Daf Yomi - Yevamos 51 - Highlights

The Gemora states: Rabban Gamliel and the Chachamim only argued regarding a get after a get and a ma’amar after a ma’amar; but a get given to one yevamah or a ma’amar performed with one will certainly be effective.

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis say that a get given to a yevamah is effective (resulting in the prohibition of Once he did not build, he should never again build)?

The Gemora answers: It is because the giving of a get is effective elsewhere (by a divorce from a man to his wife). If it would not be effective by a yevamah, people would equate chalitzah with a get, and say that just as a get will not release the yevamah, chalitzah also won’t, and then the yavam will cohabit with the yevamah after chalitzah. (It was therefore decreed that one cannot cohabit with a yevamah after a chalitzah.)

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis say that a ma’amar to a yevamah is effective (and he and his brothers can no longer perform a yibum)?

The Gemora answers: It is because ma’amar is effective elsewhere (by a marriage – either through money or a document). If it would not be effective by a yevamah, people would equate ma’amar with cohabitation, and say that just as a ma’amar does not acquire the yevamah, cohabitation also won’t, and then the yavam will cohabit with a second yevamah after cohabitation. (50b)

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis say that there is validity to something after a deficient cohabitation? (Why is there still a need for chalitzah; shouldn’t the cohabitation nullify the zikah?)

The Gemora answers: We say as follows: Regarding the case where he gave a bill of divorce to one yevamah, and he cohabited with the other widow, she (the one with whom he cohabited with) requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah; the chalitzah is required because otherwise, people might equate cohabitation after chalitzah with cohabitation after a get. They would see that cohabitation after a get does not require chalitzah, and would assume that this cohabitation is ideal. This would lead people to allow cohabitation even after chalitzah. It is for this reason that the Rabbis decreed that cohabitation after a get requires chalitzah.

And regarding the case where the yavam married this one by ma'amar, and cohabited with a second widow, they require two bills of divorce and chalitzah; the chalitzah is required because otherwise, people might equate cohabitation after ma’amar with cohabitation after cohabitation. They would see that cohabitation after ma’amar does not require chalitzah, and would assume that this cohabitation is ideal. This would lead people to allow cohabitation (with one widow) even after cohabitation was performed with a different widow. It is for this reason that the Rabbis decreed that cohabitation after ma’amar requires chalitzah. (50b)

The Gemora asks: Why do the Rabbis say that there is no validity to something after a deficient chalitzah? (Why is it different that a deficient cohabitation, which is only partially effective?)

The Gemora answers: We say as follows: Why should we be concerned? Should the Rabbis decree that chalitzah after a get should not be fully effective because of the case of chalitzah after chalitzah? There is nothing to be concerned about. Let them perform chalitzah incessantly; there is no prohibition against that. Should the Rabbis decree that chalitzah after ma’amar should not be fully effective because of the case of chalitzah after cohabitation? There is nothing to be concerned about. Chalitzah after ma’amar requires a get because of the ma’amar, so too, a chalitzah after cohabitation will require a get for the cohabitation. (50b)

Rava asks: What is the reasoning of Rabban Gamliel? (Rabban Gamliel says: There is no validity for a get after a get. If two wives (e.g., Leah and Chanah) of a dead, childless man came before his brother for yibum, and he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to Chanah, the latter's bill of divorce is not valid, and he is not forbidden to marry her relatives. Rabban Gamliel says further: And no ma'amar after ma’amar. If one yavam married by ma'amar two yevamos from one brother who came before him for yibum, i.e., he married one of them and afterwards married the other; or if two yevamim married by ma'amar, one yevamah; the second ma'amar is void, and she does not require a bill of divorce from him to annul the ma'amar, and he is not forbidden to marry her relatives.)

He answers: Rabban Gamliel is uncertain whether a get to a yevamah effects full rejection of the yevamah or none at all. He is also uncertain whether ma’amar to a yevamah effects full acquisition of the yevamah or none at all.

Regarding a get: If the first get given effected a full rejection, what would the second one accomplish? If the first get given didn’t accomplish anything, the second one will not accomplish anything either.

Regarding ma’amar: If the first ma’amar effected a full acquisition, what would the second one accomplish? If the first ma’amar didn’t accomplish anything, the second one will not accomplish anything either.

Abaye asks from the following braisa: Rabban Gamliel admits that a get (to one widow) has validity after a ma’amar (to the co-wife), and the yavam will be prohibited from performing a yibum with them or marrying the get-recipient’s relatives. He also admits that a ma’amar (to one widow) has validity after a get (to the co-wife), and the yavam will be prohibited from marrying the ma’amar-recipient’s relatives. He also admits by a get given to a third yevamah after a cohabitation with a second yevamah followed a ma’amar to the first. He also admits by a ma’amar to a third yevamah after a cohabitation with a second yevamah followed a get given to the first.

If a get or ma’amar does not accomplish anything, let the cohabitation afterwards be regarded as a cohabitation at the beginning (as if the ma’amar or get was nonexistent), and we learned in the Mishna regarding cohabitation, when it is at the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it?

Abaye offers his own explanation: Rabban Gamliel maintains that a get does effect a partial rejection and ma’amar accomplishes a partial acquisition. One get after another get has no validity because the first get given effected a partial rejection, and the second get cannot add to that rejection. One ma’amar after another ma’amar has no validity because the first ma’amar effected a partial acquisition, and the second ma’amar cannot add to that acquisition. However, regarding a get after a ma’amar or a ma’amar after a get; there can be validity since one is effecting a partial rejection, and one is accomplishing a partial acquisition.

The Chachamim disagree and maintain that the Rabbis decreed that there is the ability for a get or a ma’amar to take effect with each and every yavam and yevamah. (Since it is only a partial rejection or acquisition, the zikah-attachment still exists.)

Abaye concludes by explaining Rabban Gamliel’s opinion in the braisa. A deficient cohabitation is stronger than a ma’amar and weaker than a ma’amar. It is stronger because a ma’amar after a ma’amar has no validity, but cohabitation after a ma’amar is effective. It is weaker because a ma’amar after a get is completely effective (and a second ma’amar will not accomplish anything), but cohabitation after a get is not completely effective (and a ma’amar afterwards will have validity). (50b – 51a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabban Gamliel says: There is no validity for a get after a get. If two wives (e.g., Leah and Chanah) of a dead, childless man came before his brother for yibum, and he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to Chanah, Rabban Gamliel maintains that he should perform chalitzah with the first yevamah (Leah), and he is forbidden to marry her relatives. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second yevamah (Chanah). The Chachamim hold that he is forbidden to marry the relatives of both of them, and he is required to perform chalitzah with one of them. And a similar halacha applies if two yevamim give each a bill of divorce to one yevamah.

The braisa continues: If one yavam married by ma'amar two yevamos from one brother who came before him for yibum, i.e., he married one of them and afterwards married the other; Rabban Gamliel maintains that he should give a get to the first yevamah and perform a chalitzah with her, and he is forbidden to marry her relatives. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second yevamah. The Chachamim hold that he is required to give a get to both of them, and he is forbidden to marry the relatives of both of them, and he is required to perform chalitzah with one of them. And a similar halacha applies if two yevamim perform ma’amar to one yevamah. (51a)

The Gemora asks on Shmuel from this braisa: The braisa had stated: If two wives (e.g., Leah and Chanah) of a dead, childless man came before his brother for yibum, and he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to Chanah, Rabban Gamliel maintains that he should perform chalitzah with the first yevamah (Leah), and he is forbidden to marry her relatives. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second yevamah (Chanah). Shouldn’t this be a refutation of Shmuel? Shmuel said: There were two brothers, one of them had two wives and died childless. The yavam gave a get (bill of divorce) to one of the women. He is now prohibited from performing yibum with any of these women, but he is required to perform a chalitzah. (Although giving a get to a yevamah does not accomplish anything (for the Torah prescribes only a yibum or a chalitzah with a yevamah), the Rabbis decreed that it should be treated similar to a chalitzah.) If the yavam performs a chalitzah with the woman who received the get, the co-wife is not released.

Why then does Rabban Gamliel maintain that the chalitzah performed with the first yevamah releases the co-wife; the chalitzah is deficient since it follows the giving of a get?

The Gemora answers: Shmuel could say that he is issuing his ruling in accordance with those that hold that there exists a zikah-attachment between the yavam and the yevamah; a deficient chalitzah will not release the co-wife. Rabban Gamliel would hold that there is no zikah-attachment, and a deficient chalitzah can release the co-wife. (51a)

The Gemora assumes that if Rabban Gamliel maintains that there is no zikah-attachment, it is evident that the Chachamim hold that there is a zikah-attachment. If so, let the braisa be a refutation of Rabbah bar Rav Huna in the name of Rav.

The braisa had stated: And a similar halacha applies if two yevamim give each a bill of divorce to one yevamah. (If each yavam gave the yevamah a get, only one of them is required to perform a chalitzah with her.)

Rabbah bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Three sisters who are sisters-in-law (they were married to three brothers) who fall for yibum before two brothers, one brother performs chalitzah to one of them, the other brother performs chalitzah to a different one of them, and the middle one (the other sister) requires chalitzah from both of them. (Since there is a zikah-attachment between the widows and the brothers, and the chalitzah performed with the middle sister is a deficient chalitzah (because she cannot be taken for yibum since she is the sister of his chalutzah), and a deficient chalitzah requires that she goes for chalitzah to all of the brothers.)

Why do the Chachamim rule that only one chalitzah is necessary?

The Gemora answers: Rabbah bar Rav Huna would answer that both Rabban Gamliel and the Chachamim would hold that there is no zikah-attachment; their dispute is only regarding the validity of a get following a get or ma’amar following a ma’amar. (51a – 51b)

Rabbi Yochanan said: Rabban Gamliel, Beis Shamai, Rabbi Shimon, Ben Azzai and Rabbi Nechemia all maintain that ma’amar accomplishes a complete acquisition of the yevamah.

Rabbi Yochanan explains: Rabban Gamliel’s view is evident from the Mishna. (There is no validity for a ma'amar after a ma’amar; the first ma’amar leaves no room for the second one to accomplish anything.)

Beis Shamai’s opinion can be derived from the following ruling: There were three brothers, two of whom were married two sisters, and one is unmarried. If one of the husbands of the sisters died, and the bachelor performed a ma'amar, and afterwards his second brother died. Beis Shamai said: His wife stays with him, and the other is released because she is his wife's sister. (Beis Shamai maintains that ma’amar is Biblically valid and the sister is regarded as his wife’s sister.)

The Gemora demonstrates that Rabbi Shimon and Ben Azzai also hold that ma’amar accomplishes a complete acquisition of the yevamah.

Rabbi Nechemia’s position regarding ma’amar can be proven from his opinion cited in the Mishna (50b). Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity for anything which follows it. The Rabbis equated a deficient cohabitation with a ma’amar, and Rabbi Nechemia maintains that there is no validity for anything which follows a deficient cohabitation. It can thus be proven that he holds that ma’amar accomplishes a full acquisition. (51b)

[END]

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COMPLETING ONE'S LIFESPAN OR ADDING TO IT - Yevamos 50 - Daf Yomi

brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Yerushalayim

QUESTION: The Gemara (27b-28a) records a number of incidents wherein the Talmidim of a Tana or Amora asked their teacher how he merited living such a long life. In each case, the Tana or Amora answered by relating an act (or acts) of especially upright conduct which he practiced. In the middle of the Sugya, the Gemara relates that Rebbi Akiva once asked Rebbi Nechunya ha'Gadol how he merited to live so long. Rebbi Nechunya's attendants thought that Rebbi Akiva asked his question mockingly, as though he was upset that Rebbi Nechunya had lived so long, and they began to hit him. Rebbi Akiva escaped to the top of a tree from where he called to Rebbi Nechunya, "If the Torah says, '[You shall prepare] a lamb' (Bamidbar 28:4), then why does it add the word 'one (Keves Echad)'?"

Rebbi Nechunya understood from Rebbi Akiva's question that he was a genuine Talmid Chacham, and he ordered his attendants to leave Rebbi Akiva alone. Rebbi Akiva then answered his own question: the Torah adds the word "Echad" (one) to teach that the lamb must be the most special lamb of its flock.

Rebbi Nechunya informed Rebbi Akiva why he merited living so long. "I never accepted any presents, I never stood up for my due (to get back at someone who had wronged me), and I was forgoing with my money."

This incident needs clarification. Why were the attendants so upset with Rebbi Akiva's question to Rebbi Nechunya, and what did Rebbi Nechunya see that changed his viewpoint about Rebbi Akiva's question?

ANSWER: RAV YAKOV D. HOMNICK (in MARBEH B'SIMCHAH on Maseches Megilah)
explains as follows. The Gemara in Yevamos (49b) records a dispute among the Tana'im about the meaning of Hashem's blessing to His people, "The number of your days I shall fill" (Shemos 23:26). The Beraisa there says that the blessing refers to the days of a person's lifespan. Rebbi Akiva says that if a person is worthy, Hashem lets the person live his entire allotted time. If a person is unworthy, Hashem cuts his life short and takes him before his allotted time is completed. The Chachamim disagree and say that if a person is worthy, Hashem adds to his allotted time (and not that Hashem merely keeps the person alive for his allotted time). Since Rebbi Akiva is the minority opinion, the Halachah should follow the Chachamim.

For this reason, the attendants of Rebbi Nechunya became upset with Rebbi Akiva when he asked how their master merited living so long. Since his extra years were a blessing of addition to his allotted lifespan, it was not proper to speak about it openly because a "blessing [of addition] exists only upon something which is hidden from the eye" (Bava Metzia 42a). They feared that by revealing the extra years granted to Rebbi Nechunya and discussing why he was blessed, the blessing would become one that was no longer hidden and, as a result, cease to continue.

Rebbi Akiva, however, was acting according to his own opinion (in Yevamos) that when a person lives for a very long time, those years are
not an addition to his allotted life but rather a blessing from Hashem to live out his allotted time (which, in Rebbi Nechunya's case, happened to be a very long time). Therefore, Rebbi Akiva wanted to know the proper manner of conduct which brings merit to complete one's allotted lifespan. Since that does not involve a blessing of extra, additional years, it is not subject to the requirement that it remain "hidden from the eye."

Rebbi Akiva conveyed his intention by hinting to the lamb of the Korban Tamid. One who consistently uses each day of his life to carry out
Hashem's will -- thereby fulfilling his "daily obligation" like the Korban Tamid -- will merit living for his entire allotted lifespan.

Rebbi Akiva's intent is also evident in Rebbi Nechunya's response. When Rebbi Nechunya understood that Rebbi Akiva was asking how he managed to live for his allotted time (and not how he merited to have additional years added to his lifespan) he answered, "I never accepted any presents," meaning that he felt full and satisfied with his portion in life and needed nothing else. Measure for measure, he was awarded with the full portion of his lifespan. Similarly, "I never stood up for my due, and I was forgoing with my money" -- he trusted in Hashem to repay his due in full measure, for which he was rewarded with fully living out his allotted years.

This is the only incident of all of the incidents recorded by the Gemara which discusses the ways to merit fully living one's allotted lifespan,
since the question in this incident was posed by Rebbi Akiva. All of the other cases are in accordance with the view of the Chachamim in Yevamos, and thus they discuss how to add to one's lifespan.

A remarkable support for this understanding can be found in the words of the MESILAS YESHARIM. The Mesilas Yesharim (ch. 19) writes that these stories teach how to act with the attribute of Chasidus (adding to the requirement of the law) for which one will be rewarded measure for measure by having more time added to his allotted lifespan. The Mesilas Yesharim cites a number of the stories mentioned in the Gemara before the incident with Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Nechunya, and he also cites the story of Rebbi Zeira which follows the one with Rebbi Akiva. Why does he entirely omit the story of Rebbi Akiva?

According to the above approach, the reason for the omission is that the story of Rebbi Akiva does not demonstrate how to add to one's lifespan, but rather how to merit completing one's allotted time.

This explains why -- when Rebbi Nechunya said that he never accepted any presents -- the Gemara cites an example for this attribute from the conduct of Rebbi Zeira, who never accepted presents. In the very next case of the Gemara, however, Rebbi Zeira was asked how he merited livingso long. He answered with six reasons but he did not mention that he never accepted presents! It must be that the conduct of not accepting presents is a reason to have one's allotted time completed, but not a reason to have more years added, and thus Rebbi Zeira did not mention that attribute when he was asked how he merited having more time added to his life.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 50 - highlights

The Gemora addresses the third apparent contradiction of which Menasheh had asked Yeshaya. (Moshe Rabbeinu stated, “I (HaShem) shall fill the number of your days,” which implies that HaShem will not add to ones lifespan, whereas you said to King Chizkiyah, “I (HaShem) will add fifteen years to your life.”)

The Gemora answers that this matter is in fact a Tannaic dispute. We have learned in a braisa: I (HaShem) shall fill the number of your days, these are the years that a person is granted to live at the beginning of his life. If he merits, those years will be completed. If he does not merit, they will decrease years from his lifetime; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. The Chachamim say: If one merits, they will increase years to his lifetime, but if he does not merit, they will decrease years from his lifetime.

The Chachamim said to Rabbi Akiva: Behold it is written: I (HaShem) will add fifteen years to your life. (This proves that years can be added to one’s life.) Rabbi Akiva responded to them: Those fifteen years were originally his (fifteen years was deducted from his life on account of a sin, but it was returned to him after he repented).

He proves this from the fact that (many years earlier) the prophet prophesied (to Yeravam) that a son will be born to the house of David; Yoshiyahu will be his name. And Menasheh (Yoshiyahu’s grandfather) was not yet born (at the time of Chizkiyah’s illness). (Obviously, Chizkiyah’s original life span was not complete at this time.)

The Gemora asks: How do the Chachamim understand this prophecy?

The Gemora answers: The prophet did not say explicitly that Yoshiyahu will come from Chizkiyah; it was possible that he would come from some other descendant of King David. (49b – 50a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, HACHOLEITZ LIYIVIMTO

The Mishna states: (This Mishna is extremely technical and we have included explanations from the Kahati Mishnayos (with our editing) for the sake of clarity.)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 1 – 6}
Rabban Gamliel says, There is no validity for a get (bill of divorce) after a get, and no ma'amar after ma'amar, and no cohabitation after cohabitation, and no chalitzah after chalitzah. But the Chachamim say: There is validity for a get after a get, and there is ma'amar after ma'amar, but after cohabitation or after chalitzah there is no validity to anything.

In order to understand this chapter, it is first necessary to explain a number of principles, some of which have already been mentioned in the preceding chapters:

(1) By Torah law, the yevamah is married by yibum to the yavam, to be the wife in every respect, only by bi'ah, an act of cohabitation, as it is written, "her husband's brother shall go in [yavo] to her, and take her to him as a wife, and perform the duty of a husband's brother to her" (Deut. 25:5). The Sages, however, enacted that the yavam may not cohabitate with his yevamah until he marries her with money or a document, in the manner in which this is done for all other women. Such marriage with money or document is called "ma'amar." Ma'amar effects only a partial contract of marriage, involving its restrictions for the yevamah, as taught in the preceding chapters.

(2) The yevamah is released form her zikah (attachment to the yavam), and permitted to marry any man, only by chalitzah. If her yavam gave her a bill of divorce, the Sages enacted that the bill is restrictively effective as far as chalitzah is concerned, disqualifying her from yibum (for "since he did not build up, he may no longer build up"), prohibiting her co-wives to him and to the other brothers, prohibiting her relatives to him, and disqualifying her from marrying a Kohen, as is the law regarding a divorced woman, but she nevertheless is not permitted to marry another until he submits to chalitzah from her.

(3) If a yavam married his yevamah by ma'amar, but he does not want to consummate the marriage, he must give her a bill of divorce and also to submit to chalitzah from her: the bill of divorce -- in order to release her from the ma'amar marriage, and chalitzah -- in order to release her from the yibum tie, and to release her so that she may be married to another.

Rabban Gamliel says: There is no validity for a get (bill of divorce) after a get -- if two wives (e.g., Leah and Chanah) of a dead, childless man came before his brother for yibum, and he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to Chanah, the latter's bill of divorce is not valid, and he is not forbidden to marry her relatives. This is because when he gave a bill of divorce to Leah, he was released from the zikah-attachment to both of them (as stated in the introduction to the Mishna), for the bill of divorce is effective for the yevamah, by Rabbinic law, as a kind of chalitzah, to remove her from yibum and to prohibit her co-wives to him and to the other brothers (since a bill of divorce effects divorce for a married woman). And similarly, if two yevamim give each a bill of divorce to one yevamah, the bill of the second one is void, and he is permitted to marry her relatives.

And no ma'amar after ma'amar -- if one yavam married by ma'amar two yevamos from one brother who came before him for yibum, i.e., he married one of them and afterwards married the other; or if two yevamim married by ma'amar, one yevamah; the second ma'amar is void, and she does not require a bill of divorce from him to annul the ma'amar, and he is not forbidden to marry her relatives.

And no cohabitation after cohabitation -- if one yavam cohabited with two yevamos, or if two yevamim cohabited with one yevamah, the first act of cohabitation counts as yibum, and the second is an act of licentiousness; she does not require a bill of divorce as a result of this second cohabitation, and the second yavam is not forbidden to marry her relatives.

And no chalitzah after chalitzah -- if one yavam submitted to chalitzah from two yevamos, or if two yevamim submitted to chalitzah from one yevamah, the second chalitzah is void, and she is permitted to marry a Kohen, and he is permitted to marry her relatives.

But the Chachamim say: There is validity for a get after a get -- since the bill of divorce does not completely release the yevamah from her zikah-attachment, for she still requires chalitzah to be permitted to be married to another (as explained in the introduction to this Mishna), therefore the second bill of divorce is valid, and he is forbidden to marry her relatives.

And there is ma'amar after ma'amar -- as ma'amar does not constitute a complete contract of marriage with the yevamah as does consummation, but only a partial contract of marriage, therefore the second ma'amar is also valid and she requires a bill of divorce, and he is forbidden to marry her relatives.

But after cohabitation or after chalitzah there is no validity to anything -- as the consummation constitutes a complete contract of marriage for the yevamah, and chalitzah completely dissolves the zikah-attachment, whatever yavam does to the yevamah's co-wife after cohabitation, or after the chalitzah, or whatever another yavam does to this yevamah, has no legal significance. (50a)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 6 – 9}
The Mishna continues: How so? If he married his yevamah by ma'amar, and he gave her a bill of divorce -- she requires of him to submit to chalitzah. If he married by ma'amar and submitted to chalitzah -- she requires a bill of divorce from him. If he married by ma'amar and cohabited with her -- then this is according to the mitzvah.

How so -- is the law regarding the bill of divorce, ma'amar, etc., which was taught above? The Gemora explains that this "How so?" does not refer to the disagreement between Rabban Gamliel and the Chachamim taught above, but is an independent topic, and serves as an introduction to the next portion of the Mishna. Thus, this Mishna explains the law of ma'amar, bill of divorce, chalitzah and cohabitation where there is one yavam and one yevamah.

If he -- the yavam, married his yevamah by ma'amar -- he married her with money or a document, and afterwards he gave her a bill of divorce -- she requires of him chalitzah -- in order to release her from the yibum tie. He is prohibited, however, from wedding her as his yevamah because of the bill of divorce that he gave her.

If he married by ma'amar and submitted to chalitzah from his yevamah, she requires a bill of divorce from him -- to cancel his ma'amar marriage, since chalitzah does not dissolve the ma'amar, but only the yibum tie.

If he married by ma'amar and cohabited with her -- then this is according to the mitzvah -- although the Torah states, "her husband's brother shall go in to her" (Deut. 25:5), and (by Torah law) he is not required to wed her ceremonially first, the Sages nevertheless enacted that the yavam may not cohabit with a yevamah until he marries her by ma'amar. This yavam has indeed first fulfilled the obligation imposed by the Sages, and afterwards he performed yibum on her according to the command of the Torah. (50a)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 9 – 2 (50b)}
The Mishna continues: If he gave a bill of divorce, and he married by ma'amar -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce and he cohabited with her -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce, and he submitted to chalitzah – there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah. If he submitted to chalitzah and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce, or he cohabited with her; or if he first cohabited with her and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce or he submitted to chalitzah – there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah. It is all the same, whether one yevamah to one yavam, or two yevamos to one yavam.

If he first gave a bill of divorce -- to his yevamah, and afterwards he married -- her, by ma'amar, she requires a bill of divorce -- to cancel the ma'amar marriage, and chalitzah -- to dissolve her yibum tie, and he may not wed her as his yevamah after the ma'amar, because of the bill of divorce which he had given her initially.

If he gave a bill of divorce -- to his yevamah, and he afterwards cohabited -- with her, she is ineligible for yibum from the time that he gave her a bill of divorce and is prohibited to him, and the cohabitation with her after the bill of divorce is unlawful (but is akin to performing ma’amar), therefore she requires a bill of divorce -- because of the cohabitation, and chalitzah -- because of her tie to him.

If he gave a bill of divorce -- to his yevamah, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah -- from her, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah -- and she is completely released. (The Gemora explains that this Mishna teaches that if afterwards he married her by ma'amar or by cohabitation, she does not require a bill of divorce, for this Mishna is according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that a marriage involving a Torah prohibition punishable by lashes is void.)

If he submitted to chalitzah, and then either married by ma'amar -- after the chalitzah, or -- if after the chalitzah -- he gave a bill of divorce, or -- after the chalitzah, he cohabited with her; or if he first cohabited with her -- with his yevamah, and then either married by ma'amar -- after cohabitation, or he gave a bill of divorce -- after cohabitation, or he submitted to chalitzah -- after cohabitation, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah -- whatever he did after the chalitzah is of no legal significance. (The Mishna stated "there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah," and did not also state "there is no validity to anything that follows cohabitation," in order to be concise, and it preferred to teach the law whereby the yevamah is freed to marry any man.

It -- the law, is all the same, whether one yevamah to one yavam, or two yevamos to one yavam -- whether one yevamah or two yevamos from one brother, who came before one yavam for yibum, something can effectively follow after the first bill of divorce or after the first marriage by ma'amar, but nothing can effectively follow after cohabitation or after chalitzah. (50a – 50b)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 2 – 10}
The Mishna explains the case of two Yevamos: How so? If he married this one by ma'amar, and that one by ma'amar, they require two bills of divorce and chalitzah. If he married this one by ma'amar and he gave a bill of divorce to that one -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he married this one by ma'amar, and cohabited with that one -- they require two bills of divorce and chalitzah. If he married this one by ma'amar, and he submitted to chalitzah from that one -- the first requires a bill of divorce. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and a bill of divorce to that one -- they require from him chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and he cohabited with that one -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and ma'amar to that one -- she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and he submitted to chalitzah from that one -- there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah.

How so -- is the law regarding two yevamos tied to one yavam? If he married this one by ma'amar, and afterwards that one -- the second one, they require two bills of divorce -- each one requires a bill of divorce, according to the opinion of the Sages before that ma'amar after ma'amar is effective, and one of them requires chalitzah -- and she exempts her co-wife.

If he married this one by ma'amar, and afterwards he gave a bill of divorce to that one -- the second one, she -- the one whom he married by ma'amar, requires a bill of divorce -- because once he gave a bill of divorce to the other one, she is prohibited to him, and one of them requires chalitzah -- and she exempts her co-wife.

If he married this one by ma'amar -- he married one of them, and afterwards cohabited with that one -- the other one, they require two bills of divorce -- one because of his ma'amar, and the other because of his cohabitation with her, and chalitzah -- from one of them. If he married this one by ma'amar -- one of them, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah from that one -- the other, the first requires a bill of divorce -- to annul the marriage effected by his ma'amar.

If he gave a bill of divorce to this one, and a bill of divorce to that one -- if he gave a bill of divorce to each of them, they require from him chalitzah -- to dissolve their yibum tie (he submits to chalitzah from one of them and she exempts her co-wife). If he gave a bill of divorce to this one -- one of them, and afterwards he cohabited with that one -- the other, she -- the one with whom he cohabited with, requires a bill of divorce -- as the act of cohabitation was unlawful once he had given the bill of divorce to the first one, and one of them requires chalitzah -- and she exempts her co-wife.

If he gave a bill divorce to this one -- one of them, and afterwards was married by ma'amar to that one --- the other, she -- the one whom he married by ma'amar, requires a bill of divorce -- because of the ma'amar, and one of them requires chalitzah -- and she exempts her co-wife.

If he gave a bill of divorce to this one -- one of them, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah from that one -- the other, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah -- and if he once again betrothed his chalutzah or her co-wife, the marriage is void, according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that a marriage involving a Torah prohibition punishable by lashes is void. (50b)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 10 – 14}
The Mishna continues: If he submitted to chalitzah and he submitted to chalitzah, or he submitted to chalitzah and he either married by ma'amar, or gave a bill of divorce or cohabited with her; or if he cohabited with her and he cohabited with her, or he cohabited with her and either he married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce or he submitted to chalitzah – there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah, whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah.

The Mishna continues to discuss the case of two yevamos who were married to one brother and are tied to one yavam.

If he submitted to chalitzah -- from one, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah -- from the other or he submitted to chalitzah -- from one, and afterwards he either married by ma'amar -- the other one, or if he gave a bill of divorce to, or he cohabited with her -- with, the second; or if he cohabited with her -- with one, and afterwards he cohabited with her -- with the other, or if he cohabited with her -- with one, and either married by ma'amar -- the other, or he gave a bill of divorce to, or he submitted to chalitzah -- from, the second one, there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah -- i.e., whatever he did to the second one after he submitted to chalitzah from the first is of no legal significance, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second. And likewise, nothing follows the act of cohabitation, i.e., what he did to the second one after he cohabited with the first is of no legal significance, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second,

Whether one yavam to two yevamos, or two yevamim to one yevamah -- also in the case of two yevamim and one yevamah, if one of the yevamim married her by ma'amar, or gave her a bill of divorce, or submitted to chalitzah from her, or cohabited with her, and afterwards his fellow did one of these acts, the same laws apply to her, that there is no validity to anything which follows chalitzah and no validity to anything which follows cohabitation, whereas after ma'amar or a bill of divorce, she requires a bill of divorce and chalitzah or only chalitzah, as was explained regarding the case of one yavam and two yevamos. (50b)

{Explanation of the Mishna, lines 14 – 21}
The Mishna continues: (The Mishna repeats one of its earlier halachos, and qualifies it.) If he submitted to chalitzah and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce, or he cohabited with her; or if he first cohabited with her and then either married by ma'amar, or he gave a bill of divorce or he submitted to chalitzah – there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah. This would apply whether he submitted to chalitzah at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end. However, regarding cohabitation, when it is at the beginning, there is no validity for anything which follows it, whereas if it was in the middle, or at the end -- there is validity to something which follows it. Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one, cohabitation and chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end -- there is no validity for anything which follows it.

The Mishna repeats a portion of the Mishna mentioned before in order to qualify it.

If he submitted to chalitzah, and then either married by ma'amar -- after the chalitzah, or -- if after the chalitzah -- he gave a bill of divorce, or -- after the chalitzah, he cohabited with her; or if he first cohabited with her -- with his yevamah, and then either married by ma'amar -- after cohabitation, or he gave a bill of divorce -- after cohabitation, or he submitted to chalitzah -- after cohabitation, there is no validity to anything that follows chalitzah -- whatever he did after the chalitzah is of no legal significance. This would apply whether he submitted to chalitzah at the beginning -- and afterwards married by ma'amar or gave a bill of divorce, or in the middle – e.g., he gave a bill of divorce, submitted to chalitzah, and married by ma'amar, the ma'amar after chalitzah is not valid at all, and she does not require a bill of divorce from his ma'amar, or at the end -- if he married by ma'amar and gave a bill of divorce, and afterwards he submitted to chalitzah, there is no validity for anything which follows chalitzah, and if he again married by ma'amar after the chalitzah, she does not require a bill of divorce, for the chalitzah releases her completely from her yibum tie.

However, regarding cohabitation, when it is at the beginning -- e.g., in the case of one yavam and two yevamos, he first cohabited with one, and afterwards married by ma'amar the other, there is no validity for anything which follows it -- for the yibum tie has already been entirely cut. Whereas if it was in the middle -- e.g., he gave a bill of divorce, cohabited, and married by ma'amar, or at the end -- e.g., he gave a bill of divorce, married by ma'amar, and cohabited, there is validity to something which follows it -- since unlawful cohabitation does not effect yibum and she is still tied to the yavam, she requires chalitzah.

Rabbi Nechemia said: It is all one whether cohabitation and -- or -- chalitzah, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end -- even if cohabitation followed the bill of divorce and ma'amar, there is no validity for anything which follows it -- and she goes forth with a bill of divorce without chalitzah. If he married by ma'amar after cohabitation, e.g., in the case of two yevamos, after he cohabited with one woman, he married the other by ma'amar, the ma'amar is not effective (Rashi; Bartenura). Other commentators state that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, unlawful cohabitation does not completely cut the yibum tie, and she requires chalitzah, and the clause "there is no validity for anything which follows it" means that ma'amar is invalid after the act of cohabitation (Maharshal, Ramban). (50b)

[END]

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MOSHE’S PROPHECY - Yevamos 49 - Daf Yomi

Gemora Bava Basra 14b states that Moshe wrote his sefer and the parsha of Bil'am? What is the connection?

"In the nation of Israel, there never arose another prophet of Moshe's stature" (Devarim 34:10) -- In the nation of Israel there did not arise, but among the other nations there did arise. Who was that? Bil'am!" (Sifri, end of Sefer Devarim, see also Bamidbar Raba 14:34)

How is it possible to suggest that Bil'am, the embodiment of evil character traits (Avot 5:19), prophesied on the same level as Moshe, the greatest of prophets? (Famous question - text from Parsha page Balak 5758)

Rabbi Mordechai Kornfeld cites the commentators who say that there is a basic distinction between the prophecy of Moshe and other nevi'im. Hashem spoke through the throat of Moshe - "mitoch g'rono shel Moshe." Maharil Diskin explains (end of teshuvos):

The Gemora (Yevamos 49b) tells us that all the prophets saw their visions through "a clouded glass," while Moshe's prophecy was through "a clear glass." In what way is a prophet's vision clouded? Is the Divine Word not clearly revealed to him? Rav Diskin explains as follows: When Hashem delivers a prophetic message to a prophet, it must first "materialize" into a worldly vision, one that is within the grasp of the prophet. The prophet must then apply himself to the task of understanding the meaning of the vision. Ultimately, the accuracy of his interpretation will depend on how closely he grasps the ways of the Creator, or how much he has subordinated himself to the Divine Will. The barrier of physicality that stands between the prophet and heaven "clouds" the prophet's vision.

Does that mean that sometimes a prophet can "miss the point?" If he can "misread" his vision, at times, how are we ever to know whether his prophecy can be relied upon? Rav Diskin answers that even if a prophet does not grasp all the fine points, and interprets part of it other than ideally, his interpretation will certainly come true. Once he is appointed to be a prophet of Hashem, he is entrusted with "prophetic license" to interpret the Divine communications that reach him as he sees fit, and Hashem will follow through based on the prophet's interpretation. The concept of a Divine message being subject to human explication is, after all, not a new one. With regard to meaningful dreams (which our Sages term "a minor prophecy," Berachot 57b), we are told that "Dreams are fulfilled according to the interpretation that one suggests for them." (Berachot 55b -- This concept in fact has parallels in the license afforded to Talmudic scholars to interpret the Written Law based on the 13 principles of the Oral Law).

Moshe, though, was different from all other prophets. He obtained the loftiest spiritual level that a man of flesh and blood can attain -- he totally subordinated his will to that of the Creator (Bamidbar 12:3). His grasp of the Divine Will was therefore total; his visions were through a "clear glass."

Hashem chose to grant the gift of prophecy to a gentile, and Bil'am was chosen for the position (Rashi 22:5). It was to be expected that he would prophesy through an "unclear glass," like most prophets. But this could have had grave consequences. Bil'am, with his terribly unrefined character (Avot 5:19), would certainly have "seen" in his vision a perverted view of Hashem's message. What would have happened had he interpreted it as a sign of calamity for Israel, instead of a sign of their redemption! Since prophecy is fulfilled according to the interpretation of the prophet, this could have had dire results!

In order to avoid this, Hashem changed the ordinary manner of prophecy in this one case. Bil'am was shown crystal-clear, pure visions -- he was treated to the unadulterated word of Hashem. ("What Hashem puts in my mouth, I shall speak" -- 22:38.) There was nothing for him to misinterpret and mis-foretell.

We can now answer our original question. The Sifri does not mean to propose the preposterous suggestion that Bil'am reached as lofty a level as Moshe. It means that there was one particular aspect of prophecy that no prophet shared with Moshe but Bil'am. That is, as far as clarity of prophecy is concerned, Bil'am's visions were as clear and unfiltered as Moshe's own visions.

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IMPURE LIPS - Yevamos 49 - Daf Yomi

Rava states that (King) Menasheh accused Yeshaya HaNavi of being a Navi Sheker, pointing out a number of statements made by Yeshaya that seemed inconsistent with the Torah. Yeshaya believed that Menasheh was not interested in his explanations and intended to kill him regardless, so he hid himself inside a tree. When Menasheh’s men struck the tree near Yeshaya’s mouth, Yeshaya died, because of a gratuitous remark he had once made, calling Bnei Yisroel “a nation of impure lips”.

Kehilas Prozdor cites the Orchos Tzadikim (shaar haka’as) who points out that because Moshe criticized the tribes of Gad and Reuven, accusing them of being sinful, Moshe’s descendant ended up a priest of idolatry. Thus, we see the consequences of a reluctance to judge positively, and of careless insults, even when true.

The Gemara (Kesubos 17a) asks: How should one dance before a bride?, and Beis Shamai says she is to be described as she is, while Beis Hillel opines that she is always to be described as pleasant. Beis Shamai asks Beis Hillel: How is one permitted to one lie? To which Beis Hillel replies, shouldn’t one praise a buyer’s purchase to him? It seems as if Beis Hillel is avoiding the question. On the other hand, how can Beis Shamai just ignore the requirement to judge positively?

The Mishneh Halachos (12:278) suggests that Beis Hillel’s reply was to distinguish between one who asks about the kallah at the beginning (should he even meet her?), versus after they are married. If someone comes to ask about her at the beginning, Beis Hillel would agree that one must speak the truth. To do otherwise would transgress the prohibition against offering bad advice. (See the Gemora in Kesubos 75a-b where not all failings or blemishes are visible.) However, after they are married, to speak the truth (where the truth is not pleasant) would produce nothing but pain. Here, Beis Hillel argues, one must judge positively that there is something pleasant about her. For this reason, Beis Hillel used a comparison to a buyer, after he had purchased.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 49 - Highlights

The Mishna states: How is a mamzer produced? Rabbi Akiva says: Any union with a relative subject to a negative prohibition will produce a mamzer. Shimon Hatimni said: A mamzer can only be produced from a marriage which is punishable by kares and the halacha follows his words. Rabbi Yehoshua said: A mamzer can only be produced from a marriage which one is subject to a court-imposed execution.

Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: “I found a scroll of lineage in Yerushalayim and the following was written in it: ‘So-and-So is a mamzer because he was born from an illicit relationship with a married woman.’ This corroborates the words of Rabbi Yehoshua.”

The Mishna continues: If one’s wife died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If he divorced his wife and then she died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If he divorced her and then she married someone else and then she died, he is permitted to marry her sister.

If one’s yevamah died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If he performed chalitzah with her and then she died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If he performed chalitzah with her and then she married someone else and then she died, he is permitted to marry her sister. (49a)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural source for Rabbi Akiva’s opinion that any union with a relative subject to a negative prohibition will produce a mamzer.

Rabbi Simai adds: Any woman who is subject to a negative prohibition (even if she is not a relative) will produce a mamzer.

Rabbi Yesheivav adds: Any woman who is subject to a positive prohibition will produce a mamzer.

The Gemora provides the Scriptural sources for those opinions as well.

The Gemora provides the Scriptural sources for the respective opinions of Shimon Hatimni and Rabbi Yehoshua as well. (49a)

Abaye said: Everyone agrees that one who cohabits with a niddah (menstruant) or a husband who cohabits with his sotah (adulterous wife) that the children born from them will not be a mamzer.

Abaye explains his reasoning: A niddah cannot produce a mamzer because kiddushin would take effect with her (and the principle is that a mamzer can only result from a woman who kiddushin will not take effect with). A sotah also cannot produce a mamzer because kiddushin would take effect with her.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Abaye’s position. The braisa states: Everyone agrees that one who cohabits with a niddah or a husband who cohabits with his sotah or one who cohabits with a woman awaiting yibum that the children born from them will not be a mamzer.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t Abaye mention the case of one who cohabits with a woman awaiting yibum?

The Gemora answers: Abaye was uncertain if the halacha follows Rav or Shmuel (who dispute if kiddushin takes effect with one who cohabits with a woman awaiting yibum). (49b)

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: “I found a scroll of genealogical records in Yerushalayim and the following was written in it: ‘So-and-So is a mamzer because he was born from an illicit relationship with a married woman.’ This corroborates the words of Rabbi Yehoshua.”

The Gemora cites a related braisa: Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: “I found a scroll of lineage in Yerushalayim and the following was written in it: ‘So-and-So is a mamzer because he was born from an illicit relationship with a married woman.’ The following was also written in it: ‘The teachings of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov are few but clean.’ The following was also written in it: ‘Menasheh killed Yeshaya.’”

Rava said that Menasheh the king of Israel justified his killing of Yeshaya (who incidentally was Menasheh’s uncle) because Yeshaya's prophesies contradicted those of Moshe Rabbeinu. Moshe declared that one cannot see HaShem, yet you, Yeshaya, declared that you saw HaShem sitting on His high and lofty throne.

Moshe wondered, “Who is like HaShem our G-d, whenever we call to Him?” whereas you stated, “Seek Hashem when He can be found,” implying that HaShem is not readily available.

Moshe Rabbeinu stated, “I (HaShem) shall fill the number of your days,” which implies that HaShem will not add to ones lifespan, whereas you said to King Chizkiyah, “I (HaShem) will add fifteen years to your life.”

Yeshaya, upon hearing these accusations, said to himself, “I know that Menasheh will not accept my rebuttal of his arguments, and if I respond, I will make Menasheh a wanton killer, as he will feel justified in killing me. (Rather, I will run away.)” Yeshaya then uttered the Name of HaShem and was swallowed by a cedar tree. Menasheh had the cedar tree cut down and when the axe reached Yeshaya’s mouth, Yeshaya was killed, because Yeshaya had declared, “I dwell among a people with impure lips.” These words were not a prophecy from HaShem. Rather, Yeshaya uttered these words on his own, and for this reason he was killed.

The Gemora asks: How can we reconcile the contradictory verses?

The Gemora answers: Yeshaya was able to declare that he saw HaShem sitting on His high and lofty throne even though Moshe had declared that one cannot see HaShem because of the following braisa: All prophets viewed their prophecy through an unclear glass whereas Moshe viewed his prophecy through a clear glass.

The Gemora turns its attention to the second contradiction: When Yeshaya had stated, “Seek Hashem when He can be found,” implying that HaShem is not readily available; that is referring to the prayer of an individual (he can overcome an evil decree only during specific times of the year). Moshe, who wondered, “Who is like HaShem our G-d, whenever we call to Him?” was referring to the communal prayers; they have the ability to overturn an evil decree any time during the year.

The Gemora asks: When during the year will HaShem answer the prayer of an individual?

Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: These are the ten days between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. (49b)

[END]

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CONVERT DELAYING - Yevamos 48 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cites a braisa regarding converts: Rabbi Chanania son of Rabban Gamliel said: Why are converts nowadays afflicted, and suffer constant hardships? It is because they did not observe the seven Noahide laws prior to their conversion.

Rabbi Yosi disagrees because a convert is regarded as a newborn baby; he cannot be punished for sins committed before his conversion. The reason they are afflicted is because they do not observe all the details of each mitzvah like other Jews do.

Abba Chanan said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: It is because they do not fulfill the mitzvos out of love, but rather out of fear.

Others say: It is because they delayed in entering under the wings of the Shechinah.

The commentators ask on this last reason: Is there an obligation for an idolater to convert; he is not commanded to observe all the mitzvos? Furthermore, we even attempt to dissuade him from converting; how can they be punished for tarrying?

Reb Yaakov Emden answers: The Gemora is referring to the time that they delayed after they reached their conclusion that they plan on converting. Once they have decided to enter under the wings of the Shechinah, and nevertheless, they delay, they are punished for this laziness.

Based on this, he answers a question posed by Tosfos. The Gemora derives that a convert is punished for delaying from the blessing that Boaz bestowed on Rus. Rus converted expeditiously, and was therefore rewarded. Tosfos asks that it emerges from the pesukim and through calculations that Rus was extremely old when she converted; how can the Gemora state that she did not delay? Reb Yaakov Emden explains: Perhaps she was old when she converted, but once she decided to convert, she did not waste any time, and converted immediately.

Reb Avi Lebowitz uses this interpretation to explain why the braisa (47b) had stated: If he accepts, we circumcise him immediately. The Gemora explains: This is because we apply the principle that we do not delay the performance of a mitzvah. Perhaps the concern with delaying is not from the perspective of Beis Din, but rather we encourage the convert to act quickly, so that he will not be punished for delaying the process.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 48 - Highlights

The braisa had stated: When he heals, we immerse him immediately, and two Torah scholars stand over him, and notify him regarding a few simple commandments, and a few stringent commandments.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rabbi Chiya bar Abba say in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that a convert requires three judges?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yochanan said to the one who recorded the braisa: It should be emended to say three Torah scholars. (47b)

The braisa had stated: This process applies to a convert and to a freed servant.

The Gemora assumes that this is referring to the obligation of accepting the yoke of mitzvos at the time of his immersion.

The Gemora asks a contradiction from a braisa which states that a freed servant is not required to accept the yoke of mitzvos at that time (because he has already been observing many mitzvos as a slave, and the obligation for the remainder of the mitzvos happen automatically when he becomes a full-fledged Jew).

Rav Sheishes answers: The two braisos reflect two different opinions. The second braisa is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar, and the first braisa follows the viewpoint of the Rabbis.

The Gemora cites the dispute: It was taught in a braisa: (The braisa is discussing the laws pertaining to a yefas toar, the idolater woman taken during war by a Jewish soldier. The Torah permits him to take her home with him, and marry her. However, there are laws that are applicable prior to the marriage. She must shave her head, grow her nails long, remove her nice clothing, and endure a month-long period of mourning. She then immerses herself for the sake of conversion.) When must the woman follow the prescribed procedure? Only if she had not accepted to observe the mitzvos beforehand; however, if she already accepted to observe the mitzvos, he immerses her in the mikvah, and then he may marry her. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar says: Even if she did not accept to observe the mitzvos, he can force her and immerse her for the sake of slavery, and then immerse her for the sake of freedom, and then he frees her (thereby, he marry her as a Jewess without having to go through with the entire procedure of yefas toar). (It emerges that the point of contention between the Tannaim is if they are required to accept the yoke of mitzvos when they are being immersed for freedom.) (47b – 48a)

Rava provides the Scriptural source for Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar’s opinion. We derive from the verses cited that a master may circumcise his slave even without his consent, but an idolater who is converting may not circumcise his adult son against his will.

The Rabbis (who maintain that a slave cannot be immersed for the sake of freedom without his consent) use this verse for Shmuel’s halacha that a master who declares his slave ownerless, the slave goes out to freedom and it is not necessary to write a document of emancipation. (48a)

Rav Pappa asks: Perhaps the Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar only in respect to a yefas toar; there the Rabbis maintain that she cannot be forced to immerse because she was not previously obligated in any mitzvos. However, in regards to a slave, who was obligated in mitzvos beforehand, perhaps the Rabbis would concede that he can be converted even without his acceptance of mitzvos.

Rav Pappa cites a braisa that would seem to indicate that this distinction is indeed correct. The braisa states: A convert and a slave purchased from an idolater require an acceptance of the mitzvos (by the second immersion). We can infer from here that if the slave would be purchased from a Jew and then he would free him, the slave would not be required to accept the mitzvos.

The braisa cannot be following Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar’s opinion since he maintains that all slaves do not require an acceptance of the mitzvos during immersion for the sake of becoming free. It is obviously reflecting the opinion of the Rabbis, and thus we can learn from it that a slave purchased from an idolater require an acceptance of the mitzvos, but if the slave would be purchased from a Jew and then he would free him, the slave would not be required to accept the mitzvos.

The braisa cited above that equated a convert with a freed slave is not discussing the obligation to accept the mitzvos (since everyone agrees that a slave purchased from a Jew would not be required to accept the mitzvos), but rather, it is teaching us that they are required to immerse in a mikvah. (48a)

The Gemora presents a dispute regarding a yefas toar. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the Torah requires her to cut her nails (even though, it does not make her unattractive). Rabbi Akiva holds that she is required to let her nails grow. The Gemora provides Scriptural sources for their respective opinions. (48a)

The Gemora presents another dispute regarding a yefas toar. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that she should weep for her actual father and mother (that she is separated from them). Rabbi Akiva holds that the Torah is referring to her pagan religion. (48a – 48b)

The Gemora presents another dispute regarding a yefas toar. One Tanna maintains that she should mourn for thirty days. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar holds that she should mourn for ninety days. (48b)

The Gemora presents a dispute regarding a Canaanite slave. Rabbi Yishmael maintains that one is permitted to keep slaves that are uncircumcised (they have not undergone even the first stage of conversion). Rabbi Akiva disagrees. The Gemora provides Scriptural sources for their respective opinions. (48b)

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: If one purchases a slave from an idolater and he does not want to be circumcised (the initial stage of conversion), he may keep him for twelve months. Afterwards, he must sell him back to an idolater.

The students reported this ruling to Rav Pappa, and they asked him: According to whom was this braisa stated? It is evidently not following Rabbi Akiva’s opinion for he ruled that one is prohibited against keeping slaves that are uncircumcised (they have not undergone even the first stage of conversion).

Rav Pappa said to them: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s ruling can indeed follow Rabbi Akiva’s opinion for Rabbi Akiva only said that you cannot keep him if he never said that he would convert; however, where the slave initially said that he would convert and then changed his mind, Rabbi Akiva would concede that you may keep him up to twelve months. (48b)

Ravin sent a message that all of his teachers said in the name of Rabbi Ilai: If one purchases a slave from an idolater with the explicit intention of not circumcising him (the initial stage of conversion), he may keep him.

The students reported this ruling to Rav Pappa, and they asked him: According to whom was this braisa stated? It is evidently not following Rabbi Akiva’s opinion for he ruled that one is prohibited against keeping slaves that are uncircumcised (they have not undergone even the first stage of conversion).

Rav Pappa said to them: Rabbi Ilai’s ruling can indeed follow Rabbi Akiva’s opinion for Rabbi Akiva only said that you cannot keep him if he did not stipulate that he will not circumcise him, but if he made an explicit condition that he will not circumcise him, he may keep him. (48b)

The Gemora cites a braisa regarding converts: Rabbi Chanania son of Rabban Gamliel said: Why are converts nowadays afflicted, and suffer constant hardships? It is because they did not observe the seven Noahide laws prior to their conversion.

Rabbi Yosi disagrees because a convert is regarded as a newborn baby; he cannot be punished for sins committed before his conversion. The reason they are afflicted is because they do not observe all the details of each mitzvah like other Jews do.

Abba Chanan said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: It is because they do not fulfill the mitzvos out of love, but rather out of fear.

Others say: It is because they delayed in entering under the wings of the Shechinah. (48b)

[END]

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TEACHING TORAH TO A GENTILE PLANNING ON CONVERTING - Yevamos 47 - Daf Yomi

The Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 14:2) writes that we inform the prospective convert the essentials of the faith, which is the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry, and they go on at great length about these matters.

The Machaneh Chaim ((Y”D II, 45) asks: Why isn’t this forbidden on account of a gentile studying Torah? The Gemora in Sanhedrin (59a) states explicitly that a non-Jew who studies Torah is liable for death.

He answers by citing a Medrash Tanchuma in Parshas Vayelech: The numerical value of Torah is six hundred and eleven. The remaining two mitzvos which complete the six hundred and thirteen are the two mitzvos which were given by Hashem directly at Har Sinai. This is the explanation of the verse: The Torah that Moshe commanded us to observe. Moshe instructed us regarding six hundred and eleven mitzvos; the other two were from Hashem.

The prohibition against teaching an idolater Torah is only applicable to the six hundred and eleven mitzvos that Moshe taught us. The other two, I am Hashem your God and the Unity of God; one would be permitted to teach to them. This is where the Rambam derived his ruling from; we can go on with great length discussing the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) writes that it is permitted to teach Torah to an idolater who wishes to convert. He proves this from the incident with Hillel and the convert.

Reb Akiva Eiger (41) disagrees and maintains that it is forbidden to teach Torah to an idolater even if he is planning on converting. Hillel taught the convert Torah only after he converted.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 47 - Highlights

Rabbah said: An incident occurred at the house of Rabbi Chiya Beribi, and Rav Yosef said that Rabbi Oshaya Beribi was there as well, and Rav Safra said that Rabbi Oshaya the son of Rabbi Chiya was there as well. A convert that was circumcised, but had not yet converted came before them in order to complete the conversion process. Rabbi Chiya Beribi said to him: “Wait here until tomorrow, and we will immerse you then.”

The Gemora states that we can derive three halachos from this. Learn from here that a conversion must be in the presence of three men. Learn from here that a conversion is not valid unless he has been circumcised and underwent immersion. And learn from here that we do not immerse a convert at night.

The Gemora asks: Can’t we learn from here that three experts are required in order for the conversion to be valid?

The Gemora answers: Perhaps, it just happened to transpire in that manner, but halachically, it would not be necessary. (46b)

The Gemora cites a braisa: One who arrives and says that he is a convert; he is not believed. If he comes with his witnesses, he is believed. Rabbi Yehudah maintains (based on a Scriptural verse) that in Eretz Yisroel, he would be required to bring a proof (we are concerned that he is a circumcised idolater who wants to reap the benefits of Eretz Yisroel); outside of Eretz Yisroel, a proof is not necessary. The Chachamim hold that he always must bring a proof.

The Gemora asks: If he has witnesses with him that he converted, why is it necessary to cite a Scriptural verse that he would be trusted?

Rav Sheishes answers: The witnesses are testifying that they heard that he converted in a certain Beis Din (but they themselves did not see the conversion); the passuk teaches us that they are believed (since we will eventually find out anyway).

The Gemora explains that according to the Chachamim, one might have thought that we would not accept converts in Eretz Yisroel; perhaps they are only converting because of the goodness of Eretz Yisroel, and even nowadays that the land is not flowing with milk and honey, there is still leket, shic’chah, pe’ah and ma’aser oni (the commandment of leaving certain portions of his land or produce for the poor); the passuk teaches us that they are accepted even in Eretz Yisroel. (46b – 47a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: A conversion is effective if he converts in the presence of Beis Din. If he converts in private, it is not valid.

There was an incident where a man came before Rabbi Yehudah and said: “I converted in private.” Rabbi Yehudah asked him: “Do you have any witnesses?” He replied: “No.” “Do you have children?” The man answered: “Yes.” Rabbi Yehudah said to him: “You are believed to disqualify yourself, but not in respect to your children.”

The Gemora asks: Did Rabbi Yehudah really say that he is not believed regarding his children? But we learned in a braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: Just as a man is believed to say that this is his firstborn son, so too, he is believed to say that his son is a son of a divorcee or a chalutzah (and if he is a Kohen, this will render the son a chalal, and he will be disqualified from the Kehunah). The Chachamim say: He is not believed.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers: Rabbi Yehudah told the man that he is not believed regarding his children because according to his words, he is an idolater, and an idolater cannot provide testimony.

Ravina answers: Rabbi Yehudah told the man that he is not believed regarding his children because he has grandchildren as well, and since he would not be believed regarding the grandchildren, he is not believed to disqualify his children either.

The Gemora cites a braisa providing support for Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s answer. Rabbi Yehudah said: A man will be believed regarding his minor son, but not regarding his adult son. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba explained in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A “minor” is referring to a son who does not have children, and an “adult” is referring to a son who does have children. (47a)

The Gemora cites a braisa which describes the process of becoming a convert. The Rabbis taught: If at the present time (when the Beis HaMikdash is not standing) a man desires to convert, he is to be addressed as follows: “What prompted you to convert? Do you know that at the present time the Jewish people are persecuted, oppressed, despised and harassed, and hardships are constantly upon them?” If he replies, “I know, and yet I am unworthy,” we accept him immediately.

We notify him regarding a few simple commandments, and a few stringent commandments. We inform him of the sin of neglecting the leket, shic’chah, pe’ah and ma’aser oni. We inform him of the punishment for violating the commandments, as follows: We say to him: Be aware that until you have come to this measure, if you would have eaten cheilev (forbidden fats), you would not have been punished with kares. If you would have desecrated the Shabbos, you would not have been punished with stoning. But now, if you eat cheilev, you will be punished with kares. If you desecrate the Shabbos, you will be punished with stoning.

And just as we notify him of the punishment for violating the commandments, so too, we notify him of the reward for fulfilling the commandments, as follows: We say to him: Be aware that the World to Come is made only for the righteous, and presently, the Jewish people are not able to receive
too much goodness or too much punishment.

We do not overwhelm him (by speaking too much about punishments that might dissuade him), and we do not specify all the details of each transgression.

If he accepts, we circumcise him immediately. If there are any shreds remaining which invalidate the circumcision, we circumcise him another time. When he heals, we immerse him immediately, and two Torah scholars stand over him, and notify him regarding a few simple commandments, and a few stringent commandments. He immerses and when he comes up, he is like a Jew regarding all matters.

If it is a woman converting, women place her in the water up to her neck, and two Torah scholars stand outside, and notify her regarding a few simple commandments, and a few stringent commandments.

This process applies to a convert and to a freed servant. And in the place where a menstruant immerses (a kosher mikvah), there too, a convert and freed servant immerse. And anything that causes a chatzitzah by tumah, is regarded as a chatzitzah by a convert, by a freed servant, and by a menstruant. (47a – 47b)

The Gemora proceeds to analyze the braisa. The braisa had stated: If a man desires to convert, he is to be addressed as follows: “What prompted you to convert? We notify him regarding a few simple commandments, and a few stringent commandments.

The Gemora asks: Why do we attempt to discourage him from converting?

The Gemora answers: If he chooses to abandon his attempt to convert, we let him do so, for Rabbi Chelbo said: Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as sapachas (a type of tzara’as). (47b)

The braisa had stated: We inform him of the sin of neglecting the leket, shic’chah, pe’ah and ma’aser oni.

The Gemora asks: Why are these mitzvos chosen?

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba answered in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: A Noahite is executed for stealing even if the item is worth less than a perutah, and it does not need to be returned. (Informing him about the obligations to provide for the poor will deter him from converting.)(47b)

The braisa had stated: We do not overwhelm him (by speaking too much about punishments that might dissuade him), and we do not specify all the details of each transgression.

Rabbi Elozar provides the Scriptural source which teaches us that we shall not excessively dissuade him from converting. It is written [Rus 1:18]: And when she (Naomi) saw that she (Rus) was steadfastly minded to go with her, she stopped speaking unto her.

Naomi said to Rus: “It is forbidden to go beyond the techum boundary on Shabbos.” Rus replied: “Wherever you will go, I will go.” Naomi said: “We are not permitted to seclude ourselves with a forbidden member of the opposite gender.” Rus answered: “Wherever you will lie, I will lie.” Naomi continued: “We are obligated to observe six hundred and thirteen mitzvos.” Rus responded: “Your nation is my nation.” Naomi persisted: “We are prohibited from practicing idolatry.” Rus replied: “Your God is my God.” Naomi argued: “There are four types of capital punishment administered by Beis Din.” Rus answered: “Wherever you die, I shall die.” Naomi said: “there are two different cemeteries given over to Beis Din.” Rus responded: “And there I will be buried.” At this point, Naomi realized that Rus truly wished to convert, and she stopped trying to discourage her. (47b)

The braisa had stated: If he accepts, we circumcise him immediately.

The Gemora explains: This is because we apply the principle that we do not delay the performance of a mitzvah. (47b)

The braisa had stated: When he heals, we immerse him immediately.

The Gemora asks: Why don’t we immerse him before he is healed?

The Gemora answers: It is because water irritates a wound. (47b)

[END]

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Coffee Heated by a Gentile - Yevamos 46 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states: Anything which is normally eaten raw is not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking. (Water does not need to be heated and therefore should not be subject to this prohibition.)

The Radvaz in his teshuvos (3:637) writes: It is permitted to drink coffee heated by a gentile and it is not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking; even though coffee cannot be eaten in its raw state, it is something which does not eaten at a king’s table as an accompaniment to the bread and therefore it is permitted. There is also no concern that they cooked something forbidden in those pots beforehand, since it is well known that they have designated utensils for the coffee (because otherwise, the taste of the coffee would be ruined). He concludes: One should not drink coffee in the accompaniment of gentiles since that will result in many transgressions.

It is brought like that in the Hagahos from the Maharikash (114) as well. He rules that one should be stringent about drinking coffee in a coffee house of gentiles, similar to the halacha regarding wine and beer. Furthermore, it is considered a moishev leitzim (i.e. a session of jesters) and should be avoided.

The Knesses Hagedolah in his sefer Ba’ey Chayei (Y”D 145) disagrees and maintains that coffee heated by a gentile is prohibited to drink. He states: Anything which is eaten or drunk at the royal table by itself, even if it does not come as an accompaniment to the bread is subject to the prohibition of gentile cooking. Furthermore, the requirement that the food must be something that accompanies bread on the royal table is limited to food items, not liquids. He continues: “Even though when I was younger, I would rely on those who ruled that it is permitted, I have now investigated it thoroughly and cannot find a reason for its permission and therefore I refrain from drinking it.” He found that the Arizal prohibited drinking coffee heated by a gentile. He concludes that he is not prohibiting it for the public, but he himself refrained from drinking it.

Pri Chadash (114:6) writes that it is permitted based on Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 31b): Wheat is nullified in water in regards to reciting the blessing of shehakol, so too it is nullified in regards to the prohibition against gentile cooking. Similarly, the coffee is nullified in the boiling water that it is being cooked with and it is therefore not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking.

Teshuvos Beis Yehudah (Y”D 21) objects to the reasoning of the Pri Chadash. The Gemora Brochos (39a) rules: The proper blessing on water which was cooked with vegetables is ha’adamah and this is the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (205:2). The reasoning is based on the fact that this is the common method for these vegetables. Accordingly, the blessing on coffee should be ha’adamah as well. Our custom of reciting shehakol on coffee is astounding, but we cannot add to this novelty by being lenient with the prohibition against gentile cooking.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in his sefer Mor U’ktziah (204) writes that actually the proper blessing on coffee should be ha’eitz since it is a fruit from a tree and that was the original intent of those that planted the coffee beans; to drink from the liquid. He concludes that the custom is to recite a shehakol anyway, similar to date beer and barley beer.

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Bishul Akum - Yevamos 46 - Daf Yomi

by Rabbi Neustadt

Question: With so many women today in the work force, is it permitted for non-Jewish household help to cook kosher food in one’s kitchen if the cooking is done under the supervision of an observant Jew?

Discussion: With the intention of limiting social interaction between Jews and non-Jews — for socializing is often the first step towards assimilation, the Rabbis decreed against eating certain types of perfectly kosher food which were cooked, baked or roasted by a non-Jew, even if a Jew supervised the entire process from beginning to end. This is the Rabbinical prohibition known as bishul akum. Even b’diavad, if a non-Jew cooked these foods ─ whether in the home of a Jew or in a manufacturing plant ─ it is forbidden (in many cases) to eat them; the cooked food is now considered non-kosher even though the raw food was totally kosher before being cooked by the non-Jew.[1] The pots and pans which in which the food was cooked would — in some cases — have to undergo a koshering process before one would be allowed to use them again for kosher food.[2]

Question: Which types of foods are susceptible to the restrictions of bishul akum?

Discussion: There are basically two criteria which define the type of food which is forbidden because of bishul akum:

· The food must be “important” — that is, food that would be suitable fare for a dinner served to dignitaries. Thus most dishes of poultry, meat, potatoes, pasta, eggs or fish are included, as long as they are prepared in a manner in which important people are customarily served in a formal setting. Candies, potato chips,[3] Pringles, beer, breakfast cereals, canned tuna salmon and sardines,[4] popcorn, etc. are not considered “important” foods no matter how skillfully and tastefully they are prepared.

· Foods which are edible raw (under normal conditions[5]) are exempt from the prohibition of bishul akum, even it they were cooked. Thus most fruits and vegetables, cheeses, water, milk and peanut butter, for example, are exempt from bishul akum, even if they were prepared in a manner fit for a king, since all of these foods are edible when in a raw state.[6]

Question: We have established that “cooking” by a non-Jew renders the food bishul akum. Does that mean that a non-Jew may not participate in any phase of food preparation?

Discussion: The only phase of food preparation that is forbidden to a non-Jew is to place the pot or pan on the stove or inside the oven. The non-Jew may cut, chop, grind, grate, mix, season, etc. He may also turn on the gas or electricity in the stove or oven, regulate the temperature throughout, stir or baste the food while it is cooking, and remove the food once it is cooked or baked. All this is permitted l’chatchilah, as long as the non-Jew is being supervised to ascertain that no kashrus laws are transgressed.[7]

Question: If the non-Jew has already placed the food on the stove or into the oven but has not yet turned on the fire, can the food still qualify as bishul Yisrael?

Discussion: As long as the Jew turns on the fire, the food is considered bishul Yisrael. But, l’chatchilah, this should only be relied upon in this exact case, where the food is already on the stove or in the oven and the fire is being lit after the food has been placed on the stove or in the oven.[8] In the reverse case, where first the Jew turned on the fire and then the non-Jew placed the food on the stove or in the oven, some poskim hold that this is not considered bishul Yisrael. B’diavad, however, most poskim maintain that the food is not considered bishul akum and is permitted to be eaten.[9]

Question: If the non-Jew has already turned on the fire and placed the pot or pan on the stove or inside the oven but the food is not yet completely cooked and ready to eat, can the food still be salvaged and not considered bishul akum?

Discussion: There yet remain three options for the food to be considered bishul Yisrael:

· Remove the pot or pan from the fire or the oven, hold it for a moment, and then replace it. This is permitted l’chatchilah.

· Stir, mix or flip the food over while the pot or pan is still on the fire.

· Regulate the temperature of the fire, either by raising it a bit to hasten the cooking or by lowering it a bit to prevent burning or singeing.

However, if the food is already completely cooked and ready to be eaten, it is too late to avail oneself of any of these three options. The food is considered bishul akum.

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NOT KOSHER ENOUGH - Yevamos 45 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that Rav also ruled that the child is fit. There was once a man who came to Rav and asked him: “What is the law regarding a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess?” Rav said: “The child is fit.” The man said: “If so, give me your daughter to marry (the man was from such a union).” Rav replied: “I will not give her to you.” Shimi bar Chiya said to Rav: “People say, ‘A camel in Medea dances in a kav (a camel can dance with its four legs in a small jar – an saying which means that people invent far-fetched stories from far away places that cannot be substantiated).’ We have the kav and the camel, and this is Medea, but it is not dancing (if you ruled that it is permitted, give your daughter to him in marriage).” Rav answered: “Even if he were as great as Yehoshua son of Nun, I would not give my daughter to him.” Shimi told Rav: “If he were as great as Yehoshua son of Nun, even if you will not give him your daughter, others would certainly give him theirs; however, regarding this man, if you do not give him your daughter, nobody will.” Rav refused to change his mind and the man did not leave Rav. Rav gazed upon the man, and he died.

The Gemora states: Rav Masneh also ruled that the child is fit. Rav Yehudah also permitted the child. A man from such a union came to Rav Yehudah and Rav Yehudah said to him: “Go to a place where they will not recognize you, and you can marry a Jewess, or stay here and marry someone of your same type. Rava told the man the same advice.

*** Could Rav have said, “Even if he is as great as Moshe Rabbeinu”?

*** Why didn’t Rav want to give his daughter to him if he himself ruled that the man was qualified?

*** Why did Rav have him killed?

*** How could they give advice to go to another city where they will not be recognized? Shouldn’t this be gneivas da’as?

*** Does lifnei iver apply by a chumrah?

*** Can you sell or give someone something that is kosher, but not according to all opinions?

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 45 - Highlights

Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Everyone agrees that a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be a mamzer.

The Gemora explains: Even Shimon Hatimni, who maintains that a marriage which is subject to a negative prohibition will not produce a mamzer, will agree in this case since kiddushin does not take effect with them. It would be similar to the halacha regarding women who are subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora asks from a braisa: A Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be a mamzer. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehudah maintains that a mamzer can only be produced from a marriage which is punishable by kares. This Tanna follows Shimon Hatimni’s opinion and nevertheless, he does not agree by a Canaanite slave or an idolater.

Rav Yosef explains Rabbi Yochanan’s statement differently: Rabbi Yochanan is referring to Rebbe. Although Rebbe quoted Rabbi Akiva who holds that a chalutzah is like an ervah in respect to the child being a mamzer (since he maintains that any union with a relative subject to a negative prohibition will produce a mamzer), Rebbe does not subscribe to this view; nevertheless, Rebbe would agree that a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be a mamzer.

This is known because Rav Dimi arrived in Bavel from Eretz Yisroel, he said in the name of Rav Yitzchak in the name of Rebbe that a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be a mamzer.

Rabbi Acha Lord of the Birah and Rabbi Tanchum son of Rabbi Chiya, who was a resident of Kfar Acco ransomed Jewish Captive women who were coming from Armon to Teveria. There was one woman among them who became pregnant from an idolater. They came before Rabbi Ami, and he said: Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Elozar and Rabbi Chanina all say that a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be a mamzer.

Rav Yosef asked: What is special about listing names who all hold the same way? Rav and Shmuel from Bavel, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and Bar Kappara from Eretz Yisroel (and some omit Bar Kappara’s name and insert instead the Elders of the South) say: A Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be fit.

Rav Yosef said: The child is indeed a mamzer because Rav Dimi arrived in Bavel from Eretz Yisroel, and said in the name of Rav Yitzchak in the name of Rebbe that a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be a mamzer. Rebbe’s opinion is authoritative.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that the child is damaged.

The Gemora analyzes this ruling: The child cannot be a mamzer because Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said before that the child is fit. He must mean that the child is tainted for the Kehunah.

This is derived through a kal vachomer from the prohibition of a widow to a Kohen Gadol. The prohibition regarding a widow is not applicable to all men, only to a Kohen Gadol, and nevertheless, a child from such a union will be tainted for the Kehunah; then certainly regarding a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, which is applicable to everyone, the child should be tainted for the Kehunah.

The Gemora asks on this kal vachomer: We cannot bring proof from a widow because we rule strictly there; a widow who cohabitates with a Kohen Gadol becomes disqualified herself. Perhaps that is the reason that the child will be tainted for the Kehunah. A Jewess, who cohabits with a Canaanite slave or an idolater does not become disqualified for Kehunah; perhaps the child is not tainted either.

The Gemora answers: A Jewess, who cohabits with a Canaanite slave or an idolater does become disqualified for Kehunah. Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon: From where do we know that a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Kohenes, Leviah or Yisraelis will render her unfit to eat terumah? He cites a verse in Vayikra 22:13 which teaches us that a Kohenes who marries a non-Kohen is not permitted to eat terumah. If she should become widowed or divorced without having any children, she returns to her father’s house and may eat terumah. This is only when she was legally married to someone who can cause her to become a widow or get divorced; a Canaanite slave or an idolater are excluded because they cannot cause her to become a widow or get divorced. We learn from here that a Jewess, who cohabits with a Canaanite slave or an idolater does become disqualified for Kehunah. (44b – 45a)

Abaye asked Rav Yosef: Why were you relying on Rav Dimi’s report in the name of Rebbe; why don’t you rely on Ravin? When Ravin came to Bavel from Eretz Yisroel he said: Rabbi Nosson and Rebbe ruled that the child is fit.

The Gemora states that Rav also ruled that the child is fit. There was once a man who came to Rav and asked him: “What is the law regarding a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess?” Rav said: “The child is fit.” The man said: “If so, give me your daughter to marry (the man was from such a union).” Rav replied: “I will not give her to you.” Shimi bar Chiya said to Rav: “People say, ‘A camel in Medea dances in a kav (a camel can dance with its four legs in a small jar – an saying which means that people invent far-fetched stories from far away places that cannot be substantiated).’ We have the kav and the camel, and this is Medea, but it is not dancing (if you ruled that it is permitted, give your daughter to him in marriage).” Rav answered: “Even if he were as great as Yehoshua son of Nun, I would not give my daughter to him.” Shimi told Rav: “If he were as great as Yehoshua son of Nun, even if you will not give him your daughter, others would certainly give him theirs; however, regarding this man, if you do not give him your daughter, nobody will.” Rav refused to change his mind and the man did not leave Rav. Rav gazed upon the man, and he died.

The Gemora states: Rav Masneh also ruled that the child is fit. Rav Yehudah also permitted the child. A man from such a union came to Rav Yehudah and Rav Yehudah said to him: “Go to a place where they will not recognize you, and you can marry a Jewess, or stay here and marry someone of your same type. Rava told the man the same advice. (45a)

The residents of Bei Michsei inquired of Rabbah: One who is a half slave and half free who cohabits with a Jewess, what is the halacha regarding the child? He said to them: If the halacha regarding a complete slave is that the child is fit, certainly regarding half a slave, the halacha should be the same?

Rav Yosef said: Rav Yehudah said that a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be fit, but yet he also said that a half slave and half free who cohabits with a Jewess, the child does not have any remedy (he is a mamzer). How can this be?

The Gemora answers: Rav Yehudah is referring to a case where the half slave, half free man married a Jewess and then cohabited with her. It emerges that the portion of him that is still enslaved (where kiddushin is not effective) is cohabitating with a married woman (albeit, his own, and that would render the child a mamzer). (The ruling issued above that the child is fit and not a mamzer was referring to cases where the Jewess was unmarried, but if she would have been married, the child would be a mamzer.)

The Gemora asks: Didn’t the Nehardeans say in the name of Rabbi Yaakov that the one who considers this child a mamzer does so even in the case of an unmarried woman; and the one who maintains that the child is fit does so even in the case of a married woman?

The Gemora answers: Rav Yehudah is referring to a case where the half slave, half free man cohabited with a married woman (not his own). Here, the child is certainly a mamzer based on his free half. (45a – 45b)

Ravina said: Rav Gaza told me that Rabbi Yosi bar Avin visited our city, and there was a situation where a slave cohabited with an unmarried Jewess, and he ruled that the child is qualified; there was another situation regarding a married woman, and he ruled that the child is a mamzer.

Rav Sheishes related this incident differently: Rav Sheishes said: It wasn’t Rabbi Yosi bar Avin, but rather Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Zevida. He ruled that the child is qualified in the case of the unmarried woman and in the case of the married woman.

The Gemora issues a ruling: The halacha is that a Canaanite slave or an idolater who cohabits with a Jewess, the child born will be qualified whether in the case of the unmarried woman and whether in the case of the married woman. (45b)

Rava ruled that Rav Mari bar Rachel is qualified and he appointed him as an officer in Bavel. (Rav Mari’s mother, Rachel, was taken captive and Issur, one of her captors, cohabited with her. She gave birth to Mari. Issur later converted.) Rav Mari could be appointed an officer because his mother was Jewish, and therefore he was a Jew as well. (45b)

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TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY - Yevamos 44 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states: Whoever is subject to yibum is subject to chalitzah and whoever is not subject to yibum is not subject to chalitzah.

Tosfos asks: The halacha is that if the yavam or yevamah are deaf, they cannot perform chalitzah, but nonetheless are obligated to perform yibum. Shouldn’t we say that one who is not subject to chalitzah should not be subject for yibum either?

Tosfos answers: They in fact are fit for yibum; there is just a technical difficulty that chalitzah cannot be performed. In such cases, the principle does not apply.

Divrei Chaim (E”H I, 100) explains similarly regarding a yevamah who falls for yibum to a lame yavam. He cannot perform chalitzah, but nonetheless, there is an obligation for him to perform yibum. This is because there is no prohibition against performing a chalitzah, but rather, he is merely not fit to perform a yibum. In these cases, the principle does not apply.

Magen Avraham (O”C 39:5) cites our Tosfos and therefore rules that one whose left hand was cut off, and therefore cannot put tefillin on, is nevertheless qualified to write tefillin. Although we have a principle that whoever is included in the obligation of putting on tefillin is qualified to write tefillin, and one who is not obligated to wear tefillin cannot write tefillin; this person is permitted to write tefillin. He is included in the mitzvah; there is just a technical difficulty that he cannot wear tefillin.

Chikrei Leiv (E”H 46) comments that although most men do not have the capabilities to write their own get, they are nevertheless allowed to appoint an agent to write the get for them. Although there exists a principle that you cannot appoint an agent to perform something for you if you cannot do it yourself, that is only applicable where you are halachically disqualified from performing that task. Every person is halachically fit to write a get; he is just missing the expertise to accomplish it. This will not disqualify him from appointing an agent to write it on his behalf.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 44 - Highlights

The Mishna states: There were four brothers married to four women and then they all died childless; the eldest (surviving brother) has permission to perform yibum with all of them.

One who was married to two women and he died childless; the yibum or chalitzah with one of them releases her co-wife from any obligation.

If one of the women was qualified to marry a Kohen, and one was unfit to a Kohen; if the yavam will be performing chalitzah, he should do so with the one who is unfit, and if he is performing yibum, he should do so with the one who is qualified. (43b – 44a)

The Mishna had stated: There were four brothers married to four women and then they all died childless; the eldest (surviving brother) has permission to perform yibum with all of them.

The Gemora asks: We have learned in a braisa that the elders offer him good advice prior to performing a yibum. Wouldn’t they persuade him not to perform yibum with all four widows because he will not be able to provide for them?

The Gemora answers: We are referring to a case where he has the means to provide for them.

The Gemora asks: If so, why does the Mishna mention only four yevamos; he should be permitted to take even more?

The Gemora answers: it is good advice not to take more than four; this way, he will be able to engage in marital relations with each wife once every month. (44a)

The Mishna had stated: One who was married to two women and he died childless; the yibum or chalitzah with one of them releases her co-wife from any obligation.

The Gemora asks: Let him perform yibum with both of them?

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba answers in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: We derive from the verse that one may build only one house for his brother, not two.

The Gemora asks: Let him perform chalitzah with both of them?

Mar Zutra bar Tuvia answers: We derive from the verse that one may perform chalitzah with only one house of his brother, not two.

The Gemora asks: Let him perform a yibum with one and a chalitzah with the other?

The Gemora answers: Whoever is subject to yibum is subject to chalitzah and whoever is not subject to yibum is not subject to chalitzah.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps there is only a mitzvah of yibum if there is one widow; however, when there are two widows, there is no mitzvah altogether?

The Gemora answers: We derive form the fact that the Torah repeats the word “his yevamah,” “his yevamah” that there is an obligation even when there are two widows. (44a)

The Mishna had stated: If one of the women was qualified to marry a Kohen, and one was unfit to a Kohen; if the yavam will be performing chalitzah, he should do so with the one who is unfit, and if he is performing yibum, he should do so with the one who is qualified.

Rav Yosef said: Here is where Rebbe taught that a person should not spill out the extra waters from his pit when others may have a need for it. (If he is performing chalitzah anyway, which will render her forbidden to a Kohen, he should perform the chalitzah with the widow who is anyway disqualified to marry a Kohen.) (44a)

The Mishna states: One who remarries his divorcee, or one who marries his chalutzah, or one who marries the relative of his chalutzah is required to divorce her, and a child from that marriage will be a mamzer; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. The Chachamim say that the child is not a mamzer (since he only violated a negative prohibition, and not a kares prohibition).

The Chachamim admit that one who marries the relative of his divorcee that the child will be a mamzer (there would be kares in this situation). (44a)

The Gemora asks: Does Rabbi Akiva actually hold that one who marries the relative of his chalutzah the child is a mamzer? Didn’t Rish Lakish state: Here is where Rebbe stated: The prohibition of taking a divorcee’s sister is Biblical, whereas the prohibition of taking a chalutzah’s sister is merely Rabbinical. How can a Rabbinical prohibition produce a mamzer?

The Gemora emends the Mishna to be referring to the relative of his divorcee.

The Gemora provides support for this answer by the fact that the Mishna concluded by stating that the Chachamim admit that one who marries the relative of his divorcee that the child will be a mamzer. If Rabbi Akiva mentioned this case, it is understandable that the Mishna would say that the Chachamim admit regarding this case; but if Rabbi Akiva never discussed this case, why did the Chachamim discuss it?

The Gemora rejects this proof: Perhaps the Chachamim are informing us that a mamzer can be produced from a marriage which is punishable by kares (unlike Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion that only a marriage punishable by a court-imposed execution can produce a mamzer).

The Gemora answers: This cannot be the point of our Mishna because there is a Mishna (49a) that discusses this explicitly. The Mishna states: How is a mamzer produced? Rabbi Akiva says: Any union with a relative subject to a negative prohibition will produce a mamzer. Shimon Hatimni said: A mamzer can only be produced from a marriage which is punishable by kares and the halacha follows his words.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps our Mishna is stating his view anonymously (to indicate that the halacha follows this opinion)?

The Gemora answers: If so, the Mishna should have listed other examples of unions that are punishable by kares; by the fact that the Mishna only mentioned the relative of his divorcee is a proof that Rabbi Akiva was discussing this case as well.

The Gemora objects to this proof: Perhaps the Mishna mentioned the case of one who marries the relative of his divorcee because Rabbi Akiva discussed similar cases, namely, one who remarries his divorcee, or one who marries his chalutzah, or one who marries the relative of his chalutzah?

The Gemora reverts to the original reading of the Mishna: Rabbi Akiva maintains that one who marries the relative of his chalutzah, the child is indeed a mamzer.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yochanan provides the Scriptural source indicating that the relatives of one’s chalutzah is forbidden by Biblical law. (44a)

Rav Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Rebbe: everyone admits regarding one who marries his divorcee that the child born from that union will be tainted in respect to the Kehunah (she would not be allowed to marry a Kohen).

The Gemora explains: Even Shimon Hatimni, who maintains that a marriage which is subject to a negative prohibition will not produce a mamzer, but the child will be tainted for the Kehunah.

This is derived through a kal vachomer from the prohibition of a widow to a Kohen Gadol. The prohibition regarding a widow is not applicable to all men, only to a Kohen Gadol, and nevertheless, a child from such a union will be tainted for the Kehunah; then certainly regarding a divorcee, where every man is prohibited from remarrying his divorcee, the child should be tainted for the Kehunah.

The Gemora asks on this kal vachomer: We cannot bring proof from a widow because we rule strictly there; a widow who cohabitates with a Kohen Gadol becomes disqualified herself. Perhaps that is the reason that the child will be tainted for the Kehunah. A divorcee, who is remarried by her husband does not become disqualified for Kehunah; perhaps the child is not tainted either.

Furthermore, we have learned previously regarding one who remarries his divorcee that only she is an abomination, but her children are not.

Furthermore, the Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Akiva said: One who remarries his divorcee, or one who marries his chalutzah, or one who marries the relative of his chalutzah, the kiddushin does not take effect and a get is not required. She is disqualified, and her child is disqualified. We force him to send her away. The Chachamim maintain that the kiddushin does take effect and a get is required. She is qualified, and her child is qualified.

The Gemora assumes that the child is qualified for Kehunah, which would prove that the kal vachomer is incorrect. The Gemora deflects this question and explains that the braisa means that the child is not a mamzer, and thus qualified to marry into the congregation. This is in contrast to Rabbi Akiva’s viewpoint that the child born from a union with a woman who is subject to a negative prohibition is indeed a mamzer.

The Gemora deflects the second question by stating that the verse is not teaching us that only she is an abomination, but her children are not; rather it is teaching us that her co-wife is not an abomination, and can be taken for yibum; the child is tainted.

The first question on the kal vachomer remains, and therefore the Gemora emends the original ruling: Rav Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Rebbe: everyone admits regarding one who marries a woman subject to the penalty of kares that the child born from that union will be tainted in respect to the Kehunah.

The Gemora explains: Even Rabbi Yehoshua, who maintains that only a marriage punishable by a court-imposed execution can produce a mamzer will agree that the child is tainted for the Kehunah.

This is derived through a kal vachomer from the prohibition of a widow to a Kohen Gadol. The prohibition regarding a widow is not applicable to all men, only to a Kohen Gadol, and nevertheless, a child from such a union will be tainted for the Kehunah; then certainly regarding a woman subject to the penalty of kares, where every man is prohibited from marrying such a woman, the child should be tainted for the Kehunah.

If you will ask that a widow is different because she herself becomes disqualified, we can answer that a man who cohabits with a woman subject to the penalty of kares renders her a zonah, and she too becomes desecrated and thus forbidden to marry a Kohen. (44a – 44b)

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