Moshe's Instruction

It is written [Shmos 7:1]: Hashem said to Moshe, “See! I have made you a lord over Pharaoh, and Aaron, your brother, will be your speaker.” What is the connection between the two parts of the verse?

Reb Shlomo Kluger explains the verse based upon our Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 29a) . Rava had said that our Mishna was referring to words (that were said by the husband, i.e. instructions to write the get), and those cannot be passed on to another messenger (for words are too insignificant to be transferred). However, something tangible (like a get) can be passed on to another messenger.

This principal, he explains, is that mere words cannot be transferable to a second agent. However, the first agent can be appointed for mere words.

Moshe’s mission was one of words. Hashem commanded him to go to Pharaoh and speak to him. Accordingly, one can ask: How did Moshe have the authority to transfer this to Aaron? Mere words are non-transferable to another agent!?

This is the explanation for the introductory verse. Hashem made Moshe into a lord over Pharaoh. Moshe, therefore, was not merely an agent; he was the principal himself. He, therefore, had the authority to appoint Aaron to be his agent to talk to Pharaoh.

Read more!

Between Eighty and One Hundred

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 28a) had stated: If an agent was bringing a get and he left the husband old or sick, he may give the get under the assumption that the husband is still alive (for we assume, based upon the principle of chazakah, that nothing changed from the status quo). [If we would be certain that the husband died before the agent delivered the get to the wife, he may not give it any longer.]

The Chasam Sofer says: By the fact that the Mishna did not say ‘an old and sick person,” we may infer that if in fact the husband was old and sick, the agent would not be allowed to deliver the get, for then we can no longer assume that he is still alive.

The Chasam Sofer adds that this would apply for anyone over sixty years old.

The Maharshal in Yam shel Shlomo disagrees and says that even if the husband is old and sick, we nevertheless, assume that he is still alive, and we deliver the get. He adds that this is only if he is younger than eighty years old. However, if he is over eighty, it would depend upon his strength.

Reb Akiva Eiger in Shulchan Aruch writes that he is uncertain as to what the halacha would be if the husband was old and sick.

The Shiltei Giborim writes that when the Mishna rules that if the husband is sick, we still assume that he is alive, that is only if he is the sickness befell him from the hand of Heaven, such as a sickness which was caused by exposure to the cold or the heat. However, if he was knifed in the stomach or his skull was crushed, we do not assume that he is still alive, and we would not deliver the get.

The Yam shel Shlomo rules as follows: If the husband is over the age of one hundred, the agent may deliver the get even if he is sick as well. However, if he is over eighty years old, but not yet one hundred, the agent should not deliver the get if the husband is sick. The distinction between them is as follows: The Gemora refers to someone alive over eighty as a “ben gevuros,” a man of strength. This is true if he is healthy. However, if he took ill, then he is not at full strength, and therefore we cannot assume that he is still alive. Contrast this to someone who is over one hundred years old. Someone so old is always frail and weak, and there should not be any assumption that he will remain alive. However, the Gemora applies the logic that once he has reached such an age (over one hundred), he is regarded as an exceptional person (due to his longevity), and we may therefore assume that he is still alive, even if he is sick.

Read more!

An Ignorant Person's Recognition

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 27a) had stated: If an agent (who was bringing a get) lost the get and found it immediately, it is still valid. However, if he found it after some time, it cannot be used (for we are concerned that it fell from someone else and it is not the get which he lost). If he found the get in a chafisah or in a deluskema (types of containers), or if he recognizes the get, it is valid.

Rashi explains that if the agent himself found the get (not in a container) and he recognizes it, the get is valid.

Other Rishonim understand the Mishna to mean that the get is valid if he recognizes the container.

The Rashba writes that the get will be valid if the agent found it and claims that he recognizes it. This is true even if the agent is an ignorant person. That which the Gemora says below that an ignorant person cannot be trusted that he recognizes the get is only true when someone else found it and the agent is trying to claim it from him. There, we suspect that he is lying. However, if he himself found the get, he is trusted that he recognizes it, for he has a migu (believe me what I am saying, for if I would want to lie, I could have said a better lie); he could have said that he never lost it in the first place. (The Ritva seems to say that the ignorant person is believed even without the migu.)

The Ramban writes that it is only with respect to a lost article that we do not trust an ignorant person when he claims that he recognizes it. However, with regards to a get, which is a prohibitory matter, he is trusted. (The Magid Mishnah explains that this is because one witness is believed with respect to prohibitory matters.)

There are two glaring questions on the Ramban. Firstly, the Gemora below states explicitly that to return it to someone who claims that he recognizes it by sight, it is only to a Talmudic scholar who would be trusted, but not any ordinary person!? Secondly, a get should be regarded as a davar she’b’ervah, a matter with respect to relations, and two witnesses are required for testimony involving such matters!?

The Toras Gittin answers the first question as follows: When the Gemora states that an ordinary person will not be trusted that he recognizes the get, that is only with respect to the monetary issues of the get; however, with respect to the prohibitions stemming from the get, he will be trusted.

The Maharam Schick answers the second question: The halacha is if a father said, “I accepted a kiddushin for my daughter, but I do not know from whom,” and a fellow comes to us and says that it was him, he is believed and she is married to him. The Ran explains that although ordinarily, a davar she’b’ervah requires two witnesses, here it doesn’t, for his testimony is not in contrast with any preexisting status quo; it is merely a clarification as to whom the father accepted the kiddushin from. One person is sufficient for this. So too, here, the one witness is not testifying on the divorce; rather, he is clarifying for us as to who this get belongs to.

The Oneg Yom Tov answers this question by saying that the concern for two Yosef ben Shimon’s in the same city is only a Rabbinical one, and therefore, although it is a davar she’b’ervah, only one witness is required.

Read more!

Essence of a Get

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 26a) states: A scribe who writes the tofes (the text of the get, not including the names of the people and the date) of a get must leave blank spaces for the names of the man, woman and the date.

The Mishna Lamelech writes that it is necessary to write the location of the man and the woman as well.

Tosfos Yom Tov asks: Why doesn’t the Mishna mention that it the scribe is required to leave spaces blank for their locations as well?

He proves from here that the omission of the city names will not invalidate a get.

The Rashba rejects the proof by saying that perhaps it is included in that which the Mishna says: the names of the man and the woman.

It is brought in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that if their locations are omitted from the get, the get is invalid.

Proof to this is from the fact that the Mishna did not make mention of the fact that he has to leave a blank space for the words “Behold, you are permitted to any man,” and if that is not written, the get is rules to be invalid.

Tosfos writes that this precise language was not found in the earlier gittin, however, similar expressions were used and therefore, their gittin were valid.

The Ramban concludes that if this exact expression (“Behold, you are permitted to any man”) is not written in the get, the get is disqualified and if she has already remarried, she must leave that man.

The Steipler Gaon notes that the verse, sefer kerisus venasan beyadah veshilchah (a document of severance; and he shall place it in her hand and send her out) is the same numerical value as “zehu gufo shel get: harei at muteres lechal adam” (this is the essence of the get: “Behold, you are permitted to any man”).

Read more!

Two Lugin

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 25b) cites a braisa: If someone buys wine from amongst the Cutheans (converts to Judaism after an outbreak of wild animals in Eretz Yisroel and their conversion was debated as to its validity; they observed some commandments, but not others), he should say the following: “The two lugin (a measurement) that I will eventually separate (from the one hundred lugin in total) are terumah (tithe for the kohen), ten are ma’aser rishon (tithe for the Levite), nine are for ma’aser sheini (to be eaten in Yerushalyim),” and after redeeming the ma’aser sheini (with coins), he can drink right away. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Shimon forbid this leniency.

Rashi explains the braisa to be referring to a case where he does not have a vessel to separate the tithes required to allow him to drink the wine in an orderly fashion.

Some explain it that he did not have any tahor vessels.

Rashi in Sukkah (23b) explains that the fellow purchased the wine bein hashemashos (close to sunset) on Friday and he did not have time to separate the ma’aser before Shabbos. Since it is forbidden to separate ma’aser on Shabbos, he did not have what to drink.

Tosfos challenges Rashi’s explanation, for if that would be the case, he would not even be allowed to orally declare it to be ma’aser, for it is forbidden to fix his produce on Shabbos!?

The Kaftor va’Ferach answers that Rashi holds that the manner prescribed in the Gemora is permitted, for he is not actually fixing it on Shabbos. He is separating the ma’aser after Shabbos and retroactively the produce is remedied on Shabbos. It emerges that he did nothing on Shabbos.

Tosfos explains that the remedy discussed in the Gemora is only when it is still bein hashemashos. At that time, there was a Rabbinic decree not to separate ma’aser, but one, at that time, is permitted to orally declare it to be ma’aser.

Read more!

Cutheans

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 25a) cites a braisa: If someone buys wine from amongst the Cutheans (converts to Judaism after an outbreak of wild animals in Eretz Yisroel and their conversion was debated as to its validity; they observed some commandments, but not others), he should say the following: “The two lugin (a measurement) that I will eventually separate (from the one hundred lugin in total) are terumah (tithe for the kohen), ten are ma’aser rishon (tithe for the Levite), nine are for ma’aser sheini (to be eaten in Yerushalyim),” and after redeeming the ma’aser sheini (with coins), he can drink right away. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Shimon forbid this leniency.

Tosfos explains that although the Cutheans observed the mitzvos that are expressly written in the Torah, and therefore, it would be safe to assume that they already separated terumah and ma’aser, nevertheless, they are only trusted with respect to the food which they eat. However, the produce which they sell to others, they are not trusted, for the Cutheans were not particular about the transgression of lifnei iver (placing a stumbling block in front of a blind man). Tosfos in Sukkah (23b) explains further that understood that verse only in its literal sense. They maintained that it is forbidden to place a stumbling block in front of a blind man, but there is no prohibition against causing someone else to sin.

However, Tosfos asks: Would selling the produce without separating terumah and ma’aser not be regarded as stealing from the Kohanim? Stealing is a prohibition that they seemingly did observe!

Tosfos answers that since terumah and ma’aser is considered money that has no claimants (for which Kohen is regarded as its owner), it was not considered stealing in their eyes.

Other Rishonim add that, in truth, it is not regarded as stealing. Stealing is only when one takes something away from an owner who can make a claim to it. Since the Kohanim cannot forcibly take the produce from him, it is not considered stealing.

Read more!

Yosef ben Shimon

Reb Tzadok HaKohen explains why the Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 24b) uses the example of Yosef ben Shimon, a name that we do not find this sort of combination in the Torah. The Gemora could have used Reuven ben Yaakov! Why was this combination chosen?

He says that all of Klal Yisroel are called by the name Yosef, for they guard the covenant. Yet we find that twenty-four thousand members from the Tribe of Shimon died in the plague of Pe’or (which involved acting promiscuously with the women of Midyan), something that was completely contrary to the attributes of Yosef. One can therefore mistakenly think that the descendants of Shimon should not be called after the name of Yosef. It is for this precise reason that Chazal chose the name Yosef ben Shimon. It is to demonstrate that even the Tribe of Shimon is still connected to Yosef.

Read more!

Eliezer the Slave

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan (Daf Yomi: Gittin 23b) : A Canaanite slave is disqualified from serving as an agent to receive a woman’s get from her husband because he is not included in the halachos of divorce and marriage.

Tosfos in Kesuvos (7b) writes that Eliezer was the agent of Yitzchak to marry Rivkah.

The Panim Yafos asks: How could Eliezer serve as the agent for marriage, when he was not included in the halachos of marriage.

He answers that this principle is only applicable when he is serving as an agent for another person. However, a slave may serve as an agent of his master for marriage and divorce, since he is considered the hand of the master.

This explains why Eliezer began by saying, “I am the slave of Avraham.”

The Pardes Yosef asks that this does not explain how Eliezer could marry Rivkah on behalf of Yitzchak! Eliezer belonged to Avraham; not to Yeitzchak!?

He answers that this is why Avraham gave over all his possessions to Yitzchak, including his slave, Eliezer. Once Eliezer belonged to Yitzchak, he could serve as his agent.

Read more!