Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 63 - Highlights

The Story of Rabbi Akiva

Rabbi Akiva was a shepherd of Ben Kalba Savua. His daughter, upon observing how modest and noble the shepherd was, said to him, “Were I to be betrothed to you, would you go away to study Torah?” “Yes,” he replied. She was then secretly betrothed to him and sent him away. When her father heard what she had done, he chased her from his house and forbade her by a vow to have any benefit from his estate. Rabbi Akiva spent twelve years studying Torah. When he returned home, he brought with him twelve thousand disciples. While in his home town, he heard an old man saying to his (Rabbi Akiva’s) wife, “How long will you be living as a widow?” She said to him: “If he would listen to me, he would sit and learn for another twelve years.” Rabbi Akiva (overhearing this statement) said: “I now have permission.” He therefore returned immediately to learn for another twelve years in the Beis Medrash.

When he returned (after the second period of twelve years), he returned together with twenty four thousand of his students. His wife heard that he was returning, and came out to greet him. Her neighbors told her: “Borrow some clothing and cover yourself well.” She replied: “A righteous man knows the soul of his animal.”

When she reached him, she fell on her face and kissed his legs. Rabbi Akiva’s aide began to push her away. Rabbi Akiva said: “Leave her, as both mine and yours (merit of Torah study) is because of her.”

Her father heard that a great man was coming to town. He said: “I will go come before him, perhaps he will negate my vow.” He came before Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva said to him: “Did you make this vow with the intention that it should apply even if he becomes a great man?” He replied: “Even if he would learn one chapter or one law (I did not intend it).” Rabbi Akiva told him: “I am he (your son-in-law about whom you made the vow).” He fell to the ground, kissed his legs, and gave him one half of his assets.

The daughter of Rabbi Akiva made the same arrangement with Ben Azai (that he should go learn for many years). This is like people say: “the sheep goes after another sheep, like the actions of a mother are the actions of a daughter.”

Rav Yosef the son of Rava was sent by his father to learn in the study house of (an elder) Rav Yosef for six years (after his marriage). After three years passed and it was the eve of Yom Kippur, he thought to return to visit his wife. His father, Rava, heard about his visit and took a weapon and went out to meet him. Rava confronted him: “You remembered your prostitute?” Some say he said: “You remembered your dove?” They were both involved in this confrontation, and neither remembered to eat the seudah ha’mafsekes (the meal customarily eaten on the eve of Yom Kippur). (62b – 63a)
Mishna

A woman who rebels against her husband has her kesuvah lessened by seven dinar per week. Rabbi Yehuda says seven tarfikin. How long can he lessen the value of her kesuvah? He can subtract the entire value of her kesuvah. Rabbi Yosi says that he can even subtract more, to the point where if she inherits assets from a relative he can collect them (based on this fine). Similarly, someone who rebels against his wife must add three dinar a week to her kesuvah. Rabbi Yehuda says three tarfikin. (63a)
Rebelling From What?

What is she rebelling from? Rav Huna says from having marital relations. Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina says from doing work.

Our Mishna continued: “And so too someone who rebels against his wife.” The Gemora asks: this is understandable according to the opinion that rebelling refers to having marital relations (as both are obligated to do so). However, according to the opinion that this refers to rebelling from work, is a husband obligated to do work for his wife?

The Gemora answers: Yes, it is deemed rebellion for his to say he will not give her food nor support her.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav say that someone who tells his wife he will not give her food nor support her must divorce his wife and pay her kesuvah? The Gemora answers: Isn’t there time in the interim that we try to impress on him to change his mind? [The Mishna therefore states that during that time he must pay a fine.]

The Gemora asks a question from the following Beraisa: Both a woman who is betrothed and married, even if she is a nidah, even if she is sick, and even if she is waiting to do “yibum” – “levirate marriage (can be considered as rebelling).” The Gemora asks that the statement regarding a sick woman is understandable if we say that rebelling refers to refusing to have marital relations. However, if it refers to doing work, a sick person is not able to do work!

The Gemora answers: It must be that everyone agrees that refraining from having marital relations is considered rebelling. Their argument is merely regarding work. One opinion holds that refraining from work is not considered to be in this category, and one opinion says that it is. (63a – 63b)

We will now discuss the previous statement (of our Mishna). A woman who rebels against her husband has her kesuvah lessened by seven dinar per week. Rabbi Yehuda says seven tarfikin. Our sages analyzed this issue and decided that she should be publicly declared to be rebelling against her husband for four weeks. Beis Din sends her a message (during this time) that she should know that if she continues in this manner she will lose her entire kesuvah even if it is of a value of one hundred manah. Both a woman who is betrothed and married, even if she is a nidah, even if she is sick, and even if she is waiting to do yibum (can be considered as rebelling). Rav Chiya bar Yosef asked Shmuel: Is a nidah fit to have marital relations? He answered him: it is incomparable someone who has bread in his basket to someone who does not have bread in his basket. [This means that even if someone cannot currently eat bread, he is happy knowing that he will soon be able to do so. Accordingly, for a woman to say that she will not have marital relations with her husband when she is permitted to do so is rebelling, even if she is currently forbidden.]

Rami bar Chama states: This public declaration only takes place in the synagogues and study houses. Rava says: This is evident from the fact that the sages publicly declared this four sabbaths in a row. This shows it is only done in the synagogues and study houses (where people congregate on shabbos).

Rami bar Chama says: She is sent the above message from Beis Din twice, once before the public declaration and once afterwards.

Rav Nachman the son of Rav Chisda stated: The law follows this declaration of the sages. Rava said: This is improper! Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said to Rava: What is improper about it? I said it in front of him, and I said it in the name of a great man. Who? Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina.

The Gemora asks: Who did Rava hold like? He held like his statement in the name of Rav Sheshes that we try to pressure her to change her mind, and the interim fine her for noncompliance. Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Sheshes that we do not rely on trying to change her mind.

What is the description of a rebellious woman? Ameimar says it is where she says that she is attracted to him but wants to pain him. However, if she says she cannot have marital relations because he is disgusting to her to the point that she doesn’t even care if she loses her kesuvah, we do not force her (and he can divorce her without giving her a kesuvah) . Mar Zutra says: We force her (using the laws of noncompliance stated above).

There was an incident like this where Mar Zutra indeed forced the woman to comply, and in the couple ended up having as a child the great Rabbi Chanina from Sura. The Gemora states that this is not proof that he was correct, as Heavenly help decided that it should be so (based on the particular situation).

The daughter-in-law of Rav Zvid rebelled (and said she was disgusted by her husband). Her husband had in his possession one coat that she brought into the marriage. Ameimar, Mar Zutra, and Rav Ashi sat together, and Rav Gamda was sitting near them. They stated: “If she rebelled, she loses the clothes she brought into the marriage.” Rav Gamda interjected: “Is the reason you are saying this because Rav Zvid is an important man and you are flattering him? Didn’t Rav Kahana say that Rava asked about this law and was unsure?” (63b)

[END]

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Punishment for Causing Grief to Another

The Mishna had stated: The conjugal rights of a sailor’s wife is once in six months; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rav Beruna said in the name of Rav: The halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer (namely, that a Torah scholar may leave home to study Torah for thirty days without his wife’s permission).

Rav Adda bar Ahavah said in the name of Rav: These are the words of Rabbi Eliezer; however, the Chachamim say: A Torah scholar may leave home to study Torah for two or three years without his wife’s permission.

Rava stated: The Rabbis (and left home for more than a month to study Torah without their wife’s permission) relied on Rav Adda bar Ahavah, but act accordingly at the risk of losing their lives (they may die before their time as a penalty for neglecting their wives).

The Gemora cites an incident supporting Rava’s statement: Rav Rechumi who was frequenting the lectures of Rava at Mechoza used to return home every Erev Yom Kippur. On one occasion, he was so engrossed by his subject that he forgot to return home. His wife was expecting him home every moment, saying, “Now, he is coming, now, he is coming.” When he did not arrive, she became so depressed that a tear began to flow from her eyes. He was at that moment sitting on a roof. The roof collapsed under him and he was killed.

Reb Chaim Shmeulwitz (Sichos Mussar 5731; 23) derives from here that the punishment incurred because of a transgression against a fellow person is not for the purpose of appeasing the person suffering, for in this incident, not only was his wife not appeased by the result; she now was forced to endure even more sorrow and anguish by the fact that she was now a widow. Rather, the punishment for one who pains another is akin to a fire consuming and one who torments another is naturally consumed by fire.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 62 - Highlights

Permission to Study

The Mishna had stated: Students (who have an obligation to perform their conjugal duties once a week) may go out for Torah study without permission for thirty days.

The Gemora asks: If she grants permission, for how long should he leave?

Rav said: He should be a month in the Beis Medrash and a month at home. Rabbi Yochanan says: He should be a month in the Beis Medrash and two months at home.

The Gemora cites the Scriptural verses for their respective opinions. (61b - 62a)



Tayalin

The Mishna had stated: The conjugal rights of a wife stated in the Torah are as follows: Tayalin - every day.

The Gemora asks: What is tayalin?

Rava answers: They are students who study Torah locally, and return home to sleep at night.

Abaye challenges this explanation: Rav Yitzchak interpreted the following verse [Tehillim 127:2]: It is vain for you who rise early, and sit up late, who eat the bread of toil; so He gives unto His beloved in sleep. This is referring to the wives of Torah scholars, who drive sleep from their eyes in this world, and therefore merit entering the World to Come. How can you (Rava) say that the Torah scholars have time to have relations with their wives every night?

Rather, Abaye understands tayalin to be referring to that which Rav states, for Rav said: It is referring to a person like Rav Shmuel bar Shilas, who ate his own food, drank his own beverages, slept in the shadow of his mansion (securely) and the king’s officers never passed by his gate (to collect taxes from him since he was not regarded as a wealthy man; such a person is considered a man of independence and can be intimate with his wife every night).

When Ravin came to Bavel, he said that it is referring to the pampered men of Eretz Yisroel (who make sure to eat good food and drink and are therefore healthy and strong enough to engage in relations every night).

The Gemora cites an example, which demonstrates their strength: Rabbi Avahu was once standing in a bathhouse and two servants were supporting him. The floor of the bathhouse collapsed under him. It happened that he was near a column, upon which he climbed taking up the servants with him.

Another such incident: Rabbi Yochanan was once ascending a staircase and Rav Ami and Rav Assi were supporting him. The staircase collapsed under him. He himself climbed up and brought them up with him. The Rabbis said to him, “Since your strength is such, why do you require support? He replied, “If so, what strength will I reserve for the time of my old age?” (62a)

Bread in their Basket

The Mishna had stated: The conjugal rights of a wife stated in the Torah are as follows: Tayalin - every day; laborers - twice a week; donkey drivers - once a week; camel drivers - once in thirty days; sailors - once in six months.

Rabbah bar Rav Chanan asked Abaye from the Mishna above which stated as follows: If one vowed, prohibiting his wife to have conjugal relations with him, Beis Hillel say: One week. Why would they be discussing only the tayal and a laborer (since they are the only type of people who are obligated to have conjugal relations more than once a week)?

Abaye answers: It is referring to all the people mentioned in the Mishna, including a sailor, who is only obligated to engage in marital relations once every six months. He explains based upon the following saying: “You cannot compare one who has bread in his basket with one who doesn’t have bread in his basket (the latter experiences the pangs of hunger much more than the former who can eat the bread should he decide to use it up; a sailor’s wife may partially satisfy her desires by the hope that her husband may at any moment return; her husband’s vow extinguishes all her hope and she must not, therefore, be allowed to suffer longer than the periods indicated).”

Rabbah bar Rav Chanan asked of Abaye: May a donkey driver become a camel driver without his wife’s permission (since it will be decreasing the frequency of his conjugal duties)?

Abaye replied: A woman would rather have one kav with intimacy than have ten kavs and abstinence. (62a – 62b)

Studying Away from Home

The Mishna had stated: The conjugal rights of a sailor’s wife is once in six months; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rav Beruna said in the name of Rav: The halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer (namely, that a Torah scholar may leave home to study Torah for thirty days without his wife’s permission).

Rav Adda bar Ahavah said in the name of Rav: These are the words of Rabbi Eliezer; however, the Chachamim say: A Torah scholar may leave home to study Torah for two or three years without his wife’s permission.

Rava stated: The Rabbis (and left home for more than a month to study Torah without their wife’s permission) relied on Rav Adda bar Ahavah, but act accordingly at the risk of losing their lives (they may die before their time as a penalty for neglecting their wives).

The Gemora cites an incident supporting Rava’s statement: Rav Rechumi who was frequenting the lectures of Rava at Mechoza used to return home every Erev Yom Kippur. On one occasion, he was so engrossed by his subject that he forgot to return home. His wife was expecting him home every moment, saying, “Now, he is coming, now, he is coming.” When he did not arrive, she became so depressed that a tear began to flow from her eyes. He was at that moment sitting on a roof. The roof collapsed under him and he was killed. (62b)

Torah Scholars Studying Abroad

The Gemora asks: How often is the obligation for conjugal relations for a Torah scholar?

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: Every Friday night.

The Gemora cites a related incident: Yehudah the son of Rabbi Chiya and son-in-law of Rabbi Yannai would spend his time in the Beis Medrash all week, but every Erev Shabbos would come home. Whenever he arrived, the people would observe a pillar of light moving before him. Once he was so engrossed by his subject of study that he forgot to return home. When the light was not seen, Rabbi Yannai said to the people of the house, “Turn over his bed (as a sign of mourning), for had Yehudah been alive, he would not have neglected the performance of his marital relations.” This remark was like an error that proceeds from the ruler, for in consequence, Yehudah died.

The Gemora cites another incident: Rebbe was engaged in the arrangements for the marriage of his son to the daughter of Rabbi Chiya, but when the kesuvah was about to be written, the bride passed away. Rebbe said, “Is there, Heaven forbid, any disqualification in our families?” They investigated the genealogy of the two families and it was discovered that Rebbe descended from Shephatiah the son of Avital (the wife of Dovid haMelech) while Rabbi Chiya descended from Shimi the brother of Dovid (as the latter was not a descendent of the king's family, it was not proper for his daughter to be united in marriage with one who was).

Rebbe then went to arrange a match for his son to the daughter of Rabbi Yosi ben Zimra. It was agreed that the groom should spend twelve years studying Torah (prior to the nisuin). When the bride was led before the groom, he said to them, “Let it be six years.” When they passed her before him a second time, he said, “I would rather marry her first and then proceed to the Beis Medrash.” He felt embarrassed before his father, but his father said to him, “My son, you have the mind of your Creator; for in Scripture [Shmos 15:17] it is written first: You will bring them into Eretz Yisroel and implant them on the mountain of Your heritage, the foundation of Your dwelling place. Later, it is written [ibid, 25:8]: And let them make Me a sanctuary and I will dwell among them. (Initially, Hashem said that they would be brought into Eretz Yisroel, and then the Beis Hamikdosh will be built, and at the end, Hashem said that the Mishkan should be built before they enter Eretz Yisroel.)

After the marriage, he departed and spent twelve years studying Torah. By the time he returned, his wife had become sterile. Rebbe said, “What shall we do? Should we instruct him to divorce her, it would be said, ‘This poor soul waited in vain!’ Were he to marry another woman, it would be said ‘The latter is his wife and the other one is his mistress.’” He prayed for mercy, and she recovered.

The Gemora cites a related incident: Rabbi Chanania ben Chachinai was about to go away to study Torah towards the conclusion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai's wedding celebration. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said to him, “Wait for me until I am able to join you.” He, however, did not wait for him, but went away alone and spent twelve years at the Beis Medrash. By the time he returned, the streets of the town were altered and he was unable to find the way back to his home. He went down to the river bank and sat down. He heard people calling out to a girl saying, “Daughter of Chachinai, daughter of Chachinai, fill up your pitcher and let us go!” He thought, “It is evident that the girl is ours,” and so, he followed her. When they reached the house, his wife was sitting and sifting flour. She lifted up her eyes and seeing him, was so overcome with joy that she fainted and died. He said before Hashem, “Master of the universe, is this the reward for this poor soul?” He prayed for mercy and she revived.

Rabbi Chama bar Bisa went away from his home and spent twelve years studying Torah. When he returned he said, “I will not act as did ben Chachinai.” He therefore entered the local Beis Medrash and sent word to his house. Meanwhile, his son, Rabbi Oshaya entered, sat down before him and addressed to him a question regarding a Talmudic teaching. Rabbi Chama, upon seeing how well versed he was in his studies, became very depressed. He said, “Had I been here, I also could have had such a child.” When he entered his house, his son came in, whereupon the father rose before him, believing that he wished to ask him some further questions. His wife said to him, “what father stands up before a son?”

Rami bar Hama applied to him the following Scriptural text [Koheles 4:12]: And a three-ply cord is not quickly broken. This is a reference to Rabbi Oshaya, son of Rabbi Chama, son of Bisa. (62b)

[END]

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Conjugal Duty with Multiple Wives

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 62) discusses the conjugal rights of a wife, and that it varies dependent upon the stress of the husband’s work and the amount of time he is required to spend away from his house.

Prior to Rabbeinu Gershom’s ban against marrying more than one wife, one was permitted to have several wives. This leads us to enquire: Would these obligations remain the same even though he has multiple wives?

The Nimukei Yosef in Yevamos writes that if a man performed the mitzvah of yibum with four different yevamos, he is only required to perform his conjugal duty once a month with each wife (if he is a donkey driver, where his duty is ordinarily once a week). This is because he did not obligate himself to each wife, they were sent to him from Heaven (so to speak), and therefore, he is not required to have relations with each wife once a week; but rather, it is sufficient if he performs his duty with one of his wives each week. However, this is the halacha only by yevamos. If, however, he married four ordinary women, he is obligated to perform his marital duties with each wife once a week.

The Rambam and other Rishonim disagree and they maintain that his obligation does not change on account of marrying multiple wives; he is only required to have marital relations once a week even though each wife will be somewhat deprived from their intimacy with him.

Rav Elyashiv explains: When a man marries more than one wife, they understand that they will not be receiving from him more than a man is ordinarily required to do, and it is considered as if they waived their rights for their own personal “once a week” relations.

What would be the halacha if he marries one wife and later, he marries another? Do we say that the first wife understands that he is permitted to marry more than one wife, and she accepts that to begin with, or perhaps, it is only the second wife who accepts this fact and waives her right, but the husband would still be required to perform his conjugal duties to the first wife once a week?

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Sacrificing One's Life for Another

The Gemora (Kesuvos 61b) records an incident: Ameimar, Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi were once sitting at the gate of King Izgur’s palace (a Persian king). The King’s table-steward passed them by (carrying food for the king). Rav Ashi, observing that Mar Zutra turned pale in the face, took some of the food with his finger and put it into his mouth. “You have ruined the king’s meal,” the table-steward exclaimed. “Why did you do such a thing?” he was asked by the king’s officers. Rav Ashi responded, “The man who prepared that dish has rendered the King's food objectionable.” “Why?” they asked him. “I noticed,” he replied, “leprous pig meat in it.” They examined the dish but did not find anything. Rav Ashi took hold of the chef’s finger and put it on one piece of meat, and he asked them, “Did you examine this part?” They examined it and miraculously found it to be as Rav Ashi had said. The Rabbis asked him, “Why did you rely upon a miracle?” Rav Ashi replied, “I saw the demon of leprosy hovering over him.”

The Maharsha explains that the Rabbis asked Rav Ashi: Why did you put yourself into a severely dangerous predicament in order to save Mar Zutra from a minor danger.

What did Mar Zutra answer? Reb Avi Lebovitz explains: The Gemora answers that Rav Ashi saw the demon of leprosy hovering over him. One could interpret that he wasn't relying on a miracle since he saw that there were signs of leprosy on the meat. However, Rashi implies that Rav Ashi’s answer was that he saw signs of leprosy on Mar Zutra, indicating that the element of danger for Mar Zutra was actually more severe, therefore he was willing to give up his own life to save the life of Mar Zutra.

The Chasam Sofer proves from this dialogue that one is obligated to risk their own life in order to save another. Although this Gemora doesn't prove any obligation, and would only prove that one is allowed to risk their life to save another; the Chasam Sofer seems to hold that when it comes to life, there can't be a choice; it is either mandatory to sacrifice one’s own life or a prohibition.

The Radvaz rules that one is not permitted to sacrifice a limb of his own in order to save the life of another.

The Chasam Sofer challenges this form our Gemora. He understands that the danger to Rav Ashi was that the king will sever his finger. Rav Ashi relied on the miracle in order to save the life of Mar Zutra, for if would not have interceded, Mar Zutra would have died.

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Spit Out all of the Saliva

Rav Anan bar Tachlifa related (Kesuvos 61a): I was once standing in the presence of Shmuel when they brought him a dish of mushrooms, and, had he not given me to eat from it, I would have been exposed to danger.

Rav Ashi said: I was once standing before Rav Kahana when they brought him slices of turnip heads in vinegar, and, had he not given me to eat from it, I would have been exposed to danger.

Rav Papa said: Even a fragrant date may expose one to danger.

This is the general rule: Any food that has a strong aroma or an sharp taste will expose a man to danger if he is not allowed to eat from it.

The Gemora records a related incident: A Roman once said to a woman, “Will you marry me?” “No,” she replied. Thereupon, he brought some pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. She kept on swallowing all the saliva that irritated her, but he did not give her any of the fruit until her body became swollen. Eventually, he said to her, “If I cure you, will you marry me?” “Yes,” she replied. He went and brought more pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. He said to her, “All the saliva that irritates you, spit out at once, and again and again.” She continued doing so until something issued forth from her body in the shape of a green palm-leaf, and she recovered.

Reb Akiva Eiger (Y”D 336) writes in the name of the Maharil: The Mahari Segal told us that it is forbidden to test any of the remedies and cures mentioned in the Talmud, for we do not fully comprehend all the intricate details, and if we attempt to duplicate them and it fails to heal the sick, it will result in the mocking of our Sages. (He cites one exception that is mentioned in Meseches Shabbos.)

The Mishna Berura (617:8) cites our Gemora as a cure for one who smells the aroma of a certain food and he is unable to eat from it. He should be careful to spit out all the saliva accumulated in his mouth and he should not swallow any of it. His ruling indicates that this is not a magical remedy; but rather, it is a natural phenomenon, and it is applicable nowadays.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 61 - Highlights

To Nurse or Not to Nurse

Rav Huna said: Rav Huna bar Chinana tested us with the following question: If the wife wants to nurse the child and the husband does not want her to, we listen to her, for it is painful for her (not to nurse). What would the halacha be if the husband wants the wife to nurse the child and she does not want to; who do we listen to? If it is not her family’s custom to nurse (they are wealthy and hire wet nurses), we certainly listen to her. But, if it is her family’s custom to nurse and his family does not nurse, what is the halacha? We resolved it for him by citing the following braisa: A woman rises to the husband’s standards, but does not descend to his standards (therefore, she may follow his family’s custom of not nursing).

The Gemora cites two opinions as to the Scriptural source for the braisa’s halacha. (61a)

Wife and the Maidservant

The Mishna had stated: If she brings a maid into the marriage, she is not required to grind, bake, or launder clothes.

The Gemora asks: It may be inferred from the Mishna that the wife is still obligated to perform the other chores (cooking, nursing, making his bed and working with wool) for the husband. But why should that be? Let the wife say that the maidservant should perform all the chores?

The Gemora answers: The husband can answer her, “The maidservant will work for me and for her, but who will work for you?” (There is an extra person in this household now.) (61a)

The Mishna had stated: If she brings two maids, she is not required to nurse or cook.

The Gemora asks: It may be inferred from the Mishna that the wife is still obligated to perform the other chores (making his bed and working with wool) for the husband. But why should that be? Let the wife say that one maidservant should work for herself and for her (the wife), and the other maidservant should work for herself and for you (the husband)? (If the wife can perform these chores for two people, it is reasonable to assume that two maidservants can perform these chores for four people.)

The Gemora answers: The husband can answer her, “Who will work for the guests who stay for a long time, and who will work for all the occasional visitors who come in?” (A house that has many household members attracts people to stop by.) (61a)


The Mishna had stated: If she brings three maids she is not required to make his bed or knit with wool.

The Gemora asks: It may be inferred that her other duties, however, she must perform; but why? Let her say to him, “I brought you a third maidservant to attend upon our guests and occasional visitors.”

The Gemora answers: It is because he might reply, “The more people that are in the household, the more number of guests and occasional visitors there will be.”

The Gemora asks: If so, the same claim could also be advanced even when there were four maidservants?

The Gemora answers: In the case of four maidservants, since their number is considerable they assist one another. (61a)

Rabbi Chana, or some say Rav Shmuel bar Nachmeini, stated: When the Mishna said that she brought in maidservants, it does not mean that she had actually brought them; but rather, the Mishna means that wherever she brings in a dowry from which she is in a position to bring in maidservants, she will be released from the obligation of performing those chores, even though she has not actually brought any maidservants.

The Gemora cites the following braisa which supports this opinion: A wife is entitled to the same privileges whether she brought a maidservant to him or whether she saved up for one out of her own income. (61a)

Mixing a Cup of Wine for her Husband

The Mishna had stated: If she brings four maids she can just sit in her special silk canopy (easy chair).

Rav Yitzchak bar Chananya said in the name of Rav Huna: Even though they said that she may sit in her easy chair, she should nevertheless mix a cup of wine for him, make his bed and wash his face, hands and feet.

Rav Yitzchak bar Chananya said in the name of Rav Huna: All kinds of work that a woman performs for her husband, a menstruant may perform for her husband, except the mixing of the cup (of wine to serve him), and the making of his bed and the washing of his face, his hands and his feet (because these actions may bring about temptation).

Rava notes: That which we stated that a menstruant shall not make her husband’s bed, that is only if her husband is present, but if he is not present, she is permitted to make his bed.

With regard to ‘the mixing of the cup,’ Shmuel’s wife made a change (during her ‘seven clean days’ after menstruation and prior to ritual immersion, when marital relations are still forbidden – Rashi) by serving him with her left hand. Abaye’s wife placed the cup on the edge of the wine cask. Rava's wife placed it on the pillow. Rav Papa's wife put it on his foot-stool. (61a)
The Danger of Craving for Food

Rav Yitzchak bar Chananya further stated: All foods may remain in the presence of the waiter (even though, he will not be eating until they finished) except meat and wine (which excite his appetite and any delay in satisfying it will cause him extreme pain).

Rav Chisda said: This applies only to fatty meat and old wine. Rava said: It applies to fatty meat throughout the year but old wine only in the Tammuz season.

Rav Anan bar Tachlifa related: I was once standing in the presence of Shmuel when they brought him a dish of mushrooms, and, had he not given me to eat from it, I would have been exposed to danger.

Rav Ashi said: I was once standing before Rav Kahana when they brought him slices of turnip heads in vinegar, and, had he not given me to eat from it, I would have been exposed to danger.

Rav Papa said: Even a fragrant date may expose one to danger.

This is the general rule: Any food that has a strong aroma or an sharp taste will expose a man to danger if he is not allowed to eat from it.

Both Avuha bar Ihi and Minyamin bar Ihi showed consideration for their waiter. One would give him a portion of every kind of dish served while the other gave him a portion of one kind only (at the beginning of the meal, and gave him from the other dishes upon the conclusion of the meal). With the former Eliyahu conversed, but with the latter, he did not.

It was related of two pious men, and others say that they were Rav Mari and Rav Pinchas the sons of Rav Chisda: One of them gave a share to his waiter first while the other gave him last. With the one who gave the waiter his share first, Eliyahu conversed; with the one, however, who gave his waiter last, Eliyahu did not converse. (By failing to give the waiter a share as soon as the various dishes were served, he caused him unnecessary pain of unsatisfied desire and hunger.)

The Gemora records a related incident: Ameimar, Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi were once sitting at the gate of King Izgur’s palace (a Persian king). The King’s table-steward passed them by (carrying food for the king). Rav Ashi, observing that Mar Zutra turned pale in the face, took some of the food with his finger and put it into his mouth. “You have ruined the king’s meal,” the table-steward exclaimed. “Why did you do such a thing?” he was asked by the king’s officers. Rav Ashi responded, “The man who prepared that dish has rendered the King's food objectionable.” “Why?” they asked him. “I noticed,” he replied, “leprous pig meat in it.” They examined the dish but did not find anything. Rav Ashi took hold of the chef’s finger and put it on one piece of meat, and he asked them, “Did you examine this part?” They examined it and miraculously found it to be as Rav Ashi had said. The Rabbis asked him, “Why did you rely upon a miracle?” Rav Ashi replied, “I saw the demon of leprosy hovering over him.”

The Gemora records another related incident: A Roman once said to a woman, “Will you marry me?” “No,” she replied. Thereupon, he brought some pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. She kept on swallowing all the saliva that irritated her, but he did not give her any of the fruit until her body became swollen. Eventually, he said to her, “If I cure you, will you marry me?” “Yes,” she replied. He went and brought more pomegranates, split them open and ate them in her presence. He said to her, “All the saliva that irritates you, spit out at once, and again and again.” She continued doing so until something issued forth from her body in the shape of a green palm-leaf, and she recovered. (61a – 61b)

Rav Malkiyo or Malkiya?

The Mishna had stated: Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brings one hundred maids into the marriage, he can force her to knit, as her having nothing to do could lead to promiscuity.

Rav Malkiyo stated in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahavah: The halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rav Chanina the son of Rav Ika said: The rulings concerning a spit (that has been used for the roasting of meat on a festival, although it is deemed to be muktza, may be placed in a corner in an unusual manner), maidservants and pores (that these, even without pubic hairs growing from them, are sufficient indication of puberty) were authored by Rav Malkiyo; but those concerning locks of hair (an Israelite trimming the hairs of an idolater must withdraw his hand at a distance of three finger’s breadth on every side of the forelock to avoid assisting them in servicing their idols), ashes (are forbidden to be spread on a wound in order to heal it because it gives the appearance of a tattoo), and cheese (made by idolaters are forbidden since they smear it with lard) were authored by Rav Malkiya.

Rav Papa, however, said: If the statement is made concerning a Mishna or a braisa, the author is Rav Malkiya, but if it is concerning an Amora’s statement, the author is Rav Malkiyo. And your mnemonic is: A Tannaic statement is a queen. (A statement issued by a Tanna is more authoritative than a statement from an Amora. Malkiya, whose name closely resembles queen, is to be associated with the Mishna and the braisa that are designated queen.)

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between them?

The Gemora answers: It is the statement concerning maidservants (which is recorded in our Mishna; according to Rav Papa, the statement concerning it must be that of R. Malkiya, while according to Rav Chanina, it is included among the statements attributed to R. Malkiyo. (61b)

The Mishna had stated: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if someone vows that his wife is forbidden to do work, he should divorce her and give her a kesuvah, as having nothing to do can cause her to go crazy.

The Gemora asks: Isn’t this the same view as that of the Tanna Kamma?

The Gemora answers: The practical difference between them is the case of a woman who plays with puppies or who plays chess (a woman who spends her time in this manner may be exposed to the temptation of promiscuity, but is in no danger of falling into idiocy). (61b)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If one vowed, prohibiting his wife to have conjugal relations with him, Beis Shamai say: Two weeks (if the vow is for longer than this period, it is the duty of the husband either to have his vow disallowed or to release his wife by divorce). Beis Hillel say: One week.

Students (who have an obligation to perform their conjugal duties once a week) may go out for Torah study without permission for thirty days. Laborers (who have an obligation to perform their conjugal duties twice a week) may leave for one week.

The conjugal rights of a wife stated in the Torah are as follows: Tayalin - every day; laborers - twice a week; donkey drivers - once a week; camel drivers - once in thirty days; sailors - once in six months; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. (61b)

The Gemora cites the Scriptural sources for Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel’s respective opinions. (61b)

[END]

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Timtum Haleiv

The Gemora cites a braisa (Kesuvos 60a): A child may be nursed until he is twenty-four months. From that age and onwards, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing (the Rabbis forbade it); these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua said: He may nurse even for four or five years. If, however, he ceased nursing after twenty-four months and started again, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing.

The Rashba asks: Something that is forbidden on a Biblical level, we are not permitted to provide for a child; however, there is no prohibition to give a child something that is only Rabbinically prohibited. Why would it be forbidden to let the child nurse?

Rav Elyashiv adds: Here, there is not even a Rabbinical prohibition!

He answers: We find that there is a halachic stringency not to allow a child to nurse from an idolater; this may result in timtum. So too, when a child is beyond the age where he should be nursing, if we allow him to nurse, it can lead to timtum.

There is a discussion amongst the Poskim if one eats a permitted item in a time that it is prohibited to eat (such as Yom Kippur, prior to davening or kiddush etc.); does that eating result in timtum or not. However, in our case, Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein asks: The milk is not a forbidden item at all! If we would extract the milk and place it into a utensil, it would be permitted for consumption; the prohibition is only when the child is nursing directly from the mother. Why should we assume that this may result in timtum?

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Changes Due to a Leap Year

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 60) deals with the amount of time an infant usually suckles: A nursing mother is forbidden to re-wed till her infant becomes two years old (Yevamos 42a; Shulchan ‘Aruch, E.H. 13:11) lest she become pregnant and cut off the source of her infant’s sustenance while her husband, who is not the infant’s father, won’t see to alternative food. In a leap year, the author of Terumas HaDeshen writes (Responsa, 216), she must wait 25 months, as the Gemara explains that the suckling period is two years and in the leap year the suckling period is prolonged according to the year! (We should point out that the Remo ruled the halachah only “to worry as a first preference” while others disagree; see Pischei Teshuvah, ibid, S.K. 16, and Responsa Chasam Sofer, E.H. 137). (Meoros HaDaf Yomi Vol. 296)

They also cite other examples to this concept: Meoros HaDaf Yomi Vol. 296 brings the
Gemara in Niddah which states something astounding. The nine months of pregnancy become shorter or longer according to how the Sanhedrin determines the calendar! The Gemara says that the shofar blown at the start of the month to announce the new month as determined by the beis din causes a new calculation concerning everything connected with calculating various dates.

The Rashba writes (Toras HaBayis, bayis 7, sha’ar 3,amud 9): “Certainly the shofar is the cause, because everything that beis din below does, the beis din on High agrees, as we are told: ‘(the appointed times) that you (beis din) shall call them’.” Hashem gave power to the beis din below and gave them authority and responsibility to decide the length of months and declare leap years by adding a month.

The Rashba says that if beis din declares a leap year, they delay Pesach by a month: on the days that originally would have been Pesach it is allowed to eat chametz, and they fixed a new Pesach.

The Rashba continues that the beis din above behaves according to the rulings of the beis din below. Even nature changes according to their decisions. We have gathered a few interesting examples to demonstrate this wonderful connection between people and the Heavenly beis din, by means of the Torah.

Treifah: A treifah animal (whose body is defective such that it cannot live longer than 12 months) doesn’t live longer than 12 months but some say that in a leap year it can live 13 months! (Shach, Y.D. 57, S.K. 18, and see Pri Chadash, ibid).

An animal’s life depends on the chacham’s ruling: The Chazon Ish zt”l writes (O.C. 39, os 15) wonderful things about the power of Torah: “But deciding the measure of an individual treifah was given to the chacham and what appears to him, is the root of the halachah said to Moshe at Mount Sinai… and it’s possible that its life depends on the chacham’s ruling, if the ruling was made during its life.” Worms live long: Certain fruits have worms in them only while they’re still attached to the tree. These fruits must be examined during 12 months after picking as the worm lives for six months and its body disintegrates after six more months and then there is no prohibition to eat it (Shulchan ‘Aruch, Y.D. 84:8, and ‘Aroch HaShulchan, ibid, se’if 66). However, in a leap year the worms live longer and the fruit should be examined for 13 months! (See Pri Megadim, ibid, and Gilyon Maharsha, ibid).

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 60 - Highlights

Recognizing its Mother

The braisa had stated: If the child recognizer her (the divorcee) and will only nurse from her, the husband is required to pay her wages and she is forced to nurse.

The Gemora asks: From what age do we make this assumption?

Rava answers in the name of Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Abba who said in the name of Rav: From three months. Shmuel said: From thirty days. Rabbi Yitzchak said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: From fifty days. Rav Simi bar Abaye said: The halacha follows that which Rabbi Yitzchak said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan.

The Gemora asks on Shmuel: Do children, in fact, recognize their mother at such a young age (thirty days)?

Rami bar Yechezkel said: Do not listen to those rules which my brother Yehudah stated in the name of Shmuel, for the following is what Shmuel said: It is whenever the child recognizes his mother.

The Gemora records an incident: A divorcee once came before Shmuel declaring her refusal to nurse her son. Shmuel said to Rav Dimi bar Yosef, “Go and test her.” He went and placed the mother among a row of women and, taking hold of her child, carried him in front of them. When he came up to her, the child gazed at her face, but she turned her eyes away from him. Rav Dimi said to her, “Lift up your eyes, come and take your son.”

The Gemora asks: How does a blind child recognize its mother?

Rav Ashi said: By her smell and by taste. (60a)

Human Milk and Blood

The Gemora cites a braisa: A child may be nursed until he is twenty-four months. From that age and onwards, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing (the Rabbis forbade it); these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua said: He may nurse even for four or five years. If, however, he ceased nursing after twenty-four months and started again, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing.

The braisa had stated: From that age and onwards, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing.

The Gemora asks a contradiction from a braisa which states that milk and blood from a human being is Biblically and Rabbinically permitted; why does our braisa say that a child should not nurse after twenty-four months?

The Gemora answers: Human milk is permitted for consumption when it has been separated from the woman’s breast, whereas the braisa which prohibited nursing after twenty-four months is referring to nursing directly from the woman’s breast.

The Gemora notes: The reverse is true regarding human blood. If the blood is separated from the human body, it is forbidden (because people will say that it is blood from an animal); if however, the blood is between his teeth, he is permitted to suck without any concerns (for no one sees him eating it). (60a)
Nursing from a Goat on Shabbos

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rabbi Marinus says: One who is groaning (due to a pain in his heart resulting in shortness of breath) is permitted to nurse milk directly from a goat on Shabbos (which is known to heal this condition).

The Gemora explains its reasoning: Nursing is an act of unusual extracting (which is only Rabbinically prohibited), and where pain is involved, no preventive measure has been enacted by the Rabbis. (Extracting is a sub-category of threshing, where one extracts the grain from the covering in which it grew; milking an animal with one’s hand would be Biblically prohibited since he is extracting the milk from the animal’s udder; however, nursing directly from the animal is not the ordinary manner and therefore, it is only Rabbinically forbidden.)

Rabbi Yosef stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Marinus. (60a)

Fixing a Gutter

The Gemora cites a braisa: Nachum Ish Galya said: If straw collected in a gutter (and thus prevents the proper flow of the water), it is permissible to crush it with one’s foot in private on Shabbos, and he does not need to be concerned about the matter. What is the reason? Since this repair is carried out in an unusual manner and when a financial loss is involved, the Rabbis did not enact any preventive measure.

Rabbi Yosef stated: The halachah is in agreement with the ruling of Nachum Ish Galya. (60a)

The braisa had stated: If, however, he ceased nursing after twenty-four months and started again, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing.

Ceased to Nurse

The Gemora asks: When will it be considered that he stopped nursing?

Rav Yehudah bar Chaviva answered in the name of Shmuel: If the child stopped nursing for three days. An alternative version is that this was a braisa taught in front of Shmuel. (60a)

Marrying a Nursing Mother

The Gemora cites a braisa: A nursing mother whose husband died within twenty-four months of the birth of their child shall neither be betrothed nor married again until the completion of the twenty-four months (were she to marry sooner and happen to become pregnant, she would be compelled to wean her child prematurely); these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah however, permits her to remarry after eighteen months (a sufficient enough time for a child to be nursed).

Rabbi Nosson bar Yosef said: Those (the words of Rabbi Meir) surely, are the very words of Beis Shamai and these (the words of Rabbi Yehudah) are the very words of Beis Hillel; for Beis Shamai ruled: Twenty-four months, while Beis Hillel ruled: Eighteen months!

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel replied: I will explain: According to the opinion that a child should nurse for twenty-four months, a nursing mother is permitted to remarry after twenty-one months, and according to the opinion that a child should nurse for eighteen months, she may remarry after fifteen months. This is because a nursing mother’s milk deteriorates only after three months of pregnancy.

Ula said: The halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. Mar Ukva said: Rabbi Chanina permitted me to remarry a nursing mother after fifteen months.

The Gemora records an incident: Abaye's sharecropper once came to Abaye and asked him, “Is it permissible to betroth a nursing woman after fifteen months?” Abaye answered him: “firstly, whenever there is disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, the halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, and furthermore, in a dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel, the halacha follows the opinion of Beis Hillel. And Ula said: The halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. Mar Ukva had stated: Rabbi Chanina permitted me to remarry a nursing mother after fifteen months. Certainly, there is no need for you to wait longer than that since you only intend betrothal (and there is no actual concern that she will become pregnant and be forced to wean her child).”

When Abaye came before Rav Yosef, Rav Yosef told him: Both Rav and Shmuel maintain that a nursing woman is required to wait twenty-four months, not including the day on which the child was born, and not including the day of erusin. Thereupon, Abaye ran three parsaos after him, and some say one parsah along sand mounds, but failed to overtake him.

Abaye said, “The statement made by the Rabbis that even a simple question about the permissibility of eating an egg with kutach (a mixture containing milk), a man shall not decide in the vicinity of his teacher was not due to the fact that this might appear disrespectful; but rather, it is because a student would have no success in dealing with the matter correctly. For I have, in fact, learned the tradition of Rav and Shmuel, and yet, I did not merit applying it.”

The Gemora cites a related braisa: If a nursing mother gave her child to a wet nurse or she weaned him, or if the child died, she is permitted to remarry immediately.

Rav Papa and Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua intended to issue a practical decision in accordance with this braisa, but an elderly woman said to them, “'I have been in such a position and Rav Nachman forbade me to remarry (until the conclusion of the twenty-four months).”

The Gemora asks: Surely, this could not have been so, for has not Rav Nachman in fact permitted such remarriage in the house of the Reish Galusa (after the widows had given their children over to wet nurses)?

The Gemora answers: The f house of the Reish Galusa was different from ordinary people because no nurse would break her agreement with them. (In the case of ordinary people, however, the nurse might well change her mind at any moment and the child would consequently have to fall back upon the nursing of his own mother. Should she then happen to become pregnant, the child would be in danger of starvation.)

Rav Papi said to them: Could you not have inferred it (that the woman should be forbidden to remarry) from the following braisa: A woman who regularly goes to her father’s house (and was there for an extended period of time prior to her husband’s death), or she was angry with him (prior to her husband’s death and didn’t have relations with him), or her husband was in jail, or her husband was old or sick, or if she was sick, or if she miscarried after her husband’s death, or if she was a barren woman, or if she was old, or a minor, or an aylonis, or she was infertile, she is nevertheless required to wait three months before remarrying. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosi said: She is permitted to marry immediately. Rav Nachman stated in the name of Samuel: The halachah follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir in respect of his restrictive measures!

They answered him: This braisa did not occur to us.

The Gemora concludes: The law is that if the child died, the widow may remarry immediately, but if she has weaned him, she is forbidden.

Mar son of Rav. Ashi ruled: Even if the child died, the widow is forbidden to remarry immediately because there is a concern that she will kill her child in order to be in a position to remarry. It once actually happened that a mother strangled her child. This incident, however, is no proof. That woman was an imbecile, for it is not likely that sane women would strangle their children. (60a – 60b)

[END]

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Beauty is a Virtue

Rabbi Chiya cited a braisa: A wife is only for her beauty. A different braisa states: A wife is only for her cosmetics and jewelry.

The Gemora in Yevamos (63a) records an incident with Rabbi Chiya that is in line with his teaching here. Rabbi Chiya’s wife would constantly torment him. Nevertheless, when he would find something in the market that he thought his wife would like, he would wrap it in a shawl and give it to her as a gift. Rav asked him: “Doesn’t she bother you?” Rabbi Chiya responded: “It is enough that they raise our children, and protect us from sinning.”

The Gemora is teaching us that a wife who adorns herself for the sake of looking attractive to her husband is preventing him from sinning, for he will not be enticed to gaze at other women.

This is quite possibly the explanation for the Gemora Taanis (31a). The Mishna had stated: On the fifteenth of Av, the daughters of Yerushalayim would go forth in borrowed white garments, so as not to embarrass whoever does not have and they would go forth and dance in the vineyards. And what would they say? "Young man, lift up your eyes and see what you choose for yourself. Do not set your eyes on beauty, set your eyes on the family.

The Gemora cites a braisa: The pretty ones among the maidens would say: "Pay attention to beauty alone, because a woman is made only for beauty." Those among them who were from a distinguished family would say: "Look to a distinguished family for women are but made to bear children.” The homely ones among them would say: “Make your selections only for the glory of Heaven, but provide us with gold jewelry and pretty clothes.”

The Peleh Yoetz explains that this merely means that beauty is a virtue for a young man to look for in addition to other virtues. It is quite possible that the girls who said “look to beauty,” could have meant that they had many other virtues besides their beauty. Our Gemora is stating that even if beauty was their only virtue, it can still have a spiritual benefit. Women and their beauty are vitally important since they prevent a man from sinning.

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Indulging in Frivolities

Rabbi Pinchas Winston gleans a valuable lesson from our Mishna.

Israel camped in Shittim. The people acted immorally with the daughters of Moav, who lured the people to sacrifice to their gods (Bamidbar 25:1-2)

Talk about role reversal! One moment, Bilaam is up in the mountains overlooking the Jewish camp, trying to curse the Jewish people, but forced instead to praise them for their modesty; the next moment the people are acting immorally with the daughters of Moav! How does one fall from "perfection" so fast.

Perhaps we can glean insight into this catastrophe, which happens to plague many societies today and did in the past, from a Mishnah dealing with this issue.

The tractate is Kesuvos, which, obviously, deals with a man's marital obligations to his wife (and vice-versa) and family (and which, "coincidentally," contains a large section about the blessing of living in Eretz Yisroel toward the end). The Mishnah teaches: These are the things that a wife is obligated to perform for her husband And even if he brings into the house one hundred helpers, still, she should be compelled to work with wool, because doing nothing leads to promiscuous behavior (Mishnah, Kesuvos 59b)

We can assume, and prove from history, that this "principle" does not only apply to married women, but to everyone as well. And, we can also assume that the Mishnah's choice of "working with wool" is merely an example of an activity that keeps a person busy, and away from negative influences (not all trades create situations of modesty). And, perhaps we can make a connection from this Mishnah to the end of our parshah, and reveal the vulnerability of life in a premature Garden of Eden.

Not everyone is cut out for life in the Garden of Eden at this point in history. In fact, just about nobody is, save for a few very, VERY righteous individuals who have divested themselves of the pleasures of This World. As for the rest of us, the struggle does us a lot of good. It refines us, and defines us, and makes us grow and become great.

In fact, elsewhere the Talmud sums up our period of history with the following little saying:

Rav Yitzchak said: If a person tells you, "I tried, but did not succeed," don't believe him; "I did not try, but succeeded," don't believe him; "I tried and succeeded," believe him (Megillah 6b)

In the end, the Talmud concludes that this only applies to becoming "sharper" in Torah-learning (i.e., people can succeed in business with little effort and fail though they have made great effort). However, we know from the following:

According to the effort is the reward. (Pirkei Avos 5:22) -- that success IS the effort made.

To be human is to struggle, though our bodies fight against this with all their might (what a waste of energy!). The greatest promise that technological advancement holds out for most people is the promise of more leisure time, and, indeed, in many ways, it has delivered on that promise.

However, as we learn from the Mishnah, and from the Jews in the desert, more "leisure-time" is not necessarily a good thing. The Jews in the desert had every physical concern taken care of for them by Heaven; all they had to do was sit and learn Torah and keep away from trouble.

But what happens when trouble doesn't keep away from you?!! If you're a busy person with important goals, usually you have no time for it, and the fear of wasting a single moment for trivial matters frightens you into keeping on track. There are too many important matters to take care of to indulge in frivolities and pleasures that don't pay off in the long wrong.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 59 - Highlights

Earnings

The Gemora asks (on Rav Ada who says that “mezonos” – “support” given by a husband gives him the right to his wife’s “mosar” – “extra money earned”) from a Beraisa. The Beraisa states that the mezonos of a husband gives him the right to the “masei yadayim” – “basic earnings” of his wife (not to the “mosar”).

The Gemora answers that the Beraisa is referring to the “mosar masei yadeha” – “extra earnings of his wife’s hands.”

The Gemora asks from another Beraisa. The Beraisa states that if he doesn’t give her a silver me’ah for needs, she gets to keep her earnings. The Gemora answers that this too refers to “mosar masei yadeha.”

The Gemora asks, but doesn’t this Beraisa continue by saying “and how much does she earn for him? The amount of five Sela’im in Yehuda (implying it is talking about basic earnings).”

The Gemora answers that this is what the continuation of the Beraisa means: How much is her basic earnings so that we should know what is extra? The amount of five Sela’im in Yehuda, which is the weight of ten Sela’im in the Galil.

Shmuel’s Halachic Ruling

Shmuel states that the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan Ha’Sandlar (who stated on 58b that if a man is makdish his wife’s extra earnings the money does not become consecrated).

The Gemora asks: Did Shmuel really say this? The Mishna states that if a woman says that she forbids her husband to benefit from what she earns, her husband does not have to be “meifer” – “deny” the vow. The Mishna states that Rabbi Akiva says he should make sure to be meifer, as she might make more than her basic earnings (and that amount would be forbidden to him). Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri says that he should deny the vow, as he might end up divorcing her and would be unable to remarry, as her earnings would be forbidden to him. Shmuel ruled in this matter that the halachah is according to Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri! [This implies that a vow can be binding even when it is currently inapplicable, the opposite of Rabbi Yochanan Ha’Sandlar who says such a vow is void!]

The Gemora answers that when Shmuel said that the halachah was like Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri in the above case, he meant due to the extra earnings, not Rabbi Yochanan’s reasoning of the basic earnings.

The Gemora asks: In that case he should have clarified that he only rules like Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri regarding the extra earnings! Alternatively, he should have said merely that the halachah does not follow the Tanna Kama! Alternatively, he should have said the halachah follows Rabbi Akiva (who is only concerned about extra earnings in this case)!

Rav Yosef therefore gives a different answer. “Aren’t we discussing forbidding benefit? This type of law is different. Just as a person can forbid his friend’s fruits on himself, a person could similarly consecrate (forbidding from himself and dedicating to the Beis Hamikdosh) something which has not yet come to this world (and is currently inapplicable).”

The Comparison to a Field
Abaye said to him: It is understandable that someone can forbid his friend’s fruit upon himself, just as he has the rights to forbid his fruit from the other person. However, he should not be allowed to forbid fruit that has not yet come into existence on his friend just like he cannot forbid his friend’s fruits from being used by a third friend!

Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua therefore answers that the case (in the Mishna above) is where the woman said that her hands should be dedicated to the One Who made them. Being that her hands are in the world, it is not considered a thing that is not yet in existence.

The Gemora asks, just because she said this does the dedication work? Her hands are already indebted to her husband! The Gemora answers that the case is where she says this should take effect when she gets divorced.

The Gemora asks, is there such an effective dedication that although it does not take effect now it takes effect at a later date? Rabbi Ilai answers, why not? If someone says to his friend that the field I am now selling you should become consecrated when I buy it back from you, isn’t it valid?

Rabbi Yirmiyah asked him that the cases are incomparable. In the case of the field he currently has the ability to consecrate it. In the case of the woman, she has no ability to ensure she gets a divorce (it is up to the husband)! It is more like the case of a person who states that the field that I have already sold you should become consecrated when I buy it back from you, which is an invalid consecration.

Rav Papa told Rabbi Yirmiyah that his comparison is inaccurate. In Rabbi Yirmiyah’s case of the field, both the field and its fruit are currently in the hands of the future seller. In the case of the woman, at least her body (hands) are in her possession! It is therefore more accurately compared to a case where a person says to his friend that my field that you have as a security for a loan should become consecrated when I redeem it from you, which is valid.

Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi told Rav Papa that his comparison was inaccurate. In Rav Papa’s case of the field the person had the ability all along to redeem the field (by paying back the loan)! In the case of a married woman she has no ability to obtain her divorce (it is up to the husband)! It more comparable to a case where a person says to his friend that this field that I have given you as a security for a ten-year period should become consecrated when I redeem it, which is valid.

Rav Ashi told Rav Shisha that his comparison was inaccurate. In Rav Shisha’s case of the field the person at least will have the full rights to redeem the field after ten years, whereas as a woman never has the ability to grant herself a divorce!

Rav Ashi therefore gave a different answer. “Aren’t we discussing forbidding benefit? Forbidding benefit is different, as they involve dedicating a physical body to consecrated (not just monetary value). This is like the statement of Rava in which Rava stated that consecrated, chametz (leaven on Pesach), and freeing slaves takes precedence over prior indebtedness.

The Gemora asks that if this is true, let her hands be consecrated now (during the marriage)! The Gemora answers that the sages strengthened the indebtedness of a wife to her husband in order that the consecrated should not work during the marriage.
Mishna
These are the types of work that a woman must do for her husband: she must grind flour, bake, clean clothes, cook, nurse her son, make her husband’s bed, and knit with wool. If she brings a maid into the marriage, she does not have to grind, bake, or clean clothes. If she brought two maids, she also does not have to nurse or cook. If she brings three maids she also does not have to make his bed or knit with wool. If she brings four maids she can just sit in her special silk canopy (see Bartenura). Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brings one hundred maids into the marriage, she can force her to knit, as her having nothing to do could lead to promiscuity. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if someone vows that his wife is forbidden to do work he should divorce her and give her a kesuvah, as having nothing to do can cause her to go crazy.

Working Women
The Gemora asks: Can it really be that she has to grind (the water causes the wheel to grind)? The Gemora answers that the Mishna means that she must busy herself with the grinding work (such as loading the grain and collecting the flour). Alternatively, the Gemora answers that it is referring to hand mill (where she indeed does the grinding).

The Gemora notes that our Mishna is apparently unlike Rabbi Chiya. Rabbi Chiya taught that a woman is for the purpose of beauty, and for the purpose of having children. Another teaching of Rabbi Chiya is that a woman’s purpose is to be adorned with jewelry. Rabbi Chiya also taught that if someone wants to make his wife shine, he should buy her linen garments. Someone who wants to make his daughter’s skin lighter should feed her young chicks and give her milk when she is close to becoming an adolescent.

The Gemora notes that our Mishna is apparently unlike Beis Shamai. The Beraisa states that if a woman vowed not to nurse her son, Beis Shamai says she should can take the nipple out of his mouth. Beis Hillel says she can be forced to nurse him. If she is divorced, she cannot be forced to nurse. However, if the baby only wants to nurse from her, he pays her and she is forced to nurse, as otherwise the baby’s life is in danger!

The Gemora answers that our Mishna could even be in accordance with Beis Shamai. The Beraisa is talking about a case where she made the vow (not to nurse) and he upheld the vow. Beis Shamai therefore says that he put his finger in between her teeth (to enable her to get away without nursing), while Beis Hillel says that she put her own finger in between her teeth (it was her fault she made the vow).

The Gemora asks: Let them argue about a regular case of kesuvah? [Why did they specifically argue about nursing?] Additionally, there is a separate Beraisa where Beis Shamai says that no woman has to nurse! The Gemora therefore concludes that our Mishna is indeed unlike Beis Shamai.

[END]

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The Apple doesn't Fall Far Away

The Mishna (Kesuvos 57a) had stated regarding the amount of terumah a husband may provide his wife: Rabbi Tarfon says: They give her everything (all her food) of terumah. Rabbi Akiva says: Half of her food must be chulin (for the days in which she is tamei and therefore prohibited from eating terumah) and the other half may be terumah.

Abaye said (58a): This argument only applies to a daughter of a Kohen who is betrothed to a Kohen; however, regarding a daughter of a Yisroel who is betrothed to a Kohen, everyone agrees that half of her food must be chulin and the other half may be terumah (the chulin is needed for the days that she is tamei; a daughter of a Kohen is familiar with the halachos of terumah (from her father’s house), and she knows that the terumah must be sold when she is tamei and exchanged for other food).

Rabbi Braun, in his sefer She’orim Mitzuyanim B’halacha notes that this is the custom of the world; that which the daughter observes in her parent’s house is the manner in which she acts after she is married.

This can be seen from the Gemora above (23a) records an incident where the daughters of Shmuel were taken captive. They were taken to Eretz Yisroel from Bavel and leaving their captors outside, they entered the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Chanina and proclaimed, “We were captured but we are pure.” Rabbi Chanina permitted them to marry Kohanim (based on the principle of happeh she’assar; for the very mouth that would have rendered them forbidden to Kohanim is the mouth that has permitted them). Immediately afterwards, their captors entered the Beis Medrash. Rabbi Chanina said: It is evident that these women are the children of a halachic master (for they had known to speak to the Beis Din before their captors entered; our knowledge of them being taken captive came through their mouth and not from their captors).

Unfortunately, this can be the case in a negative manner as well. The Gemora in Sukkah states that if a child talks in a crude manner in the market, it is obvious that he heard this type of language from his parents in the house.

It is incumbent upon all parents to be constantly aware of their own behavior and manner of speech, especially, when their children are present.

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Food for Thought - Kesuvos 58

*** There are several different opinions as to the amount of terumah a groom should provide to his bride prior to the nisuin.

Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira said: We give her two thirds terumah and one third chulin (unconsecrated produce).

Maharshal comments: An average time for a woman to menstruate (consequently, she is tamei and forbidden from eating terumah) is once every thirty days. The normal flow of blood is for three days. In addition, she must observe seven days of cleanliness prior to becoming tahor and only then will she be permitted to eat terumah again.

Rav Elyashiv Shlita asks: Where did the Maharshal find that an ordinary woman menstruates for three days? It is our custom to wait five days!?

*** The Mishna had stated: The yavam does not entitle his yevamah to eat terumah.

The Gemora explains the reason for this: It is written [Vayikra 22:11]: The acquisition of his money, he may eat of it. Only a Kohen’s own acquisition may eat terumah; however, a yevamah is the acquisition of his brother, not his own.

Rashi maintains that even if the yevamah began eating terumah while her husband was alive, she will be required to cease eating terumah once he dies.

Rabbeinu Tam disagrees and holds that Biblically, once a yevamah obtained the right to eat terumah, she preserves that right even after the husband dies. It is merely a Rabbinical prohibition; the verse cited in the Gemora is only an asmachta (used as support for the Rabbi’s decree).

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (183) asks: Why does Rabbeinu Tam hold that the yevamah is Biblically permitted to eat terumah even after her husband died? She is not the wife of a Kohen any longer; she doesn’t have any offspring from the Kohen (which would have allowed her to continue eating terumah) and she is not yet the acquisition of the yavam!?

[Perhaps, this challenge can be answered by examining the concept of the zikah-attachment between the yavam and the yevamah.]

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Derived from Lavan

The Gemora (Kesuvos 57b) derives the source that a bride is given twelve months to prepare for her wedding from Lavan, when he requested from Eliezer that Rivkah should remain with them in order to prepare for her wedding.

The commentators ask: How can we learn out a halacha from the wicked Lavan?

It is noteworthy that there are several other halachos derived from Lavan.

The Yerushalmi (Moed Katan) learns out the halachos regarding the seven days of rejoicing after a wedding from Lavan.

Tosfos in Kiddushin (52a) relates an incident that occurred with Rabbeinu Tam that the son of Rabbi Oshaya Halevi betrothed the daughter of a wealthy man and he said, “Your daughter should be betrothed to me.” He failed to mention which daughter he was referring to. Rabbeinu Tam ruled that we can assume that he betrothed the older daughter. Proof to this is from Lavan.

The Admor Mi’Satmar explains: Every word in the Torah emanates from Heaven and halachos may be derived from there. These words were given over to Lavan for him to say. It is similar to that which the Torah states regarding Bila’am; Hashem placed the words into his mouth and only those words, was he granted permission to say.

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 57 - Highlights

Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yosi’s Dispute

When Rav Dimi came to Bavel from Eretz Yisroel, he said: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who said in the name of Bar Kappara: The argument between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehudah (whether one is allowed to make an oral stipulation reducing the amount of the kesuvah or not) is only applicable in the beginning; however, in the end, even Rabbi Yosi concedes that she cannot waive her right to the kesuvah (even to part of it).

Rabbi Yochanan said: The argument applies in the beginning and in the end.

Rabbi Avahu said: Rabbi Yochanan explained to me that he does not dispute Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. What did Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi mean when he said “in the beginning” and “in the end”? “In the beginning” meant the beginning of chupah (when she enters the chupah). “In the end” meant the end of cohabitation. When I (Rabbi Yochanan) said that the argument is “in the beginning” and “in the end,” what did I mean? “In the beginning” means the beginning of chupah. “In the end” means the end of chupah, which is also the beginning of cohabitation. (It emerges according to Rabbi Avahu that both Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi agree that the argument between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehudah applies in the beginning of chupah and at the end of chupah. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi adds that there is no argument after cohabitation.)

When Ravin came to Bavel from Eretz Yisroel, he said: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who said in the name of Bar Kappara: The argument between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehudah (whether one is allowed to make an oral stipulation reducing the amount of the kesuvah or not) is only applicable in the end; however, in the beginning, even Rabbi Yehudah concedes that she may waive her right to the kesuvah.

Rabbi Yochanan said: The argument applies in the beginning and in the end.

Rabbi Avahu said: Rabbi Yochanan explained to me that he does not dispute Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. What did Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi mean when he said “in the beginning” and “in the end”? “In the end” meant the end of chupah (when she leaves the chupah). “In the beginning” meant the beginning of chupah. When I (Rabbi Yochanan) said that the argument is “in the beginning” and “in the end,” what did I mean? “In the beginning” means the beginning of cohabitation. “In the end” means the end of cohabitation. (It emerges according to Rabbi Avahu in this version that both Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi agree that the argument between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehudah applies in the beginning of cohabitation and at the end of cohabitation. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi adds that there is no argument in the beginning of chupah.)

Rav Pappa said: If Rabbi Avahu had not said that Rabbi Yochanan does not dispute Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, I would have thought to say that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree, but Rav Dimi and Ravin are in agreement with each other. What did Ravin mean when he said “in the end” (that there is the only time Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehudah argue)? He meant at the end of chupah. And what did Rav Dimi mean when he said “in the beginning” (that there is the only time Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehudah argue)? He meant in the beginning of cohabitation. (Accordingly, they would have both agreed that in the beginning of chupah, she may waive her right to the kesuvah and at the end of cohabitation, she may not waive her right; the dispute would only have been after chupah, prior to cohabitation.)

The Gemora asks: What is Rav Pappa teaching us?

The Gemora answers: It is this that he teaches us: It is preferable to assume (unless there is proof to the contrary) that two Amoraim differ in their own opinions (which is completely natural and legitimate; here is where the following dictum is applicable: These and those are the words of the living God, both viewpoints are regarded as Torah), rather than that two Amoraim should differ as to what was the view of another Amora (in which case one of the two must be definitely wrong since the view of the Amora which both of them claim to represent could not possibly have agreed with what both of them submit; had not Rabbi Avahu's statement been authoritative, coming as it did from Rabbi Yochanan himself, Rav Papa's submission would have been preferred to his). (57a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: (In former times the betrothal (kiddushin) and the marriage (nisu'in) ceremonies were not performed at the same time as is our practice today. Rather it was customary for the bridegroom to first betroth his bride and make her his arusah (betrothed) and only later did he take her to the chupah (bridal canopy) for the marriage ceremony. They grant a virgin twelve months, from when her husband requested of her (to prepare for the wedding), to provide for herself (she may postpone the nisuin up until twelve months; after that, she is regarded as a rebellious wife). And just as they grant the woman, so do they grant the man to provide for himself. And a widow is given thirty days. If the time arrived and they (the virgin or the widow) were not married by the husband, they eat from his food and they eat of the terumah. Rabbi Tarfon says: They give her everything of terumah. Rabbi Akiva says: Half of her food must be chulin and the other half may be terumah.

The yavam does not entitle his yevamah to eat terumah. If she spent six months with her husband and six months with her yavam, and even if all of them were with her husband, less one day that she was with her yavam, or all of them were with her yavam, less one day that she was with her husband, she does not eat terumah.

This is the initial teaching of the Mishna. The Beis Din following them said: She does not eat terumah until she enters the bridal canopy. (57a – 57b)

Scriptural Source

The Gemora cites a Scriptural source which indicates that a bride requires twelve months for her preparations for nisuin. (57b)

Wedding Date for a Minor

Rabbi Zeira cites a braisa: Regarding a minor, both she and her father have the right to delay the wedding (until she becomes an adult, even after twelve months and they are not penalized).

The Gemora explains: Even if the minor consents, the father has a right to postpone the wedding, for he can say: Presently, she is unaware regarding the hardships of marriage; soon afterward, she will rebel against her husband and come back to rely on her father.

Rabbi Abba bar Levi says: We may not set a wedding date for a minor to be married while she is still a minor, but we may set the wedding date for a minor to be married when she becomes an adult.

The Gemora explains the novelty of this halacha: We might think that we shouldn’t set a wedding date for a minor at all, for perhaps she will become afraid (concerning the difficulties of marriage) and consequently become weak; Rabbi Abba teaches us that a date may be set even while she is still a minor. (57b)

Wedding Date for a Bogeres

Rav Huna says: If a woman was a bogeres for even one day and then becomes betrothed, we give her thirty days (for preparation for nisuin) just like a widow.

The Gemora asks on Rav Huna from the following Mishna: Concerning a bogeres who waited twelve months; Rabbi Eliezer says that since the husband is required to feed her, it is he (alone, and not together with her father like the Chachamim maintain) who annuls her vows. (It is evident from this Mishna that we wait twelve months for a bogeres.)

The Gemora answers: The Mishna should be emended to read as follows: Concerning a bogeres (who waited thirty days) and one (a na’arah) who waited twelve months; Rabbi Eliezer says that since the husband is required to feed her, it is he who annuls her vows.

The Gemora asks on Rav Huna from the following braisa: One who betroths a virgin, whether he asked her to marry him and she held back or whether she asked him and he held back, we give her twelve months for preparation from the time of the claim, but not from the time of the betrothal. However, if she is a bogeres, she is like one who has been claimed (she begins the preparations immediately without having to be asked). How is this to be understood? If she was a bogeres for one day and then she became betrothed, we give her twelve months (this statement refutes Rav Huna’s ruling); while we give an arusah thirty days.

The Gemora concludes: This braisa in indeed a refutation against Rav Huna!

The Gemora asks: What is the meaning of the braisa when it states that an arusah is given thirty days?

Rav Papa answers: It is referring to a woman who has been a bogeres for twelve months and then she became betrothed; she is given thirty days. (57b)

Decree Against Eating Terumah

The Mishna had stated: If the time arrived and they (the virgin or the widow) were not married by the husband, they eat from his food and they eat of the terumah.

Ula explains: Concerning an arusah daughter of an Israelite, who had been betrothed by a Kohen, she was not allowed to eat terumah, although, Biblically, she is allowed to eat terumah, as it is written [Vayikra 22:11]: But if a Kohen buy any soul, the acquisition of his money, he may eat of it, and the arusah is an “acquisition” effected by him with the money of the kiddushin; nevertheless, since she lives in her father’s home, the Rabbis prohibited her from eating of the terumah lest they pour a cup of terumah for her in her father's home, and she offer it to her brothers and sisters.

The Gemora asks: If so, they should also be prohibited from eating terumah in a case when the time arrived and they were not married?

The Gemora answers: Since the groom is obligated to feed her, he designates a set place for her to eat (in order that she shouldn’t share it with her relatives; therefore, we are not concerned that she will feed her brothers and sisters terumah.

The Gemora asks: If so, a Kohen, who is a hired harvest gleaner working for a Yisroel should not be permitted to eat terumah, since the Yisroel’s family members will come and eat terumah with him?

The Gemora answers: Since it is the general practice for the employer to provide food for the worker, we are not concerned that the family members will eat from the worker’s food.

Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah explains the Rabbi’s enactment differently: It is because of a blemish, i.e., if he found a physical defect in her, her kiddushin would be considered erroneous, and would be annulled retroactively and thus a non-Kohen will have partaken of terumah.

The Gemora asks: If so, if she entered the chupah, but did not cohabit, she still should be prohibited from eating terumah?

The Gemora answers: He examines her and only then does he bring her into the chupah.

The Gemora asks: If so, a slave of a Kohen purchased from a Yisroel should be prohibited from eating terumah because perhaps a defect will be found, nullifying retroactively the sale to the Kohen?

The Gemora answers: A blemish does not nullify a sale by a slave, for if the defect is recognizable from the outside, the buyer has seen it (and he nevertheless purchased the slave). If the defect is on the inside, what difference does it make; a slave is meant to work and this type of blemish should not hinder the slave from working at all. If the slave is found to be a thief or kidnapper, the sale is valid anyway. What can there be that would nullify a sale? If he was found to be an armed bandit or a person sentenced to death by the government (which would nullify the sale), such characters are generally public knowledge. (Thus, there is no reason to prohibit a Kohen’s slave from eating terumah.)

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons?

The Gemora answers: The difference between them is in the following cases: If her intended husband accepted the kiddushin even if she has defects, or where her father delivered her to the intended husband's agents or where the father’s agents went together with the groom’s agents to deliver her to him. (57b – 58a)

[END]

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MAKING A CONDITION AGAINST SOMETHING WRITTEN IN THE TORAH

The Gemara cites a Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah regarding whether a person may make a Tenai modifying the obligations stipulated by the Torah regarding monetary law ("Masneh Al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah"). Rebbi Meir says that if a man is Mekadesh a woman on condition that he not be obligated to give her She'er, Kesus, and Onah, the Tenai is invalid and the Kidushin takes effect fully (and he is obligated to provide her with She'er, Kesus, and Onah). Rebbi Yehudah says the Tenai is valid, and the Kidushin takes effect and he is not obligated to provide her with She'er, Kesus, and Onah.

Rebbi Meir's view is difficult to understand. If the Tenai is null and void, then why should the Kidushin take effect at all? The man was Mekadesh the woman on condition that if he is not obligated to give her She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then he wants the Kidushin to take effect, and conversely, if he will be obligated in She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then he does not want the Kidushin to take effect! (Rebbi Meir requires a "Tenai Kaful" -- both sides of the condition stated explicitly -- whenever a Tenai is used, as the Mishnah says in Kidushin 61a.) Since the man specified clearly that he does not want the Kidushin to be valid if he will be obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah, then how can the Kidushin take effect and obligate him in She'er, Kesus, and Onah? He did not have in mind for the Kidushin to take effect under such circumstances! (TOSFOS DH Harei Zu)
ANSWERS:
(a) The RI explains that we learns all the laws of Tenai, including the very fact that one may make a Tenai, from a verse (in Kidushin, ibid.) If not for the fact that the Torah teaches that there is such a thing as making a Tenai, we would not have known that there is a concept of Tenai at all. Had the Torah not taught us the concept of Tenai, that one may make a stipulation when making a Kinyan, we would have thought that when a person makes a Tenai as a precondition to a certain Kinyan, we just ignore the Tenai and the Kinyan takes effect. By teaching that a Tenai does work, the Torah is teaching that if the condition is not fulfilled, the Kinyan is annulled retroactively. In the situations in which the Torah does not teach that a Tenai works (such as a situation in which the Tenai counters that which is written in the Torah), we revert back to the original way we would have ruled had the Torah not taught us the concept of Tenai, and the Kinyan works regardless of the fulfillment of the Tenai.

This answer of Tosfos is very difficult to understand. Even without the Torah teaching us the laws of Tenai, we should know, logically, that if a person sells an item to his friend and stipulates that the sale should not be valid unless his friend gives him something or does something, then if the friend fails to fulfill the Tenai the sale should not be valid, since the person did not fully commit himself to the sale!

To answer this question, we must first analyze a related Halachah -- the Halachah of Bereirah.

In many places in the Gemara we find the view that holds "Ein Bereirah," which means that a Kinyan cannot be effected if -- at the moment that it takes effect -- it is not clear upon what it takes effect. For example, a person cannot pick up an item in order to be Koneh it and say, "If it rains tomorrow, I want this act of Kinyan to be for Reuven, and if it does not rain tomorrow, I want this act of Kinyan to be for Shimon." If a person does make such a stipulation, then even if it rains the next day, the object will not belong to Reuven. Similarly, a person cannot eat fruits today, "The portion that I will choose to separate tomorrow will be Terumah on these fruits starting from now." If he does so, then even if he separates a portion tomorrow, it will not serve as Terumah.

The logic for this, as the RAN explains in Nedarim (45b), is that "it is not appropriate for a Kinyan to take effect in a way that leaves a doubt as to how it took effect." This means that the Kinyan must take effect at the same moment at which the action which accomplishes the Kinyan is performed (such as the act of Hagba'ah (lifting up an item) in the case of a purchase, or Dibur (speech) in the case of making something Terumah). The Kinyan cannot take effect after the act, because the act which makes the Kinyan is no longer present. Thus, if at the moment that the act is performed, the Kinyan "does not know" where to take effect, the Kinyan does not take effect (or it takes effect on one of the two, regardless of what happens the next day; see Insights to Eruvin 37b). The Kinyan cannot see into the future, so to speak.

What is the difference between Bereirah and a Tenai? No Tenai should ever work if we say "Ein Bereirah," because the Kinyan cannot know what will happen in the future (whether the Tenai will be fulfilled or not) in order to be able to take effect now!

RASHI and TOSFOS (Gitin 25b, DH u'l'Chi Mayis) explain that when a person makes a Tenai, it is in his ability, and it is his intention, to fulfill the condition (for otherwise he would not have made the Kinyan in the first place). Hence, the Kinyan is not taking effect in a matter that leaves doubt. Rather, it takes effect for certain at the time the act of Kinyan is made, since he intends to fulfill the Tenai. What, then, is it that revokes the Kinyan retroactively when the condition is not fulfilled? The Kinyan has already been made and completed; it took effect, so how can it be revoked retroactively? The answer is that this is the reason why the Torah has to teach us the novel concept of Tenai -- even though the Kinyan was made, it can be revoked through not fulfilling the condition. This is what the Ri means to say -- since the Torah did not teach the concept of Tenai in a case where the Tenai contradicts the obligations of the Torah, then we revert to saying that the Kinyan is completed and nothing can uproot it retroactively, since it has already been done and has already taken effect. The person who made the Kinyan did intend for the Kinyan to take effect for certain, since he was expecting the Tenai to be fulfilled.
For this reason, when a man makes a Kidushin on condition that he not be obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah, he obviously thinks that he is able to create such a Kidushin and he has in mind that the Kidushin should be completed, except that it should be uprooted if it turns out that he is obligated to give She'er, Kesus, and Onah. But by that time, it is too late to revoke the Kidushin, since it already took effect.

(b) RABEINU TAM (cited by the Tosfos Yeshanim and the Tosfos ha'Rosh), the RITVA, and the RASHBA (cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes) explain that when a person makes a Tenai that contradicts the Torah, he does not really mean it, but he is just being "Mafligah b'Devarim" -- he is just frightening her with words. The Beraisa in Gitin (84a) teaches such a concept with regard to a person who says to his wife that he is giving her a Get on condition that she does something that is physically impossible to do (see Rashi there, DH Mafligah). Since he knows that the Halachah of the Torah requires that Kidushin be done in a certain way with certain obligations, it must be that he is not serious about his condition to alter those obligations, and therefore he probably has in mind to make a Kidushin, and he is just saying this condition in order to frighten her.

Rabeinu Tam might have rejected the explanation of the Ri because his explanation is logically sound only when the condition is something that will be fulfilled or not fulfilled at a point after the Kinyan is completed. In the case of Kidushin, though, the Kidushin takes effect at the same time that the obligations of She'er, Kesus, and Onah take effect (or do not take effect). Thus, since the Kidushin does not depend on a future event but on a present event, the Kidushin should not take effect (since he did not have in mind to make such a Kidushin that obligates him in She'er, Kesus, and Onah). (See also Rebbi Akiva Eiger.)

The Ri might have explained like the Rashba, who says that the condition that the husband was stipulating was not that Kidushin should take effect without the obligations of She'er, Kesus, and Onah. Rather, the husband was stipulating that Kidushin should take effect only if the woman forgoes her entitlement to She'er, Kesus, and Onah. This can take place after the Kidushin is effected. (This is not like the opinion of Rabeinu Elchanan as quoted later in Tosfos.)
The Ri, on the other hand, did not accept Rabeinu Tam's explanation, because "Mafligah b'Devarim" can only be applied to a Tenai made against something written in the Torah, but not when any of the other details of Tenai were omitted. However, we find that if a person makes a Tenai in the wrong order ("Ma'aseh Kodem le'Tenai"), then the Kinyan takes effect and we ignore the Tenai even though the logic of "Mafligah b'Devarim" does not apply (as the RE'AH points out)!

INSIGHTS INTO THE DAILY DAF
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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 56 - Highlights

Does the Law Follow Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah?

Rabbi Chanina sat before Rabbi Yanai and stated that the law follows Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah (see Mishna 54b). Rabbi Yanai told him: “Go read your statement outside, as the law does not follow Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah.”

Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi said in the name of Rabeinu that the law follows Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. Rav Nachman said that Shmuel said that the law follows Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah, but he himself holds that it does not. Nahardai said in the name of Rav Nachman (bar Yaakov, see Rashash) that the law does follow Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah. Even though Rav Nachman cursed that “any judge who judges like Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah such and such should befall him,” even so this is the law. The Gemora concludes that the law follows the ruling of Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah.

What is the Fondness that Creates Marriage?

Rabin asked: If a woman entered the wedding canopy but did not yet have marital relations, what is her status? Is the fondness shown by having her enter the husband’s domain that creates the status of marriage, or is it the fondness shown by marital relations?

The Gemora suggests that we can prove this from Rav Yosef’s teaching that he wrote her the kesuvah based on the fondness shown on the first night. If Rav Yosef is talking about her being taken into the wedding canopy, this is understandable, as this only happens on the first night of their marriage. However, it is difficult to say that he is talking about marital relations, as isn’t this an occurrence that happens after the first night of marriage as well? He therefore must be talking about her being taken into the wedding canopy.

The Gemora asks: Why then does he state the first night? Is this ceremony only applicable at night and not during the day? The Gemora counters that according to the other reason this would also be difficult, as marital relations are not necessarily had only at night and not during the day! This is apparent from Rava’s statement that in a darkened house it is permitted (to have marital relations during the day).

The Gemora answers that the possibility that Rav Yosef is referring to marital relations is not difficult, as Rav Yosef could be teaching us that marital relations should normally be done at night. However, the question regarding the fact that the wedding ceremony is not always at night still stands.

The Gemora answers that this too is not difficult. Rav Yosef was relating that since the wedding ceremony allows the couple to have marital relations, it is normal to perform it at night.

Rav Ashi asked that if the bride entered the wedding canopy and then became a niddah, what is the law? If we say that the fondness displayed by her husband taking her into the wedding canopy is what makes her married, it is possibly only due to the fact that this allows marital relations. Perhaps taking her into the wedding canopy when it does not yet allow relations is not considered enough of an acquisition (due to the lack of fondness). Perhaps it does not matter (whether or not he can now have marital relations). The Gemora says that this is unresolved.

Does Rabbi Yehuda indeed hold that one can write a receipt? Doesn’t the Mishna state that if someone pays back a partial amount of a debt, Rabbi Yehuda states that a new document should be written with the new amount and exchanged for the old one? Rabbi Yosi said a receipt should be written.

Rabbi Yirmiyah answered that the case of our Mishna (54b) is when the receipt is written within the text of the kesuvah itself. Abaye says that it is even when the text is not written within the kesuvah. In a regular case of a loan where the borrower definitely paid back part of it, it is possible he might lose his receipt and the lender will take out the loan document and collect the amount again. However, here (in the case of a kesuvah) he might never even give her anything! She is merely telling him something (that if I ever get to a stage where I have to collect the kesuvah I forgo half of its value). If he decides to guard her signed statement, he does, and if he doesn’t, he causes himself to loose.

The Gemora asks: It is understandable that Abaye does not want to give Rabbi Yirmiyah’s explanation, as Rabbi Yehudah never mentioned that this receipt is actually written in the text of the kesuvah. However, why doesn’t Rabbi Yirmiyah agree with Abaye?

The Gemora answers that being that Rabbi Yehuda did not endorse generally giving receipts on loans, he decreed that here too it should not be done (despite the reasoning of Abaye).

The Gemora asks that the reason Rabbi Yehuda says this works is because she wrote down that she is forgoing money. This implies that if she merely says so it is not valid. Why? It is a monetary condition, and Rabi Yehuda said that a monetary condition is valid (even when going against an obligation stated by the Torah).

This is evident from the Beraisa that states that if a man says to a woman that he is betrothing her on the condition that she cannot demand from him the Torah’s obligation of support, clothing, and marital relations (see 47b), kiddushin is valid but the condition is null according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that the condition is also valid.

The Gemora answers that Rabbi Yehuda holds that kesuvah is Rabbinic in nature. The Rabbanan strengthened their words more than Torah law (and therefore stated that such a condition will only be valid when written).

The Gemora asks, the rights of a husband to benefit from his wife’s possessions are Rabbinic, and even so the Rabbanan did not strengthen their words in that case. The Mishna states that Rabbi Yehuda said that a husband can always eat the fruit of his wife’s fruit. [If his wife made a condition that he cannot derive benefit from the fruit of her fields, if she sells the fruit and buys something else he is entitled to benefit from that item.] Only if he agrees write that he will not have any rights to her possessions, nor the fruits of her possessions, nor the fruits of the fruits of her possessions and so on. We understand that “write” doesn’t really mean write, but even if he agrees to this orally. [Accordingly, why by kesuvah could she not make this stipulation orally?]

Abaye answers that every wife receives a kesuvah, but not every wife brings in fruits to a marriage. The Rabbanan therefore strengthened the common occurrence, but not the uncommon occurrence.

The Gemora asks, conspiring grain sellers are common, yet we find the sages (Rabbi Yehuda) did not strengthen the Rabbinic law in that case! The Mishna states that if wagon drivers come to town and one states that his grain is still forbidden as it is chadash, and his friend’s grain is permitted as it is yoshon, or that the tithes had not been taken off of his grain but they had been taken off that of his friend’s grain, they are not believed. Rabbi Yehuda says that they are believed.

Abaye answers that the sages only strengthened definite Rabbinic laws, not doubtful Rabbinic laws (such as the unclear status of the wagon driver’s grains known as dmai). Rava answers that this is due to them being generally lenient regarding dmai.

Rabbi Meir says that anyone who lessens the standard amount of a kesuvah, even with an explicit condition, is having promiscuous relations. This implies that his condition is invalid and she really can collect the standard amount she should have received in a kesuvah. However, because the groom told her that she will not receive that amount she is not confident that she will ever collect it, which turns their relations into promiscuity.

The Gemora asks: Don’t we know that Rabbi Meir holds that if one makes a monetary condition against the Torah it is invalid, implying that if it is against a Rabbinic law it is valid? The Gemora answers that Rabbi Meir indeed holds that kesuvah is a Torah law.

The Beraisa states that Rabbi Meir says that anyone who lessens the standard amount of a kesuvah, for a virgin two hundred and for a widow one hundred, is having promiscuous relations. Rabbi Yosi says that one is allowed to do so. Rabbi Yehuda says that if he wants he can write a kesuvah of two hundred for a virgin and she can write that she has already received one hundred, and he can write one hundred for a widow and she can write that she received fifty.

Does Rabbi Yosi really hold this is permitted? Doesn’t the Beraisa state that one cannot make a kesuvah from movable objects in order to “fix the world” (as they might lose their value). Rabbi Yosi stated: what kind of “fixing the world” does this do? Their value is not set and they devaluate!

The Gemora asks: This is the very reason that the Tana Kama just gave! The Gemora explains that it must be that the Tana Kama stated that this law is only true if he does not take responsibility that they will not get lost. However, if he assumes this responsibility then he may base the kesuvah on movable objects. Rabbi Yosi said: what kind of “fixing the world” is this as this still does not cover the fact that they might devaluate (something with which the Tama Kama was apparently not concerned).

The Gemora therefore asks, if Rabbi Yosi there was so worried about the possibility that the movable items will devaluate, does it make sense that he would allow a woman not to receive a kesuvah altogether?

The Gemora answers that it does. In the case of devaluation the woman is not aware of the possibility and therefore does not forgo the devaluation. In our case the woman is fully forgoing her rights to a kesuvah.

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