A Woman's Sacrifices and Recital

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Rabbi Yehudah used to expound common terms. For it has been taught in a braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: A rich person is obligated to bring a rich person’s korban for his wife, and likewise, he is obligated to provide her with the animals for any of her korbanos that she must bring, for the following is what he wrote for her in the kesuvah: My properties are pledged for every claim you may have against me from before up to now.

Rashi explains that it is the husband’s obligation to provide for the sacrifice of his wife, and Rabbi Yehudah rules that when the husband is doing so, he must bring a sacrifice according to his financial status. He cannot claim and say, “My wife has no possessions of her own and she is therefore poor, and I should therefore only be obligated to bring a poor man’s sacrifice for her.”

The Gemora in Nedarim (35b) cites a verse which teaches us that a man is required to bring a korban for his wife, whether she is normal or insane. This, however, is only true regarding sacrifices that are offered for someone who lacks atonement, for these korbanos are different in the following respect: Korbanos are only brought with the owner’s consent; however, a korban, which is brought for one who lacks atonement, can be brought even without the owner’s consent. Therefore, all other korbanos, the woman would be required to bring them; her consent is a necessity.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in Mor U’Ketziah (47) writes that women, in general, have no connection to korbanos, except for those that are her personal obligations, e.g. the birds of a zavah or for a woman who gave birth.

The Peri Megadim disagrees and writes that they are included in the general sacrifices, and certainly with the recital of the korbanos, which we do nowadays, as a replacement for the actual offering of the sacrifices.

The sefer Toras Hayoledes brings that a woman who gave birth, on the forty-first day if she had a son, and on the eighty-first day if she had a daughter, should recite the verses in Parshas Tazria dealing with the korbanos she would have been required to bring if there was a Beis HaMikdash in existence. And she should conclude with the following prayer, “Master of the Universe, it should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that this recital which I said should be significant and accepted before You as if I actually brought my prescribed sacrifices. And it should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that You should build the Beis HaMikdash speedily in our days.”

The Pischei Zuta discusses if she would be required to recite the passages that deal with the sacrifices that she would bring if she was poor and could afford the animals. For perhaps that dispensation was only in the times of the Beis HaMikdash, when korbanos were being brought; however, now, that we are merely reciting the verses, every woman should say the same thing.

In the siddur Keser Nehura, it is written that on the day following a woman’s immersion in a mikvah for her menstrual impurity, she should recite the passages from Parshas Metzora that deal with those halachos. And she should conclude by saying, “It should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that this recital which I said should be significant and accepted before You as if I actually brought my prescribed sacrifices.”

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Kiddushin with a Slavewoman

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (Daf Yomi: Gittin 40b) explains the braisa to be dealing with the following case: The master told her, “Become free with this deed (of betrothal) and be betrothed to me with this.” [In this case, she was obviously not freed from beforehand.] Rabbi Meir holds that this expression (be betrothed) includes emancipation (for she cannot become betrothed to him unless he frees her first), and the Chachamim maintain that it does not include emancipation.

Tosfos in Yevamos (47b) asks: How can the kiddushin be effective if the slave did not immerse herself in a mikvah beforehand? The halachah is that after a slave becomes free, he is immersed in a mikvah to become a complete Jew. If so, this woman is still a slave, and kiddushin is not effective with a slave!?

Tosfos answers that we are dealing with a case where she immersed herself prior to the kiddushin.

The Nimukei Yosef states that the requirement for this immersion is only Rabbinical, and therefore, the kiddushin will be Biblically effective even if she did not immerse beforehand.

Reb Chaim Brisker asks that both of these answers will not resolve the issue according to the Rambam. He proves that the Rambam holds that this immersion is a Biblical requirement. This is because the Rambam maintains that this immersion is a completion of her conversion process. If so, asks Reb Chaim, it is obviously a Biblical requirement and it also cannot be done before she becomes free, for it is part of her conversion process and that can only be accomplished after she becomes free! How would the Rambam understand our Gemora? How can the kiddushin be effective with a slavewoman?

He answers as follows: A freed slave requires immersion in order to accept upon himself those halachos that he was lacking while he was still a slave, for at that time, he was not a complete Jew. This, however, has no bearing on the fact that kiddushin is not effective with a slave or a slavewoman. That, the Gemora in Kiddushin (68a) explains is because a slave does not have any lineage (yuchasin). A slave, in this respect, is inferior to an idolater, for an idolater does have lineage. As soon as the slave is freed and he is no longer a slave, he does have lineage, even though his conversion was not completed, for even an idolater has lineage. It is for this reason that kiddushin can be effective in this case even though she did not immerse in the mikvah yet. For in order for the kiddushin to be effective, it is not necessary for her to have a completed conversion; as long as she is not a slave is sufficient, and since at the moment she becomes free, she is no longer a slave, kiddushin may take effect.

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Showering after Mikvah

Rashi (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16a) explains that the Chachamim enacted a decree of mayim sheuvim (drawn water) because people would err and say that immersing in a Mikvah and in mayim sheuvim would render one pure. Rava (Shabbos 14a) asked Abaye, why does it make a difference if people said this? The end result was that the people had immersed themselves in a Mikvah?

Reb Moshe Feinstein writes in Iggros Moshe that perhaps Abaye’s reasoning was that by pouring on themselves mayim sheuvim, they transgressed the prohibition of baal tosif (adding on to a mitzvah) by thinking that pouring mayim sheuvim was obligatory. Rava, however, maintained that for this suspicion there was no reason to render the person tamei. Some wrote that Abaye held that if one would immerse in a Mikvah or in mayim sheuvim, others would consider him tamei, and they would end up burning Terumah and Kodshim in an errant manner.

Some Rishonim write that similar to matters of purity, the Chachamim also enacted a decree that a woman who was a niddah is not allowed to shower after immersing in a Mikvah. If she showered after immersing in a Mikvah, her immersion would be invalid and she would be forbidden to her husband. Most Rishonim, however, maintain that this is not the law, because this decree was only enacted regarding matters of purity.

The Shach writes that the reason that is offered in the Gemora that people will err in thinking that pouring mayim sheuvim is what purifies the person, also applies to a woman immersing in a Mikvah, irrespective of the woman erring in her thinking. Others write that from the words of the Rambam, it appears that the decree was enacted because people erred and thought that merely immersing in a Mikvah did not render them pure, and they also were required to pour on themselves mayim sheuvim. This reasoning only applies with regard to mayim sheuvim of Taharos, because only when one immersed for Taharos was one required to have the correct intentions. A niddah who immersed in a Mikvah, however, does not require the correct intention, and there was no reason to enact a decree for a niddah.

Rav Shmuel Vozner in Shevet HaLevi writes that even though the Rama rules that after immersing in a Mikvah a woman should not shower, once she arrives at her home she is permitted to shower.

Rav Ovadyah Yosef in Sheilos U’Teshuvos Yabia Omer, however, rules that a woman can shower immediately after immersing in a Mikvah.

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Katafreis Connection

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Gittin 16a) cites a Mishna in Taharos: A jet of liquid from a jug (nitzok), or liquid flowing down a slope (katafreis), or liquid enough to moisten (mashkeh tofe’ach) does not form a connection for tumah or for taharah. [The explanation that they are not a connection for tumah: Nitzok – if one pours liquid from a tahor vessel into a tamei one and the flow of the liquid is uninterrupted between them, it is not regarded as a connection to make the upper vessel tamei. Katafreis – if a liquid from a pool flows down a board on a slope into a pool of liquid which is tamei, the upper pool remains tahor. Mashkeh tofei’ach – a moist trough has two pools of liquid on opposite sides; one of them tamei and one of them tahor. Although the trough is damp enough that it can moisten anything that touches it, the tamei pool does not contaminate the tahor one. The explanation that they are not a connection for taharah: A mikvah must contain forty se’ah of water in order to be valid. If there are two mikvaos and neither of them contain forty se’ah and they are connected through any one of the three ways mentioned above, they are not considered halachically connected to form one large valid mikvah.]

The Vilna Gaon asks: Even without the connection through katafreis, why don’t we say that each droplet of tamei water should contaminate another drop, and ultimately, the water in the upper pool should be rendered tamei?

He answers that the halacha of katafreis would be necessary in a case where a tevul yom (one who was tamei, but has immersed himself in a mikvah; he is considered a tevul yom until nightfall) touched the liquid, for he cannot contaminate a food item with the capability of contaminating something else (and therefore, one droplet will not cause the other to become tamei). Through the principle of katafreis, it could be regarded that the entire flow is regarded as one body of liquid, and the upper pool could become tamei (if it would be considered connected).

Reb Shimon Shkop asks on his answer from the Rambam, who rules that these halachos would apply by tumas sheretz as well, and a sheretz can contaminate one drop to render the others tamei!?

He answers that one drop cannot render the other drops tamei because of the principle of beis hasetarim (for the drops touching each other are not recognizable).

Rav Elyashiv answers simply that if the liquid would be rendered tamei because of its contact with the first droplet, it would only be Rabbinically tamei, for that which a liquid is ruled to be a rishon l’tumah is only a Rabbinic decree. Hence, kodoshim that contracted tumah in such a manner could not be burned. However, through the principle of katafreis, the entire liquid would be rendered tamei on a Biblical level, and if kodoshim would be involved, it would be required to be burned.

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The Nazir's Barber and Hair that will be Cut Off

The Torah states, “A razor should not pass over his head.” This can be read as not allowing a razor to be passed over his head by anyone, whether it is him or someone else.

The Rishonim learn that the one who gives the nazir a haircut has violated this prohibition.

The Haflaah asks: How do we know from this verse that the one who gives the haircut has violated this prohibition? Perhaps it is the nazir who is transgressing by allowing the other fellow to give him a haircut, but the “barber” has not violated anything!

Hair that will be cut off is still not a Chatzitzah

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 44b) cites a braisa: If he cuts his hair on the eighth day, he brings his korbanos on the ninth day.

Rava explains that the braisa is talking about a case where he did not go the mikvah on the seventh day.

It is evident from this Gemora that the immersion of a nazir is valid, even though it occurred prior to his haircut! One might argue that his hair should be regarded as a chatzitzah (interposition), since it will shortly be cut off.

The Chasam Sofer (Y”D 195) derives from here the following halacha: Although a bride will be shaving her hair immediately after she marries (for her head will be covered), nevertheless her hair is not regarded as a chatzitzah when she immerses in the mikvah before her marriage.

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Two Leniencies and Two Stringencies

The Gemora (Kesuvos 82a) had stated that we do not find a Tanna ruling stringently on two matters in respect to a kesuvah. Rashi explains that since a kesuvah is a Rabbinic enactment in the first place, we cannot rule with extreme stringencies. Therefore, we cannot rule that moveable objects are pledged for the kesuvah (in accordance with Rabbi Meir) and that the kesuvah may be collected from the debtor of the deceased husband (in accordance with Rabbi Nosson).

The Rif writes that this particular halachic ruling is not applicable nowadays. In the times of the Gemora, the society was an agricultural one and therefore, only real estate was pledged for the kesuvah. However, now that we maintain that all of the husband’s possessions are pledged for her kesuvah, this is not regarded as a stringency and therefore we can rule that the kesuvah may be collected from the debtor of the deceased husband.

Rabbi Braun in Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha points out that the inverse is true as well. In a situation where we rule leniently, we do not rule according to two leniencies. Shulchan Aruch (Y”D, 199:7) writes that although there are times that we allow a woman to immerse herself in a ritual bath during the daytime, we will inform her then that she must clean herself immediately prior to immersion, and we do not rely on the leniency which normally allows a woman to prepare herself a significant time before immersion.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 15 - NEW RULINGS REGARDING A MIKVAH AND ERUV

The Gemora attempts to prove from the following braisa that Beis Shamai followed in practice according to their own opinion.

Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri said: How should we rule regarding the co-wife of an ervah? If we rule according to Beis Shamai and allow the yavam to perform a yibum with the co-wife, the children will be mamzeirim (illegitimate) according to Beis Hillel. If we rule according to Beis Hillel and exempt the co-wife from chalitzah and yibum, thus allowing her to marry another man; the children will be tainted (if she marries a kohen without first performing a chalitzah) according to Beis Shamai. Therefore, he wished to establish that they should have chalitzah and not yibum. This would accommodate both opinions. They were not able to resolve the matter in this way.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel asked them: What will become of all the earlier co-wives who were taken in yibum; their children will all be regarded as mamzeirim?

This is a proof that Beis Shamai did practice according to their own viewpoint.

The Gemora counters: Perhaps Beis Shamai did not permit the co-wives to be taken for yibum; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was asking according to Beis Hillel. Previously, they allowed the co-wife of the ervah to marry someone else without a chalitzah. If we would enact that the co-wives would require chalitzah, what would we do to all those co-wives who married another man? Should we perform a chalitzah now; this would be revolting to their husbands, and it is written [Mishlei 3:17]: The Torah’s ways are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace.

The commentators prove from this Gemora that Beis Din should not issue new decrees that will result in children born earlier to be rendered mamzeirim.

The Terumas Hadeshen (II, 21) asks: Why are we more concerned with the children born before, let us concern ourselves with the future children and institute a new decree, so that the marriages will be in accordance with halacha?

The poskim offer various distinctions as to when we are concerned and when we are not. (See Terumas Hadeshen, Maharit (I,86).

The Minchas Elozar (IV, 17) proves from here that Beis Din does not institute a new decree only when the result will lead to mamzeirim, however in regards to a mikvah, where the concern is not pertaining to mamzeirim, rather that a child will be considered a ben niddah, tainted, we are not concerned and Beis Din may issue decrees regarding a mikvah.

It is noteworthy that the Terumas Hadeshen (74) says that one time, one of the sages from Lenaistadt came to the city and wanted to change the lechis (poles for the eruv) to make them thicker in order to uphold the opinion of the Mordechai, who states that they should be as thick as one’s finger. The leaders of the city did not allow him to because people will say that up until then everyone had desecrated the Shabbos.

Sheorim Mitzuyanim B’halacha states that this is because the halacha is in accordance with the lenient opinion in regards to the laws of an eruv.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 7 - IS IT PREFERABLE TO VIOLATE A TOLDAH RATHER THAN AN AV (FOR ONE WHO IS DEATHLY ILL)?

The Tchebeiner Gaon (Dovev Meisharim, 3:82) inquires as to what the halacha would be in the following case. We are permitted to desecrate Shabbos for one who is deathly ill. Is it preferable to perform a labor which is only a toldah, a derivative of the av melocha, the primary categories of labor forbidden to do on Shabbos; or perhaps, there is no halachic difference since both are Biblically forbidden?

He ruled on this issue and cited support from our Gemora. It was taught in a braisa: A metzora whose eighth day (of purification) fell on Erev Pesach, but on that day had an emission of semen (resulting in the fact that he now cannot enter the Temple Mount to complete his purification process), and then immersed himself, the Chachamim said that although an ordinary tevul yom (one who has immersed in a mikvah but still has tumah on him until nightfall) may not enter the Temple Mount until nightfall, this one may enter in order to complete his purification process, thus enabling him to bring his pesach offering. It is preferable for a positive commandment that involves kares (pesach obligation) to override a positive commandment that does not involve kares (entering the Temple Mount while being a tevul yom).

Rabbi Yochanan maintains that it is only Rabbinically forbidden for a tevul yom to enter the Temple Mount.

Ula said: Why do we allow this tevul yom to enter? He answers: Since we would allow an ordinary metzora to enter the Temple Mount in order to complete his purification process, we allow a metzora who has had an emission of semen to enter as well.

Tosfos asks: Ula maintains that a partial entry into an area which is forbidden to enter is regarded as a full entry. If so, why do we limit this metzora, who is a tevul yom to insert his right ear, thumb and big toe into the Temple Courtyard, let him be permitted to enter entirely? What would be the distinction?

Tosfos answers: Entering completely into the Courtyard is regarded as being more severe than a partial entry. The Torah forbids a tevul yom from entering completely into the Courtyard explicitly, but a partial entry is only derived through the means of a hekesh (a Midrashic juxtaposition). Although both prohibitions are Biblical, the one that is written explicitly is stricter than the one which is merely derived from an exposition.

It emerges from here that a Biblical prohibition written explicitly is more stringent than one which is only derived through an exposition. He therefore posits that it would be preferable to engage in the labor which would only be violating a toldah rather than one which would constitute an av melocha. This is because a toldah is not written explicitly in the Torah.

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 21 - Food For Thought

*** There are eleven halachos (stringencies that apply by kodesh and not terumah) listed in the Mishna and yet Rabbi Ila said that there were only ten. It is evident that two of them are based upon the same reasoning; the first (one utensil inside the other) and the fifth (a garment with a knot) are both because of chatzitzah.)

If they are both on the account of chatzitzah, why did the Mishna separate them; shouldn’t they be listen one after the other?

(Turei Even, Merumei Sadeh)


*** The Mishna had stated: We may immerse utensils inside of other utensils in a mikvah for terumah, but not for kodesh.

Rabbi Ila answered: It is because the weight of the inside utensil prevents the water from circulating freely between the two utensils; if this would occur, the immersion would not be valid because the water must touch every part of the utensil. (This case would not constitute a Biblical chatzitzah (an interposition between the water and the utensil) because the water does find a way to pass through the utensils, but since it appears like a chatzitzah, the Chachamim were stringent regarding kodesh, but not in regards to terumah.)

In the sefer Masaas Binyomin (81), he rules that a woman who is physically unable to stand can be immersed in the mikvah while she is laying on a mat that is not susceptible to tumah.

The Sidrei Tahara (198: 47) asks from our Gemora: Shouldn’t her weight on the mat constitute a chatzitzah; the water will not be able to circulate freely between the woman and the mat?

I had a similar question on the Gemora above: If a wave that consisted of forty se’ah separated from the sea and fell on a person or utensils that were tamei, they become tahor. The Gemora explains that the Mishna is referring to a case where the person is sitting on the shore waiting for the wave to separate from the sea and fall on him or on the utensils. It is evident from our Gemora that even though the person did not directly immerse the utensils in the water; he was merely anticipating that the wave will detach itself from the sea and fall on the contaminated utensils, this is sufficient, provided that he has intention that the water should purify the utensils.

How does the water get in between the person or the utensils and the ground on the shore?


*** Dayan Weiss (4:35) has a teshuva regarding the validity of immersion while wearing a bathing suit.



*** Shoel Umeishiv (I:2:122) writes: “In the year 5615, I was learning Meseches Chagigah on the yahrtzeit of my mother because my father told me that the holy seforim say that it is beneficial to study Meseches Chagigah on a yahrtzeit.”

What is the source for this and what is the reasoning?

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Daf Yomi - Chagigah 20 - Food For Thought

*** Our Gemara states that one must be more scrupulous regarding utensils that are used on Shabbos than those that are used on weekdays.

The Mabit writes that the Gemara states that one is required to purify himself prior to a festival by immersing in a mikveh. The Mabit wonders why one would not also be required to immerse himself prior to Shabbos? The Mabit answers that one is not required to immerse in a mikveh prior to Shabbos because the sanctity of Shabbos will cleanse the person from any impurities.

Reb Yosef Engel questions this answer, as our Gemara clearly states that one is required to be more scrupulous on Shabbos regarding matters of impurity.

*** The Gemora states that a person cannot watch something that is in his friend's hand. We need to be certain that the utensil did not become tamei; only the holder can provide us with that assurance.

The Minchas Chinuch (10) proves from here that whenever intention is needed, the one who is performing the action must be the one who has the intention. Therefore, he rules that a non-Jew, mute or minor cannot knead the dough for matzah even if there will be someone else watching. Only the person kneading the dough can be certain that it did not become chametz.

Other Acharonim disagree and differentiate between those with intellect and those without. If the person has his own intellect, then he cannot be watched; however, a mute or a minor that have no intellect on their own may be watched.

*** The Mishna states: If one hand became tamei, the other is tamei as well; but only regarding kodoshim and not in respect for terumah.

The Minchas Chinuch (106)writes that if a Kohen loses concentration regarding one of his hands during the Bais HaMikdosh service; he has to sanctify that hand again, but not the other hand.

The distinction is that the mitzvah for the Kohen to wash his hands and feet prior to performing the sacrificial service is a Biblical one; our Mishna is discussing Rabbinical stringencies that were applied to kodoshim.

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Daf Yomi - Moed Katan 15 - IMMERSION OF A BAAL KERI

The Gemora cites a braisa: It is written [Devarim 4:9]: Make them known to your children and your children's children and the next verse states: The day that you stood before Hashem, your G-d in Choreb. We derive from the juxtaposition of the two verses that just as when the Jews stood at Mount Sinai and received the Torah, they did so in dread and awe, with trembling and fear, so too, when torah is being studied in all future generations, it must be learned with dread and awe, with trembling and fear. It is learned from here that a baal keri, one who experienced a seminal emission, is prohibited from reading the Torah, Prophets and Writings, nor can he study the Medrash, Talmud, Halacha and any Aggadic teachings. This is because the baal keri developed a tumah which occurred through levity and this is in contrast to the feelings of awe which are required when studying Torah.

The Gemora in Brochos (22a) states that one who is a baal keri should immerse himself in a ritual bath before studying Torah or praying. This is known as Tevilas Ezra.

The Gemora (ibid) states that nowadays Tevilas Ezra has been nullified. The Rif explains: Some say that it was nullified completely and a baal keri is not required to immerse himself in a mikvah prior to studying Torah or praying and others say that it was limited to studying Torah, but one would still be required to immerse himself in a mikvah prior to praying. He concludes: It is not required to immerse in a mikvah; nine kavin of water poured on his body will be sufficient.

Rabbeinu Hai Gaon states: Since it is not explicit in the Gemora, a baal keri must follow the custom of all the Jewish people and he should not commence to pray until he washes himself.

The Raavad in Sefer Haeshkol asked Rabbeinu Hai Gaon as to what should be done if one becomes a baal keri on Shabbos or on a festival when he cannot immerse himself in a mikvah. He responded that he remembers many Shabbosos being by Rav Aharon Gaon when they prayed in his house and Rav Aharon Gaon would not pray at all.

The Rambam (Hilchos Krias Shema) writes that Ezra’s enactment did not spread throughout Klal Yisroel and a majority of the community was not able to maintain it, therefore it became nullified. It has become the custom throughout Klal Yisroel to study Torah and recite Kerias Shema even while they are a baal keri since Torah is not susceptible to becoming tamei.

The Rambam in Hilchos Tefillah (4:4) writes that Ezra instituted that a baal keri should not study Torah until he immerses himself in a mikvah and a later Beis Din extended this decree to include tefillah. This was not on the account of tumah, but rather because they did not want the Talmudic scholars to be constantly with their wives like roosters. The decree regarding tefillah became nullified because the original enactment did not catch on throughout Klal Yisroel and a majority of the community was not able to maintain it. It has become the custom in certain areas for a baal keri not to pray until he washes his entire body with water based on the verse: One should prepare himself before greeting Hashem, the G-d of Israel.

The sefer Brocha Mishuleshes writes that it only became nullified in instances where one cannot locate a water source, however where water is accessible, a baal keri should not study Torah or pray until he washes himself. He concludes that one Beis Din does not have the power to nullify the decrees of a previous Beis Din.

It is written in Shailos V’teshuvos min Hashamayim (5): It is this fact (the people who are a baal keri and pray without immersing themselves) that has caused the exile to be so long. If Klal Yisroel’s tefillah would be in the proper way, our prayers would have been accepted years before.

He concludes: Perhaps we cannot accomplish that every baal keri should immerse himself in a mikvah prior to his tefillah, but at least the chazzan (leader of the services) should immerse himself and it will be in this merit that will hasten the Redemption.

Shulchan Aruch (O”C 88) rules that Ezra’s decree has been nullified and a baal keri can pray and study Torah without immersing himself. The Magen Avraham writes: Even though that one Beis Din does not have the power to nullify the decrees of a previous Beis Din unless they are greater in wisdom or numbers, since this enactment never caught on throughout Klal Yisroel, it can become nullified.

The Mishna Berura writes that one who has the custom to purify himself through immersion should only do so if he will not neglect the correct time to recite kerias shema and tefillah He adds that possibly, if immersing in the mikvah will result that he will not be able to pray along with a minyan, it is preferable not to go to the mikvah.

It is written in the sefer Meor V’shemesh: It is impossible to comprehend the true meaning of fearing Hashem if one is not careful in regards to this immersion. If one studies Kabbalah without purifying himself, the learning will result in heresy. He cites from the Baal Shem Tov and the Rebbe Reb Elimelech that one who wishes to comprehend Torah and mitzvos must be careful in this immersion, otherwise they will not be capable of reaching the heights they wish to attain.

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Daf Yomi - Taanis 7 - REBBE AKIN TO A MIKVAH

Rabbi Chanina bar Pappa explains two verses discussing teachers and students. If the student has good character, the teacher should travel to the student but if the student lacks good character, the student must go to the teacher.

The Imrei Emes said over in the name of the Kotzker Rebbe that a Chassideshe Rebbe is akin to a mikvah. Just like a mikvah purifies the unclean, so too a Rebbe has the ability to purify the unclean. When a chasid travels to the Rebbe, the Rebbe is like a mikvah and can purify the unclean even without preparation; however when the Rebbe makes a trip to the Chassidim, he is like a wave that has separated from the ocean. The halacha is in order for the wave to purify the unclean, the person must be waiting for the wave to come down.

This is the meaning of our Gemora. If the student has good character and is anxiously awaiting to learn, he will be successful even if the Rebbe comes to him; however if the student lacks good character, he must go to the Rebbe in order to learn since he lacks the proper preparation.

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