Concealing his True Stature

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The Mordechai (Gittin 461) relates that Rabbeinu Tam once instructed a Kohen to pour him some water. This caused one of his students to inquire as to how he could allow a Kohen to serve him, being that the Yerushalmi states that whoever uses a Kohen for his own needs is in violation of the prohibition of me’ilah (since the Kohen is sacred). Rabbeinu Tam's response was that the Kohen who served him in 12th century France was without the clothing of the Kohen and, therefore, not a Kohen (based upon the Gemora Sanhedrin 83b). The student persisted that if so, we shouldn’t give a Kohen the first aliyah. Rabbeinu Tam remained quiet. Rabbeinu Peter then suggested that a Kohen can voluntarily forfeit the respect due to him as a Kohen and, therefore, there was no problem with Rabbeinu Tam's use of him.

The Ta”z asks that the Kohen is not permitted to forfeit his kedushah and marry a divorcee!? What is the difference between the two?

He answers that it is only permitted for the Kohen to forfeit the respect due to him with respect to something that he will be deriving benefit from – e.g. to be an attendant for Rabbeinu Tam. However, something that the Torah explicitly prohibits, such as – marrying a divorcee, there is no option to forfeit that kedushah.

The Ta”z adds that the reason Rabbeinu Tam was quiet was not because he did not know what to answer; but rather, it was because he did not want to be considered a Torah scholar, for that would be the only reason that it would have been permitted. He cites our Gemora and Tosfos as a proof to this. The Gemora stated: Rav Kahana, Rav Pappa and Rav Ashi did not eat the produce from a pledged field even with a deduction. Ravina, however, did. Tosfos asks: How could Ravina eat the produce from a pledged field even with a deduction? Didn’t the Gemora say above that a Rabbinical scholar would not take produce in such an arrangement?

Tosfos answers that Ravina, due to his great humility, did not want to be regarded as a Rabbinical scholar. Ravina did not want people to be aware of his spiritual importance. The prohibition, which applied to other Torah scholars, did not apply to Ravina, for since he was not known as a Torah scholar, his conduct would not necessarily serve as an example to others.

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Women Plowing during Shemitah

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The Gemora in Moed Katan presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar whether one would incur the thirty-nine lashes if he would plow during Shemitah.

Rashi (2b) states that there is a positive commandment which forbids plowing on Shemitah. It is written [Shmos 34:21]: From plowing and harvesting you shall desist. The point of contention between the two Amoraim is if there is a negative commandment as well.

The Rambam in Hilchos Shemitah rules that one who plows during Shemitah does not incur the thirty-nine lashes. Kesef Mishna explains: Since in our Gemora, it was left ambiguously regarding which Amora held what, we cannot administer the lashes when there is uncertainty.

Sha’ar Hamelech in the beginning of Hilchos Shemitah writes that the Yerushalmi in Shabbos (7:2) states that Rabbi Yochanan is the one who maintains that he does not receive the lashes and the rule is that when Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar argue, the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan.

Minchas Chinuch (112) comments that women are obligated in this mitzvah even though it is a positive commandment that has a time element to it and the principle is that women are exempt from any positive mitzvah which is governed by time. He explains that this is applicable only regarding a positive mitzvah that is incumbent on the body of the person and not a mitzvah like Shemitah, which is a mitzvah that is dependent on the land (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz).

Proof to this is cited from the Ritva in Kiddushin (29a). The Gemora rules based on a Scriptural verse that women are not obligated to perform a circumcision on their sons. Tosfos asks: Why is a verse necessary; circumcision is a positive mitzvah which is governed by time since the mitzvah can only be performed by day, and women are exempt? The Ritva answers: Any mitzvah which is not related to the person themselves; this principle does not apply. The mitzvah of milah is to perform the circumcision on the son and therefore women would be obligated if not for the special verse teaching us otherwise.

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Yovel for a Runaway Servant

Rav Sheishes (Daf Yomi: Kiddushin 17) explained a braisa (which ruled that a servant who runs away does not receive gifts) to be referring to a case where the servant ran away, and Yovel intervened. The braisa is teaching us that he does not receive gifts in this case (and he is not considered as if the master has freed him).

The Ramba”m rules that the runaway servant does gain his freedom when Yovel intervenes. The Ritv”a explains that there is no servant who remains by the master after Yovel.

The Sma”g, however, disagrees, and he bases his ruling upon a Yerushalmi which indicates that a servant who is not under the jurisdiction of his master when Yovel intervenes, does not go free by Yovel.

The Kesef Mishna asks: Why would the Sma”g rule in accordance with the Yerushalmi when the Bavli (our Gemora) rules that he does go free?

The Lechem Mishna explains that the Sma”g will explain our Gemora differently. He would learn that the Gemora’s conclusion is that the runaway servant does not go free in this case, and that is why he does not receive any severance gifts.

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Kohen takes Precedence, even after Ressurection - Gittin 59

It is written [Vayikra 21:8]: You shall sanctify him, for he offers the bread of your God. And it was taught in the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yishmael: You shall sanctify him teaches us that in all matters pertaining to holiness, the Kohen takes precedence. He should be the first one called to read the Torah. He should be the first to recite the blessing by a meal. He takes the first portion (if he is dividing something with a Yisroel, the Kohen has the right to choose the first portion).

The Gemora in Megillah records the following incident: Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira ate the Purim meal together. They became intoxicated. Rabbah got up and slaughtered Rabbi Zeira. On the following day, Rabbah pleaded for mercy and he revived Rabbi Zeira. On the next year, Rabbah invited Rabbi Zeira to eat with him. Rabbi Zeira replied: A miracle does not occur at all times.

The Kli Chemda at the end of Parshas Breishis cites a kuntrus called Over Oreach. In this sefer, a question is asked: The Gemora Brochos (46a) records an incident where Rabbi Avahu honored Rabbi Zeira to recite the blessing and cut the bread. The Rashba asks that this is inconsistent with the halachah which states that this honor should be reserved for the host. The Rashba answers: since the meal was on behalf of Rabbi Zeira (he had recovered from a sickness), Rabbi Zeira was considered the host. Why didn’t the Rashba answer that Rabbi Zeira was a Kohen (Yerushalmi Brochos 8:6)? He answers that since this incident happened after the episode of Rabbah with Rabbi Zeira mentioned in Megillah (Rabbah slew him and the following day revived him), Rabbi Zeira lost his sanctity of being a Kohen and did not merit the right of this honor.

The Kli Chemda is greatly perplexed by this answer. Every Kohen is considered a Kohen because his father was a Kohen. It is obvious that he did not lose his relations with his relatives because he dies, so why shouldn’t he be a Kohen? (Rabbi Chaim Berlin cites a Gemora in Sanhedrin, proving that the Kehunah remains even after resurrection.) Perhaps he would have required a new inauguration to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh but he definitely did not lose the status of being a Kohen. He cites proof from the story with Elisha that one does not relinquish his relations with his relatives after he dies.

(Look at the Ramban in the beginning of Parshas Emor, where he writes that a Kohen has certain halachos because he is a descendant of Aharon HaKohen and other halachos are because he is a Kohen himself.)

After his resurrection, would he be required to marry his wife again? Reb Elchonon Wasserman discusses the status of the wife of Eliyahu after he ascended to Heaven without dying.

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Women and Slaves Wearing Tefillin

Rabbah bar Rav Shila (Daf Yomi: Gittin 40a) explains that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is dealing with a case where the master himself placed the tefillin on the slave. Only then, is it an indicator that the slave was previously freed.

In Shulchan Aruch (O”C 38:3) it is written that women and slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of wearing tefillin. The Rama adds that if a woman wishes to act stringently upon herself and don tefillin, you should protest the matter. The Magen Avraham explains that this is because it is difficult for women to be cautious regarding the cleanliness of their body.

The Yerushalmi in Brochos relates that Michal the daughter of Shaul HaMelech wore tefillin, and the sages of that time protested. The Gemora in Eruvin (96a), however, states that the sages did not protest.

The Peri Megadim rules that although slaves are permitted to wear tefillin, they should not be encouraged to, and one should object if they do don tefillin. The Mishna Berurah rules that it should not be frowned upon.

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Suspected of Lying

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin Daf 10a) had stated: Any document that has a Cuthean witness signed on it is disqualified (for he is suspected of lying) except that of a get for a woman and for the freeing of a slave.

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: Since they are suspect of lying, they should be regarded as a rasha (wicked person) with respect of monetary matters, and the halacha is that a thief is disqualified form all testimony!?

He answers that the Yerushalmi says that the Cutheans are eligible to sign on a get because they are only suspect with regards to monetary matters, but not with respect of illicit relations. The Pnei Yehoshua explains: The Yerushalmi holds that a witness who is suspected of stealing is only disqualified from testifying with regards to money matters, but he would still be eligible to testify on arayos (relationships). However, l’halacha we hold that such a person is ineligible to testify on all matters, so accordingly, how could the Mishna rule that the get is valid?

He answers that in truth, we do not know definitely that they would lie; it is only that they are suspect of lying. The halacha is that if they are suspected of lying, they are disqualified from testifying with respect of monetary matters, but not with respect of other testimonies.

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Hidden Away

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Sotah 20a) had stated: If before the scroll has been erased she said: “I will not drink,” her scroll is hidden away and her minchah offering is scattered on the ashes.

Rashi learns that they are hidden away at the sides of the Sanctuary, for all sacred writings which cannot be used any longer are hidden away in a place that they will not be treated with disrespect.

In the sefer Torah Haohel, he asks, why did the sotah scroll have to be hidden away? Couldn’t they have given it to a child in order for him to learn the portion in the Torah dealing with the sotah?

He answers that since it was written with sanctity, and it contains the Name of Hashem, they were concerned that the children will not treat the scroll with the proper respect, and therefore it was required to be hidden away.

Furthermore, he says that it would be degrading for the woman, for everyone would say that this is the scroll that was prepared for So-and-So the sotah.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi (and some understand that this is what Rashi means as well) that the scroll is hidden away in the hinges of the Sanctuary door. The opening and closing of the door will cause that it will be worn away.

The Minchas Kenaos asks: How would it be permitted to erase Hashem’s Name by opening and closing the door? The Gemora Makkos (22a) rules that one who erases Hashem’s Name receives lashes! Since the opening and closing of the door will certainly result in the erasure of His Name, it should be regarded as a “direct erasing,” and should be forbidden!

The Ridvaz answers: Since the Name of Hashem was written on this scroll with the intention that it will be erased (in the bitter waters), there is no prohibition to erase this Name. It is not regarded as a permanent inscription, and therefore it would be permitted to erase it.

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Spit in his Eye

The Yerushalmi in Sotah relates the following: Rav Meir was accustomed to deliver a Torah lecture every Friday night. A certain woman was always in attendance. One time, Rabbi Meir said a lengthy drasha and by the time she arrived home, the Shabbos candles had already burnt out. Her husband was angry with her and told her, “I do not want to see you again until you spit into the eye of the person who was giving the lecture that you attended.”

The Medrash records that the woman sat outside of her house for several weeks. All the women saw her and asked her what was going on. She explained the story. The women went to Rabbi Meir and related the situation to him in hope that he would have a solution. (The Yerushalmi states that Rabbi Meir realized through Divine spirit what the situation was even before the women came to him.)

Rabbi Meir pretended to be suffering from pain in the eyes, and announced: “If there is any woman skilled in whispering charms for the eyes (a type of "medicine" which was believed to be effective in those days) , let her come and whisper.” When this particular woman came to him, he asked her: “Are you skilled in whispering charms for the eyes?” She said that she didn’t. Rabbi Meir told her, “Do not worry. I will tell you what to do. Just spit into this eye seven times and all will be well.” After she did as she was instructed, Rabbi Meir told her to go to her husband and say that you only requested of me to spit in his eye once; I did so seven times.

His students asked him: “Master! Should Torah be degraded in such a manner?” Rabbi Meir replied: “Should my honor be treated in a higher regard than the honor of the Omnipresent? If, in order to make peace between a husband and a wife, the Torah commanded: Let My Name, which was written in sanctity, be erased in the destructive waters, how much more so I, where I can forego my honor in order to bring about peace between a man and his wife.

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Compensation for Teaching Torah

Rabbi Yochanan said (Nedarim 37a): While it’s true that one cannot take money for teaching Scripture, he may take money for teaching them the proper cantillation of the verses.

One is obligated to teach others the laws and statutes of the Torah without demanding payment. The Chasam Sofer rules: Nowadays that the entire Gemora and the poskim are written down, one is not obligated to teach them inside for free; rather, he is required to teach orally the halachos and the rationale behind them. If, however, one teaches the students the Gemora inside, he may demand payment. The reason that the Gemora makes a distinction between Scripture and Midrash is because the Scripture was already written down. (Although Rebbe arranged the Mishna, it was not written down until much later.) Therefore, if one teaches student the correct method to read the Gemora, he may demand payment.

The Ran cites a Yerushalmi which rules that although a person may not receive compensation for teaching Torah, he may demand payment for the loss of income that he suffers by the fact that he does not pursue other means of support. This is true as long as he devotes himself completely to teaching.

Other Rishonim rule that if a teacher has no other means of support, he may receive compensation for teaching Torah.

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Derived from Lavan

The Gemora (Kesuvos 57b) derives the source that a bride is given twelve months to prepare for her wedding from Lavan, when he requested from Eliezer that Rivkah should remain with them in order to prepare for her wedding.

The commentators ask: How can we learn out a halacha from the wicked Lavan?

It is noteworthy that there are several other halachos derived from Lavan.

The Yerushalmi (Moed Katan) learns out the halachos regarding the seven days of rejoicing after a wedding from Lavan.

Tosfos in Kiddushin (52a) relates an incident that occurred with Rabbeinu Tam that the son of Rabbi Oshaya Halevi betrothed the daughter of a wealthy man and he said, “Your daughter should be betrothed to me.” He failed to mention which daughter he was referring to. Rabbeinu Tam ruled that we can assume that he betrothed the older daughter. Proof to this is from Lavan.

The Admor Mi’Satmar explains: Every word in the Torah emanates from Heaven and halachos may be derived from there. These words were given over to Lavan for him to say. It is similar to that which the Torah states regarding Bila’am; Hashem placed the words into his mouth and only those words, was he granted permission to say.

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Spending More than a Fifth

Rabbi Ila said: It was decreed in Usha that one who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his wealth (for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself).

A braisa is cited to support this ruling: One who gives liberally to charity should not give more than a fifth of his money, for then, he will be forced to beg for support himself. There was an incident with a fellow who wished to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth and his friend did not allow him to. Who was this friend? Rabbi Yesheivav. Others say: Rabbi Yesheivav wished to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth and his friend did not allow him to. Who was this friend? Rabbi Akiva.

The Rosh writes that this halacha applies by all mitzvos; one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on any specific mitzva, such as esrog or lulav. The Rambam and Rema seem to rule accordingly.

The Rishonim ask: Why would someone be exempt from performing a mitzvah just because it costs more than a fifth of his wealth? The Ra’avad answers that this is similar to halacha that one should make his Shabbos like an ordinary weekday, and not be forced to be supported from charity. This is because poverty is regarded as death, and one is not obligated to give up his life for an ordinary mitzvah.

The Ra’avad adds that this halacha applies only to a positive commandment; however, one would be required to spend his entire wealth in order not to transgress a negative precept.

The Gemora stated that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth to fulfill a mitzvah; is one halachically required to spend up to that amount, or is it only regarded as a mitzvah?

The Beis Yosef (Y”D; 249) writes that it is considered a mitzvah in the preferable manner if one spends up to a fifth of his wealth in order to perform a mitzvah. The Beis Yosef adds that although one can imply from the Gemora that it is not even a mitzvah to spend that amount because the Gemora states: One who spends liberally should not give more than a fifth of his wealth; however, even less than that would be regarded as spending liberally, and there would be no mitzvah whatsoever to spend that amount. Nevertheless, there is a Yerushalmi in Pe’ah that seems to indicate that there is a mitzvah to spend up to one-fifth of his wealth for a mitzvah.

In the sefer Ahavas Chesed, the Chafetz Chaim cites a Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos, who writes that there is a halachic obligation to spend up to one-fifth of one’s wealth for charity. He asks form our Gemora, which would seem to indicate that there is no such obligation. He answers that our Gemora is discussing a case where the poor people are not present and someone is searching to find them in order to give them charity. In such a situation, there is not even a mitzvah to give up to one-fifth. However, the Yerushalmi and the Rambam are speaking about a case where the poor person is in front of you; then, there would be a halachic obligation to give up to one-fifth.

WHEN CAN ONE SPEND
MORE THAN A FIFTH ?

What if one wants to spend more than a fifth? Is he allowed to? It is evident from the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos that it is regarded as virtuous (midas chassidus) for one to spend more than a fifth. However, it can be inferred from the Rambam in halachos that one should not spend more than a fifth of his wealth on a mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim reconciles the two rulings of the Rambam in the same manner as before. If the poor person is present, it would be regarded as midas chassidus to spend more than a fifth, and that is what the Rambam in his explanation to the Mishnayos is discussing. However, when the poor people are not present and one is chasing after them, he should not spend more than a fifth.

The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth if it is to support the studying of Torah. The Ahavas Chesed explains the reasoning for this. One who supports another fellow to learn Torah is creating a partnership with him; the supporter receives a reward together with the one who is learning the Torah. One is permitted to purchase this reward for himself even if it will cost him more than a fifth.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe (Y”D, 4:37) rules that this is correct only if the supporter specifically negotiates with the one studying Torah to create a partnership of Yissochar and Zevulun. However, if the provider is just donating money to support Torah, he is not permitted to give more than a fifth.

The Ibn Ezra in Mishlei (4:7) writes that one is permitted to spend more than a fifth of his wealth in order to study Torah himself. The Chafetz Chaim in Likutei Halachos (Yoma 12a) also rules like that. However, the Netziv in the Shiltos states that this is a matter of dispute between two Amoraim. The Gemora in Eruvin cites the verse that Torah is not in the Heavens. Rav Avdimi says: If it would be in the heavens, one would be obligated to go there and learn. It is evident that one would be forced to spend more than a fifth of his wealth to study Torah, for otherwise, he could claim that it costs too much to travel to the Heaven. However, Rava disagrees regarding the interpretation of that verse, and according to him, one would not be allowed to spend more than a fifth in order to study Torah.

The Rema (Y”D, 249:1) seems to hold that one can give away more than one-fifth of his wealth to charity right before he dies. It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah that even then, he should not.

It is written in Ahavas Chesed that one who is a free-spender in regards to himself and his family, i.e., he splurges on expensive clothing, builds for himself a fancy mansion and generally leads a luxurious lifestyle; it is permitted for him to give to charity more than a fifth of his wealth.

Some say that if one finds himself in dire straits, he is permitted to spend more than a fifth with the intention that it should be on account of this deed that he will merit a salvation. It is brought in the name of the Bnei Yissoschar that one who requires atonement on a specific sin is also permitted to give away more than a fifth.

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Waiving her Rights

The Gemora (Kesuvos 42a) states that a bogeres (over twelve and a half years old), who has been seduced waives her rights to the fine, depreciation and embarrassment payments because she voluntarily agreed to the seduction. The Gemora above (40a) also stated regarding an orphan: One who seduces her will be exempt from all payments since the fine belongs to her, and her consent to the seducer is regarded as if she waived the fine.

The Ketzos Hachoshen (424:1) explains that a bogeres or an orphan that has been seduced waives her rights to any payments. In truth, there is an obligation for the seducer to pay, but later, she waives the payments. This functions because of the concept of mechilah.

Reb Shimon Shkop (42) states that this cannot function based on an ordinary mechilah because the payments are not yet in existence; one cannot be mochel something that is not in existence yet. Furthermore, the girl should be able to retract from the mechilah before the seducer stands for judgment. Rather, she is waiving her rights to make any claim against him. The right to this claim is in existence and once she decides this, she cannot retract later.

The Ketzos (207:8) cites from the Bnei Yaakov that the argument that mechilah should not be valid because the payment is not in existence yet is not a valid one. This is because the seducer is liable for the payments as soon as he cohabits with her. Since she consented, she is mochel this obligation. He adds that even if she can be mochel the payments before they are actually in existence, she certainly cannot sell the rights to the payments to another before they are in existence. The payments are only in existence in respect to her rights to waive the obligation on the seducer to pay her.

The Yerushalmi disagrees with our Gemora and states that the girl who is seduced can only waive the rights to the embarrassment and depreciation payments, but not the fine. This is because a person is unable to be mochel something that is not yet in their possession. The Ridvaz explains: The primary purpose of the fine is not a monetary payment; it serves as an atonement for cohabiting with this girl, and she has no right to waive the payment that the seducer needs to pay in order to be forgiven.

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REPORTING A STATEMENT IN YOUR OWN NAME - Yevamos 97 - Daf Yomi

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, what is the meaning of the following verse? “I will dwell in your tent in many worlds?” Is it possible for someone to dwell in a tent in both worlds? It means that David stated before Hashem: Master of the Universe, it should be Your will that after I die, they should say a statement in my name in this world (as well as my being in the next world), for Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: Any deceased Torah scholar, in whose name a traditional statement is reported in this world, his lips move gently in the grave (it is as if he is living in both worlds).

The Kinsker Rav in Chelkas Yoav (O”C 46) states that this is applicable even if one relates a Torah statement in his own name. In Heaven, it is known who was the author of this statement, and it will be attributed to him. He does say, however, that the one who said over the statement without attributing it to the proper author, has transgresses the negative prohibition of stealing. He has stolen the honor that the actual author duly deserved.

The Yefeh Mareh in his gloss to the Yerushalmi in Brachos disagrees, and he writes that it is only when the Torah scholar’s name is mentioned that his lips begin to move. From the fact that his name was mentioned in this world, it is regarded as if he is alive and his lips can move. The reason for this is based on a Yerushalmi in Shekalim (7b) which states that when a person is relating a Torah statement from another scholar, he should envision as if that scholar is standing beside him; it is through this that he is considered as if he is alive.

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A MAMZER WILL NOT SURVIVE - Yevamos 78 - Daf Yomi

Rish Lakish said: A mamzeres is permitted to marry into the congregation after ten generations. The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for this.

They asked Rabbi Eliezer: What is the halacha regarding a mamzeres after ten generations?

He said to them: If you would give me a third-generation mamzer, I will render him pure. (This scenario is not possible, because Heaven does not allow third-generation mamzeirim to be in existence, in order that the ordinary Jews will not unknowingly marry them.)

Rav Huna said: Mamzeirim do not survive.

The Gemora asks: But we learned in our Mishna that the prohibition regarding mamzeirim is eternal? It would seem that they do survive, and they have future generations.

Rabbi Zeira answers: Rav Yehudah explained to me the following: A known mamzer survives (since there is no danger of intermarriage with them or their descendants). An unknown mamzer does not survive. A mamzer that is known, but unknown (it is not common knowledge) will survive until three generations, but not longer (by that time, everyone will have forgotten).

Reb Yonasan Eibshitz explains: Up until ten generations, the strength of the father still exists in his descendants.

The Vilna Gaon states: A father and mother are equal partners in a child. A grandson would have twenty-five percent from the father. The third generation will have an eighth. The fourth will have a sixteenth. The fifth will have one thirty-second from the original mamzer. The sixth will have one sixty-fourth. The seventh generation will only have one out of one hundred and twenty-eight. The eighth will have one out of two hundred and fifty-six. The ninth will have one out of five hundred and twelve. The tenth generation will only have one out of one thousand and twenty-four from the original mamzer.

The portion of the mamzer that exists in the tenth-generation descendant has now become nullified. The Yerushalmi states that a berya, a complete creature can become nullified if it is intermingled among a mixture of more that nine hundred and sixty.

The Yerushalmi states that an unknown mamzer will not survive even for thirty days. The Aruch lener explains: This is only true when he is halachically classified as a mamzer (there were witnesses), but it is not public knowledge. Since he is forbidden to enter into the congregation, and people do not know this, there is a decree from heaven that he will die. However, in a case where there is a doubt if he is a mamzer, he will survive, because the halacha is that an uncertain mamzer is permitted to enter into the congregation. (Reb Elchonon disagrees with this.)

The Beis Shmuel (E”H, 2:18) cites a Sefer Chasidim who states that a mamzer will not survive twelve months, similar to a tereifah.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 23 - Simcha on Shabbos

Tosfos states that on Shabbos, the laws of mourning can apply because Scripture does not write regarding Shabbos that it is a day of simcha, happiness and therefore mourning will not be in direct contrast to the Shabbos. There is an obligation to rejoice on a festival and that is why the laws of mourning do not apply then.

Tosfos in Kesuvos (7b) writes that one should enhance the Shabbos with rejoicing and feasting. This would indicate that there is an obligation of simcha on Shabbos.

The Nimukei Yosef (19a) states explicitly that there is an obligation for oneg, pleasure on Shabbos but not simcha. The Gemora Shabbos (62b) states that there is a clear distinction between oneg and simcha.

The Sifri in Parshas Bahaloscha expounds on the verse U’veyom simchaschem, this is referring to Shabbos. The Zohar constantly refers to Shabbos as a yuma d’chedvasa, a day of happiness. The Taz (O”C 688:8) cites a Yerushalmi that one has an obligation to conduct himself with simcha on Shabbos.

The Toras Chaim (at the end of Chulin) concludes that there is no obligation to be b’simcha physically on Shabbos (such as eating and drinking), but there is an obligation for a spiritual simcha. The Sefer Chasidim writes that this can be accomplished through the studying of Torah as it is written Pikudei Hashem yeshrim mesamchei leiv.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 20 - SOURCE FOR THE LAWS REGARDING MOURNING

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source establishing that the primary period of mourning is for seven days.

Tosfos asks: Why didn’t the Gemora cite the verse where Yosef mourned for his father Yaakov in Breishis [50:10]: And he made for his father a mourning of seven days?

Tosfos answers: That verse is referring to the period of mourning prior to the burial.

It is noteworthy that the Ibn Ezra on that verse comments that the mourning mentioned here is referring to the period after the burial. Rabbi Aharon Levine in his sefer Hadrash V’haeyun wonders why the Ibn Ezra explained the verse in that manner, when it is evident that our Gemora does not learn that way. The Rif (Brochos) does derive the laws of mourning from Yaakov.

Tosfos cites a Yerushalmi that answers differently: We cannot derive the laws of mourning from the death of Yaakov because that was prior to the giving of the Torah.

This seems a bit perplexing because there are many halachos (time for the Minchah prayer) that are derived from verses in the Torah even though the incidents transpired prior to the giving of the Torah?

The Chasam Sofer answers: It is written regarding the laws of mourning ‘Banim atem,’ You are My children. When did Klal Yisroel get the status of being children of Hashem? After receiving the Torah. It is for this reason that the laws of mourning must be derived from a verse which occurred after the Torah was given.

Rav Elyashiv answers: While it is true that we could have learned many of the laws of mourning from Yaakov and Yosef, there are some laws that we would be incapable of deriving from there. A mourner cannot study Torah, nor can he don tefillin on the first day and before the burial he cannot perform any mitzvos. If the source of the laws of mourning would be from Yaakov and Yosef, we would say that those laws were included in the mourning period for the mourners who did not have these obligations (the Patriarchs before the Torah was given); however we, who have an obligation to study Torah, don tefillin and perform mitzvos, cannot be subject to these prohibitions. It was for this reason that the Gemora found the source for the laws of mourning from a verse in Amus, after the Torah was given.

[Once again, my anonymous friend pointed me in the right direction.]

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 16 - Blasphemous Words Regarding a Beis Din

The Gemora states: The agent of the Beis Din is permitted to report back to the Beis Din the derogatory words of the defendant and it is not considered loshon horah (slander). Scriptural proof is cited from the fact that Dasan and Aviram’s words were reported back to Moshe and Moshe accepted the report as true.

The Chasam Sofer asks: The Yerushalmi states: One is permitted to speak loshon horah on baalei machlokes (people causing arguments); what is the proof that one is allowed to repeat the blasphemous words of the defendant from the fact that the agent informed Moshe regarding Dasan and Aviram’s words; they were involved in an argument and it would be permitted for anyone to speak about them?

Gilyon Hashas answers: The reason why the Yerushalmi permits one to talk about people stirring a dispute is only if it is for the sake of quieting the argument; it is obvious that it is forbidden to talk about them if the intention is to arouse more strife. The agent who told over to Moshe the offensive words of Dasan and Aviram was causing the quarrel to become stronger and therefore it would have been forbidden to repeat if not for the fact that there is a special permission granted to an emissary from Beis Din.

The Ritva explains that the reason for this authorization is because people will become careful not to insult Beis Din and to refrain from saying disparaging remarks regarding the Beis Din.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 2 - READING EARLY FOR THE VILLAGERS

Villages and large towns read on the fourteenth, but the villages may advance to the day of the gathering. (Rashi explains that this refers to the Monday or Thursday preceding the fourteenth, when the villagers gathered in the large towns to settle disputes before the Courts, which convene every Monday and Thursday (as was enacted by Ezra). Since the villagers did not possess the expertise necessary to read themselves, the Sages were lenient and permitted one of the townspeople to read for them on the day of the gathering, instead of troubling them to return to the town on the fourteenth).

The Rishonim discuss the validity of this reading. How can a townsperson, who is obligated on the fourteenth, read on behalf of the villagers at an earlier date? The Yerushalmi rules that a townsperson, who is obligated on the fourteenth, cannot read the Megillah for people residing in a walled city on the fifteenth.

Turei even and Reb Akiva Eiger explain that Rashi agrees that the townsperson cannot discharge the obligation for the villager. All Rashi means is that since the people in the village are not capable of reading the Megillah; the townsperson reads the Megillah out loud and the villagers repeat after him word by word. The Baruch Ta’am explains further that all the villagers have a Megillah opened before them for otherwise; they would not be fulfilling their obligation since they would be reading the Megillah by heart.

The Ritva disagrees and maintains that a townsperson can discharge the obligation for the villager by reading the Megillah for him. He is not considered someone who is not obligated in the mitzva since he will be subject to this obligation on the fourteenth. It is not comparable to the Yerushalmi’s case. A townsperson and a resident from a walled city have two distinct obligations and two different times. A townsperson must read the Megillah on the fourteenth and not on the fifteenth, and a resident from a walled city must read on the fifteenth and not on the fourteenth. A villager, on the other hand, has the identical obligation as the townsperson and that is to read the Megillah on the fourteenth. There was a leniency established for a villager that he can also read before.

The Rosh in Yevamos and the Ran here learn a different p’shat all together. They state that a villager would be the one reading for the other villagers. The reason they didn’t read for each other on the fourteenth is not because they weren’t proficient; rather it was because it was not customary for them to gather together in the villages on the days of the gathering.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 2 - WALLED CITY FROM THE TIMES OF YEHOSHUA

Why was the determining factor for equal status with Shushan the existence of a wall during the time of Yehoshua bin Nun, and not the time of King Achashverosh? The Ran cites a Yerushalmi which explains that the purpose of this enactment was to give honor to Eretz Yisroel. At the time of Achashverosh, Eretz Yisroel was in ruins, and their cities were not surrounded by a wall. If the determining factor would have been the existence of wall during the time of Achashverosh, all the cities of Eretz Yisroel would have had the status of unwalled cities. It was therefore established that in all the cities which were surrounded by a wall during the period of the conquest of Eretz Yisroel; they would read on the fifteenth.

The Ritva states that Yehoshua was the one who led the Jewish people in the first war against Amalek. It is fitting to connect the holiday that celebrates the defeat of Haman, who was from Amalek, with Yehoshua.

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Daf yomi - Taanis 19 - When to Recite Mashiv HaRuach U'Morid HaGeshem

When to Recite Mashiv HaRuach U'Morid HaGeshem
BY RABBI MICHAEL TAUBES

Tzemach Dovid

No definitive Halacha LeMa'aseh conclusions should be applied to practical situations based on THIS Shiur.
When Paroh pleads with Moshe to pray to Hashem that He should stop the plague of Barad, hail, Moshe says that when he leaves the city, he will spread out his hands to Hashem, and the plague will indeed end (Shemos 9:29). The Pardes Yosef on this Posuk (Ibid.) takes note of the fact that Moshe never says that he will actually ask Hashem to stop the hail, just that he will stretch out his hands. When he does approach Hashem (Ibid. Pasuk 33), he indeed never specifically requests that the hail and the rain stop; he merely stretches out his hands and the plague ends. The Pardes Yosef (Ibid.) explains that although Moshe stretched out his hands in prayer, he did not want to ask that there be no more rain or hail, because rain, of course, is generally necessary and beneficial, and it is improper to request that something good should stop, even if there is too much of it. Moshe therefore simply stretched out his hands, trusting Hashem to respond appropriately to his silent prayer.

This idea that one shouldn't ask Hashem to take away something good is found in a Mishnah in Taanis (19a) which describes different communal difficulties and tragedies because of which the Chachomim would declare public fast days, featuring special Tefillos; the Mishnah (Ibid.) states that they would never declare such a fast day if there was too much rain. The Gemara there (22b) explains that this is because it is inappropriate to daven to Hashem because one has too much of a good thing. The Gemara (Ibid.) adds, however, that if the excessive rain is actually damaging or dangerous, then one could daven for it to stop because it is then no longer a good thing. The same Mishnah (Ibid.) then relates the famous story of Choni HaMe'agel who "persuaded" Hashem to cause the rains to fall by "threatening" to remain standing in the circle he drew on the ground until it would rain, which it then did, coming down at one point with such force that Choni had to request that it fall in the proper measure. The Gemara (Ibid. 23a) elaborates on this story, saying that when the rain fell very hard, Choni's students asked him to daven that it should stop entirely, to which he responded that he had it by tradition that one doesn't daven because of having too much of a good thing. He solved the problem using only specific and precise language and actions. The Rambam (Hilchos Taaniyos 2:15) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 576:11 and 577:1) rule in accordance with all of the above.
This issue of not asking Hashem to hold back something good even when we don't need it is relevant to us today concerning our practice regarding the last recitation of Mashiv HaRuach U'Morid HaGeshem in the spring. Based on the Mishnah at the beginning of Taanis (2a), the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 114:1) writes that we start reciting this phrase in the second Beracha of the Shemoneh Esrei at Mussaf on Shemini Atzeres. The Yerushaimi in Taanis (Perek 1 Halacha 1, 1b), discussing why we wait until Mussaf, quotes a view that an individual should not begin to say it until he has heard it from the Sheliach Tzibbur. The Shulchan Aruch (Ibid. Sif 2) accepts this view; the Ramo (Ibid.) adds that prior to the silent Shemoneh Esrei of Mussaf, an announcement is made to begin saying Mashiv HaRuach U'Morid HaGeshem so that the Tzibbur will say it then too.
This same Mishnah in Taanis (Ibid.) then indicates that we stop saying Mashiv HaRuach at Mussaf on the first day of Pesach, and the Shulchan Aruch (Ibid. Sif 1) rules accordingly. Here, however, no mention is made of any announcements not to say Mashiv HaRuach any longer. In fact, the Ramo (Ibid Sif 3) writes that the Tzibbur does indeed say it in the silent Shemoneh Esrei of Mussaf; only the Chazzan omits it in the Chazoras HaShatz, and the Tzibbur, hearing the Chazzan's omission, then leaves it out starting with Minchah. The Taz (Ibid. Sif Katan 9) explains that this is because any announcement not to say this phrase would be potentially confusing. The Magen Avraham (Ibid. Sif Katan 8) and the Be'er Heitev (Ibid. Sif Katan 5), however, explain that this is really because an announcement not to daven for rain would be like davening that Hashem should hold back something which is generally a Beracha, and this is inappropriate. Elsewhere, the Magen Avraham (Ibid. Siman 488 Sif Katan 4) actually quotes the aforementioned Gemara in Taanis (Ibid.) which says that one shouldn't daven to Hashem because one has too much rain as the source for this practice not to announce that people should stop saying Mashiv HaRuach U'Morid HaGeshem.
This idea may relate to an interesting question. Why do we wait on the first day of Pesach until Mussaf to stop saying it? Why not stop already the night before, at Maariv? The Yerushalmi cited above (Ibid.) discusses this question regarding when to start saying Mashiv HaRuach on Shemini Atzeres, and explains that we don't start at Maariv because not everybody is in Shul then. The Rosh in Taanis (Perek 1 Siman 2) elaborates, saying that since people often stay home at night, those in Shul will therefore know to say it, those at home will not, and as a result, different people will be doing different things, which is inconsistent and thus improper. The Rosh (Ibid.) says that this reason actually explains specifically why we don't stop saying Mashiv HaRuach at Maariv on the first night of Pesach; the Ra'avad (Hasagas HaRa'avad on Ba'al HaMaor to Taanis, 1b on the Rif Ot 2) says even more clearly that this reason applies only to the first night of Pesach. In truth, however, this explanation is not needed. If no announcement is made to stop saying Mashiv HaRuach, and the Tzibbur must first hear the Chazzan's omission of it before they omit it, obviously it will be said by the Tzibbur at Maariv.

As for making the change during Shacharis, the same Yerushalmi (Ibid.) presents two reasons for not starting to say Mashiv HaRuach then on Shemini Atzeres. First, people who were not in Shul the night before may think, upon hearing it at Shacharis, that it was to have been said at Maariv too, and will make a mistake in subsequent years. Second, since an announcement to recite it must precede the Shemoneh Esrei, at Shacharis no announcement is possible, because there can be no interruption at all between the Beracha of Go'al Yisrael and the start of the Shemoneh Esrei; we thus wait until Mussaf. The Magen Avraham (Ibid. Siman 114 Sif Katan 1) cites both these reasons. If, however, no announcement is actually made to stop reciting Mashiv HaRuach anyway, it would indeed be possible to stop at Shacharis on the first day of Pesach, at least during the Chazoras HaShatz, except for the first reason of the Yerushalmi (Ibid.) about causing confusion in subsequent years. The Aruch HaShulchan (Ibid. Sif 4) adds that the Halachos should be consistent; if we start saying Mashiv HaRuach at Mussaf, we should stop saying it at Mussaf as well, especially since there are more people in Shul at Mussaf time who will take note of the change. The Mishnah Berurah (Ibid. Sif Katan 2) does write, however, that if one did in fact recite Mashiv HaRuach at Maariv or at Shacharis on Shemini Atzeres, his Shemoneh Esrei is still valid.
It is worth noting that according to the Minhag of those who daven Nusach Sefard (and many who daven Nusach Ashkenaz), Morid HaTal is recited in place of Mashiv HaRuach U'Morid HaGeshem. That begins at Mussaf on the first day of Pesach, and for that, an announcement should be made, as the Mishnah Berurah (Ibid. Sif Katan 3) and the Aruch HaShulchan (Ibid. Sif 7) write. All the same explanations would then hold true for both insertions, as the Taz (Ibid. Sif Katan 3) implies. The Kaf HaChaim (Ibid. Ot 14) writes that the special Piyuttim recited by some before the Shemoneh Esrei (or perhaps, we may add, the special tune used by the Chazzan for Kaddish) may constitute a sufficient announcement for the Tzibbur to begin including the new insertion.

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