Daf Yomi - Yevamos 29 - Highlights

The Mishna states: Three were three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi. If two of them (Reuven and Shimon) are married to two sisters, or to a woman and her daughter, or to a woman and her daughter's daughter, or to a woman and her son's daughter (and both Reuven and Shimon die childless), these two women require chalitzah, but they may not be taken in yibum (since each one of these women is an ervah from the other zekukah). Rabbi Shimon exempts even from chalitzah.

If one of the sisters was an ervah to one of the brothers, he would be prohibited from marrying her, but permitted to her sister.

If her prohibition is because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, they would require chalitzah but they may not be taken for yibum. (28b)

The Mishna had stated: If one of the sisters was an ervah to one of the brothers, he would be prohibited from marrying her, but permitted to her sister.

The Gemora asks: Why is this halacha in the Mishna repeated here; precisely the same halacha was taught in a previous Mishna (26a)?

The Gemora answers that it is necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. He maintains that whenever two sisters fall for yibum to one yavam, they are excluded from yibum and chalitzah. One might possibly think that even if one of the sisters was an ervah to the yavam, the other sister should not be taken for yibum because we should be concerned that people will mistakenly think that you can perform a yibum with one of the sisters when there is no ervah; the Mishna teaches us that we do not institute such a decree and the brother may perform a yibum on the sister who is not an ervah. (28b)

The Mishna had stated: If her prohibition is because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, they would require chalitzah but they may not be taken for yibum.

The Gemora asks: If the latter portion of the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, why in this case would Rabbi Shimon require a chalitzah; Rabbi Shimon maintains that whenever two sisters fall for yibum to one brother, they are exempt from yibum and chalitzah, and here both women are Biblically falling for yibum to the brother (one of them is only Rabbinically forbidden); there should be no chalitzah requirement?

The Gemora answers: They were concerned that if these women would be released without a chalitzah, we would release a yevamah who is Rabbinically forbidden to the yavam even without chalitzah (in a regular case, when they aren’t sisters).

The Gemora asks: This is understandable regarding the Rabbinically forbidden woman herself, but why do we require a chalitzah to her sister?

The Gemora answers: It was decreed because of the Rabbinically forbidden woman. If we would release the sister without a chalitzah, this would result in people releasing the Rabbinically forbidden woman without chalitzah.

The Gemora asks: Why don’t we issue the same decree when one of the sisters is Biblically forbidden; there the halacha is that the sister can be taken for yibum or chalitzah, but the ervah is released outright, without even a chalitzah?

The Gemora answers: Everyone is learned regarding a Biblical ervah; they all know that she is exempt from yibum and chalitzah. This reason becomes publicized. Not everyone knows the laws regarding a Rabbinically forbidden woman and therefore chalitzah was required. (28b – 29a)

The Mishna states: There were three brothers, two of whom were married two sisters, and one is unmarried. If one of the husbands of the sisters died, and the bachelor performed a ma'amar, and afterwards his second brother died. Beis Shamai said: His wife stays with him, and the other is released because she is his wife's sister. (Beis Shamai maintains that ma’amar is Biblically valid.) Beis Hillel said: He must release his ma’amar-wife with a get (bill of divorce) and with chalitzah, and his brother's wife with chalitzah. This is what they said, “Woe unto him because of his wife and woe unto him because of his brother's wife.” (29a)

Rabbi Elozar said: Do not say that a ma’amar according to Beis Shamai accomplishes a complete acquisition of the yevamah, and if he would want to release her, it would be sufficient for him to give her a get (and not chalitzah); rather, the ma’amar accomplishes that her relatives are now Biblically forbidden to be taken for yibum.

Rabbi Avin attempts to bring support from the Mishna (26a) to Rabbi Elozar’s interpretation. The Mishna had stated: (There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. The reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) If the brothers married them, they are required to divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer states: There is actually an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding this matter. Beis Shamai maintains that the brother may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel disagrees.

It can be implied from Beis Shamai’s words that the brothers should not initially perform yibum with the sisters. Now, if a ma’amar according to Beis Shamai would accomplish a complete acquisition of the yevamah, and if he would want to release her, it would be sufficient for him to give her a get (and not chalitzah), let each brother perform a ma’amar with one sister (it is not forbidden to perform a ma’amar with a zekukah’s sister) acquiring her as a wife (which would render the sister as his wife’s sister, dissolving any zikah attachment with her; this would allow him to take his ma’amar wife for yibum), and then he will be permitted to take her for yibum. Since Beis Shamai does not allow this option, it is evident that ma’amar does not accomplish a complete acquisition of the yevamah.

The Gemora deflects this proof: Even if the ma’amar does not accomplish a complete acquisition; it at least accomplishes that the relatives of the ma’amar-wife are forbidden to him. Accordingly, the same question can be asked. Why can’t each brother perform a ma’amar with one sister, which would reject the other sister from him, and then he should be permitted to take the woman he performed ma’amar with for yibum.

It is apparent that only a permitted ma’amar (one where it would be permitted to perform a yibum) accomplishes that the relatives of the ma’amar-wife are forbidden to him, so too if you hold that a ma’amar accomplishes a complete acquisition, that is only when the ma’amar is a permitted one. (29a – 29b)

Rav Ashi taught the above discussion differently: Rabbi Elozar said: Do not say that a ma’amar according to Beis Shamai accomplishes a complete rejection of the yevamah’s relatives, and her sister would not even require a chalitzah; rather, the ma’amar accomplishes that she will not become forbidden on account of being a zekukah’s sister, and that her sister will be Biblically forbidden to be taken for yibum, but she will require a chalitzah.

Rabbi Avin attempts to bring support from the Mishna (26a) to Rabbi Elozar’s interpretation. The Mishna had stated: (There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. The reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) If the brothers married them, they are required to divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer states: There is actually an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding this matter. Beis Shamai maintains that the brother may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel disagrees.

It can be implied from Beis Shamai’s words that the brothers should not initially perform yibum with the sisters. Now, if a ma’amar according to Beis Shamai would accomplish a complete a complete rejection of the yevamah’s relatives, and her sister would not even require a chalitzah, let each brother perform a ma’amar with one sister (it is not forbidden to perform a ma’amar with a zekukah’s sister) acquiring her as a wife, which would thereby reject the second sister from himself and then he will be permitted to take his ma’amar-wife for yibum. Since Beis Shamai does not allow this option, it is evident that ma’amar does not accomplish a complete rejection of the ma’amar-wife’s sister.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Beis Shamai state in our Mishna that in the case where there were three brothers, two of whom were married two sisters, and one is unmarried. If one of the husbands of the sisters died, and the bachelor performed a ma'amar, and afterwards his second brother died. Beis Shamai said: His wife stays with him, and the other is released because she is his wife's sister. We see that the ma’amar-wife’s sister is released completely and does not require chalitzah?

This version of Rabbi Elozar is thus refuted.

The Gemora explains the reason of the other Mishna why each one of the brothers cannot perform a ma’amar with one of the sisters and then take her for yibum. Any yevamah who is not eligible for a complete yibum will not be eligible for a partial yibum, i.e. ma’amar either. (In that Mishna, the two sisters were widowed together and they each became forbidden on account of being a zekukah’s sister. Since they cannot be taken for yibum, ma’amar will not be fully effected either. In our Mishna, at the time that the yavam performed a ma’amar, there was only one widow and she could have been taken for yibum; here, the ma’amar is effective and later when the other sister falls for yibum, she is completely rejected on account of being his ma’amar-wife’s sister and is released without chalitzah or yibum.) (29b)

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CONVERSIONS BY REB JAY - Yevamos 28 (actually 24) - Daf Yomi

A conversion must be done lishma, i.e, with the desire of accepting the Torah and joining Klal Yisroel. Therefore, one cannot convert for marriage or any other external reason.

Because of this, during certain periods in Jewish history, converts were not accepted. For example, during the reign of Dovid Hamelech, converts were not accepted due to a concern that their acceptance was based on fear (due to the strength of Dovid’s army). Similarly, during the days of Shlomo Hamelech there were no conversions due to a concern that the conversions were based on a desire for prestige (as Klal Yisroel at that time was considered to be the jewel of the world).

The Rambam notes that although technically converts were not accepted at these times, there were Beis Din Hedyotos (Common Courts) that did accept converts. How was the status of these converts resolved?

The Rambam writes that their status was pending; if they saw after a period of time that these converts were still keeping the mitzvos, it could be assumed that their conversion was legitimate, and they were considered to be Jews retroactive to their conversion (meaning, for example, if it was a woman who had a child during the waiting period, the child was considered to be Jewish).

Perhaps we can use this principle to understand a difficulty in MegilasRus. Boaz married Rus as a redeemer of the property of Noami (and Rus was an extension of this due to her being the wife of the cousin of Boaz--Machlon). However, if Rus was a converts, then we know that a converts is regarded like a newborn baby, and any prior status - which in the case of Rus would include her marriage to Machlon - should be negated?

Using the principle of the Rambam we can say that Rus initially converted prior to marrying Machlon; however, there were doubts regarding her conversion (as it appeared that it was done for marriage). Therefore, her conversion had a probation period, and once she decided to follow Noami, it was retroactively revealed that her initial conversion (at the time of her marriage) was legitimate, and she fell under the category of things that could be redeemed by a redeemer (Boaz).

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 28 - Highlights

Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina asks on Rabbi Yochanan (who maintains that any yevamah that we cannot apply the verse “her yavam shall cohabit with her” at the time that she fell for yibum is regarded as a wife of a brother who has children and will be forbidden to the yavam forever) from a Mishna. The Mishna (26a) states: There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. (The reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) Why don’t we say that one of the brothers should perform a chalitzah with the second widow in order that the one widowed first will be regarded, towards the other brother, as a yevamah who was originally permitted (when she fell to yibum alone), then forbidden (when her sister fell for yibum, resulting in a prohibition of a zekukah’s sister), and then permitted again (when the zikah of her sister dissolved due to the chalitzah performed with her sister)?

Rabbi Yochanan replied: I do not know who taught the Mishna regarding the two sisters; it is not authoritative.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t Rabbi Yochanan respond to him that the Mishna is referring to a case where the brother performed a chalitzah with the first widow; the second widow may not be taken in yibum because she was always forbidden?

The Gemora objects to this interpretation: The Mishna had stated that they require chalitzah; it is evident that they both require chalitzah and there is no option for avoiding this.

The Gemora asks: Rabbi Yochanan could have responded that the only reason that the Mishna ruled that both sisters require chalitzah is because the Rabbis were concerned that if they would rule that chalitzah can be performed with the second widow and then the other brother can perform a yibum with the first widow, perhaps they will reverse the order and perform chalitzah on the first widow and take the second widow for yibum (which is forbidden because she was always prohibited).

The Gemora rejects this proposal: The Mishna had stated that they both cannot be taken in yibum; this would indicate that there is no possibility of yibum at all even if chalitzah is performed with the second widow first.

The Gemora asks: Rabbi Yochanan could have answered that the Mishna is referring to a case where both widows fell at precisely the same moment, and we are following the viewpoint of Rabbi Yosi Hagelili who maintains that two things can happen at the exact same time?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna would not issue an anonymous ruling according to Rabbi Yosi Hagelili (since his viewpoint is a minority opinion and rejected by most of the other Sages).

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t Rabbi Yochanan respond to him that the Mishna is referring to a case where we are uncertain which of the widows fell for yibum first, and that would explain why we cannot first perform a chalitzah with the second widow and the other brother would then perform a yibum with the widow that fell for yibum first?

The Gemora answers: This would raise a difficulty with a different portion of the Mishna. The Mishna had stated: If the brothers married them, they are required to divorce them. If we are uncertain which widow fell for yibum first, it is understandable why the first brother who performed a yibum would be required to divorce the sister, but let the second brother claim that he married the first widow and thereby he would be permitted to remain married to this sister. The Gemora concludes: This explains why Rabbi Yochanan told Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina that he does not know who taught the Mishna regarding the two sisters; it is not authoritative. (27b – 28a)

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Eliezer states: There is actually an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding this matter. Beis Shamai maintains that the brothers may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel disagrees.

The Gemora cites a braisa which lists various opinions regarding this matter: Rabbi Eliezer said: Beis Shamai maintains that the brothers may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel holds that they are required to divorce them. Rabbi Shimon says: The brothers may remain married to them. Abba Shaul said: Actually, Beis Hillel issued the lenient opinion in this matter for Beis Shamai maintains that the brother are required to divorce them and Beis Hillel holds that they may remain married to the sisters.

The Gemora explains Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: He maintains that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel did not dispute this matter and both schools were of the opinion that the brothers may remain married to the sisters. (28a)

The Mishna had stated: If one of the sisters was prohibited because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, her sister would require chalitzah but she is not taken for yibum.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t we learn an identical ruling to this in a Mishna above (20a)? The Mishna there said: They stated a general rule concerning the yevamah: Whoever is prohibited to the yavam because of an ervah is exempt from chalitzah and yibum. If her prohibition is because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, she would require chalitzah but she is not taken for yibum.

The Gemora answers: The first Mishna taught us that a yevamah who is Rabbinically forbidden to the yavam may not be taken for yibum; our Mishna teaches us that a sister of a Rabbinically prohibited yevamah may not be taken for yibum since she is considered a zekukah’s sister.

We might have thought that in this case, where the yevamah is Rabbinically forbidden to the yavam, the Rabbis would make an exception and permit the sister of the zekukah; the Mishna teaches us that she is still forbidden. (28a – 28b)

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav and it was taught in the braisa of Rabbi Chiya: The following teaching can apply to the fifteen cases of the Mishna: The one who is forbidden to one brother will be permitted to the other brother, and her sister, who is also a yevamah can do chalitzah or be taken in yibum.

The case is as follows: There were four brothers; two of them, Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. If Reuven and Shimon died, the remaining two brothers (Levi and Yehudah) cannot perform a yibum with any of them because each one of these women is attached to every potential yavam with a zikah, an attachment on the account of yibum. The Rabbis decreed that one cannot marry the sister of a zekukah (the woman who is attached to the yavam) because a zekukah is similar to a wife and one is not permitted to marry his wife’s sister.

If Rochel was an ervah to Levi (his mother-in-law) and Leah was an ervah to Yehudah; Levi can perform yibum with Leah and Yehudah can perform yibum with Rochel. In this case, the sisters are not forbidden because there is only a zikah from one man to one woman (since an ervah removes the zikah).

According to Rav Yehuda, the Tanna of our Mishna (26a) can only be referring to the last nine arayos listed in the first Mishna, but not to the first six (such as his daughter). The reason is because those six cases cannot occur unless the daughter was born through the violation of her mother (If Levi and Yehudah’s daughters are sisters, they obviously have the same mother; Levi and Yehudah could not possibly marry the same woman); and the Mishna is discussing cases of marriage, not cases of violation.

Abaye states that the Mishna can be referring to the first six cases because the Mishna has no compunctions discussing cases of violation. It is not discussing the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world because that would involve a disagreement (Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis) and the Mishna does not involve itself with disputed cases.

Rav Safra states that the Mishna can be discussing the case of the wife of his brother who was not in his world, but only in the following scenario: There were six brothers all together. Originally, there were four, and two of them, Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless and then a fifth brother, Yissochar was born. (Rochel is forbidden to Yissochar on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world.) Levi, the third brother, performed a yibum with Rochel and subsequently, Shimon died childless. (Yissochar can perform a yibum with Leah because he was alive together with Shimon.) A sixth brother, Zevulun was now born. (Rochel is not forbidden to Zevulun on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world because when he was born she was married to Levi. Leah is forbidden to Zevulun on the account of being the wife of his brother who was not in his world.) Yehudah performed a yibum with Leah. Levi and Yehudah then died childless. The Rabbis maintain that each one is forbidden to the surviving brothers on the account of being the wife of their brother who was not in this world (because of the initial marriage). Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that the remaining brothers can perform yibum or chalitzah (he is concerned only with the last marriage). (28b)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 27 - Highlights

Shmuel said: If there were three brothers, two of them were married to two sisters and they each had another wife as well. The two brothers died childless, leaving their wives available for yibum to the third brother. If he performs chalitzah with the sisters, the co-wives are not released and are still in a zikah situation (the chalitzah to the sisters is a deficient chalitzah because they cannot be taken for yibum and a deficient chalitzah does not exempt the co-wives). If he performed chalitzah with the co-wives, the sisters are released from their attachment to the yavam. (The Gemora will explain why the chalitzos are not deemed to be deficient in this case as well.)

Shmuel rules regarding another case: There were two brothers, one of them had two wives and died childless. The yavam gave a get (bill of divorce) to one of the women. He is now prohibited from performing yibum with any of these women, but he is required to perform a chalitzah. (Although giving a get to a yevamah does not accomplish anything (for the Torah prescribes only a yibum or a chalitzah with a yevamah), the Rabbis decreed that it should be treated similar to a chalitzah.) If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the get, the co-wife is not released; however if he performed chalitzah with the co-wife, the woman who received the get is released.

Shmuel issued a third ruling: If a yavam performs a ma’amar with one of the widows and then he decides to release her, she needs a get and a chalitzah. If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the ma’amar, the co-wife is not released. If he performs a chalitzah with the co-wife, the woman who received the ma’amar is released. (27a)

The Gemora asks on Shmuel’s first ruling: (If there were three brothers, two of them were married to two sisters and they each had another wife as well. The two brothers died childless, leaving their wives available for yibum to the third brother. If he performs chalitzah with the sisters, the co-wives are not released and are still in a zikah situation. If he performed chalitzah with the co-wives, the sisters are released from their attachment to the yavam.) Why are the co-wives not released when he performed chalitzah with the sisters? It is because each sister is regarded as a wife’s sister because of the zikah-attachment. Since they cannot be taken for yibum, their chalitzah is considered deficient and does not exempt their co-wives. Accordingly, the same logic should apply in the case when he performed a chalitzah with the co-wives. It is also forbidden to perform a yibum with the co-wives of a wife’s sister through zikah. Why does Shmuel rule that chalitzah performed with the co-wives releases the sisters; their chalitzah is deficient as well?

The Gemora answers: Shmuel is following the opinion of the one that says that there is no zikah-attachment. (The sisters would not be similar to a wife’s sister and the chalitzah with the co-wives is not deficient.)

The Gemora asks: If so, why does a chalitzah to the sisters not release the co-wives, the chalitzah should be legitimate if there is no zikah-attachment? The Gemora clarifies its question: (the example given is where he initially performs a chalitzah with Leah and then with the other sister Rochel) It is understandable that the co-wife of Rochel, who received chalitzah second, should not be released because Rochel’s chalitzah was deficient; she is a sister of a chalutzah, namely Leah, and she could not have been taken for yibum. However, the Gemora does not understand why the co-wife of Leah should not be released. If Shmuel is following the opinion who holds that there is no zikah-attachment, Leah could have been taken for yibum; her chalitzah is completely legitimate and should release her co-wife?

The Gemora concedes that Shmuel only meant to rule regarding the co-wife of the second sister, Rochel; she has not been released from the yavam. The co-wife of the first sister, Leah, to have chalitzah is released, and she is permitted to marry another man.

The Gemora asks: If when Shmuel mentioned the “co-wives,” he is referring specifically to Rochel’s co-wife, let us examine Shmuel’s next statement. Shmuel said: If he performed chalitzah with the co-wives, the sisters are released from their attachment to the yavam. Why would Rochel, the second sister, be released on account of the chalitzah performed with her co-wife; the chalitzah performed with the co-wife is deficient because she is the co-wife of his chalutzah’s forbidden relative (Leah’s sister’s co-wife)?

The Gemora explains Shmuel’s statements differently: Shmuel’s first statement is as follows: If the yavam began with one of the sisters (he performed chalitzah with Leah), he may not complete the sequence by performing chalitzah with one of the co-wives since she is forbidden to be taken for yibum on account of being the co-wife of his chalutzah’s forbidden relative. Shmuel’s second statement is as follows: If the yavam began with one of the co-wives (he performed chalitzah with Leah’s co-wife), he may complete the sequence by performing chalitzah with the other sister, Rochel. Performing a chalitzah with Rochel will release Rochel’s co-wife as well. This is because we learned in a Mishna that one is permitted to perform a yibum with the relative of his chalutzah’s co-wife. (27a)

Rav Ashi presents a different explanation of Shmuel’s statements: (Shmuel’s statements are to be understood literally and his ruling is based on his opinion that there is a zikah-attachment. Shmuel’s first statement is that if he performs chalitzah with the sisters, the co-wives are not released and are still in a zikah situation. This is because the chalitzah to the sisters are deficient because they cannot be taken for yibum and a deficient chalitzah does not exempt the co-wives. Shmuel’s second statement is that if he performed chalitzah with the co-wives, the sisters are released from their attachment to the yavam.) The Gemora above questioned this; it is forbidden to perform a yibum with the co-wives of a wife’s sister through zikah. Why does Shmuel rule that chalitzah performed with the co-wives releases the sisters; their chalitzah is deficient as well? Rav Ashi answers that although their chalitzah is deficient, it is a superior chalitzah than that of one performed with the zekukah’s sister. The prohibition pertaining to the zekukah’s sister is more severe than the prohibition regarding the co-wife of the zekukah’s sister. Hence, Shmuel rules that the inferior chalitzah (one performed with the zekukah’s sister does not release the co-wives, whereas a superior chalitzah (although it is also deficient) performed with the co-wife of the zekukah’s sister will in fact release the sister from a chalitzah.

The Gemora attempts to offer support for Rav Ashi from a braisa, but it is ultimately rejected. (27a)

The Gemora inquires: There were two brothers and one died childless, leaving two widows for yibum. The yavam performed ma’amar with one of them and gave a get to the other one. (He now cannot perform a yibum with either.) Which woman should he perform chalitzah with (and will thus release her co-wife)? Should he perform chalitzah with the woman who received the get because he already initiated a chalitzah (rejection through the get) to her or should he perform the chalitzah with the one who received the ma’amar because she is closer to cohabitating with the yavam than the co-wife?

Rav Ashi said: Let us learn from the following braisa: Rabban Gamliel admits that a get (to one widow) has validity after a ma’amar (to the co-wife), and the yavam will be prohibited from performing a yibum with them or marrying the get-recipient’s relatives. He also admits that a ma’amar (to one widow) has validity after a get (to the co-wife), and the yavam will be prohibited from marrying the ma’amar-recipient’s relatives. (Rabban Gamliel and the Chachamim disagree regarding a ma’amar after a ma’amar and a get after a get.) The Gemora states: If a get is superior, the ma’amar should not have any validity after the get; if ma’amar is superior, the ma’amar should not have any validity after the get? It is evident that they are regarded as equal and neither would take precedence over the other. (27a – 27b)

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: There were two brothers who were married to two sisters. Reuven died first and then Shimon died. Both of their widows fall for yibum to a third brother, Levi. If Levi performs a chalitzah with Reuven’s widow, she is released. If he then performs a chalitzah with Shimon’s widow, she is released. (The same halacha would be true if he reversed the order.) If the first widow dies (dissolving the zikah from her), the yavam may perform a yibum with the second widow. (Even though, the second widow was initially forbidden to Levi on account that she was his zekukah’s sister, Rav maintains that she can subsequently become permitted, provided that the zikah has dissolved.) It is not necessary to state that if the second widow would die that he may perform a yibum with the first widow because she is a yevamah who was originally permitted (when she fell to yibum alone), then forbidden (when her sister fell for yibum, resulting in a prohibition of a zekukah’s sister), and then permitted again (when the zikah of her sister dissolved due to her death).

Rabbi Yochanan disagrees: If the second widow would die, he may perform a yibum with the first widow; however if the first widow dies, the yavam may not perform a yibum with the second widow. Why not? Any yevamah that we cannot apply the verse “her yavam shall cohabit with her” at the time that she fell for yibum is regarded as a wife of a brother who has children and will be forbidden to the yavam forever.

The Gemora states that Rav actually holds of this principle as well, but only regarding a Biblical ervah such as a wife’s sister. If the yevamah is the yavam’s wife sister and subsequently, his wife dies (resulting in the fact that the yevamah does not have the prohibition of a wife’s sister any longer), he may not perform a yibum with her because she was forbidden to him at the time that she fell for yibum and remains forbidden forever. However, in our case, where the prohibition is merely Rabbinic in nature (the zekukah’s sister), Rav maintains that she can become permitted to him at a later time. (27b)

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Second Wife - Yevamos 26 - Daf Yomi

The Mishna states: And all of them (an agent who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, one who testifies about a wife that her husband had died and the sage who did not release the wife from her vow causing the husband to divorce her); if they had wives at that time and subsequently they died, they are permitted to marry those women (since they were married at the time, people will not suspect that they acted in order to marry them).

Why should them having a wife prevent people from suspecting that they acted in that way in order to marry those women; wasn't taking a second wife permitted in the times of the Mishna? (As a member of my Daf Yomi shiur said: The Mishnayos in Yevamos would be much easier if they were only permitted one wife.)

The Maharshal in Yam shel Shlomo answers: Since he is presently married, we apply the chazaka that a man does not place his eyes on another man's wife because he has "bread in his basket."

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MITZVAH OF YIBUM - WHO HAS THE OBLIGATION? - Yevamos 26 - Daf Yomi

The Rambam in his Sefer HaMitzvos (216) writes that there is a commandment for the yavam to perform a yibum with his brother’s wife when his brother died childless.

The Minchas Chinuch (1:15) states that it is implicit from the Rambam that he maintains that the mitzvah of yibum is an obligation for the man (the yavam) and not for the woman (the yevamah).

The Chinuch (Mitzvah 598 and 599) states explicitly that the mitzvah of yibum is only applicable to men and not to women.

The Minchas Chinuch cites a Pnei Yehoshua in Kesuvos (40a) that the mitzvah of yibum also applies to the yevamah.

Why should there be an obligation for the yevamah; the Torah explicitly states that the brother should marry his brother’s wife. It is not written anywhere that she shall be taken for yibum?

Reb Ezriel Cziment, in his sefer Mitzvos Hamelech answers: Besides the mitzvah of performing a yibum, there is also an obligation to establish a name for the deceased. It is this mitzvah that the yevamah plays an integral role in and she is thus included in the mitzvah obligation.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 26 - Highlights

The Mishna states: And all of them (an agent who brings a bill of divorce from overseas, one who testifies about a wife that her husband had died and the sage who did not release the wife from her vow causing the husband to divorce her); if they had wives at that time and subsequently they died, they are permitted to marry those women (since they were married at the time, people will not suspect that they acted in order to marry them).

And all of them (these women); if they married others and were divorced or became widows, they are permitted to be married to those men.

And all of them are permitted to their sons, or to their brothers. (26a)

The Mishna had stated: If they had wives at that time and subsequently they died, they are permitted to marry those women (since they were married at the time, people will not suspect that they acted in order to marry them).

The Gemora asks: The Mishna implies that they are permitted to marry those women if their wives died, but not if they were divorced. But we learnt in a braisa: Even if they divorced they are permitted to marry them?

The Gemora answers: It is no contradiction. Our Mishna is discussing a case where there was previous friction (in his marriage, and the divorce was not on account of the rumored incident), and the braisa is referring to a case where there was no previous friction (and the divorce could be because of the alleged incident; he is then prohibited from marrying her).

Alternatively, we can answer that in both cases, there was no previous friction, but the braisa is discussing a case where he started the fight, thus we suspect that he is looking for an excuse to divorce, and therefore he may not marry the woman, whereas the Mishna is discussing a case where she started the fight, and there is therefore no reason to assume that he planned the divorce in order to marry the woman. (26a)

The Mishna had stated: And all of them are permitted to their sons, or to their brothers.

The Gemora asks: How is this case different from that which was learnt in a braisa: One who is suspected of adultery with a woman is forbidden to marry her mother, daughter, and sister? (The reason for this prohibition is because this marriage might bring him closer to that woman.)

The Gemora answers: Women are accustomed to visit other women (and we are therefore concerned that he will continue his relationship with the woman when she comes to visit his wife), but men are not accustomed to visit other men (and therefore we are not concerned that she will come into contact with that man again).

Alternatively, women, who live with other women’s husbands do not cause the husband to become prohibited to his wife, and therefore the wives are not so concerned about the continued relationship, whereas men, who live with other men’s wives do cause the wives to become prohibited to their husbands, the husbands are concerned about other men being involved with their wives and therefore we permit the woman to marry his relative since the relative will not allow his wife to continue the relationship. (26a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, KEITZAD

The Mishna states: There were four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and those who were married to the sisters died; these sisters require chalitzah, but they cannot be taken for yibum. (The only reason to prohibit yibum in this case would be because each yevamah is the sister of his zekukah, the bond that exists between the yavam and the yevamah.) If the brothers married them, they are required to divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer states: There is actually an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel regarding this matter. Beis Shamai maintains that the brother may remain married to the sisters and Beis Hillel disagrees.

If one of the sisters was an ervah to one of the brothers, he would be prohibited from marrying her, but permitted to her sister; the other brother would be prohibited to marry both of them. (The case is as follows: Two brothers (Reuven and Shimon) married two sisters Rochel and Leah), and the two husbands died childless. The sisters fall for yibum to Levi and Yehudah, and one of the sisters is prohibited to Levi because she is an ervah (a former daughter-in-law). The ervah’s sister requires chalitzah or is married by yibum. Normally, if two sisters fall before the yavam for yibum, both are prohibited from marrying him as his yevamah, since each is the sister of a zekukah, and she has the status of his wife's sister. In this case, however, in which one of the women is prohibited to the yavam by a prohibition of ervah, and therefore there is no zikah between her and the yavam, he is permitted to marry her sister by yibum, because she is not the sister of a zekukah. Both of them are forbidden to Yehudah.)

If one of the sisters was prohibited because of mitzvah or because of sanctity, her sister would require chalitzah but she is not taken for yibum.

If one of the sisters (Rochel) was an ervah to one of the brothers (Levi) and the other sister (Leah) was an ervah to the other brother (Yehudah), the law is as follows: The one (Rochel) who is forbidden to this one (Levi) is permitted to the other brother (Yehudah), and the one (Leah) who is forbidden to this one (Yehudah) is permitted to the other brother (Levi). This case is where they say: Her sister who is her fellow yevamah would require chalitzah or yibum. (26a)

The Gemora states: Our Mishna obviously indicates that zikah (an attachment on the account of yibum, which would create halachos similar to marriage) exists between the yevamah and the yavam, for if you will say that no zikah exists, each yevamah is coming from two different houses, and one brother could marry the one while the other could marry the other?

The Gemora answers: Actually the Mishna could maintain that no zikah exists, but nevertheless, it would be forbidden to perform yibum with each of the widows. This is because a yibum with one can annul the precept of yibum with the other; if one of the brothers performs yibum with one sister and the other brother dies, there would be no possibility of yibum or chalitzah with her (since she is the yavam’s wife’s sister) and this would have negated the mitzvah of yibum with her.

The Gemora asks: If so, the Mishna should have stated a case where there were only three brothers (The case is as follows: Two brothers (Reuven and Shimon) married two sisters Rochel and Leah), and the two husbands died childless. The sisters fall for yibum to a third brother Levi. If Levi performs a yibum with one of them, he would negate the mitzvah of yibum with the other because she would be his wife’s sister.)?

The Gemora answers: There is a novelty in the case of four brothers that we would not have learned if the Mishna had only stated the case of three brothers. In the case of three brothers, a yibum to one of the sisters automatically negates a mitzvah of yibum with the other, whereas in the case of four brothers, it is merely a possibility that a yibum with one can negate the mitzvah of yibum with the other sister, namely if the other brother dies. The Mishna is teaching us that even when it is not a certainty, we still are concerned.

The Gemora asks: If so, let the Mishna teach a case regarding five brothers?

The Gemora answers: We are not concerned that two of the brothers will die. (26a – 26b)

Rabbah bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Three sisters who are sisters-in-law (they were married to three brothers) who fall for yibum before two brothers, one brother performs chalitzah to one of them, the other brother performs chalitzah to a different one of them, and the middle one (the other sister) requires chalitzah from both of them.

Rabbah said to Rabbah bar Rav Huna: By the fact that you ruled that the middle one (the other sister) requires chalitzah from both of them, it is evident that you hold that there is a zikah-attachment between the widows and the brothers, and you must hold that the chalitzah performed with the middle sister is a deficient chalitzah (because she cannot be taken for yibum since she is the sister of his chalutzah), and a deficient chalitzah requires that she goes for chalitzah to all of the brothers.

If so, the first two sisters also should be required to have chalitzah with each of the brothers (since they could not be taken for yibum on account of being a sister of his zekukah)?

The Gemora answers: If they fell for yibum simultaneously, you would be correct. The case is speaking about that one brother died first. One of the brothers performed a chalitzah with her. Then, another brother died, and the other brother performed a chalitzah with her. (Each of those chalitzos was a proper full chalitzah because they could have taken her in yibum and therefore only one chalitzah from one of the brothers is required.) When the third brother died, his wife could not be taken in yibum; she will need a chalitzah from both brothers. (26b)

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Ri from Orleans - Daf Yomi - Yevamos 25

Rabbi Gil Student has an interesting discussion regarding one of the baalei haTosfos, the Ri from Orleans.

An occasional name we find in the Tosafos commentary on the Talmud is R. Yosef (Ri) from Orleans. He was a twelfth century student of R. Ya'akov (Rabbenu Tam) and is mentioned in Tosafos to the tractates Shabbos, Yevamos, Bava Basra, Zevahim and Hullin. However, on two occasions we find something quite unusual happening. In Tosafos to Yevamos 25b (top), an explanation is given in the name of the Ri from Orleans. In Tosafos to Makkos 6a (sv. nirva), the same answer is attributed to R. Yosef Bekhor Shor. Similarly, the same explanation is given in Tosafos to Hullin 112b (sv. ve-dagim) by Ri from Orleans and in Semak (no. 205) by R. Yosef Bekhor Shor.

Because of this, Victor Aptowitzer (Mavo Le-Ra'avyah, ch. 8 sv. R. Yosi br' Yitzhak pp. 351-352 n. 2) cites scholars who debate whether R. Yosef Bekhor Shor was the same person as R. Yosef (Ri) from Orleans. Aptowitzer himself argued that they were different people, but remained uncertain on this point. In support of distinguishing between the two, the Pane'ah Raza is cited who quoted contradictory comments from both Ri of Orleans and R. Yosef Bekhor Shor, strongly implying that they are two different people.

Ephraim Urbach, who has generally become the final authority on these matters, concludes that they were the same person (Ba'alei Ha-Tosafos, vol. 1 p. 134). Among his proofs was an incident that occurred regarding a man who semi-married (mekadesh) a nursing woman, attributed to Ri from Orleans in Tosafos to Yevamos 36b (sv. ve-lo) and R. Yosef Bekhor Shor in Tosafos Shantz to Sotah 24a (and elsewhere).

Yehoshafat Nevo, in his introduction to the Mossad Ha-Rav Kook edition of the Bekhor Shor's commentary on the Torah, states that the Pane'ah Raza is frequently imprecise in his attribution of sources. Therefore, he suggests, the Pane'ah Raza's differentiating between Ri from Orleans and R. Yosef Bekhor is unreliable.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 25 - Highlights

The Mishna had stated: If one was accused of cohabitating with a married woman, and Beis Din forced her husband to divorce her; if he (accused adulterer) subsequently marries her, he is required to divorce her (because she is Biblically forbidden to him).

Rav said: The Mishna is referring to a case where there were two witnesses that the adulterer committed the alleged act (and that is when he would be compelled to divorce her).

Rav Sheishes said: It would seem that Rav said this when he was drifting off to sleep (for otherwise, he would never have said it). Because it was taught in a braisa: If one was accused of cohabitating with a married woman, and Beis Din forced her husband to divorce her; she subsequently married another man and was later divorced from him; if the accused adulterer marries her, we do not force him to divorce her. The Gemora analyzes the case; if there were witnesses who observed the adultery, why should it make a difference that there was a marriage in between and the rumors had ceased, she is still forbidden to the adulterer? If there were no witnesses, and the reason that she is permitted to remain married to him is because of the marriage in between; we can infer from here that if she didn’t get married beforehand, we would require the adulterer to divorce her even though there were no witnesses. This is inconsistent with Rav’s opinion.

The Gemora answers: The halacha would be the same even without the marriage in between; if there are no witnesses, we do not force him to divorce her. The braisa is teaching us that even after the marriage to another, the adulterer is still forbidden l’chatchila to marry her.

The Gemora asks on Rav from another braisa: The accused adulterer must divorce the woman if she didn’t have children from the first marriage, but if she did have children, we do not force him to divorce her (because the divorce will give credibility to the original rumor and this will cause her children to be considered mamzeirim); however, if there were witnesses that observed the adultery, he must divorce her even if there are children from the first marriage. We can infer from this braisa that if there are no witnesses and there are no children, the adulterer is required to divorce her. This is inconsistent with Rav’s opinion.

The Gemora answers: Rav understands our Mishna to be referring to a case where there are children and there are witnesses, the adulterer would be required to divorce her. However, Rav would agree that if there are no children, he will be required to divorce her even in the absence of witnesses.

Alternatively, the Gemora answers that the braisos mentioned above are following the opinion of Rebbe; Rav disagrees. It was taught in a braisa: Rebbe said: If a perfume peddler is leaving a house and the wife is found tying on her undergarments, her husband is required to divorce her since the incident indicates that adultery was committed. If a perfume peddler is leaving a house and saliva is found on top of the bed, her husband is required to divorce her since the incident indicates that adultery was committed. If a perfume peddler is leaving a house and overturned shoes are found under the bed, her husband is required to divorce her since the incident indicates that adultery was committed. (It emerges from the braisa that Rebbe holds that the husband is required to divorce his wife on the basis of a rumor, and the braisa which rules that the adulterer must divorce her even when there are no witnesses is in accordance with Rebbe.)

The Gemora rules that the halacha follows the opinion of Rav and the halacha follows the opinion of Rebbe.

The Gemora asks: How can we rule like Rav and Rebbe; these rulings contradict each other?

The Gemora answers: We rule in accordance with Rebbe in a case where there is a continuous rumor even though there are no witnesses; he is required to divorce her. We rule in accordance with Rav in a case where the rumor ceased (because of a counter-rumor); he is required to divorce her if there are witnesses.

The Gemora asks: How long must a rumor persist in order for it to be taken seriously?

Abaye answers: My mother (nursemaid) told me: A day and a half.

The Gemora qualifies this statement: This is only if the rumor persists throughout the first day and a half; if there was a counter-rumor which quieted the first rumor during that time, the first rumor is not regarded as viable.

A counter-rumor negates the original rumor only if the counter-rumor did not come about on account of fear (due to the adulterer), but if it came about because of fear, it does not negate the original rumor.

If the woman or the accused adulterer has enemies, we can disregard the rumor. (24b – 25a)

The Mishna states: If an agent brings a bill of divorce from overseas, and he said: “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed,” he may not marry his wife. (Since the validity of the divorce depends upon his testimony, it will appear suspicious if he marries her.)

If one would testify that the man died or that he killed him or that we killed him, he may not marry his wife. Rabbi Yehudah said: If he said “I killed him,” the woman may not remarry at all (a testimony that establishes himself as a sinner is not valid). If he said that we killed him, she may remarry. (25a)

The Gemora infers from the Mishna that if the agent would come from Eretz Yisroel, he would be permitted to marry her even if he said: “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” (His testimony is not required when the get is from Eretz Yisroel.)

The Gemora asks: But in the case where he testified that the husband died, he may not marry her even though it is not his testimony that is allowing the wife to remarry; for we have learned that it is the woman’s careful investigation that we rely upon, and nevertheless, we rule that the witness cannot marry her?

The Gemora answers: There is a clear distinction between the two cases. When he testifies that the husband died, there is no document attesting to that fact. His testimony supports the woman’s investigation and therefore he cannot marry her. However, when the agent brings the get from Eretz Yisroel, there is a written document. His testimony is completely superfluous and therefore he may marry the woman. (25a)

The Mishna had stated: If one would testify that the man died or that he killed him or that we killed him, he may not marry his wife. We can infer from there that his testimony is valid and others may marry her.

The Gemora asks: How can his testimony be valid when he said that he killed him; isn’t it written [Shmos 23:1]: Do not place your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness; this verse teaches us that a sinner is forbidden from being a witness? We cannot accept his testimony that he killed the husband since that would result in his becoming a sinner and that would disqualify him from being a valid witness.

The Gemora proposes an answer: Perhaps we can say that the Rabbis were lenient in regards to testimony permitting a woman to remarry.

The Gemora rejects this possibility for Rav Menashe says: The Rabbis are lenient for this testimony only to allow a thief by Rabbinic law to testify, but a thief by Biblical law is disqualified from testifying even in testimony that would enable a woman to remarry. One who testifies that he killed the husband is transgressing a Biblical law and would thus be ineligible from testifying.

The Gemora proposes that Rav Menashe is ruling according to Rabbi Yehudah (who disqualified this testimony, but the Rabbis would allow a thief by Biblical law to testify in regards to the woman remarrying).

The Gemora objects to this and states that Rav Menashe would maintain his ruling even according to the Rabbis; the reason the Rabbis permit the woman to remarry is based on Rava’s dictum. Rava states that a person is related to himself and therefore he cannot make himself into a sinner. (It emerges that we accept his testimony that the husband is dead, but we do not accept the fact that he himself killed him.)

Rav Yosef maintains that testimony which would establish the witness as a sinner is not accepted altogether; however, by testimony permitting a woman to remarry the Rabbis were lenient and ruled that this type of testimony will be accepted. (25a – 25b)

The Mishna states: If a sage prohibited a wife to her husband on account of a vow (she vowed not to derive any pleasure from her husband and the sage did not annul the vow for her, which resulted in the husband divorcing her), he may not marry her.

If she refused (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.) or if she performed chalitzah in front of the sage, he may marry her, because he is part of the Beis Din.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 24 - FOOD FOR THOUGHT

*** Will succeed in the name of his deceased brother teaches us that the brother who performs the yibum inherits the entire property of the deceased brother.

The Zohar (Mishpatim) states: The yavam becomes the father of the deceased brother. Reb Nosson Lubart in Sheiris Nosson says that this is the reason why the yavam receives the entire property of his brother and the other brothers do not get anything. One who dies and a father and brothers survive him; the father receives the entire estate and not the brothers.

*** The Gemora stated: It does not mean that the son born from the yavam and yevamah should be called the same name as the deceased brother; if the deceased brother’s name was Yosef or Yochanan, that is what you should call the son.

Reb Tzadok Hakohen explains according to the secrets of Torah why it is these two names that are mentioned here and in the Gemora Gittin (34b). It seems that the Ben Yehoyadah had a different version in the Gemora, as he asks why the Gemora mentions Yosef and Yaakov, and not Reuven and Shimon like it usually does.

*** The Gemora cites a braisa: No converts will be accepted in the days of Mashiach (it will be assumed that they have ulterior motives). Similarly, no converts were accepted in the days of Dovid, nor in the days of Shlomo.

The Maharil states: Similarly, repentance will not be accepted in the days of Mashiach (it will be assumed that one has ulterior motives). A person should hurry to repent because we are anxiously awaiting the imminent arrival of Mashiach, and if someone doesn’t repent and Mashiach will arrive, he will remain with his sins.

(Margoliyos HaShas)

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 23 - CONCEIVED FIRST OR BORN FIRST WHO IS THE FIRSTBORN?

The Gemora states: We have learned that kiddushin does take effect with women that are forbidden merely by a negative commandment. It is written [Devarim 21:15]: If a man has two wives, one beloved, and the other loathed. The Gemora asks: Is there a beloved or loathed wife before Hashem? Rather, the Torah is referring to their marriage. Beloved means that he is married to a permitted woman and loathed means that he is married to a prohibited woman and nevertheless, the Torah states regarding them “If a man has two wives.” We derive from here that if a man marries a woman that is forbidden to him merely by a negative commandment, the Torah recognizes and validates the marriage.

The verse mentioned above continues and states that if the loathed wife becomes the mother of the man’s firstborn son, the father is forbidden to deny that son the right to the double portion and give it instead to the son from the beloved wife.

How can the Torah refer to one of the wives as “a loathed one”? Why would it enter our mind that the father can deprive the son of the loathed one if he in fact is the firstborn? It would seem from the order of the words in the verse that the son of the beloved woman was actually born first.

The following explanation is written in the name of the Gra. The Torah is referring to a case where a man divorced a woman and that is why she is called “the loathed one.” He married another woman soon afterwards. His present wife gave birth to a son seven months after the marriage. The divorced woman gave birth to a son after nine months. One might think that the double portion designated for the firstborn should go to the son of the beloved woman because he was born first; the Torah teaches us that this is not the case. Since the son of the loathed woman was conceived first, by rights, he is deserving of the double portion. This is what the Torah means when it says “for he is the first-fruits of his strength.”

There are those (the Netziv) who question if the Gra ever said this. One of the questions that they ask is from Rashi in Bereishis (25:26), who writes from a Medrash: The interpretation is in accordance to its simple meaning: Yaakov held onto Esav’s heel lawfully, to restrain him. Yaakov was formed from the first drop and Esav from the second. We can learn from a tube that has a narrow opening. If one would insert two stones into it, one after the other, the one that entered first will emerge last, and the one that entered last will emerge first. The result is that Esav, who was formed last, emerged first, and Yaakov, who was formed first emerged last, and Yaakov came to restrain him so that he should be the first to be born as he was the first to be formed, and he would open her womb and take the birthright by law.

According to the Gra, this leaves us with a question: If Yaakov was the true firstborn, why was it necessary for him to purchase the birthright from Esav?

The Kli Chemda differentiates between the birthright for inheritance, which is related to the time of conception (since it is based on a relationship with the father) and between the rights to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh, which is dependent on the time of birth. This is what Yaakov wished to purchase from Esav.

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