does not take effect.

Reb Akiva Eiger disagrees. He states: The reason why the second oath does not take effect initially is because one prohibition cannot take effect upon another. The second prohibition exists, but it is in a pending state. As soon as the first prohibition is removed, the second one “wakes up” and takes effect. This would be true when the husband annuls the oath of his wife as well.

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Incidental Benefit

Abaye explains the Gemora (Nedarim 16b) as follows: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

Rava asks on Abaye’s language: Were mitzvos given to derive benefit from them? (He should still be able to sit in the sukkah?)

Rather, Rava explains: In the case of a vow, one says, “The sitting in the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not sit in the sukkah.”

The Reshash asks on Rava’s question: Although the mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving benefit from them, it still should be forbidden to sit in the sukkah in this situation? This is because he is enjoying the incidental pleasure of the shade!

He answers that if it is shade that the person desires, he could stay inside the house. The reason he chose to sit in a sukkah is solely because of the mitzvah. It is therefore not regarded as if he is befitting from the shade of the sukkah.

The Machaneh Efraim is not satisfied with this answer. He asks that the bottom line is that he is not dwelling in his house; he is inside the sukkah and enjoying its shade! Why should this be permitted?

The Oneg Yom Tov answers: We are only concerned with the physical pleasure when the benefit is purely incidental and not related to the mitzvah. However, the mitzvah of sukkah is different. The Torah commands us to dwell in the sukkah in the same manner that one would live in his house. The enjoyment of sitting in a sukkah is not regarded as an incidental benefit; this is the fulfillment of the mitzvah. And since mitzvos were not given for the purpose of deriving pleasure from them, the (direct) benefit that one receives as he is fulfilling the mitzvah is not regarded as a benefit, and is therefore permitted.

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Ran Elucidated - Daf 16

Distinction between a vow and an oath - The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for this: How do we know that one cannot swear to transgress a mitzvah? It is because it is written [Bamidbar 30:3]: If a man makes a vow to Hashem or makes an oath to prohibit himself, he shall not desecrate his word; according to whatever came out of his mouth, he shall do. We see from here that only “his word” (a discretionary matter) he should not desecrate. However, he may desecrate it when it involves the wishes of Heaven (where his oath contradicts a mitzvah).

The Gemora asks: Why is a vow any different? If it is because it says makes a vow to Hashem, which implies that he should not desecrate his word even when his vow involves the wishes of Heaven, why, by an oath, it is also written makes an oath to Hashem (since the words “to Hashem” is written between a vow and an oath)?

Abaye answers: In the case of a vow, one says, “The pleasure of the sukkah should be forbidden upon me.” (Since the vow is upon the object, not the person, it is effective.) However, in the case of an oath, one says, “I swear that I will not derive any pleasure from the sukkah.” (Since the oath is upon the person and the mitzvah is upon the person, they are contradicting each other and the oath cannot take effect.)

The Ran explains: It is reasonable that the word “to Hashem” should be referring to a vow, but not an oath. It is logical to assume that a neder in this manner will take effect. This is because he is not vowing directly against the Torah’s commandment. The neder takes effect and he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the sukkah because we cannot force a person to eat something that is forbidden to him. However, by an oath, he is saying that he will not sit in the sukkah. This is a direct contradiction to the Torah’s commandment and he doesn’t have the power to free himself from the Torah’s commandment to sit in a sukkah.

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