Honoring Shabbos Yourself

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 41a) asks: If he can betroth through an agent, he can certainly betroth himself!?

Rav Yosef answers: It is a mitzvah for him to do so rather than his agent (as by all mitzvos it is preferable for one to perform them oneself than send an agent). This is like Rav Safra who would personally singe the head of the animal and Rav who would personally salt the fish (before Shabbos in order to honor Shabbos themselves).

The Shaar Hatziyon (250:9) asks: Why did these Amoraim prepare the food for Shabbos themselves? The halachah is that one is not permitted to be interrupt his Torah studying in order to perform a mitzvah that is possible to be performed by others! These Amoraim should have instructed others to prepare the Shabbos food on their behalf!?

He answers that this is only true by a mitzvah that does not have to be performed by the person himself. However, the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos must be performed by the person himself, and therefore, they prepared the food themselves, for it is a greater mitzvah when it is done by the person himself.

The sefer Shulchan Shlomo explains that the Shaar Hatziyon does not mean that honoring Shabbos is a mitzvah similar to tefillin and sukkah, for if so, it cannot be given over to an agent at all (one cannot ask someone else to sit in a sukkah on his behalf). Rather, it is a mitzvah that is incumbent upon him, and therefore he himself must be involved with the mitzvah.

Alternatively, the Shaar Hatziyon answers that because of the severity of Shabbos, they prepared the food themselves even though it could have been accomplished through another.

The sefer Lev Yam asks that if the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos is different than any other mitzvah, and one should perform it himself even if someone else can do it, how does our Gemora bring a proof from these Amoraim that it is a greater mitzvah when he personally performs it more than when he does so through an agent? Perhaps the reason they prepared the food themselves is because of the uniqueness associated with the mitzvah of honoring Shabbos, but it will not prove anything with respect to other mitzvos!?

He cites a Shulchan Aruch Harav that answers this question.

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Women and Slaves Wearing Tefillin

Rabbah bar Rav Shila (Daf Yomi: Gittin 40a) explains that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is dealing with a case where the master himself placed the tefillin on the slave. Only then, is it an indicator that the slave was previously freed.

In Shulchan Aruch (O”C 38:3) it is written that women and slaves are exempt from the mitzvah of wearing tefillin. The Rama adds that if a woman wishes to act stringently upon herself and don tefillin, you should protest the matter. The Magen Avraham explains that this is because it is difficult for women to be cautious regarding the cleanliness of their body.

The Yerushalmi in Brochos relates that Michal the daughter of Shaul HaMelech wore tefillin, and the sages of that time protested. The Gemora in Eruvin (96a), however, states that the sages did not protest.

The Peri Megadim rules that although slaves are permitted to wear tefillin, they should not be encouraged to, and one should object if they do don tefillin. The Mishna Berurah rules that it should not be frowned upon.

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Wearing the Clothing of a Woman

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said (Daf Yomi: Nazir 59a): How do we know that a woman shall not go out wearing weapons of war? It is because it’s written: A man’s attire shall not be on a woman. And the verse, nor may a man wear a woman’s garment teaches us that a man is prohibited from beautifying himself with the adornments of a woman (included in this prohibition would be the removal of his hair).

The Beis Yosef rules that even according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, the Torah only forbade something that is in the open and recognizable to all; however, something that is hidden from the eye, it will only be Rabbinically forbidden. Therefore, he explains, that although the Rambam rules according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, it is not Biblically forbidden to shave the hair by the underarms and the pubic area, for that is something that is not seen.

The Bach wonders where the Beis Yosef saw such a distinction in the Gemora.

The Bach himself explains the Rambam as follows: Only things which are done for the sake of beauty is forbidden. This is why it would be Biblically forbidden for a man to wear make-up, eye shadow or wear colorful garments of a woman; however, shaving his body hairs is only removing things that are repulsive to him. That is why the Rambam rules that it is only Rabbinically forbidden.

The Bach rules that it is permitted for a man to wear the clothing of a woman if his purpose is not to appear like a woman. It is therefore permitted for a man to wear a woman’s clothing in order to protect himself from the rain or to shield him from the sun.

The Shach qualifies this ruling to be referring only to the embellishments of a woman; however, if he wears a woman’s garment in a manner that it would not be recognizable that he is a man, even the Bach would prohibit this.

The Darkei Moshe rules that this prohibition is not applicable on Purim. A man may wear the garment of a woman and a woman may wear the garment of a man. He explains: Whenever there is a custom for a man and a woman to wear the same clothing, there is no prohibition. (This is why the Rashba rules that in a place where it was the custom for the men to remove the hair by their underarms, there is no prohibition.) Since on Purim, it became the custom to switch clothing, there is no prohibition. Additionally, since it is being done for the joy of Purim, it is permitted.

The Yereim writes that a man may not wear a woman’s clothing, even if it just temporary and even if it is being done just for fun. The Mishna Berura rules like this.

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Spit Out all of the Saliva

Rav Anan bar Tachlifa related (Kesuvos 61a): I was once standing in the presence of Shmuel when they brought him a dish of mushrooms, and, had he not given me to eat from it, I would have been exposed to danger.

Rav Ashi said: I was once standing before Rav Kahana when they brought him slices of turnip heads in vinegar, and, had he not given me to eat from it, I would have been exposed to danger.

Rav Papa said: Even a fragrant date may expose one to danger.

This is the general rule: Any food that has a strong aroma or an sharp taste will expose a man to danger if he is not allowed to eat from it.

The Gemora records a related incident: A Roman once said to a woman, “Will you marry me?” “No,” she replied. Thereupon, he brought some pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. She kept on swallowing all the saliva that irritated her, but he did not give her any of the fruit until her body became swollen. Eventually, he said to her, “If I cure you, will you marry me?” “Yes,” she replied. He went and brought more pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. He said to her, “All the saliva that irritates you, spit out at once, and again and again.” She continued doing so until something issued forth from her body in the shape of a green palm-leaf, and she recovered.

Reb Akiva Eiger (Y”D 336) writes in the name of the Maharil: The Mahari Segal told us that it is forbidden to test any of the remedies and cures mentioned in the Talmud, for we do not fully comprehend all the intricate details, and if we attempt to duplicate them and it fails to heal the sick, it will result in the mocking of our Sages. (He cites one exception that is mentioned in Meseches Shabbos.)

The Mishna Berura (617:8) cites our Gemora as a cure for one who smells the aroma of a certain food and he is unable to eat from it. He should be careful to spit out all the saliva accumulated in his mouth and he should not swallow any of it. His ruling indicates that this is not a magical remedy; but rather, it is a natural phenomenon, and it is applicable nowadays.

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Carrying a Siddur on Shabbos - Yevamos 114 - Daf Yomi

The following is a discussion from Meorot HaDaf HaYomi: In places without a kosher eiruv, it is forbidden to carry outside on Shabbos. Today, most shuls are well stocked with siddurim. However, in generations gone by, people had to bring their own siddurim from home. It was then a common question how to daven in shul on Shabbos, if one could not carry his siddur from home. R’ Akiva Eiger was once asked if a child could be given a siddur to carry to shul for his parents. For their own benefit: As we learn in our sugya, children may not be fed forbidden foods. Similarly, they may not be encouraged to transgress other prohibitions. However, the Rashba rules that this applies only to Torah prohibitions. Children may be encouraged to transgress a Rabbinic prohibition. As a proof, the Rashba cites the Gemara (Shabbos 139a), that forbids encouraging a child to sow kilayim (mixed seeds) even outside of Israel, where the prohibition is only Rabbinic. The Gemara explains that he might get accustomed to this habit, and continue even after he grows up. From here it seems that only because of this fear, do we forbid encouraging a young child to sow Rabbinically forbidden kilayim. The general prohibition against encouraging children to sin, seems not to apply. The Rashba adds that the fear of him getting accustomed to sin applies only when we ask him to sin for our sake. When we ask him to do something for his own benefit, this does not apply. (For this reason, we encourage children to eat on Yom Kippur). Our streets are not reshus harabim: Accordingly, R’ Akiva Eiger rules that although many Poskim hold that our streets are generally not reshus harabim by Torah standards (since they are not regularly traveled by 600,000 people), it is still forbidden to ask a child to carry a siddur for an adult to use. We may only ask him to carry a siddur for himself, and then look along inside with him (Teshuvos R’ Akiva Eiger 15, cited in Biur Halacha 343). It will not lead to a Torah prohibition: In his public lectures, the Maharam Shick warned against asking children to carry outside where there is no eiruv. However, in his writings he finds some room to be lenient. He explains, based on the Rashba, that the general prohibition against encouraging children to sin does not apply to Rabbinic prohibitions. Furthermore, the concern that he might get accustomed to sin applies only to Rabbinic sins whose Torah counterparts are common. For example, kilayim is forbidden by Rabbinic law in the Diaspora, and forbidden by Torah law in Eretz Yisroel.

However, the Torah prohibition of carrying was almost inapplicable in the Maharam Shick’s time, since there were no roads commonly traveled by 600,000 people. Therefore, perhaps small children may be asked to carry for their parents (Teshuvos Maharam Shik, 173).

The Shulchan Aruch’s ruling: This question is relevant only according to the Rashba, who rules that there is no general prohibition against encouraging young children to transgress Rabbinic prohibitions. However, the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 343) follows the opinion that even this is forbidden. Therefore, there is certainly no room to permit asking a child to carry for an adult, even in a Rabbinically forbidden area.

Chinuch: Furthermore, this discussion concerns only children who are too young to be educated in mitzva observance. Nevertheless, our sugya forbids feeding them Torah prohibited foods. Here, the Rashba rules that Rabbinically prohibited foods may be fed to them. However, the Rashba certainly agrees that once a child has reached the age to be educated in mitzva observance, his father must teach him to observe all the mitzvos – both Torah and Rabbinic. Therefore, he may not carry a siddur even for himself (see Mishna Berura 343 s.k. 3). R’ Akiva Eiger seems to apply that the obligation of chinuch in mitzva observance begins at age nine. The Maharam Shick suggests that perhaps asking a child to carry a siddur to shul is also considered good chinuch, even if there is no eiruv, since one is educating him to daven.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 22 - GROWING HAIR FOR THREE MONTHS

The Gemora states: If one is mourning for a parent, he should not take a haircut until his friends criticize him on account of his long hair.

The Rama (O”C 390:4) cites that there is a dispute among the poskim as to how long a mourner should wait until he takes a haircut. The custom is to wait three months.

Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe Y”D 3:156) explains: Even though it would seem from the Gemora that the mourner must wait until his friends criticize him on the account of his long hair, this is just an indicator as to how long he should let his hair grow.

If his friends criticize him before three months, he may take a haircut then. (The Mishna Berura and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch agree to this ruling of Reb Moshe. There are those that argue.)

Maharam Schick (371) writes: The three months do not commence at the time of death, rather, it begins from his last haircut. He explains: The three months of growing his hair is not a measurement of mourning, rather it is an indicator to the length of his hair.

He concludes that the poskim do not specifically say this and therefore he cannot rule leniently in this matter unless there are other reasons to combine with this one.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 32 - VOWELS IN THE MEGILLAH

The Gemora provides the reason for Rabbi Meir: One recites the blessing when the Torah is closed in order that people will not think that the blessings are written in the Torah.

Shulchan Aruch (691:9) rules that a Megillah which has been vowelized (the nekudos have been written in) or the blessings have been written on the front page, is not disqualified and it may be used.

The Mishna Berura writes that one should not initially write the blessings in the Megillah. It can be inferred that one may be permitted to insert the vowels and punctuation into the Megillah if he doesn’t know how to read the Megillah otherwise.

The Gr”A rules however, that it is forbidden to place the vowels into the Megillah.

The Maharsham rules that one should not draw pictures on the margins of a Megillah.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein comments that if a person cannot read the Megillah without punctuation and vowels written in, one may insert them in the verses and words that if they are read incorrectly would invalidate the reading.

The Aruch Hashulchan (691:14) rules that it is preferential to read the Megillah without the trop than to write the trop inside the Megillah.

Perhaps one can write the vowels and the trop on a piece of paper and tape it to the Megillah.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 20 - It's Night after Plag Hamincha

The Gemora states that it is not regarded as night until the stars come out.

It is brought in the name of the Imrei Emes (Eretz Tzvi (25/26) that if one davens Maariv on Erev Rosh Chodesh (the day before Rosh Chodesh) from plag hamincha (one hour and fifteen minutes before sunset) and on, he should not recite yaaaleh v'yovo for Rosh Chodesh in Shemoneh Esrei.The reason provided is based on a Magen Avraham (419), who cites from the Shalah that one cannot add additional time to Rosh Chodesh like he can to Shabbos and Yom Tov.

The Mishna Berura (693:4) rules regarding one who davens Maariv after plag hamincha before Purim; he should recite al hanisim in Shemoneh Esrei. The Sha'ar Hatziyon comments that this is based on the ruling that one may daven Maariv for the next day after plag hamincha and there are no poskim who rule that one should not recite yaaleh v'yovo when he is davening Maariv early before Rosh Chodesh. One is allowed to recite havdalah after plag hamincha if he already davened Maariv. Mishna Berura concludes that it is evident from here that from plag hamincha and on; it is regarded as night in respect to davening.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 19 - EXCESSIVE HAMAN BANGING

The Rosh Yeshiva of Gateshead declared immediately prior to the reading of the Megillah: I have instructed the reader of the Megillah not to have in mind those individuals who disturb the reading of the Megillah due to excessive noisemaking during the klapping of Haman.

One can inquire if anyone at all fulfilled their obligation of hearing the Megillah. The Rama (581:1) rules that a chazzan is required to have everyone in mind during his prayers and if he has an enemy and decides to exclude him, even his friends will not have discharged their obligation of tefillah. The Mishna Berura (53:57) rules accordingly. If so, how will the remainder of the congregation fulfill their obligation of hearing the Megillah if the reader intended to exclude several people?

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein makes the following distinction. The Chavos Yair (186) explains the ruling of the Rama: The chazzan is an emissary from the congregation and he was sent to discharge the obligation for everyone. If he changes and resolves to exclude an individual, he is no longer considered their agent. Reb Shlomo Kluger cites the Magen Avraham (53:22) that a chazzan must remove from his heart any jealousy or hatred towards any individual; if he decides to exclude someone, this indicates that he has not removed the hatred from his heart and he is disqualified from being a chazzan.

The Rosh Yeshiva has the jurisdiction to decide who should be included in the congregation and who shouldn’t be. The Chavos Yair’s reason is not applicable here because the reader of the Megillah is not altering anything and he is doing precisely what he has undertaken to do. Rav Shlomo Kluger’s reason is also not applicable because here he does not bear any grudge against anyone at all.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 18 - FLYING CAMELS AND MULES

The Mishna had stated: If a foreigner hears the Megillah read in Ashuris (Hebrew), he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemora rules that this is true even if he doesn’t understand every word. Proof to this can be brought from the fact that nobody understands the precise meaning of the words הרמכים בני האחשתרנים, ha’achashtranim bnei haramachim (a species of swift camels), and nevertheless we fulfill the mitzvah. The Gemora provides the reason for this: The obligation of reading the Megillah is to publicize the miracle and that was accomplished.

It is noteworthy that Rashi in the Megillah understands the word achashtranim to be referring to a type of swift camel.

Ibn Ezra understands ramachim to mean horses and achashtranim to mean mules.

Rabbeinu Chananel might have had a different version in our Gemora since he states that women and unlearned men did not know the definition of these words, implying that learned men did know the translation.

The Reshash writes that ha’achashtranim bnei haramachim is referring to the riders on top of these animals.

The Rivash in his teshuvos (390) states that when he arrived in the city of Srakista, he observed that they would read the Megillah written in a foreign language on behalf of the women because they didn’t understand Hebrew. He wished to abolish this practice for two reasons: The Ramban rules that if one understands Hebrew and another language, he cannot fulfill his obligation by reading the other language and if so, the man reading the Megillah for the women could not discharge their obligation. Secondly, how could they know the precise translation of the words ha’achashtranim bnei haramachim?

The Rivash sent his ruling to the Ran and the Ran replied as follows: Perhaps the meaning of the Gemora is that the common person did not know the meaning of those words but the sages did know. The Ran does conclude that the translation of the people of Srakista is most definitely a mistake and therefore he agreed with the Rivash.

Reb Yaakov Emden comments that these animals are found in Persia and they are eight-legged camels who are extremely swift runners. The Gemora, at times, refers to a gamla parcha – a flying camel, must be without a doubt from the same family.

The Mishna Berura (690:34) rules that whenever one is fulfilling his obligation of reading the Megillah in a foreign language; he must recite the words ha’achashtranim bnei haramachim in Hebrew.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 18 - HOW MANY WORDS ARE IN THE MEGILLAH?

It was taught in a braisa: If the scribe had omitted letters or verses and the reader read them from memory, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemora challenges this ruling from a different braisa: If letters from the Megillah are partially effaced or torn, if they are still legible, the Megillah may be used, but otherwise it may not be used. The Gemora answers: It is only invalid if the entire Megillah is illegible, however if a Megillah is missing less than half of its letters, it is still valid.

Shulchan Aruch (690:3) rules that it is preferable that the Megillah should be written in its entirety, and if the scribe missed words in the middle, even close to half the Megillah, and he reads the rest by heart, it is only valid b’dieved (after the fact).

The Mishna Berura inquires as to what the halacha would be if the Megillah would be missing exactly half the words. In Sha’ar Hatziyon, he writes that the inference from the Rambam would be that it is invalid and from the Rosh and the Ran, it would seem that the Megillah is valid.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein cites that they asked Reb Elyashiv regarding the possibility of this case since they checked and realized that the Megillah does not have an even amount of words, so how could the Megillah be missing precisely half of the required amount of words. Reb Elyashiv answered that the case can be referring to where the Megillah was written in a foreign language which can be valid for people who understand that language.

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Daf Yomi - Sukkah 33 - Letters on the Side of a Book on Shabbos

The Mishna ruled that if there are more berries than leaves on the hadas, it is invalid. One can remove the berries before the festival but one is forbidden to remove the berries on the festival. The reason for this ruling is because removing the berries is deemed to be repairing the hadas, and one is prohibited from repairing a utensil on the festival. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it would be permitted to remove the berries on the festival. The Gemara qualifies this ruling to be referring to a case where he plucked the berries with the intention of eating them. Rabbi Eliezer permits this because he rules in accordance with the opinion of his father Rabbi Shimon who maintains that one is permitted to perform a permitted act although he may unintentionally perform a forbidden act in the process. An example of this is when one drags a chair across the dirt on Shabbos where he may make a furrow in the ground. His intention is to move the chair and not to cerate the furrow, so even though he is aware that he may cerate a furrow, Rabbi Shimon maintains that this is permitted. The Gemara questions this because even Rabbi Shimon agrees that if the prohibition will inevitably occur, it is forbidden to perform the permitted act. The Gemara answers that we are referring to a case where the person has another hadas and when he plucks the berries from this hadas, he does not care whether the hadas is valid. Thus, we do not deem the plucking of the berries to be a repair and he has not committed a prohibited act at all.Tosfos explains that the answer of the Gemara is predicated on the principle of melacha sheaina tzricha legufa, an act that was not performed for a defined purpose. Normally we say that it is rabbinically prohibited to perform an act where one does not desire the forbidden outcome. However, when there is a mitzvah involved, one is permitted to perform the act outright. [Tosfos seems to maintain that the person plucking the berries has intention for the mitzvah.] Teshuvos Imrei Yosher rules based on the words of Tosfos that one would be permitted to study on Shabbos from a sefer that has letters and words on the side of the pages. This would be permitted even though when he turns the pages he is in effect forming or erasing words. The reason for this ruling is because when one is preoccupied with a mitzvah, the Chachamim were not concerned with the prohibited act that will result if the result is unintended and undesired. The Mishna Berura rules that one can even read from a book with letters on the side even if he is not engaged in Torah study. The reason for this ruling is because one is not deemed to be writing or erasing as the pages of the book are meant to be turned. This would be analogous to opening and closing a door which would not be deemed building or destruction because a door is meant to be opened and closed.

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